A HISTORY OF RUSSIA
A HISTORY OF
RUSSIA
FOURTH EDITION
NICHOLAS V RIASANOVSKY
New York Oxford
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
1984
Copyright © 1963, 1969, 1977, 1984 by Oxford University Press, Inc.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
\ Riasanovsky, Nicholas Valentine, 1923-
'<■ A history of Russia.
Bibliography: p.
Includes Index.
1. Soviet Union— History. I. Title.
DK40.R5 1984 947 83-4116
ISBN 0-19-503361-2
Printing (last digit) :987654321
Printed in the United States of America
To My Students
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION
For a student of Russian history to write a complete history of Russia
is, in a sense, to give an account of his entire intellectual and academic
life And his indebtedness to others is, ot course, enormous I know at
least where to begin the listing of my debts my father, Valentin A
Riasanovsky, made a huge contribution to this History of Russia both
by his participation m the writing of the book and, still more important,
by teaching me Russian history Next I must mention my teachers of Rus-
Sian history at Harvard and Oxford, notably the late Professor Michael
Karpovich, the late Warden B H Sumner, and Professor Sir Isaiah Berlin
A number of colleagues read sections of the manuscript and made very
helpful comments To name only those who read large parts of the work,
I thank Professors Gregory Grossman, Richard Herr, and Martin Malia
of the University of California at Berkeley my former teacher Professor
Dimitri Obolensky of Oxford University, Professor Richard Pipes ot Har-
vard University, and Professor Charles Jclavtch of Indiana University
I wish, further, to thank the personnel of the Oxford University Press
both for great help of every kind and for letting me have things my own
way I am also indebted to several University of California graduate stu-
dents who served as my research assistants during the years in which this
work was written and prepared for publication, in particular, to Mrs
Patricia Gnmsted and Mr Walter Sablinsky, who were largely responsible
for the Bibliography and the Index, respectively Nor will I forget libraries
and librarians, especially those in Berkeley The publication of this volume
can be considered a tribute to my wife and my students my wife, because
of her persistent and devoted aid in every stage or the enterprise, my
students, because A History of Russia developed through teaching them
and has its main raison d etre in answering their needs
I would also like gratefully to acknowledge specific contributions of
material to my History of Russia The following publishers allowed me to
quote at length from the works cited
Harvard University Press for Merle Famsod, How Russia Is Ruled
(Cambridge, 1954), pp 372-73
American Committee for Liberation for News Brief s onSo\ tel Activities,
Vol II, No 3. June 1959
Houghton MifQm Company for George Z. F Bereday, William W
Viil PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION
Brickman, and Gerald H, Bead, editors. The Changing Soviet School
(Boston, 1960), pp. 8-9.
Further, I am deeply grateful to the Rand Corporation and to Harvard
University Press for their permission to use Table 51 on page 210 of
Abram Bergson, The Real National Income of Soviet Russia Since 1928
(Cambridge, 1961). A condensed version of that table constitutes an ap-
pendix to my history. Professor Bergson not only gaye his personal per-
mission to use this material but advised me kindly on this and certain
related matters.
Several people have been most generous in lending material for the illus-
trations. I should like to thank Mr. George R. Hann for making available
to me prints of his superb coliection of icons: Mrs. Henry Shapiro, who lent
photographs taken by her and her husband during recent years spent in
Russia; Professor Theodore Von Laue, who took the pictures I have used
from our trip to Russia in 1958; Miss Malvina HofFman, who lent the pic-
tures of Pavlova and Diaghilev; and the Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum,
which permitted reproduction of a painting in their collection, Winter by
Vasily Kandinsky.
As every writer — and reader — in the Russian field knows, there is no
completely satisfactory solution to the problems of transliteration and tran-
scription of proper names. I relied on the Library of Congress system, but
with certain modifications: notably, I omitted the soft sign, except in the
very few cases where it seemed desirable to render it by using i, and I used
y as the ending of family names. A few of these names, such as that of the
composer Tchaikovsky, I spelled in the generally accepted Western manner,
although this does not agree with the system of transliteration adopted in
this book. As to first names, I preferred their English equivalents, although
1 transliterated the Russian forms of such well-known names as Ivan and
used transliterated forms in some other instances as well, as with Vissarion,
not Bessarion, Belinsky. The names of the Soviet astronauts are written as
spelled in the daily press. I avoided patronymics. In general I tried to utilize
English terms and forms where possible. I might have gone too far in that
direction; in any case, I feel uneasy about my translation of kholopy as
“slaves.”
As with transliteration, there is no satisfactory solution to constructing an
effective bibliography to a general history of a country. I finally decided sim-
ply to list the principal relevant works of the scholars mentioned by name in
the text. This should enable the interested reader who knows the required
languages to pursue further the views of the men in question, and it should
provide something of an introduction to the literature on Russian history.
The main asset of such a bibliography is that it is manageable. Its chief
liability lies in the fact that it encompasses only a fraction of the works on
PREFACE TO THE FUST EDITION
which this volume is based and of necessity omits important authors and
studies
1 decided to have as appendixes only the genealogical tables of Russian
rulers, which are indispensable for an understanding of the succession to
the throne in the eighteenth century and at some other times, and Professor
Bergson's estimate of the growth of the gross national product in the
USSR
Berkeley California Nicholas V Riasanovsky
September 24, 1962
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
T HE second edition of my History of Russia follows in all essentials the
first. Still, the passage of time and the continuous development of scholar-
ship resulted in many additions and modifications. In particular, the Soviet
period was expanded both to encompass the last six years and to devote
a little more attention to certain topics. A dozen additional authors proved
important enough to be cited by name in the second edition, and thus
enter the bibliography. Numerous other researchers in the field, some of
equal importance to me, received no personal citation. In addition to the
text and the bibliography, changes were made in the maps and the illus-
trations. In the appendixes, the table of the U.S.S.R. gross national prod-
uct was brought up to date and a table of the administrative divisions of
the U.S.S.R. was added. Moreover, a new appendix containing a select list
of readings in English on Russian history was included in the second edi-
tion.
Again, I have very many people to thank. In the first place, I want to
thank my students and students throughout the United States who have
used my History and have thus given it its true test. I have tried to utilize
their experience and their opinions. I am also deeply grateful to very
numerous colleagues who used History of Russia in their courses, or
simply read it, and made corrections or comments. While it is not feasible
to list all the appropriate names, I must mention at least Professor
Gregory Grossman of the University of California at Berkeley, without
whom the gross national product table would not have been possible and
who, in addition, paid careful attention to the entire section on the
Soviet Union, and the Soviet scholar V. B. Vilinbakhov, who has subjected
my presentation of the early periods of Russian history to a thorough and
searching criticism. Needless to say, as I thank these and other scholars
for their help, I must state that they are not responsible for the opinions
or the final form of my book. I am further indebted to my research as-
sistants Mrs. Victoria King and Mr. Vladimir Pavloff and, most espe-
cially, to my wife.
Berkeley, California
December 19, 1968
Nicholas V. Riasanovsky
PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION
No attempt has been made in this third edition of A History of Russia
to alter the character and basic design of previous editions The passage
of time since the completion of the second edition in 1968 has brought Us
from the occupation of Czechoslovakia to the Twenty fifth Party Congress
m 1976 and the current Tenth Five-Year Plan Numerous changes have
therefore been made in the text as a consequence of recent events and of
recent scholarship as well The bibliography and especially the English
reading list have been expanded The section on the Soviet period has
grown slightly in proportion to the whole* although the aim remains to
present a single balanced volume
Many people deserve my special gratitude Professor Gregory Grossman
of the University of California at Berkeley again brought up to date the
gross national product table and, moreover, was of invaluable help in up
dating the entire Soviet section Other Berkeley colleagues generously con-
tributed their knowledge and wisdom in regard to subjects which preoc-
cupied me during the preparation of this third edition Colleagues else
where were equally helpful as they used A History of Russia as a textbook
and informed me of their experience or simply commented on the work 1
would like to thank particularly many conscientious reviewers, such as
Professor Walter Lcitsch of Vienna Mr Gerald Surh and Mr Jacob
Picheny proved to be excellent research assistants, who aided me m every
way and most notably in the preparation of the English reading list and the
index The mistakes and other deficiencies that remain after all that help
are, I am afraid, mine, and, taking into account the scope of the book,
they may well be considerable My most fundamental gratitude goes to my
constant helper, my wife, and to the students for whom this textbook was
written and who have been using it May the group of students who re-
cently called me across the continent from Brown University to discuss my
History of Russia and whose names I do not know accept the thanks I
extend to them, as the representatives of students everywhere
Berkeley, California
March 12, 1976
Nicholas V Riasavovskv
PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION
The death of Leonid Ilich Brezhnev on November 10, 1982, and
Iurii Vladimirovich Andropov’s prompt succession to the leadership of the
Soviet Union have provided a striking terminal point to this fourth edition
of my History of Russia. The new material in the book covers the last
seven years of the Brezhnev regime. It includes also additions and changes
in all previous parts of Russian and Soviet history as well as the updating
of the two bibliographies.
Acknowledging my overall fundamental and grateful indebtedness to the
scholarship in the field, I must record special thanks to my colleagues, par-
ticularly Berkeley colleagues, who contributed directly to the preparation
of this edition. Professor Gregory Grossman again updated the population
and gross national product table and, beyond that, offered invaluable help
based on his matchless knowledge of the Soviet economy and of the Soviet
Union in general. Other colleagues, such as Professor George Breslauer,
whose notable book Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Au-
thority in Soviet Politics came out just as Brezhnev died, were also gen-
erous with their time and expert advice. For checking, rechecking, typing,
preparing the index, and much else, I was blessed with an excellent re-
search assistant, Mr. Maciej Siekierski, who also contributed his special
knowledge of Poland and Lithuania, and an excellent secretary, Ms. Doro-
thy Shannon. And, once more, I must emphasize my indebtedness to my
students and my wife: the students have been using A History of Russia,
often both enthusiastically and critically, for some twenty years; my debt
to my wife is even more basic as well as of a still longer duration.
Berkeley, California
September 1983
Nicholas V. Riasanovsky
CONTENTS
**•***•«*«
Part I INTRODUCTION
I A Geographical Note 3
II Russia Before the Russians 11
Part II KIEVAN RUSSIA
III The Establishment of the Kievan State 23
iv Kievan Russia A Political Outline 29
V Kies an Russia Economics, Society, Institutions 43
vi Kievan Russia Religion and Culture 52
Part III APPANAGE RUSSIA
vii Appanage Russia Introduction 63
viti The Mongols and Russta 67
ix Lord Novgorod the Great 77
X The Southwest and the Northeast 88
xi The Rise of Moscow 95
xii Appanage Russia Economics, Society. Institutions 114
XIII Appanage Russia Religion and Culture 120
Xiv The Lithuaman-Russian State 132
Part IV MUSCOVITE RUSSIA
xv The Reigns of Ivan the Terrible, 1533-84, and of Theodore,
1584-98 143
xvi The Time of Troubles, 1598-1613 1ST
XVII The Reigns of Michael, 1613-45, Alexis, 1 645-76, and
Theodore, 1676-82 175
xvm Muscovite Russia Economics, Society, Institutions 183
xix Afuicow/? Russta Religion and Culture 196
xiv
CONTENTS
Part V IMPERIAL RUSSIA
xx The Reign of Peter the Great, 1682—1725 213
xxi Russian History from Peter the Great to Catherine the Great:
The Reigns of Catherine 1, 1725— 27 , peter 11, 1727—30, Anne,
1730-40, Ivan VI, 1740-41, Elizabeth, 1741-62, and Peter III,
1762 242
xxii The Reigns of Catherine the Great, 1762—96, and Paul, 1796—
1801 254
xxin The Economic and Social Development of Russia in the
Eighteenth Century 216
xxiv Russian Culture in the Eighteenth Century 285
xxv The Reign of Alexander l, 1801-25 300
xxvi The Reign of Nicholas l, 1825-55 323
XXVii The Economic and Social Development of Russia in the First
Half of the Nineteenth Century 341
XXVin Russian Culture in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century 348
xxix The Reign of Alexander II, 1855-81 368
xxx The Reign of Alexander III, 1881—94, and the First Part of the
Reign of Nicholas II, 1 894-1 905 391
xxxi The Last Port of the Reign of Nicholas H: The Revolution of
1905 and the Constitutional Period, 1905—17 404
xxxii The Economic and Social Development of Russia from the
"Great Reform s" until the Revolutions of 1917 422
xxxm Russian Culture from the "Great Reforms" until the Revolutions
of 1917 435
XXXIV The Revolutions of 1917 453
Part VI SOVIET RUSSIA
xxxv Soviet Russia: An Introduction 465
xxxvi War Communism, 1917—21, and the New Economic Policy,
1921-28 474
xxxvii The First Three Five-Year Plans, 1928-41 492
XXXYIU Soviet Foreign Policy, 1921-41, and the Second World War,
1941-45 509
xxxtx Stalin’s Last Decade, 1945-53 527
xL The Soviet Union after Stalin, 1953— 83 539
xli Soviet Society and Culture 567
xlh Soviet Russia: Concluding Remarks 590
Bibliography 599
CONTENTS
XV
I Tables 615
1—4 Russian Rulers
5 US S R Indexes of Growth of Population and Gross
National Product by Use, 1 928-72
6 Political Subdiusions of the USSR as of January 1, 1976
II A Select List of Readings in English on Russian History 623
Index 65 1
LIST OF MAPS
ALL MAPS, EYCFPT THE END-PAPER MAP, HAVE BEEN PREPARED BY VAUGHN GRAY.
1 Vegetation and Soils 6-7
2 Early Migrations 12
3 Kievan Russia In the Eleventh Century 35
4 Trade Routes during Kievan Period 44
5 Appanage Russia from 1240 64
6 Mongols m Europe. 1223-1380
Mongols in Asia at Death of Kublat Khan, 1294 68
7 Lord Novgorod the Great. 15th Century 78
8 Volynla-Galtcia c 1250 89
9 Rostov-Suzdal c 1200 92
10 Rise of Moscow , 1300-1533 96
11 The Lithtianian-Russtan State after c 1300 133
12 Russia at the Time of Ivan IV, 1533-1598 144
13 The Time of Troubles. 1598-1613 161
1 4 Industry and Agriculture — 17th Century 1 84
15 Expansion in the 17th Century 193
1 6 Europe at the Time of Peter the Great, 1694-1 725 21 5
17 Central and Eastern Europe at Close of the 18th Century 255
xvtl
LIST OF MAPS XViii
18 Poland 1662-1667; Partitions of Poland 269
19 Industry and Agriculture — 18th Century 280
20 Central Europe, 1803 and 1812 309
21 Europe, 1801-1855 316
22 The Crimean War, 1854-1855 33 9
23 The Balkans, 1877-1878 388
24 Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905 402
25 Russia in World War / — 1914 to the Revolution of 1917 419
26 Industry and Agriculture — 19th Century 427
27 Revolution and Civil War in European Russia, 1917-1922 481
28 Industry and Agriculture — 1939 500
29 Russia in World War II, 1939-1945 519
30 Population Growth 570
ILLUSTRATIONS
After page 126
Scythian embossed goldwork of the sixih centun. b c (Leningrad Museum)
Ancient monuments of Polos tsy (Sovfoto)
Icon St George and the Dragon ( Sovfoto )
Icon The Old Testament Trinity, by A Rublev, early fifteenth cetuury
(Tretiakov Gallery tn Moscow ) (Soxfoto)
Icon The Deesis Festival Tier Entrance into Jerusalem (Sovfoto)
St Nicholas, Bishop of Myra (Sov/o/o)
Icon Our Lady of Vladimir (Sox/oto)
Ipaticv Monaster) in Kostroma (Howard Sochurek )
Fourteenth-century wooden church ( Howard Sochurek)
Preobrazhatsktt Cathedral on Voles at Ughch (Howard Sochurek )
A/ter page 2<U
Fresco Head of St Peter (Soxfoto)
Holy Gates of the Rizpolozhensku Monastery in Suzdal (Mrs Henry Shapiro)
Prcobrazhcnskata Church in kizh) near Petrozavodsk (Sox/oto)
Sixteenth century view of the city of Moscow (Bettmann A relax e, Inc.)
Red Square in Moscow 1844 ( Beitmann Archive, Inc )
Church of St Basil the Blessed, Moscow (Cuing Galloway)
Zagorsk (Holy Trimtv-St Sergius Monaster) ) (So»/ofo)
Moscow Kremlin (Exung Galloway)
Moscow State University on Lenin Hills (H tde World Photos)
Hermitage Museum Leningrad, 1852 (Soxfoto)
Simeon Stolpmk Church on Moscow* Kalinin Prospect ( Soxfoto )
After page 360
Ministries opposite the Winter Palace. Leningrad ( Soxfoto )
Kazan Cathedral, Leningrad (Sovfoto)
Ivan the Terrible and His Son by Repm ( Sovfoto )
View of Admiralty and St Isaac's Cathedral, Leningrad (Sovfoto)
Petrodvorets (Petcrhof), near Leningrad (author)
Cossacks of the Zaporothie by Repin ( Soxfoto )
St. Dmtlru Cathedral in Vladimir ( Mrs Henry Shapiro)
A church m ancient Suzdal (Mrs Henry Shapiro)
Ivan the Terrible ( Soxfoto )
Catherine the Great (Sov/oto)
Peter I, the Great (Sox foto)
XIX
XX
ILLUSTRATIONS
Ivan III, the Great (Sovfoto)
Leo Tolstoy (New Yoik Public Libiary)
Ivan Turgenev ( New York Public Libiary )
Vissarion Belinsky (Sovjoto)
Fedor Dostoevsky (New York Public Library)
After page 504
Michael Lomonosov (Sovfoto)
Dmitrii Mendeleev ( New Yoik Public Library)
Nicholas Lobachevsky (Sovfoto)
Ivan Pavlov (Sovfoto)
Maxim Gorky and Theodore Chaliapin ( Sovfoto )
Nicholas Gogol (Sovfoto)
Anton Chckov (New York Public Library)
Nicholas Chernyshevsky (New York Public Library)
Michael Lermontov (Sovfoto)
Alexander Pushkin (New York Public Libiary)
Boris Pasternak (New York Public Library)
Alexander Herzen (Sovfoto)
Dmitrii Shostakovich ( Sovfoto )
Waslaw Nijinsky (New York Public Libiaiy)
Modest Musorgsky (Sovfoto)
Peter Tchaikovsky (New York Public Library )
Ernest Ansermet, Serge Diaghilev. Igor Stravinsky, and Serge Prokofiev (New
York Public Libiary)
Leon Trotsky (New York Public Library )
Joseph Stalin (Sovfoto)
Lenin (New Yoik Public Libiary)
Nikita Khrushchev ( Sovfoto )
Stalin's Funeral ( Sovfoto )
Soviet Leaders Celebrating the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution
(Wide World Photos)
Part I. INTRODUCTION
A GEOGRAPHICAL NOTE
Russia! what a marvetou* phenomenon on the world scene! Russia —
a distance of ten thousand versts • in length on a straight line from
the virtually central European river across all of Asia and the East
ern Ocean down to the remote American lands' A distance of five
thousand versts in width from Persia one of the southern Asiatic
states to the end of the inhabited world — to the North Potc What
state can equal if Its half How many stales can match its twentieth
its fiftieth part 1 * Russia — a state which contains alt types of
soil from the warmest to the coldest, from the burning environs of
Erivon to icy Lapland which abounds in all the products required for
the needs comforts snd pleasures of I fe in accordance with its
present state of development— a whote world self sufficient inde
pendent absolute
FOOODIN
Loe thus 1 make an ende none other news to thee
But that the country is too cold the people beastly bee
AMBASSADOR GEORGE TVRBEV1U.E
REPORTING TO ELIZABETH I OP ENGLAND
These poor villages
This barren nature —
Native land of enduring patience
The land of the Russian people!
•nirrtjiEv
The Russian empire, and more recently the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, represents a land mass of over eight and one half million square
miles an area larger than the entire North American continent To quote
the leading Russian encyclopedia The Russian empire, stretching in the
mam latitudinally, occupies all of eastern Europe and northern Asia, and
its surface constitutes 0 42 of the area of these two continents The Russian
empire occupies VCe part of the entire globe and approximately \{ part of
its total had surface
Yet, this enormous territory exhibits considerable homogeneity Indeed,
homogeneity helps to explain its size The great bulk of Russia is an immense
plain — at one lime the bottom of a huge sea — extending from central and
even western Europe deep into Siberia Although numerous hilts and chains
of hills are scattered on its surface, they arc not high enough or sufficiently
concentrated to interfere appreciably with the flow of the mighty plain, the
* A versta is not quite two-thirds of a mile
TRo:
largest on the entire globe. The Ural mountains themselves, ancient and
■weather-beaten, constitute no effective barrier between Europe and Asia,
which they separate; besides, a broad gap of steppe land remains between
the southern tips of the Ural chain and the Caspian and Aral seas. Only
in vast northeastern Siberia, beyond the Enisei river, does the elevation
rise considerably and hills predominate. But this area, while of a remarkable
potential, has so far remained at best on the periphery of Russian history.
Impressive mountain ranges are restricted to Russian borders or, at the
most, borderlands. They include the Carpathians to the southwest, the high
and picturesque Caucasian chain in the south between the Black Sea and
the Caspian, and the mighty Pamir, Tien Shan, and Altai ranges further
east along the southern border.
Rivers flow slowly through the plain. Most of them carry their waters
along a north-south axis and empty either into the Baltic and the Arctic
Ocean or into the Black and the Caspian seas. In European Russia, such
rivers as the Northern Dvina and the Pechora flow northward, while others,
notably the Dniester, the Bug, and the larger Dnieper, Don, and Volga
proceed south. The Dnieper and the Don empty into the Black Sea, the Volga
into the Caspian. Siberian rivers, the huge Ob and Enisei, as well as the rapid
Lena, the Indigirka, and the Kolyma, drain into the Arctic Ocean. The
exception is the Amur, which flows eastward, serves during much of its
course as the boundary between Russia and China, and empties into the
Strait of Tartary. South of Siberia in Russian Central Asia both the Amu
Daria and the Syr Daria flow northwestward to the Aral Sea, although the
former at one time used to reach the Caspian. These rivers and their tribu-
taries, together with other rivers and lakes, provide Russia with an excel-
lent system of water communication. The low Valdai hills in northwestern
European Russia represent a particularly important watershed, for it is
there that the Dnieper and the Volga, as well as the Western Dvina and the
Lovat, have their sources.
But while Russia abounds in rivers and lakes, it is essentially a landlocked
country. By far its longest coastline opens on the icy Arctic Ocean. The
neighboring seas include the Baltic and the Black, both of which must pass
through narrow straits, away from Russian borders, to connect with broader
expanses of water, and the Caspian and the Aral, which are totally isolated.
The Aral Sea is also entirely within Russian territory, and it has been listed
with such major Russian lakes as Ladoga and Onega In the European part
of the country, Balkhash in Central Asia, and the huge and extremely deep
Lake Baikal in Siberia. The Russian eastern coastline too is subject to cold
and inclement weather, except for the southern section adjacent to the
Chinese border.
Latitude and a landlocked condition largely determine Russian climate,
which can be best described as severely continental. Northern and even
A GEOGRAPHICAL NOTE
5
central Russia arc on the latitude of Alaska, while the position of southern
Russia corresponds more to the position of Canada in the western hemi-
sphere than to that of the United States The Gulf Stream, which does so
much to make the climate of western and northern Europe milder, barely
reaches one segment of the northern coastline of Russta In the absence of
interfering mountain ranges, icy winds from the Arctic Ocean sweep across
European Russia to the Black Sea Siberian weather, except in the extreme
southeastern corner, is more brutal stiU In short, although sections of the
Crimean littoral can be described as the Russian Rmera, and although sub-
tropical conditions do prevail in parts of the southern Caucasus, the over-
whelming bulk of Russian territory remains subject to a very severe climate
In northern European Russia the soil stays frozen eight months out of
twelve. Even the Ukraine ts covered by snow three months every year,
while the mere freeze all the way to the Black Sea Siberia in general and
northeastern Siberia in particular belong among the coldest areas in the
world The temperature at Vcrkhoiansk has been registered at as low as
—90° F Still, in keeping with the continental nature of the climate, when
summer finally comes — and it often comes rather suddenly — tempera-
tures soar Heat waves are common in European Russia and in much of
Siberia, not to mention the deserts of Central Asia which spew sand many
miles to the west
Climate determines the vegetation that forms several broad belts extend-
ing latitudmally across the country In the extreme north lies the tundra, a
virtually uninhabited frozen waste of swamps, moss, and shrubs covering
almost 15 per cent of Russian territory South of the tundra stretches
the taiga, a zone of coniferous forest, merging with and followed by the
next zone, that of mixed forest The two huge forested belts sweep across
Russia from its western boundaries to its eastern shoreline and account for
over half of its territory Next comes the steppe, or prairie, occupying south-
ern European Russia and extending into Asia up to the Altai mountains
Finally, the southernmost zone, that of semi-desert and desert, takes up
most of Central Asia Being very wide if considerably shorter than even the
steppe belt, it occupies somewhat less than one-fifth of the total area of the
country.
One important result of the climate and of this pattern of vegetation m
Russia has been a relative dearth of first-rate agricultural land Only on
estimated one million square miles out of an area more than eight times that
size are truly rewarding to the tiller of the soil Other sections of the country
suffer from the cold and from insufficient precipitation, which becomes more
inadequate as one progresses cast Even the heavy snowfalls add relatively
little moisture because of the rapid melting and the quick run-ofl of water
in the spring In Central Asia farming depends almost entirely on irrigation
The best land m Russia, the excellent black soil of the southern steppe.
INTRODUCTIO
offers agricultural conditions comparable to those on the great plains of
Canada rather than those in warmer Iowa or Illinois. Russia, on the other
hand, is fabulously rich in forests, more so than any other country in the
world. And it possesses a great wealth and variety of natural resources,
ranging from platinum to oil and from coal to gold. On the whole, however,
these resources remained unused and even unexplored for a very long time.
Ever since Herodotus historians have been fascinated by the role of
geographic factors in human history. Indeed the father of history referred
to the broad sweep of the southern Russian steppe and to the adaptation of
the steppe inhabitants, the Scythians, to their natural environment in his
explanation of why the mighty Persians could not overcome them. Modern
historians of Russia, including such leading Russian scholars as Kliuchevsky
and especially his teacher S. Soloviev, as well as such prominent Western
writers as Kemer and Sumner, have persistently emphasized the significance
of geography for Russian history. Even if wc reject the rigid determinism
implicit in some of their views and refuse to speculate on such nebulous
and precarious topics as the Russian national character and its dependence
on the environment — speculations in which Kliuchevsky and others en-
gaged in a fascinating manner — some fundamental points have to be made.
For instance, it appears certain that the growth of the Russian state was
affected by the geography of the area: a vast plain with veiy few natural
obstacles to expansion. This setting notably made it easier for the Moscow
state to spread across eastern Europe. Beyond the Urals, the Russians ad-
vanced all the way to the Pacific, and even to Alaska and California, a pro-
gression paralleled only by the great American movement west. As the
boundaries of the Russian empire ultimately emerged, they consisted of
oceans to the north and east and, in large part, of seas, high mountains,
and deserts to the south; only in the west, where the Russians merged with
streams of other peoples, did the border seem unrelated to geography. The
extremely severe climate contributed to the weakness of the tribes scattered
in northern European Russia and of the various inhabitants of Siberia,
leading to their utter inability to stem the Russian advance. Whereas the
Russians could easily expand, they were well protected from outside attack.
Russian distances brought defeat to many, although not all, invaders, from
the days of the Persians and the Scythians to those of Napoleon and Hitler.
Occupied territory had to be governed. The problem of administering an
enormous area, of holding the parts together, of co-ordinating local activities
and efforts remained a staggering task for those in power, whether Ivan the
Terrible, Nicholas I, or Stalin. And the variety of peoples on the great plain
was bound to make such issues as centralization and federation all the more
acute. One can appreciate, if not accept, the opinion of those thinkers,
prominent in the Enlightenment and present in other periods, who related
A GEOGRAPHICAL NOTE
the system of government of a country directly to its size and declared des-
potism to be the naturat form of rule m Russia
The magnificent network of Russian rivers and lakes also left its mark
on Russian history It is sufficient to mention the significance of the Dnieper
for Kievan Russia, or of the Volga and its tributaries tor the Moscow state.
The landlocked position of the country and the search for an access to the
waterways of the world made the Russians repeatedly concerned with the
Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Straits Climate and vegetation basically
affected the distribution of people in Russia and also their occupations The
poor quality of much agricultural land has led to endemic suffering among
Russian peasants and has taxed the ingenuity of tsarist ministers and Khrush-
chev alike Russian natural resources, since they began to be developed
On a large scale, have added immeasurably to Soviet strength Both the
wealth of Russia and the geographic and climatic obstacles to a utilization
of this wealth have perhaps never stood out so sharply as m the course of
present efforts to industrialize eastern Siberia
The location of Russia on its two continents has had a profound impact
on Russian history The southern Russian steppe in particular served for
centuries as the highway for Asiatic nomads to burst into Europe Mongol
devastation was for the Russians only the most notable incident in a long
senes, and it was followed by over two hundred years of Mongol rule In
effect, the steppe frontier, open for centuries, contributed hugely to the mili-
tarization of Russian society, a trend reinforced by the generally unprotected
and fluid nature of the western border of the country. But proximity to
Asiatic lands led also to some less warlike contacts, furthermore, it enabled
Russia later in turn to expand grandly m Asia without the need first to rule
the high seas Recently the Eurasian school of historians, represented in
the English language especially by Vernadsky, has tried to interpret the
entire development of Russia in terms of its unique position in the 01(1
World
Russian location in Europe may well be regarded as even more important
than its connections with Asia Linked to the West by language, religion, and
basic culture, the Russians nevertheless suffered the usual fate of border
peoples* invasion from the outside, Tclalive isolation, and retardation Hence,
at least in part, the efforts to catch up, whether by means of Peter the
Great’s reforms or the Five-Year Plans Hence also, among other things,
the interminable debate concerning the nature and the significance of the
relationship between Russia and the West
As the examples above, which by no means exhaust the subject, indicate,
geography does affect history, Russian history included It has been noted
that the influence of certain geographic factors tends to be especially per-
sistent. Thus, while our modem scientific civilization does much to mitigate
10
INTRODUCTION
the impact of climate, a fact brilliantly illustrated in the development of
such a northern country as Finland, so far we have not changed mountains
into plains or created new seas. Still, it is best to conclude with a reservation:
geography may set the stage for history; human beings make history.
RUSSIA BEFORE THE RUSSIANS
Wc hive only 10 study more closely than has been done the antiquities
of South Russia during the penod ol m graiion* i e from the fourth
to the eighth century to become aware of the uninterrupted evolution
of Iranian culture in South Russia through these centuries. The
Slavonic state of Kiev presents the same features becaute the
same cultural tradition — I mean the Graeco Iranian — was the only
trad t on which was known to South Russia for centuries and wh ch
no German or Mongolian invaders were able to destroy
KOSTOVTZEFF
Yes we are Scyth ans Yes we are Asiatics
%uh slanting and greedy eyes
BLOK
Continuity is the very stuff of history Although every historical event
is unique and every sequence of events therefore presents flux and change,
it is the connection of a gt\cn present with ns past that makes the present
meaningful nnd enables us to have history In sociological terms, continuity
is indispensable for group culture without which each new generation of
human beings would have had to start from scratch
Non-Slavic Peoples and Cultures
A number of ancient cultures dev eloped in the huge territory that is today
enclosed within the boundaries of the USSR Those that flourished in
Transcaucasia and in Central Asia, however, exercised merely a peripheral
influence on Russian history, the areas themselves becoming pans of the
Russian state only m the nineteenth century As an introduction to Russian
history proper, we must turn to the northern shore of the Black Sea nnd to
the steppe bejond These wide expanses remained for centuries on the
border of the ancient world of Greece, Rome and Byzantium In fact,
through the Greek colonies which began to appear m southern Russia from
the seventh century before Christ and through commercial and cultural
contacts in general the peoples of the southern Russian steppe participated
m classical civilization Herodotus himself who lived in the fifth century
b c , spent some time tn the Greek colony of Olbia at the mouth of the Bug
river and left us a v aluable description of the steppe area and its population
Herodotus' account and other scattered and scarce contemporary evidence
have been greatly augmented by excavations pursued first in tsarist Russia
and subsequently, on an increased scale, in the Soviet Union. At present we
know, at least in broad outline, the historical development o£ southern
Russia before the establishment of the Kievan state. And we have come to
appreciate the importance of this background for Russian history.
The best-known neolithic culture in southern Russia evolved in the valleys
RUSSIA BEFORE THE RUSSIANS 13
of the Dnieper, the Bug, and the Dniester as early as the fourth millennium
before Christ Its remnants testify to the fact that agriculture was then al*
ready entrenched in that area, and also to a struggle between the sedentary
tillers of the soil and the invading nomads, a recurrent motif In southern
Russian, and later Russian, history This neolithic people also used domestic
animals, engaged in weaving, and had a developed religion The “pottery
of spirals and meander” links u not only to the southern part of Central
Europe, but also and especially, as Rosiovtzeff insisted, to Asia Minor,
although a precise connection is difficult to establish At about the same time
a culture utilizing metal developed m the Kuban valley north of the Cau-
casian range, contemporaneously with similar cultures in Egypt and Meso-
potamia Its artifacts of copper, gold, and silver, found in numerous hunal
mounds, testify to the skill and taste of its artisans While the bronze age
m southern Russia is relatively little known and poorly represented, that
of iron coincided with, and apparently resulted from, new waves of invasion
and the establishment of the first historic peoples in the southern Russian
steppe
The Cimmerians, about whom our information is very meager, arc usuafly
considered to be the earliest such people, again in large part thanks to
Herodotus They belonged to the Thracian subdivision of the Indo European
language family and ruled southern Russia from roughly 1000 B c to 700
sc At one time their dominion extended deep into the Caucasus Recent
historians have generally assumed th3t the Cimmerians represented the
upper crust in southern Russia, while the bulk of the population consisted
of indigenous elements who continued the steady development of culture
on the northern shore of the Black Sea The ruling group was to change
several times during the subsequent centuries without destroying this funda-
mental cultural continuity
The Scythians followed the Cimmerians, defeating them and destroying
their state The new invaders, who came from Central Asia, spoke on Iranian
tongue and belonged thus to the Indo-European language family, although
they apparently also included Mongol elements They ruled southern
Russia from the seventh to the end of the third century B c. The Scythian
sway extended, according to a contemporary, Herodotus, from the Danube
to the Don and from the northern shore of the Black Sea mfand for a dis-
tance traveled in the course of a twenty-day journey At its greatest extent,
the Scythian state stretched south of the Danube on its western Bank and
across the Caucasus and into Asia Minor on Us eastern
The Scythians were typical nomads they lived m tentlike carnages
dragged by oxen and counted their riches by the number of horses, which
also served them as food In war they formed excellent light cavalry, utiliz-
ing the saddle and fighting with bows and arrows and short swords Their
military tactics based on mobility and evasion proved so successful that
14 INTRODUCTION
even their great Iranian rivals, the mighty Persians, could not defeat them in
their home territory. The Scythians established a strong military state in
southern Russia and for over three centuries gave a considerable degree of
stability to that area. Indigenous culture continued to develop, enriched by
new contacts and opportunities. In particular, in spite of the nomadic
nature of the Scythians themselves, agriculture went on flourishing in the
steppe north of the Black Sea. Herodotus who, in accordance with the gen-
eral practice, referred to the entire population of the area as Scythian, dis-
tinguished, among other groups, not only “the royal Scythians,” but also
“the Scythian ploughmen.”
The Scythians were finally defeated and replaced in southern Russia by
the Sarmatians, another wave of Iranian-speaking nomads from Central
Asia. The Sarmatian social organization and culture were akin to the
Scythian, although some striking differences have been noted. Thus, while
both peoples fought typically as cavalry, the Sarmatians used stirrups and
armor, lances, and long swords in contrast to the light equipment of the
Scythians. What is more important is that they apparently had little diffi-
culty in adapting themselves to their new position as rulers of southern
Russia and in fitting into the economy and the culture of the area. The
famous Greek geographer Strabo, writing in the first century A.D., men-
tions this continuity and in particular observes that the great east-west
trade route through the southern Russian steppe remained open under
the Sarmatians. The Sarmatians were divided into several tribes of which
the Alans, it would seem, led in numbers and power. The Ossetians of today,
a people living in the central Caucasus, are direct descendants of the Alans.
The Sarmatian rule in southern Russia lasted from the end of the third
century b.c. to the beginning of the third century a.d.
It was during the Scytho-Sarmatian period that the Graeco-Iranian cul-
ture developed on the northern shore of the Black Sea and in the Russian
steppe. The Iranian element was represented in the first place by the Scyth-
ians and the Sarmatians themselves. They established large and lasting
military states which provided the basic pattern of political organization
for the area. They brought with them their languages, their customs, their
religion emphasizing war, an original style in decorative art known as the
Scythian animal style, and generally vigorous and varied art and craftsman-
ship, especially in metalwork. The enormously rich Greek civilization came
to the area primarily through Greek colonies. These colonies began as fish-
ing enterprises and grew into major commercial centers and flourishing
communities. They included the already mentioned Olbia, founded as early
as the middle of the seventh century b.c., Chersonesus in the Crimea near
present-day Sevastopol, Tanais at the mouth of the Don, and Panticapaeum
and Phanagoria on either side of the Strait of Kerch, which links the Sea of
Azov to the Black Sea and separates the Crimea and the Caucasus. The
RUSSIA BEFORE THE RUSSIANS \5
Greeks engaged in varied trade, but especially significant was their impor-
tation of southern Russian grain into the Hellenic world The settlements
near the Strait of Kerch, enjoying a particularly favorable position for trade
and dcfcji'e, formed the nucleus of the Dosporan kingdom which was to
have a long and dramatic history. That kingdom as well as other Greek
centers in southern Russia fell in the first century before Christ under the
sway of Mithndatcs the Great of Pontus and, after his ultimate defeat by
the Romans, of Rome Even after a retrenchment of the Roman Empire and
its eventual collapse, some former Greek colonies on the northern shore of
the Black Sea, such as Chersonesus, had another revival as outposts of the
Byzantine Empire
Thus for many centuries the Iranians and the Greeks lived and worked
side by side It has been noted that the Scythians and the Sarraatians made
no sustained effort to destroy Greek colonies in southern Russia, choosing
instead to maintain vigorous trade relations and other contacts with them
Intermarriage, Heilemzauon of Iranians, and Iramzation of Greeks pro-
ceeded apace The resulting cultural and at times political synthesis was
such that the two elements became inextricably intertwined As Rostovtzfff
explains in regard to the Bosporan kingdom, a prize example of this sym-
biosis “It is a matter of great interest to trace the development of the new
community A loosely knit confederation of cities and tribes tn its begin-
ning, it became gradually a political body of dual nature The ruler of this
body was for the Greeks an elected magistrate, for the natives a king ruling
by divine nght ’* Today one can readily appreciate some of the sweep and
the glory of the ancient Gracco-Iraman culture in southern Russia after
visiting the appropnate rooms of the Hermitage or of the historical museum
in Moscow
The Sarmatian rule in the steppe north of the Black Sea was shattered
by the Goths These Gcrmantc invaders came from the north, originally
from the Baltic area, reaching out in a southeasterly direction In southern
Russia they split into the Visigoths and the Ostrogoths, and the latter even-
tually established under Hcrmannc a great state stretching from the Black
Sea to the Baltic But the Gothic period in Russia, dated usually from
a t>. 200 to A D 370, ended abruptly with the appearance of new intruders
from Asia, the Huns Furthermore, while the Goths proved themselves
to be fine soldiers and sailors, their general cultural level lagged considerably
behind the culture of southern Russia, to which they had little to contribute.
The Huns, who descended upon the Goths around a d. 370, came in a
mass migration by the classic steppe road from Central Asia to southern
Russia A remarkably mixed group when they appeared in European his-
tory, the Huns were, on best evidence, a Turkic-spcaking people supported
by large Mongol and Ugnan contingents Later, as they swept into central
and even western Europe, they also brought with them different Germanic
16
NTRODUCTIO
and Iranian elements which they had overwhelmed and picked up on the
way. Although one of the most primitive peoples to come to southern Rus-
sia, the Huns had sufficient drive and military prowess to conquer that area
and, indeed, to play a hey role in the so-called period of great migrations
in Europe. Even after their defeat in the battle of Chalons, deep in France,
in 451, they invaded Italy and, according to tradition, spared Rome
only because of the influence of Pope Leo I on their leader, Attila. But
with the sudden death of Attila in 453 the poorly organized Hunnic
state crumbled. Its successors included the large horde of the Bulgars and
the smaller ones of the Utigurs and the Kutrigurs.
The next human wave to break into southern Russia consisted again of
an Asiatic, Mongol- and Turkic-spcaking, and relatively primitive people,
the Avars. Their invasion is dated a.d. 558, and their state lasted for about
a century in Russia and for over two and a half centuries altogether, at the
end of which time it dissolved rapidly and virtually without trace, a com-
mon fate of fluid, politically rudimentary, and culturally weak nomadic em-
pires. At the height of their power, the Avars ruled the entire area from
eastern Russia to the Danubian plain, where they had their capital and
where they remained after they had lost control in Russia. Avar armies
threatened Byzantium, and they also waged major, although unsuccessful,
wars against Charlemagne and his empire.
In the seventh century a.d. a new force emerged in southern Russia, to
b'e more exact, on the lower Volga, in the northern Caucasus, and the south-
eastern Russian steppe in general: the Khazar state. The impact of the
Khazars split the Bulgars sharply in two: one group definitely settled in the
Balkans to dissolve in the Slavic mass and give its name to present-day
Bulgaria; the other retreated to the northeast, eventually establishing a state
at the confluence of the Volga and the Kama, with the town of Great Bulgar
as its capital. The Utigurs and the Kutrigurs retrenched to the lands along
the Sea of Azov and the mouth of the Don.
Although the Khazars were still another Turkic-speaking people from
Asia, their historical role proved to be quite different from that of the Huns
or of the Avars. To begin with, they fought bitter wars against the Arabs
and served as a bulwark against the spread of Islam into Europe, When
their own state assumed form in southeastern European Russia, it became
notable for its commerce, its international connections, and the tolerance
and enlightenment of its laws. Although a semi-nomadic people themselves,
the Khazars promoted the building of towns, such as their capital of Itil —
not far from the mouth of the Volga' — Samandar, Sarkil, and certain others.
The location at the crossroads of two continents proved to be of funda-
mental importance for the Khazar economy. In the words of a recent his-
torian of the Khazars, Dunlop: “The prosperity of Khazaria evidently de-
pended less on the resources of the country than on its favorable position
RUSSIA BEFORE THE RUSSIANS 17
across important trade-routes *’ The Khazar revenue, consequently, came
especially from commercial imposts as well as from the tribute which in-
creased as the Khazar rule expanded westward on the Russian plain Pagans,
Moslems, Christians, and Jews mingled in Khazana, where all enjoyed
considerable freedom and autonomy to live under their own laws In the
eighth and ninth centuries the Khazars themselves embraced Judaism, or at
least their ruler, who bore the title of khahan, and the upper class did, thus
adding another exceptional chapter to their unusual history The Khazars
have also been cited as one of the first peoples to institute a permanent
paid armed force The development of Khazana, with its close links to the
Arabic and Byzantine worlds, as well as to some other civilizations its far-
flung trade connections and its general cosmopolitanism well represents
one line of political, economic, and cultural evolution on the great Russian
plain at the time of the emergence of the Kievan state It may be added
that, while the Khazars were outstanding m commercial development, varied
commercial intercourse on a large scale also grew further ootvli m \hc coon,
try of the Volga Bulgars
The East Sla\s
Cultures on the northern shore of the Black Sea and m the southern Rus-
sian steppe, from the neolithic period to the time of the Khazars, form an
essential part of the background of Kievan Russia Yet it is true too that
the people of the Kievan state who came to be known as Russians were not
Scythians, Greeks or Khazars, much as they might have been influenced
m one way or another by thc<c and other predecessors and neighbors, they
were Hast Slavs Therefore, Hast Slavs also demand our attention The term
itself Is linguistic, as our better classifications of ancient peoples usually are
It refers to a group speaking the Eastern variety of Slavic With time,
three distinct East Slavic languages developed Great Russian, often called
simply Russian, Ukrainian, ard White Russian or Belorussian Other
branches of the Slavic languages are the West Slavic, including Polish and
Czech, and the South Slavic, represented for instance, by Serbo Croatian
and Bulgarian The Slavic languages, in turn form a subdivision of the Indo-
European language family which includes most of the tongues spoken today
in Europe and some used in Asia To be more precise, in addition to the
Slavic this family contains the Teutonic, Romance, Hellenic, Baltic, Celtic,
Iranian, Indie, Armenian, and Thraco-Illynan subfamilies of languages. The
Cimmerians, it might be recalled belonged apparently to the Thraco-Uly nan
subfamily, the Scythians and the Sdimalians to the Iranian, and the Goths
to the Teutonic or Germanic, while the Greeks arc, of course, the great
representatives of the Helfemc Early Russian history was also influenced
by other Indo-European peoples, such as the Baltic Lithuanians, as well
18
IN TR OD UCTION
as by some non-Indo-Europeans, notably by different Turkic tribes — some
of which have already been mentioned — the Mongols, and Finno-Ugrian
elements.
Languages are organically and intrinsically related within the same sub-
family and also within the same family. By contrast, no fundamental con-
nection, as distinct from chance borrowing, has been established between
languages in different families, for example, the Indo-European and the
Ural-Altaic. In fact, some specialists believe that speech originated on our
planet in a number of separate places, division thus being the rule in the
linguistic world from the very beginning. To explain the relatedness of the
languages within a family and the much closer relationship of the languages
of the same subfamily, scholars have postulated an original language and
homeland for each family — such as for all Indo-European peoples whence
they spread across Europe and parts of Asia — and later languages and
homelands for different linguistic subfamilies before further separation and
differentiation. Within the framework of this theory, the Slavs have usually
been assigned a common homeland in the general area of the valley of the
Vistula and the northern slopes of the Carpathians. Their split has been
dated, by Shakhraatov and others, in the sixth century a.d., and the settle-
ment by the East Slavs of the great plain of European Russia in the seventh,
the eighth, and the ninth. In reconstructing Slavic migrations, allowance
has frequently been made for the fact that the East Slavic languages are
closer to the South Slavic than those of cither of these branches to the West
Slavic ones. It should be emphasized that in relying on original languages
and their homelands one is dealing with languages, not races. The categories
listed above are all linguistic, not racial, and do not necessarily correspond
to any physical traits. Besides, intermarriage, conquest, imitation, as well
as some other factors, have repeatedly changed the number and composi-
tion of those speaking a given language. Today, for instance, English is the
native tongue of American blacks as well as of Yorkshiremen. An entire
people can lose a language and adopt a new one. Invaders have often been
absorbed by the indigenous population, as in the case of the Turkic Bulgars
in the Balkans. Other invaders have been able to overwhelm and incor-
porate native peoples. Thus some historians explain the Germanic expan-
sion in eastern Europe by a Germanization, not an extermination, of dif-
ferent Slavic and Lithuanian tribes. There are also such puzzling cases as
the language of the Lapps in the far north of Scandinavia and Russia: it
is a Finno-Ugrian tongue, but, in the opinion of certain specialists, it ap-
pears to be superimposed on a radically different linguistic structure.
Recent scholarship has subjected the theory of original languages and
homelands to a searching criticism. At present few specialists speak with
any confidence about the historical homeland of the Indo-Europeans, and
some reject it even as a theoretical concept. More important for students of
RUSSIA BEFORE THE RUSSIANS 19
Russian history the Slavic homeland has also been thoroughly questioned.
The revaluation has been largely instigated by discoveries of the presence
of tba Slavs at a much earlier time and over a much larger area in Russia
than had been traditionally supposed To meet new evidence some scholars
have redefined the orig ml Slavic homeland to include parts of Russia
Others have postulated an earl cr dispersal of the Slavs some suggesting
that it proceeded in several waves to esplJin both ihcir ancient prcscm-c
on the Russian plain and their later migration thither St 11 others have given
up the Slavic homeland altogether While recent work concerning Slavic
prehistory has produced many new facts it has Inched a convincing general
theory to replace that which has been found wanting
The first extant written references to the Slavs belong to the classical
■writers early tn our era including Plmy the Elder and Tacitus Important
later accounts include those of the sixth century produced by the By7innnc
historian Procopius and the Gothic Jordancs The terms most frequently
used to designate the Slavs were Vencdi and Antes with the latter com
ing to mean the East Stavs — although Antes has also been given other
interpretations such as pre Slavic Iranian inhabitants of southern Russia or
Goths Soviet archaeologists insist that Slavic settlements in parts of Rus
sia notably m the Don area date at least from the middle of the first
millennium b c It is now assumed by some historians that the Slavs com
posed a significant part perhaps the bulk of the population of southern
and central Russia from the time of the Scythians For instance they may
be hidden under various designations used by Herodotus such as Scythian
ploughmen It is known that the East Slavs fought against the Goths were
swept westward with the Huns and were conquered by the Avars certain
East Slavic tribes were paying tribute to the khazars at the dawn of
Kievan history At that time according to our main written source, the
Kievan Primary Chronicle of the early twelfth century the East Slavs were
divided into twelve tribes located on the broad expanses of the Russian
plain from the Black Sea the Danube and the Carpathian mountains
across the Ukraine and beyond northward to the Novgorod terntoty and
eastward toward the Volga Their neighbors included m addition to some
of the peoples already mentioned I innic elements scattered throughout
northern and eastern Russia and Lithuanian tribes to the Rest
By die ninth century a d Last Slavic economy society and culture had
already experienced a considerable development Agriculture was well and
Widely established among the East Slavs Other important occupations in
eluded fishing hunting apiculture cattle raising weaving and pottery
making as well as oth-r arts and crafts such as carpentry The East Slavs
had known the use of iron for centuries They had also been engaging m
v tried and far flung commerce They possessed a remarkable number of
towns even Tikhomirovs count of them some 238 is not complete
20 INTRODUCTION
Certain of these towns, such as Novgorod, Smolensk, and Kiev, a town
belonging to the tribe of the Poliane, were to have long and important his-
tories. Very little is known about the political organization of the East Slavs.
There exist, however, a few scattered references to the rulers of the Antes
and of some of the component tribes: for example, Jordanes’s mention of
Bozh, a prince of the Antes at the time of the Gothic wars; and the state-
ment of Masudi, an Arabian writer, concerning Madzhak, apparently a
prince of the East Slavic tribe of the Dulcby in the Avar period.
II KIEVAN RUSSIA
1 1 1
THE ESTABLISHMENT OT THE KIEVAN STATE
They accordingly went oversea* to the Varangian Russes
THE PRlSim CHROMO.E
The problem of the origin of the first Russian state, that of Kiev, is ex-
ceedmgly complex and controversial No other chapicr of Russian history
presents the same number and variety of difficulties Yet the modern stu-
dent of the subject, although he can by no means produce all the answers,
should at least be able to avoid the cruder mistakes and oversimplifications
of the past
The first comprehensive, scholarly effort to explain the appearance of the
Km an siste was made in (he eighteenth century m terms of (he so-called
Norman theory As formulated by Bayer, Schlozer, and others, this view
stressed the role of the vikings from Scandinavia — that is, Norsemen, or,
to follow the established usage in Russian histonography, Normans— in
giving Russia government, cohesion, and, in large part, even culture The
Norman period of Russian history was thus postulated as the foundation
for ns subsequent evolution In the course of some two hundred years the
Norman theory has been developed, modified, and changed by many promi-
nent scholars Other specialists, however, opposed it virtually from the very
beginning, offering instead a dazzling variety of possibilities More recently
Soviet historians have turned violently against it, and at present It is out of
bounds for Soviet scholarship
In estimating the value of the Norman theory it is important to appreciate
its drastic limitations in the field of culture The original assertion of the
Norman influence on Russia was made before the early history of southern
Russia, outlined in the preceding chapter, had been discovered With our
present knowledge of that history there is no need to bring in the Norsemen
to account for Kievan society and culture What is more, Scandinavia itself,
located in the far north, lay at that time much farther from cultural centers
and crosscurrents than d!d the valley of the Dnieper Not surprisingly, once
the Kievan stats emerged, Us culture developed more nchly and rapidly
than that of its northern neighbor, whether we consider written literature
and written law or com stamping, wc have to register their appearance m
Kievan Russia a considerable time before their arrival in Scandinavia
23
24
KIEVAN RUSS
Detailed investigations of Scandinavian elements in Russian culture serve
to emphasize their relative insignificance. Norman words in the Russian
language, formerly supposed to be numerous, number actually only six or
seven. Old Russian terms pertaining to navigation were often Greek, those
dealing with trade, Oriental or native Slavic, but not Scandinavian. Written
literature in Kiev preceded written literature in Scandinavia, and it experi-
enced clear Byzantine and Bulgarian rather than Nordic influences; under
these circumstances, persistent efforts to link it to the Scandinavian epic
fail to carry conviction. Claims of Norman contributions to Russian law
have suffered a fiasco: while at one time scholars believed in the Scandi-
navian foundation of Russian jurisprudence, it has in fact proved impossible
to trace elements of Kievan law back to Norman prototypes. Similarly, there
is no sound evidence for Norman influence on Kievan paganism: Perun,
the god of thunder and the chief deity of the East Slavic pantheon, far
from being a copy of Thor, was described as the supreme divinity of the
Antes by Procopius in the sixth ccntuiy; a linguistic analysis of the names
of East Slavic gods reveals a variety of cultural connections, but none of
them with Scandinavia. Other assertions of Norman cultural influences, for
instance, on the organization of the Kievan court or on Russian dress, tend
to be vague and inconclusive, especially when compared to the massive im-
pact of Byzantium and the tangible effects of some Oriental cultures on
Russia.
But, while the importance of Scandinavian culture for Russian culture
no longer represents a major historical issue, the role of the Normans in the
establishment of the Kievan state itself remains highly controversial. The
question of the origin of the Kievan state is very closely connected with
a group, tribe, or people known as the Rus, and it is also from the Rus that
we derive the later name of the Russians. Almost everything connected with
the Rus has become a subject of major controversy in Russian historiogra-
phy. Under the year a.d. 862 the Primary Chronicle tells briefly about the
arrival of the Rus following an invitation from the quarreling Slavic tribes
of the Slovcni and the Krivichi and some Finnish tribes:
They accordingly went overseas to the Varangian Russes: these particular
Varangians were known as Russes, just as some arc called Swedes, and
others Normans, Angles, and Goths, for they were thus named. The
Chuds, the Slavs and the Krivichians then said to the people of Rus, “Our
whole land is great and rich, but there is no order in it. Come to rule and
reign over us!” They thus selected three brothers, with their kinsfolk,
who took with them all the Russes and migrated. The oldest, Rurik, lo-
cated himself in Novgorod; the second, Sineus, in Byel oozero; and the
third, Truvor, in Izborsk. On account of these Varangians, the district of
Novgorod became known as the land of the Rus. The present inhabitants
THE fcSTA B LJSIIMENT OF THE KIEVAN STATE 25
of Novgorod arc descended from the Varangian race, but aforetime they
were Slavs *
The proponents of the Norman theory accepted the Chronicle verbatim,
with the understanding that the Rus were a Scandinavian tribe or group, and
proceeded to identify the Rus-Ros-Rhos of other sources with the Scandi-
navians However, before long grave complications arose A group called
Rus could not be found in Scandina\ia itself and were utterly unknown in
the West Although the Chronicle referred to Novgorod, Riu became identi-
fied with the Kievan state, and die very name came to designate the south-
ern Russian state as distinct from the north, Novgorod included Still more
important was the discovery that the Rus had been known to some Byzantine
and Oriental writers before a d 862 and was evidently located m southern
Russia Finally, the Tnmary Chronicle itself came to be suspected and
underwent a searching criticism
As one of their first tasks the supporters of the Norman view set out to
find the Scandinavian origin of the name fliu Their search, from the time
of Schlozer to the present, has had mixed success at best A number of
derivations hnd to be abindoned The deduction of Rus from the Finnish
word for the Swedes, Ruoisi developed by Thomsen and upheld by Slcndcr-
Pcterscn and others, seems linguistically acceptable, but it has been criti-
cized as extremely complicated and unlikely on historical grounds
Because they considered the Rus a Scandinavian group, the proponents
of the Norman theory proceeded to interpret all references to the Rus in
Norman terms Under the year a d 839 a Western source, The Btrtmtan
Annds. tells about the Rus ambassadors who came to IngcJheim through
Constantinople and who were men of Khakan-Rus. but who turned out to
be Swedes Some scholars even concluded that the ambassadors must have
come all the way from Sweden, and they read khakan to mean Haakon
But the Russian khaVamtc was probably located in southern Russia and
the title of khakan suggests hhazar rather than Norman influence The
early date made certain other scholars advance the hypothetical arrival of
the Scandinavian Rus into Russia from ad 862 to approximately a D
840 ” A slight change in the original chronology also enabled these special-
ists to regard as Scandinavian the Rus who staged an attack on Constan-
tinople in ad 860 and who were described on that occasion by Patriarch
Photius
In the tenth century Bishop Lmtprand of Cremona referred to the Run os
in his description of the neighbors of the Byzantine Empire A controversy
* 1 am using the standard English translation of the Primary Chronicle by Pro-
fessor S Cross {The Russian Primary Chronicle Laurentlan Tex r Cambridge Mass,
19301, although I am not entirely satisfied with it either in general or in this par
ocular instance
26 KIEVAN RUSSIA
stilt continues as to whether Liutprand described his Rusios as Normans
or merely as a northern people. Also in the tenth century the Byzantine
emperor and scholar Constantine Porphyrogenitus gave the names of seven
Dnieper rapids “in Slavic” and “in Russian.” The “Russian” names, or at
least most of them, can best be explained from Scandinavian languages.
This evidence of “the language of the Rus” is rather baffling: there is no
other mention of any Scandinavian tongue of the Rus; on the contrary, the
Chronicle itself states that the Slavic and the Russian languages are one.
The supporters of the Norman theory were quick to point to the Scandi-
navian names of the first Russian princes and of many of their followers
listed in the treaties between Kievan Russia and Byzantium. Their oppo-
nents challenged their derivation of some of the names and stressed the fact
that the treaties were written in Greek and in Slavic and that the Rus swore
by Slavic gods. \ 0 B
Certain Arabic authors also mention and sometimes discuss and describe
the Rus, but their statements have also been variously interpreted by differ-
ent scholars. In general the Rus of the Arabic writers are a numerous people
rather than a viking detachment, “a tribe of the Slavs” according to Ibn-
Khurdadhbih. The Rus had many towns, and its ruler bore the title of
khakan. True, the Rus are often contrasted with the Slavs. The contrast, how-
ever, may refer simply to the difference between the Kievan Slavs and other
Slavs to the north. Some of the customs of the Rus, described in Arabic
sources, seem to be definitely Slavic rather than Norman: such are the
posthumous marriage of bachelors and the suicide of wives following the
death of their husbands. The Rus known to the Arabs lived most probably
somewhere in southern Russia. Although Arabic writers refer primarily to
the ninth century, the widespread and well-established relations of the Rus
with the East at that time suggest an acquaintance of long standing.
Other evidence, it has been argued, also points to an early existence of
the Rus in southern Russia. To mention only some of the disputed issues,
the Rus, reportedly, attacked Surozh in the Crimea early in the ninth century
and Amastris on the southern shore of the Black Sea between a.d. 820 and
842. Vernadsky derives the name of Rus from the Alanic tribe of the Roxo-
lans. Other scholars have turned to topographic terms, ranging from the
ancient word for Volga, Rha, to Slavic names for different rivers. An in-
genious compromise hypothesis postulates both a Scandinavian and a south-
ern derivation of Rus-Ros and the merger of the two.
The proponents of the Norman view have reacted in a number of ways
to assertions of the antiquity of the Rus and their intrinsic connection with
southern Russia. Sometimes they denied or challenged the evidence.
Vasiliev, for instance, refused to recognize the early attacks of the Rus on
Surozh and Amastris. The first he classified as apocryphal, the second as
referring in fact to the well-known campaign of Igor in A.D. 941. Other
THE ESTABLISHMENT OP THE XIEVAN STATE 27
specialists, in order u> account for all the events at the dawn of Russian
history and to connect them with the Scandinavian north have postulated
more than one separate Scandinavian Rus, bringing rather arbitrarily,
some of them from Denmark and others from Sweden Their extremely
complex and unverified schemes serve little purpose, unless one is to as*
sume that the Rus could be nothing but Scandinavians For example
Vernadsky in his reconstruction of early Russian history conveyed one
group of Normans to the shores of the Black Sea as early as A D 740
Vernadsky’s reasoning unfortunately is highly speculative and generally
not at all convincing By contrast, recently many scholars have considered
the Normans as merely one element in the composition of the Rus linked
fundamentally to southern Russia and its inhabitants
The Primary Chronicle itself, a central source for the Norman theory,
has been thoroughly anatyzed and criticized by Shakhmatov and other
specialists This criticism threw new light on the obvious inadequacies of
its nairauve and revealed further failings in it The suspiciously peaceful
establishment of Riunk and his brothers in northern Russia was related
to similar Anglo-Saxon and other stones m particular to a passage in
Widukmds Res gestae saxonicae to indicate, in the opinion of some
scholars the mythical character of the entire * invitation of the Varangians "
OJegs capture of Kiev in the name of Riunk s son Igor m ad 882, the
starting point of Kievan history according to the Chronicle also raised
many issues In particular it was noted that due to considerations of age,
Igor could hardly have been Riunk s son and that no Kievan sources
antenor to the Primary Chronicle that is, until the early twelfth century,
knew of Riunk, tracing instead the ancestry of Kievan princes only to
Igor Moreover, the Chronicle as a whole is no longer regarded as a naive
factual narrative, but rather as a work written from a distinct point of
view and possibly for definite dynastic purposes such as providing desirable
personal or territorial connections for the Kievan ruling family On the
other hand, the proponents of the Norman theory argue plausihly that the
Chronicle remains our best source concerning the origin of the Russian
state, and that its story, although incorrect in many details, does on the
whole faithfully reflect real events
To sum up, the Norman theory can no longer be held in anything like its
original scope Most significantly, there is no reason to assert a fundamental
Scandinavian influence on Kievan culture But the supporters of the theory
stand on a much firmer ground when they rely on archaeological, phifologi
cal and other evidence to substantiate the presence of the Normans m
Russia in the moth century In particular the names of the first pnnccs,
to and excluding Sviatoslav, as well as the names of many of their followers
in the treaties with Byzantium, make the majority of scholars outside the
Soviet Union today consider the first Russian dynasty and its immediate
28
kievan Russia
retinue as Scandinavian. Yet, even it we accept this view, it remains danger-
ous to postulate grand Norman designs for eastern Europe, or to interpret
the role of the vikings on the Russian plain by analogy with their much
better known activities in Normandy or in Sicily. A historian can go beyond
his evidence only at his own peril.
In any case, whether through internal evolution, outside intervention,
or some peculiar combination of the two, the Kievan state did arise in
the Dnieper area toward the end of the ninth century.
KIEVAN RUSSIA- A POLITICAL OUTLINE
In that city, in the city of Kiev
THE FIRST LINE OF AN EPIC POEM
Kir. van POLITICAL history can be conveniently divided into three periods.
The first starts with Oleg’s semi~legendiry occupation of the city on the
Dnieper in 882 and continues until 972 or 980 During that initial century
of Kievan history, Kievan princes brought the different East Slavic tnbes
under their sway, exploiting successfully the position of Kiev on the famous
road "from the Varangians to the Greeks" — that is, from the Scandinavian,
Baltic, and Russian north of Europe to Constantinople — as well as
other connections with the inhabitants both of the forest and the steppe,
and building up their domain into a major European state At the end of
the century Pnncc Sviatoslav even engaged in a series of far-reaching cam-
paigns and conquests, defeated a variety of enemies, and threatened the
status quo in the Balkans and the Byzantine Empire itself
The failure of Sviatoslav’s more ambitious plans as well as a gradual
consolidation of the Kievan state in European Russia macks the transition
to the nett period of Kievan history, when Kievan Russia attained in most
respects its greatest development, prosperity, stability, and success This
second period was occupied almost entirely by the reigns of two remarkable
princes, Saint Vladimir and Iaroslav the Wise, and it ended with the death
of the latter in 1054 While the Kievan rulers from Oieg thtough Sviatoslav
established Kievan Russia as on important state, it was early in the time
of Vladimir that a new element of enormous significance entered the life
and culture of Kiev Christianity The new Christian civilization of Kievan
Russia produced impressive rcsulls as early as the first half of the eleventh
century, adding literary and artisuc attainment to the political power and
high economic development characteristic of the age
The third and last period of Kievan history, that of the decline and fall,
Is the mast difficult one to define chronologically It may be said to begin
with the passing of Iaroslav the Wise m 1054, but there is no consensus
about the point at which foreign invasions, civil wars, and the general
diminution in the significance of Kiev brought the Kievan era of Russian
history to a close Vladimir MonomaVh. "ho reigned from 1 113 to 1125,
has often been considered the last effective Kievan ruler, and the same has
been said of his son, Mstislav, who reigned from 1 125 to 1132 Other
25 >
30 KIEVAN RUSSIA
historians indicate as the terminal point, for example, the capture and the
sacking of Kiev in 1169 by Prince Andrew Bogoliubskii of Suzdal and his
decision to remain in the northeast rather than move to the city on the
Dnieper. As the ultimate date of Kievan history, 1240 also has a certain
claim: in that year Kiev, already a shadow of its former self in importance,
was thoroughly destroyed by the Mongols, who established their dominion
over conquered Russia.
The Rise of the Kievan State
Oleg, the first historical ruler of Kiev, remains in most respects an
obscure figure. According to the Primary Chronicle he was a Varangian,
a relative of Igor, who occupied Kiev in 882 and died in 913. Assisted by
his retainers, the druzhina, Oleg spread his rule from the territory of the
Poliane to the areas of several neighboring East Slavic tribes. Some record
of a subsequent bitter opposition of the Drevliane to this expansion has
come down to our time; certain other tribes, it would seem, submitted with
less struggle. Tribute became the main mark and form of their allegiance
to Kiev. Still other tribes might have acted simply as associates of Oleg
and his successor Igor in their various enterprises, without recognizing the
supreme authority of Kiev. Toward the end of his life Oleg had gathered
a sufficient force to undertake in 907 a successful campaign against By-
zantium. Russian chronicles exaggerate Oleg’s success and tell, among
other things, the story of how he nailed his shield to the gates of Con-
stantinople. Byzantine sources arc strangely silent on the subject of Oleg’s
campaign. Yet some Russian victories seem probable, for in 911 Oleg
obtained from Byzantium an extremely advantageous trade treaty.
Oleg’s successor. Prince Igor, ruled Kievan Russia from 913 until his
death in 945. Our knowledge of him comes from Greek and Latin, in
addition to Russian, sources, and he stands out, by contrast with the semi-
legendary Oleg, as a fully historical person. Igor had 10 fight the Drevliane
as well as to maintain and spread Kievan authority in other East Slavic
lands. That authority remained rather precarious, so that each new
prince was forced to repeat in large part the work of his predecessor.
In 941 Igor engaged in a major campaign against Constantinople and
devastated its suburbs, but his fleet suffered defeat by the Byzantine navy
which used the celebrated “Greek fire.” * The war was finally terminated
by the treaty of 944, the provisions of which were rather less favorable to
the Russians than those of the preceding agreement of 911. In 943 the
Russians campaigned successfully in the distant transcaspian provinces of
“The Greek fire was an incendiary compound projected through copper pipes
by Byzantine sailors to set on fire the ships of their opponents. Its exact composition
remains unknown.
A POLITICAL OOTMNt 31
Persia Igor was lulled by the Drevlianc in 945 while collecting tribute
in their land
Oleg's and Igor's treaties with Byzantium deserve special attention Their
carefully worded and remarkably detailed provKions dealt with the sojourn
of the Russians in Constantinople, Russian trade with its inhabitants, and
the relations between the two states in general It may be noted that the
Russians in Constantinople were subject to their own courts, but that, on
the other hand, they were free to enter Byzantine service
While their relations with Byzantium increased the prestige and the
profits of the Russians, the inhabitants of the steppe continued to threaten
the young Kievan stale In addition to the relatively stabilized and civilized
Khnzars, more primitive peoples pressed westward At the dawn of Kievan
history, the Magyars, n nomadic horde speaking a Finno-Ugrian language
and associated for a long time with the Khazar state, moved from the
southern Russian steppe to enter, at the end of the ninth century, the
Pannoman plain and lay the foundations for Hungary Bui they were
replaced and indeed in part pushed out of southern Russia by the next
wave from the east, rather primitive and ferocious Turkic nomads, the
Pechencgs or Patzinaks The approach of the Pechcnegs u mentioned m the
Cfironicle under the year 915. and they began to carry out constant assaults
on the Kievan state m the second half of the tenth century, after the decline
of the Khazan
Igor's sudden death left his widow Olga in charge of the Kievan state,
for their son Sviatoslav was still a boy Olga rose to the occasion, ruling
the land from 945 to about 962 and becoming the first famous woman in
Russian history as well as a saint of the Orthodox church The information
concerning Olga describes her harsh punishment of the Drcvhane and
her persistent efforts to strengthen Kievan authority among other Hast
Slavic tribes It tells also of her conversion to Chmuamty, possibly in 954
or 955, and her journey to Constantinople in 957 There she was received
by the emperor Constantine Potphyrogenitus, who left us an account of her
visit. But the conversion of Olga did not mean a conversion of her people,
nor indeed of her son Sviatoslav
The ten years of Sviatoslav’s rule of Kievan Russia, 962 to 972, which
marked the culmination of the first period of Kievan history m the course
of which the new state obtained a definite form and role on the east
European plain, have been trenchantly called “the great adventure ” If
successful, the adventure might have given Russian history a new center
and a different course Even w>ith their tdumate failure, Sviatoslav’s daring
campaigns and designs left their imprint all the way from Constantinople
to the Volga and the Caspian Sea Sviatoslav stands out in history as a
classic warrior-prince, simple, severe, indefatigable, brave, sharing with his
men uncounted hardships as well as continuous battles He has been
32 KIEVAN RUSSIA
likened to the cossack hetmans and to the viking captains as well as to
leaders in other military traditions, and the cossack, if not the viking,
comparison has a point: Sviatoslav’s appearance, dress, and manner of
life all remind us of the steppe. In the words of the Primary Chronicle:
“Upon his expeditions he carried with him neither wagons nor kettles, and
boiled no meat, but cut off small strips of horseflesh, game, or beef, and
ate it after roasting it on the coals. Nor did he have a tent, but he spread
out a piece of saddle cloth under him, and set his saddle under his head.”
In 964 Sviatoslav started out on a great eastern campaign. First he
subjugated the East Slavic tribe of the Viatichi, who had continued to pay
tribute to the Khazars rather than to Kiev. Next he descended to the mouth
of the river Oka bringing the surrounding Finnic -speaking tribes under
his authority. From the mouth of the Oka he proceeded down die Volga,
attacked the Volga Bulgars, and sacked their capital, the Great Bulgar.
But instead of developing his campaign against the Bulgars, he resumed in
965 his advance down the Volga toward the Khazar state, subduing Fin-
nic and Turkic tribes on the way. Sviatoslav’s war against the Khazars
had a sweeping scope and impressive results: the Russians smashed the
Khazar army, captured and sacked the Khazar capital, Itil, reached the
Caspian and advancing along its western shore seized the key fortress of
Samandar. Next, turning west, they defeated the Alans and some other
peoples of the northern Caucasus, came to the mouth of the Don and
stormed the Khazar fortress of Sarkil. which dominated that area. The
Khazars, although their state lasted for another half century, never re-
covered from these staggering blows. Sviatoslav returned to Kiev in 967.
His remarkable eastern campaign, which led to the defeat of the Volga
Bulgars and the Khazars, completed the unification of the East Slavs
around Kiev, attaching to it botli the Viatichi and other groups to the
southeast, notably in the Don area. Also, it brought under Russian con-
trol the entire flow of the Volga, and thus the great Volga-Caspian Sea
trade route — a more ancient and perhaps more important north-south
communication artery than the Dnieper way itself — whereas formerly the
Russians had held only the upper reaches of the Volga. Yet the magnificent
victory over the Khazars had its reverse side; it weakened decisively their
effectiveness as a buffer against other Asiatic peoples, in particular the
Pechenegs.
In 968 Sviatoslav became involved in another major undertaking. On
the invitation of the Byzantine emperor Nicepliorus Phocas, he led a large
army into the Balkans to attack the Bulgarian state in the Danubian valley.
Once more the Russians achieved notable military successes, capturing the
capital of the Bulgarians and taking prisoner their ruler Boris, although they
had to interrupt the campaign to defeat the Pechenegs, who in 969 in the
A rOUTICAl OUTLINE 33
absence of Sviatoslav and Jus troops had besieged Kiev bviatoslav, who
thus came to control the territory from the Volga to the Danubian plain,
apparently liked the Balkan lands especially well According to the Chron-
icle, he declared “I do not care to remain in Kiev, but should prefer to
live in Pcreiaslavets on the Danube, since that is the center of my realm,
where all riches are concentrated gold, silks, wine, and various fruits
from Greece, silver and horses from Hungary and Bohemia, and from
Russia furs, wax, honey, and slaves” One can only speculate on the pos-
sible implications of such a change of capital for Russian history
But the Byzantine state, ruled from 969 by the famous military leader
Emperor John Tzimisccs, had become fully aware of the new danger As
Sviatoslav would not leave the Balkans, a bitter war ensued In his
characteristic manner the Russian pnnee rapidly crossed the Balkan
mountains and invaded the Byzantine Empire capturing Phihppopohs and
threatening Adnanople and Constantinople itself However, John Tzimisccs
managed in the nick of time to restore his position in Asia, which had
been threatened by both a foreign war and a rebellion and to shift his
mam effort to the Balkans He counterattacked crossing in his tum the
Balkan range and capturing Great Preslav the Bulgarian capital The Rus-
sian army its lines of communication endangered, had to retreat to the
fortress of Dorostolon on the Danube — present day Dnstra or Stlistria
— which after a hard fought battle John Tzimisccs placed under siege
Following more desperate fighting in July 971 Sviatoslav was finally re-
duced to making peace with Byzantium on condition of abandoning the
Balkans, as well as the Crimea and promising not to challenge the Byzan-
tine Empire in the future On his way back to Russia with a small retinue,
he W3s intercepted and killed by the Pechvnegs Tradition has it that the
Pecheneg khan had a drinking cup made out of Sviatoslav’s skull The
great adventure had come to its end Sviatoslav s Balkan wars attract at-
tention not only because of the issues involved but also because of the
sizes of the contending armies and because of their place in military his
tory, Byzantine sources indicate that Sviatoslav fought at the head of
60 000 troops of whom 22,000 remained when peace was concluded
After the death of his mother Olga in 969, Sviatoslav, constantly away
wnh the army, entrusted the administration of the Kiev area to his elder
son laropolk, dispatched the second son Oleg to govern the territory of
the Drevhane, and sent the third the young Vladimir, with an older rela-
tive to manage Novgorod A civil war among the brothers followed Sviato-
slav's death At first laropolk had the upper hand, Oleg perishing in the
struggle and Vladimir escaping abroad But in two years Vladimir re-
turned and with foreign mercenaries and local support defeated and killed
laropolk About 980 he became the ruler of the entire Kievan realm
34
KIEVAN
Russia
Kiev at the Zenith
Vladimir, who reigned until 1015, continued in most respects the policies
of his predecessors. Among the East Slavs, he reaffirmed the authority of
the Kievan state which had been badly shaken during the years of civil
war. He recovered Galician towns from Poland and, further to the north
subdued the warlike Lithuanian tribes of the Iatviags, extending his domain
in that area to the Baltic Sea. Vladimir also made a major and generally
successful effort to contain the Pechenegs. He built fortresses and towns,
brought settlers into the frontier districts, and managed to push the steppe
border to two days, rather than a single day, of travel time from Kiev.
However, Vladimir’s great fame rests on his relations with Byzantium
and, most especially, on his adoption of Christianity, which proved to be
of immense significance and long outlasted the specific political and cul-
tural circumstances that led to the step. Interest in Christianity was not
unprecedented among the Russians. In fact, there may even have been a
Russian diocese of the Byzantine Church as early as 867, although not
all scholars agree on this inference from a particular tantalizing passage
in an early document. Whether or not an early Christian Rus existed on the
shores of the Sea of Azov, Kiev itself certainly experienced Christian in-
fluences before the time of Vladimir. A Christian church existed in Kiev
in the reign of Igor, and we know that Olga, Vladimir’s grandmother, be-
came a Christian; Vladimir’s brother laropolk has also been described as
favorably inclined to Christianity. But it should be emphasized that Olga’s
conversion did not affect the pagan faith of her subjects and, furthermore,
that, in the first part of the reign of Vladimir, Kievan Russia experienced a
strong pagan revival. Vladimir's turnabout and the resulting “baptism of
Russia” were accompanied by an intricate series of developments that has
been given different explications and interpretations by scholars: Vladimir’s
military aid to Emperor Basil II of Byzantium, the siege and capture by
the Russians of the Byzantine outpost of Chersonesus in the Crimea, and
Vladimir’s marriage to Anne, Basil II’s sister. Whatever the exact import
and motivation of these and certain other events, the Kievan Russians
formally accepted Christianity from Constantinople in or around 988 and
probably in or near Kiev, although some historians prefer Chersonesus.
The conversion of Kievan Russia to Cliristianity fits into a broad his-
torical pattern. At about the same time similar conversions from paganism
were taking place among some of the Baltic Slavs, and in Poland, Hungary,
Denmark, and Norway; Christendom in effect was spreading rapidly across
all of Europe, with only a few remote peoples, such as the Lithuanians,
holding out. Nevertheless, it can well be argued that Vladimir’s decision
represented a real and extremely important choice. The legendary account
of how the Russians selected th«r religion spurning Islam because it pro-
hibited alcohol — for ' drink is the joy of the Russian — and Judaism
because it expressed the beliefs of a defeated people without a state, and
opting for Byzantine liturgy and faith, contains a larger meaning Russia
did lie at cultural crossroads, and it had contacts not only with Byzantium
and other Christian neighbors but also with the Moslem slate of the Volga
36 kievan Russia
Bulgars and other more distant Moslems to the southeast as well as with
the Jewish Khazars, In other words, Vladimir and his associates chose to
become the Eastern flank of Christendom rather than an extension into
Europe of non-Christian civilizations. In doing so, they opened wide the
gates for the highly developed Byzantine culture to enter their land. Kievan
literature, art, law, manners, and customs experienced a fundamental im-
pact of Byzantium. The most obvious result of the conversion was the
appearance in Kievan Russia of the Christian Church itself, a new and
extremely important institution which was to play a role similar to that
of the Church in other parts of medieval Europe. But Christianity, as
already indicated, remained by no means confined to the Church, permeating
instead Kievan society and culture, a subject to which we shall return in
later chapters. In politics too it gave the Kievan prince and state a stronger
ideological basis, urging the unity of the country and at the same
time emphasizing its links with Byzantium and with the Christian world
as a whole. Dvomik, Obolensky, and many other scholars have given
us a rich picture of the Byzantine heritage and of the Russian borrowing
from it.
It must be kept in mind that Christianity came to Russia from Byzantium,
not from Rome. Although at the time this distinction did not have its
later significance and although the break between the Eastern and the
Western Churches occurred only in 1054, the Russian allegiance to By-
zantium determined or helped to determine much of the subsequent history
of the country. It meant that Russia remained outside the Roman Catholic
Church, and this in turn not only deprived Russia of what that Church it-
self had to offer, but also contributed in a major way to the relative isola-
tion of Russia from the rest of Europe and its Latin civilization. It helped
notably to inspire Russian suspicions of the West and the tragic enmity
between the Russians and the Poles. On the other side, one can well argue
that Vladimir’s turn to Constantinople represented the richest and the most
rew-arding spiritual, cultural, and political choice that he could make at
the time. Even the absence of Latinism and the emphasis on local languages
had its advantages: it brought religion, in the form of a readily under-
standable Slavic rite, close to the people and gave a powerful impetus to
the development of a national culture. In addition to being remembered as
a mighty and successful ruler, Vladimir was canonized by the Church as the
baptizer of the Russians, “equal to the apostles.”
Vladimir’s death in 1015 led to another civil war. Several of Vladimir’s
sons who had served in different parts of the realm as their father’s lieu-
tenants and had acquired local support became involved in the struggle.
The eldest among them, Sviatopolk, triumphed over several rivals- and
profited from strong Polish aid, only to be finally defeated in 1019 by
another son laroslav, who resumed the conflict from his base in Novgorod.
A POLITICAL OUT LIS r. 3?
Sviatopolfc’s traditional appclation in Russian history can be roughly trans-
lated as “tlic Damned,” and his listed crimes — true or false, for laroslav
was the ultimate victor — include the assassination of three of his brothers,
Sviatoslav, Boris, and Gleb The latter two became saints of the Orthodox
Church
Prince laroslav, known m history as laroslav the Wise, ruled In Kiev
from 1019 until his death in 1054 His reign has been generally acclaimed
as the high point of Kievan development and success Yet, especially m its
first pan, it was fraught with danger, and the needs of the state continued
to demand strenuous exertion from the pnnee and his subjects Civil war
did not end with laroslav ‘s occupation of Kiev In fact he had to flee it and
ultimately, by an agreement of 1026 divide the realm with his brother
Mstislav the Brave, prince of Tmutorokan, a principality situated in the
area where the Kuban flows into the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea
laroslav kept Kiev and authority over the lands west of the Dnieper,
Mstislav secured as his domain the territory cast of u, with the center in
Chernigov Only after the death of Mstislav m 1036 did laroslav become
the ruler of the enure Kievan state and even then the Polotsk district
retained a separate prince Besides fighting for his thionc, laroslav had to
suppress a whole series of local rebellions ranging from a militant pagan
revival in the Suzdal area to (he uprisings of various Finnish and Lithuanian
tribes
laroslav’s foreign wars included a successful effort in 1031 to recover
from Poland the southwestern section which that count. iy obtained in re-
turn for supporting Sviatopolk and an unsuccessful campaign against
Byzantium some twelve years later which proved to be Uie last in the long
sequence of Russian military undertakings against Constantinople But
especial significance attaches to laroslav’s struggle with the attacking Pcchc-
negs in 1037 the decisive Russian victory broke the might of the invaders
and led to a quarter century or relative peace on the steppe frontier, unht
the arrival from the cast of new enemies, the Potovtsy
At the time of laroslav the prestige of the Kievan state stood at its zenith,
the state itself stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea and from tht mouth
of the Oka river to the Carpathian mountains, and the Ktevan ruling
family enjoyed close connections with many other reigning houses of
Europe Himself the husband of a Swedish princess, laroslav obtained the
hands of three European princesses for three of his sons and married his
three daughters to the kings of France, Hungary, and Norway, one of hts
sisters became the wife of the Polish king, another the wife of a Byzantine
prince laroslav offered asylum to exiled rulers and princes, such as the
princes who fled from England and Hungary 3nd St Olaf, the king of Nor-
way, with bis son, and hts coustn Harold Hardrada It should be added that
while the links with the rest of Europe were particularly numerous in the
38 KIEVAN RUSSIA
reign of Iaroslav, they were in genera! a rather common occurrence in Kievan
Russia. Following Baumgarten, Vernadsky has calculated, for instance, that
six Kievan matrimonial alliances were established with Hungary, five with
Bohemia, some fifteen with Poland, and at least eleven with Germany, or,
to be more precise on the last point, at least six Russian princes had
German wives, while “two German marquises, one count, one landgrave,
and one emperor had Russian wives.”
Iaroslav's great fame, however, rests more on his actions at home than
on his activities in foreign relations. His name stands connected with an
impressive religious revival, and with Kievan law, education, architecture,
and art. Church affairs of the reign present certain very intricate puzzles
to the historian. For some reason Kievan sources, and most importantly
the Primary Chronicle, virtually omit Russian ecclesiastical history from the
conversion in 988 to 1037, and, furthermore, give the impression that the
years around the latter date, at the time of Iaroslav, produced a new
departure in Russian Christianity, marked by such a strange act as the
consecration in 1039 of a Kievan church which had been erected by Vladi-
mir. In search of an explanation, Priselkov suggested that until 1037 the
Russian Church was linked to the Bulgarian archbishopric of Ochrid rather
than to Byzantium. Some specialists proposed that the Church at Kiev
turned from Constantinople to Rome or simply took an independent and
disobedient stand vis-S-vis Constantinople. A more recent interpretation, by
Stokes, shifted the emphasis from international ecclesiastical politics to the
internal history of the Kievan state and argued that the change under
Iaroslav consisted in the transfer of the religious center of Russia, the seat
of the metropolitan, from its original location in the city of Pereiaslavl. east
of the Dnieper, to Kiev. At least until further evidence, it seems best to
assume that Russia remained under the jurisdiction of the Byzantine
Church and also had its own metropolitan, whether in Kiev or Pereiaslavl,
from the time of the conversion. Whatever the interpretation of its pre-1037
development, Iaroslav did leave an impact on the Russian Church, changing
or confirming its organization, having an able and educated Russian,
Hilarion, serve as the first native metropolitan, and building and supporting
churches and monasteries on a large scale. He has usually been credited
with a major role in the dissemination and consolidation of Christianity
in Russia.
Iaroslav the Wise has the reputation also of a lawgiver, for he has gener-
ally been considered responsible for the first Russian legal code. The Russian
Justice, an invaluable source for our knowledge of Kievan society and life.
And he played a significant role in Kievan culture by such measures as his
patronage of artists and architects and the establishment of a large school
and a library in Kiev.
roUTJ
ITMHB
39
The Decline and Fall of the hie\an State
Before his death Iaroslav assigned separate princedoms to his sons
Ixiaslav, the eldest, received the Kiev and Novgorod areas, Sviatoslav, the
second, the area centered on Chernigov, Vsevolod, the third, Perciaslavl,
Viacheslav, the fourth, Smolensk; and Igor, the fifth, Vladimir-m-VoIyma
— -always with their surrounding territories The princes, apparently, were
expected to co operate and to hold Kievan Russia together Moreover, it
would seem that when a vacancy occurred, they were to move up step by
step, with the position m Kiev the summit Some such moves did in fact
take place, but the system — If indeed it can be called a system — quickly
bogged down. laroslav's arrangement, based quite possibly on old Clan
concepts and relations still present in the ruling family, worked to break
the natural link between a prince and his state, and it excluded sons from
succession in favor of their uncles, their late father s brolhers Besides, with
a constant increase in the number of pnnccs, precise calculations of appro-
priate appointments became extremely difficult At their meeting in Liubcch
in 1097 the pnnccs agreed that the practice of succession from lather to
son should prevail Yet the principle of rotation from brother to brother
remained linked for a long time to the most important seat of all, that of
the Grand Prince m Kiev
The reigns of Imstav, Sviatoslav, and Vsevolod, the last of whom died
in 1093, as well as that of Iziaslav’s sonSviatopolk, who succeeded Vsevolod
and ruled until his death m U13. present a frightening record of virtually
constant civil wars which failed to resolve with any degree of permanence
the problem of political power in Kievan Russia At |he some tunc ihe
Kievan state had to face a new major enemy , die Polovtsy, or the Cumans
as they are known to Western authors This latest wave of Turkic invaders
from Asia had defeated the Pcchencgs, pushing them toward the Danube,
and had occupied the southeastern steppe They attacked Kievan territory
for the first time m 1061, and after that initial assault became a persistent
threat to the security and even existence of Kievan Russia and a constant
dram on its resources
Although hard beset, the Kievan state had one more revival, under an
outstanding ruler, Vladimir Monomakh A son of Grand Prince Vsevolod,
Vladimir Monomakh became prominent m the political life of the country
long before he formally assumed the highest authority he acted with and
for his father in many matters and he took the lead at princely conferences,
such as those of 1097 and 1100 to settle internecine disputes or that or
1103 to concert action in defense of the steppe border Also, he played a
major role in the actual fighung against the Polovtsy, obtaining perhaps his
greatest victory over them, in 1131 at Sainitsa, before his elevation to the
Kievan seat. As Grand Prince, that is, from 1123 until his death in 1125
Vladimir Monomakh fought virtually all the time. He waged war ia
Livonia, Finland, the land of the Volga BuJgars, and the Danubian area
repulsing the Poles and the Hungarians among others; but above all he
campaigned against the Polovtsy. His remarkable Testament speaks of a
grand total of eighty-three major campaigns and also of the killing of two
hundred Polovetsian princes; according to tradition, Polovetsian mothers
used to scare their children with his name. Vladimir Monomakh distin-
guished himself as an effective and indefatigable organizer and administra-
tor, a builder, for instance, of the town of Vladimir in the northeast on
the river Kliazma, which was to become in two generations the seat of the
grand prince, and also as a writer of note. Of special interest is his social
legislation intended to help the poor, in particular the debtors.
Vladimir Monomakh was succeeded by his able and energetic son
Mstislav (ruled 1125-32) and after him by another son, Iaropolk, who
reigned until his death in 1139. But before long the Kievan seat became
again the object of bitter contention and civil war which often followed
the classic Kievan pattern of a struggle between uncles and nephews.
In 1169 one of the contenders, Prince Andrew, or Andrei, Bogoliubskii
of the northeastern principalities of Rostov and Suzdal, not only stormed
and sacked Kiev but, after his victory in the civil war, transferred the capital
to his favorite city of Vladimir. Andrew Bogoliubskii’s action both repre-
sented the personal preference of the new grand prince and reflected a
striking decline in importance of the city on the Dnieper. Kiev was sacked
again in 1203. Finally, it suffered virtually complete destruction in 1240,
at the hands of the Mongols.
The Fall of Kiev: The Reasons
The decline and collapse of Kievan Russia have been ascribed to a num-
ber of factors; but there is considerable controversy about the precise
nature of these factors and no consensus concerning their relative weight.
The most comprehensive general view, held by Soviet historians as a group
and by some others, emphasizes the loose nature of the Kievan state and
its evolution in the direction of further decentralization and feudalism. In
fact, certain specialists raised the question of whether Kievan Russia could
be called a state at all. Aside from this extreme opinion, it has been gen-
erally recognized that the Kievan state, very far from resembling its modem
counterparts, represented in a sense a federation or association of a number
of areas which could be effectively held together only for limited periods
of time and by exceptionally able rulers. Huge distances and poor com-
A POLITICAL OUTLINE 41
mumcauons made ihc issue of ccn(nUz-nion especial!) acute Moreover,
u is argued that Russia, as sm. 1I as Europe in general, evolved toward
natural economy, particularism, and feudalism Therefore, the relatively
slender unifying bonds dissolved, and Russia emerged as an aggregate of
ten or twelve separate areas We shall return to this view when we discuss
the question of feudalism in Russia and on other occasions
Soviet historians, as well as some other specialists, have also pointed
to social conflicts as a factor in the decline of Kiev They refer m particular
to the gradual enserfment of the peasants bj the landlords and to the worsen-
ing position of the urban poor, as indicated by events at the lime of Vladimir
Monomahh Slavery, which Kievan Russia inherited from earlier societies
has also been cited m an element of weakness
Another essential!) economic explanation of the fall of Kievan Russia
stresses trade, or rather the destruction of trad*. In us crude form it argue*
that the Kievan state arose on the great commercial route * from the Varan
gians to the Greeks, ’ lived by it vnd perished when it was cut In -\ more
limited and generally accepted version the worsening of the kwvan position
in international trade has been presented as one major factor in the decline
of Kiev The city on the Dnieper suffered from the change in trad* routes
which began in the eleventh century and resulted, largely through the ac-
tivities of Italian merchants in the Mediterranean, in the establishment of
closer connections between western and central Europe on the one hand
and Byzantium and Asia Minor on the other, and a bypassing of Kiev It
was adversely affected by the Crusades, and in particular by the sacking of
Constantinople by the Crusaders in 1204, as well as by the decline of the
Caliphate of Bagdad The fact that certain Russian towns and areas, such
as Smolensk and especially Novgorod, profited by the rearrangement of
the commercial map of Europe and the nsc of Italian and German cities
only tended to make Kievan control over them less secure Finally, Kiev
experienced tremendous difficulty, and ultimately failed, m protecting from
the steppe peoples the commercial line across the southern steppe to the
Black Sea
In addition to the economic and social analyses, one can turn to the
political A number of historians have placet) much stress on the failure of
the Kievan system of government which they consider a major, possibly
decisive, cause of the collapse of Kievan Russia, rather chan merely a
reflection of more fundamental economic and social difficulties There is a
consensus that the Kievan princely political system did not function well,
but no agreement as to the exact nature of that system Of the two mam
interpretations, one considers it simply to be confusion worse confounded
and a rule of force without broad agreement on principle, while the other
gives full credence and weight to the practice of joint clan rule and of
42 KIEVAN RUSSIA
brother to brother rotation with such further provisions as the equation of
the claims of the elder son of a prince to those of his father’s third brother,
his third uncle. In any case, the system did collapse in constant disputes
and endemic internal strife. Pogodin calculated that of the 170 years follow-
ing the death of Iaroslav the Wise 80 witnessed civil war. Kievan princes
have also been blamed for various faults and deficiencies and in particular
for being too militant and adventurous and often lacking the more solid
attributes of rulers. On this point it would seem, however, that their quali-
ties in general were well suited to the age.
Towns added further complications to princely rule and princely rela-
tions. Towns in Kievan Russia had existed before princely authority ap-
peared, and they represented, so to speak, a more fundamental level of
political organization. As princely disputes increased and princely power
declined, the towns proceeded to play an increasingly significant role in
Kievan politics, especially in determining what prince would rule in a given
town and area. The later evolution of Novgorod represents an extreme case
of this Kievan political tendency.
At least one other factor must be mentioned: foreign pressure. While it
can well be argued that Kievan economics, social relations, and politics all
led to the collapse of the state, the fall of Kiev can also — perhaps para-
doxically — be explained primarily in terms of outside aggression. For
Kiev had to fight countless exhausting wars on many fronts, but above all
in the southeast against the inhabitants of the steppe. The Pcchenegs re-
placed the Khazars, and the Polovtsy the Pechcnegs, but the fighting con-
tinued. After the Polovtsy and the Kievan Russians virtually knocked each
other out, the Mongols came to give the coup de grace. In contrast to the
wars of medieval Europe, these wars were waged on a mass scale with
tremendous effort and destruction. It might be added that during the cen-
turies of Kievan history the steppe had crept up on the forest, and de-
forestation has been cited as one development weakening the military
defenses of Kiev. There exists an epic Russian tale about the destruction
of the Russian land. It tells of the bogatyri, the mighty warriors of Kievan
Russia, meeting the invaders head on. The bogatyri fought very hard;
indeed they split their foes in two with the blows of their swords. But then
each half would become whole, and the enemies kept pressing in ever-
increasing numbers until finally they overwhelmed the Russians.
V
KIEVAN RUSSIA ECONOMICS, SOCIETY, INSTITUTIONS
merry go-round moving harmoniously and melodiously M of
joy Hue spim permeates this form marks everything that comes
from Russia, such Is our song itself, such is its tone such is the Organ-
ization of our Land
t AKSAKOV
The decisive factor in the process of fetidalizatlon proved to be the
emergence of private ownership m land and the expropriation of the
small farmer who was turned into a feudal “tenant of privately
owned land and his exploitation by economic or extra-economic com
pulsion
UASIIC1UNKO
The TRADitioval mew of Kievan economy stresses the role of trade Its
classic document is an account of the activities of the Rus composed by
the tenth century Byzantine emperor and scholar Constantine Torphyro-
genltus Every November, writes Constantine Porphyrogemtus, the Kievan
princes and their retainers went on a tour of the territories of different
tributary Slavic tribes and lived on the fat of those lands during the winter
In April, after the ice on the Dnieper had broken, they relumed, with the
tribute, down the river to Kiev In (he meantime, Slavs, subject to the Rus,
would fell trees, build boats, and in the spring, when rivers became navi-
gable, take them to Kiev and sell them to the pnnee and his retinue Having
outfitted and loaded the boats, the Rus next moved down the Dnieper to
Vitichev where they waited for more boats carrying goods from Novgorod,
Smolensk, Liubcch, ChenngoY, and Vyshgorod to join them Finally, the
entire expedition proceeded down the Dnieper toward the Black Sea and
Constantinople
Khuchevsky and other historians have expounded how this brief Byzan-
tine narrative summarizes some of the most essential characteristics of
Kievan Russia, and even, so to speak, its life cycle The main concern of
the prince and his retainers was to gather tribute from subject territories,
cither, as described above, by visiting the different parts of the realm during
the winter — a process called pohudie in Russian — or by having the
tribute brought to them — pn\oz The tribute m kind, which the prince
obtained tn his capacity as ruler and which consisted m particular of such
items as furs, wax, and honey, formed the found ation of the commercial
undertakings of the Rus Slaves constituted another major commodity the
43
continuous expansion of the Kievan state connected with repeated wars
enabled the prince constantly to acquire human chattels for foreign markets.
The Kievan ruler thus acted as a merchant-prince on a grand scale. His
retainers, the druzhina, emulated him as best they could: they helped him
gather tribute in winter, and received their share of it, which they took for
sale abroad with the great summer expedition of the Rus. Many other
merchants from different parts of Kievan Russia with their merchandise
joined the princely train to secure protection on the way and support for
their interests at the end of the journey. The gathering of tribute, the con-
struction of boats and their sale each spring near Kiev, the organization of
the commercial convoy, and finally the expedition itself Jinked the entire
population of the Dnieper basin, and even of Kievan Russia in the large,
and constituted the indispensable economic foundation of the Kievan state.
With regularity, coins from Byzantium or Bagdad found their way to the
banks of the Oka or the Volkhov rivers.
Constantine Forphyrogenitus’ account, it is further argued, explains
also the foreign policy of the Rus which followed logically from their
economic interests. The rulers in Kiev strove to gain foreign markets and
to protect the lifelines of trade leading to those markets. The Kievan slate
depended above all on the great north-south commercial route “from the
Varangians to the Greeks” which formed its main economic and political
ECONOMICS, SOCIETY, INSTITUTIONS 45
axis, and it pcnshed with the blocking of this route The famous Russian
campaigns against Constantinople, in 860, under Oleg m 907, under Igor
in 941 and 944, under Sviatoslav in 970, and m the reign of taroslav the
Wise in 1043, demonstrate in an especially striking manner this synthesis
between trade and foreign policy Typically, wars began over such incidents
as attacks on Russian merchants in Constantinople and ended with trade
pacts All the Russo-Byzantme treaties which have come down to us ex
hibit a commercial character Furthermore, their provisions dealing with
trade are both extremely detailed and juridically highly developed, con-
stituting m tact an engaging chapter in the history of international relations
and international law Russian commercial interests, It may well be noted,
obtained various advantages from these agreements, and they were con-
sidered m Constantinople not as pnvatc enterprise but as trade missions of
the allied Kievan court
Tull evidence for a history of Kievan commerce goes of course, far
beyond Constantine Porphyrogcmius narration and even beyond the sig-
nificant story of Russo Byzantine relations Its main points include trade
routes and activities in southern Russia pnor to the formation of the Kievan
state, a subject expertly treated by Rostovtzcff and some other specialists
Attention must also be drawn to the widespread commercial enterprises
of the East Slavs themselves long before the time of Oleg as well as to
the fact that at the dawn of Kievan history they already possessed many
towns Saveliev, for instance, estimates that the trade of the East Slavs with
Oriental countries, which extended to the borders of China dates at least
from the seventh century a d Some Russian weights and measures were
borrowed from the cast, notably from Mesopotamia, while others came
originally from Rome Similarly, to the west at an early date the East
Slavs established trade relations with their closer neighbors and also with
some more remote European countries, like Scandinavia With the flower
mg of the Kievan $t3tc, Russian trade continued to grow, and on on an
pressivc scale Its Complexity and high degree of development find strong
reflection, for example, in the elevcnlh-ccntury legal code, The Russian
Justice
Whereas the traditional estimate of Kievan economy stresses commerce, a
different interpretation emphasizing agriculture has more recently risen
into prominence Grekov was the ablest exponent of this view, and his
uork has been continued by other Soviet historians These scholars care-
fully delineate the early origin of agnculcure in Russra and its great com-
plexity and extent prior to as well as after the establishment of the Kievan
state In point of time, as mentioned earlier, agriculture in southern Russia
goes back to the Scythian ploughmen and even to a neolithic civilization
of the fourth millennium before Christ The past of the East Slavs also
testifies to their ancient and fundamental Jink with agriculture For example.
46 KIEVAN RUSSIA
linguistic data indicate that from deep antiquity they were acquainted with
various kinds of grains, vegetables, and agricultural tools and implements.
Their pagan religion contained the cults of mother earth and the sun,
and their different beliefs and rites connected with the agricultural cycle
survived in certain aspects of the worship of the .Virgin and of Saints Elijah,
George, and Nicholas, among others. The East Slavic calendar had its months
named after the tasks which an agricultural society living in a forest found
it necessary to perform: the month when trees are cut down, the month
when they dry, the month when burned trees turn to ashes, and so on.
Archaeological finds similarly demonstrate the great antiquity and per-
vasiveness of agriculture among the East Slavs; in particular they include
metallic agricultural implements and an enormous amount of various grains,
often preserved in separate buildings.
Written sources offer further support of the case. “Products of the earth”
were mentioned as early as the sixth century in a reference to the Antes.
Slavic flax was reported on Central Asiatic markets in the ninth century,
where it came to be known as “Russian silk.” Kievan writings illustrate the
central position of agriculture in Kievan life. Bread emerges as the principal
food of men, oats of horses. Bread and water represent the basic ration,
much bread is associated with abundance, while a drought means a calamity.
It should be noted that the Kievan Russians knew the difference between
winter grain and spring grain. The Russian Justice, for all its concern with
trade, also laid extremely heavy penalties for moving field boundaries.
Tribute and taxes too, while sometimes paid in furs, were more generally
connected to the “plough” as the basic unit, which probably referred to a
certain amount of cultivated land.
Grekov and other Soviet historians argue further that this fundamental
role of agriculture in Kievan economy determined the social character of
the prince and his druzhina and indeed the class structure of Kievan society.
They emphasize the connections of the prince and his retainers with the
land as shown in references to elaborate princely households, the spread
of princely and druzhina estates throughout Kievan territory, and nicknames
associated with the land. They consider that Kievan Russia was developing
into a fully feudal society, in the definition of which they stress the prev-
alence of manorial economy.
It can readily be seen that the evidence supporting the significance of
trade in Kievan Russia and the evidence urging the importance of agri-
culture supplement, rather than cancel, each other. Both occupations, then,
must be recognized as highly characteristic of the country. But the inter-
relationship of the two docs present certain difficulties. One view holds that
the bulk of population supported itself by agriculture, whereas the prince
and the upper class were mainly interested in trade. Other specialists stress
ECONOMICS. SOCIfTV, INSTITUTIONS 47
the evolution in time, suggesting tint, while Constantine Forphyrogenitus’
account may be a valid guide for the middle of the tenth century, subse-
quent Kievan development tipped the scales increasingly m favor of agri-
culture Furthermore, there is no consensus on the social structure of Kievan
Russia which is intimately related to this complicated economic picture
Kievan exports, as has already been mentioned in the case of Byzantium,
consisted primarily of raw materials. In particular furs, wax, and honey, and
also, during ihc earlier part of Kievan history, of slaves Other items for
sale included flax, hemp, low, burlap, hops, sheepskin, and hides In
return the Kievan Russians purchased such luxury goods as wines. Silk
fabrics, and objects of ait from Byzantium, and spices, precious stones, and
various fine fabrics from the Orient Byzantium also supplied naval stores,
while Damask blades and superior horses came from the east From the
west the Kievan Russians imported certain manufactured goods, for instance
textiles and glassware, as well as some metals and other items, such as
Hungarian horses Russian merchants went abroad in many directions and
foreign traders came in large numbers to Russia, where they established
themselves sometimes as separate communities, in Kiev, Novgorod, Smo-
lensk, Suzdal, and other centers The newcomers included Germans, Greeks,
Armenians, Jews, Volga Bulgars, merchants from the Caucasus, and repre-
sentatives of still other nationalities Russian traders themselves were often
organized m associations stmilar to Western guilds, not to mention less
formal groupings Financial transactions and commercial activity in general
enjoyed a high development It should be added that, in addition to ex-
change for direct consumption, the Kievan Russians engaged in transit
trade on a large scale
Internal trade, although less spectacular than foreign commerce, likewise
dated from time immemorial and satisfied important needs Kiev, Novgorod,
and other leading towns served as its main centers, but it also spread widely
throughout the land Some of this domestic trade stemmed from the
division of the country into the steppe and the forest, the gram-producing
south and the gram-consuming north — a fact of profound significance
throughout Russian history — and the resulting prerequisites for exchange
Commerce led to a wide circulation of money Originally furs were used
as currency in the north and cattle in the south But, beginning with the
reign of St Vladimir, Kievan minting began with, in particular, silver bars
and coins Foreign money too accumulated in considerable quantities in
Kievan Russia
Agriculture developed both in the steppe and in the forest In the steppe
it acquired an extensive, rather than intensive, character, the peasant cul-
tivating new, good, and easily avadablc land as his old field became less
productive In the forest a more complex process evolved The trees had to
48
K l E'
N RUSSIA
be cut down — a process called podseka — and the ground prepared for
sowing. Moreover, when the soil became exhausted, a new field could be
obtained only after further hard work. Therefore, the perelog practice
emerged: the cultivator utilized one part of his land and left the other fal-
low, alternating the two after a number of years. Eventually a regular two-
field system grow out of the perelog, with the land divided into annually
rotated halves. Toward the end of the Kievan period the three-field system
appeared, marking a further important improvement in agriculture and a
major increase in the intensity of cultivation: the holding came to be divided
into three parts, one of which was sown under a spring grain crop, harvested
in the autumn, another under a so-called winter grain crop, sown in the
autumn and harvested in the summer, while the third was left fallow; the
three parts were rotated in sequence each year. Agricultural implements
improved with time; the East Slavs used a wooden plough as early as the
eighth and even the seventh century a.d. Wheat formed the bulk of the
produce in the south; rye, also barley and oats, in the north. With the evolu-
tion of the Kievan state, princes, boyars, and monasteries developed large-
scale agriculture. It may be noted in this connection that, in the opinion of
some scholars, private ownership of land in Kievan Russia should be dated
from the eleventh century at the earliest, while, on indirect evidence, other
specialists ascribe the origins of tliis institution to the tenth or the ninth cen-
turies, and even to a still more distant past.
The East Slavs and later the Kievan Russians engaged in many other
occupations as well. Cattle raising has existed since very ancient times in
the steppe of southern Russia, and a Byzantine author of the sixth century
a.d. wrote about the great number and variety of cattle possessed by the
Antes. Forest environment on the other hand led to the acquisition of such
skills as carpentry and woodworking in general, as well as apiculture, and
the forests also served as enormous game preserves. Hunting for furs, hides,
and meat, together with fishing in the many rivers and lakes, developed long
before the formation of the state on the Dnieper and continued to be im-
portant in Kievan Russia. The Kievan people mined metal, primarily iron,
and extracted salt. Their other industries included pottery, metalwork, fur-
riery, tanning, preparation of textiles, and building in stone, not to mention
many less widespread arts and crafts practiced at times with a consummate
artistry. Rybakov and some other investigators liave recently shed much
light on this interesting aspect of Kievan life.
Kievan Society
Vernadsky’s well-known and perhaps high estimate has placed the popu-
lation of Kievan Russia in the twelfth century at seven or eight million.
ECONOMICS, SOCIETY, INSTITUTIONS 49
At the top stood the pnnee and the ever-increasing princely family with its
numerous branches, followed by the retainers of the pnnee, the druzhina.
The latter, divided according to their importance and function into the
senior and the junior druzhina, together with the local aristocracy formed
the upper class of the country, known in the Russian Justice and other docu-
ments of the time as the muzhl With the evolution of the Kievan state the
retainers of the prince and the regional nobility fused into a single group
which was to play for centuries an important role m Russian history under
the name of the boyars After the muzht came the liudj who can be gen-
erally described as the Kicvon middle class Because of the great number
and significance of towns m Kievan Russia, ihis class had considerable rela-
tive weight, more than its counterparts in other European countries at the
time or in Russia In later periods, even though apparently it diminished
with the decline of the state
The bulk of the population, the so-called smerdy, remained agricultural
and mral Kievan peasants, or at least the great majority of them, seem to
have been free men at the dawn of Kievan history, and free peasantry
remained an important element throughout the evolution of the Kievan
state, although bondage gradually increased Indeed several kinds of bonds-
men emerged, their dependence often resulting from their inability to repay
the landlord’s loan which they had needed to establish or re-establish their
economy in troubled times The slaves occupied die bottom of the social
pyramid It may be added that the principal taxes in Kiev were levied on
the ’plough” or the “smoke,” meaning a household, and were gathered
only in the countryside and apparendy exclusively from the peasants,
A special group consisted of people connected with the Church, both the
clergy who manicd and had families and the monks and nuns, together
with others serving the huge ecclesiastical establishment in many different
capacities The Church operated hospitals and hostels, dispensed charity,
and engaged in education, to mention only some of its activities. In addition
to performing the fundamental religious functions Sull another classifica-
tion, that of the izgoi, encompassed various displaced social elements, such
as freed slaves
Soviet historians — and, for different reasons, Pavlov Silvansky and a
few other early scholars — consider the evolution of Kievan society in terms
of the establishment of a full lledged feudalism But the prevalence of money
economy in Kievan Russia, the importance of towns and trade, the unre-
stricted rather than feudal attitude to landed property, the limited and dele-
gated authority of the local magnates, as well as certain other factors, indi-
cate senous weaknesses of any such view and suggest that the issue of
feudalism in Russia can be more profitably discussed when dealing with a
later period of Russian history.
50
K I EVA'
RUSSt.
Kievan Institutions
The chief Kievan political institutions were the office of prince, the duma
or council of the boyars, and the veche or town assembly, which have been
linked, respectively, to the autocratic or monarchic, aristocratic, and demo-
cratic aspects of the Kievan state. While princes in Kievan Russia prolifer-
ated, the one in Kiev retained a special position. From the twelfth century
he carried the title of the great, or grand, prince. Princely tasks included
military leadership, the rendering of justice, and administration. In war the
prince could rely first of all on his own druzhina, and after that on the regi-
ments of important towns, and even, in case of need, on a mass levy. Kievan
military histocy, as has already been mentioned, proved to be unusually
rich, and the organization and experience of Kievan armies left a legacy for
later ages.
In both justice and administration the prince occupied the key position.
Yet he had to work with elected as well as his own appointed officials and
in general co-ordinate his efforts with the local elements. To repeat a point
made earlier, princely government came relatively late and had to be
superimposed on rather well-developed local institutions, notably so in
towns. The customary law of the Kievan Russians, known to us best through
the Russian Justice, a code associated with laroslav the Wise, indicates a
relatively high development of Kievan society, especially in the fields of
trade and finance. It has also attracted attention for the remarkable mildness
of its punishments, including a reliance on fines in preference to the death
penalty. Canon law came with Christianity from Byzantium. In addition to
the direct taxes on the “smoke” and the “plough,” state revenue accumu-
lated from judicial fees and fines, as well as from tariffs and other imposts
on commerce.
The boyar duma developed, it would seem, from consultations and joint
work of the prince and his immediate retinue, the senior druzhina. It ex-
panded with the evolution of Kievan Russia, reflecting the rise of the boyar
class and also such developments as the conversion of Russia to Christianity,
for the higher clergy found a place in the duma. While it would be quite
incorrect to consider the boyar duma as analogous to a parliament — al-
though it might be compared to its immediate predecessor, the curia regis
— or even to claim for it a definite legal limitation of princely power, it
remained an extremely important institution in its customary capacity as
the constant adviser and collaborator of the prince. We know of a few oc-
casions when the senior druzbina refused to follow the prince because he
had failed to consult It.
Finally, the democratic element in the Kievan state found a certain ex-
ECONOMICS, 50CIETY, INSTITUTIONS
51
prcssion in the veche or town meeting similar to the assemblies of freemen
in the barbarian kingdoms of the West All heads of households could par-
ticipate m these gatherings, held usually in the market place and called to
decide such basic issues as war and peace, emergency legislation, and con-
flicts with the pnnee or between princes The frequently unruly veche prac-
tice of decision by unanimity, can be described as an application of direct
democracy, ignoring such principles as representation and majority rule The
veche derived from prehistoric tunes and thus preceded princely authority
with which it never became fully co-ordinated In the Kievan penod, the
veche in Kiev itself played an especially significant role, but there were other
vecha m action all over Russia In fact, the most far reaching development
of this institution was to occur a little later in Novgorod
The economic and social development of Kievan Russia, and m particular
its institutions, deserve study not only in themselves but also as the heritage
of the subsequent periods of Russian history For example we shall time
and again be concerned with the prince, the duma, and the veche as they
evolved differently under changing circumstances in venous parts of what
used to be the Kievan state
V I
KIEVAN RUSSIA: RELIGION AND CULTURE
Old customs and beliefs have left but the slightest trace in the docu-
ments of the earlier period, and no systematic attempt to record the
national epic was made until the middle of the nineteenth century.
Moreover, it is generally admitted that the survival of folklore has
suffered important modifications in the course of lime. Under these
conditions any attempt to present a comprehensive survey of Russian
cultural developments previous to the seventeenth century meets with
insurmountable obstacles and is necessarily incomplete and one-sided.
The sources have preserved merely the Christian literature, while the
bulk of the national epic has been irretrievably lost. . . . The early
literary efforts of native origin were hardly more than slavish imita-
tions of the Byzantine patterns.
FLORINSKY
Yet, Kievan Russia, like the golden days of childhood, was never
dimmed in the memory of the Russian nation. In the pure fountain
of her literary works anyone who wills can quench his religious thirst;
in her venerable authors he can find his guide through the complexities
of the modern world. Kievan Christianity has the same value for the
Russian religious mind as Pushkin for the artistic sense: that of a
standard, a golden measure, a royal way.
FEDOTOV
The Kievan Russians, as we have seen, had two religions in succession:
paganism and Christianity. The heathen faith of the East Slavs included a
deification of the forces of nature, animism in general, and a worship of
ancestral spirits. Of the many gods, Perun, the deity of thunder and light-
ning, claimed special respect. East Slavic paganism lacked elaborate organi-
zation or institutional development. Vladimir’s efforts to strengthen it proved
to be short-lived, and the conversion to Christianity came quickly and rela-
tively painlessly, although we know of some instances of the use of force by
the government, and of certain rebellions. But the effectiveness of the bap-
tism of Russia represents a more controversial matter. Some historians, in-
cluding Golubinsky and other Church historians, have declared that the new
religion for centuries retained only a superficial hold on the masses, which
remained stubbornly heathen in their true convictions and daily practices,
incorporating many of their old superstitions into Christianity. Some scholars
speak of dvoeverie, meaning a double faith, a term used originally by such
religious leaders of the time as St. Theodosius to designate this troublesome
phenomenon.
52
religion and culture 53
Kievan Christianity presents its own problems to the historian Rich in
content and relatively well known it revealed the tremendous impact of its
Byzantine origin and model as well as changes to fit Russian circumstances
The resulting product has been both unduly praised as an organically Rus-
sian and generally superior type of Christianity and excessively blamed for
Its superficiality and derivative nature In drawing a balance it should be
made clear that m certain important respects Kiev an Chnsuamty could not
even copy that of Byzantium, let alone surpass it Thus theology and phi-
losophy found little ground on which to grow m Kievan Russia and pro-
duced no major fruits In fact, Kievan religious writings in general closely
followed their Byzantine originals and made a mintmal independent con-
tribution to the Christian heritage Mysticism too remained alien to Kievan
soil Yet in another sense Kievan Christianity did grow and develop on its
own It represented, after all the religion of an entire, newly baptized people
with its special attitudes, demands, and ethical and esthetic traditions This
Russification, so to speak of Byzantine Christianity became gradually ap-
parent in the emergence of Kievan saints, in the creativ c growth of church
architecture and art, in the daily life of the Kievan Orthodox Church, and
in its total influence on Russian society and culture
Kievan saints, who it might be added, were sometimes canonized with
considerable delay and over pronounced opposition from Byzantium which
was apparently unwilling to accord too much luster to the young Russian
Church, included of course Vladimir the baptizer of Russia, Olga the first
Christian ruler of Kiev and certain princes and religious leaders Of these
princes, Boris and Gleb deserve special notice as reflecting both Kievan
politics and in a sense — m their lives and canonization — Kievan men
tality As mentioned before, the brothers, sons of St Vladtmtr and hts
Bulgarian wife, were murdered, allegedly, by their half brother Sviatopolk,
in the fratricidal struggles preceding Iaroslav the Wise's accession to power
They were elev ated to sainthood as innocent victims of civil u ar, but also,
at least in the case of Boris, because they preferred death to active participa-
tion in the deplorable conflict St Anthony, who lived approximately from
982 to 1073, and St Theodosius, who died in 1074, stand out among the
canonized churchmen Both were monks and both are associated with the
establishment of monasticism in Russia and with the creation and organiza-
tion of the Monastery or the Caves near Kiev Yet they possessed untike
personalities, represented dissimilar religious types, and left different im-
pacts on Russian Christianity Anthony, who took Ins monastic vows on
Mount Athov and whose very name recalled that of the founder of atl
monasticism, St Anthony the Great, followed the classic path of asceticism
and struggle for the salvation of one’s soul His disciple, Theodosius, while
extremely ascetic in his own life, made his major contribution in develop-
ing the monastic community and in stressing the social ideal of seivtce to
54 KIEVAN RUSSIA
the needy, be they princes who required advice or the hungry poor. The
advice, if need be, could become an admonition or even a denunciation. A
number of St. Theodosius’ writings on different subjects have been pre-
served. Following the lead and the organizational pattern of the Monastery
of the Caves near Kiev, monasteries spread throughout the land, although
in Kievan Russia, in contrast to later periods of Russian history, they clus-
tered in and near towns.
At the end of the Kievan period the Russian Church, headed by the
metropolitan in Kiev, encompassed sixteen dioceses, a doubling from St.
Vladimir’s original eight. Two of them had the status of archbishoprics.
The Russian metropolitan and Church remained under the jurisdiction of
the patriarch of Constantinople. In the days of Kiev only two metropolitans
are known to have been Russians, Hilarion in die eleventh century and
Clement in the twelfth; especially at first, many bishops also came from
Byzantium. The link with Byzantium contributed to the strength and inde-
pendence of the Russian Church in its relations with the State. But in gen-
eral the period witnessed a remarkable co-operation, rather than conflict,
between Church and State.
As already mentioned, the Church in Kievan Russia obtained vast hold-
ings of land and pre-empted such fields as charity, healing the sick, and
sheltering travelers, in addition to its specifically religious functions. Canon
law extended not only to those connected with the ecclesiastical establish-
ment but, especially on issues of morality and proper religious observance,
to the people at large. The Church also occupied a central position, as we
shall see, in Kievan education, literature, and the arts. The over-all impact
of religion on Kievan society and life is much more difficult to determine.
Kievan Christianity has been described, often in glowing terms, as peculiarly
associated with a certain joyousness and affirmation of man and his works;
as possessing a powerful cosmic sense and emphasizing the transfiguration
of the entire universe, perhaps under the influence of the closeness to nature
of the pagan East Slavs; or as expressing in particular the kenotic element
in Christianity, that is, the belief in the humble Christ and His sacrifice,
in contrast to the Byzantine stress on God the Father, the ruler of heaven
and earth. Whatever the validity of these and other similar evaluations of
Kievan Christianity — and they seem to contain some truth in spite of the
complexity of the issues involved and the limited and at times biased nature
of our sources — Christian principles did affect life in Kievan Russia. Their
influence can be richly illustrated from Kievan literature and especially its
ethical norms, such as the striking concept of the good prince which emerges
from Vladimir Monomakh’s Testament, the constant emphasis on alms-
giving in the writings of the period, and the sweeping endorsement of Chris-
tian standards of behavior.
RELIGION AND CULTURE
55
Language and Luerature
The language of the Russians too was affected by their conversion to
Christianity The emergence among the Russians of a written language,
using the Cyrillic alphabet, has been associated with the baptism of the
country, the writing itself having been originally devised by St Cynl and
St Methodius, the apostles to the Slavs, m the second half of the ninth
century for the benefit of the Moras lans More precisely, the dominant view
today is that St Cyril invented the older Glagolithtc alphabet and that the
Cyrillic was a somewhat later development earned out by one of his dis-
ciples, probably in Bulgaria While there exists some evidence, notably In
the early treaties with Byzantium and in the fact that these treaties were
translated mto Slavic, that the Russians had been acquainted with writing
before 988, the conversion firmly and permanently established the written
language in Russia To repeat, the liturgy itself, as well as the lesser services
of the Church and its other activities, were conducted in Church Slavonic,
readily understandable to ihc people, not in Greek, nor in Latin as in the
West A. written literature based on the religious observances grew qutckly
and before long embraced other fields as well The language of this Kievan
written literature has traditionally been considered to be the same as Church
Slavonic, a litcraty language based on an eastern South Slavic dialect which
became the tongue of Slavic Christianity Recently, however, certain schol-
ars, and especially Obnorsky, have advanced the highly questionable argu-
ment that the basic written, as well as spoken, language of Kievan society
had been and remained essentially Russian, although it experienced strong
Church Slavonic influences Perhaps it would be best to say that many writ-
ten works of the Kievan period were written in Church Slavonic, others in
Russian — Old Church Slavonic and Old Russian, to be more exact — and
still others in n mixture or blend of both In any case, the Kievan Russians
possessed a rather rich and well developed literary language, one compari-
son of an eleventh century Russian translation with the original Byzantine
chronicle indicates that the Russian version had the exact equivalents of
eighty per cent of the Greek vocabulary The conversion to Christianity
had meant not only an influx of Greek terms, dominant in the sphere of
religion and present in many other areas, but also certain borrowings from
the Balkan Slavs, notably the Bulgarians, who had accepted Christianity
earlier and who helped its dissemination in Russia
Kievan literature consisted of two sharply different categories oral crea-
tions, and wntten works linked to particular authors Although It is highly
probable that the great bulk of Kievan folklore has been lost, enough re-
mains to demonstrate its richness and variety. That folklore had developed
56 KIEVAN RUSSIA
largely in the immemorial past, and it expanded further to incorporate
Kievan experiences. It has been noted, for example, that different Russian
wedding songs reflect several distinct stages of social relations: marriage by
kidnapping, marriage by purchase, and marriage by consent. Funeral dirges
too go very far back in expressing the attitude of the East Slavs toward
death. These and other kinds of Russian folk songs often possess outstand-
ing lyrical and generally artistic qualities that have received recognition
throughout the world. Kievan folklore also included sayings, proverbs, rid-
dles, and fairy tales of different kinds.
But special interest attaches to the epic poems, the famous byliny. They
represent one of the several great epic cycles of Western literature, com-
parable in many ways to the Homeric epic of the Greeks, or to the Serbian
epic. The byliny narrate the activities of the bogatyri, the mighty warriors
of ancient Russia, who can be divided into two categories: a few senior
bogatyri and the more numerous junior ones. Members of the first group,
concerning whom little information remains, belong to hoary antiquity,
overlap with or even become part of mythology, and seem often to be as-
sociated with forces or phenomena of nature. The junior Kievan bogatyri,
about whom wc possess some four hundred epic songs, reflect Kievan his-
tory much better, although their deeds too usually belong to the realm of
the fantastic and the miraculous. Typically, they form the entourage of St.
Vladimir, at whose court many byliny begin and end, and they fight the deadly
enemies of the Russian land. The Khazars, with their Hebrew faith, may
appear in the guise of the legendary Zhidovin, the Jew; or Tugor Khan of
the Polovtsy may become the dragon Tugarin. The junior bogatyri express
the peculiarly Kievan mixture of a certain kind of knighthood, Christianity,
and the unremitting struggle against the steppe peoples.
Ilia of Murom, Dobrynia Nikitych, and Alesha Popovicli stand out as the
favorite heroes of the epic. Ilia of Murom, the mightiest of them and in many
respects the most interesting, is depicted as an invalid peasant who only at
the age of thirty-three after a miraculous cure started on his great career
of defending Kievan Russia against its enemies: his tremendous military
exploits do not deprive him of a high moral sense and indeed combine
with an unwillingness to fight, except as a last resort. If Ilia of Murom
represents the rural masses of Kiev, Dobrynia Nikitych belongs clearly to
the upper stratum: his bearing and manners strike a different note than
those of the peasant warrior, and in fact he, more tlian other bogatyri, has
links to an actual historical figure, an uncle and associate of St. Vladimir.
Alesha Popovich, as the patronymic indicates, comes from the clerical class;
his characteristics include bragging, greediness, and a certain shrewdness
that often enables him to defeat his opponents by means other than valor.
In addition to the great Kievan cycle, we know some Novgorod byliny that
REtlOlON AND CULTURE 5?
will be mentioned later in a discussion of that city state and a few stra>
epic: poems not fitting into any cycle, os «m as the artistically much less
valuable historical songs of the Moscow period
Kievan written literature ns already nored, developed in dose association
with the conversion of the Russians to Christianity Tt contained Church
service books, collections of Old Testament narratives, canonical and apoc-
ryphal, known as Palaea after the Greek word for Old Testament, sermons
and other didactic works hymns, and lives of saints Among the more
prominent pieces one might mention ihc hymns composed by St Cyril of
Turov, a collection of the lives of the saints of the Monastery of the Caves
near Kiev, the so-called Patertkon and the writings of HilanOn, a metro-
politan m the reign of laroslav the Wise and a leading Kievan intellectual
who has been described by Fedotov as the best theologian and preacher
of all ancient Russia the Muscovite period included 1 Hilanon’s best known
work, a sermon On Law and Grace begins with a skillful comparison of
the law of Moses and die grace of Chmt the Old and the New Testaments,
and proceeds to a rhetorical account of the baptism of Russia and a paean
of praise to St Vladimir, the baptizer It hat olten been cited as a fine ex-
pression of the joyously affirmative spirit of Kievan Christianity
The chronicles of the period deserve special notice Although frequently
written by monks and reflecting the strong Christian assumptions of Kiev no
civilization, they belong more with the historical than the religious htera
turc These early Russian chronicles have been praised by specialists for
their historical sense, realism, and richness of detail They indicate clearly
the major problems ot Kievan Russia such as the struggle against the
peoples of the steppe and the issue of pnnccly succession Sull more impor-
tant, they have passed on to us the specific facts of the history of the pe-
riod The greatest value attaches to the Primary Chronicle — to which we
have already made many references — associated especially with two Kievan
monks, Nestor and Sylvester, and daung from around 1111 The earliest
extant copies of it ore the fourteenth-century Laurenuan and the fificenth-
century Hypatian The Primary Chronicle forms the basis ol all later general
Russian chronicles Regional chronicles, such as those of Novgorod or
Vladimir, a number of which survive, also flourished in Kievan Russia
The secular literature of Kievan Russia included a variety ot w orks rang-
ing from Vladimir Monomakh's remarkable Testament to the most famous
product of all The Lay of the Host of Igor The Lay. a poetic account of
the unsuccessful Russian campaign against the Polov fsy in 1185, written m
verse or rhythmic prose, has evoked much admiration and considerable
controversy Although one view, championed by Mazon, more recently
Zimin, anil some other scholars, holds it to be a modem forgery, the Lay
has been accepted by Jakobson and most specialists as a genuine, if in cer-
58 KIEVAN RUSSIA
tain respects unique, expression of Kievan genius. Its unknown author ap-
parently had a detailed knowledge of the events that he described, as well
as a great poetic talent. The narrative shifts from the campaign and the de-
cisive battle of one of the local Russian princes, Igor and his associates, to
Kiev where Grand Prince Sviatoslav learns of the disaster, and to Putivl
where Igor’s wife laroslavna speaks her justly celebrated lament for her lost
husband. The story concludes with Igor’s escape from his captors and the
joy of his return to Russia. The Lay is written in magnificent language
which reproduces in haunting sounds the clang of battle or the rustle of the
steppe; and it also deserves praise for its impressive imagery, its lyricism,
the striking treatment of nature — in a sense animate and close to man —
and the vividness, power, and passion with which it tells its tale.
Architecture and Other Arts
If Kievan literature divides naturally into the oral or popular and the writ-
ten, Kievan architecture can be classified on a somewhat parallel basis as
wooden or stone. Wooden architecture, like folk poetry, stems from the
prehistoric past of the East Slavs. Stone architecture and written literature
were both associated with the conversion to Christianity, and both experi-
enced a fundamental Byzantine influence. Yet they should by no means
be dismissed for this reason as merely derivative, for, already in the days
of Kiev, they had developed creatively in their new environment and pro-
duced valuable results. Borrowing, to be sure, forms the very core of cul-
tural history.
Because wood is highly combustible, no wooden structures survive from
the Kievan period, but some two dozen of the stone churches of that age
have come down to our times. Typically they follow their Byzantine models
in their basic form, that of a cross composed of squares or rectangles, and
in many other characteristics. But from the beginning they also incorporate
such Russian attributes as the preference for several and even many cupolas
and, especially in the north, thick walls, small windows, and steep roofs to
withstand the inclement weather. The architects of the great churches of the
Kievan age came from Byzantium and from other areas of Byzantine or
partly Byzantine culture, such as the Slavic lands in the Balkans and certain
sections of the Caucasus, but they also included native Russians.
The Cathedral of St. Sophia in Kiev, built in 1037 and the years follow-
ing, has generally been considered the most splendid surviving monument
of Kievan architecture. Modeled after a church in Constantinople and
erected by Greek architects, it follows the form of a cross made of squares,
with five apses on the eastern or sanctuary side, five naves, and thirteen
cupolas. The sumptuous interior of the cathedral contains columns of por-
phyry, marble, and alabaster, as well as mosaics, frescoes, and other decora-
RELIGION ANb CULTURE 59
tion In Novgorod another majestic and luxurious Cathedral of St Sophia
— a favorite Byzantine dedication of churches to Christ as Wisdom — built
by Greeks around 1052, became the center of the life of that city and tern-
tor}’ But still more outstanding from the artistic point of view, according
to Grabar, was the St George Cathedral of the St George Monaster) near
Novgorod Erected by a Russian mister, Peter, in 1119-30, this building
With its three apses, three cupolas, and unomamented walls of white stone
produces an unforgettable impression of grace, majesty, and simplicity.
The architecture of the Kievan penod achieved especially sinking results
in the twelfth and the Grst half of the thirteenth century in the eastern part
of the country, the Vladimir Suzdal area, which became at that time also
the political center of Russia The churches of that region illustrate well
the blending of the native tradition with the Romanesque style of the West
together with certain Caucasian and, of course, Byzantine influences The
best remaining examples include the two cathedrals in Vladimir, that of the
Assumption of Our Lady, which later became the prototype for the cathe-
dral by the same name in the Moscow Kremlin, and that of St Dmitnl, the
Cathedral of Si George in Iunev Polskn, with its marked native character
istics, and the church of the Intercession of Our Lady on the Ncrl river,
near Vladimir, which has often been cited as the highest achievement of
ancient Russian architecture Built in 1 166-71 and representing a rectangle
with three apses and a single cupola, it has attracted unstinting praise for
harmony of design and grace of form and decoration
Other forms of art also flourished in Kievan Russia, especially m connec-
tion with the churches Mosaics and frescoes richly adorned St Sophia in
Kiev and other cathedrals and churches in the land Icon painting too came
to Russia with Christianity from Byzantium Although the Byzantine tradi-
tion dominated all these branches of art, and although many masters prac-
ticing in Russia came from Byzantium or the Balkans, a Russian school
began gradually to emerge It was to have a great future, especially in icon-
painting in which St Alipu of the Monastery of the Caves and other Kievan
pioneers started what has often been considered the most remarkable artistic
development m Russian history Fine Kievan work in illumination and
muuaturcs in general, as well as in different decorative arts, has also come
down to our time By contrast, because of the negative attitude of the East-
ern Church, sculpture proper was banned from the churches, the Russians
and other Orthodox peoples being limited to miniature and relief sculpture
Reliefs, however, did develop, reaching the high point in the Cathedral of
St Dmitri i m Vladimir, which has more than a thousand relief pieces, and
in the cathedral in lurtev Polskn Popular entertainment, combining music
and elementary theater, was provided by traveling performers, the sko-
morof.hl, whom the church tned continuously to suppress as immoral and
as remnants of paganism
60
KIEVAN RUSSIA
Education. Concluding Remarks
The scope and level of education in Kievan Russia remain controversial
subjects, beclouded by unmeasured praise and excessive blame. On the pos-
itive side, it seems obvious that the Kievan culture outlined above could not
have developed without an educated layer of society. Moreover, as Kliu-
chevsky, Chizhevsky, and others have emphasized, Kievan sources, such as
the Primary Chronicle and Vladimir Monomakh’s Testament , express a
very high regard for learning. As to specific information, we have scattered
reports of schools in Kiev and other towns, of monasteries fostering learn-
ing and the arts, and of princes who knew foreign languages, collected
books, patronized scholars, and generally supported education and culture.
Beyond that, recent Soviet discoveries centering on Novgorod indicate a
considerable spread of literacy among artisans and other broad layers of
townspeople, and even to some extent among the peasants in the country-
side. Still it would appear that the bulk of the Kievan population, in par-
ticular the rural masses, remained illiterate and ignorant.
Even a brief account of Kievan culture indicates the variety of foreign
influences which it experienced and their importance for its evolution. First
and foremost stands Byzantium, but it should not obscure other significant
contributions. The complexity of the Kievan cultural heritage would become
even more apparent had we time to discuss, for example, the links between
the Kievan and the Iranian epic, the musical scales of the East Slavs and of
certain Turkic tribes, or the development of ornamentation in Kiev with its
Scythian, Byzantine, and Islamic motifs. In general, these influences stimu-
lated, rather than stifled, native growth — or even made it possible. Kievan
Russia had the good fortune of being situated on the crossroads, not the
periphery, of culture.
Perhaps too much emphasis has been placed on the destruction of Kievan
civilization and the loss of its unique qualities. True, Kievan Russia, like
other societies, went down never to reappear. But it left a rich legacy of
social and political institutions, of religion, language, and culture that we
shall meet again and again as we study the history of the Russians in the
long centuries that followed their brilliant debut on the world scene.
Part III. APPANAGE RUSSIA
V 1 I
APPANAGE RUSSIA INTRODUCTION
The grass bends in sorrow and ihe tree « bowed down to earth by
woe For alread) brethren a cheerless season has set in already our
sfrengfh has been swallowed op by the wilderness Victory of
the princes over the mUch is gone for now brother laid to brother
"This w mute and that is mine also " and the princes began to say Of
little things "Lo‘ this is a great matter " and to forge discord against
themselves And on all sides the infidels were victoriously invading the
Russian land.
“THE LAY OF THE HOST OF ICO*"
(s cross s TajmsiATioN)
The Kievan legacy stood the Russians ut good stead It included, as has
already been noted, a uniform religion, a common language and literature,
and, with numerous regional and local modifications, common arts and cul-
ture tn general It embraced a similarly rich heritage tn the economic, social,
and political fields While the metropolitan in Kiev headed the Church of the
entire realm, the grand prince, also m Kiev, occupied the seat of the tem*
poral pow et of the state Both offices outlived by centimes the society which
had created them and both remained of major significance in Russian his-
tory, in spite of a shift in their locale and competition for preference among
different branches of the huge princely clan In a like manner the concept
of one common “Russian land,” so dear to Ktevan writers and preachers,
stayed in the Russian consciousness These bonds of unit) proved to be of
decisive importance in the age of division and defeat which followed the
collapse of the Ktevan state, in particular during the dark first hundred
years following the Mongol conquest, that is, approximately from the mid-
dle of the thirteenth to the middle of the fourteenth century In that period
the persistence of these bonds ensured the survival of the Russians as a
major people, thus making possible their future historical toIc The powerful
Moscow state which finally emerged on the east European plain looked,
and often was, stnkmgly different from its Kievan predecessor Yet, for the
historian m any case, Muscovite Russia remains linked to Kievan Russia in
many essential, as well as less essential, ways And it affirmed and treasured
at least a part of its Kievan inheritance
The twin terrors of Kievan Russia, internal division and invasion from
abroad, prevailed m the age which followed the collapse of the Ktevan state
61
64
1 NT RODUCTIOK
65
The new period has been named after the udel. or appanage, the separate
holding of an individual prince And indeed appanages proliferated at that
tune Typically, in his will a ruler would divide his principality among Ms
sons, thus creating with a single act several new political entities Subdivision
followed upon subdivision, destroying the tenuous political unity of the land
As fcgal historians have emphasized, private law came to the fore at the
expense of public law The political life of the period corresponded to — -
some would say was determined by — the economic, which was dominated
by agriculture and local consumption Much Kievan trade, and m general a
part of the variety and richness of the economy of Kievan Russia, disap-
peared
The parceling of Russia in the appanage period combined with popula-
tion shifts, a political, social, and economic regrouping, and even the emer-
gence of new peoples These processes began long before the final fall of
Kiev, on the whole developing gradually But their total impact on Russian
history may well be considered revolutionary As the struggle against the
inhabitants of the steppe became more exhausting and as the fortunes of
Kiev declined, migrants moved from the south to the southwest, the west,
the north, and especially the northeast The final terrible Mongol devasta-
tion of Kiev itself and southern Russia only helped to emphasize this de-
velopment The areas which gamed in relative importance included Galicia
and Volynia in the southwest, the Smolensk and Polotsk territories in the
west, Novgorod with its huge holdings in the north, ns well as the prin-
cipalities of the northeast, notably Rostov, Suzdal, Vladimir, and eventually
Moscow Population movements led to a colonization of vast lands in the
north and northeast of European Russia, although there too the continuity
with the Kievan period persisted, for the new expansion radiated from such
old Kievan centers as Novgorod, Rostov, and Suzdal
Of special significance was the linguistic and ethnic differentiation of the
Kievan Russians into three peoples the Great Russians, usually referred
to simply as Russians, the Ukrainians, and the Belorussians or White Rus-
sians While certain differences among these groups go far back, the ulti-
mate split was in part caused by the collapse of the Kievan state and the
subsequent history of its population, in particular by the fact that south-
western and western Russia, where the Ukrainian and the White Russian
nationalities grew, experienced Lithuanian and Polish rule and influences,
whereas virtually the enure territory of the Great Russians remained out
of their reach
Appanage Russia was characterized not only by internal division and dif-
ferentiation but also by external weakness and, indeed, conquest The Mon-
gol domination over the Russians lasted from 1240 to 1380 or even 1480
depending on whether wc include the period of a more or less nominal
Mongol rule But divided Russia became subject to aggression from nu-
66
APPANAGE RUSSIA
merous other quarters as well. As already mentioned, the western and south-
western parts of the country fell to the Lithuanians — whose state as we
shall see represented in a sense a successor state to that of Kiev — and even-
tually fell to the Poles. Novgorod to the north had to light constant wars
against the German Knights, the Swedes, and the Norwegians, in addition
to the Lithuanians. With the collapse of the Kievan state and the Mongol
conquest, Russia lost its important international position, even though a
few principalities, such as Novgorod, acted vigorously on the diplomatic
stage. In general, in contrast to the earlier history of the country, a relative
isolation from the rest of Europe became characteristic of appanage Russia,
cut off from many former outside contacts and immersed in local problems
and feuds. Isolation, together with political, social, and economic parochial-
ism, led to stagnation and even regression, which can be seen in the political
thought, the law, and most, although not all, fields of culture of the period.
The equilibrium of appanage Russia proved to be unstable. Russian econ-
omy would not permanently remain at the dead level of local agriculture.
Politically, the weak appanage principalities constituted easy prey for the
outside aggressor or even for the more able and ambitious in their own
midst. Thus Lithuania and Poland obtained the western part of the country.
In the rest, several states contended for leadership until the final victory
of Moscow over its rivals. The successful Muscovite “gathering of Russia”
marked the end of the appanage period and the dawn of a new age. To-
gether with political unification, came economic revival and steady, if slow,
cultural progress, the entire development reversing the basic trends of the
preceding centuries. The terminal date of the appanage period has been
variously set at the accession to the Muscovite throne of Ivan III in 1462,
or Basil III in 1505, or Ivan IV, the Terrible, in 1533. For certain reasons
of convenience, we shall adopt the last date.
V I 1 1
THU MONGOLS AND RUSSIA
The churches of God they devastated, and In the holy altars they shed
much blood And no one in the town remained olive all died equally
and drank the single cup of death There was no one here to moan,
or cry — neither father and mother over children, nor children over
father and mother, neither brother over brother, nor relatives over
relatives — but all lay together dead. And all this occurred to us for
our sins
“THE me OF THE RAVAGE OF RIAZAN BT BAtU”
And how could the Mongol influence on Russian life be considerable,
when the Mongols Used far of! did not mix with ihc Russians, and
came to Russia only to gather tribute or as an army, brought m for
the most part by Russian princes for the princes' own purposes’*
Therefore we can proceed to consider the internal life of Russian
society in the thirteenth century without paying attention to the fact
of the Mongol yoke
PLATONOV
A convenient method of gauging the extent of Mongol influence on
Russia is to compare the Russian state and society of the pre Mongol
period with those of the post Mongol era. and in particular to con-
trast the spirit and institutions of Muscovite Russia with those of
Russia of the Kievan age The picture changed completely after
the Mongol period
VERNADSKY
The Mongols — or Tolars as they are called in Russian sources * — came
upon the Russians like a boh from the blue. They appeared suddenly in
1223 in southeastern Russia and smashed the Russians and the Polovtsy in
a battle near the river Kalka, only to vanish into the steppe But they re-
turned to conquer Russia, in 1237-40, and impose their long rule over it
Unknown to the Russians. Mongolian-speaking tribes had lived for cen-
turies m the general area of present-day Mongolia, and in the adjoining parts
of Manchuria and Siberia The Chinese, who w atchcd their northern neigh*
* “Tatars” referred originally to a Mongol uibe But, with the expansion of the
Mongol state, the Tatar* of the Russian sources were mostly Turkic, rather than
Mongol, linguistically and ethnically I am using “Monger throughout m preference
to “Tatar.”
67
izv-
bors closely, left us informative accounts of the Mongols. To quote one
Chinese author:
, . . they are preoccupied exclusively with their Hocks, they roam and
they possess neither towns, nor walls, neither writing, nor books; they
conclude all agreements orally. From childhood they practice riding and
shooting arrows . . . and thus they acquire courage necessary for pillage
and war. As long as they hope for success, they move back and forth; when
there is no hope, a timely flight is not considered reprehensible. Religious
TH? MONGOLS AND RUSSIA
69
rites and legal institutions they knew not ... They all feed on the meat
of the animals which they kill ... and they dress in theif hides and
furs The strongest among them grab the fattest pieces; the old men, on
the other hand, eat and drink what is left They respect only the bravest,
old age and feebleness are held in contempt
While excellent fighters and warlike, the Mongols generally directed their
efforts to fratricidal strife among the many tribes, their rivalries skillfully
fanned by the Chinese Only an extraordinary leader managed to unite the
Mongols and suddenly transform them into a power of world significance
Tcmuchin, bom probably in 11 5S or 1162 and a son of a tnbal chief, finally
tn 1206 after many years of desperate struggle became the head of all the
Mongols with the title of Jenghiz Khan One of the decisively important
figures in history, Jenghiz Khan remains something of an enigma It has
been suggested that he was inspired by an urge to av enge the treasonable
poisoning of Ins father and the subsequent humiliation of his family With
time, Jenghiz Khan apparently came to believe in his sweeping divine
mission to re-establish justice on earth, and as in tjic case of some other
great leaders, he seems to have had an unshakable conviction in the right-
eousness of his cause The new Mongol ruler joined to this deterounatton
and sense of mission a remarkable intelligence and outstanding militaty,
diplomatic, and administrative ability
After uniting the Mongols, Jenghiz Khan subdued other neighboring
tubes, and then in 121 1 invaded the independent Chin empire in northern
China, piercing the Great Wall What followed has been described as the
conquest, in five years, of one hundred million people by one hundred thou-
sand soldiers The western campaigns of Jenghiz Khan and his generals
proved to be still more noiable In spite of bitter resistance, the Mongols
smashed the Moslem states of Central Asia and reached the Caucasus It
was through Caucasian passes that they staged a raid into southern Russia
to defeat the Russians and the Polousy on the river Kalka in 1223 Jenghiz
Khan died in 1227 Before his death he had made provisions for succession,
dividing the empire among four sons, although its substantial unity was
to be preserved by the leadership of one of them with the title of "great
khan," a position which fell to the third son, Ugcdcy Jenghiz Khan's suc-
cessors continued h\S sweeping conquests and spread Mongol rule to Tur-
kestan, Armenia, Georgia, and other parts of the Caucasus, the state of
the Volga Bulgars, Russia, Persia, Mesopotamia, Syria, Korea, and all
of China At the time of Kublat Khan, the founder of the Yuan dynasty
In China who ruled as Great Khan from 1259 to 1294, Mongol dominion
stretched from Poland and the Balkans to the Pacific and from the Arctic
Ocean to Turkey, the Persian Gulf, and the southern borders of China
Moreover, the Mongols had penetrated deep into Central Europe, defeating
the Poles, the Germans, and the Hungarians m the process
70
The remarkable success of Mongol armies can no longer be ascribed, as
in the past, to overwhelming numbers. It stemmed rather from the effective
strategy of the Mongols, their excellence as highly mobile cavalry, their
endurance, and their disciplined and co-ordinated manner of fighting assisted
by an organization which in certain ways resembled a modem general staff.
These assets acquired particular importance because the military forces of
the invaded countries, especially in Europe, were frequently cumbersome,
undisciplined and unco-ordinated. Espionage, terrorism, and superior siege
equipment, borrowed from China and other lands, have also been cited as
factors contributing to the amazing spread of Mongol rule. The Mongols
held occupied territories with the aid of such devices as newly built roads,
a courier system, and a crude census for purposes of taxation.
Batu, a grandson of Jenghiz Khan and a nephew of Ugedey, who suc-
ceeded his father Juchi to the greater part of Juchi’s empire, directed the
Mongol invasion of Europe. He had some 150,000 or 200,000 troops at bis
disposal and the veteran Subudey to serve as his chief general. The Mongols
crossed the Urals in 1236 to attack first the Volga Bulgars. After that, in
1237, they struck at the Russian eastern principality of Riazan, coming
unexpectedly from the north. In the Mongol strategy, the conquest of Rus-
sia served to secure their flank for a further major invasion of Europe. The
Russian princes proved to be disunited and totally unprepared. Character-
istically, many of them stayed to protect their own appanages rather than
come to the aid of invaded principalities or make any joint effort. Following
the defeat of a Russian army, the town of Riazan was besieged and cap-
tured after five days of bitter fighting and its entire population massacred.
Next, in the winter of 1237/38, the Mongols attacked the Suzdal territory
with its capital of Vladimir, the seat of the grand prince. The sequence
of desperate fighting and massacre recurred on a larger scale and at many
towns, the grand prince himself and his army perishing in the decisive bat-
tle near the river Sit. Thus, in a matter of several months, the Mongols
succeeded in conquering the strongest section of the country. Furthermore,
they attained their objectives by means of a winter campaign, the Mongol
cavalry moving with great speed on frozen rivers — the only successful
winter invasion of Russia in history. But a spring thaw that made the ter-
rain virtually impassable forced the Mongols to abandon their advance on
Novgorod and retreat to the southern steppe. They, spent the next year and
a half in preparation for a great campaign as well as in devastating and con-
quering some additional Russian territories, notably that of Chernigov.
The Mongol assault of 1240, continued in 1241 and the first part of 1242,
aimed at more than Russia. In fact, it had been preceded by an order to the
king of Hungary to submit to the Mongol rule. The Mongols began by
invading the Kievan area proper. Overcoming the stubborn defenders, they
took Kiev by storm, exterminated the population, and leveled the city. The
THE MONGOLS AND KUSSIA 71
same fate befell other towns of the area, whose inhabitants cither died or
became slaves After Kiev, the Mongols swept through the southwestern
principalities of Galicia and Voljnia, laying everything waste Poland and
Hungary came next One Mongol army defeated the Poles and the Germans,
the most important b3ttle taking place at Liegmtz m Silesia in 1241, while
another army smashed the Hungarians Undeterred by the Carpathian
mountains, the. Mongols occupied the Hungarian plain, then advance guard
reached the Adriatic Whereas campaigning in central Europe presented
certain problems to the Mongols, particularly the need to reduce fortresses,
many historians believe that only the death of Great Khan Ugedey saved
a number of European countries Concerned with internal Mongol politics,
his nephew Batu decided to retrench, and in the spring of 1242 he with-
drew his atmies to the southern steppe, subjugating Bulgaria, Moldavia,
and Wallachia on the way back Although the Mongols thus retreated to
the east, all of Russia, including the northwestern part which escaped
direct conquest, remained under their sway
Batu established his headquarters in the lower Volga area in what be-
came the town of Old Sarai and the capital of the domain known as the
Golden Horde The Golden Horde constituted first a part of the Mongol
empire and later, as the central ties weakened, an independent state A de-
partment tn Old Sarai headed by a daruga handled Russian affairs Mon-
gol dominion over Russta meant that the Russian rulers recognized the
Mongol overlordship, that the Mongols, initially the great khan m Mon
goha and subsequently the potentate of the Golden Horde, invested the
Russian grand pnnee with his office, and that to be so Invested the Rus-
sian pnnee had to journey to the Mongol headquarters and pay humble
obeisance to his suzerain Further, it meant that the Mongols collected
tribute from the Russians, at first by means of their own agents and after-
wards through the intermediacy of Russian princes Also, the Russians oc-
casionally had to send military detachments for the Mongol army Wc know
of several such levies and of Russians serving in the Mongol forces as far
away from their homeland as China
In general, although the Mongols interlercd little in Russian life, they
maintained an effective control over Russia tor almost a century and a half,
from 1240 to 1380 In 1380 the prince of Moscow Dmitrii succeeded tn
defeating the Mongols in a major battle on the field of Kulikovo Although
the Mongols managed to stage a comeback, their invincibility had been
destroyed and their rule greatly weakened Still, another century passed
before the Mongol yoke was finally overthrown Only in 1480 Ivan III
of Moscow renounced his, and Russian, allegiance to the khan, and the
Mongols failed to challenge his action seriously Later yet, Russia expanded
to absorb the successor states to the Golden Horde die khanate ot Kazan
in 1552, of Astrakhan m 1556, and, at long last, that of Crimea in 1783
72
GE RUSSIA
The Role of the Mongols in Russian History
Thus, the Mongol rule over the Russians lasted, with a greater or a lesser
degree of effectiveness, fdr almost 250 years. There exists, however, no
consensus among specialists concerning the role of the Mongols in Rus-
sian history. Traditionally Russian historians have paid little attention to
the Mongols and their impact on Russia; nevertheless, some of them did
stress the destructive and generally negative influence of the Mongol inva-
sion and subjugation. Others virtually dismissed the entire matter as of
minor significance in the historical development of their country. While a
few earlier scholars held radically different views, a thorough reconsidera-
tion of the problem of the Mongols and Russia occurred only in the twen-
tieth century among Russian emigre intellectuals. A new, so-called Eurasian,
school proclaimed the fundamental affiliation of Russia with parts of Asia
and brought the Mongol period of Russian history to the center of interest.
What is more, the Eurasian school interpreted the Mongol impact largely
in positive and creative terms. Their views, particularly as expressed in
Vernadsky’s historical works, have attracted considerable attention.
The destructive and generally negative influence of the Mongols on the
course of Russian history has been amply documented. To begin with, the
Mongol invasion itself brought wholesale devastation and massacre to Rus-
sia. The sources, both Russian and non-Russian, tell, for instance, of a
complete extermination of population in such towns as Riazan, Torzhok,
and Kozelsk, while in others those who survived the carnage became slaves.
A Mongol chronicle stales that Batu and his lieutenants destroyed the towns
of the Russians and killed or captured all their inhabitants. A papal legate
and famous traveler, Archbishop Plano Carpini, who crossed southern Rus-
sia in 1245-46 on his way to Mongolia, wrote as follows concerning the
Mongol invasion of Russia:
. . . they went against Russia and enacted a great massacre in the Russian
land, they destroyed towns and fortresses and killed people, they besieged
Kiev which had been the capital of Russia, and after a long siege they took
it and killed the inhabitants of the city; for this reason, when we passed
through that land, wc found lying in the field countless heads and bones
of dead people; for this city had been extremely large and very populous,
whereas now it has been reduced !o nothing: barely two hundred houses
stand there, and those people arc held in the harshest slavety.
These and other similar contemporary accounts seem to give a convincing
picture of the devastation of the Mongol invasion even if we allow for possi-
ble exaggeration.
The Mongol occupation of the southern Russian steppe deprived the
THE MONO 02, S AND RUSSIA 73
Russians for centuries of much of the best land and contributed to the shift
of population economic activity and political power to the northeast U
also did much to cut Russia off from Byzantium and in pan from the West
and to accentuate the relative isolation of the country typical of the time
It has been suggested that but for the Mongols Russia might well have
participated in 3uch epochal European developments as the Renaissance
and the Reformation The financial exactions of the Mongols laid a heavy
burden on the Russians precisely when their impoverished and d slocated
economy was least prepared to bear it Rebellions against the Mongol taxes
led to new repressions and penalties The entire period and especially the
decades immediately following the Mongol invasion acquired the character
of a grim struggle for survival with the advanced and elaborate Kievan
style of life and ethical and cultural standards in rapid decline We learn
of new cruel punishments established by law of illiterate princes of an
inability to erect the dome of a stone cathedral and of other clear signs
of cultural regress on Indeed certain historians have estimated that the
Mongol invasion and domination of Russia retarded the development of the
country by some 150 or 200 years
Constructive positive contributions of the Mongols to Russian histoiy
appear by contrast very lun ted A number of Mongol an words in the
fields of administration and finance have entered the Russian language in
dicating a degree of influence For example the term tarlyk which means
In modern Russ an a trademark or a customs stamp comes from a Mongol
word signifying a written order of the khan especially the khan s grant of
privileges similarly the Russian words denga meaning coin and dengi
money dense from Mongolian The Mongols did take a census of the Rus
sian population They have also been credited with aflecling the evolution
of Russian military forces and tactics notably as applied to the cavalry
Yet even these restricted Mongol influences have to be quahfed The finan
cial measures of the Mongols together with the census and the Mongol
roads added something to the process of centralization in Russia Yet these
taxes had as their aim an exaction of the greatest possible tribute and as
such proved to be neither beneficial to the people nor lasting The invaders
replaced the old smoke and plough taxes with the cruder and simpler
head tax which d d not at all take into account one s ability to pay This
innovation disappeared when Russian pnnccs as intermediaries took over
from the Mongol tax collectors Thinking simply m terms of pecuniary
profit the Mongols often acted with little wisdom they sold the position
of grand pnnee to the highest bidder and m the end failed to check in tune
th* rise of Moscow Rampant corruption further vitiated the financial poticy
of the Mongob As to military matters where the invaders did excel the feet
remains that Russian armies and tactics of the appanage period based on
74 APPANAGE RUSSIA
foot soldiers, evolved directly from those of Kiev, not from the Mongol
cavalry. That cavalry, however, was to influence later Muscovite gentry
horse formations.
Similarly, the Mongols deserve only limited credit for bringing to Russia
the postal service or the practice of keeping women in seclusion in a separate
part of the house. A real postal system came to Russia as late as the seven-
teenth century, and from the West; the Mongols merely resorted to the
Kievan practice of obligating the local population to supply horses, car-
riages, boats, and other aids to communication for the use of officials, al-
though they did implement this practice widely and bequeath several words
in the field of transportation to the Russians. The seclusion of women was
practiced only in the upper class in Russia; it probably reflected the general
insecurity of the time to which the Mongols contributed their part rather
than the simple borrowing of a custom from the Mongols. The Mongols
themselves, it might be added, acquired this practice late in their history
when they adopted the Moslem faith and some customs of conquered
peoples.
Turning to the more far-reaching claims made, especially by scholars of
the Eurasian school, on behalf of the Mongols and their impact on Russia,
one has to proceed with caution. Although numerous and varied, Eurasian
arguments usually center on the political role of the Mongols. Typically
they present the Muscovite tsar and the Muscovite state as successors to
the Mongol khan and the Golden Horde, and emphasize the influence of
the Mongols in transforming weak and divided appanage Russia into a
powerful, disciplined, and monolithic autocracy. Institutions, legal norms,
and the psychology of Muscovite Russia have all been described as a legacy
of Jenghiz Khan.
Yet these claims can hardly stand analysis. As already mentioned, the
Mongols kept apart from the Russians, limiting their interest in their un-
willing subjects to a few items, notably the exaction of tribute. Religion
posed a formidable barrier between the two peoples, both at first when the
Mongols were still pagan and later when the Golden Horde became Moslem.
The Mongols, to repeat a point, were perfectly willing to leave the Russians
to their own ways; indeed, they patronized the Orthodox Church.
Perhaps a still greater significance attaches to the fact that the Mongol
and the Russian societies bore little resemblance to each other. The Mon-
gols remained nomads in the clan stage of development. Their institutions
and laws could in no wise be adopted by a much more complex agricultural
society. A comparison of Mongol law, the code of Jenghiz Khan, to the
Pskov Sudebnik, an example of Russian law of the appanage age, makes
the difference abundantly clear. Even the increasing harshness of Russian
criminal law of the period should probably be attributed to the conditions
T HR MONOOLS AND RUSSIA 75
ol the time rather than to borrowing from the Mongols Mongol influence
on Russia could not parallel the impact of the Arabs on the West, because,
to quote Pushkin, the Mongols were "Arabs without Aristotle and algebra"
— or other cultural assets
The Eurasian argument also tends to misrepresent the nature of the Mon-
gol states Far from having been particularly well organized, efficient or last-
ing, they turned out to be relatively unstable and short lived Thus, in 1260
Kublai Khan built Peking and in 1280 he completed the conquest of south-
ern China, but in 136S the Mongol dynasty was driven out of China, the
Mongol dynasty in Persia lasted only from 1256 to 1344, and the Mongol
Central Asiatic state with its capital in Bukhara existed from 1242 until its
destruction by Tamerlane us 1370 In the Russian case the dates arc rather
similar, but the Mongols never established their own dynasty in the coun-
try, acting instead merely as overlords of the Russian princes While the
Mongol states lasted, they continued on the whole to be rent by dissen-
sions and wars and to suffer from arbitrariness, corruption, and misrule in
general Not only did the Mongols fail to contribute a superior statecraft,
but they had to borrow virtually everything from alphabets to advisers
from the conquered peoples to enable their states to exist As one of these
advisers remarked, an empire could be won on horseback, but not ruled
from the saddle True, cruelty, lawlessness, and at times anarchy, in that
period characterized also the life of many peoples other than the Mongols,
the Russians included But at least most of these peoples managed eventually
to surmount their difficulties and organize effective and fasting states Not
so the Mongols, who, after their sudden and stunning performance on the
world scene, receded to the steppe, dan life, and the internecine warfare of
Mongolia
When the Muscovite stale emerged, us leaders looked to Byzantium for
their high model, and to Kievan Russia for their historical and still mean-
ingful heritage As to the Mongols, a single attitude toward them pervades
all Russian literature they were a scourge of God sent upon the Russians
for their sms Historians too, whether they studied the growth of serfdom,
the rise of the gentry, or the nature of princely power m Muscovite Russia,
established significant connections with the Russian past and Russian con-
ditions, not with Mongolia Even for purposes of analogy, European coun-
tries stood much closer to Russia than Mongol states In tact, from the
Atlantic to the Urals absolute monarchies were m the process of replacing
feudal division Therefore, Vernadsky’s affirming the importance of the
Mongol impact by contrasting Muscovite with Kievan Russia appears to
miss the point There existed many other reasons for changes in Russia,
and, needless to say, other countnes changed during those centuries with-
out contact with the Mongols
76
APPANAGE RUSSIA
It is tempting, thus, to return to the older view and to consider the Mon-
gols as of little significance in Russian history. On the other hand, their
destructive impact deserves attention. And they, no doubt, contributed
something to the general harshness of the age and to the burdensome and
exacting nature of the centralizing Muscovite state which emerged out of this
painful background. Mongol pressure on Russia and its resources continued
after the end of the yoke itself, for one of the authentic legacies of Jenghiz
Khan proved to be the successor states to the Golden Horde which kept
southeastern Russia under a virtual state of siege and repeatedly taxed the
efforts of the entire country.
LORD NOVGOROD THE GREAT
The Iialita municipalities hud in earlier days given signal proof cl
that force which transforms the city into the stale
BURCKHAR&T
The men of Novgorod showed Knyaz * Vsevolod the road “VV e do
not want thee go whither thou wilt" He went to his father, into
Russia
"tup chronicle of Novgorod"
(r MICHEU.S AND N FORBES S TRANSLATION)
Novgorod or, to use us formal name Lord Novgorod the Great stands out
as one of the most impressive and important states of appanage Russia
When Kievan might and authority declined and economic and political
weight shifted, Novgorod rose as the capital of northern Russia as wcIJ as
the greatest trading center and. indeed the leading city of the enure country
Located in a lake area, in the northwestern comer of European Russia, and
serving throughout the appanage penod as a great Russian bulwark against
the West, it came to rule enormous lands, stretching east to the Urals and
north to the coast line Yet, for the historian, the unusual political system of
the principality of Novgorod and its general st)lc of life and culture possess
even greater interest than its Size, wealth, and power
The Historical Evolution of Novgorod
Novgorod was founded not later than the eighth century of our era - —
recent excavations and research emphasize its antiquity and its connection
with the Baltic Slavs — and according to the Primary Chronicle, it was
to Novgorod ihat Riurik came in 862 at the dawn of Russian history
During the hegemony of Kiev, Novgorod retained a position of high im-
portance In particular, it served as the northern base of the celebrated
trade route "from the Varangians to the Greeks.” and also as a center of
trade between the East and the West by means of the Volga nver The city
seems to have remained outside the regular Kievan pnneely system of
succession from brother to brother Instead, it was often ruled by sons of
the grand princes of Kiev who, not infrequently, themselves later ascended
the Kievan throne, although some persons not closely related to the grand
• Knyat means "prince *
77
— a — City walls and fa*
+ Principal Churxnes
prince also governed in Novgorod on occasion. St. Vladimir, Iaroslav the
Wise, and Vjadimir Monomalch’s son Mstislav all were at some time
princes of Novgorod. Iaroslav the Wise in particular came to be closely
linked to Novgorod where he ruled for a number of years before his
accession to the Kievan throne; even the Russian Justice has been con-
sidered by many scholars as belonging to the Novgorodian period of his
activities. And Novgorod repeatedly offered valuable support to the larger
ambitions and claims of its princes, for example, to the same Iaroslav the
Wise in his bitter struggle with Sviatopolk for the Kievan seat.
The evolution of authority and power within Novgorod proved to be
even more significant than the interventions of the Novgorodians on behalf
LORD HOVOOROD Til
D RE AT
79
©{ their favorite princes While we know of a lew earlier instances when
Novgorod refused to accept the prince allotted to the city — m one case
advising that the appointee should come only if he had two heads— u is
with the famous expulsion of a ruler m 1136 that the Novgorodians em-
barked upon their peculiar political course After that date the prince of
Novgorod became in essence a hired official of the city with strictly
circumscribed authority and prerogatives His position resembled that of
the podcstii In Italian city-states, and it made some historians refer to
Novgorod as a “commercial republic ” In 1 1S6 Novgorod obtained virtual
independence m religious administration too by seizing the right to elect its
own archbishop To be exact, under the new system the Novgorodian veche
selected three candidates for the position ol archbishop, next, one of the
three was chosen by lot to fill the high office, and, finally, he was elevated
to his new ecclesiastical rank by the head of the Russian Church, the
metropolitan
The emergence of Novgorod as an independent principality formed a
part of the general process of collapse of the Kievan state accompanied by
ihe appearance of competing regional entities which were frequently mutu-
ally hostile For Novgorod the great rivals were the potentates of the north-
east, notably the princes of Suzdal, who controlled the upper reaches of
the Volga and thus the Volga trade artery and who — the most important
point — could cut the grain supply of Novgorod Moreover, for ceniunes
vast and distant lands in northeastern Russia remained in contention be-
tween the city of Novgorod and the princes of the northeast, at times owing
allegiance to both In 1216 the Novgorodians, led by the dashing prince
Mstislav of Toropcts, scored a decisive victory over their rivals at Lipitsa
But, although Novgorod also acquitted itself well in subsequent struggles,
the troublesome issues remained to be resolved finally only with the
destruction of the independence of Novgorod and its absorption into the
Muscovite state
Novgorod's defense of Russian lands from foreign invasions, stemming
from its location in the northwestern corner of Russia, might well have
had a greater historical significance than us wars against other Russian
principalities The most celebrated chapter of this defense is linked to the
name of Prince Alexander, known as Alexander Nevskii, that is, of the
Neva, for his victory over the Swedes on the banks of that nver Alexander
became the prince of Novgorod and later the grand pnnee of Russia at a
particularly d fficult time in the history of his country Born in 1219 and
dying in 1263, Alexander had to face die Mongol invasion and the imposi-
tion of the Mongol yoke on Russia, and he also was forced to deal with
major assaults on Russia from Europe These assaults came from the
Swedes and the Teutonic Knights, while neighboring Finnish and especially
strong Lithuanian tribes applied additional pressure The German attack
SO APPANAGE RUSSIA
was the most ominous: it represented a continuation and extension of the
long-term German drive eastward which had already resulted in the Ger-
manization or extermination of many Baltic Slavic and western Lithuanian
tribes and which had spread to the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian
neighbors of Russia. A forcible conversion of all these peoples to Roman
Catholicism, as well as their subjugation and Germani 2 ation, constituted
the aims of the Teutonic Knights who had begun as a crusading order in
the Holy Land and later transferred their activities to the Baltic area.
In the year in wliich Kiev fell to the Mongols, 1240, Alexander seized
the initiative and led the Novgorodians to a victory over the advancing
Swedes on the banks of the Neva River. The chronicles tell us that
Alexander himself wounded the Swedish commander Birger, who barely
escaped capture. In the meantime the Teutonic Knights had begun their
systematic attack on northwestern Russian lands in 1239, and they suc-
ceeded in 1241 in capturing Pskov. Having defeated the Swedes and settled
some differences with the Novgorodians, Alexander Nevskii turned against
the new invaders. In short order he managed to drive them back and free
Pskov. What is more, he carried warfare into enemy territory. The crucial
battle took place on April 5, 1242, on the ice of Lake Chud, or Peipus, in
Estonia. It became known in Russian historical tradition as “the massacre
on the ice” and has been celebrated in song and story — more recently in
Prokofiev’s music and Eisenstein’s brilliant film Alexander Nevskii. The
massed force of mailclad and heavily armed German knights and their
Finnish allies struck like an enormous battering ram at the Russian lines ;
the lines sagged but held long enough for Alexander Nevskii to make an
enveloping movement with a part of his troops and assail an enemy flank;
a complete rout of the Teutonic Knights followed, the spring ice breaking
under them to aid their destruction.
Alexander Nevskii’s victories were important, but they represented only
a single sequence in the continuous struggle of Novgorod against its
western and northwestern foes. Two Soviet specialists have calculated that
between 3Z42 and 1446 Novgorod fought the Swedes twenty-six times,
the German knights eleven times, the Lithuanians fourteen times, and the
Norwegians five times. The German knights then included the Livonian
and the Teutonic orders, which merged in 1237.
Relations with the Mongols took a different turn. Although the Mongol
invasion failed to reach Novgorod, the principality together with other
Russian lands submitted to the khan. In fact, the great warrior Alexander
Nevskii himself instituted this policy of co-operation with the Mongols,
becoming a favorite of the khan and thus the grand prince of Russia from
1252 until his death in 1263. Alexander Nevskii acted as he did because
of a simple and sound reason: he considered resistance to the Mongols
hopeless. And it was especially because of his humble submission to the
LORD NOVGOROD THE GREAT 81
khan and his Consequent ability to preserve the principality of Novgorod
as well as some other Russian lands from run that the Orthodox Church
canonized Alexander Nevskii
Throughout the appanage period Novgorod remained one of the most
important Russian principalities It played a significant role in the rivalry
between Moscow and Tver as well as in the struggle between Moscow and
Lithuania As Moscow successfully gathered other Russian lands, the posi-
tion of Novgorod became increasingly difficult Finally in 1471 the city
surrendered to Ivan III of Moscow Trouble followed several yean later
and in 1478 the Muscovites severely suppressed all opposition, exiling
many people, and incorporated the city organically into the Moscow state
Novgorod Institutions and Way of Life
Novgorod was an impressive city Its population at the time of its inde-
pendence numbered more than 30,000 Its location on the mti Volkhov
m a lake district assisted commerce and communication and supported
strong defense The Volkhov flows from Lake Umcn to Lake Ladoga,
opening the way to the Baltic Sea and ttadc centers beyond This complex
of waterways represented the northern section of the famed commercial
route “from the Varangians to the Greeks," and it also connected well
with the Volga and trade routes going cast As to defense, its location and
the skill of the Novgorodians made the city virtually inaccessible to the
enemy, at least during much of the year Novgorod reportedly possessed
sturdy wooden walls with towers of stone, although recently a fourteenth-
century stone wall was discovered It found further protection in defensive
perimeters constructed roughly two and a half, seven, and twelve miles
from the city These defensive lines frequently had monasteries as strong
points, and they skillfully utilized the difficult terrain. In particular, the
Novgorodians were excellent hydraulic engineers and knew how to divert
water against an advancing enemy
Like other medieval towns, Novgorod suffered from crowding because
cvciyonc wanted to dwell within the walls The nch families and their
servants lived In large houses built in solid blocks and the poorer in-
habitants used whatever area they could obtain The Volkhov divided the
city into two halves the commercial side, where the mam market was
located, and that of St Sophia On the St Sophia side stood, of course,
the cathedral itself as well as the ancient kremhn, or citadel, of the city
The Novgorodians enjoyed the advantages of fixe protection, streets in-
geniously paved with wood, and a wooden water pipe system, the principles
of which they had learned from Byzantium.
Local initiative, organization, and autonomy constituted the distinguish-
ing traits of Novgorod. Sevcrat block houses in the city composed a street
82 APPANAGE RUSSIA
which already had the status of a self-governing unit with its own elected
elder. Several streets formed a sotnia, that is, a hundred. Hundreds in their
turn combined into quarters, or konlsy, which totaled five. Each konets
enjoyed far-reaching autonomy: not only did it govern itself through its
own veche and officials, but it also possessed separately a part of the
piatina lands, a large area outside the city limits and subject to Novgorod.
The piatina holdings of a particular konets usually radiated from its city
boundary. It should be added that distant Novgorodian territories did not
belong to the piatina lands and were managed by the city as a whole. Also,
because of the autonomy of the kontsy, formal Novgorodian documents
had to be confirmed at times with as many as eight seals: one for each of
the five kontsy and three for central authorities.
The chief central official remained the prince, who commanded the army
and played a major role in justice and in administration. However, after
the popular revolution and the expulsion of 1136, the veche proceeded to
impose severe and minute restrictions on his power and activities. We have
the precise terms of a number of such contracts between princes and the
city, the earliest concluded with Alexander Nevskii’s brother Iaroslav in
1265. As in most of these contracts, the prince promised to follow ancient
Novgorodian custom in his government, to appoint only Novgorodians as
administrators of the city's lands, not to dismiss officials without court
action, and not to hold court without the posadnik, an elected official, or
his delegate to represent the city. He had to establish his headquarters
outside the city limits; he and his druzhina could not own land in Novgorod
or trade with the Germans; his remuneration as well as his rights to hunt
and to fisli were all regulated in great detail. Thus, although in the course
of time the grand prince of Moscow or at least a member of the Muscovite
ruling family came to hold the office of prince in Novgorod, his power there
remained quite limited.
The posadnik and the tysiatskii, elected by the veche, shared executive
duties with the prince and if need be, especially the posadnik, protected
the interests of the city from the prince. The posadnik served as the prince’s
main associate and assistant, who took charge of the administration and
the army in the prince’s absence. The tysiatskii, or chiliarch, had apparently
at least two important functions: he commanded the town regiment or
thousand ■ — hence probably his name — and he settled commercial dis-
putes. He has sometimes been regarded as a representative of the common
people of Novgorod. The archbishop of Novgorod must also be mentioned.
In addition to performing the highest ecclesiastical functions in the princi-
pality, he continuously played a leading role in political affairs, 'presiding
over the Council of Notables, advising secular authorities, reconciling
antagonistic factions, and sometimes heading Novgorodian embassies
abroad.
LORD NOVGOROD THE GREAT 83
Truly outstanding was the power of the Novgorodian veche, or town
council, which usually met m the mam market place As wc have seen, it
invited and dismissed the prince, elected the posadnik and the tysiatskii,
and determined the selection of the archbishop by electing three candidates
for that position It decided the issues of war and peace, mobilized the
army, proclaimed laws, raised taxes, and acted m general as the supreme
authority m Novgorod A permanent chancellery was attached to it The
veche could be called together by the prince, an official, the people, or
even a stnglc person through ringing the veche bell One might add paren-
thetically that the removal of the bell by the Muscovites symbolized the
end of the independence of Novgorod and of its peculiar constitution The
veche, composed as usual of all free householders, did settle tnany im-
portant matters, but it also frequently bogged down in violent factional
quarrels promoted by its practices of direct democracy and unanimity of
decision The Novgorodians won respect as independent and self reltant
people who managed their own affairs Yet the archbishop made many
solemn appearances at the veche in a desperate effort to restore some
semblance of order, and a legend grew up that the statue of the pagan god
Perun dumped into the river when the Novgorodians became Christian,
reappeared briefly to leave a stick with which the townspeople have be-
labored one another ever since
The Council of Notables also rose into prominence m Novgorodian
politics, both because the vcchc could not conduct day to-day business
efficiently and still more fundamentally, as a reflection of the actual distri-
bution of wealth and power in the principality Presided over by the arch-
bishop, it included a considerable number of influential boyars, notably
present and past holders of the offices of posadnik and tysiatskn, as well
as heads of the komsy and of ihc hundreds The Council elaborated the
legislative measures discussed or enacted by the veche and could often
control the course of Novgorodian politics It effectively represented the
wealthy, so to speak aristocratic, element in the principality
The judicial system of Novgorod deserves special mention It exhibited
a remarkable degree of elaboration, organization, and complexity, as well
as high juridical and humanitarian standards The pnnee, the posadnik, the
tysiatskn, and the archbishop, all had their particular courts A system
of jurymen, dokladduki functioned in the high court presided over by the
posadnik, the jurymen, ten in number, consisted of one boyar and on?
commoner from each of the five Lontsy Novgorodian jurisprudence also
resorted frequently to mediation the contending persons were asked to
nominate two mediators, and only when the four faded fo reach an agree-
ment did court aetton follow Judicial combat, after a solemn kissing of
the cross, was used to reach the nght decision in certain dubious cases
There seem to have been instances of such combat even between women
A P P
USSIA
Novgorodian punishments remained characteristically mild. Although the
death penalty was not unknown, they consisted especially of fines and, on
particularly grave occasions, of banishment with the loss of property and
possessions which could be pillaged at will by the populace. In contrast
to the general practices of the time, torture occupied little, if any, place
in the Novgorodian judicial process. Much evidence reflects the high regard
for human life characteristic of Novgorod; the Novgorodian Chronicle
at times refers to a great slaughter when it speaks of the killing of several
persons,
Novgorod stood out as a great trading state. It exploited the enormous
wealth of northern Russian forests, principally in furs, but also in wax and
honey, for export to foreign markets, and it served, as already mentioned,
as an intermediary point on extensive trade routes going in several direc-
tions. Manufactured goods, certain metals, and other items, such as herring,
wine, and beer, were typical imports. Novgorod traded on a large scale
with the island of Gotland and with the ports of the Baltic coast line, but
its merchandise also reached England, Flanders, and other distant lands,
Many merchants, especially from Gotland and Germany, came to Novgorod
where they enjoyed autonomy and a privileged position. Yet, the Novgo-
rodians themselves engaged for a long time in active trade — a point which
some scholars failed to appreciate. They went to foreign lands and, on the
basis of reciprocal treaties, established Novgorodian commercial communi-
ties abroad, as attested by the two Russian churches on the island of Got-
land and Other evidence. It was in the second half of the thirteenth century,
with the beginnings of the Hanseatic commercial league of northern Euro-
pean cities and the growth of its special commercial ships vastly superior
to the rather simple boats of the Novgorodians, that Novgorod gradually
shifted to a strictly passive role in trade.
While merchants, especially prosperous merchants engaged in for-
eign trade, constituted a very important element in Novgorod, Soviet
research has emphasized the significance of landed wealth, together with
the close links between the two upper-class groups. In any case, social
differentiation in Novgorod increased with time, leading to political antag-
onisms, reminiscent again of Italian cities and their conflicts between the
rich and the poor, the populo grosso and the populo minuto. Apparently
in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Novgorod became increasingly an
oligarchy, with a few powerful families virtually controlling high offices.
Thus, during most of the fourteenth century the posadniki came from only
two families.
At the time when social tensions inside Novgorod increased, the city
also found it more difficult to hold its sprawling lands together. The huge
Novgorodian territories fell roughly into two groups: the piatina area and
the more distant semi-colonial possessions in the sparsely populated far
LORO NOVGOROD THE GREAT 85
north end east In line with Novgorodian political practice, piatina towns
with their surrounding countryside received some self government al
though their posadmki and tysiaUkie were appointed from Novgorod rather
than elected Gradually decentralization increased Viatka in fact, bceom
mg independent in the late twelfth century and Pskov in the middle of the
fourteenth In addition as has been noted, Novgorod had to struggle con-
tinuously for the security and allegiance of many of its terntoncs against
the princes of the northeast who came to be ably represented by the power-
ful and successful Muscovite rulers
Moscow finally destroyed Novgorod The outcome of their conflict had
been In a sense predetermined by the fact that Novgorod in spite of Its
swollen size, had remained essentially a city state Not surprisingly, many
historians consider the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries as the golden
age of Novgorod although the principality gamed additional territory it*
the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Devoted to its highly specific and
particularistic interests it flourished in the appanage period when it stood
out because of its wealth and its strength and when it could utilize the
rivalries of its neighbors Furthermore by controlling its prince it had es
caped subdivision i<"d new appanages Bui it proved j’ n obV to compete
with Moscow in uniting the Russian people As Moscow gathered Russian
lands and as its last serious mal the Lithuanian state came to be linked
increasingly to Poland and Catholicism Novgorod lost its freedom of
maneuver Moscow s absorption of the city and its huge holdings in north
cm Russia represented the same kind of historical logic — with much less
bloodshed — that led to the incorporation of southern France into the
French state Social conflicts made their contribution to this end when
class differences and antagonism grew in Novgorod Tt seems that in the
decisive struggle with Moscow the poor of Novgorod preferred Ivan HI
to their own oligarchical government with its Lithuanian orientation
Novgorodian culture too developed in an impressive manner The city
had the good fortune to escape Mongol devaslauon In contrast to other
appanage principalities it contained sufficient wealth to continue Kievan
cultural traditions on a grand scale And it benefited from its rich contacts
with the West While Russian culture in the appanage penod will be dis-
cussed m a later chapter it is appropriate to note here that Novgorod
became famous for its church architecture and its icon painting as well
as for its vigorous and varied literature
Moreover, it was in Novgorod that recent Soviet search uncovered over
five hundred so-called birchbark documents usually succinct businesslike
notes or messages which suggest a considerable spread of literacy among
the general population of that city and area Novgorodian literature em
braced the writings of such archbishops of the city as Moses and Basil
travelogues, m particular accounts of visits to the Holy Land and extremely
86 APPANAGE RUSSIA
useful chronicles, together with an oral tradition which included a special
cycle of byliny. The oldest surviving Russian, that is, Church Slavonic
manuscript, the illuminated so-called Ostromirovo Gospel of 1056-57
comes from Novgorod. Indeed, as is frequently the case, the culture of
Novgorod survived the political downfall of the city to exercise a con-
siderable influence on Moscow and on Russia in general.
Specialists have cited certain characteristics of Novgorodian culture as
reflecting the peculiar nature and history of that city-state. The Chronicle
of Novgorod and other Novgorodian writings express a strong and constant
attachment to the city, its streets, buildings, and affairs. Moreover, the
whole general tone of Novgorodian literature has been described as strik-
ingly realistic, pragmatic, and businesslike, even when dealing with religious
issues. For example, Archbishop Basil adduced the following arguments,
among others, to prove that paradise was located on earth rather than in
heaven or in imagination: four terrestrial rivers flow from paradise, one
of which, the Nile, Basil described with some relish; St. Macarius lived
near paradise; St. Efrosimius even visited paradise and brought back to
his abbot three apples, while St. Agapius took some bread there; two
Novgorodian boats once reached the paradise mountain as they sailed in a
distant sea. Together with realism and practicality went energy and bustle,
manifested, for example, in constant building — about one hundred stone
churches were erected in the city in the last two centuries of its independence.
Visitors described the Novgorodians as an extremely vigorous and active
people, whose women were equal to men and prominent in the affairs of
the city.
The heroes of Novgorodian literature also reflect the life of the city.
The main protagonists of the Novgorodian cycle of byliny included the
extraordinary businessman and traveler, merchant Sadko, and the irrepress-
ible and irresponsible young giant Basil Buslaev, whose bloody forays
against his neighbors could be checked only by his mother. Buslaev’s death
illustrates well his behavior: given the choice by a skull to jump in one
direction and live or to jump in another and perish, he naturally chose the
second and cracked his head. Buslaev has been cited as a genuine repre-
sentative of the free adventurers of Novgorod, who did so much to spread
the sway of their city over enormous lands populated both by Russians and
by Finnic-speaking and other tribes.
The history of Novgorod, remarkable in itself, attracts further attention
as one variant in the evolution of the lands of Kievao Russia after the de-
cline of Kiev. While it is usual to emphasize the peculiar qualities of
Novgorod, it is important to realize also that these qualities stemmed directly
from the Kievan — and to some extent pre-Kievan — period and repre-
sented, sometimes in an accentuated manner, certain salient Kievan char-
acteristics. The urban life and culture of Novgorod, the important position
LORD NOVGOROD THE GREAT 87
of its middle class, its commerce, and its dose contacts with the outside
wcrftf aft fink Novgorod to the mainstream of Kievan history The veche
too, of course, had had a significant role in Kievan life and politics In
emphasizing further its authority and functions, the Novgorod tans developed
one element of the political synthesis of Kievan Russia, the democratic, at
the expense of two others, the autocratic and the aristocratic, which, as we
shall sec, found a more ferule soil in other parts of the country.
Pskov
The democratic political evolution characteristic of Novgorod occurred
also in a few other places, especially in another northwestern Russian town,
Pskov Long subject to Novgorod, this extreme Russian outpost became
in 1348 a small independent principality with a territory of some 250 by
75 miles Pskov had a prince whose powers were even more restricted
than those of the prince of Novgorod and a veche which in some ways
exceeded that of the larger town m importance Notably, the Pskovian
veche, in addition to its other functions, acted as a court for senous crimes
The town had two elected posadniki as well as the elders of the kontsy,
but no tysiatsku, and it was subdivided, much like Novgorod, into streets
and kontsy A council of elders also operated in Pskov
Being much smaller than Novgorod, Pskov experienced less social differ-
entiation and social tension It has been generally described as more
compact, democratic, and peaceful in its inner life than its “big brother."
On the other hand, this “little brother ' — a title given to Pskov by Nov-
gorod at one point — ~ participated fully in the high development of urban
life and culture typical of Novgorod In fact, Pskovian architects obtained
wide renown, while the legal code issued by the Pskovian veche, the cele-
brated Sudebnlk of 1397, with supplements until about 1467 — mentioned
earlier m contrasting the Russians and the Mongols — represents a most
impressive compendium of highly developed Russian medieval law.
Pskov’s relations with Moscow differed from those of Novgorod Never
a rival of the Muscovite state, Pskov, on the contrary, constantly needed
As W.p agivTAk watte tram the TV.ws a ft’. 1 vawafly a'vd wJhfcc
peacefully under the influence of Moscow Yet when the Muscovite suite
finally incorporated Pskov around 1511, the town, after suffering deporta-
tions, lost its special inslituuons, all of its independence, and in the face
of Muscovite tates and regulations, us commercial and middle-cfass way of
hfe.
In spife of brilliance and many successes, the historical development of
Novgorod and Pskov proved to be, in the long run, abortive.
THE SOUTHWEST AND THE NORTHEAST
At the end of the twelfth century the Russian land has no effective
political unity; on the contrary, it possesses several important centers,
the evolutions of which, up to a certain point, follow different di-
rections and assume diverse appearances.
MIAKOTIN
"While THE history of Novgorod represented one important variation
on tlic Kievan theme, two others were provided by the evolutions of the
southwestern and the northeastern Russian lands. As in the case of Nov-
gorod, these areas formed parts of Kievan Russia and participated fully
in its life and culture. In fact, the southwest played an especially important
role in maintaining close links between the Russians of the Kievan period
and the inhabitants of eastern and central Europe; whereas the northeast
gradually replaced Kiev itself as the political and economic center of the
Russian state and also made major contributions to culture, for instance,
through its brilliant school of architecture which we discussed earlier. With
the collapse of the Kievan state and the breakdown of unity among the Rus-
sians, the two areas went their separate ways. Like the development of
Novgorod, their independent evolutions stressed certain elements in the
Kievan heritage and minimized others to produce strikingly different, yet
intrinsically related, societies.
The Southwest
The territory inhabited by the Russians directly west and southwest of
the Kiev area was divided into Volynia and Galicia. The larger land,
Volynia, sweeps in a broad belt, west of Kiev, from the foothills of the
Carpathian Mountains into White Russia. The smaller, Galicia, which is
located along the northern slopes of the Carpathians, irrigated by such
rivers as the Prut and the Dniester, and bordered by Hungary and Poland,
represented the furthest southwestern extension of the Kievan state. During
the Kievan period the Russian southwest attracted attention by its inter-
national trade, its cities, such as Vladimir-in-Volynia and Galich, as well
as many others, and in general by its active participation in the life and
culture of the times. Vladimir-in-Volynia, it may be remembered, ranked
high as a princely scat, while the entire area was considered among the more
desirable sections of the state. The culture of Volynia and Galicia formed
Till S
D THE KQHTHt.
89
an integral part of Kievan culture, but it experienced particularly strong
foreign, especially Western, influences The two lands played their part in
the warfare of the period, Galicia became repeatedly a battleground for
the Russians and the Poles
As Kiev declined, the southwest and several other areas rose in im-
portancc In the second half of the twelfth century Galicia had one of us
ablest and most famous rulers, prince laroslav Osmomysl, whose obscure
appellation has been taken b> some scholars to mean “of eight minds'* and
to denote his wisdom, and whose power was treated with great respect in
the Lay of the Host of Igor After laroslav Osmomysl s death m 1187,
Andrew, king of Hungary, made an abortive effort to reign in the princi-
pality, which was followed by the rule of laroslav's son Vladimir who died
in 1 197, After Vladimir, Galicia obtained a strong and celebrated prince,
Roman of Volyma, who united the two southwestern Russian lands and
also extended his sway to Kiev itself Roman campaigned successfully
against the Hungarians, the Poles, the Lithuanians, and the Polovtsy By-
zantium sought his alliance, while Pope Innocent III offered him a royal
Crown, which Roman declined The chronicle of Galicia and Volyma, a
work of high literary merit noted for ns vivjd language, pictured Roman
as follow's* “he threw himself against the pagans like a Ifon, he raged like
90
APPANAQE RUs
a lynx, he brought destruction like a crocodile, and he swept over their
land like an eagle, brave he was like an aurochs.” Roman died in a Polish
ambush in 1205, leaving behind two small sons, the elder, Daniel, aged
four.
After Roman’s death, Galicia experienced extremely troubled times
marked by a rapid succession of rulers, by civil wars, and by Hungarian
and Polish intervention. In contrast, Volynia had a more fortunate history,
and from 1221 to 1264 it was ruled by Roman’s able son Daniel. Follow-
ing his complete victory in Volynia, which required a number of years,
Daniel fumed to Galicia and, by about 1238, brought it under bis own
and his brother’s jurisdiction. Daniel also achieved fame as a creator of
cities, such as Lvov, which to an extent replaced Kiev as an emporium of
East-West trade, a patron of learning and the arts, and in general as a
builder and organizer of the Russian southwest. His rule witnessed, in a
sense, the culmination of the rapprochement between Russia and the West,
In 1253 Daniel accepted a king’s crown from the pope — the only such
instance in Russian history — while his son Roman married into the
Austrian reigning house. Daniel’s work, however, received a shattering
blow from the Mongol invasion. The Mongols laid waste Galicia and
Volynia, and the Russians of the southwest, together with their compatriots
elsewhere, had to submit to the overlordship of the khan.
Following the death of Daniel in 1264 and of his worthy son and succes-
sor Leo in 1301, who had had more trouble with the Mongols, Volynia
and Galicia began to decline. Their decline lasted for almost a century
and was interrupted by several rallies, but they were finally absorbed by
neighboring states. Volynia gradually became part of the Lithuanian state
which will be discussed in a later chapter. Galicia experienced intermit-
tently Polish and Hungarian rule until the final Polish success in 1387.
Galicia’s political allegiance to Poland contributed greatly to a spread of
Catholicism and Polish culture and social influences in the southwestern
Russian principality, at least among its upper classes. Over a period of
time, Galicia lost in many respects its character as one of the Kievan Rus-
sian lands.
The internal development ofVolynia and Galicia reflected the exceptional
growth and power of the boyars. Ancient and well-established on fertile
soil and in prosperous towns, the landed proprietors of the southwest often
arrogated to themselves the right to invite and depose princes, and they
played the leading role in countless political struggles and intrigues. In a
most extraordinary development, one of the boyars, a certain Vladislav,
even occupied briefly the princely seat of Galicia in 1210, the only occasion
in ancient Russia when a princely seat was held by anyone other than a
member of a princely family. Vladimirsky-Budanov and other specialists
have noted such remarkable activities of Galician boyars as their direct
THE SOUTHWEST AND THE NORTHEAST 91
administration of parts of the principality, in disregard of the prince, and
their withdrawal m cor pore from the princedom m 1226 in their dispute
with Prince Mstislav By contrast with the authority of the boyars pnneely
authority m Gatina and Volynia represented a later, more superficial, and
highly circumscribed phenomenon Only exceptionally strong rulers, such
as laroslav Osmomysl, could control the boy an The veche in Galicia and
Volyma, while It did play a role in politics and at least occasionally sup-
ported the prince against the boyars, could not consistently curb their
power It should be noted that the rise of the boyars in southwest Russia
resembled in many respects the development of the landlord class in ad-
jacent Poland and Hungary
The Northeast
The northeast, like the southwest formed an integral part of the Kievan
state Its leading towns Rostov and Suzdal and some others, belonged with
the oldest in Russia Its princes, deriving from Vladimir Mocomakh, par-
ticipated effectively m twelfth-century Kievan politics In fact, ns we have
seen, when Kiev and the Kievan area declined, the political center of the
state shifted to the northeast, to the so-called pnneedom of Vladimtr-Suzdal
which covered large territories in the central and eastern parts of European
Russia It was a ruler of this principality, Andrew Bogohubskn, who sacked
Kiev in 1 169 and, having won the office of the grand pnnee, transferred
its scat to his favorite town of Vladimir in the northeast His father, the
first independent prince of Suzdal and a son of Vladimir Monomakh, the
celebrated Turn Dolgoruku, that is, George of the Long Arm, had already
won the grand princedom, but had kept it in Kiev, with Andrew, it shifted
definitively to the northeast Although Andrew Bogohubskn fell victim to
a conspiracy in 117 4, his achievements of building up his principality and of
emphasizing the authority of the princes of Suzdal in their own territory and
in Russia, remained His work was resumed in 1176 by Andrew's brother
Vsevolod, known as Vsevolod III because he was the third Russian grand
pnnee with that name, or Vsevolod of the Large Nest because of his big
family Vsevolod ruled unul his death m 1212 and continued to build
towns, fortresses, and churches, to suppress opposiuon, and to administer
the land effectively At the same time, as grand pnnee, he made his au
thonty felt all over Russia
It will be remembered that the Mongol invasion dealt a staggering blow
to the Russian northeast The grand pnnee at the time, Iuru, a son of
Vsevolod III, fell in battle, the Russian armies were smashed, ard virtually
the entire land was laid waste Yet, after the Golden Horde established its
rule in Russia, the northeastern principalities had some advantages In
contrast to the steppe of the south, they remained outside the zone directly
occupied by the Mongols and on the whole could slowly rebuild and de-
velop. A certain distance from the invaders, it might be added, gave them
an advantage not only over the old Kievan south, but also over the south-
eastern principality of Riazan, which evolved along lines parallel to the
evolution of the northeast, but experienced greater Mongol pressure. More-
over, the seat of the grand prince stayed in the northeast with the descend-
ants of Vladimir Monomakh. To be more exact, after the death in 1263
of Alexander Nevskii, who, as mentioned earlier, had managed to stabilize
relations with the Mongols, the office of the grand prince went successively
to his brothers Iaroslav of Tver and Basil of Kostroma and to his sons
Dmitrii and Andrew. Following the death of Andrew in 1 304, Michael of
Tver, laroslav’s son and Alexander Nevskii’s nephew, ruled as grand prince
until he was killed by the Mongols at the court of the Golden Horde in
1319, Michael was succeeded by his rival, a grandson of Alexander Nevskii,
lurii, or George, who became the first prince of Moscow to assume the
office of grand prince.
But, while the position of the grand prince, with its location in the north-
cast and the complicated Kievan practice of princely succession, continued
as a symbol of Russian unity, in other respects division prevailed. Ap-
panages multiplied as princes divided their holdings among their sons.
On the death of Vsevolod III, the Vladimir-Suzdal princedom had already
THE SOUTHWEST AND THE KOUTHUST 93
split into five principalities which proceeded to divide further Ultimately
some pnnees inherited tiny territories, while still others could not be pro-
vided for and had to find service wuh more fortunate members of the
fa mil) In the continuous shifting of political boundaries, four leading
principalities emerged in the northeast in the first half of the fourteenth
century the princedoms of Vladimir, Rostov, Tver, and Moscow A pro-
liferation of appanages, characteristic of the northeast, occurred also In the
western lands and in the southeastern principality of Riazan, in fact, every-
where in Russia, except in Novgorod which knew how to control its pnnees
Whereas the evolution of Novgorod emphasized the role of the veche,
and the evolution of Galicia and Volyma that of the boyars, the prince
prevailed in the northeast Although, as already mentioned, Rostov, Suzdal,
and some other towns and areas of the northeast formed integral and
important parts of Kievan Russia, they generally lay, tn contrast to the
southwest, in a wilderness of forests with no definite boundaries and hence
with great possibilities of expansion to the north and the east That expan-
sion took place in the late Kievan and especially the appanage periods
This celebrated “colonization" of new lands was considered by S Soloviev,
Kliuchevsky, and some other specialists to have been decisive for subse-
quent Russian hisiory The princes played a major role in the expansion
by providing economic support, protection, and social organization for the
colonists In the new pioneer societ) there existed little in the nature of
vested interests or established institutions to challenge princely authority
It may be noted that Andrew Bogoliubsku had already transferred his
capital from ancient Suzdal to the new town of Vladimir and that his chief
political opponents were the boyars from the older sections of his realm
The Mongol invasion and other wars and disasters of the umc also con-
tributed to the growth of princely authority, for they shattered the
established economic and social order and left it to the prince to rebuild
and reorganize devastated territory The increasing particularism and de-
pendence on local economy, together with the proliferation of appanages,
meant that the pnnee often acted simply as the proprietor of his principality,
entering into every detail of its life and worrying little about the distinction
between public and private law With the passage of years, die role of the
prince 10 the northeast came to bear little resemblance to that of the pnnees
In Novgorod or in Galicia
Kliuchevsky and other Russian historians seem to overstate the case when
they select the evolution of the northeast as the authenuc Russian develop-
ment and the true continuation of Kievan history It would seem better to
consider Novgorod, the southwest, and the northeast, all as fully Kievan and
as accentuating in their later independent growth certain aspects of the
mixed and complicated Kievan society and system the democratic veche,
the aristocratic boyar rale, or the autocratic prince, the city or the country-
94
APPANAGE RUSS!*
side; trade or agriculture; contacts with the West or proximity to Asia.
Nor should other Russian areas— not included in our brie! discussion
-such as those of Smolensk, Chernigov, or Riazan, be denied their full
share of Kievan inheritance. The more catholic point of view would not
minimize the significance of the northeast in Russian history, It was in the
northeast, together with the Novgorodian north and certain other adjacent
lands, that the Great Russian ethnic type developed, as distinct from the
Ukrainian and the White Russian. The conditions of its emergence, all
characteristic of the northeast, included the breakdown of Kievan unity
and the existence of a more primitive style of life in a forest wilderness
inhabited also by Finnic-speaking tribes. And it was a northeastern princi-
pality, Moscow, which rose to gather the Russian lands and initiate a new
epoch in Russian history.
THE RISE OF MOSCOW
. we can imagine the attitude towards the princedom of Moscow
and its pnoce which developed amidst the northern Russian popula-
tion. 1) The scmoi Grand Prince of Moscow came to be re-
garded as a model ruler manager, the establish er of peace in the land
and of civil order, and the princedom of Moscow as the starting point
of a new system of social relations the first fruit of which was pre-
cisely the establishment of a greater degree of internal peace and
external security 2) The senior Grand Prince of Moscow came to
be regarded as the leader of the Russian people in its struggle against
foreign enemies and Moscow as the instrument of the first popular
successes over infidel Lithuania and the heathen ‘•devourers of raw
flesh " Ihc Mongols. 3) Finally in ihe Moscow prince northern Russia
became accustomed to see the eldest son of the Russian church, the
closest friend and collaborator of the chief Russian hierarch and it
came to consider Moscow as a cuy on which rests a special blessing
of the greatest saint of the Russian land and to which are linVed the
religious moral interests of the enure Orthodox Russian people Such
significance was achieved by the middle of the fifteenth century, by
the appanage pnncehng from the hauls of the Moscow River who.
a century and a half earlier had acted as a minor plunderer, lying
around a corner in ambush for his ncigbbois
mvctttvsrv
The unification of Great Russia took place through • destruction Of
all local independent political force* in favor of the single authority
of the Grand Pnnce But these forcei doomed by historical cireum
stances were ihe bearers of -anuquity and tradition,” of the cuitomary-
legal foundations of Great Russian life Their fall weakened its firm
traditions. To create a new system of life on the ruins of the old
became a task of the authority of the Oraml Pnnce which sought not
only unity, but also complete freedom in ordenne the forces and the
resources of the land The single rule of Moscow led to Muscovite
autocracy
nxsvwnov
The name Moscow first appears in a chronicle under the year 1 147, when
lum DolgoruVn, a pnnce of Suzdal mentioned in the preceding chapter,
sent an invitation to his ally Prince Sviatoslav of the eastern Ukrainian
principality of Novgorod Scvcrsk “Come to me, brother, to Moscow.’*
And in Moscow, Iurn feasted Sviatoslav Under the year 1156, the chron-
icler notes that Grand Pnnce lum Dolgorukii ' laid the foundations of the
town of Moscow,” meaning — as on other such occasions — that he built
the city wall Moscow as a town is mentioned next under 1 177 when Gleb,
95
96
THE RISE OF MOSCOW 97
Pnncc of Riazan, ‘came upon Moscow and burned the entire town and
the villages ' Tt would seem then that Moscow originated as a princely
village or settlement prior to 1147, and that about the middle ol the twelfth
century tt became a walled center, that is, a town Moscow was located m
Suzdal territory, close to the borders of the principalities of Novgorod
Seversk and Riazan ’
The Rise of Moscow to the /feign o] Ivan W
We know little of the early Muscovite princes, who changed frequently
and apparently considered their small and insignificant appanage merely
as a stepping stone to a better position although one might mention at
least one Vladimir who was one of the younger sons of Vsevolod III and
probably the first prince of Moscow in the early thirteenth century, and
another Vladimir who perished when Moscow was destroyed by the Mon-
gols in 1237 It was with Daniel the youngest son of Alexander Nevskii,
who became the ruler of Moscow in the second half of the thirteenth cert
tury that Moscow acquired a separate family of pnnees who stayed In
their appanage and devoted tlicmsclvcs to its development Daniel con-
centrated his efforts both on building up his small principality and on
extending it along the flow of the Moscow river, of which he controlled
originally only the middle course Darnel succeeded in seizing the mouth
of the river and its lower course from ore of the Riazan pnnees, he also
had the good fortune of inheriting an appanage from a childless ruler
Daniel s son lurn, or George, who succeeded him m 1303, attacked
another neighbor, the pnncc of Mozhaisk, and by annexing his territory
finally established Muscovite control over the enure flow of the Moscow
river After that he turned to a much more ambitious undertaking a strug
glc with Grand Pnncc Michael of Tver for leadership in Russia The malty
between Moscow and Tver was to continue for almost two centuries,
determine m large part which pnnctpality would unite the Russian people,
and also add much drama and violence to the appanage period In 1317
or 1318 luni mamed a sister of the khan of the Golden Horde, the bnde
having become Orthodox atul received from the khan the appointment
as grand pnncc During the resulting campaign against Tver, the Muscovite
army suffered a crushing defeat, and, although lum escaped his wife fell
prisoner When she died in captivity, lum accused Michael of poisoning
her The Tver prince had to appear at the court of the Golden Horde,
where he was judged, condemned and executed In consequence, lum was
reaffirmed in 1319 as grand prince Vet by 1322 the khan had made
Michael s eldest son Dmitm, grand prince lum accepted this dccisiort.
APPANAGE RUSSI
but apparently continued his intrigues, traveling in 1324 to the Golden
Horde. There, in 1325, he was met and dispatched on the spot by Dmitrii,
who was in turn killed by the Mongols. Dmitrii’s younger brother, Alex-
ander of Tver, became grand prince. However, he too soon ran into trouble
with the Mongols. In 1327 a punitive Mongol expedition, aided by Musco-
vite troops, devastated Tver, although Alexander escaped to Pskov and
eventually to Lithuania. In 1337 Alexander was allowed to return as
prince of Tver, but in 1338 he was ordered to appear at the court of the
Golden Horde and was there executed.
Following the devastation of Tver and Alexander’s flight, lurii’s younger
brother Ivan Kalita, Prince of Moscow, obtained the position of grand
prince, which he held from 1328, or according to another opinion from
1332, until his death in 1341. Ivan Kalita means “John the Moneybag,”
and Ivan I remains the prototype of provident Moscow princes with their
financial and administrative talents. Always careful to cultivate the Golden
Horde, he not only retained the office of grand prince, but also received
the commission of gathering tribute for the khan from other Russian princes.
He used his increasing revenue to purchase more land: both entire ap-
panages from bankrupt rulers and separate villages. The princedom of
Vladimir, which he held as grand prince, he simply added to his own
principality, keeping the capital in Moscow. He ransomed Russian prison-
ers from the Mongols to settle them on Muscovite lands. All in all, Ivan
Kalita managed to increase the territory of his princedom severalfold.
It was also in Ivan Kalita’s reign that Moscow became the religious
capital of Russia. After the collapse of Kiev, and in line with the general
breakup of unity in the land, no ecclesiastical center immediately emerged
to replace Kiev, “the cradle of Christianity in Russia.” In 1326 the head
of the Russian Church, Metropolitan Peter, died while staying in Moscow.
He came to be worshipped as a saint and canonized, his shrine bringing a
measure of sanctity to Moscow. Moreover, in 1328 Ivan Kalita persuaded
Peter’s successor, Theognost, to settle in Moscow. From that time on, the
metropolitans “of Kiev and all Russia” — a title which they retained until
the mid-fifteenth century — added immeasurably to the importance and
prestige of the upstart principality and its rulers. Indeed,, the presence of
the metropolitan not only made Moscow the spiritual center of Russia,
but, as we shall see, it also proved time and again to be helpful to the
princedom in diverse material matters.
Following the passing of Ivan Kalita in 1341, his son Simeon, surnamed
the Proud, was confirmed as grand prince by the khan of the Golden Horde.
Simeon’s appellation, his references to himself as prince “of all Russia,”
and his entire bearing indicated the new significance of Moscow. In addition
to emphasizing his authority over other Russian rulers, Simeon the Proud
TJIE RISE OF MOSCOW
99
continued his predecessor s work of enlarging the Muscovite domain proper
He died in 1353 at the age of thirty six apparently of the plague which had
been devastating most of Europe In his testament Simeon the Proud
urged his heirs to obey a remarkable Russian dene Alexis, who was to
become one of the most celebrated Muscovite metropolitans
Alexis in fact, proceeded to play a leading role in the affairs of the
Muscovite state both dunng the reign of Simeon the Proud s weak brother
and successor, Ivan the Meek, which lasled from 1353 to 1359, and dunng
the minority of Ivan's son Grand Pnnce Dmitri! Besides overseeing the
management of affairs in Moscow and treating with other Russian princes,
the metropolitan traveled repeatedly to the Golden Horde to deal with the
Mongols Alexis’s wise leadership of Church and Slate contributed to his
enshrinement as one of the leading figures m the Muscovite pantheon of
saints During Ivan II s reign beginning with 1357, civil strife erupted m
the Golden Horde no less than twenty rulers were to change in bloody
struggle in the next twenty years Yet if Mongol power declined, that of
Lithuania led by Olgerd, grew, and the Moscow pnnees had to turn in-
creasing attention to the defense of their western frontier
Ivan the Meek’s death resulted in a contest for the office of grand pnnee,
with Prince Dmitrn of Suzdal and Ivans nine year-old son Dmitni as the
protagonists In a sense, the new crisis represented a revival of old Kievan
political strife between “uncles and “nephews” Dmitni of Suzdal, who,
as well as Dnutm of Moscow, was descended directly from Vsevolod III,
was a generation older than the Muscovite pnnce and clatmcd seniority
over him Rapidly changing Mongol authorities endorsed both candidates
The rally of the people of Moscow behind their boy ruler and the principle
of direct succession from father to son earned the day Dmitni of Suzdal
abandoned his headquarters in Vladimir without a fight, and Ivan the
Meeks son became firmly established as the Russian grand pnnce The
Kiev an system of succession failed to find sufficient support m the northeast.
Grand Pnnce Dmitni, known as Dmitni Donskor, that is, of the Don,
after his celebrated victory over the Mongols near that riser, reigned in
Moscow for three decades until his death in 1389 The early part of his
reign, with Metropolitan Alexis play mg a major role in the government,
saw a continuing growth of Muscovite temtory, while in Moscow itself in
1367 stone walls replaced wooden walls in the Kremlin It also witnessed
a bitter struggle against Tver supported by Lithuania Indeed Pnnce
Michael of Tver obtained from the Golden Horde the title of grand pnnce
and together with the Lithuanians tned to destroy hts Muscovite nval
Twice, in 1368 and 1372, Olgerd of Lithuania reached Moscow and
devastated its environs, although he could not capture the fortified town
itself Dmitrn managed to blunt the Lithuanian offensive and n3ke peace
100 APPANAGE RUSSIA
with Lithuania, after which he defeated Tver and made Michael recognize
him as grand prince. Muscovite -troops also scored victories over Riazan
and over the Volga Bulgars, who paid tribute to the Golden Horde.
But Dmitrli’s fame rests on his victorious war with the Golden Horde
itself. As Moscow grew and as civil strife swept through the Golden Horde,
the Mongol hegemony in Russia experienced its first serious challenge
since the time of the invasion. We have seen that Dmitrii had successfully
defied the Mongol decision to make Michael of Tver grand prince and had
defeated the Volga Bulgars, whose principality was a vassal state of the
Golden Horde. A series of incidents and clashes involving the Russians
and the Mongols culminated, in 1378, in Dmitrii's victory over a Mongol
army on the banks of the Vozha river. Clearly the Mongols had either to
reassert their mastery over Moscow or give up their dominion in Russia.
A period of relative stability in the Golden Horde enabled the Mongol
military leader and strong man, Mamai, to mount a major effort against
Dmitrii.
The Mongols made an alliance with Lithuania, and Mamai set out with
some 200,000 troops to meet in the upper Don area with forces of Grand
Prince Jagiello of Lithuania for a joint invasion of Muscovite lands. Dmitrii,
however, decided to seize the initiative and crossed the Don with an army
of about 150,000 men, seeking to engage the Mongols before the Lithua-
nians arrived. The decisive battle, known as the battle of Kulikovo field,
was fought on the eighth of September 1380 where the Nepriadva river
flows into the Don, on a hilly terrain intersected by streams which the Rus-
sians selected to limit the effectiveness of the Mongol cavalry. The terrain
was such that the Mongols could not simply envelop Russian positions,
but had to break through them. Fighting of desperate ferocity — Dmitrii
himself, according to one source, was knocked unconscious in combat and
found after the battle in a pile of dead bodies — ended in a complete rout
of Mamai’s army when the last Russian reserve came out of ambush in a
forest upon the exhausted and unsuspecting Mongols. Jagiello, whose Lithua-
nian forces failed to reach KuJikovo by some two days, chose not to fight
Dmitrii alone and turned back. The great victory of the Russians laid to rest
the belief in Mongol invincibility. What is more, the new victor of the Don
rose suddenly as the champion of all the Russians against the hated Mongol
oppressors. While certain important Russian rulers failed to support Dmitrii,
and those of Riazan even negotiated with the Mongols, some twenty princes
rallied against the common enemy in an undertaking blessed by the Church
and bearing some marks of a crusade. The logic of events pointed beyond
the developments of 1380 to a new role in Russian history for both the
principality and prince of Moscow.
' Nevertheless, the years following the great victory at Kulikovo saw a
reversal of its results. In fact, only two years later, in 1382, the Mongols
THE RISE OF MOSCOW
101
came back, led this time by the able Khan Tokhtamysh While the sur-
prised Drnitm was in the north gathering an army, they besieged Moscow
and, after assaults failed, managed to enter the city by a ruse Tokhtamysh
swore that he had decided to stop the fighting and that he and his small
party w anted to be allowed within the walls merely to satisfy their curiosity,
once inside, the Mongols charged their hosts and, by seizing a gate, ob-
tained reinforcements and hence control of Moscow, which they sacked and
burned Although Tokhtamysh retreated, with an enormous booty, rather
than face Dmitm's army, the capital and many of the lands of the principal-
ity were desolated and us resources virtually exhausted Dmitni, therefore,
had to accept the oserlordship of the Mongol khan, who in return confirmed
him as the Russian grand prince Still, after Kulikovo, the Mongol grip on
Russia lacked its former firmness Dmitni Donskoi spent the last years of
his reign in strengthening his authority among Russian princes, especially
those of Tver and Riazan, and in assisting the rebuilding and economic re-
covery of his lands
When Dmitrn Donskoi died tn 1389 at the age of thirty-nine, lus son
Vasilu or Basil, became grand prince without challenge cither in Russia
or in the Golden Horde Basil 1 s long reign, from 13S9 until his death m
1425, deserves attention for a number of reasons The cautious and intel-
ligent ruler continued very successfully the traditional policy of the Mus-
covite princes of enlarging their own principality and of making its welfare
their first concern Thus, Basil I acquired several new appanages as well as
a number of individual towns with their surrounding areas Also he waged
a continuous struggle against Lithuania for western Russian lands Although
the warlike Grand Pnnee Vitovt of Lithuania scored some victories over hts
Russian son in law, Basil s persistent efforts led to a militaiy and political
deadlock in much of the contested area It might be noted that, after the
conclusion of a treaty with Lithuania in 1408, a number of appanage princes
in the western borderlands switched their allegiance from Lithuania to Mos-
cow
Relations with the East presented as many problems as relations with
the West In 1395 Moscow barely escaped invasion by the army of one of
the greatest conquerors of history, Tamerlane, who had spread his rule
through the Middle East and the Caucasus and in 1391 had smashed
Tokhtamysh Tamerlane’s forces actually devastated Riazan and advanced
upon Moscow only to turn back to the steppe before reaching the Oka
river Around 1400 Muscovite troops laid waste the land of the Volga
Bulgars, capturing their capital Great Bulgar and other towns In 1408
the Golden Horde, pretending to be staging a campaign against Lithuania,
suddenly mounted a major assault on Moscow to punish Basil 1 for not pay-
ing tribute and for generally disobeying and disregarding his overlord The
Mongols devastated the principality, although they could not capture the
102
APPANAGE RUSS.
city of Moscow itself. In the later part of his reign, Basil I, preoccupied by
his struggle with Lithuania and Tver, maintained good relations with the
khan and sent him “gifts.”
The death of Basil I In 3425 led to the only war of succession in the his-
tory of the principality of Moscow. The protagonists in the protracted strug-
gle were Basil I’s son Basil II, who succeeded his father at the age of ten,
and Basil II’s uncle Prince Iurii, who died in 1434 but whose cause was
taken over by his sons, Basil the Squint-eyed and Dmitrii Shemiaka. Prince
Iurii claimed seniority over his nephew, and he represented, in some sense,
a feudal reaction against the growing power of the grand princes of Moscow
and their centralizing activities. By 1448, after several reversals of fortune
and much bloodshed and cruelty — which included the blinding of both
Basil the Squint-eyed and of Basil II himself, henceforth known as Basil
the Blind — the Muscovite prince had prevailed. Dmitrii Shemiaka's final
rebellion was suppressed in 1450. Indeed, having obtained sufficient support
from the boyars and the people of Moscow, Basil II managed, although at
a very heavy cost, not only to defeat his rivals but also to expand his prin-
cipality at the expense of Basil the Squint-eyed and Dmitrii Shemiaka and
also of some other appanage princes.
Relations with the Mongols continued to be turbulent as the Golden
Horde began to break up and Moscow asserted its independence. In 1445
Basil II was badly wounded and captured in a battle with dissident Mongol
leaders, although soon he regained his freedom for a large ransom. The year
3452 marked a new development: a Mongol prince of the ruling family
accepted Russian suzerainty when the princedom of Kasimov was estab-
lished. Basil II had taken into his service Mongol nobles with their fol-
lowers fleeing from the Golden Horde, and he rewarded one of them, Kasim,
a descendant of Jcnghiz Khan, with the principality for his important assist-
ance in the struggle against Dmitrii Shemiaka. The creation of this Mongol
princedom subject to the grand prince of Moscow was only one indication
of the decline of Mongol power. Still more significant was the division of
the vast lands held directly by the Golden Horde, with the Crimean khanate
separating itself in 3430, that of Kazan in 1436, and that of Astrakhan in
3466 during the reign of Basil II’s successor, Ivan III. In 1475 the Crimean
state recognized Ottoman, suzerainty, with Turkish troops occupying several
key positions on the northern shore of the Black Sea. Of course, the khans
of the Golden Horde tried to stem the tide and, among other things, to bring
their Russian vassal back to obedience. Khan Ahmad directed three cam-
paigns against Moscow, in 3451, 1455, and 1461, but failed to obtain deci-
sive results. For practical purposes, Moscow can be considered as inde-
pendent of the Mongols after 1452 at least, although the formal and final
abrogation of the yoke came only in 1480. In fact, Vernadsky regards the
establishment of the principality of Kasimov as a decisive turning point in
THE RISE OP MOSCOW 103
the relations between the forest and the strppe and thus in what is, to him,
the basic rhythm of Russian history
Basil IP* long reign from 1425 to 1462 also witnessed important events
in Europe which were to influence Russian history profoundly, although
they did not carry an immediate political impact like that implicit m the
break-up of the Golden Horde At the Council of Florence in J439, with
Byzantium struggling against the Turks for its existence and hoping to
obtain help from the West, the Greek clergy signed ftn abortive agreement
with Rome, recognizing pap3l supremacy The Russian metropolitan, Isi-
dore, a Greek, participated in the Council of Florence and, upon his return
to Moscow, proclaimed its results during a solemn service and read a prayer
for the pope After the service he was arrested on orders of the grand pnnec
and imprisoned in a monastery, from which he escaped before long to the
West A council of Russian bishops in 1443 condemned the Church union,
deposed Isidore and elected Archbishop Jonas metropolitan The admin-
istrative dependence of the Russian Church on the Byzantine came to fill
end Furthermore, many Russians remained suspicious of the Greeks even
after they repudiated the very short lived Union of Florence Then tn 1453
Constantinople fell to the Turks, who proceeded to acquire complete control
of the Balkan peninsula and of what used to be the Byzantine Empire As
we know, it was with Byzantium and the Balkan Slavs that ancient Russia
had its most important religious and cultural ties, in the appanage period
as well as m the days of Kiev The success of the Turks contributed greatly
to a weakening of these ties and, therefore, to a more complete Isolation
of Russia As we shall see, it also strengthened Muscovite xenophobia and
self importance and various teachings based on these attitudes It should
be noted that this boost to Muscovite parochialism occurred at the very
tune when the northeastern Russian princedom was being transformed into
a major state that was bound to play an important role fa international re-
lations and was in need of Western knowledge
The Reigns of I\an 111 and Basil III
The long reign of Ivan III, which extended from 1462 to 1505, has gen-
erally been considered, together with the following reign of Basil III, as the
termination of the appanage period and the beginning of a new age la Rus-
sian history, that of Muscovite Russia These two reigns provide a fitUng
climax to the story of the rise of Moscow Ivan Ill’s predecessors had al-
ready increased the territory of their principality from less than 600 square
miles at die time of Ivan Kalita to 15,000 toward the end of Basil II's reign.
But it remained for Ivan HI to absorb such old rivals as Novgorod and
Tver and to establish virtually a single rule in what used to be appanage
Russia Also, it was Ivan III who, as the conclusion to the developments
104 APPANAGE RUSSIA
described earlier in this chapter, successfully asserted full Russian inde-
pendence from the Mongols. And it was in his reign that the position and
authority of the grand prince of Moscow, continuing their long-term rise, ac-
quired attributes of majesty and formality unknown in the appanage period.
Ivan III, also called Ivan the Great, suited his important role well: while
sources differ concerning certain traits of his character, the general impres-
sion remains of a mighty figure combining practical abilities of an appanage
prince with unusual statesmanship and vision. Although only twenty-two
years old at the time of Basil H’s death, the new grand prince was fully
prepared to succeed him, having already acted for several years as his blind
father's chief assistant and even co-ruler.
Under Ivan III “the gathering of Russia” proceeded apace. The follow-
ing catalogue of events might give some indication of the nature and di-
versity of the process. In 1463 — or about a decade later according to
Cherepnin — Ivan HI purchased the patrimony of the appanage princes
of Iaroslavl, and in 1474 the remaining half of the town of Rostov. In 1472
lie inherited an appanage, the town of Dmitrov, from his childless brother
Iurii; and in the same year he conquered the distant northeastern land of
Perm, inhabited by a Finnic-speaking people and formerly under the vague
suzerainty of Novgorod. In 1481 the Muscovite grand prince obtained an-
other appanage after the death of another brother, Andrew the Little. In
1485 he forced Prince Michael of Vereia to bequeath to him Michael's
principality, bypassing Michael’s son, who had chosen to serve Lithuania.
In 1489 he annexed Viatka, a northern veche-ruled state founded by emi-
grants from Novgorod. And in 1493 Ivan III seized the town of Uglich
from his brother, Andrew the Big, and imprisoned Andrew for failing to
carry out his instructions to march with an army to the Oka river, against
the Mongols. Around 1500 the Muscovite grand prince inherited, from
Prince Ivan of Riazan, half of his principality and was appointed warden
of the other half bequeathed to Ivan of Riazan’s young son.
Ivan Ill’s most famous acquisitions, however, were Novgorod and Tver.
Novgorod, which we discussed in an earlier chapter, collapsed because of
both the Muscovite preponderance of strength and its own internal weak-
nesses. After the treaty of 1456 imposed by Basil II on Novgorod, the boyar
party in the city — led by the Boretsky family which included Martha the
celebrated widow of a posadnik — turned to Lithuania as its last hope. The
common people of Novgorod, on the other hand, apparently had little liking
either for Lithuania or for their own boyars. In the crucial campaign of
1471 Novgorodian troops made a poor showing, the archbishop’s regiment
refusing outright to fight against the grand prince of Moscow. After win-
ning the decisive battle fought on the banks of the Shelon river, Ivan 111
had the Novgorodians at his mercy. They had to promise allegiance to the
grand prince and his son, pay a Iaige indemnity, and cede to Moscow some
THE RISE OP MOSCOW 105
of their lands The new arrangement, which meant a thorough defeat and
humiliation of Novgorod but left ns system and position essentially intact,
could not be expected to last And indeed the authorities of Novgorod soon
refused to recognize Nan III as their sovereign and tried again to obtain
help from Lithuania In 1478 the angry grand prince undertook, hi* second
campaign against Novgorod, because Lithuanian help failed to materialize
and the Ncvgorodians split among themselves, the city finally surrendered
without a battle to the besieging Muscovite army This tune Ivan III ex-
ecuted some of his opponents as traitors, exiled others, and transferred
a considerable number of Novgorodian boyar families to other parts of the
country He declared, as quoted in a chronicle "The veche bell in my
patrimony, in Novgorod, shall not be, a posadnik there shall not be, and
I will mle the entire state ” The veche, the offices of the posadnik and the
tysiatsku, and m effect the entire Novgorodian system were accordingly
abolished even the veche bell was carted away Further large-scale deporta-
tions took place in 1489, and Novgorod became an integral part of the
Muscovite state
Tver's turn came next, and the principality oflercd even less resistance
than Novgorod Another Tver prince named Michael also tried to obtain
Lithuanian help against the expanding might of Moscow, signing an agree-
ment ui 1483 with Casimtr IV of Lithuania and Poland But when Ivan HI
marched on Tver, Michael repudiated the agreement and declared himself
an obedient 1 younger brother' of the Muscovite ruler Yet in 1485 he tried
to resume relations with Ltthuania, his messages to Casimtr IV were inter-
cepted and his plans discovered by Moscow Thereupon, Ivan III promptly
besieged Tver Michaels support among his own followers collapsed, and
he escaped to Lithuania, while the town surrendered without battle to the
Muscovite army WIkji Michael died in Lithuania he left no heir, and in
this manner ended the greatest rival family to the princes of Moscow In
contrast to Novgorod, the incorporation of Tver, which was a northeastern
principality, presented no special problems to Muscovite authorities The
sum of Ivan III s acquisitions, large and small, meant that very few Russian
appanages remained to be gathered, and as a rule even these few, such as
Pskov or the last half of Rtazan, survived because of their co-operation with
the grand pnnees of Moscow
Ivan Ill's ambitions were not limited to the remaining Russian appanages
The grand prince of Moscow considered himself the rightful heir to all the
former Kievan lands, which in his opinion constituted his lawful patrimony.
Ivan III made his view of the matter quite clear in foreign relations, and at
home he similarly emphasized his position as the sole tuler of the whole
country In 1493 he assumed the title of Sovereign — gosudar in Russian
•— of All Russia Ivan Ill’s claim to the entire inheritance of the Kievan
state represented above all else, a challenge to Lithuania which, following
106 APPANAGE RUSSIA
the collapse of Kiev, had extended its dominion over vast western and south-
western Russian territories. The Princedom of Lithuania, called by some
the Lithuanian-Russian Princedom, which we shall discuss in a later chap-
ter, arose in large part as a successor to Kiev: on the outcome of the strug-
gle between Moscow on one side and Lithuania and Poland on the other
depended the final settlement of the Kievan estate.
After Ivan III acquired Novgorod and Tver, a number of appanage
princes in the Upper Oka area, a border region between Lithuania and
Moscow, switched their allegiance from their Lithuanian overlord to him.
Lithuania failed to reverse their decision by force and had to accept the
change in an agreement in 1494. But new defections of princes to Moscow,
this time further south, led to war again in 1500. The Russians won the
crucial battle on the banks of the Vedrosha river, capturing the Lithuanian
commander, artillery, and supplies. By the peace treaty of 1503, the Lithu-
anians recognized as belonging to the grand prince of Moscow those terri-
tories that his armies had occupied. Ivan III thus obtained parts of the
Smolensk and the Polotsk areas and much of Chernigov-Seversk, a huge
land in southern and central European Russia based on the old principality
of Chernigov. Another peace treaty in 1503 ended the war which Moscow
had effectively waged to defend the principality of Pskov against the Livo-
nian Order. All in all, Ivan Hi’s successes in other Russian states and in
foreign wars enormously increased his domain.
The grand prince’s growing power and prestige led him logically to a final
break with the Mongols. This definitive lifting of the Mongol yoke, how-
ever, represented something of an anticlimax compared to the catastrophe
of the Mongol invasion or the epic battle of Kulikovo. Ivan III became
grand prince without being confirmed by the khan and, following the prac-
tice of his father Basil II, he limited his allegiance to the Golden Horde to
the sending of “presents” instead of the regular tribute, finally discontinuing
even those. Mongol punitive expeditions in 1465 and 1472 were checked
in the border areas of the Muscovite state. Finally in 1480, after Ivan III
publicly renounced any allegiance to the Golden Horde, Khan Ahmad de-
cided on an all-out effort against the disobedient Russians. He made an
alliance with Casimir IV of Lithuania and Poland and invaded Muscovite
territory. Ivan III, in turn, obtained the support of Mengli-Geray, the
Crimean khan, and disposed his forces so as to block the Mongol advance
and above all to guard river crossings. The main Mongol and Muscovite
armies reached the opposite banks of the Ugra river and remained there
facing each other. The Mongols had failed to cross the river before the
Muscovites arrived, and they did not receive the expected Lithuanian and
Polish help because these countries had to concentrate on beating hack the
Crimean Tartars who had made a large raid into Lithuania. Strangely
enough, when the river froze, making it possible for the cavalry of the
THE RISE OP MOSCOW
107
Golden Horde to advance, and the Russians began to retreat, the Mongols
suddenly broke camp and rushed back into the steppe. Apparently they
were frightened by an attack on their home base of Sarai that was staged
by a Russian and Tartar detachment. In any case, Khan Ahmad's effort
to restore his authority in Russia collapsed Shortly after, he was killed dur-
ing strife in the Golden Horde, and around 1500 the Horde itself fell under
the blows of the Crimean Tartars
Another important event in Ivan Ill’s reign was his marriage in 1472 to
a Byzantine princess, Sophia, or Zoe, Pateologue The marital alliance be-
tween the grand pnnee of Moscow and a niece of the last Byzantine em-
peror, Constantine XI, who had penshed on the walls of Constantinople in
the final Turkish assault, was sponsored by the Vatican in the hope of bring-
ing Russia under the sway of the pope and of establishing a broad front
against the Turks These expectations failed utterly, yet for other reasons
the marriage represented a notable occurrence Specifically, it fitted well Into
the general trend of elevating the position of the Muscovite ruler. Ivan III
added the Byzantine two-headed eagle to his own family’s St. George, and
he developed a complicated court ceremonial on the Byzantine model He
also proceeded to use the high titles of tsar and autocrat and to institute
the ceremony of coronation as a solemn church rite. While autocrat as
used in Moscow originally referred to the complete independence of the
Muscovite sovereign from any overlord, and thus to the termination of the
Mongol yoke, the word itself — although translated into the Russian —
and the attendant concept of power and majesty were Greek, just as tsar
stemmed from the Roman, and hence Byzantine, caesar, Ivan III also en-
gaged in an impressive budding program in Moscow, inviting craftsmen
from many countries to serve him In 1497 he promulgated for his entire
land a code of law which counted the Russian Justice and the Pskov
Sudebmk among its main sources It may be added that legends and doc-
trines emphasizing the prestige of Moscow and its ruler grew mainly in
Ivan Ill’s reign, and in that of his successor. They included the stories of
the bringing of Christianity to Russia by St. Andrew the apostle, the descent
of the Muscovite pnnees from the Roman emperors and the significance
of the regalia of Constantine Monomakh, and even the rather well-developed
doctrine of Moscow the Third Rome. Apparently, the Muscovite ruler took
the attitude of a distant superior toward his collaborators, especially after
his Byzanunc marriage Or, at least, so ihc boyars complained for years to
come
Although Ivan III asserted his importance and role as the successor to
the Kievan princes, he refused to be drawn into broader schemes or sacrifice
any of his independence Thus he declined papal suggestions of a union
with Rome and of a possible rc-establishment, in the person of the Musco-
vite ruler, of a Christian emperor In Constantinople. And when the Holy
108 APPANAGE RUSSIA
Roman Emperor offered him a kingly crown, he answered as follows: “We
pray God that He let us and our children always remain, as we are now,
the lords of our land; as to being appointed, just as we had never desired
it, so we do not desire it now.” Ivan III has been called the first national
Russian sovereign.
Ivan III was succeeded by his son Basil III, who ruled from 1505 to
1533. The new reign in many ways continued and completed the old. Basil
III annexed virtually all remaining appanages, such as Pskov, obtained
in 151 1 , and the remaining part of Riazan, which joined the Muscovite state
in 1517, as well as the principalities of Starodub, Chemigov-Seversk, and
the Upper Oka area. The Muscovite ruler fought Lithuania, staging three
campaigns aimed at Smolensk before that town was finally captured in
1514; the treaty of 1522 confirmed Russian gains. Continuing Ivan Ill’s
policy, he exercised pressure on the khanate of Kazan, advancing the Rus-
sian borders in that direction and supporting a pro-Russian party which
acted as one of the two main contending political factions in the turbulent
life of the city and the state. Profiting from the new standing of Muscovite
Russia, Basil III had diplomatic relations with the Holy Roman Empire —
the ambassador of which, Sigismund von Herberstein, left an important
account of Russia, Rerum moscovitarum commentarii — with the papacy,
with the celebrated Turkish sultan Suleiman I, the Magnificent, and even
with the founder of the great Mogul empire in India, Babar. Ironically, in
the case of this last potentate, of whom next to nothing was known in Mos-
cow, the Russians behaved with extreme caution not to pay excessive honors
to his empire and thus to demean the prestige of their ruler. Invitations
to foreigners to enter Russian service continued. It was in the reigns of Ivan
III and Basil III that a whole foreign settlement, the so-called German
suburb, appeared in Moscow.
In home affairs too Basil III continued the work of his father. He sternly
ruled the boyars and members of former appanage princely families who
had become simply servitors of Moscow. In contrast to the practice of
centuries, but in line with Ivan Ill’s policy, the abandonment of Muscovite
service in favor of some other power — which in effect came to mean
Lithuania — was judged as treason. At the same time the obligations im-
posed by Moscow increased. These and other issues connected with the
transition from appanages to centralized rule were to become tragically
prominent in the following reign.
Incidentally, it was Basil HI who forbade his merchants to attend the
Kazan fair and established instead a fair first in Vasilsursk and soon after
near the monastery of St. Macarius where the Vetluga flows into the Volga;
the new fair was transferred in 1817 to Nizhnii Novgorod to become the
most famous and important annual event of its kind in modern Russia.
THE RISE OF MOSCOW
109
Why Moscow Succeeded
The rise of Moscow was a fundamental development in Russian history*
The ultimate success of the northeastern principality meant the end of the
appanage period and the establishment of a centralized state, and the par-
ticular character of Muscovite government and society affected the evolu-
tion of Russia for centuries to come Yet, while the role of Moscow proved
to be in the end overwhelming, its ability to attain this role long remained
subject to doubt and thus its success needs a thorough explanation Moscow,
after all, began with very little and for a long time could not be compared
to such nourishing principalities as Novgorod or Galicia Even in ns own
area, the northeast, it started as a junior not only to old centers like Rostov
and Suzdal but also to Vladimir, and it defeated Tver in a long struggle
which it appeared several times to have lost Written sources, on their part,
indicate the surprise of contemporaries at the unexpected emergence of
Moscow In explaining the nse of Moscow, histonans have emphasized
several factors, or rather groups of factors, many of which have already
become apparent in our brief narrative
First, attention may be given to the doctnne of geographical causation
which represents both one of the basic and one of the earliest explanations
offered, having already been fully developed by S Soloviev. It stresses the
decisive importance of the location of Moscow for the later expansion of
the Muscovite state and includes several lines of argument Moscow lay at
the crossing of three roads The most important was the way from Kiev
and the enure declining south to the growing northeast In fact, Moscow
has been described as the first stopping and settling point in the northeast
But it also profited from movements in other directions, including the re-
verse Thus, it seems, immigrants came to Moscow after the Mongol devas-
taUon of the lands further to the northeast Moscow is also situated on a
bend of the Moscow river, which flows from the northwest to the southeast
into the Oka, the largest western tributary of the Volga To speak more
broadly of water communicauons which span and unite European Russia,
Moscow had the rare fortune of being located near the headwaters of four
major nvers the Oka, the Volga, the Don, and the Dnieper. This offered
marvelous opportunities for expansion across the flowing plain, especially
as there were no mountains or other natural obstacles to hem in the young
principality
In another sense too Moscow benefited from a central position It stood
in the midst of lands inhabited by the Russian, and especially the Great
Russian, people, which, so the argument runs, provided a proper setting
for a natural growth in all directions In fact, some specialists have tned
110 APPANAGE RUSSIA
to estimate precisely how close to the geographic center of the Russian
people Moscow was situated, noting also such circumstances as its proximity
to the line dividing the two main dialects of the Great Russian language.
Central location within Russia, to make an additional point, cushioned
Moscow from outside invaders. Thus, for example, it was Novgorod, not
Moscow, that continuously had to meet enemies from the northwest, while
in the southeast Riazan absorbed the first blows, a most helpful situation
in the case of Tamerlane’s invasion and on some other occasions. A11 in all,
the considerable significance of the location of Moscow for the expansion
of the Muscovite state cannot be denied, although this geographic factor
certainly is not the only one and indeed has generally been assigned less
relative weight by recent scholars.
The economic argument is linked in part to the geographic. The Moscow
river served as an important trade artery, and as the Muscovite principality
expanded along its waterways it profited by and in turn helped to promote
increasing economic intercourse. Soviet historians in particular have treated
the expansion of Moscow largely in terms of the growth of a common mar-
ket. Another economic approach emphasizes the success of the Muscovite
princes in developing agriculture in their domains and supporting coloniza-
tion. These princes, it is asserted, clearly outdistanced their rivals in obtain-
ing peasants to settle on their lands, their energetic activities ranging from
various inducements to free farmers to the purchase of prisoners from the
Mongols, As a further advantage, they managed to maintain in their realm
a relative peace and security highly beneficial to economic life.
The last view introduces another key factor in (he problem of the Musco-
vite rise: the role of the rulers of Moscow. Moscow has generally been con-
sidered fortunate in its princes, and in a number of ways. Sheer luck con-
stituted a part of the picture. For several generations the princes of Moscow,
like the Capetian kings who united France, had the advantage of con-
tinuous male succession without interruption or conflict. In particular, for
a long time the sons of the princes of Moscow were lucky not to have uncles
competing for the Muscovite seat. When the classic struggle between “the
uncles” and “the nephews” finally erupted in the reign of Basil II, direct
succession from father to son possessed sufficient standing and support in
the principality of Moscow to overcome the challenge. The princedom has
also been considered fortunate because its early rulers, descending from
the youngest son of Alexander Nevskii and thus representing a junior
princely branch, found it expedient to devote themselves to their small ap-
panage instead of neglecting it for more ambitious undertakings elsewhere.
It is generally believed that the policies of the Muscovite princes made
a major and massive contribution to the rise of Moscow. From Ivan Kalita
to Ivan III and Basil III these rulers stood out as “the gatherers of the
THE RISE OP MOSCOW 111
Russian land,” as skillful landlords, managers, and businessmen, as well as
warriors and diplomats They all acted effectively even though, for a long
time, on a petty scale Khucbcvsfcy distinguishes five main Muscovite meth-
ods of obtaining territory purchase, aimed seizure, diplomatic seizure with
the aid of the Golden Horde service agreements with appanage princes,
and the settlement by Muscovite population of the lands beyond the Volga
The relative prosperity, good government, peace, and order prevalent in
the Muscovite principality attracted increasingly not only peasants but also,
a fact of great importance, boyars, as well as members of other classes, to
the growing grand princedom
To be sure, not every policy of the Muscovite rulers contributed to the
nsc of Moscow Tor example they followed the practice of the appanage
period in dividing their principality among their sons Yet m this respect too
they gained by comparison with other princedoms In the Muscovite prac-
tice the eldest son of a grand prince received a comparatively larger share
of the inheritance and his share grew relatively as well as absolutely, with
time Thus Dmitri: Donskoi left his eldest son one third of his total posses-
sions, Basil II left his eldest one half, and Ivan III left his eldest tbree-
founhs Furthermore, the eldest son became, of course, grand prince and
thus had a stronger position w relation to his brothers than was the case
with other appanage rulers Gradually the right to com money and to nego-
tiate with foreign powers came to be restricted to the grand prince
The development of the Muscovite state followed the pattern mentioned
earlier in our general discussion of the northeast in a relatively primitive
society and a generally fluid and shifting situation, the prince became in-
creasingly important as organizer and owner as well as mler — with little
distinction among his various capacities — while other elements of the
Kievan political system declined and even atrophied We know, for instance,
that Basil Veliaminov, the last Muscovite tysiatsku, died in 1374 and that
thenceforth that office was abolished The Muscovite 1 gathering of Russia,”
while it was certainly a remarkable achievement, also reflected the trend
of the time Tlic very extent of the division of Russia in the appanage pe-
riod paved the way for the reverse process, because most principalities
proved to be too small and weak to ofiet effective resistance to a centraliz-
ing force After Moscow trnimphcd in the northeast, in the old principality
of Vladimir Suzdal, it had to deal with only two other major Russian lands,
those of Novgorod and of Riazan the rest having already been absorbed
by the expanding Lithuanian Russian state
To appreciate better the success of the princes of Moscow, it is necessary
to give special attention to one aspect of their policy relations with the
Mongols In their dealings with the Golden Horde, the Muscovite rulers
managed to eat the proverbial cake and to have it too The key to their
112
remarkable performance lay in good timing. For a long time, while the
Mongols retained their strength, the princes of Moscow demonstrated com-
plete obedience to the khans, and indeed eager co-operation with them. In
tills manner they became established as grand princes after helping the
Mongols to devastate the more impatient and heroic Tver and some other
Russian lands to their own advantage. In addition, they collected tribute
for the Mongols, thus acquiring some financial and, indirectly, judicial au-
thority over other Russian princes. “The gathering of the Russian land”
was also greatly facilitated by this connection with the Golden Horde:
Liubavsky and other historians have stressed the fact that the khans handed
over to the Muscovite princes entire appanages which were unable to pay
their tribute, while, for that reason, rulers of other principalities preferred
to sell their lands directly to Moscow in order to save something for them-
selves. But, as the Golden Horde declined and the Muscovite power rose,
it was a grand prince of Moscow, Dmitrii Donskoi, who led the Russian
forces against the Mongol oppressors on the field of Kulikovo. The victoiy
of Kulikovo and the final lifting of the Mongol yoke by Ivan III represented
milestones in the rise of the princedom of Moscow from a northeastern ap-
panage principality to a national Russian state.
Yet another major factor in that rise was llic role of the Church. To esti-
mate its significance one should bear in mind the strongly religious char-
acter of the age, which was similar to the Middle Ages in the West. Moscow
became the seat of the metropolitan and thus the religious capital of Russia
in 132(5 or 132S, long before it could claim any effective political domina-
tion over most of the country. It became, further, the city of SL Alexis and
especially St. Sergius, whose monastery, the Holy Trinity-St. Sergius Mon-
astery north of Moscow, was a fountainhead of a broad monastic movement
and quickly became a most important religious center, rivaled in all Rus-
sian history only by the Monastery of the Caves near Kiev. Religious leader-
ship, very valuable in itself, also affected politics. St. Alexis, as we saw,
acted as one of the most important statesmen of the princedom of Moscow;
and the metropolitans in general, linked to Moscow and at least dimly
conscious of broader Russian interests, favored the Muscovite “gathering
of Russia.” Their greatest service to tills cause consisted probably in their
frequent intervention in princely quarrels and struggles, through advice,
admonition, and occasionally even excommunication; this intervention was
usually in favor of Moscow.
Judgments Of the nature and import of the rise of Moscow are even more
controversial than descriptions and explanations of that process. Most pre-
revolutionary Russian historians praised it as a great and necessary achieve-
ment of the princes of Moscow and of the Russian people, who had to unite
to survive outside aggression and to play their part in history. Soviet his-
THE FIST OF MOSCOW
113
tornas have come to share the same view On the other hand, some Rus-
sian doubters, for example, Presniakov, together with many scholars in
other traditions, such as the Polish, the Lithuanian, or the nationalist Ukrain
lan, have argued on the other side they have emphasized in particular
that the vaunted “gathering of Russia” consisted above all in a skillful
aggression by the Muscovite princes against both Russians, such as the in-
habitants of Novgorod and Pskov, and eventually various non Russian na-
tionalities, which deprived them of their liberties, subjugating everyone to
Muscovite despotism As is frequently the case m major historical con-
troversies, both schools ate substantially cancel stressing as they do differ-
ent aspects of the same complicated phenomenon Without necessarily tak-
ing sides on this or other related issues, v.o shall appreciate a little better
the complexity and the problems of the period after devoting some atten-
tion to the economic, social, and cultural life of appanage Russia
XII
APPANAGE RUSSIA: ECONOMICS, SOCIETY, INSTITUTIONS
Thus our medieval boyardom in its fundamental characteristics of
territorial rule; the dependence of the peasants, with the right of de-
parture; manorial jurisdiction, limited by communal administration;
and economic organization, characterized by the insignificance of the
lord's own economy: in all these characteristics our boyardom rep-
resents an institution of the same nature with the feudal seigniory,
just as our medieval rural commune represents, as has been demon-
strated above, an institution of the same essence with the commune
of the German Mark.
PAVLOV-SH.VANSKY
. . . the "service people” was the name of the class of population ob-
ligated to provide service (court, military, civil) and making use, in
return, on the basis of a conditional right, of private landholdings.
The basis for a separate existence of this class is provided not by ils
rights, but by its obligations to the state. These obligations are varied,
and the members of this class have no corporate unity.
VLADIMIRSKY -BUDANOV
Here, of course, you have in fact the process of a certain feiidaliza/ion
of simpler state arrangements in their interaction and mutual limi-
tation.*
STRUVE
WiEREAS THE controversy continues concerning the relative weight of
commerce and agriculture in Kievan Russia, scholars agree that tilling the
soil represented the main occupation of the appanage period. Rye, wheat,
barley, millet, oats, and a few other crops continued to be the staples of
Russian agriculture. The centuries from the fall of Kiev to the unification
of the country under Moscow saw a prevalence of local, agrarian economy,
an economic parochialism corresponding to political division. Furthermore,
with the decline of the south and the Mongo] invasion, the Russians lost
much of their best land and had to establish or develop agriculture in for-
ested areas and under severe climatic conditions. Mongol exactions further
strained the meager Russian economy. In Liubavsky’s words: “A huge
parasite attached itself to the popular organism of northeastern Russia; the
parasite sucked the juices of the organism, chronically drained its life
forces, and from time to time produced great perturbations in it.”
* Italics in the original. Struve’s statement refers to a particular development
during the period, but I think that it can also stand fairly as the author’s general
judgment on the issue of feudalism in Russia.
114
ECONOMICS, SOCIETY. INSTITUTIONS 115
The role of trade in appanage Russia is more difficult to determine. While
it retained great importance m such lands as Galicia, not to mention the
city and the principality of Novgorod, ns position in the northeast, and
notably in the princedom of Moscow, needs further study True, the Mos-
cow nver served as a trade route from the very beginning of Moscow's
history, and the town also profited commercially from its excellent location
on the waterways of Russia in a more general sense Soviet historians stress
the ancient Volga trade artery, made more usable by firm Mongol control
of an enormous territory to the east and the southeast, and, as already
indicated, they also link closely the expansion of the Muscovite principality
to the growth of a common market In addition to the Volga, the Don be-
came a major commercul route, with Genoese and Venetian colonies ap-
pearing on the Black Sea Around 1475, however, the Turks established o
firm hold on that sea, eliminating the Italians The Russians continued to
export such items as furs and wax and to import a wide variety of products,
including textiles, wines silverware, objects of gold, and other luxuries
Vet, although the inhabitants of northeastern Russia in the appanage period
did retain some important commercial connections with the* outstde world
and establish others, and although internal trade did grow m the area with
the nse of Moscow agricultural economy for local consumption remained
dominant Commercial interests and the middle class in general had re-
markably little weight in the history of the Muscovite state
Other leading occupauons of the period were hunting, fishing, cattle rais-
ing, and apiculture, as well as numerous arts and crafts Carpentry was
especially well developed, while tannery, weaving, work in metal, and some
other skills found a wide application in providing for the basic needs of the
people Certain luxurious and artistic crafts sharply declined, largely be-
cause of the poverty characierisnc of the age, but they survived in some
places, principally in Novgorod, with the nse of Moscow, the new capital
gradually became their center
The Question o] Russian Feudalism
The question of the social structure of appanage Russia is closely tied
to the issue of feudalism m Russian history Traditionally, specialists have
considered the development of Russia as significantly different from that
of other European countries, one of the points of contrast being precisely
the absence of feudalism in the Russian past Only at the beginning of this
century did Pavlov-Silvansky offer a brilliant and reasonably full analysis
of ancient Russia supporting the conclusion that Russia too had experienced
a feudal stage Pavlov-Silvansky’s thesis became an object of heated con-
troversy in the years preceding the First World War. After the Revolution,
Soviet historians proceeded to define “feudal” in extremely broad terms
116 APPANAGE RUSSIA
and to apply this concept to the development of Russia all the way from
the days of Kiev to the second half of the nineteenth century. Outside the
Soviet Union, a number of scholars, while disagreeing with Pavlov-Silvansky
on important points, nevertheless accepted at least a few feudal character-
istics as applicable to medieval Russia.
Pavlov-Silvansky argued that three traits defined feudalism and that all
three were present in appanage Russia: division of the country into inde-
pendent and semi-independent landholdings, the seigniories; inclusion of
these landholdings into a single system by means of a hierarchy of vassal
relationships; and the conditional quality of the possession of a fief. Russia
was indeed divided into numerous independent principalities and privileged
boyar holdings, that is, seigniories. As in western Europe, the vassal hier-
archy was linked to the land: the votchina, which was an inherited estate,
corresponded to the seigniory; the pomestie, which was an estate granted
on condition of service, to the benefice. Pavlov-Silvansky, it should be
noted, believed that the pomestiia, characteristic of the Muscovite period
of Russian history, already represented a significant category of landholding
in the appanage age. The barons, counts, dukes, and kings of the West found
their counterparts in the boyars, service princes, appanage princes, and
grand princes of medieval Russia. Boyar service, especially military service,
based on free contract, provided the foundation for the hierarchy of vassal
relationships. Special ceremonies, comparable to those in the West, marked
the assumption and the termination of this service. Appanage Russia knew
such institutions as feudal patronage, commendation — personal or with
the land — and the granting of immunity to the landlords, that is, of the
right to govern, judge, and tax their peasants without interference from
higher authority. Vassals of vassals appeared, so that one can also speak
of sub-infeudation in Russia.
Pavlov-Silvansky’s opponents, however, have presented strong arguments
on their side. They have stressed the fact that throughout the appanage
period Russian landlords acquired their estates through inheritance, not as
compensation for service, thus retaining the right to serve whom they
pleased. The estate of an appanage landlord usually remained under the
jurisdiction of the ruler in whose territory it was located, no matter whom
the landlord served. Furthermore, numerous institutions and even entire
aspects of Western feudalism either never developed at all in Russia, or, at
best, failed to grow there beyond a rudimentary stage. Such was the case,
for example, with the extremely complicated Western hierarchies of vassals,
with feudal military service, or with the entire phenomenon of chivalry.
Even the position of the peasants and their relationship with the landlords
differed markedly in the East and in the West, for serfdom became firmly
established in Russia only after the appanage period.
In sum, it would seem that a precise definition of feudalism, with proper
ECONOMICS) SOCIETY, INSTITUTIONS Jl?
attention to its legal characteristics, would not be applicable to Russian
society Yet, on the other hand, many developments in Russta, whether We
thick of the division of power and authority in the appanage period, the
economy of large landed estates, or even the later pomcstic system of state
service, bear important resemblances to the feudal West As already indi-
cated, Russian social forms often appear to be rudimentary, or at least
simpler and cruder, versions of Western models Therefore, a number of
scholars speak of the social organization of medieval Russia ns Incipient
or undeveloped feudalism That feudalism proved to be particularly weak
when faced with the rising power of the grand pnnees and, especially, of the
autocratic tsars
Soviet historians require an additional note Starting from the Marxist
emphasis on similarities in the development of different societies and basing
their periodization on economic factors, they ofler an extremely broad
definition of feudalism in terms of manorial economy, disregarding the usual
stress on the distribution of power and legal authonty Thus, they consider
Russia as feudal from the later Kievan penod to the second half of the
nineteenth century The Soviet approach, it may be readily seen, does little
to differentiate between the appanage penod of Russian history and the
preceding and succeeding epochs
Appanage Society and Institutions
The social structure of appanage Russia represented, of course, a con-
tinuation and a further evolution of the society of the Kievan penod. With
no sharp break between the two The pnnees occupied the highest mng on
the social ladder The already huge Kievan princely family proliferated and
differentiated further dunng the centuries which followed the collapse of
a unitary state The appanage penod naturally proved to be the heyday
of pnnees and pnncelings, ranging from grand pnnees to rulers of tmy
principalities and even to pnnees who had nothing to rule and were forced
to find service with their relatives It might be added that in addition to the
grand pnnees “of Moscow and all Russia,” grand princes emerged in sev-
eral other regional centers, notably Tver and Riazan, where the lesser
members of a particular branch of the pnncely family paid a certain homage
to their more powerful elder. The expansion of Moscow ended this anarchy
of pnnees, and with u the appanage penod
Next came the boyars, followed by the less anstocratic “free servants’*
of a prince who performed a similar function The boyars and the free
servants made contracts with their prince, and they were at liberty to leave
him and seek another master The boyars had their own retinues, sometimes
quite numerous For instance, m 1332 a boyar with a following of 1,700
persons entered the service of the grand pnnee of Moscow, while shortly
APPANAGE RUSSIA
after his arrival another boyar with a retinue of 1 ,300 left it. As already
emphasized, members of the upper classes of appanage Russia were land-
lords. They acted as virtual rulers of their large estates, levying taxes and
administering justice, although it is worth noting that, as Moscow rose, the
immunities which they received to govern their lands no longer extended
to jurisdiction in cases of major crimes. Votchiny, that is, hereditary land-
holdings, prevailed in the appanage period. However, with the rise of Mos-
cow, the pomestie, that is, an estate granted by a prince to a servitor during
the term of his personal service, became common. The earliest extant refer-
ence to a pomestie goes back to Ivan Kalita’s testament, but the pomestie
system developed oa a large scale only in the fifteenth and subsequent cen-
turies. We shall meet it again when we discuss Muscovite Russia.
Traders, artisans, and the middle class as a whole experienced a decline
during the appanage period. Except in Novgorod and a few other centers,
members of that layer of society were relatively few in number and politi-
cally ineffective.
Peasants constituted the bulk of the population. It is generally believed
that their position worsened during the centuries which followed the col-
lapse of the Kievan state. Political division, invasions, and general insecu-
rity increased the peasant’s dependence on the landlord and consequently
his bondage, thus accelerating a trend which had already become pro-
nounced in the days of Kiev. While serfdom remained incomplete even at
the end of the appanage period — for the peasant could still leave his mas-
ter once a year, around St. George’s day in late autumn, provided his ac-
counts had been settled — it grew in a variety of forms. Principal peasant
obligations were of two types: the as yet relatively little developed
barshchina, or corvee, that is, work for the landlord, and obrok, or
quitrent, that is, payment to the landlord in kind or in money. It should
be noted, however, that many peasants, especially in the north, had no
private landlords, a fortunate situation for them, even though they bore
increasingly heavy obligations to the state.
The slaves, kholopy, of the Kievan period continued to play a significant
role in the Russian economy, performing all kinds of tasks in the manorial
households and estates. In fact, a small upper group of kholopy occupied
important positions as managers and administrators on the estates. Indeed
Diakonov suggested that in the Muscovite principality, as in France, court
functionaries and their counterparts in most noble households were origi-
nally slaves, who were later replaced by the most prominent among the free
servitors.
In the period which followed the fall of Kiev, the Church in Russia main-
tained and developed its strong and privileged position. In a time of division
it profited from the best and the most widespread organization in the coun-
try, and it enjoyed the benevolence of the khans and the protection of Rus-
ECONOMICS, SQC1TTY, INSTITUTIONS !I9
slan, especially Muscovite, princes Ecclesiastical lands received exemptions
from taxation and sweeping immunities, also, as m the West — although
this is a controversial point — they probably prosed to be more attractive
to (he peasants than other estates because of their relative peace, good
management and stability The Church, or rather individual monasteries
and monks, often led the Russian penetration into the northeastern wilder*
ness Disciples of St Sergius alone founded more than thirty monasteries
on or beyond die frontier of settlement But the greatest addition to eccle-
siastical possessions came from continuous donations, in particular the be-
queathing of estates or parts of estates in return for prayers for one’s soul,
a practice similar to the granting of land in free alms to the Catholic Church
in the feudal West It has been estimated that at the end of the appanage
period the Church in Russia owned over 25 per cent of all cultivated land
in the country As we shall see these enormous ecclesiastical, particularly
monastic, holdings created major problems both for the religious conscience
and for the state
The unification of Russia under Moscow meant a victory for a north-
eastern political sjstem characterized by the dominant position of the
prince Princes of course played a major pari in the appanage penod It
was during that time that they acted largely as managers and even proprie-
tors of their principalities, as illustrated in the celebrated princely wills and
testaments which deal indiscriminately with villages and winter coats
Princely activities became more and more petty, public rights and interests
became almost indistinguishable from private With the rise of Moscow,
the process was reversed The rulers * of Moscow and all Russia" gained
tn importance until, at about the umc of Ivan III, they instituted a new
era of autocratic tsardom Yet, for all their exalted majesty, the tsars re-
tained much from their northeastern princeling ancestry, combining In a
formidable manner sweeping authority with petty despotism and public
goals with proprietary instincts Their power proved to be all the more
dangerous because it went virtually unopposed After the absorption of
Novgorod, Pihov, and Viatka, the veche disappeared from Russian politics
The third element of the Kievan system of government the boyar duma,
it is true, continued to exist side by side with the princes and with the
tsars However, as will be indicated in later chapters, the duma in Musco-
vite Russn supported rather than effectively circumscribed the authority
of the ruler The evolution of Russia in the appanage period led to
autocracy
XIII
APPANAGE RUSSIA: RELIGION AND CULTURE
The Mongol yoke, which dealt a heavy blow to the manufactures of
the Russian people in general, could not but be reflected, in a most
grievous manner, in the artistic production and technique closely re-
lated to manufacturing. . . . The second half of the thirteenth and
the entire fourteenth century were an epoch “of oppression of the life
of the people, of despair among the leaders, of an impoverishment
of the land, of a decline of trades and crafts, of a disappearance of
many technical skills."
bagalei
If we consider nothing but its literature, the period that extends from
the Tatar invasion to the unification of Russia by Ivan III of Moscow
may be called a Dark Age. Its literature is either a more or less
impoverished reminiscence of Kievan traditions or an unoriginal
imitation of South Slavonic models. But here more than ever it is
necessary to bear in mind that literature docs not give the true measure
of Old Russian culture. The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the
Dark Age of literature, were at the same rime the Golden Age of
Russian religious painting.
MIRSKY
The Russian icon was the most significant artistic phenomenon of
ancient Russia, the fundamental and preponderant means, and at the
same time a gift, of its religious life. In its historical origin and forma-
tion the icon was an expression of the highest artistic tradition, while
in its development it represented a remarkable phenomenon of artistic
craftsmanship.
KONDAKOV
The religion and culture of appanage Russia, like its economic and
social development, stemmed directly from the Kievan period. The hard cen-
turies which followed the collapse of a unitary state witnessed, however, a
certain retardation, and even regression, in many fields of culture. Im-
poverishment and relative isolation had an especially adverse effect on
education in general and on such costly and difficult pursuits as large-scale
building in stone and certain luxury arts and crafts. Literature too seemed
to have lost much of its former artistry and ilan. Yet this decline in many
areas of activity coincided with probably the highest achievements of Rus-
sian creative genius in a few fields which included wooden architecture and,
especially, icon painting.
Religion in appanage Russia reflected, in its turn, the strong and weak
points, the achievements and failings of the period, as it continued to occupy
120
ELI Ol ON ANP CULTURE
121
a central position in the life and culture of the people In an age of division,
the unity and organization of the Church stood out in sinking manner In
the early fifteenth century the Orthodox Church in Russia had, in addition
to the metropolitan m Moscow, fifteen bishops, of whom three, those of
Novgorod, Rostov, and Suzdal had the title of archbishop In 1448, after
suspicions of the Greek clergy had been aroused in Russia by the Council
of Florence, Jonas became metropolitan without the confirmation of the
patriarch of Constanunople, thus breaking the old Russian allegiance to the
Byzantine See and inaugurating the autocephalous, m effect independent
penod in the history of the Russian Chutch Administrative unity within
the Russian Church, however finally proved impossible to preserve The
growing division of the land and the people between Moscow and Lithuania
resulted in the establishment m Kiev, of a separate Orthodox metropoli-
tanate for the Lithuanian state the final break with Moscow coming in 1458
As we know, the Church with ns enormous holdings and its privileged
position, played a major role in the economic and political life of appanage
Russia inlluencing almost every important development of the period, from
the rise of Moscow to the colonization of the northeastern wilderness Bui
the exact impact of the Church in its own religious and spiritual sphere
remains difficult to determine It has been frequently and on the whole
convincingly argued that the ritualistic and esthetic sides of Christianity
prevailed in medieval Russia finding their fullest expression in the liturgy
and other Church services some of which became extremely long and
elaborate Fasting, celebrating religious holidays, and generally observing
the Church calendar provided further occasions for the ritualism of the
Russian people while icon painting and church architecture served as addi
tional paths in their search for beauty Still the ethical and social import
of Russian Christianity should not be underestimated in this period any more
than during the hegemony of Kiev Many specialists credit the teaching
of the Church with the frequent manumission of slaves by individual mas
ters, realized often by means of a provision in Inst wills and testaments
And, in a general sense, Christian standards of behav lor remained at least
the ideal of the Russian people
Saints continued to reflect the problems and aspirations of the Russians
Figures of the appanage pertod who became canonized ranged from princes,
such as Alexander Nevskii and ecclesiastical statesmen exemplified by Met
ropolitin Alexis, to obscure hermits But the strongest impression on the
Russian religious consciousness wras made by St Sergius of Radonezh St
Sergius, who died in 1392 at the age of about seventy eight, began as a
monk m a forest wilderness and ended as the recognized spiritual leader
of Russia His blessing apparently added strength to Grand Prince Dnutru
and the Russian army for the daring enterprise of Kultkovo, and his word
could on occasion stop princely quarrels Although he refused to be met-
122 APPANAGE RUSSIA
ropolitan, he became in effect the moral head of the Russian Church. As
already mentioned, the monastery which St. Sergius founded north of Mos-
cow and which came to be known as the Holy Trinity-St. Sergius Mon-
astery, became one of the greatest religious and cultural centers of the
country and the fountainhead of a powerful monastic movement. For cen-
turies after the death of St. Sergius tens and hundreds of thousands of pil-
grims continued to come annually from all over Russia to his burial place
in one of the churches in the monastery. They still come. As in the case
of many other saints, the chief explanation of the influence of St. Sergius
lies in his ability to give a certain reality to the concepts of humility, kind-
ness, brotherhood, and love which remain both beliefs and hopes of the
Christians. It might be added that St. Sergius tried constantly to help all who
needed his help and that he stressed work and learning as well as religious
contemplation and observance.
The disciples of St. Sergius, as already mentioned, spread the Christian
religion to vast areas in northern Russia, founding scores of monasteries.
St. Stephen of Perm, the most distinguished of the followers of St. Sergius,
brought Christianity to the Finnic-speaking tribes of the Zyriane: he learned
their tongue and created a written language for them, utilizing their decora-
tive designs as a basis for letters. Thus, following the Orthodox tradition,
the Zyriane could worship God in their native language.
In medieval Russia, as in medieval Europe as a whole, intellectual life
centered on religious problems, although their ramifications often encom-
passed other areas of human activity. While, in the main, Russia stayed
outside the rationalist and reforming currents which developed in Western
Christendom, it did not remain totally unaffected by them. Significantly,
Russian religious movements stressing rationalism and radical reform
emerged in western parts of the country and especially in Novgorod. As early
as 1311 a Church council condemned the heresy of a certain Novgorodian
priest who denounced monasticism. In the second half of the fourteenth
century, in Novgorod, the teaching of the so-called slrigolniki acquired
prominence. These radical sectarians, quite similar to the evangelical Chris-
tians in the West, denied the authority of the Church and its hierarchy, as
well as all sacraments except baptism, and wanted to return to the lime
of the apostles; an extreme faction within the movement even renounced
Christ and sought to limit religious observances to prayer to God the Father.
It might be noted that the protest began apparently over the issue of fees
for the sacraments, and that the dissidents came rapidly to adhere to in-
creasingly radical views. AH persuasion failed, but violent repression by the
population and authorities in Novgorod and Pskov, together with disagree-
ments among the strigolniki, led to the disappearance of the sect in the early
fifteenth century.
Later in the century, however, new heretics appeared, known as the
REIJOION AND CUt-TURE J23
Judnizers Their radical religious movement has been linked to the arrival
in Novgorod in 1470 of a Jew Zechanah, or Skhana l and to the spread
of his doctrines The Judaizers m effect accepted the Old Testament, but
rejected the New, considering Christ a prophet rather than the Messiah
Consequently they also denounced the Church Through the transfer of two
Novgorodian priests to Moscow, the movement obtained a foothold m the
court circles of the capital Joseph of Volok, an abbot of Volokolamsk,
led the ecclesiastical attack on the heretics They were condemned by the
Church council of 1504, and Ivan III, finally ceding to the wishes of the
dominant Church party, cruelly suppressed the Judaizcrs, having then
leaders burned at the stake
Controversies within the Russian Orthodox Church at the time had an
even greater historical significance than did challenges to the Church from
the outside The most important and celebrated dispute of the nge pitted
the “possessors” against the “non possessors," with Joseph of Volok
again occupying a central position as the outstanding leader of the first-
named faction Joseph ol Volok and the possessors believed in a close
union of an autocratic ruler and q nch and powerful Church The pnnee,
or tsar, was the natural protector of the Church with all its lands and privi-
leges In return, he deserved complete ccclcsiasuc.il support, his authority
extending not only to all secular matters but also to Church administration
The possessors emphasized, too, a formal and ritualistic approach to reli-
gion, the sanctity of Church services, ntuals, practices, and teachings, and
a violent and complete suppression of all dissent
The non-possessors, who because of their origin in the monasteries of
the northeast, have sometimes been called the “ciders from beyond the
Volga," had as their chief spokesman Nil Sorskn — or Nilus of Sora —
a man of sinking spiritual qualities The non-possessors, as their name
indicates, objected to ecclesiastical wealth and in particular to monasuc
landholding They insisted that the monks should in fact carry out their
vowis, that they must be poor, must work for their living, and must remain
truly “dead to the world ” The Church and the State should be independent
of each other, most especially, the State, which belonged to a lower order
of reality, had no right to interfere in religious matters The non-possessors
stressed contemplation and the inner spiritual light, together with a striving
for moral pcrfecuon, as against ecclesiastical formalism anil ritualism Fur-
thermore, by contrast with the possessors, they differentiated in the teach-
ing of the Church among Holy Writ, tradition, and human custom, con-
sidering only Holy Wnt — that is, God’s commandments — as completely
binding The rest could be criticized and changed But even those who chal-
lenged the foundations of the Church were to be met with persuasion, never
with force
The Church council of 1503 decided in favor of the possessors Joseph
124
APPANAGE RUSSIA
of Volok and his associates cited Byzantine examples in support of their
position and also argued, in practical terms, the necessity for the Church
to have a large and rich establishment in order to perform its different
functions, including the exercise of charity on a large scale. Their views,
especially on relations of Church and State, suited on the whole the rising
absolutism of Moscow, although it seems plausible that Ivan 331 sympa-
thized with the non-possessors in the hope of acquiring monastic lands.
After Joseph of Volok died in 1515, subsequently to be proclaimed a
saint, other high clerics continued his work, notably Daniel, who became
metropolitan in 1521. At the councils of 1524 and 1531, and even as late
as 1554—55, some of Nil Sorskii’s chief followers were declared to be
heretics. Nil Sorskii himself, however, was canonized.
In explaining the controversy between the possessors and the non-posses-
sors, many scholars, including Soviet historians as a group, have emphasized
that the possessors championed the rise of the authority of the Muscovite
rulers and the interests of those elements in Russian society which favored
this rise. The non-possessors, on the other hand, with their high social con-
nections, reflected the aristocratic opposition to centralization. In a differ-
ent context, that of the history of the Orthodox Church, the non-possessors
may be considered to have derived from the mystical and contemplative
tradition of Eastern monasticism, especially as practiced on Mount Athos.
However, in a still broader sense, the possessors and the non-possessors
expressed two recurrent attitudes that devoted Christians have taken toward
things of this world, burdened as they have been by an incompatibility
between the temporal and the eternal standards and goals of behavior. The
non-possessors, thus, resemble the Franciscans in the West as well as other
religious groups that have tried hard to be in, and yet not of, this world.
And even after all the sixteenth-century councils they remained an im-
portant part of the Russian Church as an attitude and a point of view.
Such essentially secular intellectual issues of the period as that of the
position and power of the ruler often acquired a religious coloring. The
problem of authority, its character and its limitations, became paramount
as Moscow rose to “gather Russia” and as its princes turned into autocratic
tsars. As already mentioned, a number of legends and doctrines appeared
to justify and buttress these new developments. For example, one tale about
the princes of Vladimir, which originated, apparently, in the first quarter
of the sixteenth century, related how Vladimir Monomakh of Kiev, the
celebrated ancestor of the Muscovite princes, received from his maternal
grandfather, the Byzantine emperor Constantine Monomakh, certain regalia
of his high office: a headdress which came to be known as “the hat of
Monomakh” and some other items of formal attire. Still more grandly, the
princes of Moscow came to be connected to the Roman emperors. Accord-
ing to the new genealogy, Augustus, a sovereign of Rome and the world,
RELIGION AND CULTURE l * 5
m his old age divided his possessions among his relatives, placing lus brother
Pros as ruler on the banks of the Vistula Riunk was a fourteenth generation
descendant of this Pros, St Vladimir a fourth-generation descendant of
Riurik, and Vladimir Monomakh a fourth generation descendant of St
Vladimir Concurrently with tins revision of the genealogy of the princes
of Moscow, Christianity in Russia was antedated and St. Andrew, the
apostle, was proclaimed its true originator
But the roost interesting doctrine — and one that has received divergent
interpretations from scholars — was that of Moscow as the Third Rome
Its originator, an abbot from Pskov named Phdotheus or Filofet, wrote
a letter to Basil 111 in 1510 which described three Rones the Church of
Old Rome, which fell because of a heresy, the Church of Constantmopi-
brought down by the infidels and fmall) the Church in Basil Ills o\\n
tsardom which like the sun was to illunum. the entire world — further-
more, after two Romes had fallen Moscow the Third Rome would stand
permanently for there was to be no fourth Some scholars have stressed
the political aspects of this doctrine and recently it has even been re-
peatedly cited as evidence of a secular Russian imperialism and aggression
It is therefore, necessary to emphasize that Phdotheus thought, in the first
place of Churches not Status and that he was concerned with the pres
ervation of the true faith, not political expamton And, in any ease, the
Muscovite rulers in their foreign policy never endorsed the view of Moscow
as the Third Roirn. remaining as already mentioned, quite uninterested in
live possibility of a Byzantine inheritance while at the same time deter-
mined to recover the inheritance of the princes of Kiev
Literature and the Arts
The literature of the appanage period has generally been rated rather
low This judgment applies with full force only to the extant written works,
although the oral, folklonstic tradition too, white it continued to be rich
and varied, failed to produce tales equal in artistry to the Kievan byliny
As n qualification it might be added that, in the opinion of certain scholars,
surviving material is insufficient to enable us to form a definitive view of
the scope and quality o! appanage literature
The Mongol conquest of Russia gave nsc to a number of factual narra-
tives as well as semi legendary and legendary stones These dwelt on the
bitter fighting the horror, and the devastation of the invasion and inter-
preted the events as divme punishment for the Russians* sms The best artis
tic accounts of the catastrophe can be read m the senes dealing with the Mon
gol ravage of Riazan and in the Lay of the Destruction of the Russian Land,
written early in the appanage period about the middle of the thirteenth
century, of which only the beginning has survived The vtctoty of Kuhkovo
126 APPANAGE RUSSIA
in turn found reflection in literature. Thus the Story of the Massacre of
Martial, written with considerable artistry some twenty years after the
event* tells about the departure of Prince Dmitrii from Moscow, the grief
of his wife, the visit of the prince to the blessed Sergius of Radonezh, the
eve of the battle, and the battle itself. Another well-known account of
Kulikovo, the Zadonshchina composed at the end of the fifteenth ccntuiy,
has little literary merit and is a clumsy imitation of the Lay of the Host of
Igor. The expansion of Moscow, as seen from the other side, inspired the
Tale about the Capture of Pskov, written by a sorrowing patriot of that
city. Chronicles in Novgorod and elsewhere continued to give detailed and
consecutive information about developments in their localities.
Accounts of the outside world can be found in the sizeable travel literature
of the period. Foremost in this category stands Athanasius Nikitin’s cele-
brated Wanderings beyond the Three Seas, a narrative of this Tver mer-
chant’s journey to Persia, Turkey, and India from 1466 to 1472. Particular
value attaches to the excellent description of India, which Nikitin saw some
twenty-five years before Vasco da Gama. Other interesting records of
travel during the period include those of a Novgorodian named Stephen
to the Holy Land in 1350, of Metropolitan Pimcn to Constantinople in
1389, and of a monk Zosima to Constantinople, Mount Athos, and Jeru-
salem in 1420 and also two accounts of journeys to the Council of Florence.
Church literature, including sermons, continued to be produced on what
must have been a considerable scale. Hagiography deserves special notice.
Lives of saints composed in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, for
example, of Abraham of Smolensk, Alexander Nevskii, Michael of Cherni-
gov, and Metropolitan Peter, are characterized by simplicity and biographi-
cal detail. Unfortunately for the historian, a new style, artificial, pompous,
and opposed to realistic description, came to the fore with the fifteenth
century. This style came from the southern Slavs and was introduced by
such writers as Cyprian in his life of St. Peter the Metropolitan, and
Epiphanius the Wise, who dealt with St. Sergius of Radonezh and St.
Stephen of Perm. The southern Slavs, it should be added, exercised a
strong influence on appanage literature and thought, as for example in the
formulation of the doctrine of Moscow as the Third Rome.
In contrast to literature, architecture has frequently been considered one
of the glories of the appanage period in spite of the fact that the age wit-
nessed relatively little building in stone. Russian wooden architecture, to
say the least, represents a remarkable achievement. Although it dates,
without doubt, from the Kievan and the pre-Kievan eras, no buildings
survive from those early times. It is only with the appanage and the Mus-
covite periods that we can trace the consecutive development of this archi-
tecture and study its monuments.
A klet or srub, a rectangular structure of stacked beams, each some
The Old Testament Tnmty A Rublev, early fifteenth century
Cathedral and cemetery »i Ipai ev i, Kostroma
Fourtccnlli-ccntury wooden church displayed at Ipntiev Monastery in Kostroma.
Prcobrazhenskii Cathedral on Volga river at Uglich.
RELIGION AND CULTURE
12?
twenty or twenty-foe feet long, constituted the basis of ancient Russian
wooden architecture The walls were usually eight or rune feet high A
steep, two-slope roof offered protection and prevented an accumulation of
snow, while moss and later hemp helped to plug cracks and holes At
first the floors were earthen, later wooden floors were constructed A klet
represented the living quarters of a family Another, usually smaller, klet
housed livestock and supplies Generally the two were linked by a third
small structure, a passageway, which also contained the door to the outside
A peasant household thus consisted of three separate, although connected,
units As the owner became more prosperous, or as his sons started families
of their own, additional klctt were built and linked to the old ones, the
ensemble growing, somewhat haphazardly, as a conglomeration of distinct,
yet joined, structures
After the Russians accepted Christianity, they adapted their wooden
architecture to the Byzantine canons of church building The three required
parts of a church were erected as follows the sanctuary, always on the
eastern side, consisted of a small klet. the main section of the chufeh,
where the congregation stood, was built as a large double klet, one on top
of the other, finally, another small Met on the western side constituted the
pnfior, or separate entrance hall, where originally catechumens waited for
the moment to enter the church proper The high two-slope roof of the
large klet was crowned with n small cupola topped by a cross Churches of
tins simple ancient type can be seen on old icons, aud a few of them in
northern Russia — built, however, in the seventeenth ccmury — have come
down to our times
Various developments in church architecture followed Frequently a
special basement klet was constructed under each o£ the three kleti con-
stituting the church proper, which was thus raised to a second-floor level
while its mam part acquired a three-story elevation The basement could
be used for storage, a high outside staircase and porch were built to secure
entrance to the church The sanctuary sometimes assumed the form not
of a quadrangle, but of a polygon, for instance, an octagon The roofs of
the churches became steeper and steeper, until many of them resembled
wedges In contrast to the Byzantine tradition of building churches V>ith
one or five cupolas, the Russians, whether they worked in stone or In wood,
early demonstrated a liking for more cupolas It might be noted lhat St
Sophia m Kiev had thirteen cupolas, and another Kievan church, that of
the Tithe, had twenty-five Numerous wooden churches also possessed many
cupolas, including a remarkable one with seventeen and another with
twenty-one
The Russians not only translated Byzantine stone church architecture
into another medium, wood, but they also deve toped it further in a creative
and varied manner Especially original and striking were the so-called
128 APPANAGE RUSSIA
tent, or pyramidal, churches, of which some from the late sixteenth and
the seventeenth centuries have escaped destruction. In the tent churches
the main part of the church was a high octagon — although occasionally
it had six or twelve sides — - which provided the foundation for a very high
pyramidal, sometimes conical, roof, capped by a small cupola and a cross.
The elevation of these roofs ranged from 125 to well over 200 feet. The
roofs of the altar and the pritvor were, by contrast, usually low. To quote
Grabar, perhaps the most distinguished historian of Russian architecture
and art, concerning tent churches:
Marvelously strict, almost severe, in their majestic simplicity are these
giants, grown into the earth, as if one with it. . . . The idea of the
eternity and immensity of the church of Christ is expressed here with un-
believable power and utmost simplicity. The simplicity of outline has
attained in them the highest artistic beauty, and every line speaks for itself,
because it is not forced, not contrived, but absolutely necessary and
logically inevitable.
Weidle has written of undeveloped Gothic in Russia, an approach not
unrelated to the general concept of undeveloped Russian feudalism.
By contrast, architecture in stone, as already indicated, experienced a
decline in the appanage period, although stone churches continued to be
built in Novgorod and in lesser numbers in some other centers. To illustrate
regression, historians have often cited the inability of Russian architects
in the 1470’s to erect a new Cathedral of the Assumption, the patron church
of Moscow, using the Cathedral of the Assumption in Vladimir as their
model. Yet this incident also marked the turning point, for Ivan III invited
foreign specialists to Moscow and initiated stone building on a large scale.
The most important result of the revival of stone architecture was the
construction of the heart of the Kremlin in Moscow, a fitting symbol of the
new authority, power, and wealth of the Muscovite rulers.
Beginning in 1474, Ivan III sent a special agent to Venice and repeatedly
invited Italian architects and other masters to come to work for him in
Moscow. The volunteers included a famous architect, mathematician, and
engineer, Aristotle Fieravanti, together with such prominent builders as
Marco Ruffo, Pietro Solario, and Alevisio. Fieravanti, who lived in Russia
from 1475 to 1479, erected the Cathedral of the Assumption in the Kremlin
on the Vladimir model, but with some differences. In 1490 architects from
Pskov constructed in the same courtyard the Cathedral of the Annuncia-
tion, a square building with four inside pillars, three altar apses, five cupolas,
and interesting decorations. It reflected the dominant influence of Vladimir
architecture, but also borrowed elements from the tradition of Novgorod
and Pskov and from wooden architecture. Next, still working on the Kremlin
courtyard, Ivan III ordered the construction of a new Cathedral of the
Archangel in place of the old one, just as he had done earlier with the
RfctlOION ANP CULTURE 129
Cathedral of the Assumption Alevisio accomplished this task between
[505 and 1509, following the plan of the Cathedral of the Assumption, but
adding such distinct traits as Italian decoration of the facade The three
cathedrals of the Annunciation, the Assumption, and the Archangel Michael
became, so to spefiV, the sacred heart of the. Kremlin and served, among
other functions, respectively ns the place for the wedding, the coronation,
and the burial of the rulers of Russia
Stone palaces also began to appear As with the cathedrals, probably the
greatest interest attaches to the palace in the Kremlin in Moscow It was
constructed by Ruflo, Solano, Alevisio and other Italian architects, but
following the canons of Russian wooden architecture the palace was a
conglomerate of separate parts, not a single building Indeed stone struc-
tures often replaced the earlier wooden ones piecemeal Italian architects
also rebuilt walls and erected towers in the Kremlin, while Alevisio $ur*
rounded it with a moat by joining the waters of the rivers Moscow and
Ncghnnaia Soviet specialists insist that the Muscovite Kremlin became the
greatest citadel of its kind in Europe They also stress the point that US
architecture made use of the existing terrain, by contrast with the Italian
tradition which required leveling and preparation of a site for budding
But we shall return to the Kremlin when we deal with Muscovite Russia
More than architecture, icon painting has frequently been considered
ihe medieval Russian art par excellence, tbc greatest and most authentic
expression of the spirituality and the creative genius of the Russians of the
appanage period As we have seen, icon pjtnttng came to Russia with
Christianity from Byzantium However, apparently quite early the Russians
proceeded to modify their Byzantine heritage and lo develop the rudiments
of an original style In the centuries which followed the collapse of the
Kievan state several migntficcnt Russian schools of icon painting came
into then own To understand their role in the life and culture of the
Russians, one should appreciate the importance of icons to a believer who
finds in them a direct link with the other world and, in effect, a materializa-
tion of that other world If, on one hand, icons might suggest superstition
and even idolatry, they represent, on the other, one of the most radical
and powerful attempts to grapple with such fundamental Christian doc
innes as the incarnation and the transfiguration of the universe And. in
the appanage period, pictorial representation provided otherwise unobtain-
able information and education for the illiterate masses
The first original Russian school of icon panning appeared in Suzdal
at the end of the thirteenth century, flourished in the fourteenth, and merged
early in the fifteenth with the Muscovite school Like the architecture of
Suzdal, the icons are characterized by elegance, grace, and fine taste, and
can also be distinguished, according to Grabar, by "a general tone, which
U always cool, silvery, in contrast to Novgorndian painting which inevitably
130 APPANAGE RUSSIA
tends towards the warm, the yellowish, the golden.” The famous icon of
Saints Boris and Gleb and that of Archangel Michael on a silver back-
ground provide excellent examples of the icon painting of Suzdal.
“The warm, the yellowish, the golden” Novgorod ian school deserves
further notice because of its monumcntality and generally bright colors.
The icons are often in the grand style, large in size, massive in composition,
and full of figures and action. “The Praying Novgorodians” and “The
Miracle of Our Lady,” also known as “The Battle between the Men of
Suzdal and the Novgorodians,” illustrate the above-mentioned points. The
Novgorodian school reached its highest development around the middle of
the fifteenth century, and its influence continued after the fall of the city.
In the second half of the fourteenth century a distinct school formed in
and around Moscow. Soon it come to be led by the most celebrated icon
painter of all times, Andrew Rublev, who lived approximately from 1370
to 1430. The few extant works known to be Rublev’s, especially his master-
piece, a representation of the so-called Old Testament Holy Trinity, demon-
strate exquisite drawing, composition, rhythm, harmony, and lyricism.
Muratov, stressing the influence of St. Sergius on the artist, describes
Rublev’s chef d’oeuvre as follows:
This masterpiece is imbued with a suave and mystical spirituality. The
composition is simple and harmonious; following its own rhythm, free
from any emphasis or heaviness, it obeys a movement clearly discernible
and yet hardly noticeable. The impression of harmony, peace, light and
integrity which this icon produces, is a revelation of the spirit of St. Sergius.
Dionysus, who was active in the first decade of the sixteenth century, stood
out as the greatest continuer of the traditions of Rublev and the Muscovite
school. Contemporaries mentioned his name immediately after Rublev’s,
and his few remaining creations support this high esteem. The icons of
Dionysus are distinguished by a marvelous grace, especially in the de-
lineation of figures, and by a certain perfection and polish. For subjects
he often chose the Virgin Mary, the protectress of the city of Moscow,
and the Holy Family. It should be noted that the works of Rublev and
Dionysus set the high standard of icon paintings not only in Russia, but
also generally in the Orthodox East.
In addition to the icons, some very valuable frescoes have come down
to us from the appanage period. Located in old churches, they include
works possibly of Rublev and certainly of Dionysus and his followers. The
art of the miniature also continued to develop, achieving a high degree
of excellence in the fifteenth century. The so-called Khitrovo Gospels of
the beginning of the fifteenth century and some other manuscripts con-
tained excellent illustrations and illumination. By contrast with all these
forms of painting, sculpture was stifled because the Orthodox Church con-
tinued its ban on statuary, although, contrary to a popular misconception,
RELIGION and culture 13i
even large scale sculpture was not unknown in ancient Russia Miniature
sculpture, which was permitted, developed in a remarkable manner Cut-
ting figures one inch and less in height, Russian artists managed to repre-
sent saints, scenes from the Gospels, and even trees, hills, and buddings as
background The most famous practitioner of this difficult art was the
monk Ambrosius, whose work ts linked to the Holy Trinity-St Sergius
Monastery In spite of gene ml poverty, certain artistic crafts, especially
embroidery, also developed brilliantly in the appanage penod
Education
In the appanage period, education was m eclipse As already indicated,
the Mongol devastation and the relative isolation and poverty character-
istic of ihe age led to a diminution 10 culture and learning The decline of
Russian towns played an especially significant role in this process because
Kievan culture had been essentially urban Studying documents of the
appanage period, wc find mention of illiterate pnnees, and we note repeated
complaints on the part of the higher clergy of the ignorance of priests The
masses of people, of course received no education at all, although a cer-
tain slight qualification of that statement might be in order on the basis of
the already-mentioned Novgorodian birchbark documents Yet some learn-
ing and skills did remain to support the cultural development outlined in
this chapter They were preserved and promoted largely by the monas-
teries — as happened earlier and under comparable conditions in the
West — not only by the great Holy Tnmty-Sl Sergius Monastery north of
Moscow, but also by such distant ones ns that of St Cyril on the White
Lake or the Solovctsku on the White Sea The first century after the
Mongol invasion seems to have been the nadir W«h the use of Moscow,
education and learning in Russia likewise began 3 painful ascent
XIV
THE LITHUANIAN-RUSSIAN STATE
And one more trait distinguishing the grand princedom of Lithuania
from its origin revealed itself. This slate from the very beginning was
not simply Lithuanian, but Lithuanian -Russian.
UUBAVSKX
Lithuania's expansion, almost unique in its rapid success, thus proved
beyond the real forces of the Lithuanians alone and of a dynasty
which in spite of the unusual qualities of many of its members was
too divided by the petty rivalries of its various branches to guarantee
a joint action under one chief. . . . The comparatively small group
of ethnic Lithuanians would have been the main victim, bm the whole
of East Central Europe would have suffered from a chaotic situation
amidst German, Muscovite, and possibly Tartar interference. . . .
A union of Poland with Lithuania and her Rulheninn lands, added lo
those already connected with Poland, could indeed create a new great
power, comprising a large and crucial section of East Central Europe
and strong enough lo check both German and Muscovite advance.
The amazing success of a plan which would seem almost fantastic
was a turning point in the history not only of that region but also of
Europe.
HALECM
Whereas by the reign of Basil III the Muscovite rulers had managed
to bring a large part of the former territory of the Kievan state under their
authority, another large part of the Kievan inheritance remained in the
possession of the grand princes of Lithuania. In effect, the history of the
western Russian lands was linked for centuries to the social systems and
fortunes of Lithuania and Poland.
The Evolution of the Lithuanian State
The Lithuanians, whose language belongs to the Baltic subfamily of the
Indo-European family, appeared late on the historical scene, although for
a very long time they had inhabited the forests of the Baltic region. It
was apparently tire pressure of the Teutonic Knights — the same who at-
tacked Novgorod — that finally forced a number of Lithuanian tribes into
a semblance o£ unity under the leadership of Miedovg, or Mindaugas,
whose rule is dated approximately 1240-63. Mindovg accepted Christianity
and received a crown from Pope Innocent IV only lo sever his Western
connections and relapse into paganism. A period of internal strife and
VY>
STATE
IJX
rapidly changing rulers followed his assassination However toward the
end of the thirteenth century Viten. or Vytems managed to unite the
Lithuanians again He ruled as grand pnnee from 1295 to 1316 acted
energetically at home and in foreign relations and perished fighting the
Teutonic Knighis
Vilen’s brother Gftfymm (Gedjmmas), who turned front 1316 to 1341,
ha; been called the true founder of the Lithuanian state He completed the
unification of the Lithuanian tribes and strove hard to organize his posses-
sions into a viable political unit \\ hat is more, he extended his dominion
134 APPANAGE RUSSIA
to the southeast. Some Russian territories, notably in the Polotsk area
had already become parts of the Lithuanian principality under Mindovg;
with Gcdymin, that principality began a massive expansion into Russia.
Vilna — Vilnius in Lithuanian — became the capital of the growing state.
Gedymin’s famous son Olgerd, or Algirdas, who died in 1377, carried
the work of his father much further. Assisted by his valiant brother Keistut,
or Kestutis, who undertook the heavy task of blocking the formidable
Teutonic Order in the west, Olgerd expanded eastward with a stunning
rapidity. The Russian lands which he brought under his authority included,
among others, those of Volynia, Kiev, and Chernigov, and a large part of
Smolensk. In the process, he defeated the Polish effort to win Volynia and
fought successfully against the Mongols. Lithuanian sway spread from the
Baltic to the Black Sea. Indeed, Olgerd wanted to rule all of Russia. Three
times he campaigned against the Muscovite state, and twice he besieged
Moscow itself, although he failed to capture it or to force the issue other-
wise.
The sweeping Lithuanian expansion into Russia has more explanations
than one. Obviously, internal division and foreign invasions had made the
Russian power of resistance extremely low. But it should also be noted that
the attacks of the Lithuanians could not be compared in destruction and
brutality to the invasions of the Mongols or the Teutonic Knights, and that
their domination, in a sense, did not represent foreign rule for the Russians.
Indeed, many historians speak, on good evidence, of a Lithuanian-Russian
state. Population statistics help to illustrate the situation: it has been esti-
mated that, after the expansion of the Lithuanian state virtually to the
Black Sea, two-thirds or even three-fourths and more of its people were
Russians. Also, very little social displacement took place: the towns re-
tained their Russian character; the Russian boyars and the Orthodox Church
kept their high positions and extensive privileges; Russian princes con-
tinued to rule in different appanages next to Lithuanian princes, all subject
to the Lithuanian grand prince; and intermarriage between the two aris-
tocracies was quite common. Perhaps as important as the superior numbers
of the Russian element was the fact that the Lithuanians, on their part, had
little to offer and much to learn. Coming from a still pagan and relatively
isolated and culturally backward area, the ruling circles of Lithuania eagerly
accepted the culture of Kievan Russia. The Lithuanian army, administra-
tion, legal system, and finance were organized on the Russian pattern, and
Russian became the official language of the new state. As Platonov in-
sisted in the case of Grand Prince Olgerd of Lithuania: “In relation to
different nationalities, it can be said that Olgerd’s entire sympathy and
attention concentrated on the Russian nationality. By his opinions, habits,
and family connections, Olgerd belonged to the Russian nationality and
served as its representative in Lithuania.” Not surprisingly, then, the
THE LITHUANIAN-RU5SIAN STATE 135
Lithuanian state could well he considered as another variation on the Kievan
theme and art heir to Kiev, rather than a foreign body imposed upon Russia
And this made us nvatry with Moscow, the other successful heir, all the
more fundamental and significant
However, shortly after Olgcrds death a new major clement entered the
situation a UnV between Lithuania and Poland In 1386, following the
dynastic agreement of Krcwo of 1385, Olgerd s son and successor Jagiello,
or Jogaila — who reigned from 1377 to 1434 — married Queen Jadwiga
of Poland Because the Polish Piast ruling family had no male members
feft, Jagiefto became the legitimate sovereign of both states, with the Polish
name of WJadysfaw If The states remained distinct, and the union per-
sonal In fact, in 1392 Jagicllo had to recognize his cousin, Kelstut’s son
Vitovt, or Vytautas, as a separate although vassal, grand pnrtce of Lith-
uania an arrangement extended in 1413 to subsequent rulers of the two
states Yet both positions came to be occupied by the same man again
when, in 1447, Casirmr IV ascended the Polish throne without relin-
quishing his position as grand pnnee of Lithuania Whether with the same
or different rulers Poland exercised a major and increasing influence on
Lithuania after 1385
The late fourteenth and early fifteenth century was a remarkable penod
in the history of the Lithuanian state Within the decade from 1387 to
1396, Moldavia, Wallachia, and Bessarabia accepted Lithuanian suzerainty
VitoUs rule, which lasted from 1392 to 1430, witnessed the greatest ex-
tension of the Lithuanian domain, with still more alluring possibilities m
sight as Lithuania continued to challenge Moscow for supremacy on the
great Russian plain In addition, in 1410 Vitovt personally led his army in
the crucial battle of Tannenbcrg or Grilnwatd where the joint forces of
Poland and Lithuania crushed the Teutonic Knights, thus finally eliminating
this deadly threat to both Slav and Lithuanian The Lithuanian pnnee s
great defeat came m 1399, when his major campaign against (he Mongols
met disaster at their hands Some historians believe that had Vitovt won
rather than lost on the banks of the Vorskla, he could then have asserted
his will successfully against both Moscow and Poland and given a different
direction to eastern European history
Jagicllo s marriage, in the last anal)sis, proved more important for
Lithuania than Vitovt’s wars It marked the beginning of a Polomzation
of the country Significantly, »n order to marry Jadwiga, Jagicllo forsook
Orthodoxy for Roman Catholicism Moreover, he had his pagan Lithuanians
converted to Catholicism The clergy, naturally, came to Lithuania from
Poland, and the Church became n great stronghold of Polish influence It
has been noted, for instance, that three of the first four bishops of Vilnius
were definitely Poles, and that the Poles constituted the majority In the
Vilnius chapter even at the end of the fifteenth century Education followed
136 APPANAGE RUSSIA
religion: the first schools were either cathedral or monastic schools, and
their teachers were mainly members of the clergy. To obtain higher educa-
tion, unavailable at home, the Lithuanians went to the great Polish uni-
versity at Cracow, which provided the much- needed training for the
Lithuanian elite. Russian historians, who stress the cultural impact of the
Russians on the Lithuanians, often fail to appreciate the powerful attraction
of the glorious Polish culture of the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance.
Naturally the Lithuanians were dazzled by what Poland had to offer.
Naturally too Polish specialists, ranging from architects and artists to
diplomats, appeared in Lithuania. Even Polish colonists came. But, to
return to the Church, its influence extended, of course, beyond religion
proper, education, and culture, to society, economics, and politics. Church
estates grew, and they remained exempt from general taxation. The bishops
sat in the council of the grand prince, while many clerics, highly esteemed
for their education, engaged in the conduct of state business.
Polonization was the most extensive at the court and among the upper
classes. Poland, with its sweeping privileges and freedom for the gentry,
proved to be extremely attractive to Lithuanian landlords. Indeed, many
western Russian landlords as well were Polonized, to complicate further
the involved ethnic and cultural pattern of the area and contribute another
element for future conflicts. Polish language and Polish customs and atti-
tudes, stressing the independence and honor of the gentry, came gradually
to dominate Lithuanian life. For example, in 1413 forty-seven Polish noble
families established special relations with the same number of Lithuanian
aristocratic families, each Polish family offering its coat of arms to its
Lithuanian counterpart. It should also be emphasized that between 1386,
that is, the marriage of Jagiello and Jadwiga and the beginning of a close
relationship between Lithuania and Poland, and 1569, the year of the
Union of Lublin, the Lithuanian upper classes underwent a considerable
change: in general their evolution favored the development of a numerous
gentry, similar to the Polish szlachta, while the relative importance of the
great landed magnates declined.
The Union of Lublin
Over a period of time, the principality of Lithuania came into the Polish
cultural and political sphere and thus ceased to be a successor state to
Kiev. The Union of Lublin, which bound Poland and Lithuania firmly
together, represented, one can argue, a logical culmination of the historical
evolution of the Lithuanian princedom. Still, its accomplishment required a
major and persistent effort on the part of the Poles. In fact, in spite of
THE LITilt/ANIAPf-RUSSfAK STATE 137
Polish pressure and a sympathetic attitude toward Poland on the part of
their own petty gentry, the Lithuanian magnates managed to block an
effective union even as late as the Lublin meeting itself In 1569 Only when
Sigismund II, or Sigismund Augustus, of Poland proceeded to seize large
Russian territories from Lithuania and incoiporatc them into his own
kingdom, did the Lithuanians accept Polish proposals The Union of Lubltn
provided for a merger of the two states they were to have a common
sovereign and a common diet, although they retained separate laws, ad-
ministrations, treasuries, and even armies Notwithstanding an explicit
recognition of equality between Lithuania and Poland and a grant of vast
autonomy to the Lithuanians the new arrangement meant a decisive Polish
victory To begin with, Poland kept the Russian lands that it had just
annexed from Lithuania and that constituted the entire southern section of
the principality and ox er a third of its total territory, including some of
the richest areas. Because each county sent two representatives to the
common diet and because there were many more counties m Poland than
in Lithuania, the Poles outnumbered the Lithuanians in the diet by a ratio
of three to one Perhaps still more important under conditions of union
Polish influences of almost every sort were bound to spread further in
Lithuania, assuring for Poland the position of the senior partner in the
new commonwealth
Constituting as it does a crucial event in the histones of several peoples,
the Union of Lublin has received sharply divergent evaluations and inter-
pretations Polish historians m general consider it very favorably, empha-
sizing the diffusion of high Polish culture as well as the political and other
successes resulting from the Polish Lithuanian association Further, they
stress that the large new political entity in eastern Europe resulted from
agreement, not conquest, and occasionally they even suggest it as a model
for the future Lithuanian historians, by contrast, complain that their coun-
try did not receive a fair break from Poland, which used every means to
dominate Its neighbor The Russians show special concern with the fate of
the Russian population Poland s seizure of the Kiev, Volynw, and other
southern areas of the Lithuanian principality in 1569 meant that their
Orthodox Russian people found themselves no longer in a state which
continued their traditions and to which they had become accustomed, but
under foreign rule, Polish and Catholic Besides, whatever the Polish sys-
tem promised to the gentry, it had nothing but oppression for the peasants
This note of tragedy is prominent in nationalist Ukrainian historiography
For the Ukrainians, the transfer of the bulk of their land to Polish rule
— the Poles had obtained Galicia earlier — marked the beginning of a
new chapter in the trials and tribulations of the Ukrainian people and also
set the stage for a heroic struggle for independence In any ease, for good
138 APPANAGE RUSSIA
or evil, the Union of Lublin terminated the independent history of the
Lithuanian principality.
The Lithuanian State and Russian History
From the standpoint of Russian history, the Lithuanian, or Lithuanian-
Russian, princedom presents particular interest as the great, unsuccessful
rival of Moscow for the unification of the country. Liubavsky and other
specialists have provided thoughtful explanations of why Vilna lost where
Moscow won. A fundamental cause, in their opinion, was the contrast in
the evolutions of central authority in the two states. Whereas princely ab-
solutism developed in Moscow, the position of the Lithuanian rulers be-
came progressively weaker rather than stronger. Limited by the interests
of powerful boyars and largely self-governing towns, the grand princes of
Lithuania turned into elected, constitutional monarchs who granted ever-
increasing rights and privileges to their subjects: first they came to depend
on the sanction of their aristocratic council; after the statutes of 1529 and
1566 they also needed the approval of the entire gentry gathered in a diet.
Thus, as the Muscovite autocracy reached an unprecedented high in the
reign of Ivan the Terrible, the authority of the Lithuanian grand princes
sank to a new low. Whereas the Muscovite rulers strove, successfully on
the whole, to build up a great central administration and to control the
life of the country, those of Lithuania increasingly relied on, or resigned
themselves to, the administration of local officials and the landlord class
in general. In the showdown, the Muscovite system proved to be the
stronger.
Important causes, of course, lay behind the contrasting evolutions of
the two states. To refer to our earlier analysis, the princedom of Moscow
arose in a relatively primitive and pioneer northeast, where rulers managed
to acquire a dominant position in a fluid and expanding society. The
Lithuanian principality, on the other hand, as it emerged from the Baltic
forests, came to include primarily old and well-established Kievan lands.
It encompassed much of the Russian southwest, and its economic, social,
and political development reflected the southwestern pattern, which we
discussed in a preceding chapter and which was characterized by the great
power of the boyars as against the prince. Detailed studies indicate that in
the princedom of Lithuania the same noble families frequently occupied
the same land in the seventeenth as in the sixteenth or fifteenth centuries,
that at times they were extremely rich, even granting loans to the state,
and that the votchina landholding remained dominant, while the pomestie
system played a secondary role. The rulers found this entrenched landed
aristocracy, as well as, to a lesser degree, the old and prosperous towns,
THE LITHU ANIAN-fcUSSl AN STATE
139
too much to contend with and had to accept restrictions on princely power
The Lithuanian connection with Poland contributed to the same end.
Poland served as a model of an elective monarch) vuth sweeping privileges
for the gentry, in fact, it presented an entire gentry culture and way of life.
While the social and political structure of Lithuania evolved out of its own
past, Polish influences supported the rise of the gentry, supplying it with
theoretical justifications and legal sanctions Lithuania m contrast to mono-
lithic Moscow, always had to deal with different peoples and cultures and
formed a federal, rot a unitary, state In the end, as already indicated, it
became a junior partner to Poland rather than a serious contender for the
Kievan succession
The Lithuanian-Russian princedom also attracts the attention of his-
torians of Russia because of its role in the linguistic and ethnic division
of the Russians into the Great Russians, often called simply Russians, the
Ukrainians, and the White Russians or Belorussians and Its particular
importance for the last two groups While the roots of the differentiation
extend far back, one can speculate that events would have taken a different
shape if the Russians had preserved their political unity m the Kievan state
As it actually happened, the Great Russians came to be associated with
the Muscovite realm, the Ukrainians and the White Russians with Lithuania
and Poland Political separation tended to promote cultural differences,
although all started with the same Kievan heritage Francis Skonna, a
scholar from Polotsk, who early in the sixteenth century, translated the
Bible and also published other works in Prague and in Vilna, has fre-
quently been cited as the founder of a distinct southwestern Russian
literary language and, in particular, as a forerunner of Belorussian litera-
ture The Russian Orthodox Church too, as we know, finally split admin-
istratively, with a separate metropolitan established in Kiev to head the
Orthodox w the Lithuanian state The division of the Russians into the
Great Russians, the Ukrainians, and the Belorussians, reinforced by cen-
turies of separation, became a major factor m subsequent Russian history
Part IV MUSCOVITE RUSSIA
X V
THE REIGNS OF IVAN THE TERRIBLE, 1533-84, AND OF
THEODORE, 1584-98
There is nothing rnort unjust than to deny that there was a principle;
at stake tn Ivan’s struggle with the boyars or to see In this struggle
only political stagnation Whether Ivan TV was himself the initiator
or not — most probably he was not — yet this “opnch«ina n was at*
attempt a hundred and fifty years before Peter i lime, to found a
personal autocracy hire the Petnne monarchy Just as the “re-
forms had been the work of a coalition of the bourgeoisie and the
boyars, the coup of 1564 was carried out by a coalition of the towns-
men and the petty vassals
porsovsry
The new system which be {Ivan the Temblel set up was madness, but
the madness of a genius
PARTS
With the reign of Ivan IV, the Terrible, the appanage period became
definitely a thing of the past and Muscovite absolutism came fully into its
own Ivan IV was the first Muscovite ruler to be crowned tsar, to have this
action approved by the Eastern patriarchs, and to use the title regularly and
officially both in governing his land and in conducting foreign relations In
calling himself also “autocrat" he emphasized his complete power at home
as well as the fact that he was a sovereign, not a dependent, monarch
Nevertheless, it was Ivan the Temble’s actions, rather than his titles or
ideas, that offered a stunning demonstration of the new arbitrary might of
the Muscovite, and now Russian, ruler Indeed, Ivan the Tcrnblc remains
the classic Russian tyrant »n spite of such successors as Peter the Great,
Paul I, and Nicholas I.
Ivan the Terrible's Childhood and the First Part of Ills Rule
Ivan IV was only three years old in 1533 when his father, Basil IH,
died, leaving the government of Russia to his vide — Ivan’s mother Helen,
of the GhnsVy family — and the boyar duma The new regent acted in a
haughty and arbitrary manner, disregarding the boyars and relying first
on her uncle, the experienced Prince Michael Glinshy, and after his death
on her lover, the youthful Prince Telepncv-Obofensky In 1538 she died
suddenly, possibly of poison Boyar rule — if this phrase can be used tej
143
144
MUSCOVITE ru
characterize the strife and misrule which ensued — followed her demise.
To quote one brief summary of the developments :
The regency was disputed between two princely houses, the Shuiskys and
the Belskys. Thrice the power changed hands and twice the Metropolitans
themselves were forcibly changed during the struggle, one of them, Joseph,
V AKD THEO
RE I
145
being done to death. The Shuiskys prevailed, and three successive mem-
bers of this family held power in turn Their use of it wat entirely selfish,
dictated not even by das* Interests hut simply by those of family and
favour.
Imprisonments, exiles, executions, and murders proliferated
All evidence indicates that Ivan IV was a sensitive, intelligent, and
precocious boy He learned to read early and read everything that he could
find, especially Muscovite Church literature He became of necessity pain-
fully aware of the struggle and intrigues around him and also of the am-
bivalence of his own position The same boyars who formally paid obeisance
to him as autocrat and treated him with utmost respect on ceremonial oc-
casions, neglected, insulted, and injured him m private life In fact, they
deprived him at will of his favontc servants and companions and ran the
palace, as well as Russia, as they pleased Bitterness and cruelty, expressed,
for instance, in his torture of animals, became fundamental traits of the
young ruler’s character
At the age of thirteen Ivan IV suddenly turned on Andrew Shuisky, who
was arrested and dispatched by the tsar's servants The autocrat entered
into his inheritance The year 1S47 is commonly considered the intro-
duction to Ivan IV’s effective reign In that year, at the age of sixteen,
he decided to be crowned, not as grand prince, but os tsar, paying minute
attention to details in planning the ceremony in order to make it as majestic
and awe-inspiring as possible In the same year Ivan IV married Anastasia
of the popular Romanov boyar family again, he acted with great serious-
ness and deliberation m selecting Anastasia from a special list of eligible
young Russian ladies after he had considered and dismissed the alternative
of a foreign marital alliance The mamage turned out to be a Very happy
one Still in the same year, a great fire, followed by a riot, swept Moscow.
As the city burned, and even the belfry of Ivan the Great in the Kremlin
collapsed, crazed mobs killed an uncle of the tsar nnd imperiled the tsar’s
own life before being dispersed The tsar himself experienced one of the
psychological crises which were periodically to mark hts explosive reign
He apparently believed the disaster lo be a punishment for his sms he
repented publicly in Red Square and promised Jo rule in the interests of
the people
What followed has traditionally been described as live first, the good,
half of Ivan TV’s rule The young tsar, beneficially influenced by his kind
and attractive wife, worked with a small group of able and enlightened
advisers, the Chosen Council, which included Metropolitan Macarius, a
priest named Sylvester, and a court official of relatively low origin, Alexis
Adashev In 1549 he called together the first full zemsKn sobor, an Insti-
tution similar to a gathering of the representatives of estates in other Euro-
pean countries, which will be discussed in a later chapter. While our know!-
146
MUSCOVITE RUSS:
edge of the assembly of 1549 remains fragmentary, it seems that Ivan IV
solicited and received its approval for his projected reforms, notably for
a new code of law and for changes in local government, and that he also
used that occasion to hear complaints and learn opinions of his subjects
concerning various matters.
In 1551 a great Church council, lenown as the Council bl a Hundred
Chapters, took place. Its decrees did much to regulate the position of the
Church in relation to the state and society as well as to regulate ecclesiasti-
cal affairs proper. Significantly, the Church lost the right to acquire more
land without the tsar’s explicit permission, a regulation which could not,
however, be effectively put into practice. In general, Metropolitan Macarius
and his associates accomplished a great deal in tightening and perfecting
the organization of the Church in the sprawling, but now firmly united,
Russian state. One interesting aspect of this process was their incorporation
of different regional Russian saints — with a number of new canonizations
in 1547 and 1549 — into a single Church calendar.
Ivan the Terrible also presented to the Church council his new legal
code, the Sudebnik of 1550, and the local government reform, and received
its approval. Both measures became law. The institution of a novel scheme
of local government deserves special attention as one of the more daring
attempts in Russian history to resolve this perennially difficult problem. The
new system aimed at the elimination of corruption and oppression on the
part of centrally appointed officials by means of popular participation in
local affairs. Various localities had already received permission to elect their
own judicial authorities to deal, drastically if need be, with crime. Now,
in areas whose population guaranteed a certain amount of dues to the
treasury, other locally elected officials replaced the centrally appointed gov-
ernors. And even where the governors remained, the people could elect
assessors to check closely on their activities and, indeed, impeach them
when necessary. But we shall return to the Muscovite system of govern-
ment in a later chapter.
In 1556 Ivan IV established general regulations for military service of
the gentry. While this service had existed for a long time, it remained
without comprehensive organization or standardization until the new rules
set a definite relationship between the size of the estate and the number
of warriors and horses the landlord had to produce on demand. It should
be noted that by the middle of the sixteenth century the distinction be-
tween the hereditary votchina and the pomestie, granted* for service, had
largely disappeared: in particular, it had become impossible to remain
a landlord, hereditary or otherwise, without owing service to the tsar.
In 1550 and thereabout Ivan the Terrible and his advisors also engaged
in an army reform, which included new emphasis on artillery and engineer-
ing as well as development of the southern defense line. Moreover, the first
1VAK IV «HO tmeokoke j J47
permanent, regular regiments, known because of their chief v« capon as
the Streltsy or musketeers, were added to the Russian army
The military unprov emeuts came none too soon, for m the 1550 s the
Muscovite state was already engaging in a senes of wars Most impor-
tant, a new phase appeared in the struggle against the peoples of the
Steppe After Ivan IV became tsar, just as in the time of his predecessors
Russia remained subject to constant large scale raids by n number of Tartar
o rones, particularly from the khanates of Kazan, Astrakhan, and the
Crimea. These repeated invasions in search of booty and slaves cost the
Muscovite state dearly because of the havoc and devastation which they
wrought and the immense burden of guarding the huge southeastern
frontier Certain developments in the early years of Ivan the Terrible’s
reign indicated that the Tartan were increasing their strength and improving
their co-ordination In 1551, however, the Russians began an offensive
against the nearest Tartar enemy, the khanate of Kazan, conquering some
of its vassal tribes and building the fortress of Svuazhsk near Kazan itself
But as soon as the great campaign against Kazan opened m 1552, tbc
Crimean Tartars assisted by some Turkish janissaries and artillery, in-
vaded the Muscovite territory atmmg for Moscow itself Only after they
had been checked and had withdrawn to the southern steppe could the
Russians resume their advance on Kazan The tsar’s troops surrounded
the city by land and water, and after a siege of six weeks stormed it success-
fully, using powder to blow up some of the fortifications The Russian
heroes of the bitter fighting included commanders Prince Michael Vorotyn-
sky and Prince Andrew Kurbsky, who led the first detachment to break
into the city It took another five years to establish Russian rule over the
entire territory of the khanate of Kazan
Following the conquest of Kazan on the middle Volga, the Russians
turned tbeir attention to ihs mouth of the m cr, to Astrakhan They seized
it first in 1554 and Installed their candidate there as khan. After this vassal
khan established contacts With the Crimea, the Russians seized Astrakhan
once more in 1556, at which time the khanate was annexed to the Musco-
vite state Thus of the three chief Tartar enemies of Russia, only the
Crimean state remained. With its Ottoman suzerain looming behind it.
Cnmcan forces invaded the tsar’s domain in 1554, 1557, and 1558. but
were beaten back each time On the last occasion the Russians counter-
attacked deep into the southern steppe, penetrating the Crimean peninsula
itself
Another major war was waged at the opposite end of the Russian state,
in the northwest, against the Livonian Order It started in 1558 over tbc
issue of Russian access and! expansion to the Baltic beyond the small hold
on the coastline at the mouth, of the Neva The first phase of this war,
to 1S63, brought sinking successes to the Muscovite armies In 1558 alone
148 MUSCOVITE RUSSIA
they captured some twenty Livonian strongholds, including the greatest of
them, the town of Dorpat, originally built by Iaroslav the Wise and named
luriev. In 1561 the Livonian Order was disbanded, its territories were
secularized, and its last master, Gotthard Kcttler, became the hereditary
Duke of Courland and a vassal of the Polish king. Yet the resulting Polish-
Lithuanian offensive failed, and the Russian forces seized Polotsk from
Lithuania in 1563.
Ivan IV and his assistants had many interests in the outside world other
than war. As early as 1547 the Muscovite government sent an agent, the
Saxon Slitte, to western Europe to invite specialists to serve the tsar.
Eventually over one hundred and twenty doctors, teachers, artists, and
different technicians and craftsmen from Germany accepted the Russian
invitation. But when they reached Liibeck, authorities of the Hanseatic
League and of the Livonian Order refused to let them through, with the
result that only a few of their number ultimately came to Russia on their
own. In 1553 an English captain, Richard Chancellor, in search of a new
route to the East through the Arctic Ocean, reached the Russian White Sea
shore near the mouth of the Northern Dvina. He went on to visit Moscow
and establish direct relations between England and Russia. The agreement
of 1555 gave the English great commercial advantages in the Muscovite
state, for they were to pay no dues and could maintain a separate organiza-
tion under the jurisdiction of their own chief factor. Arkhangelsk — Arch-
angel in English — on the Northern Dvina became their port of entry.
Ivan IV valued his English connection highly. Characteristically, the first
Russian mission to England returned with some specialists in medicine
and mining.
The Second Part of Ivan the Terrible’s Rule
However, in spite of improvements at home and successes abroad, the
“good” period of Ivan the Terrible’s rule came gradually to its end. The
change in the Muscovite government involved the tsar’s break with the
Chosen Council and liis violent turning against many of his advisers and
their associates and afterwards, as his suspicion and rage expanded, against
the boyars as a whole. His personal despotism became extreme. Further-
more, Ivan the Terrible’s assault on the boyars, bringing with it changes in
the administrative mechanism of the state and a reign of terror, came to
dominate, and to a considerable extent shatter, Russian political life,
society, and economy.
In a sense, a conflict between the tsar and the boyars followed logically
from preceding history. As Muscovite absolutism rose to its heights with
Ivan the Terrible, the boyar class, constantly growing with the expansion
of Moscow, represented one of the few possible checks on the sovereign s
IVAN I
ND THEODORE I
149
power. Furthermore, the boyars remained partly linked to the o*d appanage
order, which the Muscovite rulers had striven hard and successfully to
destroy. The size and composition of the Muscovite boyardom reflected
the rapid growth of the state While in the Erst half of the fifteenth century
some forty boyar families served the Muscovite ruler, m the first half of
the sixteenth the number of the families bad increased to over two hun-
dred The Muscovite boyars included descendants of former Russian or
Lithuanian grand princes, descendants of former appanage prirccs, mem-
bers of old Muscovite boyar famflies, and. finally, members of bov 2 r fam-
ilies from other parts of Russia who had transferred their service to Moscow
The first two groups, the so-called service ponces, possessed the greatest
influence and prestige and also the strongest links with the past they
remained at least to some extent rulers in their own localities even after
they became servitors in Moscow The power of the Muscovite boyars,
however, should not be overestimated They showed JinJe initiative and
lacked solidarity and organization In fact, they constantly engaged in petty
squabbles ami intriguers against one another, a deplorab'e situation well
illustrated during the early years of Ivau the Ternble s re -so. The Mu»covi'e
system of appointments, the notonous mestmehestvo based on a hierarchi-
cal ranking of boyar families, as well as of the mcLvidual members within
a given family, added to the boyar disunity
Ivan the Terrible’s attitude toward his advisers and the boyars as a whole
dunged over a period of years under die stiong impact, it would seem, of
certain events In 1553 the tsar fell gravely ill and believed hinsclf to be
on his deathbed He asked the boyars to swear allegiance to hts infant son
Dmitni, but met opposition even from some of his closest associates, such
as Sylvester, not to mention a considerable number of boyars they ap-
parently resented the merely boyar, not princely, family of Ivan the Tem-
blc’s wife, were afraid of more misfortunes for the Muscovite state during
another reign of a minor, and favored Ivan the Tcmble’s cousut, Prince
Vladimir of Stantsa, as tsar Although the oath to Itnutni was finally sworn.
Ivan the Terrible never forgot this troubling experience Shortly afterwards
some boyars were caught planning to escape to Lithuania. New tensions
resulted from the Livonian War In fact it led to the break betw ecu the tsar
and lus advisers, Sylvester and Adashev, who disapproved of the proposed
offensive in the Baltic area, preferring an as»ault against the Crimean
Tartars
In 1560 Ivan the Tcrnble’s young and beloved wife Anastasia died sud-
denly, Convinced that Sylvester 2 nd Adashev had participated m a plot to
poison her, the tsar h 2 d them condemned in extraordinary judicial proceed-
ings, in the course of which they were not allowed to appear to s’a'e tbe.r
case The priest was apparently exiled to a distant monastery, the layman
thrown into jail where he died. Before long Ivan the Tcmble’s wrath de-
150 MUSCOVITE RDSSIA
scended upon everyone connected with the Chosen Council. Adashev’s and
Sylvester’s relatives, associates, and friends perished without trial. Two
princes lost their lives merely because they expressed disapproval o! the
tsar’s behavior. At this turn of events, a number of boyars fled to Lithuania.
The escapees included a famous commander and associate of the tsar.
Prince Andrew Kurbsky, who spent the rest of his life organizing forces
and coalitions against his former sovereign. Kurbsky is best known, how-
ever, for the remarkable letters which he exchanged with Ivan the Terrible
in 1564—79 and which will demand our attention when we deal with the
political thought of Muscovite Russia.
In late 1564 Ivan IV suddenly abandoned Moscow for the small town
of Aleksandrov some sixty miles away. A month later two letters, addressed
to the metropolitan, arrived from the tsar. In them Ivan IV expressed his
desire to retire from the throne and denounced the boyars and the clergy.
Yet, in the letter to be read to the masses, he emphasized that he had no
complaints against the common people. In confusion and consternation,
the boyars and the people of Moscow begged the tsar to return and rule
over them. Ivan the Terrible did return in February 1565, after his two
conditions had been accepted: the creation of a special institution and sub-
division in the Muscovite state, known as the oprichnina — from the word
oprich, that is, apart, beside — to be managed entirely at the tsar’s own
discretion; and an endorsement of the tsar’s right to punish evil-doers and
traitors as he would see fit, executing them when necessary and confiscating
their possessions. After the tsar returned to Moscow, it became apparent to
those who knew him that he had experienced another shattering psychologi-
cal crisis, for his eyes were dim and his hair and beard almost gone.
The oprichnina acquired more than one meaning. It came to stand for
a separate jurisdiction within Russia which consisted originally of some
twenty towns with their countryside, several special sections scattered
throughout the state, and a part of Moscow where Ivan the Terrible built
a new palace. Eventually it extended to well over a third of the Muscovite
realm. The tsar set up a separate state administration for the oprichnina,
paralleling the one in existence which was retained for the rest of the
country, now known as the zemshchina. Much later there was even estab-
lished a new and nominal ruler, a baptized Tartar prince Simeon, to whom
Ivan the Terrible pretended to render homage. Our knowledge of the struc-
ture and functioning of the oprichnina administration remains fairly limited.
Platonov suggested that after the reform of 1564 the state had actually one set
of institutions, but two sets of officials. In any case, new men under the direct
control of Ivan the Terrible ran the oprichina, whereas the zemshchina
stayed within the purview of the boyar duma and old officialdom. In fact,
many landlords in the territory of the oprichnina were transferred else-
IVAN IV AND THEODORE
151
where, while their lands were granted to the new servitors of the tsar The
term oprichnina also came to designate especially this new corps of servants
to Ivan the Terrible — called oprichniki — who arc described sometimes
today as gendarmes or political police The oprichniki, dressed in black and
iidmg black horses, numbered at first one thousand and later as many as
six thousand Their purpose was to destroy those whom the tsar considered
to be his enemies
A reign of terror followed Boyars and other people linked to Prince
Kurbsky, who had escaped to Lithuania, fell first The tsar’s cousin. Prince
Vladimir of Stantsa, perished in his turn together wuh his relatives, friends,
and associates The circle of suspects and victims kept widening not only
more and more boyars but also their families, relatives, friends, and even
servants and peasants were swept away in the purge The estates of the vic-
tims and the villages of their peasants were confiscated by the state, and
often plundered or simply burned Ivan the Terrible brooked no contradic-
tion Metropolitan Philip, who dared remonstrate wuh the tsar, was thrown
into jail and Killed there by ihe oprichniki Entire towns, such as Torzhok,
Klin, and, especially, in 1570, Novgorod, suffered utter devastation and
rum It looked as if a civil war were raging in the Muscovite state, but a
peculiar civil war, for the atiackers met no resistance It might be added
that the wave of extermination engulfed some of the leading oprichniki
themselves In 1572 Ivan the Terrible declared the oprichnina abolished,
although division of the state into two parts lasted at least until 1575
Following the death of his first wife, Ivan the Terrible appeared to have
lost his emotional balance His six subsequent wives never exercised the
same beneficial influence on him as had Anastasia Tile tsar was increas-
ingly given to feelings of persecution and outbreaks of wild rage He saw
traitors everywhere After the oprichnina began its work, Ivan the Terrible’s
life became part of a nightmare which he had brought into being With
Malmta Skuratov and other oprichniki the sovereign personally participated
in the investigations and. the horrid tortures and executions Weirdly he
alternated dissolution and utmost cruelty with repentance, and blasphemy
with prayer Some contemporary accounts of the events defy imagination.
In 1581, in a fit of violence, Ivan the Terrible struck his son and heir Ivan
with a pointed staff and mortally wrounded him It has been said that from
that time on. he knew no peace at all The tsar died in March 1 5 84, a Soviet
autopsy of his body indicating poisoning
While the oprichnina was raging mside Russia, enemies pressed from the
outside Although the Crimean Tartars failed to take Astrakhan in 1569,
m 1571 Khan Davlet-Geray led them to Moscow itself Unable to seize the
Kremlin, they burned much of the city They withdrew from the Muscovite
state only after lay mg waste a large area and capturing an enormous booty
152 MUSCOVITE RUSSIA
and 100,000 prisoners. Famine and plague added to the horror o£ the
Tartar devastation. The following year, however, a - new invasion by the
Crimean Tartars met disaster at the hands of a Russian army.
The Muscovite unpreparedness for the Crimean Tartars resulted largely
from the increasing demands of the Livonian War. Begun by Ivan the Ter-
rible in 1558 and prosecuted with great success for a number of years, this
major enterprise, too, started to turn against the Russians. In his effort to
expand in the Baltic area, the tsar found himself opposed by a united
Lithuania and Poland after 1569, and also by Sweden. After the death of
Sigismund II in 1 572, Poland had experienced several turbulent years: two
elections to the Polish throne involved many interests and intrigues, with
the Hapsburgs making a determined bid to secure the crown, and Ivan the
Terrible himself promoted as a candidate by another party; also, the suc-
cessful competitor, Henry of Valois, elected king in 1573, left the country
the following year to succeed his deceased brother on the French throne.
The situation changed after the election in 1575 of the Hungarian Prince
of Transylvania, Stephen Bathory, as King of Poland. The new ruler brought
Stability and enhanced his reputation as an excellent general. In 1578 the
Poles started an offensive in southern Livonia. The following year they
captured Polotsk and Velikie Luki, although, in exceptionally bitter com-
bat, they failed to take Pskov. On their side, in 1578, the Swedes smashed
a Russian army at Wenden. By the treaties of 1582 with Poland and 1583
with Sweden, Russia had to renounce all it had gained during the first part
of the war and even cede several additional towns to Sweden. Thus, after
some twenty-five years of fighting, Ivan the Terrible’s move to the Baltic
failed dismally. The Muscovite state lay prostrate from the internal ravages
of the oprichnina and continuous foreign war.
In concluding the story of Ivan the Terrible, mention should be made of
one more development, in the last years of his reign, pregnant with con-
sequences for subsequent Russian history: Ermak’s so-called conquest of
Siberia. Even prior to the Mongol invasion the Novgorodians had penetrated
beyond the Urals. The Russians used northern routes to enter Siberia by
both land and sea and, by the middle of the sixteenth century, had already
reached the mouth of the Enisei. In the sixteenth century the Stroganov
family developed large-scale industries, including the extracting of salt and
the procurement of fish and furs, in northeastern European Russia, espe-
cially in the Ustiug area. After the conquest of Kazan, the Stroganovs ob-
tained from the government large holdings in the wild upper Kama region,
where they maintained garrisons and imported colonists. The local native
tribes' resistance to the Russians was encouraged by their nominal suzerain,
the so-called khan of Sibir, or Siberia, beyond the Urals. In 1579 the
Stroganovs sent an expedition against the Siberian khanate. It consisted of
perhaps 1650 cossacks and other volunteers, led by a cossack commander,
IVAN IV AND THEODORE I 153
Erraak Greatly outnumbered, but making good use of their better
organization, firearms, and daring, the Russians defeated the natives m
repeated engagements and, in 1582, seized the headquarters of the Siberian
Khan Kuchuni Ivan the Terrible appreciated the importance of this un-
expected conquest, accepted the new territories into his realm, and sent
reinforcements Although Ermak perished in the struggle in 1585 before
help arrived and although the conquest of the Siberian khanate had to
be repeated, the Stroganov expedition marked in effect the beginning of
the establishment of Russian control in western Siberia Tiumen, a forti-
fied town, was built there in 1586 and another fortified town, Tobolsk,
was built in 1587 and subsequently became an important administrative
center
Explanations
The eventful and tragic reign of Ivan the Terrible has received different
evaluations and interpretauons In general, the judgments of historians
have fallen into two categories an emphasis on the tsar s pathological char-
acter, indeed madness, and an explanation of his actions on the basis of
fundamental Muscovite needs and problems, and thus in terms of a larger
purpose on his part Personal denunciation of Ivan the Terrible, together
with the division of his reign into the first, good, half, when the tsar listened
to his advisers, and the second, bad. half, when he became a bloodthirsty
tyrant, derives from the accounts of Andrew Kurbsky, as well as, to a lesser
extent, of some other contemporaries Karamzin adopted this view in his
extremely influential histoiy of the Russian state, and it has been accepted
by many later scholars
The view stressing political, social, and economic reasons for the events
of Ivan IV’s reign has also had numerous adherents Platonov did particu-
larly valuable work tn elucidating the nature of the opnchnma and the rea-
sons for its establishment He argued that the Chosen Council had indeed
ruled Russia, representing a usurpation of power by the boyars. Ivan the
Terrible’s struggle against it and against the boyars ns a whole marked one
of the most important developments in the evolution of the centralized
Russian monarchy Moreover, the tsar waged this struggle with foresight
and intelligence Platonov pointed out that the lands taken into the oprich-
nina, in particular in central Russia, included many estates of the descend-
ants of former appanage pnnees and pnneelings who xn their hereditary
possessions had retained the prestige and largely the authority of rulers,
including the rights to judge and collect taxes Their transfer to other lands
where they had no special standing or power and their replacement with
reliable new men, together with the wholesale suppression of the boyar
opposition, ensured the tsar’s Victory over the remnants of the old order
154
MUSCOVITE
SSI,
Henceforth, the boyars were to be their monarch’s obedient servants both
in the duma and in their assigned militaiy and administrative posts. In
addition, the oprichnina territory contained important commercial centers
and routes, notably the new trade artery from Archangel to central Rus-
sia. Platonov saw in this arrangement Ivan the Terrible’s effort to satisfy
the financial needs of the oprichnina; some Marxist historians have offered
it as evidence of a new class alignment. Furthermore, the oprichnina gave
the tsar an opportunity to bypass the mestnichestvo system and to bring
to the fore servicemen from among the gentry, most of whom remained in
important government work even after the country had returned to nor-
malcy. And it provided an effective police corps to fight opposition and
treason. The bitterness and the cruelty of the struggle stemmed likewise
from more basic reasons than the tsar’s character. In fact, in this respect
too Ivan the Terrible’s reign provided a close parallel to those of Louis XI
in France or Henry VIII in England, who similarly suppressed their aris-
tocracies. Platonov added that the tsar began with relatively mild measures
and turned to severe punishments only after the boyar opposition continued.
Marxist historians have developed an analysis of Ivan IV’s reign in terms
of the class struggle. Pokrovsky and others have interpreted the reforms
of 1564 as a shift from boyar control of the government to an alliance
between the crown and the service gentry and merchants, to whom the tsar
turned at the zemskii sobor of 1566 on the issue of the Livonian War and
on other occasions. In fact, Ivan IV tried to establish, long before Peter
the Great, an effective personal autocracy. Other Soviet scholars, especially
Wipper, have placed heavy emphasis on the reality of treason in the reign
of Ivan the Terrible and the need to combat it. In general, Soviet historians
have gradually come to stress the progressive nature of Ivan IV’s rule in
Russia as well as the tsar’s able championing of Russian national interests
against foreign foes, although recently Makovsky restated emphatically the
negative view of the reign. The Soviet cinema versions of the reign of Ivan the
Terrible reflect some of the major characteristics and problems of the shift-
ing Soviet interpretations of the tsar and the period. It might be added that
the Soviet evaluation of Ivan IV has, apparently, interesting points of con-
tact with the image which the brilliant and restless tsar left with the Rus-
sian people. It seems that his popular epithet Grozny i — usually rendered
ambiguously and inadequately in English as "Terrible” — implied admira-
tion rather than censure and referred to his might, perhaps in connection
with the victory over the khanate of Kazan or other successes. On occasion
the epithet was also applied to Ivan III in this sense.
Yet, after all the able and valuable rational explanations of Ivan the
Terrible’s actions in the broad setting of Russian history, grave doubts re-
main. Even if the boyars, or at least their upper layer, constituted an ele-
ment linked to the appanage past and opposed to the Muscovite cenfraliza-
tVAH IV AND THEODORE I JJ5
Uon, we have very little evidence to indicate that they were organized,
aggressive, or otherwise presented a serious threat to the throne Probably,
given time, thetr position would have declined further, eliminating any need
for drasUc action The story of the oprichnina is that of civil massacre, not
civil war Also, even Platonov failed to provide objective reasons for many
of Ivan IV’s measures, such as his setting up Simeon as the Russian ruler
to whom Ivan himself paid obeisance — although it should be added that
some other historians tried to find rational explanations where Platonov
admitted defeat Most Important, the pathological element in the tsar’s
behavior cannot be denied people of such character have brought about
many private tragedies Ivjn the Terrible, however, w as not just a private
person but the absolute ruler of a huge state
The Reign of Theodore
The reign of Ivan IV’s eldest surviving son Theodore, or Fedor. 1584—
98, gave Russia a measure of peace Physically weak and extremely limited
in intelligence and ability, but welt meaning as well as very religious, the
new tsar relied entirely on his advisers Fortunately, these advisers, espe-
cially Dons Godunov, performed their task fairly well.
An important and extraordinary event of the reign consisted tn the estab-
lishment of a patriarchate m Russia m 1589 Largely as a result of Boris
Godunov's skillful diplomacy, the Russians managed to obtain the consent
of the patriarch of Constantinople, Jeremiah, to elevating the head of the
Russian Church to the rank of patriarch, the highest in the Orthodox world
Later nil Eastern patriarchs agreed to this step, although with some reluc-
tance Boris Godunov's friend. Metropolitan Job, became the first Musco-
vite patriarch The new importance of the Russian Church led to an up-
grading and enlargement of its hierarchy through the appointment of a
number of new metropolitans, archbishops, and bishops This strengthening
of the organization of the Church proved to be significant in the Time of
Troubles.
Foreign relations >n the course of the reign included Theodore's unsuc-
cessful candidacy to the Polish throne, following Stephen Eathory’s death
in 1586, and a successful war against Sweden, which ended m 1595 with
the return to the Muscovite state of the towns and territory near the Gulf
of Finland which had been ceded by the treaty of 1583 Hie pre-Livonian
War frontier was thus re-established In 1586 an Orthodox Georgian king-
dom in Transcaucasia, beset by Moslems, begged to be accepted as a vassal
of the Russian tsar While Georgia Jay too far away for more than it nonu-
jtaJ. transitory connection to be established in the sixteenth century, the
request pointed to one direction of later Russian expansion
Theodore’s reign also witnessed, in 1591, the death of Prince Dnutni of
Uglich m a setting which made it one of the most famous detective stones
156
MUSCOVITE RUSSIA
of Russian history. Nine-and-a-half-year-oJd Dmitrii, the tsar’s brother and
the only otlier remaining male member of the ruling family, died, his throat
slit, in the courtyard of his residence in Uglich. The populace rioted, ac-
cused the child's guardians of murder, and killed them. An official investi-
gating commission, headed by Prince Basil Shuisky, declared that Dmitrii
had been playing with a knife and had injured himself fatally while in an
epileptic fit. Many contemporaries and later historians concluded that
Dmitrii had been murdered on orders of Boris Godunov who had deter-
mined to become tsar himself. Platonov, however, argued persuasively
against this view: as a son of Ivan the Terrible’s seventh wife — while
canonically only three were allowed — Dmitrii’s rights to the throne were
highly dubious; the tsar, still in his thirties, could well have a son or sons
of his own; Boris Godunov would have staged the murder much more skill-
fully, without immediate leads to his agents and associates. More recently
Vernadsky established that no first-hand evidence of an assassination
exists at all, although accusations of murder arose immediately following
Prince Dmitrii’s apparently accidental death. But, whereas scholars may
well remain satisfied with Platonov’s and Vernadsky’s explanation, the
general public will, no doubt, prefer the older version, enshrined in
Pushkin’s play and Musorgsky’s opera, Boris Godunov.
Even if Boris Godunov did not murder Dmitrii, he made cveiy other
effort to secure power. Coming from a Mongol gentry family which had
been converted to Orthodoxy and Russified, himself virtually illiterate,
Boris Godunov showed uncanny intelligence and abilities in palace intrigue,
diplomacy, and statecraft. He capitalized also on his proximity to Tsar
Theodore, who was married to Boris’s sister, Irene. In the course of several
years Boris Godunov managed to defeat his rivals at court, and become the
effective ruler of Russia in about 1588. In addition to power and enormous
private wealth, Boris Godunov obtained exceptional outward signs of his
high position: a most impressive and ever-growing official title; the formal
right to conduct foreign relations on behalf of the Muscovite state; and a
separate court, imitating that of the tsar, where foreign ambassadors had
to present themselves after they had paid their respects to Theodore. When
the tsar died in 1598, without an heir, Boris Godunov stood ready and wait-
ing to ascend the throne. His reign, however, was to be not so much a suc-
cessful consummation of his ambition as a prelude to the Time of Troubles,
X V I
THE TIME OF TROUBLES, 1598-1613
O God save Thy people and Mess thine heritage preserve th s
city and this holy Temple and every city and land from peat lenee
famine earthquake flood, fire the sword, the invasion ot enem «s,
and from civil war
AH ORTHODOX *«UYE*.
The Time of Troubles — • Smutnoe Vremla, in Russian — refers to a
particularly turbulent confusing and painful segment of Russian history
at the beginning of the seventeenth century, or. roughly from Boris Godu-
novs accession to the Muscovite throne m 1598 to the election of Michael
as tsar and the establishment ot the Romanov d) nasty in Russia in 1613
Following the greatest student of the Time of Troubles, Platonov, we may
subdivide those years into three consecutive segments on the basis of the
paramount issues at stake the dynastic, the social and the national This
classification immediately suggests the complexity of the subject
The dynastic aspect stemmed from the fact that with the passing of Tsar
Theodore the Muscovite ruling family died out For the first tune in Mu*
covite history there remained no natural successor to the throne The prob-
lem of succession was exacerbated because there existed no law of sue
cession in the Muscovite state, because a number of claimants appeared
because Russians looked in different directions for a new ruler, and be-
cause, apparently they placed a very high premium on some link with the
extinct dynasty, which opened the way to fantastic intrigues and imper
sonations
While the dynastic issue emerged through the accidental absence of an
heir, the national issue resulted largely from the centuries-old Russian strug
glv in the west and in the north Poland and to a lesser extent Sweden,
felt compelled to lake advantage of the sudden Russian weakness The
complex involvement or Poland especially, in the Time of Troubles re-
flected some of the key problems and possibilities in the history of eastern
Europe
Bui it is the social element that demands our mam attention. Tor it was
the social disorganization, stnfe, and virtual collapse that made the dynastic
issue so critical and opened the Muscovite state to foreign intrigues and
invasions The Time of Troubles can be understood only as the end product
of the rise of the Muscovite state with its attendant dislocations and ten-
157
158 MUSCOVITE RUSSIA
sions, It has often been said that Russian history, by comparison with the
histories of western European countries, has represented a cruder or sim-
pler process, in particular that Russian social structure has exhibited a cer-
tain lack of complexity and differentiation, While this approach must be
treated circumspectly, it must not be dismissed. We noted earlier that it
might be appropriate to describe appanage Russia in terms of an incipient
or undeveloped feudalism. The rise of Moscow meant a further drastic sim-
plification of Russian social relations.
To expand and to defend its growing territory, the Muscovite state relied
on service people, that is, on men who fought its battles and also performed
die administrative and other work for the government. The service people
— eventually known as the service gentry, or simply gentry — were sup-
ported by their estates. In this manner, the pomestie, an estate granted for
service, became basic to the Muscovite social order. After the acquisition
of Novgorod, in its continuing search for land suitable for pomestiia, the
Muscovite government confiscated most of the holdings of the Novgorodian
boyars and even half of those of die Novgorodian Church. Hereditary land-
lords too, it will be remembered, found themselves obligated to serve the
state. The rapid Muscovite expansion and the continuous wars on all fron-
tiers, except the north and northeast, taxed the resources of the government
and the people to the breaking point. Muscovite authorities made frantic
efforts to obtain more service gentry. “Needing men fit for military service,
in addition to the old class of its servitors, free and bonded, nobles and
commoners, the government selects the neccssaiy men and establishes on
pomestiia people from everywhere, from all the layers of Muscovite society
in which there existed elements answering the military requirements.” Thus,
for example, small landholders in the areas of Novgorod and Pskov and an
ever-increasing number of Mongols, some of whom had not even been con-
verted to Christianity, became members of the Muscovite service gently.
When Moscow succeeded in the “gathering of Russia" and the appanages
disappeared, the princes and boyars failed to make a strong stand against
Muscovite centralization and absolutism. Many of them, indeed, were
slaughtered, without offering resistance, by Ivan the Terrible. But the rela-
tively easy victory of the Muscovite despots over the old upper classes left
problems in its wake. Notably, it has been argued that the Muscovite gov-
ernment displaced the appanage ruling elements all too rapidly, more rapidly
than it could provide effective substitutes. The resulting weakening of the
political and social framework contributed its share to the Time of Trou-
bles. And so did the boyar reaction following the decline in the tsar’s au-
thority after Boris Godunov’s death.
As the Muscovite state expanded, centralizing and standardizing admin-
istration and institutions and subjugating the interests of other classes to
those of the service gentry, towns also suffered. They became administra-
THE TIME OF TROUBLES
159
uve and military centers at the expense of local self-government, commercial
elements, and the middle class as a whole This transformation occurred
most stnktngly in Novgorod and Pskov, but similar changes affected many
other towns as well
Most important, however, w as a deterioration in the position of the peas-
ants, who constituted the great bulk of the people They, of course, pro-
vided the labor force on the estates of the service gentry, and, therefore,
were affected immediately and directly by the rise of that class Specifically,
the growth of the service gentry meant that more and more state lands and
peasants fell into gentry hands through the pomestic system Gentry land-
lords, themselves straining to perform burdensome slate obligations,
squeezed what they could from the peasants Furthermore, the ravages of
the opnchmna brought outright disaster to the already overtaxed peasant
economy of much of central Russia Famine, which appeared in the second
half of Ivan the Terrible s reign, was to return m the frightful years of
I 601-3
Many peasants tried to escape The Russian conquest of the khanates
of Kazan and Astrakhan opened up fertile lands to the southeast, and at
first the government encouraged migration to consolidate the Russian hold
on the area But this policy could not be reconciled with the interests of
the service gentry, whose peasants had to be prevented from fleeing if their
masters were to retain the ability to sene the state Therefore, m the last
quarter of the sixteenth century, Muscovite authorities made an especially
determined effort to secure and guarantee the labor force of the gentry
Legal migration ceased The state also wed to curb Church landholding,
and especially to prevent the transfer of any gentry land to the Church
Furthermore, serfdom as such finally became fully established in Russia
While the long term process of the growth of serfdom will be discussed
later, it should be menuoned here that the government’s dedication to the
interests of the service gentry at least contributed to It
Hard pressed economically and increasingly deprived of their rights, the
peasants conunued to flee to the borderlands m spite of all prohibitions
The shattering impact of the oprichnina provided another stimulus for the
growth of that restless, dislocated, and dissatisfied lower-class element which
played such a significant role during the Time of Troubles Moreover, some
fugitive peasants became cossacks The cossneks, first mentioned in the
chronicles in 1444, represented free or virtually free societies of warlike
adventurers that began to emerge along distant borders and m areas of
overlapping jurisdictions and uncertain control Combining military organi-
zation and skill, the sptnt of adventure, and a hatred of the Muscovite politi-
cal and social system, and linked socially to the broad masses, the cossacks
were to act as another major and explosive element in the Time of Troubles
Dissatisfied elements in the Russian state included also a number of con-
lbu MUSCOVITE RUSSIA
quered peoples and tribes, especially in the Volga basin. The gentry itself,
while a privileged class, had many complaints against the exacting govern-
ment Finally, it should be emphasized that conditions and problems varied
in the different parts of the huge Muscovite state, and that the Time of
Troubles included local as much as national developments. The Russian
north, for example, had no problem of defense and very few gentry or serfs.
Since a brief general account can pay only the scantest attention to these
local variations, the interested student must be referred to more specialized
literature, particularly to the writings of Platonov.
The Reign of Boris Godunov and the Dynastic Phase of the Time of
Troubles
With the passing of Theodore, the Muscovite dynasty died out and a new
tsar had to be found. While it is generally believed that Boris Godunov re-
mained in control of the situation, he formally ascended the throne only
after being elected by a specially convened zemskii sobor and implored by
the patriarch, the clergy, and the people to accept the crown. He proved
to be, or rather continued to be, an intelligent and able ruler. Interested
in learning from the West, Boris Godunov even thought of establishing a
university in Moscow, but abandoned this idea because of the opposition
of the clergy. He did, however, send eighteen young men to study abroad.
In foreign policy, Boris Godunov maintained peaceful relations with other
countries and promoted trade, concluding commercial treaties with England
and with the Hansa.
But, in spite of the efforts of the ruler, Boris Godunov’s brief reign, 1598—
1605, witnessed tragic events. In 1601 drought and famine brought disaster
to the people. The crops failed again in 1602 and also, to a considerable
extent, in 1603. Famine reached catastrophic proportions; epidemics fol-
lowed. Although the government tried to feed the population of Moscow
free of charge, direct supplies to other towns, and find employment for the
destitute, its measures availed little against the calamity. It has been esti-
mated that more than 100,000 people perished in the capital alone. Starv-
ing people devoured grass, bark, cadavers of animals and, on occasion, even
other human beings. Large bands of desperate men that roamed and looted
the countryside and sometimes gave battle to regular troops appeared and
became a characteristic phenomenon of the Time of Troubles,
At this point rumors to the effect that Boris Godunov was a criminal and
a usurper and that Russia was being punished for his sins began to spread.
It was alleged that he had plotted to assassinate Prince Dmitrii; it was
alleged further that in reality another boy had been murdered, that the
prince has escaped and would return to claim his rightful inheritance. The
claimant soon appeared in person. Many historians believe Shat False
Dmitru was in fact a certain Gregory Otrcpiev, a young man of service
class origin, who had become a monk and then left Jus monastery Very
possibly he belies cd himsetf to be the true Prince Dimtni Apparently he
lived in Moscow ut 1601 and early 1602, but escaped to the cossacks when
nut h on tics became interested in his assertions and decided to arrest him
Next he appeared in Lithuania, where he reiterated his claim to be Ivan
162 MUSCOVITE RUSSIA
the Terrible's son Prince Dmitrii. While the Polish government gave him
no official recognition, he obtained support from the Jesuits and from cer-
tain Lithuanian and Polish aristocrats. He afso fell in love with the daughter
of a Polish aristocrat, the beautiful Marina Mniszech. The Jesuits received
from him the promise to champion Catholicism in Russia. The role of the
Muscovite boyars in the rise of False Dmitrii remains less clear. Yet, in
spite of the paucity and frequent absence of evidence, many scholars have
become convinced that important boyar circles secretly supported False
Dmitrii in order to destroy Boris Godunov. Indeed, the entire False Dmitrii
episode has been described as a boyar stratagem. Boris Godunov, on his
part, in an effort to defend his position, turned violently against the boyars
around the throne, instituting in 1601 a veritable purge of them. In October
1604, False Dmitrii invaded Russia at the head of some 1,500 cossacks,
Polish soldiers of fortune, and other adventurers.
Most surprisingly, the foolhardy enterprise succeeded. False Dmitrii’s
manifestoes proclaiming him to be the true tsar had their effect, in spite of
Boris Godunov’s attempts to confirm that Prince Dmitrii was dead and to
brand the pretender as an impostor and a criminal by such means as his
excommunication from the Church and the testimony of Gregory Otrepiev’s
uncle. Much of southern Russia, including such large centers as Chernigov,
welcomed False Dmitrii; in a number of places authorities and population
wavered in their stand, but failed to offer firm resistance. Dissatisfaction
and unrest within the Muscovite state proved to be more valuable to the
pretender’s cause than Polish and Lithuanian aid. False Dmitrii’s motley
forces suffered repeated defeats, but regrouped and reappeared. Still, False
Dmitrii probably owed his victory to a stroke of luck: in April 1605, when
the military odds against the pretender appeared overwhelming, Boris Go-
dunov suddenly died. Shortly after his death his commander, Theodore
Basmanov, went over to False Dmitrii’s side, Boris Godunov’s wife and
his young son and successor Theodore were deposed and murdered in Mos-
cow, and on June 20, 1605, False Dmitrii entered the capital in triumph.
The people rejoiced at what they believed to be the miraculous return of
the true tsar to ascend his ancestral throne. On the eve of the riots that
overthrew the Godunovs, Basil Shuisky himself had already publicly re-
versed his testimony and claimed that in Uglich Prince Dmitrii had escaped
the assassins, who killed another boy instead. In July 1605, Prince Dmitrii’s
mother, who had become a nun under the name of Martha, was brought
to identify her alleged long-lost child: in the course of a tender meeting
she proclaimed him her own. Followers of False Dmitrii, such as Theodore
Basmanov, succeeded the supporters of Godunov around the throne. A
Greek cleric, Ignatius, who had been among the first to side with the pre-
tender, replaced Boris Godunov’s friend Job as patriarch. The new tsar
returned from disgrace, prison, or exile the boyars who had suffered during
THE TIME OF TROUBLES !6J
the last years or his predecessor's reign Those regaining favor included
JPhslaret, formerly Theodore, Romanov, the abbot of a northern monastery
whom Boris Godunov had forced to take holy orders and exiled Philarct
became the metropolitan in Rostov
False Dmitri! has been de«cnbcd at an unprepossessing figure with no
waistline, arms of unequal length, red hair that habitually stood up, a large
wart on his face, a big ugly nose and an expression both unsympathetic
and melancholy His qualities, however, included undeniable courage and
considerable intelligence and ability He refused to be anyone s puppet, anil
in particular failed to honor his promises concerning the introduction of
Catholicism into Russia Instead of acting on these promises, he propounded
the grandiose project of driving the Turks out of Europe
Their new ruler s manners upset the Muscovites False Dmnm repeatedly
failed 10 observe the established traditions and etiquette He would not at-
tend church services, and did not take a nap in the afternoon, but instead
wandered on his own in the city, dressed as a Pole The Polish entourage
of the tsar proved still more disturbing these Poles, loud and prominent,
generally despised the Russians who in turn suspected and hated them as
enemies and heretics But the mam argument agamst False Dmuni, m the
opinion of Platonov and many other specialists, rested simply m the fact
that he had already served his purpose The boyars had uulized him suc-
cessfully agamst the Godunovs and now made arrangements to dispose of
him in his turn
It would seem that almost immediately after False Dnutni’s victory Basil
Shuisky and his brothers began to spread rumors to the effect Out the new
tsar was, after all, an impostor Caught and condemned to death, they
were instead exiled and, after several months, enure ly pardoned by the
nltmctst tsar — • a sure sign us. the opinion, of some specialists that False
Draitru believed himself to be the true heir to the throne The next impor-
tant event of the reign, the tsar’s marriage, served to increase tensions In
November 1605 in Cracow, False Dmitni became engaged to Manna
Mmszeeb The tsar’s proxy for the ritual, Athanasius Vlasmv, surprised
those in attendance by refusing to answtr the ceremonial question as to
whether the tsar had promised to many anyone else, on the ground that
he had no instructions on the subject Manna came to Moscow on May 2,
1606, and the wedding was celebrated on May 8 hl 2 nna, however, re-
mained a Catholic, and she brought with her another large group of Poles
Arguments and clashes between the Poles and the Russians increased
Having prepared the ground. Prince Basil Shuislcy, Prince Basil Golitsyn,
and other boyars on the night of May 26 led into Moscow a very large mili-
tary detachment stationed nearby Their coup began under the slogan of sav-
ing the tsar from the Poles, but as it progressed the tsar himself was de-
nounced as an impostor The defenders of the palace were overwhelmed
164 MUSCOVITE RUSSIA
False Dmitrii tried to escape, but was handed over to the rebels and death by
a guard of the streltsy, apparently after they had been persuaded by the
mother of Prince Dmitrii of Uglich, the nun Martha, that their tsar was an
impostor, Theodore Basmanov and two or three thousand other Russians
and Poles perished. The Patriarch Ignatius was deposed.
Both the Godunovs and their rival had thus disappeared from the scene.
Prince Basil Shuisky became the next tsax with no greater sanction than the
wishes of his party and the endorsing shouts of a Muscovite crowd. The new
ruler made certain revealing promises: he would not execute anyone without
the decision of the boyar duma; innocent members of a family would not
suffer because of a guilty relative; denunciations would not be given cre-
dence without a careful investigation; and false informers would be pun-
ished. Although historians who see in Basil Shuisky’s declaration an effec-
tive limitation of autocracy seem to overstate the case, the tsar’s assurances
did reflect his tics to the boyars as well as the efforts of the latter to obtain
minimal guarantees against the kind of persecution practiced by such rulers
as Ivan the Terrible and Boris Godunov. Moreover, it appears that the
boyars acquired a certain freedom under the new monarch and often be-
haved willfully and disobediently in their relations with him.
The government tried its best to assure the people that False Dmitrii had
been an impostor who had won the throne by magic and had forced the
nun Martha and others to recognize him as the authentic prince. The body
of False Dmitrii was exposed in Red Square and then burned, and the
ashes were fired from a cannon in the direction of Poland. In addition to
this, and to Basil Shuisky’s and Martha’s denunciations of False Dmitrii,
another novel attempt at persuasion was made: in June 1606 Prince Dmitrii
of Uglich was canonized and his remains were brought to Moscow.
The Social Phase
Basil Shuisky’s elevation to tsardpm may be said to mark the transition
in the Time of Troubles from the dynastic to the social phase. Not that
dynastic issues lost their importance: in fact, the contest for the throne re-
mained a basic aspect of the Time of Troubles to the end. But the social
conflict became dominant. We have already seen how social discontent
assisted False Dmitrii and how mobs in Moscow were significant in the
struggle for the seat of power. With the deposition and murder of False
Dmitrii, authority in the land was further weakened, whereas the forces
of discontent and rebellion grew in size and strength. Indeed, the Russians
had .seen four tsars — Boris and Theodore Godunov, False Dmitrii, and
Basil Shuisky — within thirteen and a half months, and the once firm gov-
ernment control and leadership had collapsed in intrigue, civil war, murder.
THE TIME OP TROUBLES 165
and general weakness Then too. whatever advantages the changes brought
to the boyars the masses had gamed nothing and their dsssattsfaction grew
In effect, Basil Shuisky's unfortunate reign, 1606-10, had no popular sanc-
tion and very little popular support, representing as it did merely the vic-
tory of a boyar clique
Opposition to the government and outright rebellion took many forms
An enemy of Basil Shuisky, Pnnee Gregory Shakhovskoy, and others roused
southern Russian cities against the tsar Disorder swept towns an the Volga,
and in Astrakhan in the far southeast the governor. Prince Ivan Khvoro-
sUiun, turned against Basil Shuisky Similarly in other places local authori-
ties refused to obey the new ruler The political picture in the Muscovite
state became one of extreme disorganization with countless local variations
and complications Rumors persisted that False Dmitru had escaped death,
and people rallied to his mere name Seifs and slaves started numerous and
often large uprisings against their landlords and the state On occasion they
joined with native tnbes such as the Finnic speaking Mordva, who Oh their
part also sought to overturn the oppressive political and social system of
Muscovite Russia
The rebellion in the south led by Shakhovskoy and by Bolotnikov, pre-
sented the gravest threat to the government and m fact to the entire estab-
lished order Ivan Bolotnikov was a remarkable person who was thrown
into prominence by the social turmoil of the Time of Troubles a slave, and
o captive of the Tatars and the Turks from whom he escaped he rallied
the lower classes — the serfs, peasants, slaves, fugitives and vagabonds —
m a war against authority and property Bolotnikov’s manifestoes clearly
indicate the importance of the social issue, not simply of the identity of
the Tuler, as a cause of this rebellion The masses were to fight for their
own interests not for those of the boyars In October 1606, the southern
armies came to the gates of Moscow, where, however, they were checked
by government forces commanded by the tsar’s brilliant young nephew.
Prince Michael Skopin Shuisky Perhaps inevitably, the rebels split The
gentry armies of Riazan, led by the Liapunov brothers, Procopius and
Zachary, and those of Tula, led by Philip Pashkov, broke with die social
rebel Bolotnikov and even in large part went over to Basil Shuisky’ s aide
The tsar also received other reinforcements In 1607 a huge government
army invested the rebels in Tula and, alter a bittet tom month siege and
n partial Hooding of the town, forced them to surrender Shakhovskoy was
exiled to the north, Bolotnikov was also exiled and, shortly afterwards, dis-
patched
It should be noted that Shakhovskoy and Bolotnikov claimed to act in
the name of Tsar Dmitru, although they had no such personage in their
camp Later they did acquire a different pretender, False Peter, who claimed
to be Tsar Theodore’s son, born allegedly m 1592, although this son never
[66 MUSCOVITE RUSSIA
existed. False Peter was hanged after the capture of Tula. As order col-
apsed and disorganization spread, more and more pretenders appeared,
rhe cossacks in particular produced them in large numbers and with dif-
erent names, claiming in that strange manner, it would seem, a certain
egal sanction for their bands and movements. But it was another False
3mitrii, the second, who became a national figure. Although he emerged
n August, 1607, shortly before the fall of Tula, and thus too late to join
Jhakhovskoy and Bolotnikov, he soon became a center of attraction in his
>wn right.
The new False Dmitrii, who claimed to be Prince Dmitrii of Uglich and
ilso the Tsar Dmitrii who defeated the Godunovs and was deposed by a
■onspiracy of the boyars, resembled neither. In contrast to the first pre-
ender, he certainly realized that he was an impostor, and his lieutenants
ilso had no illusions on that score. Nothing is known for certain about the
econd False Dmitrii’s identity and background. The earliest mention in the
ources locates him in a Lithuanian border town, in jail. Yet, in spite of
bese unpromising beginnings, the new pretender quickly gathered many
upporters. After the defeat of Shakhovskoy and Bolotnikov he became
he focal point for forces of social discontent and unrest. He attracted a
'ery large following of cossacks, soldiers of fortune, and adventurers, espe-
ially from Poland and Lithuania, including several famous Polish com-
nanders. Marina Mniszech recognized him as her husband and later bore
tim a son; the nun Martha declared him her child.
Basil Shuisky made the grave mistake of underestimating his new enemy
nd of not acting with vigor in time. In the spring of 1 608 the second False
dmitrii defeated a government army under the command of one of the tsar’s
irothers, Prince Dmitrii Shuisky, and approached Moscow. He established
tis headquarters in a nearby large village called Tushino — hence his his-
orical appellation, “The Felon of Tushino.” Prince Michael Skopin-Shuisky
gain prevented the capture of the capital, but he could not defeat or dis-
odge the pretender. A peculiar situation arose: in Tushino the second False
dmitrii organized his own court, a boyar duma, and an administration,
larallel to those in Moscow; he collected taxes, granted lands, titles, and
>ther rewards, judged, and punished. Southern Russia and a number of
ities in the north recognized his authority. Moscow and Tushino, so dose
o each other, maintained a constant clandestine intercourse. Many Rus-
ians switched sides; some families served both rulers at the same time. The
econd False Dmitrii suffered a setback, however, when his forces tried
o capture the well-fortified Holy Trinity-St. Sergius Monastery, one of
he gateways to northern Russia. A garrison of 1,500 men, reinforced later
vy another 900, withstood for sixteen months the siege of a force number-
ng up to 30,000 troops. Also, the Felon of Tushino’s rule in those northern
T«S TIME OP TROUBLES
167
Russian cities which had recognized his authority proved to be ephemeral
once they had a taste of his agents and measures
In his desperate plight, Basil Shunky finally, in February 1609, made an
agreement with Sweden, obtaining the aid of a detachment of Swedish troops
6,000 strong, commanded by Jakob De la Gardte, m return for abandon-
ing all claims to Livonia, ceding a border district, and promising eternal
alliance against Poland Throughout the rest of the year and early m 1610,
Prince Michael Skopin Shuisky, assisted by the Swedes, cleared northern
Russia of the Felon of Tushtno s troops and bands, lifted the siege of the
Holy Trinity St Sergius Monastery, and finally relieved Moscow of its nval
Tushtno neighbor The pretender and a part of his following fled to Kaluga,
After his departure, and before the entire camp disbanded, the Russian
gentry in Tushino asked King Stgismund III of Poland to let his son \Vlady-
slaw, a youth of about fifteen, become the Russian tsar on certain condi-
tions
Sigismund III granted the request and signed an agreement m February
1610 with Russian emissaries from Tushino who by that time had ceased
to represent any organized body in Russia The Polish king had become
deeply involved in Russian affairs in the autumn of 1609, when he declared
war on the Muscovite state on the ground of ns anu Poltsh alliance with
Sweden His advance into Russia, however, had been checked by a heroic
defense of Smolensk It would seem that from the beginning of his mterven
lion Sigismund III intended to play for high stakes and obtain the most
from the disintegration of Russia his main goal was to become himself
ruler of Russia as well as Poland The invitation to Wladyslaw. however,
gave him an added opportunity to participate in Muscovite affairs
In March 1610 the successful and popular Pnncc Michael Skopm Shut sky
triumphantly entered Moscow at the head of his army But his triumph did
not last long In early May he died suddenly, although he was only about
twenty four years old Rumor had it that he had been poisoned by Drmtm
Shuisky s wife, who wanted to assure the throne to her husband after the
death of childless Tsar Basil New disasters soon followed The Polish com
Wander, Stamdaw Zolkiewski, defeated Dmitru Shuisky when the latter
tried to relieve Smolensk, and marched on Moscow In the area occupied
by Polish troops, the population swore allegiance toWIady slaw At this turn
of events, live Felon of Tushtno too advanced again on Moscow, establish
mg himself once more near the c3pital In July 1610 Basil Shuisky finally
lost his throne he was deposed by an assembly of Muscovite clergy, boyars,
gentry, and common people, and forced to become a monk The boyar
duma in the persons of seven boyars, with Pnnce Theodore Msuslavsky as
the senior member, look over the government, or what there was left of
u The interregnum was to last from 1610 to 1613
168
MUSCO
TE RUSSIA
The National Phase
The national phase of the Time of Troubles began after Sweden, and
especially Poland, became involved in Russian affairs. Wladyslaw’s candi-
dacy to the Muscovite throne, supported by various groups in Russia, tended
to deepen and complicate the national issue. The eventual great rally of the
Russians found its main inspiration in their determination to save the coun-
try from the foreign and heretical Poles. The increasing prominence of the
national and religious struggle also explains the important role of the Church
during the last years of the Time of Troubles. Yet, needless to say, dynastic
and social issues retained their significance during those years. In fact any
neat classification of the elements which, together, produced the fantastically
complicated Time of Troubles is of necessity arbitrary and artificial.
The condition of the country prevented the calling of a zemskii sobor.
Yet some decision had to be taken, and urgently. At the gathering of
Muscovite boyars, clergy, and ranking service gentry opinions differed.
Those proposed for the throne included Prince Basil Golitsyn, and a boy,
Michael Romanov, Metropolitan Philaret’s son; however, the candidacy
of the Polish prince Wladyslaw, which found backing especially among the
boyars, prevailed. Probably Wladyslaw profited from a general lack of en-
thusiasm for another boyar tsar. But, more importantly, he was one of the
only two strong and active candidates in the field, the oilier being the Felon
of Tushino who was supported by the lower classes in Russia and probably
in Moscow itself. In late August 1610, the Muscovites reached an agree-
ment with the Polish commander Zolkiewski concerning the invitation to
Wladyslaw to rule Russia; Russian conditions, which stressed that Wlady-
slaw was to become Orthodox, resembled in most respects those offered to
the Polish prince earlier by the Tushino group, although they acquired a
boyar, rather than gentry, coloring. Ten days later Moscow swore allegiance
to Wladyslaw. An impressive embassy headed by Prince Basil Golitsyn,
Metropolitan Philaret, and other dignitaries departed for Sigismund Ill’s
headquarters near Smolensk to confirm the new arrangement with the
Polish king. The Felon of Tushino fled again to Kaluga, while Zolkiewski’s
troops entered Moscow.
At this point, when the Muscovite state appeared finally to be settling
its affairs and obtaining a firm government, another reversal occurred: un-
expectedly Sigismund III rejected the Russian offer. He objected especially
to the conversion of Wladyslaw to Orthodoxy and to the lifting of the siege
of Smolensk. But — beyond these and other specified issues — his real
intention was to become the Russian ruler himself and without conditions.
No agreement could be reached. Finally, contrary to international usage,
THE TIME OP TROUBLES
Sigismund III arrested the Russian representatives, except those few who
endorsed his claims, and sent them to Poland where they were to remain
for nine years Then he proceeded openly to develop his campaign to win
the Russian throne by arms, diplomacy, and propaganda
The autumn of 1610 saw the Muscovite state in utterly desperate straits
The Poles were again enemies of the Russians, and they held Moscow os
well as a large area in the western part of the country The Swedes had
declared war on the Russians after Moscow had sworn allegiance to Wlady-
slaw They advanced in the north, threatened Novgorod, and before long
claimed the Muscovite throne for their own candidate. Prince Philip With
the collapse of Wlady slaw's candidacy, the Felon of Tushmo again increased
his following, much of eastern Russia turning to him for leadership In-
numerable bands of lawless men were roaming and devastating the land
Yet — as if to illustrate the Russian proverb “there is no evil, but that it
bungs some good* — at least the issues gradually became clearer Sigis-
mund Ill's rejection of the arrangement to put Wladyslaw on the Russian
throne eliminated one major alternative for the Russians More important
sull, Swedish and especially Polish aggression led to a national tally More-
over, the cause of Russian unity received an unexpected and mighty boost
in December 1610 when the Felon of Tushmo was hilled by one of his men
in a settlement of personal accounts
la the absence of a tsar and because of the impotence of the boyar duma
and other branches of government in Pohsh-occuptcd Moscow, the Church
headed the rally Patriarch Herraogcn in Moscow declared the Russians
released from nllcgiance to Wladyslaw, and through misted emissaries he
sent manifestoes to other towns urging them to organize an army and
liberate the capital The patriarch's appeals had a strongly religious as well
os national character, for the Poles were Catholic, and Hcrmogen feared
especially the extension of the Uniale jurisdiction to Muscovite territories
• — a subject to be discussed later when wc deal with the Ukraine Other
clerics and laymen joined the patriarch »n trying to arouse the people The
first response came from Riaxan, where Procopius luapunov formed an
army of gentry, peasants, certain remnants of Skopm Shuisky s troops and
other elements As Liapunov’s army marched on Moscow in early 1611,
it was joined by other forces, including even former troops of the Tclon
of Tushmo who came from Kaluga, notably a mixed group commanded
by Prince Dmitni Trubetskoy, and the cossacks led by Wan Zarutsky, It
should be noted that this so-called first national army, headed by Procopius
Liapunov. Trubetskoy, and Zarutsky, acted also as the government of the
Muscovite state In particular, n contained a council of representatives Who
concerned themselves with state legislation and policy as well as with the
more immediate demands of the campaign
170 MUSCOVITE RUSSIA
Tie Poles, who had but a small garrison in Moscow, retreated under
pressure, burned most of the city, and entrenched themselves principally
in the Kremlin. The large Russian army appeared to be in control of the
situation. But once more social antagonisms asserted themselves. The cos-
sacks, furious because certain legislative measures in the interest of the
gentry were passed, especially on the subject of land, fugitive serfs, and
cossack brigandage, and also possibly believing a false document manu-
factured by the Poles, killed Procopius Liapunov in July 1611. Deprived
of its leader and unwilling to co-operate with the cossacks, the gentry army
disbanded. The men of Trubetskoy and Zarutsky, on the other hand, stayed
around Moscow to continue the siege and seized the government machinery
of the defunct first national army. In June 161 1 the main Po3ish army finally
captured Smolensk, the population of the town having been reduced from
80,000 to 8,000 in the course of the siege. In July the Swedes took Novgo-
rod by a stratagem. And in Pskov, a new pretender appeared, sometimes
called the third False Dmitrii. In Kaluga Marina Mniszech and her son by
the Felon of Tushlno, known as the Little Felon, constituted another center
of attraction for dissatisfied dements.
Yet the Russians did not collapse under all these blows; instead they
staged another rally. They profited from a certain lack of energy and initia-
tive on the part of their enemies: instead of advancing with a large army,
Sigismund III sent merely a cavalry detachment to the relief of the Poles
in Moscow, and that detachment was blocked by the cossacks; the Swedes,
after the capture of Novgorod, appeared to rest on their laurels. Still, the
magnitude of the Russian recovery should not be underestimated. Stimulated
again by the appeals of Patriarch Hermogen, of Abbot Dionysus of the
Holy Trinity-Sf. Sergius Monastery, and of others, the new liberation move-
ment began in the town of Nizhnii Novgorod, present-day Gorky, on the
Volga. It found a remarkable leader in Kuzma Minin, a butcher by trade,
who combined exalted patriotism and the ability to inspire others with
level-headedness and organizational and other practical talents. The people
of Nizlmii Novgorod donated a third of their possessions to the cause and,
together with other northeastern towns, soon organized a large army that
was entrusted to a veteran warrior, Prince Dmitrii Pozharsky. Minin be-
came its quartermaster and treasurer. The entire movement marked a reli-
gious, as well as a national, revival, accompanied by fasting and prayer.
The second national army, just like its predecessor, acted as the govern-
ment of the Muscovite state as well as its military force. It too apparently
contained an assembly of representatives from different localities, some-
thing in the nature of a traveling zemsldi sobor.
In early September 1612, the second national army reached Moscow
and besieged the Poles. The cossacks blockading the city remained passive;
THE TIME OF THOU
BUS 171
eventually one part of them joined Minin and Pozharsky, while another,
with Zarutsky, went to the borderlands to continue their rebellion In early
November the Russians stormed Moscow and, after bitter fighting, captured
Polish positions in the heart of the city, in particular in the Kremlin Mos-
cow was free at last o! the enemy All Polish efforts, finally led by Sigismund
III Imnsclf, to come to the aid of the Polish garrison in Moscow faded
The first aim of the victors was to elect a tsar and thus establish a firm,
legitimate government m Russia and end the Time of Troubles The spe-
cially called zemsku sobor which met for that purpose in the beginning of
1613 consisted of 500 to perhaps 700 members, although only 277 signa-
tures have come down to us on the final document. It included the clergy,
the boyars, the gentry, the townspeople, and even some representatives of
peasants, almost certainly of the state peasants of northern Russia rather
than of serfs Twelve of the signatures belonged to peasants While we have
no records of ihe assembly and very little information about Us delibera-
tions we know that the number of possible candidates for tsar was first
reduced by the decision to exclude foreigners 1~ rom a half dozen or more
Russians mentioned, the assembly selected Michael Romanov to be tsar,
and the Romanov family ruled Russia for over 300 years, from J 61 3 to
1917
Historians have adduced a number of reasons for this choice Through
Ivan the Terrible's marriage to Anastasia Romanova, Michael Romanov was
related to the old dynasty The family enjoyed popularity with the masses
In particular, the people remembered Anastasia, Ivan the Tcmble’s good
first svtfe, and her brother, Nikita Romanov, who dared defend some of the
victims of the violent tsar Metropolitan Phil arct, Nikita’s son and Michael's
father, who was a prisoner of the Poles at the Umc of the zemsku sobor,
added to the advantageous position of the family In particular, Miliukov
and others have stressed that he stood closer to the Tushuio camp and had
much better relations with the cossacks than other boyars Michael’s youth
too counted in his favor only sixteen years old he had not been com-
promised by serving the Poles or the pretenders, and he generally remained
free of the extremely complicated and painful entanglements ot the Time
of Troubles Michael Romanov also gained siaiuie as Patriarch Hermogen’s
choice, although the patriarch himself did not live to see the election, having
perished as a prisoner of the Poles shortly before the liberation of Moscow.
Thus, in February 1613, the zemsku sobor decided in favor of Michael
Romanov Next, special emissaries were dispatched to different parts of the
Muscovite state to sound local opinion When they reported the people’s
strong endorsement of the decision, Michael Romanov was elected to rule
Russia as tsar, and the title was to pass on to his future descendants It
took additional time to persuade his mother and him to accept the offer.
172 MUSCOVITE RUSSIA
Finally, Michael Romanov was crowned tsar on July 21, 1613. In Plato-
nov’s words: “According to the general notion, God himself had selected
the sovereign, and the entire Russian land exulted and rejoiced.”
The Nature and Results of the Time of Troubles
Platonov’s authoritative evaluation of the Time of Troubles contains sev-
eral major points: the explosive crisis which Russia experienced repre-
sented the culmination and the overcoming of a dangerous disease, or
perhaps several diseases. It ended with a decisive triumph over Polish inter-
vention, over the aristocratic reaction inside Russia, over the cossacks and
anarchy. The result meant a national victory for Russia and a social victory
for its stable classes, that Is, the service gentry, the townspeople, and the
state peasants of the north. The state gained in strength, and the entire
experience, which included popular participation in and indeed rescue of
the government, contributed greatly to the growth of national sentiment
and to a recognition of public, as against private, rights and duties by sover-
eign and subject alike.
Many other historians, both before and after Platonov, noted positive
results of the Time of Troubles. S. Soloviev, for example, claimed that it
marked the victory in Russia, at long last, of the concept of state over
that of family and clan. The Slavophiles — whom we shall consider when
we discuss Russian thought in the nineteenth century — were probably the
most enthusiastic of all: to them the Time of Troubles represented a revela-
tion of Che greatness of the Russian people, who survived the hardest trials
and tribulations, overcame all enemies, saved their faith and country, and
re-established the monarchy.
Critical opinions too have not been lacking. Kliuchevsky, for one, stressed
the social struggle, the abandonment of the tradition of patient suffering
by the masses, and the legacy of devastation and discord which pointed to
the great popular rebellions of later years. He also emphasized the peculiar
role and importance of the pretenders which demonstrated the political
immaturity of the Russians. Michael Romanov himself could be considered
a successful pretender, for his main asset lay in his link with the extinct
dynasty. It might be added that Basil Shuisky, for his part, pointed out in
his manifestoes that he belonged to an even older branch of the princely
house of Suzdal and Kiev than the former Muscovite rulers and thus pos-
sessed evexy claim to legitimacy.
Soviet historians have devoted considerable attention to the Time of
Troubles, which they often characterize as a period of peasant revolts and
foreign intervention. They have concentrated on the class struggle exempli-
fied by Bolotnikov’s rebellion, on the role of the poorer classes generally,
and sometimes on the role of the non-Russian nationalities. In contrast to
THE TIME OF TROUBLES 173
Platonov they have favored the revolutionary not the "stable" elements
Among the weaknesses of Soviet interpretations has been an underestimation
of the significance of the Church
In conclusion, we may glance at the Muscovite government and society
as they emerged from the Time of Troubles In spite of everything that hap-
pened between 1598 and 1613, autocracy survived esscnually unimpaired
In fact, at the end of it all, autocracy must have appeared more than ever
the only legitimate form of government and the only certain guarantee of
peace and security Centralization, too, increased in the wake of social dis-
organization In particular, local self-government that had developed In
Ivan the Terrible’s reign did not outlast the Time of Troubles The Church,
on its side, gamed authority and prestige as the great champion of the inter-
ests of the country and the people and the most effective organization in the
land that had survived the collapse of the secular order
The service gentry also won Wc know something about the aspirations
of that class from such documents as the invitation to ascend the Muscovite
throne sent to Wladyslaw by the service gentry m Tushino The conditions
of the offer included full protection of the Orthodox Church in Russia and
freedom of religion, for Wladyslaw was a Catholic, rule with the help of
the boyar duma and the zemskn sobor, no punishment without trial in court,
the preservation and extension of the rights of the clergy, the service gentry
and to a degree the merchants, the rewarding of servitors according to merit,
the right to study abroad, and at the same time a prohibition of serfs leav-
ing their masters and a guarantee that slaves would not be freed This
attempt by the Tushino gentry to establish a governmci * failed, but, m o
broader sense, the Muscovite gentry succeeded in defci ding its interests
during the Time of Troubles and m preserving and m part re-establishing
a political and social order in which it occupied, the central position The
Muscovite system, based on a centralizing autocracy and the service gentry,
thus surmounted the great crisis and challenge of the Time of Troubles and
continued to develop m the seventeenth century as it had in the sixteenth
It is this fundamental conuniuty that makes it difficult to find any lasting
results of the Time of Troubles, anything beyond Platonov's "disease over-
come "
The losers included, on one hand, the boyars and, on the other, the com-
mon people The boyars attained their greatest power in the reign of Basil
Shutsky and the period immediately following his deposition Yet this power
lacked popular support and failed to last In the end, autocracy returned with
its former authority, while the boyars, many of their families further deci-
mated during the Time of Troubles, had to become unequivocally servants of
the tsar The desires of the boyars found expression in the remarkably mild
“conditions” associated with the accession of Basil Shuishy, that Is in his
174
MUSCOVITE RUSSIA
promise not to purge the boyars arbitrarily, and in the Muscovite invitation
to Wladyslaw, which changed the earlier Tushino stipulations to exclude
promotion according to merit and the right to study abroad and insisted
that foreigners must not be brought in over the heads of the Muscovite
princely and boyar families.
The common people also suffered a defeat. They, and especially the serfs,
slaves, fugitives, vagabonds, and uprooted, together with the cossacks,
fought for Bolotnikov, for the various pretenders, and also in countless
lesser armies and bands. Although they left little written material behind
them, their basic demand seems clear enough: a complete overturn, a
destruction of the oppressive Muscovite social and economic order. But the
order survived. The decades which followed the Time of Troubles saw a
final and complete establishment of serfdom in Russia and in general a fur-
ther subjugation of the working masses to the interests of the victorious
service gentry.
The legacy of the Time of Troubles, good and bad, was the point of de-
parture for the reign of Michael Romanov.
XVII
Tim REIGNS OF MICHAEL, 1613-45, ALEXIS, 1645-76, AND
THEODORE, 1676-82
The seventeenth century cannot be separated either from the pre-
ceding or the succeeding epoch. It is the continuation and the result of
the past just as it is the preparation for the future It is essentially an
age of transition, which lays the ground* orV, and rapidly, for the
reforms of Peter
MILIUKOV
Xv Kostomarov's words, "Few examples can be found in history « hen
a new sovereign ascended the throne in conditions so extremely sad as those
m which Mikhail Fedorovich, a minor, was elected ” And indeed Michael
Romanov assumed power o\er a devastated country with the capital itself,
as well as a number of other tomis, burned down The treasury i was empty,
and financial cotlapse ol the state appeared complete la Astrakhan, Za-
rutsky, who had Marina Mniszcch and the Little Felon in his camp, rallied
the cossacks and other malcontents, continuing the story of pretenders and
social rebellion so characterist-c of the Time of Troubles Many roaming
hands, some of them sc\cral thousand strong, continued looting the land
Moreover, Muscovy remained at war with Poland and Sweden, which had
seized respectively Smolensk and Novgorod as well as other Russian terri-
tory and promoted their own candidates to the Muscovite throne. Prince
V/ladyslaw and Prince Philip
Under the circumstances, the sixteen-} ear-old tsar asked the zemskn
sobor not to disband, but to stay in Moscow and help him rule The zemskn
sobor, while its personnel changed several Umes, m fact participated in the
government ot Russia throughout the first decade of die new reign Platonov
and others have pointed to the naturalness of tins alliance of the “stable"
classes of the Muscovite society with the monarchy which they had estab-
lished Michael worked very closely also with the boyar duma Some his-
torians even believe that at his accession he had given the duma certain
promises limiting autocracy — an uueiesung supposition that has not been
corroborated by the evidence The t«at’s advisers, few of whom showed
ability, at first included especially members of the Saltykov family, relatives
on his mother’s side In 1619, however, Michael’s father. Metropolitan
Philaret, returned from imprisonment lit Poland, was made patriarch, and
175
176 MUSCOVITE RUSSIA
became the most important man in the state. In addition to his ecclesiastical
dignities, Philaret received the title of Great Sovereign, with the result that
the country had two great sovereigns and documents were issued in the
names of both. But Philaret’s real power lay in his ability and experience
and especially in his forceful character that enabled him to dominate his
rather weak son. Philaret died in 1633, almost eighty years old.
In 1613 and the years following, the most pressing problems were those
of internal disorder, foreign invasion, and financial collapse. Within some
three years the government had dealt effectively with the disorder, in spite
of new rebellions. Authorities made certain concessions to the cossacks
and amnestied all bandits, provided they would enroll in the army to fight
the Swedes. Then they proceeded to destroy the remaining opponents,
group by group. The especially dangerous enemies, Zarutsky, the Little
Felon, and Marina Mniszcch, were defeated in Astrakhan and captured in
1614. The first two were executed, while Marina Mniszech died in prison.
Everything considered. Tsar Michael’s government could also claim suc-
cess in checking foreign aggression and stabilizing international relations,
although at a price. Sweden, with its new king Gustavus II, or Gustavus
Adolphus, occupied elsewhere in Europe, concluded peace in Stolbovo in
1617. According to the agreement, the Swedes returned Novgorod and
adjacent areas of northern Russia, but kept the strip of territory on the
Gulf of Finland, thus pushing the Russians further from the sea. In ad-
dition, Sweden received twenty thousand rubles. The Poles had greater
ambitions; however, an understanding was attained after Wladyslaw’s cam-
paign of 1617-18 reached but failed to capture Moscow. By the truce of
Deulino of 1618, which was to last for fourteen years, Poland kept Smo-
lensk and certain other gains in western Russia. It was by the terms of this
agreement that Russian prisoners, including Philaret, were allowed to re-
turn home. At the termination of the treaty in 3632, hostilities were re-
sumed. But in 1634 peace was made: Poland again kept its gains in west-
ern Russia and, besides, received twenty thousand rubles, while Wiadyslaw
finally withdrew his claims to the Muscovite throne.
During Michael’s reign important events also occurred south of the
Muscovite borders. In 1 637 Don cossacks, on their own, seized the distant
Turkish fortress of Azov by the sea of the same name. In 1641 a huge
Turkish army and navy returned, but in the course of an epic siege of four
months could not dislodge the intruders. Having beaten back the Turks,
the cossacks offered Azov to Tsar Michael. Acceptance meant war with
Turkey. At the especially convened zemskii sobor of 1 642 the delegates of
the service class opted for war, but those of the merchauts and the towns-
people argued that financial stringency precluded large-scale military action.
The tsar endorsed the latter opinion, and the cossacks had to abandon
MICHAEL, ALEXIS AND THEODORE MI ITT
Azov In the Azov area, as in the area of the Gutf of Finland, the next
Russian effort was to be led by Fcter the Great
Financial stability proved to be more difficult to attain than security at
home or peace abroad Miliukov and others have pointed out that the cata-
strophic financial situation of the Muscovite state resulted from Its ovetex-
tcnsion, from the fact that Its needs and requirements tended to exceed the
economic capacity of the people The Time of Troubles caused a further de-
pletion and disorganization In a desperate effort to obtain money, Tsar Mi-
chael’s government tried a variety of measures collection of arrears, new
taxes, and loans, including successive loans of three, sixteen, and forty thou-
sand rubles from the Strogmovs In 1614 an extraordinary levy of 4 the fifth
money” in towns, and of corresponding sums in the countryside, was en-
acted While specialists dispute whether this impost represented one fifth
of one’s possessions or one fifth of one s income, us Draconian nature is
obvious On two later occasions the government made a similar collection
of ‘ the tenth money On the whole enough funds were obtained for the
state to carry on its activities but at the end of Michael s reign, as m the
beginning the financial situation remained desperate Finances were to
plague the tsar’s successors with further crises
The Reigns o] Alexis and Theodore
Michael died m 1645 at the age of forty tight, nnd his only son Alexis
or Afcksci, a youth of sixteen succeeded him as tsar Known as Ttshatsfttt
the Quietest One, to spite of his outbursts of anger and general Impulsive-
ness, Alexis left a favorable impression with many contemporaries, as well
as with subsequent historians In his brilliant reconstruction of the tsar’s
character KliuchevsVy called Alexis ' the kindest man. a glorious Russian
soul’ and presented him both as the epitome of Muscovite culture and as
one of the pioneers of the new Russian interest m the West Even if we
allow for a certain exaggeration and stylization in Kliuchevsky s celebrated
analysis there remains the image of an attractive person, remarkably sen-
sitive and considerate in his rchuons with other people, an absolute rider
who was not at all a despot Alexis had been brought up in the Muscovite
religious tradition, and he continued to be a dedicated and well informed
churchgoer and to observe fasts and ntuals throughout his life At the
same time he developed an interest in the West and Western culture, in-
cluding architecture and also the theatre, which was an innovation for Rus
sia The tsar liked to write and left behind him many fascinating letters
Alexis’s long reign. 1 645-76 was by no means quiet Old cnscs and prob-
lems persisted and some new ones appeared In addition, the tsir was a
weak ruler, although an attractive person, and especially at first depended
178 MUSCOVITE RUSSIA
veiy heavily on relatives and other advisers, who often failed him. The
boyar Boris Morozov, Alexis’s Western-oriented tutor who married a sister
of Alexis’s wife, and Prince Elijah Miloslavsky, Alexis’s father-in-law, be-
came especially prominent after the accession of the new sovereign. Moro-
zov acted with intelligence and ability, but his efforts to replenish the treas-
ury by such means as an increase in the salt tax and the sale of the hitherto
forbidden tobacco, to which the Church objected, antagonized the masses.
Also, some of his proteges and appointees robbed the people. Narrow
selfishness, greed, and corruption characterized the behavior of Miloslavsky
and his clique. In May 1648 the exasperated inhabitants of Moscow staged
a large rebellion, killing a number of officials and forcing the tsar to execute
some of the worst offenders, although both Morozov and Miloslavsky
escaped with their lives. Shortly afterwards rebellions swept through several
other towns, including Novgorod and especially Pskov.
Later in the reign, when the government was still in desperate straits
financially, it attempted to improve matters by debasing the coinage. The
debasing of silver with copper, begun in 1656, proved to be no more suc-
cessful than similar efforts in other countries: it led to inflation, a further
financial dislocation, and the huge “copper coin riot” of 1662. But the
greatest rebellion of the reign, headed by Stenka, or Stepan, Razin and long
remembered by the people in song and story, occurred in 1670-71. It bore
striking similarities to the lower-class uprisings of the Time of Troubles.
Razin, a commander of a band of Don cossacks, first attracted attention as
a daring freebooter who raided Persia and other lands along the Caspian
Sea and along the lower Volga. In the spring of 1670, he started out with
his band on a more ambitious undertaking, moving up the Volga and every-
where proclaiming freedom from officials and landlords. In town after town
along the river members of the upper classes were massacred, while the
soldiers and the common people welcomed Razin. Razin’s emissaries had
similar success in widespread areas in the hinterland. Native tribes as well
as the Russian masses proved eager to overthrow the established order. The
rebel army reached Simbirsk and grew to some 20,000 men. Yet its poor
organization and discipline gave the victory to the regular Muscovite troops,
which included several regiments trained in the Western maimer. Razin and
some followers escaped to the Don. But the following spring, in 1671, he
was seized by cossack authorities and handed over to Muscovite officials to
be publicly executed. Several months later Astrakhan, the last center of the
rebellion, surrendered.
In addition to suppressing uprisings, the government took steps to im-
prove administration and justice in order to assuage popular discontent. Of
major importance was the introduction of a new legal code, the Ulozheme
of 1649. Approved in principle by the especially convened zemskii sobor
of 1648 and produced by a commission elected by the sobor, the new code
MICHAEL, ALEXIS, AND THEODORE HI 179
provided the first systematization of Muscovite laws since 1550, It marked
a great improvement over its predecessors and was not to be superseded
until 1835
The extension of Muscovite jurisdiction to the Ukraine in 1654, repre-
sented an event of still greater and more lasting significance As we remem-
ber, that land after 1569 found itself under Polish, rather than Lithuanian,
control Association with Poland meant increasing pressure of the Polish so-
cial order— based on the exclusive privileges of the gentry and servitude of
the masses — as well as pressure of Catholicism on the Orthodox Ukrain-
ian people The religious issue became more intense after 1596 That year
marked the Union of Brest and the establishment of the so-called Umate
Church, that is, a Church linked to Rome but retaining the Eastern ritual,
the Slavonic language in its services, and its other practices and Customs
Although the Orthodox community split violently on the subject of union,
each side anathcmizmg the other, the Polish government chose to proceed
as if the union had been entirely successful and the Umate Church had
replaced the Orthodox in the eastern part of the realm Yet, in fact, al-
though most Orthodox bishops in the Polish state favored the union, the
majority of the Orthodox people did not Two churches, therefore, com-
peted in the Ukraine the Unntc. promoted by the government but often
lacking other support, and the Orthodox, opposed and sometimes persecuted
by authorities but supported by the masses Lay Orthodox brotherhoods and
a small, diminishing, but influential group of Orthodox landed magnates
helped the Church of the people
The cossacks also entered the fray Around the middle of the sixteenth
century the Dnieper cossacks, the most celebrated of all cossack "hosts,”
had established their headquarters, the Sech — • Sich in Ukrainian — on an
Island m the Dnieper beyond the cataracts They proceeded to stage unbe-
lievably daring raids m all directions, but especially against the Crimean
Tartars and Turkey — as described in detail by Hrushevsky and other
Ukrainian historians The cossacks developed a peculiar society, both mili-
tary and democratic, for their offices were elective and a general gathenng
of all cossacks made the most important decisions The Polish government
faced difficulties in trying to control the cossacks Stephen Bathary and
his successors allowed them very considerable autonomy, but also estab-
lished a definite organization for the “host" and introduced the category
of registered, that is, officially recognized, cossacks to whom both autonomy
and the new organization applied All other cossacks were to be treated
simply as peasants The Polish policy h3d some success in that it helped
to develop economic and social ties between the cossack uppeT stratum and
the Polish gentry Yet the same well-established cossacks retained ethnic
and, especially, religious links with the Ukrainian people The ambivalent
position of the registered cossacks, particularly of their commanders, re-
180 MUSCOVITE RUSSIA
peatedly affected their behavior. An example is the case of the hetman
that is, the chief commander, Peter Sagaidachny, or Sahaidachny, who did
so much to strengthen and protect the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine
but in many other matters supported the policies of the Polish government.
Nevertheless, as the struggle in the Ukraine deepened, the cossacks sided
on the whole with the people. And if the hetmans and registered cossacks
who after the expansion in 1625 numbered six thousand men, obtained
certain advantages from their association with Poland and found themselves
often with divided loyalties, the unrecognized cossacks, who were several
times more numerous, as well as the peasants, saw in Poland only serfdom
and Catholicism and had no reason to waver.
From 1624 to 1638 a series of cossack and peasant rebellions swept the
Ukraine. Only with great exertion and after several defeats did the Polish
army and government at last prevail. The ruthless Polish pacification man-
aged to force obedience for no longer than a decade. In 1648 the Ukrainians
rose again under an able leader Bogdan, or Bohdan, Khmelnitsky in what
has been called the Ukrainian War of Liberation. After some brilliant suc-
cesses, achieved with the aid of the Crimean Tartars, and two abortive agree-
ments with Poland, the Ukrainians turned again to Moscow. Earlier, in
1625, 1649, and 1651, the Muscovite government had failed to respond to
the Ukrainian request, which, if acceded to, would have meant war against
Poland. However, the zemskii sobor of 1653 urged Tsar Alexis to take
under his sovereign authority Hetman Bogdan Khmelnitsky and his entire
army “with their towns and lands.” Both sides thus moved toward union.
The final step was taken in Pereiaslavl in January 1654. A rada, or as-
sembly, of the army and the land considered the alternatives open to the
Ukraine — subjection to Poland, a transfer of allegiance to Turkey, or a
transfer of allegiance to Muscovy — and decided in favor of the Orthodox
tsar. After that, the Ukrainians swore allegiance to the tsar, A boyar, Basil
Buturlin, represented Tsar Alexis at the assembly of Pereiaslavl. It would
seem that, contrary to the opinion of many Ukrainian historians, the new
arrangement represented unconditional Ukrainian acceptance of the au-
thority of Moscow. The political realities of the time, with the Ukrainians,
not the Muscovite government, pressing for union, the political practice
of the Muscovite state, and the specific circumstances of the union all lead
to this conclusion. It should be noted, on the other hand, that in subsequent
decades and centuries the Ukrainians acquired good reasons to complain
of the Russian government, which eventually abrogated entirely the con-
siderable autonomy granted to the Ukrainians after they had sworn alle-
giance to the Muscovite tsar, and which imposed, or helped to impose, upon
them many heavy burdens and restrictions, including serfdom and meas-
ures meant to arrest the development of Ukrainian literary language and
culture. After the union, the Ukrainians proceeded to play a very important
MICHAEL. ALEXIS. AKD THEODORE III 181
part in Muscovite government and culture, for they were of the same reli-
gion as the Great Russians and very close to them ethnical!), but were
more familiar with the West In particular, many Ukrainians distinguished
themselves as leading supporters of the reforms of Peter the Great and his
successors
The war between the Muscovite state and Poland, which with Swedish
intervention at one point threatened complete disaster to Poland, ended
in 1 667 with the Treaty of Andrusovo, which was negotiated on the Rus-
sian side by one of Alexis’s ablest assistants, Athanasius Ordyn-Nashchakm
The Dnieper became the boundary betw een the two states, with the Ukraine
on the left bank being ceded to Moscow and the right bank Ukraine remain-
ing under Poland Kiev, on the right bank, was an exception, for it was to
be left for two yean under Muscovite rule Actually Kiev stayed under
Moscow beyond the assigned term, as did Smolensk, granted to the tsar
for thirteen and a half years, and the treaty of 1686 confirmed the perma-
nent Russian possession of the cities The Muscovite state also fought an
inconclusive war against Sweden that ended in 1661 and managed to de-
fend its new possessions in the Ukraine in a long struggle with Turkey that
lasted until 1681 In Ukrainian history the period following the Union of
Pcreiaslav, Bogdan Khmelnitsky’s death in 1657, and the Treaty of Andru-
sovo is vividly described as “the Ruin,” and its complexities rival those of
the Russian Time of Troubles Divided both physically and m orientation
and allegiance, the Ukrainians followed a number of competing leaders
who usually, in one way or another, played of! Poland against Moscow,
Hetman Peter Doroshenko even paid allegiance to Turkey Constant and
frequently fratricidal warfare decimated the people and exhausted the land
Yet the Muscovite hold on the left bank Ukraine remained, and the arrange-
ment of 1654 acquired increasing Importance with the passage of time
Significant events m the second half of Alexis’s reign Include the eccle-
siastical reform undertaken by Patriarch Nikon and the resulting major
split in the Russian Orthodox Church Nikon himself certainly deserves
notice Of peasant origin, intelligent, and possessing an extremely strong
and domineering character, he attracted the favorable attention of the tsar,
distinguished himself as metropolitan in Novgorod, and, m 1652, became
patmreb The strong willed cleric proceeded to exercise a powerful per-
sonal influence on the younger and softer monarch Alexis even gave Nikon
the title of Great Sovereign, thus repeating the quite exceptional honor
bestowed upon Patriarch Phtlarct by his son, Tsar Michael The new patri-
arch, expressing a viewpoint common in the Catholic West, but not in the
Orthodox world, claimed that the church was supenor to the state and
endeavoured to assert his authority over the sovereign’s Charged with pa-
pism, he answered characteristically “And why not respect the pope for that
which is good.” Nikon pushed his power and posrUon too far In 1658
182 MUSCOVITE RUSSIA
Alexis quarreled with his exacting colleague and mentor. Finally, the
Church council of 1666-67, in which Eastern patriarchs participated, de-
posed and defrocked Nikon. The former Great Sovereign ended his days
in exile in a distant monastery.
The measures of Patriarch Nikon that had the most lasting importance
concerned a reform of Church books and practices that resulted in a per-
manent cleavage among the Russian believers. While this entire subject, the
fascinating issue of the Old Belief, will be considered when we discuss reli-
gion in Muscovite Russia, it might be mentioned here that the same eccle-
siastical council of 1666-67 that condemned Nikon entirely upheld his re-
form. The last decade of Tsar Alexis’s reign passed in religious strife and
persecution,
Alexis’s successor Theodore, his son by his first wife, became tsar at the
age of fourteen and died when he was twenty. He was a sickly and undis-
tinguished person, whose education, it is interesting to note, included not
only Russian and Church Slavonic, but also Latin and Polish taught by a
learned theologian and writer, Simeon of Polotsk. Theodore’s brief reign,
1676-82, has been noted for the abolition of mestnichestvo. It was in 1682
that this extremely cumbersome and defective system of service appoint-
ments at last disappeared, making it easier later for Peter the Great to re-
form and govern the state. The mestnichestvo records were burned.
x vn i
MUSCOVITE RUSSIA ECONOMICS, SOCIETY, INSTITUTIONS
The debat concerns the issue as to whether the peasants had been
tied to their masters prior to the Vh^heme As we already had reason
to Icam from the above the gentry and the lowtr servitors did not
ask for the repeal of St George s Day They as well as the peasants
knew that it had been repeated even if temporarily The peasants
hoped for the restoration of their ancient nght and indubitably
wanted that to happen the landlords ne ther wanted it nor thought It
likely to occur The Utozheme put an end to the hopes of the peasant!
and futly met the demands of the gentry and the lower servitors, not
directly however but indirectly by means ot the recognition cf the
time tested practice of forbidden yean which was not to be repealed.
CHEtOV
The zemskie sobory m ihe Muscovite state represent a form of popular
participation in the discussion and decision of some of the most lm
ponant questions of legislation and government. But what form of
participation n is how it arose and developed — these problems have
led to no agreement m historical literature
DUXONOV
One of the most spectacular aspects of Russian history u the unique,
enormous and continuous expansion of Russia.
lAKTzrrr
To quote Ljashchemco, and m effect the entire Marxist school of his-
torians “The agrarian order and rural economy again serve as a key to the
understanding of all economic and social relationships within the feudal
economy and society of the Moscow state during the fifteenth to Ihe seven-
teenth centuries” And while the term feudal in this passage exemplifies
the peculiar Soviet usage mentioned in in earlier chapter, Ltasbchenko Is
essentially correct in emphasizing the importance of agriculture for Musco-
vite Russia.
Rye, wheat, oats barley, and mQtct constituted the basic crops Agricul'
lural technique continued the practices of the appanage penod, which
actually lasted far into modem tunes The implements included wooden
or iron ploughs, harrows, scythes, and sickles Oxen and horses provided
draft power and manure served ns fertilizer Cattle-raising, vegetable-
gardening. and. particularly in the west, the growing of more specialized
crops such as flax and hemp, as well as hunting, fishing and apiculture,
consututcd some other important occupations of the people Many scholars
,83 _
have noted a crisis in Muscovite rural economy, especially pronounced m
the.second half of the sixteenth century, and ascribed it both to the general
difficulties of transition from appanages to a centralized state based on gentry
service and exploitation of peasants and to Ivan the Terrible’s oprichnina.
. Trade, crafts, and manufacturing grew, although slowly, with the expan-
sion and development of the Muscovite state. Russia continued to sell raw
materials to other countries, and its foreign trade received - a boost from
ECONOMICS, SOCIETY. INSTITUTIONS 185
the newly established relations with the English and the Dutch The Rus-
sians, however, lacked a merchant marine, and their role in the exchange
remained passive Domestic trade increased, especially after the Time of
Troubles, and profited from a rather enlightened new commercial code
promulgated in 1661 The mining of metal and manufacturing had to pro-
vide, first of all, for the needs of the army and the treasury Industrial enter-
prises belonged either to the state or to private owners, among the latter
were the Strogonov family which engaged m various undertakings, espe-
cially in extracting salt, and the Morozovs, so prominent in Alexis's reign,
who developed a huge business in potash Foreign entrepreneurs and spe-
cialists placed a leading role in the growth of Muscovite mining and manu-
facturing. and we shall return to them when we discuss Western influences
on Muscovy As a result of intensified and more vaned economic activity,
regional differentiation increased For example, metalwork developed m
the Urals, the town of Tula, and Moscow, while the salt enterprises cen-
tered principally m the northeast
Serfdom Muscovite Society
Serfdom was the mainstay of Muscovite agriculture Serf labor supported
the gentry and thus the entire structure of the state As we saw earlier, cer-
tain types of peasant bondage originated m the days of Kiev, and had under-
gone centuries of evolution before the times of Ivan the Temble and Tsar
Alexis Originally, it would seem, peasant dependence on the landlords
began through contracts m return lor a loan of money, grain, or agricul-
tural tools, the peasant would promise to pay dues, the quitrent or obrok.
to the landlord and perform work, the corv6e or barshchma, for him Al-
though made for a period ranging from one to ten years, the agreements
tended to continue, for the peasant could rarely pay off his obligations
Indeed his annual contributions to the landlord’s economy often consti-
tuted merely interest on the loan Invasions, civil wars, droughts, epidemics,
and other disasters, so frequent m Russian history in the period from the
fall of Kiev to the rise of Moscow, increased peasant dependence and bond-
age Gradually it became possible for the peasant to leave his master only
once a year, around St George's day In late autumn, provided, of course,
his debts had been paid
AH these developments that laid the foundations for full fledged serfdom
— which were discussed in previous chapters — preceded the Muscovite
period proper Yet the contributions which the Muscovite system itself made
to serfdom should not be underestimated The new pomestic agriculture
meant that bondage spread rapidly as lands with peasants were granted
by the tsar to his gentry servitors It is worth noting that serfdom prcdoml
nated in southern, southeastern and, in large part, western Russia, but not
X86 MUSCOVITE RUSSIA
in the huge northern territories which faced no enemy and needed no gentry
officers. The government continued to promote the interests of the gentry,
in particular by its efforts to limit or eliminate peasant transfer and to stop
peasant flights. While it is now generally agreed that no law directly estab-
lishing serfdom was ever issued, certain legislative acts contributed to that
end. In particular the government proclaimed forbidden years, that is, years
when the peasants could not move — or, more realistically, be moved by
those who paid their obligations — even around St. George’s day. We know,
for example, of such legislation in regard to many categories of peasants
in 1601 and 1602. Also, the government proceeded to lengthen the period
of time after which a fugitive serf could no longer be returned to his master:
from five years at the end of the sixteenth century to an indefinite term, as
we find it in the Ulozhenie of 1649. Further, in 1607 and other years/thc
state legislated penalties for harboring fugitive serfs; while the first census,
taken from 1550 to 1580, as well as later ones, also helped the growth of
serfdom by providing a record of peasant residence and by listing children
of serfs in the same category as their parents.
With the Ulozhenie of 1649, serfdom can be considered as fully estab-
lished in the Muscovite state. The new code disregarded the once important
distinction between old settlers and new peasants, considering as serfs all
tillers of soil on private holdings, and their progeny; it eliminated, as al-
ready indicated, any statute of limitations for fugitives; and it imposed heavy
penalties for harboring them. Although a few highly special exceptions
remained, the Ulozhenie in essence assumed the principle “once a serf al-
ways a serf” and gave full satisfaction to the gentry. Vladimirsky-Budanov
and others have argued convincingly that after 1 649 the government con-
tinued to consider the serfs its responsible subjects rather than merely gentry
property; nevertheless, in fact their position in relation to their masters
deteriorated rapidly, Their obligations undefined, the serfs were at the mercy
of the landlords who came to exercise increasing judicial and police au-
thority on their estates. By the end of the century, the buying, selling, and
willing of serfs had developed; that is, they were treated virtually as slaves.
Serfdom in Russia had a number of striking characteristics. It has been
observed that serfdom commenced and ended first in western Europe, and
that the time lag increases as we consider areas further east. Thus in Russia,
and also Poland, it appeared and disappeared last. Serfdom in Russia ap-
peared simultaneously with a centralized monarchy not with any kind of
feudalism. It resulted from two major factors: the old and growing eco-
nomic dependence of the peasant on the landlord, and the activity of the
Muscovite government in support of the gentry. Pre-revolutionary Russian
historians, with some notable exceptions, emphasized the first dement;
Soviet scholars have paid particular attention to the second, as has an
American specialist, Hellie, in a recent reconsideration of the issue.
ECONOMICS, SOCIETY, INSTITUTIONS 167
Lower classes in Muscovite Russia included slaves and state peasants
as well as serfs Slaves continued to play a significant role m large house-
holds and on large estates More people joined this category during the
disturbances and disasters ot the late sixteenth and early seventeenth ccn
times by selling themselves into slavery With the growth and final triumph
of serfdom the distinction between slaves and serfs became less and less
pronounced State peasants, that is peasants who owed their obligations
to the state rather than to a private landlord, constituted the bulk of the
population in the north and the northeast Although they were regulated
by the state, and although their obligations increased with the development
of the Muscovite tsardom their position was far superior to that of the serfs
The townspeople or middle classes consisted of merchants, subdivided
into several hierarchical groups, and artisans For reasons of fiscal control
trade was strictly regulated as to its location and nature In general, the
government levied the greater part of its taxes in the towns Also, the mer-
chants had to serve the tsar in state finance and state commerce The latter
included the monopoly ot foreign trade and of certain products sold at home,
such ns wine and tobacco, as well as the greatest single interest In the fur
trade and other interests As the Ulozhente of 1649 and other evidence
indicate, the merchants and artisans as well as the serfs and peasants, tended
to become a closed caste, with sons following the occupauon of their fathers
Landlords can be considered the upper class of Muscovite Russia They
ranged from extremely nch and influential bo jars to penniless servitors of
the tsar who frequently could not meet their service obligations Yet, as
already indicated with the growth of the pomcstic system and the uniform
extension and standardization of state service, differences diminished m
importance and the landlords gradually coalesced into a fairly homoge-
neous class of service gentry
The history of the mestmehestvo illustrates wen the peculiar adjustment
of ancient Russian pnneely and boyar families to Muscovite state service,
as well as the eventual discarding of the arrangements they cherished in
favor of uniformity, efficiency, and merit The mestmehestvo may be de-
scribed as the system of state appointments in which the position of a
given person hod to correspond to the standing of hvs family and to hi*
own place in the family, nobody who ranked lower on the mestmehestvo
scale could be appointed above him The resulting cumbcrsomcnttss, in
efficiency, and complication can easily be imagined For example, the sys
tem led to deplorable rigidity In the assignment of military commands A
Muscovite army consisted of five segments or regiments the big or mam
regiment, the right arm or wuig the left arm or wing the forward regiment
or advance guard and the security regiment or rear guard In the honor of
command, the main regiment came first, followed by the tight wing, the
advance guard and the rear guard which were considered equal, and finally
188 MUSCOVITE RUSSIA
the left wing- The refined calculations involved in awarding these appoint-
ments in accordance with the mestnichestvo had nothing to do with military
ability. Moreover, the system made it extremely difficult in any case for a
man of talent who did not belong to a leading aristocratic family to receive
an important command. True, the government proclaimed certain cam-
paigns exempt from the mestnichestvo, and on other occasions it kept high-
ranking but unintelligent boyars in Moscow “for advice,” while entrusting
the direction in the field to abler hands. But these measures proved to he
at best palliatives. The same encumbrance hindered the operation of the
state machine in civil matters.
The mestnichestvo dated formally from 1475, when boyar families in the
Muscovite service were entered into the state genealogical book and all ap-
pointments began to be listed in special registers which became indispensable
for subsequent assignments. The boyars valued their own and their families’
"honor” and “just position” extremely highly, all the more so because any
occasional downgrading would be added to the permanent record. The his-
tory of Muscovite government often resembled one long squabble among
boyars over “honor” and appointments, with some of them dramatically
determined to cat sitting on the floor, rather than at a position at the table
which they considered below their rank. Even Ivan the Terrible, who dealt
so violently with the boyars, failed to abrogate the mestnichestvo. It disap-
peared at last, as already mentioned, a full century later in 1682 to allow
greater simplicity and uniformity in the service and more reward for merit
in the interests of Muscovite absolutism and gentry.
Muscovite Institutions
Muscovite tsars developed the emphasis on autocracy that was begun by
Muscovite grand princes. They trutlifully claimed to be absolute rulers of
perhaps ten to fifteen million subjects. Yet they did not exercise their high
authority alone: the boyar duma persisted as their constant companion, and
a new important state institution, the zemskii sobor, appeared. Both the
boyar duma and the zemskii sobor deserve attention for a number of rea-
sons, not the least of which stems from their interesting and suggestive re-
semblances to Western institutions.
The boyar duma of die Muscovite tsars represented, of course,' a con-
tinuation of the boyar duma of the Muscovite grand princes. However, in
the conditions of a new age, it gradually underwent certain changes. Thus
although it still included the great boyars, an increasing portion of the
membership were less aristocratic people brought in by the tsar, a bureau-
cratic element so to speak. The duma membership grew, to cite Diakonovs
figures, from 30 under Boris Godunov to 59 under Alexis and 167 under
ECONOMICS, SOCIETY, INSTITUTIONS 1B9
Theodore Large size wintered with work in spite of the creation of venous
special committees The boyar duma met very frequently, usually daily, end
could be considered as continually in session It dealt with virtually every
kind of state business Kliuchcvsky and others have demonstrated convinc-
ingly that the boyar duma was essentially an advisory body and that it did
not limit autocracy Indeed service m the Muscovite boyar duma might 'veil
be regarded as one of the many obligations imposed by the state But. on
the other band, the ever-present boyar duma formed in effect on integral
part of the supreme authority of the land rather than merely a government
department or agency The celebrated Muscovite formula for state decisions,
“the sovereign directed and the boyars assented," reminds one strongly
of the English legal phrase * King in Council, * while the boyar duma itself
bears resemblance to royal councils in different European monarchies The
boyar duma assumed the directing authonly in the absence of the tsar from
Moscow or in ease of an interregnum, such as that which followed the
deposition of Basil Shuisky
The nature of the zemskic sobory and their relationship to the Muscovite
autocracy presene even more complicated problems than docs £fte boyar
duma Again, one should hear ui mind that Muscovite political practice
showed little evidence of the clear disjunctions of modern political theory
and that it was based on custom, not written constitutions The zemskie
sobory, as we had occasion to see earlier, were essentially sporadic gather-
ings convened by the tsar when he wanted to discuss and decide a particu-
larly important issue "with all the land" Fortunately for the students of
the zemskic sobory, they had much in common with certain Western institu-
tions and especially with the so-called Estates General In fact, their chief
characteristic, m the opinion of most scholars, consisted precisely in their
inclusion of at least three estates the elerjy, the boyars, and the gentry
servitors of the tsar These were usually supplemented by the townspeople
and, on at least one occasion, tn 1613, by the peasants The representation
was by estates Sometimes, as m the West, the estates would first meet
separately, for instance, in the boyar duma or a Church council, and after-
wards present their opinion to the entire zemshu sober The numbers of the
participants m the different zemskie sobory varied from about two hundred
to perhaps five hundred or more m 1613, with the service gentry invariably
strongly m evidence
The assembly of 1471, called by Ivan III before his campaign against
Novgorod, has usually been listed as a “forerunner" of the zemskic sobory
The first full-fledged zemskie sobory occurred in the reign of Ivan the
Terrible, in 1549, 1566, 1575, and possibily 1580, and dealt with such
important matters as the tsar’s program of reforms and the Livonian War
Immediately after Ivan the Ternble’s death, in 1584, another zemskit sober
confirmed his son Theodore as tsar, a step possibly suggested by the fact
190 MUSCOVITE RUSSIA
that Ivan the Terrible had left no testament and no formal law of succession
existed in Muscovite Russia. In 1598 a zemskii sobor offered the throne
to Boris Godunov. The celebrated zemskii sobor of 1613, which we dis-
cussed earlier, elected Michael Romanov and his successors to rule Russia,
As we know, at the time of Tsar Michael the zemskie sobory reached the
peak of their activity: they met almost continually during the first decade
of the reign; later, in 1632—34, 1636-37, and 1642, they convened to tackle
the issue of special taxes to continue war against Poland and the problem
of the Crimea, Azov, and relations with Turkey. In 1645 a zemskii sobor
confirmed Alexis’s accession to the throne, while during his reign one
zemskii sobor dealt with the Ulozhenie of 1649, another in 1650 with the
disturbances in Pskov, and still another in 1651-53 with the Ukrainian
problem. Many historians add to the list of zemskie sobory the gathering
or gatherings of 1681-82 connected with the abolition of the mestnichestvo
and the accession of a new ruler. Unknown zemskie sobory may yet be un-
covered; recently a Soviet historian claimed to have discovered one in 1575.
But, in any case, the zemskie sobory belonged clearly to Muscovite Russia,
and the period of their activity corresponded roughly to its chronological
boundaries. They found no place in Peter the Great’s reformed empire.
The key controversial issue in the literature on the zemskie sobory has
been the scope of their authority and their exact position in the Muscovite
order of things. Kliuchevsky and some other leading specialists have shown
that the zemskie sobory aided and supported the policies of the tsars, but
did not limit their power. The question of restricting the sovereign’s au-
thority never arose at their gatherings. Moreover, at least in the sixteenth
century, the members were appointed by the government rather than elected.
Although in the Time of Troubles, with the collapse of the central govern-
ment and an interregnum, the elective principle appeared and a zemskii
sobor emerged as the highest authority in the country, it proved only too
eager to liand over full power to a new tsar. In the seventeenth as in the
sixteenth century, membership in a zemskii sobor continued to represent
obligation and service to the sovereign, rather than rights or privileges
against the crown. At most the participants could state their grievances
and petition for redress; the monarch retained full power of decision and
action.
A different view of the situation has been emphasized by Tikhomirov
and other Soviet historians, as well as by certain Western scholars such as
Keep. They point out that the zemskie sobory, after all, dealt with most
important matters, and often dealt with them decisively: the succession to
the throne, war and peace, major financial measures. The most famous
zemskii sobor, that of 1613 which led Russia out of the Time of Troubles
and established the Romanov dynasty on the throne, deservedly received
great attention. It should also be noted that during a large part of Michael s
ECONOMICS, SOCIETY, INSTITUTIONS 191
reign no subsidy was levied or benevolence extorted without the consent
of zemskie sobory. thus they had a hand on the purse strings, if they did not
actually control state finances Many edicts earned the characteristic sen*
tencc "By ihe desire of the sovereign and all the land ” Agate, such epoch*
making decisions as the extension of the tsar's jurisdiction to the Ukraine
depended on the opinion of a zemsku sobor Besides particularly in the
seventeenth century, with the elective principle persisting after the Time
of Troubles and asserting itself in the composition of several of the zemskie
sobory, these assemblies acted by no means simply as rubber stamps for
the tsars For example, it has been argued that the Ulozhcnie of 1649
represented the decision and imitative of a zemskn sobor that it forced
on the government In fact, the argument proceeds, the tsars and their
advisers in the second half of the seventeenth century began to convene
the zemskie sobory less and less frequently precisely because of their possi-
ble threat to the position of the monarch. The ftticriion of tsarist absolutism
in Russia against the zemskie sobory corresponded to parallel developments
m a number of other European countries, such as F ranee, where the Estates
General did not meet between 1614 and 17S9. and England, where the
seventeenth century witnessed a great struggle between the Stuarts and Par-
liament But, whether the story of the zemskie sobory resembles its Western
counterparts only faintly or rather closely, the net result in Russian social
conditions consisted in arrested evolution otbest and in the continuing sway
of autocracy
The expansion of the Muscovite state brought with it centralization and
standardization, whether sudden or gradual First the Sudebniki of 1497
and 1550 and later the Ulozhente of 1649 became the law of the entire land
In the course of time uncounted legal peculiarities and local practices of
appanage Russia disappeared, as did such foreign imports As the so-called
Magdeburg Law, German in origin, that was granted to western Russian
towns by their Lithuanian and Polish rulers This interesting law — al-
though oligarchical m nature and often applied m a selective manner, for
instance, with discrimination against the Orthodox — had effectively sup-
ported the self-government of towns in Poland and Lithuania Autocracy
and legal and administrative centralization in Muscovite Russia were to help
immeasurably Peter tbe Great's far reaching reforms
The central administration of Muscovite Russia represented a rather
haphazard growth of different departments and bureaus In the seventeenth
century these agencies, which came to be known as the pnkazy — singular
prikaz — already numbered about fifty Many pnkazy developed ftont the
Simpler offices and functions at the court of Muscovite rulers, others, for
example the pnkaz dealing with the pomestna and the one concerned with
Siberia, reflected new activities or acquisitions of the state The authority
of a pnkaz extended over a certain type of affairs, such as foreign policy
192 MUSCOVITE RUSSIA
in the case of the ambassadorial prikaz; certain categories of people, such
as the slaves and the streltsy; or a certain area, such as Siberia and the
former khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan. Overlapping and confusion in-
creased with time, although some scholars see in the unwieldly Muscovite
arrangement the wise intention to maintain mutual supervision and checks.
Bureaucracy continued to proliferate on both the central and the local levels.
Local government constituted one of the weakest parts of the Muscovite
political system. The problem, of course, became enormous as the state grew
to gigantic size. As a ruler of Moscow acquired new territories, he sent his
representatives, the namestniki and volosteli, to administer them. The ap-
pointments, known as kormleniia, that is, feedings, were considered personal
awards as well as public acts. The officials exercised virtually full powers
and at the same time enriched themselves at the expense of the people, a
practice which could not be effectively stopped by customary and later
written restrictions on the amount of goods and services which the popula-
tion had to provide for its administrators.
However, as already mentioned, local self-government developed in the
sixteenth century, with earlier measures leading up to Ivan the Terrible's
legislation of 1555. In addition to the locally elected judicial and police
officials — the so-called gubnye officials — who were already functioning
to combat crime, the enactments of that year provided for local zemstvo
institutions concerned with finance, administration, and justice. Where the
population guaranteed a certain amount of dues to the treasury, locally-
elected town administrators — gorodovye prikazchiki — replaced centrally
appointed officials; and even where the latter remained, the population could
elect assessors to check closely on their activities and, indeed, impeach them
when necessary. Unfortunately, although both earlier historians and such
contemporary scholars as Nosov have shown the considerable development
and broad competence of the institutions of local self-government in six-
teenth-century Muscovy, these institutions did not last. After the Time of
Troubles self-government appeared no more, and the state relied mainly
on its military governors, the voevody. The failure of local self-government,
which was also to plague Peter the Great and his successors, points again
to a deficiency in social stratification, independence, initiative, and educa-
tion in old Russia.
The Eastward Expansion . Concluding Remarks
The expansion of the Muscovite state brought under the scepter of the
tsar not only ancient Russian lands but also colonial territories to the east
and southeast. The advance continued after the conquest of the khanates
of Kazan and Astrakhan. It has been estimated that between 1610 and 1640
194 MUSCOVITE RUSSIA
alone the Russian military line and colonists moved three hundred miles
further into the southern steppe, under conditions of continuous struggle
with the Crimean Tartars and other nomads. But the most spectacular ex-
pansion occurred in the direction of the more open cast, where, in the course
of the same three decades, the Russians advanced three thousand miles from
the Ob river to the Pacific, exploring and conquering, if not really settling,
gigantic Siberia.
In sweep and grandeur the Russian penetration into Siberia resembles
the exploration of Africa, or, to find a closer parallel, the American advance
westward. To mention a few highlights, in 1639 a cossack, Ivan Moskvi-
tianin, at the head of a small group of men, reached the Pacific. In 1648
Semen Dezhnev, another cossack, and his followers sailed in five boats, of
which three survived, from the mouth of the Kolyma river, around the
northeastern tip of Siberia, and through the strait that was later to be named
in honor of Bering. Dezhnev’s report, incidentally, attracted no attention
at the time and was rediscovered in a Siberian archive only in 1736. Other
remarkable explorations during the seventeenth century included expedi-
tions in the Amur river basin and the penetration of the Kamchatka pen-
insula in 1696 and the years immediately following. In the Amur area the
Russians finally reached and clashed with China. The settlement of Ner-
chinsk in 1689 established the boundary between the two countries along
the Argun and Gorbitsa rivers and the Stanovoi mountain range. This set-
tlement lasted until 1858.
Furs presented the main attraction in Siberia, where sable, ermine, beaver,
and other valuable fur-bearing animals abounded. It should be emphasized
that furs constituted an extremely important item in Muscovite finance and
foreign trade. In fact, as mentioned earlier, the government acted as the
principal dealer in furs. As Russian rule spread among the thinly scattered
natives in Siberia, they were required to pay the iasak, a tax in furs, to their
new sovereign. Also the central authorities expended great effort — need-
less to say, not always successful — to limit the private acquisition of furs
by the administrators in Siberia, so that the state treasury would not suffer.
In general, although precise calculation remains difficult, the annexation
of Siberia was a highly profitable undertaking for the Muscovite state.
The Siberian prikaz in Moscow bad charge of that enormous land. Its
jurisdiction, however, overlapped with the jurisdiction of several other
institutions, not the least of which was the Church, which established an
archbishopric in Siberia in 1621. The system, in typical Muscovite manner,
provided some mutual supervision and checks, which were especially impor-
tant in tills distant, primitive, and fantastically large territory. Still, both
the voevody and lesser administrators exercised great power and often
proved difficult to control from Moscow.
ECONOMICS, SOCIETY, INSTITUTIONS
195
As Lantzcff and others have demonstrated, the policy of the Muscovite
state m Siberia, as well as that of the Church, can be considered enlightened
The natives were not to be forcibly baptized. On the other hand, if they
became Orthodox, they were treated thenceforth as Russians — a condition
which, among other things, excused them from paying the iasak and thus
might have given the government second thoughts about the desirability
of conversion The government also tried to extend a paternalistic care to
both natives and Russian settlers and made an effort to learn and, if possi-
ble, to redress their grievances It encouraged colonists and tried from on
early tune to develop local agriculture, a perennially difficult problem in
Siberia But Moscow was vet) far away, whereas the local situation encour-
aged extreme exploitation and crueJty on the part of officials and other
Russians Often government edicts and instructions had little relation to
the harsh reality of Siberia Still, Siberian life was not all dark Of most
importance is the fact that, with very few gentry and endless spaces for the
fugitive, Siberia escaped serfdom As Siberian society developed, profiting
from an assimilation of natives — for intermarriage was common — as well
as from migration from European Russia, it came to represent a freer and
more democratic social system than the one across the Urals and to exhibit
certain qualities of sturdiness and independence often associated with the
American frontier
In concluding our brief survey of Muscovite government and society, it
may be appropriate to point out again the enormous effort which the crca-
bon and maintenance of the centralized Russian monarchy demanded In
fact, the mam tradition of pre-revolutionary Russian histonography placed
extremely heavy emphasis on the state* autocracy, gentry service, obliga-
tions and restrictions imposed on other classes, serfdom itself, as well as
other major characteristics of Muscovy, all fitted into the picture of a great
people mobilizing its resources to defend its existence and assert its inde-
pendence. Soviet historians, however, have shifted the focus of attention to
class interests and the class struggle, presenting the history of Muscovite
Russia above all in terms of a victory of the gentry over the peasants, not
of n national rally. Both interpretations have much to recommend them
XIX
MUSCOVITE RUSSIA: RELIGION AND CULTURE
The Emperor was seated upon an Imperiall Throne, with Pillars of
silver and gold, which stood 3 or 4 stepps high, an Imperiall Crovvjie
Upon his Head, his Scepter in his right hand and his Globe in his left.
And so he sate without any motion that I could perceave, till such
time as I had repeated all the King my Masters titles and his owne,
and given hint greeting in his Majesties name. And then he stood up,
and with a very gratious aspect, asked me how his Loving Brother
the King of England did, to which when I had made him Answer, he
sate downe agaync. Then the Lord Chancellor who stood upon a
strada close by me with a high furred Capp upon his head: told me
that the great Lord and Emperor of all Russia did very Lovingly re-
ccave that Present which stood all this while before the Emperor,
and likewise his Majesties Letters which I bad presented; then he
looke upon a Paper which he had in his hand and said with a loud
voycc: “Simon Digb y, The great Lord and Emperor of al! Russia
askes you how you do, and desires you to come necre unto him to
kiss his Hand.” The first stepp I made towards him upon the state:
there stood fourc Noble men in Cloth of silver Roabes, with Polates
in their hands advanced over me as if they would have knocked me
on the head; under which 1 went, and having stepped up one stepp
upon the Emperors throne, it was as much as I could do to rcache his
Hand, which when I had kissed, I retired unto the Place when 1 had
my first Posture. ... As I was to goc out of the roomc, 1 observed
betwixt 20ty and 30ty great Princes and Councellors of State, sitting
upon the left hand of the Emperor, who were all in long Roabes of
Cloth of gold, imbrodered with Pcarles and Precious Stones, and
high Capps either of Sables or Black Fo.xe about three quarters of a
yard high upon their heads. To them, at my going out of the Doom,
I bowed myself and they all rose up and putt of their Capps unto me.
SIMON DIGBY TO SIR JOHN COKE
O you Teachers of Christendom! Rome fell away long ago and lies
prostrate, and the Poles fell in the like ruin with her, being to the end
the enemies of the Christian. And among you orthodoxy is of mongrel
breed; and no wonder — if by the violence of the Turkish Mahound
you have become impotent, and henceforth it is you who should come
to us to learn. By the gift of God among us there is autocracy; till
the time of Nikon, the apostate, in our Russia under our pious princes
and tsars the orthodox faith was pure and undefiled, and in the Church
was no sedition.
AWAKUM (J. HARRISON’S AND H. MIRRLEES’S TRANSLATION)
Muscovy appeared strange to foreigners. Visitors from the West, such
as Guy de Miege. secretary to the embassy sent to Alexis by Charles II of
England, as well as many others, described it as something of a magic world:
weird, sumptuous, colorful, unlike anything they had ever seen, and utterly
barbarian. The church of St. Basil the Blessed, one might add, continues
196
RELIGION AND CULTURE 197
to produce a similar impression on many European and American visitors
Foreign emissaries noticed the rich costumes especially the furs, the sink-
ing grey beards the elaborate court ceremonial the lavish banquets and
the tremendous drinking They added however, that the state dinners, with
their endless courses proved deficient in plates and silver and that the wise
grey beards as a rule said nothing Of more importance were the funda-
mental characteristics of Muscovy that the visitors quickly discovered the
enormous power and authority of the tsar and the extreme centralization
which required that even insignificant matters be referred for decision to
high officials Other interesting facts were reported, however to sum up,
what they saw was an tntneate, cohesive and well-organized society, but
one which they found uncongenial and very odd Indeed we find references
to the effect that Turkey stood closer to the West than Muscovy and sincere
doubts as to whether the Muscovites were really Christians
The view of Muscovy as a strange world apart a view shared by foreign
travelers with such diverse later groups as the Slavophiles and certain Polish
historians contains some truth Muscovite Russia existed in relative isola
lion by contrast, for example with Kievan Russia Moreover, it developed
a distinctive culture bas»d on religion and ritualism and assumed a tone
of self righteousness and suspicion toward any outside influence This pc
culiar and parochial culture it must be added apparently had a great hold
on the people But the ease should not be overstated In reality the main
elements of Muscovite culture — religion language, law-, and others —
served as links to the outside world In terms of time too Muscovy repre
sented not simply a self-contained culture, but the transition from appanage
Russia to the Russian Empire And, after all it was the Muscovites them
selves, Jed by Rcter the Great, who transformed their country and culture
— the fairy land and at times the nightman: of Western travelers — into
one of the great states of modem Europe
Religion and Church The Schism
Religion occupied a central position in Muscovite Russia and reflected
the principal aspects and problems of Muscovite development the growth
and consolidation of the state, ritualism and conservatism, parochialism and
the belonging to a larger world, ignorant self satisfied pride and the rccog
mtion of the need for reform As already mentioned, the expansion and
strengthening of the Muscovite state found a parallel in the cvolunon of
the Church in Muscovy The Church councils of 1547, 1549, 1551, and
1554 strove to improve ecclesiastical organization and practices and ehmi
nate various abuses In 1547 twenty two Russians were canonized and in
1549 seventeen more The resulting consolidated national pantheon of
saints represented a religious counterpart to the political unification The
198 MUSCOVITE RUSSIA
Hundred-Chapter Council of 1551 dealt, as its name indicates, with many
matters in the life of the Church. The council of 1554 condemned certain
Russian heretics and heresies which had roots either in Protestantism or in
the teachings of the non-possessors. None of them, it might be noted, gained
popular support.
The rising stature of die Russian Church at a time when many other
Orthodox Churches, including the patriarchate of Constantinople itself, fell
under the sway of the Moslem Turks increased Muscovite confidence and
pride. References to the holy Russian land, to Holy Russia, date from the
second half of the sixteenth century. In 1589, as we know, Muscovy ob-
tained its own patriarch. Some later incumbents of this position, such as
Hermogen, Philaret, and Nikon, were to play different but major roles
in Russian history. The upgrading of numerous Muscovite sees after the
establishment of the patriarchate was followed by a further expansion of
the Church when the Ukraine, which included the ancient metropolitanate
of Kiev and several other dioceses, joined Moscow in 1654. It should be
added that the Church, especially the monasteries, enjoyed enormous wealth
in land and other possessions in spite of the repeated efforts of the govern-
ment to curb its holdings and particularly to prevent its encroachments on
the gentry.
Tile great split or schism in the seventeenth century — raskol in Russian
— revealed serious weaknesses in the apparently mighty and monolithic
Muscovite Church. Over a long period of lime, errors in translation from
the Greek and other mistakes had crept into some Muscovite religious texts
and rituals. Tsar Michael had already established a commission to study
the matter and make the necessary corrections. Some visiting Orthodox
dignitaries also urged reform. But in the face of general ignorance, inertia,
and opposition little was done until Nikon became patriarch in 1652. The
new head of the Church proceeded to act in his usual determined manner
which before long became a drastic manner. The reign of Tsar Alexis was
witnessing a religious and moral revival in the Church, ah effort to improve
the performance of the clergy and to attach a higher spiritual tone and
greater decorum to various ecclesiastical functions. Yet, once Nikon intro-
duced the issue of corrections, many leaders of this revival, such as Stephen
Vonifatiev, Ivan Neronov, and the celebrated Archpriest Avvakum, or
Habakkuk, turned against him. In 1653 they accused him of heresy.
To defeat the opposition, the patriarch proceeded to obtain the highest
possible authority and support for his reforms: in 1654 a Russian Church
council endorsed the verification of all religious texts; next, in response to
inquiries from the Russian Church, the patriarch of Constantinople called
a council that added its sanction to Nikon’s reforms; a monk was sent to
bring five hundred religious texts from Mount Atbos and the Orthodox
East, while many others arrived from the patriarchs of Antioch and Alex-
RFLICtON AND CULTURE 199
andna; a committee of learned Kievan monks and Greeks vras set up to do
the collating and correcting, another Russian Church council In 1656 also
supported Nikon’s undertaking Nikon widened the scope of the reform to
Include the ritual in addition to texts, introducing In particular the sign of
the cross in the Greek manner with three nilher than two fingers But the
patriarch’s opponents refused to accept all the high authorities brought to
bear against them and stood simply on the Muscovite precedent — to keep
cveiythmg as their fathers and grandfathers had it- They found encourage-
ment m Nikon’s break with the tsar in 1658 and in the Ineffectiveness of
the cleric who replaced him at the head of the Church To settle matters
once nnd for all, a Russian Church council was held in 1666 and another
Church council, attended by the patriarchs of Alexandria and Antioch, who
also represented those of Constantinople and Jerusalem, convened later
that year and continued in 1667, in Moscow. This great council, which
deposed Nikon for his bid for supreme political power, considered the issue
of his reforms, listened to the dissenters, and in the end completely endorsed
the changes The opponents had to submit or defy the Church openly.
It is remarkable that, although no dogmatic or doctrinal differences were
involved, priests and laymen in considerable numbers refused to obey cccle-
siasucal authorities, even though the latter received the full support of
the state The raskoJ began in earnest The Old Believers or Old Ritualists
— -staroxery or staroobnadtiy — . rejected the new sign of the cross, the
corrected spelling of the name of Jesus, the tripling Instead of the doubling
of the “Hallelujah," and other simitar emendations, and hence rejected the
Church Persecution of the Old Believers was soon widespread Avvakum
himself — whose stunning autobiography represents the greatest document
of Old Belief and one of the great documents of human faith — perished
at the stake in 1682 The Solovctskii Monastery m the far north had to be
captured by a siege that lasted from 1668 to 1676 Apocalyptic views pre-
vailed among the early Old Believers, who saw in the Church reform the
end of the world, and m Nikon the Antichrist It has been estimated that
between 1672 and 1691 over twenty thousand of them burned themsches
alive in thirty-seven known communal conflagrations
Yet, surprisingly, the Old Belief survived Reorganized in the eighteenth
century by a number of nble leaders, especially by' the Denisov brothers,
Andrew and Simeon, it claimed the allegiance of millions of Prussians up
to the Revolution of 1917 and after It exists today. With no canonical
foundation and no independent theology to speak of, the Old Belief divided
again and again, but u never disappeared. The mam cleavage came to he
between the popovtsy and the bespopov tsy. those who had priests and those
who had none. For, although the Otd Believers refused to change a utUc
in the texts or the least detail m the ntual, they soon found themselves with-
out p nests and thus without the liturgy, without most of the sacraments,
200 MUSCOVITE RUSSIA
and in general without the very core of traditional religious life: bishops
were required for elevation to the priesthood, and no bishops joined the Old
Belief. Some dissenters, the popovtsy, bent all their efforts to obtain priests
by every possible means, for instance, by enticing them away from the
established Church. The priestless, on the other hand, accepted the catas-
trophic logic of their situation and tried to organize their religious life along
different lines. It is from the priestless Old Believers that most Russian
sects derive. But all this takes us well beyond the Muscovite period of Rus-
sian history.
The raskol constituted the only major schism in the history of the Ortho-
dox Church in Russia. It was in an important sense the opposite of the
Reformation: in the West, Christians turned against their ecclesiastical
authorities because they wanted changes; in Russia believers revolted be-
cause they refused to accept even minor modifications of the traditional
religious usage. Many scholars have tried to explain the strange phenome-
non of the raskol. Thus Shchapov and numerous others have stressed the
social composition of the Old Believers and the social and economic rea-
sons for their rebellion. The dissenters were originally and continued to be
mostly well-established peasants and traders. Their action could, therefore,
be interpreted as a protest against gentry domination and the entire op-
pressive Muscovite system. More immediately, they reacted against the in-
creased ecclesiastical centralization under Nikon which led to the appoint-
ment of priests — formerly they had been elected in northern parishes —
and to the loss of parish autonomy and democracy. In addition to being
democrats — so certain historians have claimed — the Old Believers ex-
pressed the entrepreneurial and business acumen of the Russian people.
Over a period of time they made a remarkable record for themselves in
commerce. Some parallels have even been drawn with the Calvinists in
the West. As to the other side, the drive for reform has been ascribed, in
addition to the obvious reason, to the influence of the more learned Ukrain-
ian clergy, and to the desire of the Muscovite Church and state to adapt
their practices to include the Ukrainians and the White Russians, with a
further view, according to S. Zenkovsky, to a possible expansion to the
Balkans and Constantinople.
Even more rewarding as an explanation of the raskol has been the em-
phasis on the ritualism and formalism of Muscovite culture. The Old Be-
lievers were, characteristically. Great Russians, that is, Muscovite Russians
and not, for example, Ukrainians. To them the perfectly correct form and
the untainted tradition in religion could not be compromised. This, and
their arrogant but sincere belief in the superiority of the Muscovite Church
and its practices, go far to explain the rebellion. The reformers exhibited
a similar formalism. In spite of the advice of such high authorities as the
RELIGION AND CULTURE 201
patriarch of Constantinople Nikon and Ms followers refused to allow any
local practice or insignificant variation to remain thus on their part too
confusing the letter with the spirit As we have noted the Russian Church
had developed especially in the direction of re! gious ceremony ritualism
and formalism which for the believers served as a great unifying bond and
a tangible basis for thetr duly life ll has been estimated for instance that
the tsar often spent five hours or more a day m church Even visiting Ortho*
dox hierarchs complained of the length of Russian services The appearance
of the Old Belief us well as the excessively narrow and violent reaction to
it Indicated that m Muscovy religious content in certain respects Jagged
behind religious form The raskol can thus be considered a tribute to the
hold that Muscovite culture had on the people and as time made apparent
to its staying power It also marked the dead end of that culture
Miliukov and others have argued that because of the split the Russian
Church lost its most devoted and active members and in effect its vitality
those who had the courage of their convictions joined the Old Belief the
cowardly and the listless remained in the establishment Even if we allow
for the exaggeration implicit in this view and note further that many of the
most ignorant and fanatical must also have joined the dissenters the loss
remains great It certainly made it easier for Peter the Great to treat the
Church in a high handed manner
Muscovite Thought and Literature
In addition to the issue of the true faith the issue of the proper form of
government preoccupied certain Muscovite minds It concerned essentially
the nature and the new role of autocracy and discussion of k continued
the intellectual trend clearly observable in the reigns of Ivan III and Basil
III Such pub! cists as Ivan Perexvetov who wrote in the middle of the six
teenth century upheld the new power and authority of the tsar while the
events of the Time of Troubles provided variations on this theme of proper
government and seemed to offer to the Russians unwanted political expen
cncc The most famous debate on the subject took place between Ivan the
Terrible and Prince Andrew Kurbsky in two letters from the tsar and five
from the fugitive nobleman written between 1564 and 1579 The sover
eign s bntliant letters strike the reader by the sweep of their assertions and
their grandiose tone Ivan the Terrible bel c\ ed in the divine foundation
of autocracy, and he declared that even if he were a tyrant Kurbsky $ only
alternative as a Christian and a faithful subject remained patient suffer
mg The prince on his part proved to bo stronger in his criticism of the
tsar’s conduct and in personal invective than m political theory Yet hit
views too represented 3 system of belief they harked back to an earlier
202
muscovit:
USSIA
order of things, when no great gulf separated the ruler from his chief lieu-
tenants, and when an aristocrat enjoyed more freedom and more respect
than Ivan IV wanted to allow.
In foreign relations, as in domestic matters, Ivan the Terrible and other
tsars reiterated the glory of autocracy and demanded full respect for it.
They considered the Polish kings degraded because the latter had been put
on their throne by others, and thus could not be regarded as hereditary or
rooted rulers. They asked why Swedish monarchs treated their advisers as
companions. Or, to quote the frequently mentioned bitter letter of Ivan
the Terrible to Elizabeth of England, written in 1570: “We had thought
that you were sovereign in your slate and ruled yourself, and that you saw
to your sovereign honor and to the interests of the country. But it turns out
that in your land people rule besides you, and not only people, but trading
peasants. . .
Passing on to the subject of Muscovite literature as a whole, one should
note die development of the “chancellery language,” based on the Musco-
vite spoken idiom, in which official documents were written, and also the
gradual penetration of popular language into literature in place of the book-
ish Slavonic-Russian. Awakum’s autobiography, written in the racy spoken
idiom, was a milestone in Russian literature. Religious writings continued
and indeed flourished, especially in the seventeenth century. They included
hagiography and, in particular, menologia, that is calendars with the lives
of saints arranged under the dates of their respective feasts, the most im-
portant of which was compiled by Metropolitan Macarius. They also in-
cluded theological and polemical works, sermons, and other items. After the
Ukraine joined Muscovy, the more learned and less isolated Ukrainian
clerics began to play a leading role in a Russian literary revival.
The Domostroi, or “house manager,” constituted one of the most note-
worthy works of Muscovite Russia. Attributed to Sylvester and dating in
its original version from about 1556, it intends in sixty-three didactic chap-
ters to instruct the head of a Muscovite family and its other members how
properly to run their household and lead their lives. The Domostroi teach-
ings reflect the ritualism, piety, severity, and patriarchal nature of Musco-
vite society. Some commentators have noted in horror that the author, or
more likely authors, write in the same peremptory manner about the venera-
tion of the Holy Trinity and about the preservation of mushrooms. Possibly
the most often cited directive reads:
Punish your son in his youth, and he will give you a quiet old age, and
restfulness to your soul. Weaken not beating the boy, for he will not die
from your striking him with the rod, but will be in better health: for while
you strike his body, you save his soul from death. If you love your son,
punish him frequently, that you may rejoice later.
RELIGION AND CULTURE
203
If the Domostroi, with its remarkable ritualism, formalism, and emphasis
on the preservation of appearances, is considered by some to be a kind of
Muscovite summa, other events in literature, especial!) in the seventeenth
century, pointed in new directions Gradually the lay literature of the West
spread m Russia Coming through Poland, the Ukraine, the Balkans, and
sometimes more directly, the stories assumed a romantic, didactic, or satiri-
cal character and were usually full of adsenture, which the religious writ-
ings of ancient Russia as a rule lacked Often, through the vehicle of such
recurrent themes as the talcs of the seven wise men or of Tristan and Isolde,
the stones acquainted Muscovites with the world of knighthood courtly
love, and other concepts and practices unknown in the realm of the tsars
Soon, Russian talcs following Western models made their appearance for
instance, stones about Sawa Grudtsm who sold his soul to the devil, and
about the rogue Frol Skobcev Numbers of these tales cnjo)cd great popu-
larity
Syllabic versification also came from the West, from the Latin and Polish
languages, largely through the efforts of Simeon of Polotsk, who died in
1680 It remained the dominant form jn Russian poetry until the middle
of the eighteenth century After some productions of plays arranged by
private individuals, Tsar Alexis established a court theater in 1672 under
the direction of a German pastor, Johann Gregory Before long, a few
Russian pla>s ennehed the repertoire which was devoted primarily to bibli-
cal subjects
The traditional oral literature of the people continued to thrive through-
out the Muscovite period Tales and songs commemorated such significant
events as the capture of Kazan, the penetration into Siberia, or Stenka
Razrn’s rebellion The byliny retained their popularity Pilgnms and beg-
gars composed religious poems at venerated shrines The skomorokhi went
on entertaining the people, in spite of all prohibitions All in all it seems
quite unfair to characterize Muscovite culture as silent, as has sometimes
been done, all the more so because it is probable that many writings of the
period have been lost. On the other hand, Muscovite literary life does ap-
pear meager by companson with the riches of its contemporary West. Nor
did it measure up, m the opinion of specialists, to Muscovite architecture
and other arts
The Arts
In architecture, as well as in literature and m culture os a whole, no divide
rises between the appanage and the Muscovite periods of Russian history
Building in both wood and stone flounshed in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries As described earlier, wooden houses of the boyars and mansions
204
MUSCOVITE Russ:
of the rulers — the so-called khoromy — were remarkable conglomerations
of independent units which usually lacked symmetry but compensated for
it by the abundance and variety of parts. Outstanding examples of this
type of building included the khoromy of the Stroganovs in Sofvychegodsk
and the summer palace of the tsars in the village of Kolomenskoe near Mos-
cow. Furthermore, it was especially during the Muscovite age that the
principles of Russian wooden architecture, with its reliance on small in-
dependent structural units and its favorite geometric forms, found a rich
expression also in the stone medium, notably in churches.
The church of St. Basil the Blessed at one end of Red Square, outside
tile Kremlin wall, provides the most striking illustration of this wooden
type of construction in stone. Built in 1555-60 by two architects from
Pskov, Banna and Posnik, it has never ceased to dazzle visitors and to excite
the imagination. This church, known originally as the Cathedral of the
Intercession of the Virgin, consists in fact of nine separate churches on a
common foundation. All nine have the form of tall octagons — a narrower
octagon on top of a broader one in each case — and the central church,
around which the other eight are situated, is covered by a tent roof. Striking
and different cupolas further emphasize the variety and independence of
the parts of the church. Bright colors and abundant decorations contribute
their share to the powerful, if somewhat bizarre, impression. While the
church of St. Basil the Blessed and its predecessor, the church in the village
of Diakovo that consisted of five churches, seem strange and unsymmctric
to Western eyes, they succeed, in the opinion of many specialists, in combin-
ing their separate units into one magnificent whole.
In the Moscow Kremlin itself the construction went on, although the most
important work had already been done in the reigns of Ivan III and Basil
III. The Golden Gate arose in the first half of the seventeenth century, and
as late as 1670-90 towers in the Kremlin wall were topped with roofs,
usually in the Russian tent style, while within the walls palaces and churches
continued to grow. In addition to the kremlin in Moscow, the beautiful
kremlin of ancient Rostov, built mainly in the seventeenth century, and
parts of kremlins in a score of other Russian cities have come down to our
time.
In the second half of the seventeenth century the baroque style reached
Moscovy through the Ukraine and quickly gained popularity, developing
into the so-called Muscovite, or Naryshkin, baroque — the last name refer-
ring to the boyar family which sponsored it. It has been said that the Rus-
sians found baroque especially congenial because of their Jove of decora-
tion. The church built in 1693 in the village of Fili, now part of Moscow,
provides an interesting example of Russian baroque.
The great Russian tradition of icon painting continued daring the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries but then was effectively terminated. Two
RELIGION AND CULTURE
205
prominent new schools emerged the Stroganov school and the school of the
tsar's icon-painters The first, supported by the great merchant family of
the northeast, was acme approximately from 1550 to 1630 Its character-
istics included bright backgrounds, rich coiois, elaborate and minute design,
and a penchant for decorative elements and gold, for instance gold contours
In fact, the Stroganov icons tended to become miniatures, “'lovely and
highly precious objects, if no longer great works of art” in the words of one
critic Procopius Chinn, who later joined the tsar’s icon-painters and even
became Tsar Michael's favonle artist, was an outstanding member of the
Stroganov group
The tsar's icon-painters dominated the scene m the second half of the
seventeenth century They found patronage in the so-called Oruzheincua
Palata headed by an able and enlightened boyar, Bogdan Khitrovo The
Oruzheinaia Palata began early in the sixteenth century as an arsenal, but,
n> quote Voycc * It became successively a technical, scientific, pedagogical,
and art institute and contained shops and studios of icon and portrait paint-
ing, gold and silversmith work, keeping at the same time its original pur-
pose — the manufacture of arms" The tsar’s icon painters developed a
monumental style and reflected the influence of the West with Its knowledge
of perspective and anatomy Simon Ushakov, who lived approximately from
1626 to 1686. was the school’s celebrated master We can slit! admire his
skillful composition and precue execution in such icons as that of Chrut the
Ruler of the World pamted for the cathedral of the Novodevichu Convent
in Moscow
Although Russian icon painting mihe Muscovite period produced nota-
ble works and although its prestige and influence in the entire Orthodox
world then teached its height, the school of the tsar’s icon painters marked
the end of a long road Ushakov himself has been praised for his remarka-
ble ability to combine Byzantine and Western elements in his art, and the
same can be said more modestly of his companions Before long, the West
swept over the Hast Secular painting, including portrait painting, had
already become popular m Muscovite Russia After Peter the Great’s re-
forms, art m Russia, as well as all of Russian culture, joined the Western
world Icon painting, of course, continued to exist, and on a very large scale,
but as a craft rather than a highly creative and leading art
Fresco painting and illumination also prospered in Muscovy In fact, the
second half of the seventeenth century saw a great flowering of fresco paint-
ing, which centered in laroslavl and spread to other towns in the Volga area.
The gigantic scope and the fine quality of the work can best be studied
in two churches in laroslavl the church of the Prophet Elijah painted by
Guni Nikitin, Sila Savin, and their thirteen associates, and that of St John
the Baptist, where Dmitrii Grigoriev and fifteen other men pamted the
frescoes The frescoes in the last-named church, which were created in
206 MUSCOVITE RUSSIA
1694—95 and contain approximately 4,200 figures, represent the greatest
effort of its kind in the world. Illumination also flourished, as evidenced, for
instance, by the 1,269 miniatures — another 710 spaces remained blank
of the huge first volume of a sixteenth-century Russian chronicle of the
world. In Muscovite frescoes and miniatures, as in icons. Western influ-
ences became increasingly apparent. By the end of the seventeenth century
all ancient Russian graphic art was being rapidly replaced by the modem
art of the West. It might be added in passing that in many other highly-
skilled arts and crafts, such as carving, enamel, ceramics, and work with
jewelry and precious metals, Muscovite Russia also left a rich legacy.
Education
Education in pre-Petrine Russia remains a controversial subject. Esti-
mates of Muscovite enlightenment have ranged from an emphasis on well-
nigh total illiteracy and ignorance to assertions that there existed in the
realm of the tsars a widespread ability to read, write, and understand
Church teachings and practices. The highly skeptical views of Miliukov
and other critics appear on the whole rather convincing. Still, in this case,
as in so many others, one has to strive for a balanced judgment. The Mus-
covite culture that we have discussed in this chapter could not have existed
without some enlightenment. The enormous Muscovite state, and in par-
ticular its numerous bureaucracy, required, as a minimum, some education
of officials. More speculative, although not necessarily fantastic, is Vladi-
mirsky-Budanov’s suggestion that Muscovites, like later Old Believers, gen-
erally could read and had thorough knowledge of their religious books.
Finally, we do possess considerable direct evidence of education in Musco-
vite Russia.
Some education remained and developed in towns, in the many monas-
teries, and among the clergy generally. While much of it must have been of
an extremely elementary character, more advanced schools appeared in
the seventeenth century, especially after the acquisition of the Ukraine by
Muscovy. In Kiev in the Ukraine, which was more open to the West, and
where Orthodoxy had to defend itself against Catholicism, Metropolitan
Peter Mogila, or Mohila, founded an Academy modeled on Jesuit colleges
in 1631. In Moscow in 1648— 49, a boyar Theodore Rtlshchev built a
monastery and invited some thirty Kievan monks to teach Slavonic, Latin,
Greek, rhetoric, philosophy, and other disciplines. In 1666 Simeon of
Polotsk established a school where he taught Latin and the humanities.
After his death the school was re-established by his student, Sylvester
Medvedev. In 1683 a school that offered Greek was opened in conjunction
with a printing office and eventually contained up to two hundred and
thirty students. Later in the 1680’s the Medvedev and the printing press
RELIGION AND CULTURE 207
schools combined to form the Slavomc-Greck-Latm Academy, headed by
learned Greet monies, the Lichud brothers, Ioanflicius and So [rooms As
planned, the Academy was to protect the faith and to control knowledge
as well as disseminate it. While Kiev and Moscow dearly stood out as
centers of Russian enlightenment, some relatively advanced teaching also
went on in such places as the Holy Trtmty-St Sergius Monastery and the
cities of Novgorod and Kharkov.
The Muscovite school curriculum resembled closely, at corresponding
levels, that of medieval Europe In particular, it included almost no study
of science and technology Of the humanities, history fartd best. In the
sixteenth and, especially, the seventeenth centuries Russian textbooks in
such fields as anthmetic, history, and grammar, dictionaries, and even
elementary encyclopedias made their appearance, and toward the end of
the period Sylvester Medvedev compiled the first Russian bibliography
Western Influences The beginnings of Self-Criticism
Even if we make full allowance for Muscovite enlightenment, the fact
remains that in a great many ways Muscovy lagged behind the West Russia
experienced no Renaissance and no Reformation, and it took no part m
the maritime discoveries and the scientific and technological advances of
the early modem period Deficiencies became most apparent in war and
in such practical matters as medicine and mining They extended, however,
into virtually every field It should be noted that the Muscovite government
showed a continuous and increasing interest in the West and in the many
things that it had to offer Muscovite society too, in spite of all the parochial-
ism and prejudice, began gradually to learn from "the heretics "
Diplomacy constituted one obvious contact between the Muscovite
state and other European countries Although wc traced the highlights of
Russian foreign relations m preceding chapters, wc should note here that
these relations repeatedly included distant lands, such as England and
Holland, as well as neighbors like Poland and Sweden, and that they dealt
with many matters Tor m stance, an English merchant. Sir John Merrick,
helped to negotiate the Treaty of Stolbovo between Sweden and Russia
Or, less happily, after the execution of Charles J, Tsar Alexis restricted
English traders to Archangel, and he helped the king's son, later Charles
II, with money and gram. Diplomatic correspondence published by Konova-
lov in the Oxford Staxomc Papers illustrates well the variety of issues en-
compassed in Anglo-Russian relations
Many foreigners came to Muscovy and stayed The number continued to
increase after the first large influx in the reign of Ivan III. At the end of
the sixteenth century foreigners in Muscovite service could be counted in
hundreds, and even thousands if we include Poles, Lithuanians, and
Ukrainians, while the foreign section of the tsar’s army consisted of 2,500
men. The Time of Troubles reduced these numbers, but with the reign of
Michael the influx of foreigners resumed. In 1652 Tsar Alexis assigned
them a northeastern suburb of Moscow, the so-called Nemetskaia Sloboda
or German Suburb. Incidentally, the Russian word for German, nemets,
derived from the Russian for dumb, nemoi, came to mean all Europeans
except Slavs and Latins. A visitor in the sixteen-seventies estimated that
about eighteen thousand foreigners lived in Muscovy, mostly in the capital,
but also in Archangel and other commercial centers, and in mining areas.
The importance of the foreign community, in particular for the eco-
nomic development of the country, far exceeded its numbers. In addition to
handling Russia’s foreign trade, the newcomers began to establish a variety
of manufactures and industries. Sir John Merrick, already mentioned as a
diplomat, concentrated on producing hemp and tow. Andrew Vinius, a
Dutchman, organi2cd the industrial processing of iron ore and built the
first modern ironworks in Muscovy. A Swede established a glass factory
near Moscow. Others manufactured such items as gunpowder and paper.
Second-generation foreigners often proved particularly adept at advancing
both the economy of Russia and their own fortunes. Foreigners also acted
as military experts, physicians, and other specialists.
Slowly the Russians turned to Western ways. In addition to reading and
even writing secular stories, constructing baroque buildings, and painting
portraits, as indicated above, they began to eat salad and asparagus, to
snuff and smoke tobacco in spite of all the prohibitions, and to cultivate
roses. Western clothing gained in popularity; some audacious persons also
trimmed their hair and beards. In 1664 the postal service appeared, based
on a Western model. And in the reign of Tsar Theodore a proposal was ad-
vanced to deal with the poor “according to the new European manner,”
The stage was set for Peter the Great. In conclusion, however, it might be
added that the reformer’s wholesale condemnation of the existing order, al-
though highly unusual, also had certain precedents in the Muscovite past.
Not to mention the religious jeremiads, the secular writers often complained
that there was no justice in the land even when praising the Muscovite form
of government, as in the case of Peresvetov. More radical critics included
Prince Ivan Khvorostinin, who died in 1 625 and has been described as the
first Russian free-thinker, George Krizanic, and Gregory Kotoshikbin.
Krizanic, a Croatian and a Catholic priest, spent eighteen years in the
realm of the tsars, from 1659 to 1677, and wrote there some nine books
on religious, philosophical, linguistic, and political subjects. He combined
an extremely high regard for Russia as the natural leader and savior of
Slavdom with a sweeping condemnation of its glaring defects and, above
all, its abysmal ignorance. Krizanic’s writings were apparently known to
the Russian ruling circles. Kotoshikhin, an official in the foreign office,
RELIGION AND CULTURE
209
escaped to Sweden in 1664 after some personal trouble There — before
being executed in 1667 for the murder of his landlord — he wrote a sweep-
ing denunciation of his native land Kotoshikhin emphasized Muscovite
pnde, deceit, and, again, the isolation and ignorance of the people As
it turned out, the sjstcia that he condemned did not long outlast him.
Part V IMPERIAL RUSSIA
THE REIGN OF PETER THE GREAT, 1682-1725
Now trt academician now a hero
Now a sc'ifarcr now a carpenter
He with an atl-encompa<>sing soul
Was on the throne an eternal worker
pvsinctv
If we consider the matter thoroughly then in Justice we mu't be
called not Rusnans but Petrcnuins Russia should be called
Prtrovlo and wc Peltovians
KAVKRtN
Peter the Great’s reign began a new epoch in Russian history, known
variously as the Imperial Age because of the new designation of ruler and
land, the St Petersburg Era because of the new capital, or the All Rus-
sian Period because the state came to include more and more peoples
other than the Great Russians, that is the old Muscovites The epoch
lasted for approximately two centuries and ended abruptly in 1917 Al-
though the chronological boundaries of Imperial Russia are clearly marked
— by contrast, for instance, with those of appanage Russia — the begin-
ning of Peter the Great’s reign itself can be variously dated The reformer,
who died on February 8, 1725, attained supreme power in several stages,
and with reversals of fortune m 1682 as a boy of ten he was proclaimed
at first tsar and later that same year co-tsar with his elder half brother
Ivan, tn 1689 he, or rather his family and party, regained effective control
of the government, in 1694 Peter’s mother died and he started to rule in
fact as well as m name, finally m 1696 Ivan died, leaving Peter the only
and absolute sovereign of Muscovy Therefore, before turning to the cele-
brated reformer and his activities wc must consider a number of years
during which Peter s authority remained at best nominal
Human History from 1682 to 1694
Tsar Alexis had been married twice, to Mary Miloslavskaia front 1648
to 1669, and to Nathalie Naryshkina from 1671 until his death m 1676
He had thirteen children by his first wife, but of the sons only two,
Theodore and Han, both of them sickly, survived their father Peter, strong
and healthy, was bom on June 9, 1672, about a year after the tsar’s second
marriage, Theodore, as we know, succeeded Alexis and died without an
213
214 imperial Russia
heir in 1682. In the absence of a law of succession, the two boyar families
the Miloslavskys and Naryshkins, competed for the throne. The Narysh-
kins gained an early victory: supported by the patriarch, a majority in
the boyar duma, and a gathering of the gentry, peter was proclaimed tsar
in April 1682. Because of his youth, his mother became regent, while her
relatives and friends secured leading positions in the state. However, as
early as May, the Miloslavsky party, led by Alexis’s able and strong-willed
daughter Sophia, Peter’s half-sister, inspired a rebellion of the regiments of
the streltsy, or musketeers, concentrated in Moscow. Leading members of
the Naryshkin clique were murdered — Peter witnessed some of these mur-
ders — and the Miloslavskys seized power. At the request of the streltsy,
the boyar duma declared Ivan senior tsar, allowed Peter to be junior tsar,
and, a little later, made Sophia regent. It might be added that the streltsy,
strongly influenced by the Old Belief, proceeded to put more pressure on
the government and cause further trouble, but in vain: the new regent
managed to punish the leaders and control the regiments.
From 1682 to 1689 Sophia and her associates governed Muscovy, with
Ivan V incapable of ruling and Peter I, together with the entire Naryshkin
party, kept away from state affairs. Prince Basil Golitsyn, the regent’s
favorite, played a particularly important role. An enlightened and humane
person who spoke several foreign languages and arranged his own home
and life in the Western manner, Golitsyn cherished vast projects of im-
provement and reform including the abolition of serfdom and education
on a large scale. He did liberalize the Muscovite penal code, even if he
failed to implement his more ambitious schemes. Golitsyn’s greatest suc-
cess came in 1686 when Russia and Poland signed a treaty of “eternal
peace” that confirmed the Russian gains of the preceding decades, in-
cluding the acquisition of Kiev. Yet the same treaty set the stage for the
war against the Crimean Tartars, who were backed by Turkey. This war
proved disastrous to Muscovite arms. In 1687 and again in 1689 Golitsyn
led a Muscovite army into the steppe only to suffer heavy losses and defeat
as the lack of water and the huge distances exhausted his troops, while the
Tartars set the grass on fire. Golitsyn’s military fiasco, together with other
accumulating tensions, led to Sophia’s downfall.
As Peter grew older, his position as a tsar without authority became in-
creasingly invidious. Sophia, on her part, realized the insecurity of her
office and desired to become ruler in her own right. In 1689 Theodore
Shaklovity, appointed by Sophia to command the streltsy, apparently tried
to incite his troops to stage another coup, put the regent on the throne,
and destroy her opponents. Although the streltsy failed to act, a denoue-
ment resulted. Frightened by the report of a plot, Peter escaped in the dead
of night from the village of Preobrazhenskoe, near Moscow, where he had
216 IMPERIAL EUSSl*
been living, to the Holy Trinity-St. Sergius Monastery. In the critical days
that followed, the patriarch, many boyars and gentry, the military units
trained in the Western manner and commanded by General Patrick Gordon
and even several regiments of the Streltsy, rallied behind Peter. Many
others wavered, but did not back Sophia. In the end the sister capitulated
to the brother without a fight and was sent to live in a convent. Shaklovity
and two of his aides were executed; several other officers and boyars, in-
cluding Basil Golitsyn, suffered exile. Thus, in August 1689, Peter won
acknowledgment as the effective ruler of Russia, although Ivan retained
his position as co-tsar. Still, at seventeen, Peter showed no desire to take
personal charge of affairs. Instead the government fell into the hands of his
mother Nathalie and her associates, notably her brother, the boyar Leo
Naryshkin, Patriarch Joachim, and, after his death in 1690, Patriarch
Hadrian, The years 1689-94 witnessed the last flowering of Muscovite
religiosity, ritualism, parochialism, and suspicion of everything foreign —
it was even forbidden to train troops in the Western manner. But in 1694
Nathalie died, and Peter I finally assumed the direction of the state at the
age of twenty-two.
Peter the Great: His Character , Childhood, and Youth
The impression that Peter I commonly made on his contemporaries
was one of enormous strength and energy. Almost seven feet tall and
powerfully built, the tsar possessed astonishing physical strength and vigor.
Moreover, he appeared to be in a constant state of restless activity, taking
on himself tasks normally done by several men. Few Russians could keep
up with their monarch in his many occupations. Indeed, as he walked with
rapid giant strides, they had to run even to continue conversation. In addi-
tion to his extraordinary physical attributes, Peter I exhibited some remark-
able qualities of mind and character. The tsar had an insatiable intellectual
curiosity coupled with an amazing ability to learn. He proceeded to par-
ticipate personally in all kinds of state affairs, technical and special as well
as general, becoming deeply involved in diplomacy, administration, justice,
finance, commerce, industry, education, and practically everything else be-
sides. In his reforms the tsar invariably valued expert advice, but he was
also generally independent in thought and did not hesitate to adapt proj-
ects to circumstances. Peter I also developed into an accomplished mili-
tary and naval commander. He studied the professions of soldier and sailor
from the bottom up, serving first in the ranks and learning the use of each
weapon before promoting himself to his first post as an officer. The monarch
attained the rank of full general after the victory of Poltava and of full
admiral after the successful conclusion of the Great Northern War. In
PETER THE GREAT
217
addition, the sovereign found time to leam some twenty different trades
and prided himself on hu ability to make almost anything, from a ship
to a pair of shoes With his own hands he pulled the teeth of his courtiers
and cut off their beards Characteristically, he warned ta be everywhere
and see everything for himself, traveling indcfatigably around his vast
state as no Muscovite monarch had ever done In a still more unprecedented
manner he went twice to the West to learn, in 1697-98 and m 1717 peter
I s mind can best be described as active and practical, able quickly to
grasp problems and devise solutions if not to construct theories
As to character, the tsar impressed those around him by his energy,
unbending will, determination, and dedication He recovered quickly from
even the worst defeats and considered every obstacle as an invitation to
further exertion and achievement Less attractive, but at times equally im-
posing, traits included a violent temper, crudeness, and frequent cruelty
The sovereign could be an executioner as well as a dentist, and his
drunken, amorous, and blasphemous pastimes exceeded the measure of
the tough times m which he lived Yet Peter the Great must not be confused
Will Ivan the Testable, whom be, uvadsntalty, witamtd The tefertWM
never lost himself in the paranoid world of mcgalomann and delusions of
persecution and he even refused to identify himself with the state To
mention one significant detail, when reforming the army, Peter 1 crossed
out * the interests of His Tsanst Majesty as the object of military devotion
and substituted “the interests of the state ” Consistently he made every ef-
fort to serve his country, to bring to it change and enlightenment As the
sovereign wrote in the last month of his life, in connection with dispatching
Vitus Benngs first expedition Having ensured the security of the state
against the enemy, it is requisite to endeavor to win glory for it by means
of the arts and sciences " Or, to support Peter the Great s emphasis on
education with another quotation — and one especially appropriate w a
textbook — * For learning is good and fundamental, and as it were the
root, the seed, and first principle of all that is good and useful in church and
state ”
Although a precocious child, Peter received no system atic education,
barely being taught to read and write Instead, from a very early age he
began to pick things up on his own and pursue a variety of interests He
devoted himself m particular to v/ar games with a mixed assortment of
playmates These games, surprisingly enough, developed over a period
of years into a serious military undertaking and resulted in the formation of
the first two regiments of the guards, the PrcobrazJienskii — ■ for Peter lived
in the village of Prcobraihenskoe — and the Semenov skh named after
a nearby village Similarly, the joung tsar showed an early interest in the
navy At first he built small vessels, but as early as 1694 he established a
218
IMPERIAL It US S I,
dockyard in Archangel and constructed a large ship there all by himself.
For information and instruction Peter went to the foreign quarter in Mbs-
cow. There he learned from a variety of specialists what he wanted to
know most about military and naval matters, geometry and the erection
of fortifications. There too, in a busy, informal, and unrestrained atmos-
phere, the tsar apparently felt much more at ease than in the conservative
tradition-bound palace environment, which he never accepted as his own.
The smoking, drinking, love-making, rough good humor, and conglomera-
tion of tongues, first discovered in the foreign quarter in Moscow, became
an enduring part of Peter the Great’s life. The determined attempt of
Peter’s mother to make him mend his ways by marrying him to Budoxia
Lopukhina in 1689 failed completely to accomplish the desired purpose.
Peter's Assistants
After Peter took over the conduct of state affairs and began to reform
Muscovy, he found few collaborators. His own family, the court circles,
and the boyar duma overwhelmingly opposed change. Because he dis-
covered little support at the top of the state structure, and also because
he never attached much importance to origin or rank, the sovereign pro-
ceeded to obtain assistants wherever possible. Before long an extremely
mixed but on the whole able group emerged. To quote Kliuchevsky’s
colorful summary:
Peter gathered the necessary men everywhere, without worrying about
rank and origin, and they came to him from different directions and all
possible conditions: one arrived as a cabin-boy on a Portuguese ship, as
was the case of the chief of police of the new capital, de Viere; another
had shepherded swine in Lithuania, as it was rumored about the first
Procurator-General of the Senate, laguzhinsky; a third had worked as a
clerk in a small store, as in the instance of Vice-Chancellor Shafirov; a
fourth had been a Russian house serf, as in the case of the Vice-Governor
of Archangel, the inventor of stamped paper, Kurbatov; a fifth, i.e., (Her-
mann, was a son of a Westphalian pastor. And all these men, together with
Prince Menshikov, who, the story went, had once sold pies in the streets
of Moscow, met in Peter's society with the remnants of the Russian boyar
nobility.
Among foreigners, the tsar had the valuable aid of some of his old
friends, such as Patrick Gordon and the Swiss, Francis Lefort, who played
a prominent role until his early death in 1699. Later such able new-
comers from Germany as the diplomat, Andrew Ostermann, and the mili-
tary expert, Burkhard Munnich, joined the sovereign’s entourage. Some
of his numerous foreign assistants, for example, the Scot James Bruce
PETER THE OR E AT
219
who helped with the artillery, mining, the navy and other matters, had been
bom in Russia and belonged to the second generation of foreign settlers
in Muscovy
Russian assistants to Peter ranged over the entire social gamut. Alex-
ander Menshikov, Paul faguzhmshy, Peter Shafirov, and Alexis Kurbatov,
among others, came from the lower classes A large group belonged to the
service gentry, or whom only two examples are the chief admiral of the
reign, Theodore Apraksin, and Chancellor Gabriel Golovkin Even old
aristocratic families contributed a number of important figures, such as
Field Marshal Count Boris Shcrerrctev and Senator Prince Jacob Do?-
goruky The Church too, although generally opposed to reform, supplied
some able clerics who furthered the work of Peter the Great, The place
of honor among them belongs to Archbishop Tlicophanes, or Feofan,
Prokopovich, who, like many other promoters of change in Russia, came
from the Ukraine Of all the "fledglings of Peter’s nest" — to use Pushkin's
expression — Menshikov acquired the greatest prominence and power. This
son of a corporal or groom, who reportedly was once a pic vendor, came
closest to being the sovereign’s alter ego and participating in the enure range
of his activity Begmntng as the boy tsar’s orderly in the Prcobrazhcnskit
regiment, Menshikov rose to be Generalissimo, Prince in Russia, and
Prince of the Holy Roman Empire, to mention only his most outstanding
titles. Vain and thoroughly corrupt, as welt as able and energetic, he con-
stituted a permanent target for investigations and court proceedings and
repeatedly suffered summary punishment from Peter the Great’s cudgel,
but somehow managed to maintain his position
The First Years oj Peter's Rule
War ag3inst Turkey was the first major action of Peter I after he took
the government of Russia into his own hands in 1694, following the death
of his mother. In fighting Turkey, the protector of the Crimean Tartars
and the power controlling the Black Sea and its southern Russian shore,
the new monarch followed m the steps of his predecessors. However, be-
fore long it became apparent that he managed Vns affairs differently. The
war began in 1695, and the first Russian campaign against A 2 ov failed:
supplied by sea, the fortress remained impregnable to the Muscovite army
Then, in one winter, the tsar built a fleet in Voronezh on the Don river
He worked indefatigably himsetf, as well as ordering and urging others,
and utilized to the best advantage the knowledge of all available foreign
specialists along with his own previously acquired knowledge. By dis-
playing his tremendous energy everywhere, Peter the Great brought thirty
sea-going vessels and about n thousand transport barges to Azov in May
220 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
1696. Some of the Russian fleet, it might be noted, had been built as far
away as Moscow and assembled in Voronezh. This time besieged by sea
as well as by land, the Turks surrendered Azov in July.
With a view toward a further struggle against Turkey and a continuing
augmentation and modernization of the Russian armed forces, the tsar
next sent fifty young men to study, above all shipbuilding and navigation, in
Holland, Italy, and England. Peter dispatched groups of Russians to study
abroad several more times in his reign. After the students returned, the
sovereign often examined them personally. In addition to experts, the tsar
needed allies to prosecute war against Turkey. The desire to form a
mighty coalition against the Ottoman Empire, and an intense interest in
the West, prompted Peter to organize a large embassy to visit a number
of European countries and — a most unusual act for a Muscovite ruler
to travel with the embassy.
Headed by Lefort, the party of about 250 men set out in March 1697.
The sovereign journeyed incognito under the name of Peter Mikhailov.
His identity, however, remained no secret to the rulers and officials of
the countries he visited or to the crowds which frequently gathered around
him. The tsar engaged in a number of important talks on diplomatic and
other state matters. But, above all, he tried to learn as much as possible
from the West. He seemed most concerned with navigation, but he also
tried to absorb other technical skills and crafts, together with the ways
and manners and, in fact, the entire life of Europe as he saw it. As the
so-called Grand Embassy progressed across the continent and as Peter
Mikhailov also took trips of his own, most notably to the British Isles, he
obtained some first-hand knowledge of the Baltic provinces of Sweden,
Prussia, and certain other German states, and of Holland, England, and
the Hapsburg Empire, From Vienna the tsar intended to go to Italy, but
instead he rushed back to Moscow at news of a rebellion of the Streltsy.
Altogether Peter the Great spent eighteen months abroad in 1697-98. At
that time over 750 foreigners, especially Dutchmen, were recruited to
serve in Russia. Again in 1702 and at other limes, the tsar invited Euro-
peans of every nationality — except Jews, whom he considered parasitic
— to come to his realm, promising to subsidize passage, provide advan-
tageous employment, and assure religious tolerance and separate law
courts.
The Streltsy had already caused trouble to Peter and suffered punishment
on the eve of the tsar's journey to the West — in fact delaying the journey.
Although the new conspiracy that was aimed at deposing Peter and putting
Sophia in power had been effectively dealt with before the sovereign’s re-
turn, the tsar acted with exceptional violence and severity. After investi-
gation and torture more than a thousand streltsy were executed, and tlieir
mangled bodies were exposed to the public as a salutary lesson. Sophia
PLTLR t lit CRI.AT
221
was forced to become a nun, and the same fate befell Peter s wife, Eudoxia,
who had sympathized with the rebels
If the gruesome death of the Streltsy symbolized the destruction of the
old order, many signs indicated the coming of the new After he returned
from the West, the tsar began to demand that beards be cut and foreign
dress be worn by courtiers, officials, and the military. With the beginning
of the new century, the sovereign changed the Russian calendar hence-
forth years were to be counted from the birth of Christ, not the creation
of the world, and they were to commence on the first of January, not the
first of September More important, Peter the Great rapidly proceeded to
reorganize his army according to the Western pattern
The Great Northern IVar
The Grand Embassy failed to further Peter the Great’s designs against
Turkey But, although European powers proved unresponsive to the
proposal of a major war with the Ottomans, other political opportunities
emerged Before long Peter joined the military alliance against Sweden
organized by Augustus II, ruler of Saxony and Poland Augustus II, in
turn, had been influenced by Johann Remhold Patkul, an dmigrd Livonian
nobleman who bore a personal grudge against the Swedish crown The
interests of the allies, Denmark, Russia, and Poland-Saxony — although,
to be exact, Saxony began the war without Poland — clashed with those
of Sweden, which after its extremely successful participation m the Thirty
Years' War had acquired a dominant position on the Baltic and in the
Baltic area The time to strike appeared npe, for Charles XII, a mere youth
of fifteen, had ascended the Swedish throne in 1697 While Peter I con-
centrated on concluding the long-drawn-out peace negotiations with Tur-
key, Augustus II declared war on Sweden in January 1700, and several
months later Denmark followed his example On July 14 the Russo-
Turkish treaty was finally signed m Constantinople the Russians ob-
tained AZOV and Taganrog as well as the right to maintain a resident min-
ister in Turkey On August 19, ten days after Peter the Great learned of
the conclusion of the treaty with the Porte and the day after he officially
announced it, he declared war on Sweden Thus Russia entered what came
to be known as the Great Northern War
Immediately the Russians found themselves in a much more difficult
situation than they had expected Charles XII turned out to be something
of a military genius With utmost daring he crossed the straits and earned
the fight to the heart of Denmark, quickly forcing the Danes to surrender
Unknown to Peter, the peace treaty of Travendat marking the Danish de-
feat and abandonment of the struggle was concluded on the very day on
which Russia entered the war Having disposed of Denmark, the Swedish
king- promptly alia eked the new enemy Transporting his troops across the
222
IMPERIAL SU;
Baltic to Livonia, on November 30, 1700, he suddenly assaulted the main
Russian army that was besieging the fortress of Narva. In spite of the very
heavy numerical odds against them the Swedes routed the Russian forces
killing or capturing some ten thousand troops and forcing the remaining
thirty thousand to abandon their artillery and retreat in haste. The pris-
oners included ten generals and dozens of officers. In the words of a
recent historian summarizing the Russian performance at Narva; “The
old-fashioned cavalry and irregulars took to flight without fighting. The
new infantry levies proved ‘nothing more than undisciplined militia,’ the
foreign officers incompetent and unreliable. Only the two guards and one
other foot regiment showed up well.”
It was believed by some at the time and has been argued by others since
that after Narva Charles XII should have concentrated on knocking Rus-
sia out of the war and that by acting in a prompt and determined manner
he could have accomplished this purpose. Instead, the Swedish king for
years underestimated and neglected his Muscovite opponent. After lifting
the Saxon siege of Riga in the summer of 1701, he transferred the main
hostilities to Poland, considering Augustus II his most dangerous enemy.
Again Swedish arms achieved notable successes, but for about six years
they could not force a decision. In the meantime, Peter made utmost use
of the respite he received. Acting with his characteristic energy, the tsar
had a new army and artillery ready within a year after the debacle of
Narva. Conscription, administration, finance, and everything else had to
be strained to the limit and adapted to the demands of war, but the
sovereign did not swerve from his set purpose. The melting of church bells
to make cannons has remained an abiding symbol of that enormous war
effort.
Peter I used his reconstructed military forces in two ways: he sent help
to Augustus II, and he began a systematic advance in Livonia and Estonia,
which Charles XII had left with little protection. Already in 1701 and
1702 Sheremetev at the head of a large army devastated these provinces,
twice defeating weak Swedish forces, and the Russians began to establish
themselves firmly on the Gulf of Finland. The year 1703 marked the found-
ing of St. Petersburg near the mouth of the Neva. The following y eat
Peter the Great built the island fortress of Kronstadt to protect his future
capital, while the Russian troops captured the ancient city of Dorpat, or
luriev, in Estonia and the stronghold of Narva itself. The tsar rapidly
constructed a navy on the Baltic, his southern fleet being useless in the
northern war, and the new ships participated effectively in amphibious
and naval operations.
But time finally ran out for Augustus II. Brought to bay in his own
Saxony, he had to sign the Treaty of Altranstadt with Charles XII in late
September, 1706: by its terms Augustus II abdicated the Polish crown in
PETER THE QREAT
223
fa' or of pro-Swedish Stanislav. Leszczvnski and of course, withdrew from
the war Peter the Great was thus left alone to face one of the most feared
armies and one of the most successful generals of Europe Patkul in
cidentally, Was handed over to the Swedes by Augustus II and executed
The Swedish king began his decisive campaign against Russia in January
1703, crossing the Vistula with a force of almost fifty thousand men and
advancing in the direction of Moscow
Peter l's position was further endangered by the need to suppress re-
bellions provoked both by the exactions of the Russian government and by
opposition to the tsar's reforms In the summer of 1705 a monk and one
of the Streltsy started a successful uprising in Astrakhan aimed against the
upper classes and the foreign influence It was even rumored m Astrakhan
that all Russian girls would be forced to wed Germans, a threat which
led to the hasty conclusion of many marriages The town was recaptured
by Shercmuev only m March 1706, after bitter fighting In 1707 Conrad
Bulavin, a leader of the Don cossacks, led a mayor rebellion in the Don
area Provoked by the governments determination to hunt down fugitives
and also influenced by the Old Belief, Bulavin's movement followed ihe
pattern of the great social uprisings of the past At its height, the rebellion
spread over a large area of southern Russi3, including dozens of towns,
and the rebel army numbered perhaps as many as one hundred thousand
men As usual in such uprisings however, this huge force lacked organiza-
tion and discipline Government troops managed to defeat the rebels de-
cisively a year or so before the war with Sweden reached its climax in the
summer of 1709 Still another rebellion, that of the Turkic Bashkirs who
opposed the Russian disruption of their way of life as well as the heavy
exactions of the state erupted m the middle Volga area in 1 705 and was
not finally put down until 1711
Some historians believe that Charles XII would have won the war had
he pressed his offensive m 1708 against Moscow Instead he swerved south
and entered the Ukraine The Swedish king wanted to rest and strengthen
his army in a rich land untouched by the fighting before resuming the
offensive, and he counted heavily on Hetman Ivan Mazepa who had
secretly turned against his sovereign His calculations fail-d Mazepa could
bring only some two thousand cossacks to the Swedish side — with a
few thousand more joining later — while a general lack of sympathy for
the Swedes together with Menshikov s energetic and rapid countermeasures
assured the loyalty of the Ukraine to Peter the Great Also, Charles XII s
move south made it easier for 3 Russian force led by the tsar to intercept
and smash Swedish reinforcements of fifteen thousand men on October 9,
1708, at Lesnaia What ts more, at Lesnaia the Russians captured the
huge supply tram which was being brought to Charles Largely isolated
from the people, far from home bases, short of supplies, and unable to
224 IMPBRIAL RUSSIA
advance their cause militarily or diplomatically, the Swedish army spent a
dismal, cold winter in 1708-09 in the Ukraine. Yet Charles XII would
not retreat. The hour of decision struck in the middle of the following sum-
mer when the main Russian army finally came to the rescue of the small
fortress of Poltava besieged by the Swedes, and the enemies met in the
open field.
The Swedish army was destroyed on July 8, 1709, In the battle of
Poltava. The Swedes, numbering only from 22,000 to 28,000 as against
over 40,000 Russians, and vastly inferior in artillery, put up a tremendous
fight before their lines broke. Most of them, including the generals, eventu-
ally surrendered either on the field or several days later near the Dnieper
which they could not cross. Charles XII and Mazepa did escape to Turkish
territory. Whereas in retrospect the outcome of Poltava occasions no sur-
prise, it bears remembering that a few years earlier the Swedes had won
at Narva against much greater odds and that Charles XII had acquired
a reputation as an invincible commander. But, in contrast to the debacle
at Narva, Russian generalship, discipline, fighting spirit, and efficiency all
splendidly passed the test of Poltava. Peter the Great, who had himself led
his men in the thick of battle and been lucky to survive the day, appreciated
to the full the importance of the outcome. And indeed he had excellent rea-
sons to celebrate the victory and to thank his captive Swedish “teachers” for
their most useful “lessons.”
Yet not long after Poltava the fortunes of Peter I and his state reached
perhaps their lowest point. Instigated by France, as well as by Charles XII,
Turkey, which had so far abstained from participation in the hostilities,
declared war on Russia in 1710. Peter acted rashly, underestimating the
enemy and relying heavily on the problematical support of the vassal
Ottoman principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia and of Christian sub-
jects of the sultan elsewhere, notably in Serbia and Montenegro. In July
1711, the tsar found himself at the head of an inadequate army in need
of ammunition and supplies and surrounded by vastly superior Turkish
forces near the Prulh river. Argument persists to this day as to why the
Turks did not make more of their overwhelming advantage. Suggested
answers have ranged from the weariness and losses of the Turkish troops
to skillful Russian diplomacy and even bribery. In any case Peter the
Great signed a peace treaty, according to which he abandoned his southern
fleet, returned Azov and other gains of 1700 to the Turks, promised not
to intervene in Poland, and guaranteed to Charles XII safe passage to
Sweden. But, at the price of renouncing acquisitions to the south, he was
enabled to extricate himself from a catastrophic situation and retain a domi-
nant hand in the Great Northern War.
That war, decided in effect in 1709, dragged on for many more years.
After Poltava, the tsar transferred his main effort to the Baltic, seizing
PETER THE OR EAT
225
Viborg — or Vnputi — Riga, and Reval in 1710 St. Petersburg could
be considered secure at last The debacle of Charles XII in the Ukraine
led to a revival of the coalition against him Saxony, Poland, Denmark,
Prussia, and Hanover joined Russia against Sweden In new circum-
stances, Peter the Great developed hts military operations along two
chief lines Russian troops helped the allies in their campaigns on the
southern shore of the Baltic, while other forces continued the advance in
the eastern Baluc area Thus in 1713—14 the tsar occupied most of Fin-
land The new Russian navy became ever more active, scoring a victory
under Peter’s direct command over the Swedish fleet oil HangS m 1714
It may be worth noting that the sudden nse of Russia came as something
of a shock to other European countries, straining relations, for example,
between Great Britain and Russia It also led to considerable fear and wor-
ried speculations about the intentions and future steps of the northern
giant, this was reflected later in such forgeries as the purported testament of
Peter the Great which expressed his, and Russia s, aim to conquer the
world In 1717 the tsar traveled to Pans, and, although he failed to obtain
any diplomatic results beyond the French promise not to help Sweden,
once more he saw and learned much In December 1718, Charles XII
was killed in a minor military engagement in Norway His sister Ulrika
Eleonora and later her husband Frederick 1 succeeded to the Swedish
throne Unable to reverse the course of the war and, indeed, increasingly
threatened, for Peter the Great proceeded to send expeditions into Sweden
proper m 1719-21, the Swedes finally admitted defeat and made peace In
1720-21, by the Treaties of Stockholm, Frederick I reached settlements
with Saxony, Poland, Denmark, Prussia, and Hanover, abandoning some
islands and territory south o! the Blluc, mostly in favor of Prussia And
on August 30, 1721, Sweden concluded the Treaty of Nystadt with Rus-
sia.
By the provisions of the Treaty of Nystadt Russia acquired Livonia,
Estonia, Jngermanland part of Karelia, and certain islands, although it
returned the bulk of Finland and paid two million nx dollars In effect it
obtained the so-called Baltic provinces which were to become, after the
Treaty of Versailles, the independent states of Estonia and Latvia and arc
at present the corresponding Soviet Socialist Republics, and also obtained
southeastern Finnish borderlands located strategically nett to St Peters
burg and the Gulf of Finland The capture and retention of the fortress of
Viborg in particular gave Russia virtual control of the Gulf At a solemn
celebration of the peace settlement the Senate prevailed upon Peter I to
accept the titles of ‘ Great,” ■'Father of the ratherland,” and * Emperor’
In this manner Russia formally became an empire and one can say that the
imperial period of Russian history was officially inaugurated, even though
some European powers took their tunc tn recognizing the new title of the
226
M P E
rial Russia
Russian ruler: only Prussia and the Netherlands did so immediately,
Sweden in 1723, Austria and Great Britain in 1742, France and Spain as
late as 1745.
In modern European history the Great Northern War was one of the
important wars and Poltava one of the decisive battles. The Russian vic-
tory over Sweden and the resulting Treaty of Nystadt meant that Russia
became firmly established on the Baltic, acquiring its essential “window
into Europe,” and that in fact it replaced Sweden as the dominant power
in the north of the continent. Moreover, Russia not only humiliated
Sweden but also won a preponderant position vis-h-vis its ancient rival
Poland, became directly involved in German affairs — a relationship which
included marital alliances arranged by the tsar for his and his half-brother
Ivan V’s daughters — and generally stepped forth as a major European
power. The Great Northern War, and the War of the Spanish Succession
fought at the same time, can be regarded as successful efforts to change
the results of the Thirty Years’ War and to curb the two chief victors of that
conflict, Sweden and France. The settlement in the north, it might be
added, turned out to be more durable than that in the west. Indeed, be-
cause of the relative sizes, resources, and numbers of inhabitants of Rus-
sia and Sweden, Peter the Great’s defeat of Charles XII proved to be
irreversible.
Foreign Relations: Some Other Matters
Although the Great Northern War lasted for most of Peter’s reign and
although it had first claim on Russian efforts and resources, the tsar never
forgot Turkey or the rest of Asia either. We have noted the two wars
that he fought against the Ottomans, the first successful and the second
unsuccessful in the midst of the hostilities with Sweden. After Nystadt, the
emperor turned south once more, or rather southeast. In 1722-23 he
fought Persia successfully, in spite of great difficulties of climate and com-
munication, to obtain a foothold on the western and southern shores of
the Caspian sea. This foothold was relinquished by Russia in 3732,
shortly after Peter’s death.
Earlier the tsar had shown a considerable interest in Central Asia, its ge-
ography, peoples — particularly the Kazakhs — and routes, and especially
in the possibility of large-scale trade with India. Whereas most of the Rus-
sian contacts with Central Asia were peaceful, a tragic exception occurred
in 1717 when a considerable force commanded by Prince Alexander
Bekovich-Cherkassky was tricked and massacred by the supposedly friendly
khan of Khiva. Peter the Great ordered young men to learn Turkish, Tar-
tar, and Persian, assigning them for this purpose to appropriate dipIo® at,c
missions. He even established classes in Japanese, utilizing the services of
PETER THE GREAT
227
a castaway from that hermit island empire The tsar sent a mission to
Mongolia and maintained diplomatic and commercial relations with China,
which resulted in the negotiation of the Treaty of Kiakhta shortly after
his death, and in the permanent establishment of an important mission of
the Russian Orthodox Church in Peking He initiated the scholarly study
of Siberia, and, indeed, the emperor's interest extended even to the island
of Madagascar!
The Reforming of Russia Introductory Remarks
In regard to interna! affairs during the reign of Peter the Great, we find
that scholars have taken two extreme and opposite approaches On the one
hand the tsar s reforming of Russia has been presented as a scries, or rather
a jumble, of disconnected ad hoc measures necessitated bj the exigencies
of the moment, especially by the pressure of the Great Northern War
Contrariwise the same activity has been depicted as the execution of a
comprehensive, radically new, and well integrated program In a number of
mays, the fosl uew seems closer to the facts As Kluchevsky pointed out,
only a single year in Peter the Great $ whole reign, 1724, passed entirely
without war while no more than another thirteen peaceful months could
be added for the entire period Connected to the enormous strain of war
was the inadequacy of the Muscovite financial system, which was over-
burdened and m a slate of virtual colhpsc even before Peter the Great
made vastly increased demands upon it The problem for the state became
simply to survtve, and survival exacted a heavy pnee Under Peter the
Great the population of Russia might have declined Miliukov, who made
a brilliant analysis of Petrine fiscal structure and economy, and other
scholars of his persuasion have shown how military considerations re-
peatedly led to financial measures, and in tum to edicts aiming to stimulate
Russian commerce and industry, to changes m the administrative system
without whose improvement these and other edicts proved ineffective, to
attempts to foster education in whose absence a modem administration
could not function, and on and on It has further been argued on the
whole convincingly, that in any case Peter the Great was not a theoretician
or planner, but an intensely energetic and practical man of affairs
Yet a balanced judgment has to allow something to the opposite point of
view as well Although Peter the Great was preoccupied during most of his
reign with the Great Northern War and although he had to sacrifice much
else to its successful prosecution, hts reforming of Russia was by no means
limited to hectic measures to bolster the war effort In fact, he wanted to
Westernize and modernize oil of the Russian government, society, life, and
culture, and even if his efforts fell far short of this stupendous goal, failed
to dovetail, and left huge gaps, the basic pattern emerges, nevertheless,
228 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
with sufficient clarity. Countries of the West served as the emperor’s
model, Wc shall see, however, when we turn to specific legislation, that
Peter did not merely copy from the West, but tried to adapt Western
institutions to Russian needs and possibilities. The very number and
variety of European states and societies offered the Russian ruler a rich
initial choice. It should be added that with time Peter the Great became
more interested in general issues and broader patterns. Also, while the re-
former was no theoretician, he had the makings of a visionary. With charac-
teristic grandeur and optimism he saw ahead the image of a modem, power-
ful, prosperous, and educated country, and it was to the realization of that
image that he dedicated his life. Both the needs of the moment and longcr-
range aims must therefore be considered in evaluating Peter the Great’s
reforms. Other fundamental questions to be asked about them include their
relationship to the Russian past, their borrowing from the West — and,
concurrently, their modification of Western models — their impact on Rus-
sia, and their durability.
The Army and the Navy
Military reforms stemmed most directly from the war. In that field Peter
the Great’s measures must be regarded as radical, successful, and lasting,
as well as imitative of the West; and he has rightly been considered the
founder of the modern Russian army. The emperor’s predecessors had
large armies, but these were poorly organized, technically deficient, and
generally of low quality. They assembled for campaigns and disbanded
when the campaign ended. Only gradually did “regular” regiments, with
Western officers and technicians, begin to appear. Even the Streltsy,
founded by Ivan the Terrible and expanded to contain twenty-two
regiments of about a thousand men each, represented a doubtful asset.
Stationed mainly in Moscow, they engaged in various trades and crafts
and constituted at best a semi-professional force. Moreover, as mentioned
earlier, the Streltsy became a factor in Muscovite politics, staged uprisings,
and were severely punished and then disbanded by Peter the Great. The
reformer instituted general conscription and reorganized and modernized
the army. The gentry, of course, had been subject to personal military
service ever since the formation of the Muscovite state. Under Peter the
Great this obligation came to be much more effectively and, above all, con-
tinuously enforced. Except for the unfit and those given civil assignments,
the members of the gentry were to remain with their regiments for life.
Other classes, with the exception of the clergy and members of the mer-
chant guilds, who were needed elsewhere, fell under the draft. Large
numbers were conscripted, especially in the early years of the Great
Northern War, In 1715 the Senate established the norm of one draftee
PETER THE GREAT
229
from every seventy five serf households Probably the same norm oper-
ated m the ctse of the state peasants, while additional recruits were ob-
tained from the townspeople AH were to be separated from, their families
and occupations and to serve for life, a term which was reduced to twenty-
five years only in the last decade of the eighteenth century
Having obtained a large body of men, Peter I went on to transform
them into a modern army He personally introduced a new and up-to-date
military manual, became proficient with every weapon, and learned to
command units from the smallest to the largest He insisted that each
draftee, aristocrat and serf alike, similarly work his way from the bottom
up, advancing exactly as fast and as far as his ment would warrant Im
portant changes in the military establishment included the creation of the
elite regiments of the guards, and of numerous other regular regiments, the
adoption of the flintlock and the bayonet, and an enormous improve-
ment m artillery By the time of Poltava Russia was producing most of
its own flintlocks The Russian army was the first to use the bayonet »n
attack — a weapon originally designed for defense against the charging
enemy As to artillery, Peter the Great developed both the heavy siege
artillery, which proved very cflective tn 1704 in the Russian capture of
Narva and by about 1707 light artillery which participated in battles
alongside the infantry and the cavalry The Russian victory over Sweden
demonstrated the brilliant success of the tsar's military reforms At the
time of Peter the Great s death the Russian army numbered 2 10,000 regular
troops and 100 000 cossacks who retained their own organization
The select regiments of guards, however, were not only the elite of
Peter’s army, they had, so to speak, grown up with the emperor, and con-
tained many of his most devoted and enthusiastic supporters Especially in
the second half of his reign, Peter the Great frequently used officers and
non-commissioned officers of the guards for special assignments, bypass-
ing the usual administrative channels Often endowed with summary
powers, which might include the tight to bnng a transgressing governor
or other high official back m chains, they were sent to speed up the collec-
tion of taxes or the gathering of recruits, to improve the functioning of
the judiciary or to investigate alleged administrative corruption and abuses
Operating outside the regular bureaucrauc structure, these emissaries
could be considered as extensions of the ruler's own person Later em-
perors, such as Alexander I and Nicholas I, continued Peter the Great’s
novel practice on a large scale, relying on special, and usually military,
agents to obtain immediate results in various matters and in general to
supervise the workings of the government apparatus
To an even greater extent than the army, the modem Rus*!an navy
was the creation of Peter the Great One can fairly say it was one of his
passions He began from scratch — with one vessel of an obsolete type
230 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
to be exact- — and left to his successor 48 major warships and 787 minor
and auxiliary craft, serviced by 28,000 men. He also bequeathed to those
who followed him the first Russian shipbuilding industry and, of course
the Baltic ports and coastline. Moreover, the navy, built on the British
model, had already won high regard by defeating the Swedish fleet. The
British considered the Russian vessels comparable to the best British ships
in the same class, and the British government became so worried by the
sudden rise of the Russian navy that in 1719 it recalled its men from the
Russian service. Incidentally, in connection with shipbuilding the emperor
introduced forestry regulations in Russia; however, they proved virtually
unenforceable.
Administrative Reforms: Central Government, Local Government , the
Church
Although mainly occupied with military matters, Peter reformed the
central and local government in Russia as well as Church administration
and finance, and he also effected important changes in Russian society,
economy, and culture. Peter I ascended the throne as Muscovite tsar and
autocrat — although, to be sure, until Ivan V’s death in 1696 the country
had two tsars and autocrats — and he proved to be one of the most
powerful and impressive absolute rulers of his age, or any age. Yet com-
parisons with Ivan the Terrible or other Muscovite predecessors can be
misleading. Whatever the views of earlier tsars concerning the nature
and extent of their authority - — • and that is a complicated matter — Peter
the Great believed in enlightened despotism as preached and to an extent
practiced in Europe during the so-called Age of Reason. He borrowed his
definition of autocracy and of the relationship between the ruler and his
subjects from Sweden, not from the Muscovite tradition. The very title of
emperor carried different connotations and associations than that of tsar.
In contrast to Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great had the highest regard for
law, and he considered himself the first servant of the state. Yet, again in
accord with his general outlook, he had no use for the boyar duma, or the
zemskii sobor, and treated the Church in a much more high-handed man-
ner than his predecessors had. Thus the reformer largely escaped the
vague, but nevertheless real, traditional hindrances to absolute power in
Muscovy. It was the discarding of the old and the creation of the new gov-
erning institutions that made the change in the nature of the Russian state
explicit and obvious.
In 1711, before leaving on his campaign against Turkey, Peter the
Great published two orders which created the Governing Senate, The
Senate was founded as the highest state institution to supervise all
judicial, financial, and administrative affairs. Originally established only
P t TER THE GREAT
251
for the time of the monarch’s absence it became a permanent body after
his return The number of senators was first set at nine ancj m 1712
increased to ten A special high official, the Ober Procurator, served as the
link between the sovereign and the Senate and acted, m the emperor s own
words, as ‘the sovereigns eye" Without his signature no Senate decision
could go into effect, any disagreements between the Ober Procurator and
the Senate were to be settled by the monarch Certain other officials and a
chancellery were also attached to the Senate While it underwent many sub-
sequent changes, the Senate became one of the roost important institutions
of imperial Russia, especially in administration and law
In 1717 and the years immediately following Peter the Great es-
tablished collegia or colleges, tn place of the old, numerous, overlapping,
and unwieldy pnkazy The new agencies comparable to the later ministries,
were originally nine m number the colleges of foreign affairs, war, navy,
state expenses, state income, justice financial inspection and control,
commerce, and manufacturing Later three colleges were added to deal with
mining estates, and town organization Each college consisted of a prcsi
dent, a vice president, four councilors, four assessors a procurator, a sec-
retary. and a chancellery At first a qualified foreigner was included in
every college, but as a rule not as president At that time collegiate ad-
ministration had found considerable favor and application in Europe
Peter the Great was especially influenced by the example of Sweden and
also, possibly, by Leibniz's advice It was nrgued that government by
boards assured a greater variety and interplay of opinion, since decisions
depended on. the majority vote, not on the will of an individual, and that
it contributed to a strictly legal and proper handling of state affairs More
bluntly, the emperor remarked that he did not have enough trust
worthy assistants to put in full charge of the different branches of the
executive and had therefore, to rely on groups of men who would keep
check on one another The colleges lasted for almost a century before
they were replaced by ministries m the reign of Alexander I Some prilcary,
however, lingered on, and the old system went out of existence only gradu-
ally
Local government also underwent reform In 1699 towns were reor-
ganized to facilitate taxation and obtain more revenue for the state Hus
system, run for the government by merchants, took little into account ex-
cept finance and stemmed from Muscovite practices rather than Western
influences In 1720-21, on the other hand, Peter the Great introduced a
thorough municipal reform along advanced European lines Based on the
elective principle and intended to stimufatc the initiative and activity of
the townspeople, the ambitious scheme failed to be translated into practice
because of local inertia and ignorance
Provincial reform provided probably the outstanding example of a
232
major reforming effort of Peter’s come to naught. Again, changes began
in a somewhat haphazard manner, largely under the pressure of war and
a desperate search for money. After the reform of 1708 the country was
divided into huge gubernii, or governments, eight, ten, and finally eleven
in number. But with the legislation of 1719 a fully-developed and ex-
tremely far-reaching scheme appeared. Fifty provinces, each headed by a
voevoda, became die main administrative units. They were subdivided
into uezdy administered by commissars. The commissars, as well as a
council of from two to four members attached to the voevoda, were to be
elected by the local gentry from their midst. All officials received salaries
and the old Muscovite practice of kormleniia — “feedings” — went out of
existence. Peter the Great went beyond his Swedish model in charging
provincial bodies with responsibility for local health, education, and eco-
nomic development. And it deserves special notice that the reform of 1719
introduced into Russia a separation of administrative and judicial power.
But all this proved to be premature and unrealistic. Local initiative could
not be aroused, nor suitable officials found. The separation of administra-
tion and justice disappeared by about 1727, while some other ambitious
aspects of the reform never came into more than paper existence. In the
case of local government, Peter the Great’s sweeping thought could find
little or no application in Russian life.
The reign witnessed a strengthening of government control in certain
borderlands. After the suppression of Bulavin’s great revolt, the emperor
tightened his grip on the Don area, and that territory came to be more
closely linked to the rest of Russia. The cossacks, however, did retain a dis-
tinct administration, military organization, and way of life until the very
end of the Russian empire and even into the Soviet period — as readers of
the novels of Sholokhov realize. Similarly, after Mazepa’s defection to
Charles XII in the Ukraine, the government proceeded to tie that land,
too, more closely to the rest of the empire. For example, an interesting or-
der in 1714 emphasized the desirability of mixing the Ukrainians and the
Russians and of bringing Russian officials into the Ukraine, buttressing its
argument with references to successful English policies vis-a-vis Scotland,
Wales, and Ireland.
The change in the organization of the Church paralleled Peter the
Great’s reform of the government. When the reactionary patriarch
Hadrian died in 1700, the tsar kept his seat vacant, and tbe Church was ad-
ministered for over two decades by a mere locum tenens, the very able
moderate supporter of reform Metropolitan Stephen Iavorsky. Finally in
1721, the so-called Spiritual Reglament, apparently written mainly by
Archbishop Tbeophanes Prokopovich, established a new organization of the
Church. The Holy Synod, consisting of ten, later twelve, clerics, re-
placed the patriarch. A lay official, the Ober-Pxocurator of the Holy
PETER THE GREAT
233
Synod, was appointed to see that that body earned on its work in a per-
fectly legal and correct manner Although the new arrangement fell
under the conciliar principle widespread in the Orthodox Church and a]
though it received appro\a! from the Eastern patriarchs, the reform
belonged — os much as did Peter the Greats other reforms — to West-
ern, not Muscovite or Byzantine, tradition In particular, it tried to repro-
duce the relationship between Church and state in the Lutheran coun-
tries of northern Europe Although it did not make Russia Byzantine as
some writers assert, nor even caesaropapist — for the emperor did not
acquire any authority in questions of faith — it did enable the government
to exercise effective control over Church organization, possessions, and
policies If Muscovy had two supreme leaders, the tsar and the patriarch,
only the tsar remained in the St Petersburg era The Holy Synod and the
domination of the Church by the government lasted until 1917
Peter the Great s other measures in the religious domain were similarly
conditioned by his general outlook He considered monks to be shirkers
and wastrels and undertook steps to limit ecclesiastical possessions and
eventually to control ecclesiastical wealth On the other hand he tried to
strengthen and broaden Church schools and improve the lot of the 1 m
poverishcd secular clergy As one might expect, the reformer exhibited
more tolerance toward those of other denominations than had his
Muscovite predecessors, on the whole preferring Protestants to Catholics
In 1721 the Holy Synod permitted intermarriage between the Orthodox
and Western Christians The emperor apparently felt no religious animosity
toward the Old Believers and favored tolerance toward them They, how-
ever, proved to be bitter opponents of his program of reform Therefore,
the relaxation in the treatment of the Old Believers early in the reign gave
way to new restrictions and penalties, such as special taxation
An evaluation of the total impact of Peter the Great’s administrative
reforms presents certain difficulties These reforms copied and adapted
Western models, trying to import into Russia the best institutions and prac-
tices to be found anywhere in Europe Efforts to delimit clearly the uu
thonty of every agency, to separate powers and functions, to standardize
procedure, and to spell out each detail could well be considered revolu-
tionary from the old Muscovite point of view On the surface at least the
new system seemed to bear a greater resemblance to Sweden or the
German states than to the realm of the good Tsar Alexis The very names
of the new institutions and the offices and technical terms associated with
them testified to a flood of Western influences and a break with the
Muscovite past Yet reality differed significantly from this appearance
Even where reforms survived — and sometimes as in the case of the local
government, they did not — the change turned out to be not nearly as
profound as the emperor h3d intended Statutes, prescriptions, and precise
234
IMPERIAL ROSS
rules looked well on paper; in actuality in the main cities and especially in
the enormous expanses of provincial Russia, everything depended as of old
on the initiative, ability, and behavior of officials. The kormleniia could
be abolished, but not the all-pervasive bribery and corruption. Personal
and largely arbitrary rule remained, in sum, the foundation of Russian
administration; all the more so because despite the reformer’s frantic ef-
forts the new system, which was much too complicated to be discussed
here with anything approaching completeness, lacked integration, co-ordina-
tion, and cohesion. In fact a few scholars, such as Platonov, have argued
that the administrative order established by Peter the Great proved to be
more disjointed and disorganized than that of Muscovite Russia.
Financial and Social Measures
The difficulty of transforming Russian reality into something new and
Western becomes even more evident when we consider Peter the Great’s
social legslation and his overall influence on Russian society. Before turn-
ing to this topic, however, we must mention briefly the emperor’s financial
policies, for they played an important and continuous part in his plans and
actions.
Peter the Great found himself constantly in dire need of money, and at
times the need was utterly desperate. The only recourse was to squeeze
still more out of the Russian masses, who were already overburdened
and strained almost to the breaking point. According to one calculation,
the revenue the government managed to exact in 1702 was twice, and in
1724 five and a half times, the revenue obtained in 1680. In the process
it taxed almost everything, including beeliives, mills, fisheries, beards, and
bath houses; and it also extended the state monopoly to new items. For
example, stamped paper, necessary for legal transactions, became an
additional source of revenue for the state, and so did oak coffins. In fact,
finding or concocting new ways to augment government funds developed
into a peculiar kind of occupation in the course of the reign. Another and
perhaps more significant change was in the main form of direct taxation; in
1718 Peter the Great introduced the head, or poll, tax in place of the
household tax and the tax on cultivated land.
One purpose of the head tax was to catch shirkers who combined house-
holds or failed to till their land. It was levied on the entire lower class of
population and it represented a heavy assessment — considerably heavier
than the taxes that it replaced. Set at seventy or eighty kopecks per serf
and at one ruble twenty kopecks for each state peasant and non-exempt
townsman, the new tax had to be paid in money. From 1718 to 1722 a
census, a so-called revision, of the population subject to the head tax
took place. On private estates, serfs and those slaves who tilled the soil
ETER THE GREAT
235
were registered first Next came orders to add to the lists household slaves
and all dependent people not on the land, and finally even vagrants of
every sort Each person registered during the region had to pav the
same set head tax, on estates, the landlords were held responsible for the
prompt flow of money to the treasury A number of scholars have stressed
that Peter the Great s tax legislation thus led to the final elimination of
the ancient difference between xerf and stave, and the merging of the land-
lords’ peasants mto one bonded mass Legally the mass consisted of
serfs, not slaves In actuality as alreaJy indicated, the arbitrary power of
the landlord and the weakness of the peasant made Russian serfdom differ
htlle from slavery After the revision the serfs were allowed to leave the
estate only with their master's written permission, a measure which
marked the beginning of a passport system The head tax. It might be
added, proved to be one of the emperors lasting innovations
On the whole Peter the Great had to accept and did accept Russian
society as it was, with serfdom and the economic and social dominance
of the gentry The emperor, howiver, made a tremendous effort to bend that
society to serve hts purposes the successful prosecution ot war, Western
uatton, and reform Above all, the government needed money and men
The bead tax presents an excellent example of an important social rncas
ure passed for financial reasons But whereas the head tax affected the
lower classes, other social groups also found themselves subject to the
insatiable demands of the tireless emperor For example, the merchants
the few professional people and other middle class elements, who were all
exempt from the head tax, had to work harder than ever before to
discharge their obligations to the state in the economic domain and other
fields of activity
However, the emperor insisted on service especially m the case of the
gentry State service, of course, constituted an ancient obligation of that
Class But, as we have already seen in dealing with the army, under
Peter the Great it became a more regular and continuous as well as much
heavier obligation Every member of the gentry was required to serve from
about the age of sixteen to the end of his days, and the sovereign himself
often gave an examination to boys as young as fourteen or even ten and
assigned them to schools and careers After an inspection, he)J usually in
Moscow, the gentry youths were divided roughly two-thuds to one third
between the military and the civilian branches of service Peter the Great
insisted that in the civilian offices as in the regiments or aboard ships all
novices must start at the bottom and advance only according to their
ment In 1722 he promulgated the Tabic of Ranks, which listed m
hierarchic order the fourteen ranks, from the fourteenth to the first, to be
attained in the parallel services — military, civil, and court The Table,
with its impressive ranks borrowed from abroad, served as the foundation
236 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
of the imperial Russian bureaucracy and lasted, with modifications, until
1917. The emperor opened advancement in service to all. Entrance into
service brought personal nobility, while those of non-gentry origin who
attained the eighth rank in the civil service or the twelfth in the military
became hereditary members of the gentry. He also began to grant titles of
nobility, including “prince,” for extraordinary achievements, and later em-
perors continued this practice.
Peter the Great’s handling of the gentry represented something of a
tour de force, and it proved successful to the extent that the emperor did
obtain a great deal of service from that class. But the reformer’s successors
could not maintain his drastic policies. In fact, we shall see how in the
course of the eighteenth century the gentry gradually escaped from its
service obligations. At the same time entry into that class became more
difficult, so that Peter the Great’s effort to open the road to all talents was
somewhat diminished. It might be added that some of the emperor’s social
legislation failed virtually from the start. Thus, for example, in 1714, in
opposition to the established Russian practice of dividing land among
sons, the reformer issued a law of inheritance according to which the
entire estate had to go to one son only — by choice, and to the elder son
if no choice had been made — the others thus being forced to exist, as in
the case of the British nobility, solely by service. But this law turned out
to be extremely difficult to enforce even during Peter the Great’s reign,
and it was repealed as early as 173 1 .
The Development of the National Economy
The development of the national economy constituted another aim of
the reformer and another field for his tireless activity. Again, the em-
peror thought first of war and its immediate demands. But, in addition,
from about 1710 he strove to develop industries not related to military
needs, to increase Russian exports, and in general to endow the country
with a more varied and active economy. Peter the Great made every ef-
fort to stimulate private enterprise, but he also acted on a large scale directly
through the state. Ideologically the emperor adhered to mercantilism, popu-
lar in Europe at the time, with its emphasis on the role of the govern-
ment, a favorable balance of trade, and the protection of home industries
as reflected in the Russian tariff of 1724. One account gives the figure of
200 manufacturing establishments founded in Peter the Great’s reign
86 by the state and 114 by private individuals and companies — to add t0
the 21 in existence in Russia by 1695; another account mentions 250
such establishments in operation at the time of the emperor’s death. The
greatest development occurred in metallurgy, mining, and textiles. In
effect, the emperor created the Russian textile industry, while he de-
PETER THE GREAT
237
v eloped mining and metallurgy impressively from very modest beginnings,
establishing them, notably, in the Urals He promoted many other indus-
tries as well, including the production of china and glass.
To facilitate trade Peter the Great built canals and began the construc-
tion of a merchant marine For instance, a canal was built between 1703
and HO'.) to connect the Neva with the Votg3. Indeed, the Volga-Don
canal itself, finally completed by the Soviet government after the Second
World War, had been one of the reformer's projects In the course of Peter
the Great's reign Russian foreign trade increased fourfold, although it
continued to be handled in the main by foreign rather than Russian mer-
chants On the whole, although some of the emperor’s economic under-
takings faded and many exacted a heavy price, Peter the Great exercised
a major and creative influence on the development of the Russian economy.
Later periods built on his accomplishments there was no turning back.
Education and Culture
There could be no turning back in culture either Tn a sense Peter the
Great’s educational and cultural reforms proved to be the most lasting of
all, for they pushed Russia firmly and irrevocably in the direction of the
West While these measures will be discussed in more detail tn the chapter
dealing with Russian culture in the eighteenth century, it should be
pointed out here that they fitted well into the general pattern of the em-
peror’s activity. Utilitarian in his approach, the sovereign stressed the
necessity of at least a minimum education for service, and he also en-
couraged schools that would produce specialists, such as the School of
Mathematics and Navigation established in 1701 His broader plans in-
cluded compulsory education for the gentry — which could not be trans-
lated into practice at the time — and the creation of the Academy of
Sciences to develop, guide, and crow-n learning in Russia, This academy
did come into existence a few months after the reformer’s death Through-
out his life Peter the Great showed a burning interest in science and
technology as well as some interest in other areas of knowledge
In bringing the civilization of the West to hts native land, the emperor
tried to introduce Western dress, manners, and usages, often by Cal and
against strong opposition The shaving of beards is a celebrated and abiding
symbol ol the reign While the government demanded it “Cor the glory and
comeliness of the state and the military profession” — to quote from
Sumner’s excellent little book on Peter the Great — the traditionalists
objected on the ground that shaving unpaired the image of God in men and
made the Russians look like such objectionable beings as Lutherans, Poles,
Kalmyks, Tartars, cats, dogs, and monkeys Similarly it was argued that
the already-mentioned calendar reform sto'e time from God and that the
238
IMPERIAL RU
new simplified cavil script should not be allowed to replace Church
Slavonic. The assemblies or big society parties that women attended, who
hitherto had been secluded, also aroused a storm. Yet by the end of
Peter’s reign members of the civil service, army, and navy, of the upper
classes, and to some extent even of the middle classes, particularly in the
two leading cities, were shaven and wore foreign dress. Other Western
innovations also generally succeeded in winning more adherents with time.
It might be added in passing that the criticism frequently levied at Peter
the Great that he split Russian society in two appears to miss the point.
The reformer had no choice, for he could not bring Western culture to all
of his subjects at the same time. The gap between the Westernized segment
of the population and the masses had to be bridged by his successors, if at
all.
The Problem of Succession
The conflict between old Muscovy and new imperial Russia was played
out in the sovereign’s own family. Both Peter the Great’s mother and his
first wife Eudoxia, whom he forced to become a nun in 1698, belonged
to the unreformed. In 1690 Eudoxia gave Peter a son, Alexis. The boy
lived with his mother until her seclusion and later with aunts, in the old
Muscovite palace. The emperor had little time for his son and never es-
tablished rapport with him. Instead Alexis became the hope of the op-
ponents of the new order and their rallying point. In 1711 Peter the Great
married Alexis to a German princess. In 1712 the emperor himself mar-
ried for the second time, taking as his wife a Lithuanian woman of low
origin named Catherine, whom he had found in Menshikov’s household,
with whom he had been living happily for a few years, and by whom he
had had children. It might be added that, because of her understanding and
energy, Catherine proved on the whole to be a good companion to the
emperor, whom she accompanied even in his campaigns. In 1715 Alexis’s
wife died after giving birth to a son, Peter.
At that point Peter the Great demanded that Alexis either endorse
Peter’s reforms and become a worthy successor to his father or renounce
his rights to the throne. With characteristically passive resistance, Alexis
agreed to give up his rights. Soon after that, in 1716, when Peter the
Great, then in Denmark, called for his son, Alexis used the opportunity
to escape to Austria and ask the protection of Emperor Charles VI, who
had married a sister of Alexis’s late wife. The following year, however, Peter
the Great’s emissary persuaded Alexis to return to Russia. He arrived m
Moscow in 1718 and received pardon from his father on condition that
he renounce his rights to the throne and name those who had urged him to
escape. The last point led to an investigation, which, although it failed to
PETER THE GREAT
239
discover an actual plot against the emperor, brought to light a great deal
of opposition to and hatred of the new order, as well as some scandals
The pardon of Alexis was withdrawn as a result of the investigation and a
trial set Over a hundred high dignitaries of the state acted as the special
court that condemned Alexis to death But before the execution could be
carried out Alexis expired m the fortress of Peter and Paul m the summer
of 1718, probably from shock and also torture used during the ques-
tioning Nine of hts associates were executed, nine sentenced to hard labor,
while many others received milder punishments
Peter the Great’s several sons bom to Catherine died at an early age
Possible heirs, therefore, included the emperor s grandson Peter, the em-
peror’s daughters and those of his half brother Tsar Ivan V, and the
emperor’s wife Catherine In 1722 Peter the Great passed a law of suc-
cession which disregarded the principle of hereditary seniority and pro-
claimed instead that the sovereign could appoint his successor Once more
position was to be dctci mined by merit 1 But the emperor never used his
new law His powerful organism worn out by disease, strain, and an
irregular life, he died on Februar) 8 1 725, without designating n successor
to hts gloriously victorious multinational modernising, and exhausted
empire
Evaluations of Peter the Great
Peter the Great hit Muscovy with a tremendous impact To many of his
contemporaries he appeared as either a virtually superhuman hero or the
Antichrist It was the person of the emperor that drove Russia forward
in war and reform and inspired the greatest effort and utmost dcvotioa It
was also against Peter the Great that the streltsy, the Bashkirs, the in-
habitants of Astrakhan, and the motley followers of Bulat in staged their
rebellions, while uncounted others. Old Believers and Orthodox, fled to
the borderlands and into the forests to escape his reach Rumor spread
and legends grew that the reformer was not a son of Tsar Alexis, but a
foreigner who substituted himself for the true tsar dunng the falters
journey abroad, that he was an Imposter, a usurper, indeed the Antichrist
Peter Jumsclf contributed much to this polanzauon of opinion He too
saw things in black and white, haling old Muscovy and believing himself
to be the creator of a new Russia Intolerance, violence, and compulsion
became the distinguishing traits of the new regime, and St Petersburg —
built in the extreme northwestern comer of the country, in almost inac-
cessible swamps at a cost tn lites far exceeding that of Poltava — became
its fitting symbol The emperor’s very size, strength, energy, and temper-
ament intensified hts popular image
So the matter stood lor about one hundred and fifty years, or roughly
240 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
until the third quarter of the nineteenth century. Peter the Great was revered
and eulogized by the liberals, who envisaged him as a champion of light
against darkness, and also by the imperial government and its ideologists,
for, after all, that government was the first emperor’s creature. Those who
hated the reformer and his work included, in addition to the Old Be-
lievers and some other members of the inarticulate masses, such quixotic
romantic intellectuals as the Slavophiles, who fancied to have discovered in
pre-Petrine Russia the true principles and way of life of their people and
who regarded the emperor as a supreme perverter and destroyer. It took a
sensitive writer like Pushkin to draw a balance, emphasizing the necessity
and the greatness of Peter’s reforms and state, while at the same time
lamenting their human cost. And Pushkin too was, in fact, overwhelmed by
the image of Peter the Great.
Finally, with the work of S. Soloviev, himself a great admirer of the re-
former, and other nineteenth-century historians the picture began gradu-
ally to change. Scholarly investigations of the last hundred years, together
with large-scale publication of materials on the reformer’s reign, under-
taken by a number of men from Golikov to Bogoslovsky, have established
beyond question many close connections between Peter the Great and the
Muscovite past. Entire major aspects of the reformer’s reign, for example,
foreign policy and social relations and legislation, testified to a remarkable
continuity with the preceding period. Even the reformer’s desire to curb
and control ecclesiastical landholding had excellent Muscovite precedents.
The central issue itself, the process of Westernization, had begun long be-
fore the reformer and had gathered momentum rapidly in the seventeenth
century. In the words of a modern scholar, Peter the Great simply marked
Russia’s transition from an unconscious to a conscious following of her
historical path.
Although in the perspective of Russian history Peter the Great appears
human rather than superhuman, the reformer is still of enormous impor-
tance. Quite possibly Russia was destined to be Westernized, but Peter the
Great cannot be denied the role of the chief executor of this fate. At the
very least the emperor’s reign brought a tremendous speeding up of the
irreversible process of Westernization, and it established state policy and
control, where formerly individual choice and chance prevailed.
Since Peter the Great was practical, and a utilitarian, it may be better lo
conclude this discussion on a more mundane note than historical destiny.
Long ago Pogodin, a historian, a Right-wing intellectual, and one of the
many admirers of the emperor, wrote:
Yes, Peter the Great did much for Russia. One looks and one does not
believe it, one keeps adding and one cannot reach the sum. We cannot
open our eyes, cannot make a move, cannot turn in any direction without
peter the oreat
241
encountering him everywhere, at home, in the streets, in church, in school,
w court, jn the regiment, at a promenade— u » always be, always he,
every day, every minute, at every step!
We wake up What day is u today? January 1, 1841 — Petct the Great
ordered m to count years from the birth of Christ, Peter the Great ordered
us to count the months from January
ft is time to dress — our clothing is made according to the fashion
established by Peter the First, our uniform according to hts model The
cloth is woven m a factory which he created, the wool is shorn from the
sheep which he started to raise
A book strikes our eyes — Peter the Great introduced this script and
himself cut out the letters You begin to read it — this language became
a written language a titerary language, at the tune of Peter the first, super-
seding the earlier church language
Newspapers are brought in — Peter the Great introduced them
You must buy different things — they all, from the silk neckerchief to
the sole of your shoe will remind you of Peter the Great some were
ordered by him others were brought into use or improved by him.
earned on his shtps, into his harbors on his canals on his roads
At dinner, afl the courses from salted herring through potatoes which
he ordered grown to wine made from grape* which he began to cultivate,
u ill speak to you of Peter the Great
After dinner you drive out for a visit — this « an asiemhtie of Peter
the Great You meet the ladies there— they were admitted into masculine
company by Order of Peter the Great
Let us go to the university — the first secular school was founded by
Peter ihc Great
You receive a rank — according to Peter the Greats Table o! Ranks
The rank gives me gentry status — Peter the Great so arranged it
I must file a complaint— Peter the Great prescribed its form U will
be received — m front of Peter the Great s mirror of justice U Will he
acted upon — on the basis of the General Rcgl ament
You decide to travel abroad — following the example of Peter the
Great, you will be received well — Peter the Great placed Russia among
the European states and began to instill respect for her, and so on, and
so on, and so on
XXI
RUSSIAN HISTORY FROM PETER THE GREAT TO
CATHERINE THE GREAT: THE REIGNS OF CATHERINE I,
1725-27, PETER II, 1727-30, ANNE, 1730-40, IVAN VI,
1740-41, ELIZABETH, 1741-62, AND PETER III, 1762
The period between the death of Peter the Great and the accession of
Catherine the Great, 1725 to 1762, has been considered by some his-
torians as an era of shallowness, confusion, and decay, whereas
others attribute to it much of Russia’s spiritual growth and political
advancement. The truth seems to lie on both sides Rapid and violent
changes, as under Peter, were discontinued, but slowly the process of
Westernization went on, gaining in depth and leading to a better pro-
portion between the ambitions and the actual potentialities o£ the
country.
XIRCHNER
With the second quarter of the eighteenth century a new period of Rus-
sian social history begins.
K1ZEVETTER
Russian history from the death of Peter the Great to the accession of
Catherine the Great has been comparatively neglected. Moreover, the treat-
ments available turn out not infrequently to be superficial in nature and
derisive in tone. Sandwiched between two celebrated reigns, this period —
“when lovers ruled Russia,” to quote one writer — offers little to impress,
dazzle, or inspire. Rather it appears to be taken up with a continuous strug-
gle of unfit candidates for the crown, with the constant rise and fall of their
equally deplorable favorites, with court intrigues of every sort, with Biren’s
police terror, Elizabeth’s absorption in French fashions, and Peter Ill’s
imbecility. Florinsky’s description of the age, although verging on carica-
ture, has its points. In the course of thirty-seven years Russia had, sardonic
commentators remark, six autocrats: three women, a boy of twelve, an
infant, and a mental weakling.
But the tragicomedy at the top should not be allowed to obscure im-
portant developments which affected the country at large. Westernization
continued to spread to more people and broader areas of Russian life.
Foreign relations followed the Petrine pattern, bringing Russia into an ever-
closer relationship with other European powers. And the gentry made a
successful bid to escape service and increase their advantages.
242
V E T C R THE GREAT TO CATHERINE THE GREAT
243
Catherine 1 Peter It
When the first emperor died without naming his successor, severs! candi-
dates for the throne emerged The dominant two were Peter, Alexis's son
and Peter the Great’s grandson, ami Catherine, Peter the Great’s second
wife The deceased sovereign’s daughters, Anne and Clizaheth. and his
nieces, daughters o i hm half-brother Tsar Ivan V, Catherine and Anne, ap-
peared as more remote possibilities at the time, although before very long
two of them were to rule Russia, while descendants of the other two also
occupied the throne Peter was the only direct male heir and thus the logi-
cal successor to bis grandfather He had the support of the old nobility,
including several of their number prominent in the first emperor’s reign,
and probably the support of the masses Catherine, who had been crowned
empress in a special ceremon) in 1724 — in the opinion of some, a dear
indication of Peter the Greats intentions with regard to succession —
possessed the baching of "the new men,” such as Iaguzhinsky and espe-
cially Menshikov, who had risen with the reforms and dreaded everything
connected with Peter’s son Alexis and old Muscovy The Priobrazhcnskn
and Semenovskn guard regiments decided the issue by demonstrating m
favor of the empress Opposition to her collapsed, and the dignitaries of
the state proclaimed Catherine the sovereign of Russia, "according to the
desire of Peter the Great ” The guards, as we shall sec, were subsequently
to play a decisive role m determining who ruled Russia on more than one
occasion
Catherine’s reign, dunng which Menshikov plajed the leading role in
the government, lasted only two years and three months The empress’s
most important act was probably the creation, in February 1726, of the
Supreme Secret Council to deal with "matters of exceptional significance ’*
The six members of the council, Menshikov and five others, became in
effect constant advisers and in a sense associates of the monarch, a de-
parture from Peter the Great’s administrative organization and practice
Catherine I died m 1727, having appointed joung Peter to succeed her
and nominated as regent the Supreme Secret Council, to which Anne and
Elizabeth, her daughters end the new ruler's aunts, were added
Peter II, not yet twelve when he became emperor, fell into the hands of
Menshikov, who even transferred the monarch from the palace to his
residence and beuothed him to his daughter But Peter II did not like
Menshikov, he placed his confidence to joung Pnnee Ivan Dolgoruky.
The Dolgoruky family used this opportunity to have Menshikov arrested
The once all-powerful favorite and the closest assistant of Peter the Great
died some two years later in exile in northern Siberia, and the Dolgorukys
244
rMPERlAL RUSSJ.
replaced him at the court and in the government. Two members of that
family sat in the Supreme Secret Council, and late in 1729 the engagement
of Peter II to a princess Dolgorukaia was officially announced. But again
the picture changed suddenly and drastically. Early in 1730, before the
marriage could take place and when Peter II was not quite fifteen years
old, he died of smallpox.
Anne. Ivan VI
The young emperor had designated no successor. Moreover, with his
death the male line of the Romanovs came to an end. In the disturbed and
complicated deliberations which ensued, the advice of Prince Dmitrii
Golitsyn to offer the throne to Anne, daughter of Ivan V and childless
widow of the Duke of Courland, prevailed in the Supreme Secret Council
and with other state dignitaries. Anne appeared to be weak and innocuous,
and thus likely to leave power in the hands of the aristocratic clique.
Moreover, the Supreme Secret Council, acting on its own, invited Anne
to reign only under certain rigid and highly restrictive conditions. The
would-be empress had to promise not to marry and not to appoint a suc-
cessor. The Supreme Secret Council was to retain a membership of eight
and to control state affairs: the new sovereign could not without its ap-
proval declare war or make peace, levy taxes or commit state funds, grant
or confiscate estates, or appoint anyone to a rank higher than that of
colonel. The guards as well as all other armed forces were to be under the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Secret Council, not of the empress. These
drastic conditions, which had no precedent in Russian history, stood poles
apart from Peter the Great’s view of the position and function of the
monarch and his translation of this view into practice. But Anne, who had
very little to lose, accepted the limitations, thus establishing constitutional
rule in Russia.
Russian constitutionalism, however, proved to be extremely short-lived.
Because the Supreme Secret Council had acted in its narrow and exclu-
sive interest, tension ran high among the gentry. Some critics spoke and
wrote of extending political advantages to the entire gentry, while others
simply denounced the proceedings. Anne utilized a demonstration by the
guards and other members of the gentry, shortly after her arrival, to tear
up the conditions she had accepted, asserting that she had thought them
to represent the desires of her subjects, whereas they turned out to be the
stratagem of a selfish cabal. And she abolished the Supreme Secret Council.
Autocracy came back into its own.
Empress Anne’s ten-year reign left a black memory. Traditionally it
has been presented as a period of cruel and stupid rule by individual Ger-
\ »•
Head of St Peter of Aleeandr a from the fre'eo n the Church of the Sa
the Ncred tsa No'gorod 1 197
Zagorsk, with Holy Trlnity-St. Sergius Monastery, Kremlin, ami Assumption Cathedral.
Fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and later.
Moscow Kremlin
PETER THE ORE.AT TO CATHERINE THE ORE AT 245
mans and even “the German party” in Russia And \shi1c this interpretation
should not be overdone — for, after all, the 1730‘s, in foreign policy, in
social legislation, and m other major respects constituted an integral part
of the Russian evolution in the eighteenth century rather than anything
specifically German — it remains true that Anne brought with her from
Courland a band of favorites, and that in general she patronized Germans
as well as other foreigners and distrusted the Russian nobility. The sover-
eign herself proved largely unfit and thoroughly disinclined to manage state
affairs Certain departments, such as the foreign office w ith Ostcrtmnn at
the head and the army with Munmeh, profited from able German leader-
ship of the Petrine vmtage, but many new favorites had no qualifications
for their positions, acted simply m their personal interest, and buttressed
their remarkable ignorance of Russia with their disdain of c\ erything Rus-
sian Ernst Johann Biren, or Biron, the empress’s lover from Courland,
acquired the highest honors and emoluments and became the most hated
figure and symbol of the reign Bironovshchtna — that is, Biromsm —
refers especially to the police pcrsecuuon and political terror during the
reign, which led to the execution of several thousand people and to the exile
of some twenty or thirty thousand to Siberia Although many of the vic-
tims were Old Believers and even common criminals rather than political
opponents, and although the cruelty of Btren and his associates perhaps
shoutd not be considered exceptional for the age, the pcrsecuuons ex-
cited the popular imagination and made the reign compare unfavorably,
for example, with the rule of Elizabeth which was to follow it It might
be added that after the abolition of the Supreme Secret Council Anne did
not restore the Senate to its former importance as the superior governing
institution, but proceeded to rely on a cabinet of two or three members to
take charge of state affairs
Anne died in the autumn of 1740 Shortly before her death she had nomi-
nated a two-month old infant, Ivan, to be her successor on the throne
Ivan was a great-grandson of Ivan V and a grandson of Anne’s elder sis-
ter, Catherine, who in 1716 had mamed the Duke of Mecklenburg, Charles
Leopold A daughter from this marriage, Anna Leopoldovna, became the
wife of Duke Anthony Ultic of Brunswick- Severn- Lune burg The new
emperor was the child of Anna Leopoldovna and Anthony Ulric But, al-
though both of hu patents resided at the Russian court. Empress Anne
appointed Biren as regent The arrangement failed to last First, within
a month Biren was overthrown by Munmeh and Anna Leopoldovna be-
came regent Then, in another year, late in 1741, Ivan VI, Anna Leo-
poldovna, and the entire “German party” were tumbled from authonty and
power. This last coup was executed by the guards led by Peter the Great’s
daughter Elizabeth, who then ascended the throne as Empress Elizabeth of
Russia
246
IMPERIAL RUS
Elizabeth, Peter 111
Just as Anne and her reign have been excessively blamed in Russian his-
toriography, Elizabeth has received more than her fair share of praise.
Kind, young, handsome, and charming, the new monarch symbolized to
many contemporaries and later commentators the end of a scandalous
“foreign” domination in Russia and even, to an extent, a return to the
glorious days of Peter the Great, an association which the empress herself
stressed as much as she could. But in truth there was little resemblance
between the indolent, easy-going, and disorganized, although by no means
stupid, daughter and the fantastically energetic, active, and forceful father.
Although the cabinet was abolished, the Senate was restored to its former
importance, and certain other administrative changes were made that also
harked back to the reign of Peter the Great, the spirit and vigor of the
celebrated reformer could not be recaptured, nor in fact was a serious
attempt made to recapture them. Moreover, the social and economic evo-
lution of the country continued under Elizabeth as under Anne: neither
ruler made a strong personal impress on it. Even Elizabeth’s abolition of
capital punishment, enlightened and commendable in itself as well as
strikingly different from the practices of Anne’s government, pales into
insignificance when compared to the enormous, persistent, and in fact grow-
ing evil of serfdom.
Favorites continued to occupy the stage, although their identity changed,
and the new group proved on the whole more attractive than the one
sponsored by Empress Anne. Alexis Razumovsky, who may have been
morganatically married to Elizabeth, was closest to the monarch. His rise
to eminence represents an earlier and truer version of Andersen’s tale of
the princess and the swineherd. He was a simple cossack in origin, who
tended the village flock in his native Ukraine. Because of his magnificent
voice, the future favorite was brought to the court as a singer. Elizabeth
fell in love with him, and her attachment lasted until her death. Yet,
while Alexis Razumovsky became a very close associate and perhaps even
the husband of the empress, his impact on state affairs remains difficult to
discern. Indeed one historian, in a rather typical evaluation, dismisses the
favorite as follows:
He became the bearer of all Russian decorations, a General Field Marshal,
and he was raised to the position of Count of the Holy Roman Empire.
He was very imperious, even lived in the palace. But he was distinguished
by an honest, noble, and lazy character. He had little influence on the
governing of the country; he constantly dodged state affairs. He did much
good in the Ukraine and In Russia, and in his tastes and habits he re-
mained more a simple Ukrainian than a Russian lord. In the history
PETER THE CREA.T TO CATHERINE THE GREAT 247
of the Russian court he was a remarkable individual, in Ibe history of
the state — an entirely Insignificant actor
Alexis Razumovs Icy’s younger brother, Cynl, received a good educa-
tion abroad and occupied such important offices as those of President of
the Academy of Sciences, Held Marshal, and Hetman of the Ukraine
The Shuvalovs, the brothers Peter and Alexander and their cousin Ivan,
displayed more energy than the Razutnovskys I\an Shuvalov, the empress’s
favorite, left behind hurt an almost unique reputation for integrity and kind-
ness, for refusing honors and rewards, and for selfless service in several
capacities especially m promoting enlightenment in Russia The University
of Moscow, which he founded, remains his lasting monument Peter
Shuvalov was made Count by the empress— -a title which Ivan Shuvalov
refused — and used his strong position at the court to have a hand jn
every kind of state business, in particular in financial and economic mat-
ters and in the military establishment Able, but shamelessly corrupt and
cynical, Peter Shuvalov contributed much to the ruinous financial policy
of the reign end has been credited with saying that debased coinage would
be less of a load to carry and that the tax on vodka suited a time of dis-
tress because people w ould then want to get drunk Elizabeth's own ex-
travagance, which included the building of the extremely expensive
Winter Palace and the acquistuon of, reportedly, fifteen thousand dresses,
added greatly to the financial crisis A French milliner finally refused
further credit to the Russian empress’ Of much more importance ts the
fact that ibe financial efiaos, together with the fundamental and overwhelm-
ing burden of serfdom, led to the flight and uprisings of peasants that
became characteristic of the age Alexander Shuvalov, the third prominent
member of that family, served as the head of the security police Other
clove associates of Elizabeth included her old fnend Chancellor Count
Michael Vorontsov and Count Alexis Bestuzhcv-Riumm who specialized
m foreign policy The replacement of Germans by Russians in the imperial
entourage under Elizabeth had some connection with the increasing in-
terest of the Russian court and educated public in French society and cul-
ture and their declining concern with the German states
The German orientation, however, came back with a vengeance, if only
briefly, in the reign of Peter 111 When Elizabeth died in late 1761 or early
1762 — depending on whether we use the Old or the New Style — Peter,
Duke of Holstein Gottorp, who had been nominated by the empress as
her successor as early as 1742, became Emperor Peter III The new ruler
was a son of Elizabeth’s older sister, Anne— -therefore a grandson of
Peter the Great — and of Charles Frederick, Duke of Holstein Gottorp
Having lost his mother m infancy and his father when a boy, Peter was
brought up first with the view of succeeding to the Swedish throne, for
248 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
his father was a son of Charles XIPs sister. After Elizabeth’s decision
he was educated to succeed to the throne of the Romanovs. Although he
lived in Russia from the age of fourteen, Peter III never adjusted to his
new country. Extremely limited mentally, as well as crude and violent in
his behavior, he continued to fear and despise Russia and the Russians
while he held up Prussia and in particular Frederick II as his ideal. His
reign of several months, best remembered in the long run for the law
abolishing the compulsory state service of the gentry, impressed many of
his contemporaries as a violent attack on everything Russian and a deliber-
ate sacrifice of Russian interests to those of Prussia. While not given to
political persecution and in fact willing to sign a law abolishing the security
police, the new emperor threatened to disband the guards, and even de-
manded that icons be withdrawn from churches and that Russian priests
dress like Lutheran pastors, both of which orders the Holy Synod did not
dare execute. In foreign policy Peter Ill’s admiration for Frederick the
Great led to the withdrawal of Russia from the Seven Years’ War, an act
which probably saved Prussia from a crushing defeat and deprived Russia
of great potential gains. Indeed, the Russian emperor refused to accept
even what Frederick the Great was willing to give him for withdrawing
and proceeded to make an alliance with the Prussian king.
While Peter III rapidly made enemies, his wife Catherine, who had
married him in 1745 and who was originally a princess of the small German
principality of Anhah-Zerbst, behaved with far greater intelligence and
understanding. Isolated and threatened by her boorish husband, who had
a series of love affairs and wanted to marry one of his favorites, she
adapted herself to her difficult environment, learned much about the gov-
ernment and the country, and found supporters. In mid-summer 1762
Catherine profited from the general dissatisfaction with Peter III to lead
the guards in another palace revolution. The emperor was easily deposed
and shortly after killed, very possibly by one of the leaders of the insur-
rection, Alexis Orlov, in a drunken argument. Catherine became empress,
bypassing her son Paul, bom in 1754 during her marriage with Peter III,
who was proclaimed merely heir to the throne. Although the coup of 1762
appeared to be simply another one in a protracted sequence of overturns
characteristic of Russian history in the eighteenth century, and although
Catherine’s chances of securing her power seemed, if anything, less prom-
ising than those of a number of her immediate predecessors, in fact her
initial success meant the beginning of a long and celebrated reign. That
reign will form the subject of another chapter.
The Gains of the Gentry and the Growth of Serfdom
While rulers changed rapidly and favorites. constantly rose and fell in
Russia between 1725 and 1762, basic social processes went on in a con-
PETE* THE GREAT TO CATHERINE THE GREAT 249
tmuous and consistent manner Most important was the growih of the
power and standing of the gentry together with its complementary proc
css, a further deterioration in the position of the serfs As w-c know, peter
the Great's insistence that only one son inhent his father's estate could
hardly be enforced c\ca in the reformer's reign and was formally repealed
in 1731 Empress Anne began giving away state lands to her gentry sup-
porters on a large scale, the peasants on the lands becoming serfs, and
Elizabeth enthusiastically continued the practice These grants were no
longer connected to service obligations
In 1731 Empress Anne opened a cadet school for the gentry in St.
Petersburg The graduates of this school could become officers without
serving tn the lower ranis, a privilege directly opposed to Peter the Great's
intentions and practice As the century progressed the gentry came to rely
increasingly on such cadet schools for both education and advancement in
service Also to their advantage was the Gentry Bank that was established
by Empress Elizabeth in St Petersburg with a branch in Moscow, to
supply the landlords with credit at a moderate rate of interest The gentry
became increasingly class-conscious and exclusive An order of 1746 for-
bade all but the gentry to acquire * men and peasants with and without
land " In 1758 the members of other classes who owned serfs were re-
quired to sell them A Senate decision of 1756 affirmed that only those who
proved their gentry origin could be entered into gentry registers, while de-
cisions »n the years 1758-60 in effect eliminated the opportunity to obtain
hereditary gentry status through state service, thus destroying another one
of Peter the Great s characteristic arrangements At the same time “per-
sonal,' or non hereditary, members of the class came to be ngidly re-
stricted tn their gentry rights
The most significant evoluuon took place in regard to the service ob-
ligations of the gentiy to the state In 1736 this service, hitherto termless,
was limited to twenty five years — the gentry themselves had asked for
twenty years — with a further provision exempting one son from service
so he could manage the estates Immediately following the publication of
the law and tn subsequent decades, many members of the gentry left serv-
ice to return to their landho'dings Moreover, some landlords managed
to be entered m regimental books from the age of eight or ten to complete
the twenty five year period of service relatively early in their lives Finally,
on March 1, 1762 — February 18, Old Style — in the reign of Peter III.
compulsory gentry service was abolished Henceforth members of the
gentry could serve the state, or not serve it, at will, and they could ev*n
serve foreign governments abroad instead, if th-y so desired The edict
also urged upon the gentry the importance of education and proper care
of their estates
The Saw of 1762 has attracted much attention from hts’orians To many
older scholars, exemplified by KliuchevsLy, it undermined the basic struc-
250 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
ture of Russian society, in which everyone served: the serfs served the
landlords, the landlords served the state. In equity the repeal of com-
pulsory gentry service should have been followed promptly by the emanci-
pation of the serfs. Yet — again to cite Kliuchevsky — although the aboli-
tion of serfdom did take place on the following day, the nineteenth of
February, that day came ninety-nine years later. The serfs themselves, it
would seem, shared the feeling that an injustice had been committed, for
the demand for freedom of the peasants, to follow the freedom of the
gentry, became a recurrent motif of their uprisings. By contrast, some
specialists, such as V. Leontovich and Malia, have emphasized the posi-
tive results of the law of 1762: it represented the acquisition of an essential
independence from the state by at least one class of Russian society, and
thus the first crucial step taken by Russia on the road to liberalism; besides,
it contributed to the growth of a rich gentry culture and, beyond that, to
the emergence of the intelligentsia.
As the gentry rose, the serfs sank to a greater depth of misery. In the
reign of Peter II they were already prohibited from volunteering for mili-
tary service and thus escaping their condition. By a series of laws under
Empress Anne peasants were forbidden to buy real estate or mills, estab-
lish factories, or become parties to government leases and contracts. Later,
in the time of Elizabeth, serfs were ordered to obtain their master’s per-
mission before assuming financial obligations. Especially following the
law of 1731, landlords acquired increasing financial control over their
serfs, for whose taxes they were held responsible. After 1736 serfs had to
receive the permission of their masters before they could leave for tem-
porary employment elsewhere. Landlords obtained further the right to
transfer serfs from one estate to another and, by one of Elizabeth’s laws,
even to exile delinquent serfs to Siberia and to fetch them back, while the
government included these exiles in the number of recruits required from
a given estate. As already noted, Russian serfdom, although never quite
the same as slavery and in the Russian case not concerned with race or
ethnicity, came to approximate it closely. The criminal code of 1754 listed
serfs only under the heading of property of the gentry.
The Foreign Policy of Russia from Peter to Catherine
Russian foreign policy from Peter the Great to Catherine the Great
followed certain clearly established lines. The first emperor, as we know,
brought Russia forcefully into the community of European nations as a
major power that was concerned with the affairs of the continent at large,
not, as formerly, merely with the activities of its neighbors, such as Tur-
key, Poland, and Sweden. From the time of Peter the Great, permanent
rather than only occasional — representatives were exchanged between
PETEK THE GREAT TO CATHERINE THE OREAT 255
Russia and other leading European states Ostermann In the years immedi-
ately following the death of Peter the Great, and Bestuzhev Riutoin m (he
ume of Elizabeth, together with lesser officials and diplomats, followed
generally in the steps of Peter
As Karpov jeh to mention one historian, has pointed out Russian foreign
policy from 1725 to 1762 find also immediately before and after that
period approached what has been called the checkcrboird system Russia
was to a considerable degree an enemy of its neighbors and a friend of
its neighbors neighbors with other relations affected by this basic pattern
France for example consistently remained an antagonist of Russia, be
cause in its struggle for the mastery of the continent it relied on Turkey
Poland and Sweden to envelop and weaken its arch-enemy the Hapsburgs
France had maintained an alliance with Turkey trom 1526 tn the days of
Suleiman the Magnificent with Poland Irom 1573 when Henry of Valais
was elected to the Polish throne and with Sweden from the time of the
Thirty Years War in the first half of the seventeenth century Russia of
course had repeatedly fought against the three eastern European allies
of France
Austria ruled by the Hapsburgs stood out by contrast, as the most
reliable Russian ally The two states shared hostility toward Trance and,
more importantly for Russia ilso toward Turkey and Sweden, which be
ginning with its major intervention m the Thirty Years War, acted repc3t
cdly in Germany against the interests of the Hapsburgs In Poland also both
Russia and Austria found themsetves opposed to the French party The first
formal alliance between the two eastern European monarchies was signed
in 1726 and it remained with certain exceptions, a cornerstone of Rus
sian foreign policy until the Crimean War in mid nineteenth century
Prussia the other leading German power, represented a threat to Russia
rather than a potential ally Prussia s rise to great power rank under
Fred nek the Great after 1740 together with Russia s rise under Peter the
Great which had just preceded it upset the political equilibrium in Europe
Bestuzhev Riumin was one of the first continental statesmen to point to the
Prussian menace He worried especially about the Russian position on the
Baltic, called Frederick the Great * the sudden prince,’ and spoke in a typi
cally eighteenth century doctrinaire manner of Russia s 4 natural friends
Austria and Great Britain and its natural enemies " France and Prussia
Tlit hostile Russian attitude toward Prussia lasted, with some mtcmip
lions, until the time of Catherine the Great and the partitions of Poland
which satisfied both monarchies and brought them together
In the period under consideration. Great Britain could well be called
a natural friend’ of Russia After the scare occasioned by the achieve
menu of Teter the Great and his navy, no serious conflicts arose between
the two until the last part of (he century On the contrary, Great Britain
252
IMPERIAL R
valued Russia both as a counterweight to France and as a trade partner
from which it obtained raw materials, including naval stores, in exchange
for manufactured goods. Thus it is no surprise that Russia concluded its
first modem commercial treaty with Great Britain.
In line with its interests and alliances, Russia participated in five wars
between 1725 and 1762. In 1733-35 Russia and Austria fought against
France in the War of the Polish Succession, which resulted in the defeat
of the French candidate Stanislaw Leszczynski and the coronation of
Augustus ll’s son as Augustus III of Poland. In 1736-39 Russia, again
allied to Austria, waged a war against Turkey who was supported by
France. Miinnich and other Russian commanders scored remarkable vic-
tories over the Ottoman forces. However, because of Austrian defeats and
French mediation, Russia, after losing approximately 100,000 men, gained
very little according to the provisions of the Treaty of Belgrade: a section
of the steppe between the Donets and the Bug, and the right to retain Azov,
captured during the war, on condition of razing its fortifications and prom-
ising not to build a fleet on the Black Sea. In 1741-43, Russia, supported
by Austria, fought Sweden, who was supported by France. Sweden started
the war to seek revenge, but was defeated, and by the Treaty of Abo ceded
some additional Finnish territory to Russia.
In its new role as a great power Russia became involved also in wars
fought away from its borders over issues not immediately related to Rus-
sian interests. Thus in 1746-48 she participated in the last stages of the
War of the Austrian Succession, begun in 1740 when Frederick the Great
seized Silesia from Austria. That conflict saw Bestuzhev-Riumin’s theory of
alliances come true: Russia joined Austria and Great Britain against Prus-
sia and France. The Russian part in this war proved to be, however, en-
tirely inconsequential.
A much greater importance must be attached to the Russian interven-
tion in the Seven Years’ War, 1756-63, fought again largely over Silesia.
The conflict was preceded by the celebrated diplomatic revolution of 1756
which saw France ally itself with its traditional enemy Austria, while
Prussia turned for support to Great Britain. In the war Russia joined
Austria, France, Sweden, and Saxony against Prussia, Great Britain, and
Hanover. Yet it should be noted that Russia never declared war on Great
Britain and that she found it natural to aid Austria against Prussia, so that
in the case of the empire of the tsars the diplomatic revolution had a rather
narrow meaning. Russian armies participated in great battles, such as those
of Zorndorf and Kuncrsdorf, and in 1760 Russian troops even briefly held
Berlin. Moreover, Russia and its allies managed to drive Prussia to the
■brink of collapse. Only the death of Empress Elizabeth early in 1762, and
the accession to the throne of Peter III, who admired Frederick the Great,
saved the Prussian king. Russia withdrew without any compensation from
PETER THE GREAT TO CATHERINE THE GREAT 253
the war and made an alliance with Prussia, which in turn was discontinued
when Catherine the Great replaced Peter ill
Although Russian foreign policy between 1725 and 1762 has been
severely criticized for its cost in men aod money, its meddling in European
affairs which had no immediate hearing on Russia, and its alleged sacrifice
of national interests to those cither of Austria or of the ‘ German party”
at home, these criticisms on the whole are not convincing In its new role
Russia could hardly disengage itself from major European affairs and
conflicts In general Russian diplomats successfully pursued the interests
of their country, and the wars themselves brought notable gains, for ex-
ample, the strengthening of the Russian position in Poland and the defeat
of the Swedish challenge, even though Peter HI did write off m a fantastic
manner the opportunities produced by the Seven Years War Catherine
the Great would continue the basic policies of her predecessors Militarily
the Russians acquitted themselves welt The Russtan army reorganized,
improved and tempered in the wars scored its first major victories against
Turkey in 1736-39, and played its first major part m the heart of Europe
in the course of the Seven Years War Such famous commanders as Peter
Rumiantsev and Alexander Suvorov began their careers in this interim
period between two celebrated reigns
XXII
THE REIGNS OF CATHERINE THE GREAT, 1762-96,
AND PAUL, 1796-1801
Long live the adorable Catherine!
VOLTAIRE
What interest, therefore, could the young German princess take in
that magnum ignotum, that people, inarticulate, poor, semi-barbarous,
which concealed itself in villages, behind the snow, behind bad roads,
and only appeared in the streets of St. Petersburg like a foreign out-
cast, with its persecuted beard, and prohibited dress — tolerated only
through contempt.
HERZEN
Of the three celebrated “Philosophic Despots" of the eighteenth cen-
tury Catherine the Great could boast of the most astonishing career.
GOOCH
Catherine the Great was thirty-three years old when she ascended the
Russian throne. She had acquired considerable education and experience.
Bom a princess in the petty German principality of Anhalf-Zerbst, the
future empress of Russia grew up in modest but cultured surroundings.
The court in Anhalt-Zerbst, like many other European courts in the
eighteenth century, was strongly influenced by French culture , and Cathe-
rine started reading French books in childhood. In 1744, at the age of
fifteen, she came to Russia to marry Peter of Holstein-Gottorp and prepare
herself to be the wife of a Russian sovereign.
The years from 1744 to 1762 were hard on Catherine. Peter proved to
be a miserable husband, while the German princess’s position at the im-
perial court could be fairly described as isolated and even precarious. To
add to Catherine’s difficulties, her mother was discovered to be Frederick
the Great’s agent and had to leave Russia. Yet the future empress accom-
plished much more than merely surviving at court. In addition to becoming
Orthodox in order to marry Peter, she proceeded to learn Russian lan-
guage and literature well and to obtain some knowledge of her new coun-
try. Simultaneously she turned to the writings of the philosophes, Voltaire,
Montesquieu, and others, for which she had been prepared by her earlier
grounding in French literature. As we shall see, Catherine the Great’s
254
256 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
interest in the Enlightenment was to constitute an important aspect of het
reign. The young princess adapted herseif skillfully to the new environ-
ment, made friends, and won a measure of afFection and popularity in
court circles. While simulating innocence and submissiveness, she parti-
cipated in political intrigues and plots, carefully covering up her tracks,
however, until she led the successful coup in mid-summer 1762, which
brought deposition and death to her husband and made her Empress
Catherine II.
Catherine the Great’s personality and character impressed many of her
contemporaries as well as later commentators. A woman quite out of the
ordinary, the empress possessed high intelligence, a natural ability to ad-
minister and govern, a remarkable practical sense, energy to spare, and an
Iron will. Along with her determination went courage and optimism:
Catherine believed that she could prevail over all obstacles, and more of-
ten than not events proved her right. Self-control, skill in discussion and
propaganda, and a clever handling of men and circumstances to serve her
ends were additional assets of that unusual monarch. The empress herself
asserted that it was ambition that sustained her. The historian can agree,
provided (hat ambition is understood broadly, that is, not merely as a
desire to snatch the crown, or attain glory by success in war, or gain the
admiration of the philosophcs , but as a constant, urgent drive to excel in
everything and bring everything under one’s control. For the first time since
Peter the Great, Russia acquired a sovereign who worked day and night,
paying personal attention to all kinds of matters, great and small.
Yet, together with her formidable virtues, Catherine the Great had cer-
tain weaknesses. Indeed the two were intrinsically combined. Determination
easily became ruthlessncss, ambition fed vanity just as vanity fed ambition,
skill in propaganda would not stop short of asserting lies. Above all, the
empress was a supreme egoist. As with most true egoists, she had few
beliefs or standards of value outside of herself and her own overpowering
wishes. Even Catherine IPs admirers sometimes noticed that she lacked
something, call it charity, mercy, or human sympathy, and, incidentally,
that she looked her best in masculine attire. It was also observed that the
sovereign took up every issue with the same unflagging drive and earnest-
ness, be it Pugachev’s rebellion or correspondence with Voltaire, the par-
titions of Poland or her latest article for a periodical. Restless ambition
served as the only common denominator in her many activities, and, ap-
parently, the only thing that mattered. Similarly, in spite of Catherine's
enormous display of enlightened views and sentiments and of her adherence
to the principles of the Age of Reason, it remains extremely difficult to
tell what the empress actually believed, or whether she believed anything.
In fact, the true relationship of Catherine the Great to the Enlightenment
CATHERINE THF CHEAT AND PAUL 2S7
constitutes one o! the most controversial subjects in the historiography of
her reign
Catherine the Great's notorious love affairs also reflected her peculiar
personality grasping, restless, determined, and somehow, m spite of nil
passion and sentimentality, essentially cold and unable to establish a happy
private life It has been asserted that her first lover was forced on Catherine,
so that she. would have a son and Russia an heir, and that Paul resulted
from that liaison rather than from the marriage to Peter In any case,
Catherine soon took matters into her own hands The empress had twenty-
one known lovers, the last after she had turned sixty The favorites In-
cluded Gregory Orlov, an officer of the guards who proved instrumental in
elevating Catherine the Great to the throne and whose brother may have
killed Peter Ilf, Stamsfaw Pomatowski, a Polish nobleman whom the em-
press made King of Poland, and, most important, Gregory Potcmktn
Potemkin came to occupy a unique position both in the Russian govern-
ment, to the extent that he can be considered the foremost statesman of
the reign, and in the empress’s private life Some specialists believe he mar-
ried her, he certainly continued to be influential with her after the rise of
other favorites One desenpuon of the unusual manage says “From 1776
to 1789 her favorites succeeded one another almost every year, and they
were confirmed in their position, as a court poet would be, by Potemkin
himself, who, after he had lost the empress’s heart, remained for thirteen
years the manager of her male harem "
The First Years oj the Reign The Legislative Commission
Catherine II had to behave carefully during her first years on the throne
Brought to power by a palace revolution and without a legal title to the
crown, the empress had the enthusiastic support of guardsmen such as the
Orlov brothers, but otherwise little backing Elder statesmen looked at her
with some suspicion There persisted the possibility that another turn of
fortune would make her son Paul sovereign and demote Cathcnne to the
position of regent or even eliminate her altogether A different danger
struck in July 1764, when a young officer, Basil Mirovich, tned to liberate
Ivan Vl from his confinement m the Schlusselburg fortress The attempt
failed, and m the course of it Ivan VI — who, apparently, because of
isolation since early childhood, had never grown up mentally and emo-
tionally but remained virtually subhuman — was killed by his guards, who
earned out emergency instructions of long standing The depressing im-
pact of the incident on Russian society was heightened by the execution of
Mirovich, an event alt the more striking because Elizabeth had avoided
executions Catherine also ran into a certain amount of trouble when, in
258 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
1763—64, she completed the long process of divesting the Church of its
huge real estate by secularizing Church lands. This reform, which we shall
discuss briefly in a later chapter, evoked a violent protest on the part of
Metropolitan Arsenii of Rostov, who did not stop short of excommunicat-
ing those connected with die new policy. Fortunately for the empress,
other hierarchs failed to support Metropolitan Arsenii, and, after two
trials, the empress had him defrocked and imprisoned for life.
Gradually Catherine II consolidated her position. She distributed honors
and rewards on a large scale, in particular state lands with peasants, who
thus became serfs. She traveled widely all over Russia, reviving Peter the
Great’s practice, both to learn more about the country and to win popu-
larity. She selected her advisers carefully and well. Time itself worked for
the empress: with the passage of years memories of the coup of 1762
faded, and the very fact that Catherine II continued to occupy the throne
gave the reign a certain legitimacy. In late 1766 she felt ready to introduce
into Russia important changes based on the precepts of the Enlightenment,
and for that purpose she called the Legislative Commission.
The aim of the Commission was to codify laws, a task last accomplished
in 1649, before the Westernization of the country. Moreover, Catherine
the Great believed that the work of the Commission would go a long way
toward rationalizing and modernizing Russian law and life. Although the
empress had certainly no desire to grant her subjects a constitution, and
although her propaganda greatly exaggerated the radical nature of her
intentions, the Nakaz, or Instruction, which she prepared for the Legislative
Commission, was in fact, even in its final attenuated version, a strikingly
liberal document. Composed by Catherine the Great herself over a period
of eighteen months, the Instruction found its inspiration in the thought of
the Enlightenment, particularly in the writings of Montesquieu and the
jurist Beccaria. Montesquieu, whose Spirit of the Laws the empress re-
ferred to as her prayer book, served as the chief guide in political theory.
Yet it should be noted that the willful sovereign adapted rather than copied
the French philosopher: she paid lip service to his ideas, but either left
them conveniently vague or changed them drastically in application to
Russian reality; for example, Montesquieu’s celebrated admiration of the
division of powers in England into the executive, the legislative, and the
judicial became an administrative arrangement meant to improve the
functioning of Russian autocracy. The empress continued to believe that
autocracy was the only feasible form of government for holding enormous
Russia together. And in fairness it should be added that here, too, she had
some support in the thought of the Enlightenment. Serfdom, on the other
hand, she was willing to condemn in theory, although again she largely
avoided the issue: the final draft of the Instruction contained merely a pious
CATHERINE THE GREAT AND UUt 259
Wish that masters would not abuse their serfs As to the influence of Bec-
cari3, Catherine the Great could afford to follow h»s views more closely,
as they were expressed in his treatise Crimes and Punishments, ard she did
Thus the Instruction denounced capital punishment — which had ahead)
been stopped m Russia by Elizabedi — as well as tottutc > argued for
crime prevention, and in general was abreast of advanced Western thought
in criminology On the whole, the liberalism of the Instruction produced a
strong impression m a number of European countries, and led to Its being
banned in France
The Legislative Commission which opened deliberations in the summer
of 1767, consisted of 564 deputies 28 appointed and 536 elected The
appointees represented the state institutions such as the Senate The
elected deputies comprised delegates from different segments of the popu-
lation of the empire 161 from the landed gentry 208 from the townspeo
pie, 79 from the state peasants and 88 from ihc cossaeks and national
minorities Yet this numerous gathering — an all Russian ethnographic
exhibition, to quote khuchcvsky — excluded large bodies of the Russian
people the serfs, obviously, but also in line with the secular tendency of
the Enlightenment the clerical class, although the Holy Synod was rep-
resented by a single appointed deputy Delegates received written instruc-
tions or mandates from their electorates including the state peasants, who,
together with the cossacks and national minorities supplied over a thou-
sand such sets of instructions Taken together, the instructions of 1767
offer the historian insight into the Russian society of the second half of
the eighteenth century comparable to that obtainable for France m the
famous cahicrs of 1789 Kizevcttcr and other scholars have emphasized
ihc following well nigh universal characteristics of the instrucuons a pracu
cal character, a definite acceptance of the existing regime, a desire for
decentralization, complaints of unbearable financial demands and, in par-
ticular, requests to lower the taxes, and a wish to delineate clearly the rights
and the obligations of all the classes of society
The Legislative Commission met for a year and a half, holding 203
sessions, in addition special committees were set up to prepare the ground
for dealing with particular issues But all this effort came to naught The
commission proved unwieldy, not enough preliminary work had been done,
often there seemed to be little connection between the French philosophy of
the empress's Instruction and Russian reality Most important, however,
the members of the commission split along class lines For example,
gentry delegates argued with merchant representatives over serf owner-
ship and rights to engage m trade and industry More ominously, gentry
deputies clashed with those of the peasant class on the crucial issue of
serfdom No doubt Catherine the Great quickly realized the potential
260
ERIAL RUSS
danger of such confrontations. The outbreak of war against Turkey in
1768 provided a good occasion for disbanding the Legislative Commission.
Some committees continued to meet for several more years until the
Pugachev rebellion, but again without producing any practical results. Still,
the abortive convocation of the Commission served some purpose: it gave
Catherine the Great considerable information about the country and in-
fluenced both the genera! course of her subsequent policy and certain
particular reforms.
Pugachev's Rebellion
Social antagonisms which simmered in the Legislative Commission ex-
ploded in the Pugachev rebellion. That great uprising followed the pattern
of earlier lower-class insurrections, such as the ones led by Bolotnikov,
Razin, and Bulavin, which strove to destroy the established order. A
simple Don cossack, a veteran of several wars and a deserter, Emelian
Pugachev capitalized on the grievances of the Ural cossacks to lead them
in revolt against the authorities in the autumn of 1773. Before long the
movement spread up and down the Ural river and also westward to the
Volga basin. At its height the rebellion encompassed a huge territory in
eastern European Russia, engulflng such important cities as Kazan and
posing a threat to Moscow itself.
Pugachev profited from the fact that Russia was engaged at the time in
a major war against Turkey, that few troops were stationed in the eastern
part of the country, and that many local officials, as well as, to some ex-
tent, the central government itself, panicked when they belatedly realized
the immediacy and extent of the danger. Yet his most important advan-
tages stemmed from the nature and the injustice of the Russian social sys-
tem. The local uprising of the Ural cossacks became a mass rebellion.
Crowds of serfs, workers in the Ural mines and factories, Old Believers,
Bashkirs, Tartars, and certain other minority peoples, joined Pugachev’s
original cossack following. Indeed, some specialists believe that Pugachev
should have shown more daring and marched directly on Moscow in the
heart of the serf area. As Pushkin’s A Captain’s Daughter illustrates, few,
except officials, officers, and landlords, tried to stem the tide.
Pugachev acted in the grand manner. He proclaimed himself Emperor
Peter HI, alleging that he had fortunately escaped the plot of his wife
Catherine; and he established a kind of imperial court in imitation of the
one in St. Petersburg. He announced the extermination of officials and
landlords, and freedom from serfdom, taxation, and military service for
the people. ’Pugachev and his followers organized an active chancellery
and engaged in systematic propaganda. Also, the leaders of the rebellion
arranged elections for a new administration in the territory that they held.
CATHERINE THE GREAT AND UUL J61
and they tried to form a semblance of a regular army with a central staff
and an artillery, for which Ural metal workers supplied some of the guns
Although the extent and organization of the Pugachev uprising de-
servedly attract attention, it still suffered from the usual defects of such
movements: a lack of preparation, co-ordination, and leadership Small
army detachments, when well commanded, could defeat peasant hordes
After government victories and severe reprisals, the raging sea of rebellion
would vanish almost as rapidly as it had appeared In late 1774, following
the defeat of his troops and his escape b3ck to the Ural area, Pugachev
was handed Over by his own men to the government forces He was
brought to Moscow, tried, and executed in an especially cruel manner
The great uprising had run its course
The Pugachev rebellion served to point out again, forcefully and tragi-
cally, the chasm between French philosophy and Russian reality Catherine
the Great had in any case allied herself with the gentry from the time of the
palace coup which gave her the throne, and it is highly doubtful that she
had ever seriously intended to act against any essential interests of the
landlords The sharp division of her reign into the early liberal years and
a later period of conservatism and reaction appears none too convincing
Still, the enormous shock of the revolt, following the milder one of the col-
lapse Df the work of the Legislative Commission because of social antag-
onisms, made the alliance between the crown and the gentry very dose,
explicit, and even militant In the conditions of eight ecnth-ccntury Russia
and as a logical result of the policies followed by the Russian government,
the two had to sink or swim together Yet Catherine the Great was too
intelligent to become simply a reactionary She intended instead to com-
bine oppression and coercion with a measure of reform and a great deal
of propaganda.
Reforms The Gentry and the Serfs
The new system of local government introduced by Catherine the Great
m 1775 was closely related to the Pugachev rebellion, although it also
represented an attempt to bolster this perennially weak aspect of the ad-
ministration and organization of Russia Frightened by the collapse of au-
thority at the time of the revolt, the empress meant to strengthen govern-
ment in the provinces by means of deccntra Uzation, a clear distribution of
powers and functions, and local gentry participation She divided some
fifteen major administrative units, through which the country was governed
at the tune, to make a total of fifty units by the end of her reign "Each of
these gubemn — "governments” or “provinces” — 'vas subdivided into
some ten uezdy, or districts Every province contained about 300,000 in-
habitants and every district about 30,000, while historical and regional
262 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
considerations were completely disregarded in the drawing of the boun-
daries.
An appointed governor at the head of the administration of each prov-
ince was assisted by a complicated network of institutions and officials.
Catherine the Great tried — not too successfully — to separate the legis-
lative, executive, and judicial functions, without, of course, impairing her
autocracy or ultimate control from St. Petersburg. Local gentry partici-
pated in local administration, and were urged to display initiative and
energy in supporting the new system. The judicial branch too was organ-
ized, quite explicitly, on a class basis, with different courts and procedures
for different estates. Catherine the Great’s reform of local government was
apparently influenced by the example of England, more particularly by
Blackstonc’s views on the matter, and also by the example of the Baltic
provinces. The arrangement that she introduced lasted until the fundamen-
tal reform of 1864.
Catherine the Great’s scheme of local government fitted well into her
program of cooperating with and strengthening the landlords. Other meas-
ures contributing to the same purpose included the granting of corporate
representation and other privileges to the gentry. The incorporation of the
gentry began in earnest with the formation of district gentry societies in
1766-67, developed further through the legislation of 1775 concerning
local government, and reached its full development in the Charter to the
Nobility of 1785. The Charter represented the highwater mark of the posi-
tion and privileges of the Russian gentry. It recognized the gentry of each
district and province as a legal body headed by an elected district or
provincial Marshal of the Nobility. The incorporated gentry of a province
could petition the monarch directly in connection with issues which aroused
its concern, a right denied the rest of the population. Moreover, the
Charter confirmed the earlier privileges and exemptions of the landlords
and added certain new ones to give them a most advantageous and dis-
tinguished status. Members of llie gentry remained free from obligations
of personal service and taxation, and they became exempt from corporal
punishment. They could lose their gentry standing, estates, or life only by
court decision. The property rights of the landlords reached a new high;
members of the gentry were recognized as full owners of their estates,
without any restriction on the sale or exploitation of land, forests, or min-
eral resources; in case of forfeiture for crime, an estate remained within
the family. Indeed some scholars speak — exaggeratedly to be sure — of
Catherine the Great’s introducing the modern concept of private prop-
erty into Russia. Also in 1785, the empress granted a largely ineffective
charter to towns which provided for a quite limited city government con-
trolled by rich merchants.
As earlier, a rise in the position of the gentry meant an extension and
CATHERINE THE GREAT AND PAUL 263
strengthening of serfdom, a development which characterized Catherine
the GTeat s entire reign Serfdom spread to new areas, and in particular to
the Ukraine Although Catherines government ia essence confirmed an
already-existing s) stem in the Ukraine, it docs bear the responsibility for
helping to legalize serfdom m the Ukraine and for, so to speak, standardiz-
ing that evil throughout the empire A senes of laws, fiscal in nature, is-
sued in 1763-83, forbade Ukrainian peasants to leave 3n estate without
the landlord s permission and in general directed them ‘ to remain in their
place and calling Catherine the Great personally extended serfdom on
a large scale by her frequent and huge grants of state lands and peasants
to her favorites, beginning with the leaders of the coup of 1762 The total
number of peasants who thus became serfs has been variously estimated,
but it was m the order of several hundred thousand working males — the
usual way of counting peasants in imperial Russia — and well over a mil-
lion persons The census of 1794-96 indicated this growth of serfdom,
with the serfs constituting 53 1% of all peasants and 49% of the entire
population of the country As to the power of the masters over their serfs,
httle could be added, but the government nevertheless tntd its best it
became easier for the landlords to sentence their peasants to hard labor
in Sibena, and they were empowered to fetch the peasants back at will,
the serfs were forbidden, under a threat of harsh punishment, to petition
the empress or the government for redress against the landlords Catherine
the Great also instituted firmer control over the cossacks, abolishing the
famed Secb on the Dnieper in 1775 and limiting the autonomy of the Don
and the Ural * hosts Some of the Dnieper cossacks were transferred to
the Kuban nver to establish a Cossack force in the plain north or the Cau
easian mountains
Other government measures relating to land and people included a huge
survey of boundaries and titles — -an important step in legalizing and con-
firming landholdings — the above mentioned final secularization of vast
Church estates with some two million peasants who became subject to
the so-called College of Economy, and a program of colonization Colonists
were sought abroad, often on very generous conditions and at great cost,
to populate territories newly won from Turkey anil other areas, because
serfdom and government regulations drastically restricted the mobility of
the Russian people Elizabeth had already established Serbian communities
in Russia Catherine the Great sponsored mans more colonies of foreigners,
especially of Germans along the Volga and m southern Russia
Catherine Its efforts to promote the development of industry, trade,
and also education and culture in Russia will be treated m appropnate
chapters Briefly, in economic life the empress turned in certain respects
from rigid mercantilism to the newly popular ideas of free enterprise and
trade In culture she cut a broad swath A friend of the philosophes, one
264 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
who corresponded with Voltaire and arranged for Diderot to visit Russia
— unprofitable as it turned out — a writer and critic in her own right, and
a determined intellectual, Catherine the Great had plans and projects ior
everything, from general education to satirical reviews. Indeed, she con-
sidered it her main mission to civilize Russia. For this reason, too, she
established a Medical Collegium in 1763, founded hospitals, led the way
in the struggle against infectious diseases, and decreed that Russia be
equipped to produce its own medicines and surgical instruments. And,
again in the interests of civilization, the empress pioneered in introducing
some feeble measures to help the underprivileged, for example, widows and
orphans.
Foreign Affairs: Introductory Remarks
In spite of her concern with internal affairs, Catherine the Great paid
unflagging attention to foreign policy. Success and glory could be attained
by diplomacy as well as by enlightened reform at home, in war perhaps
even more than in peace. Assisted by such statesmen as Nikita Panin and
Potemkin and such generals as Rumiantsev and Suvorov, the empress
scored triumph after triumph on the international stage, resulting in a
major extension of the boundaries of the empire, the addition of millions
of subjects, and Russia’s rise to a new importance and eminence in Europe.
However, Catherine the Great’s foreign policy was by no means a novel
departure. New ideas did appear: for example, Panin’s early doctrine of a
northern accord or alliance of all leading northern European states to
counterbalance Austria, France, and Spain; and Potemkin’s celebrated
“Greek project,” which we shall discuss in its proper place. Bat, in
fact, these ideas proved ephemeral, and Russia continued on her old
course. As Russian historians like to put it, Peter the Great had solved one
of the three fundamental problems of Russian foreign relations: the
Swedish. Catherine the Great settled the other two: the Turkish and the
Polish. In addition to these key issues, the famous empress dealt with many
other questions, ranging from another Swedish war to the League of
Armed Neutrality and the need to face the shocking reality of the French
Revolution.
In foreign affairs, important events of the reign clustered in two brief
segments of time. The years 1768—74 witnessed the First Turkish War,
together with the first partition of Poland in 1772. Between 1787 and 1795
Russia participated in the Second Turkish War, 1787—92, a war against
Sweden, 1788-90, and the second and third partitions of Poland, 1793
and 1795. It was also during that time, of course, that Catherine the
Great became increasingly hostile to the French Revolution. Fortunately
for the empress. Great Britain was immersed in a conflict with its North
CATHERINE THE GREAT AND PAUL 2$S
American colonies during the latleT part of the First Turkish War, while
during the second crucial sequence of years all powers had to shift their
attention to revolutionary France.
Russia and Turkey
In their struggle against Turkey the Russians aimed to reach the Black
Sea and thus attain what could be considered their natural southern bound-
ary as well as recover fertile lands lost to Asiatic invaders since the days of
the Kievan state The Crimean Tartars, successors to the Golden Horde
in that area, had recognized the suzerainty of the Sultan of Turkey In push-
ing south Catherine the Great followed the tunc honored example of Mus-
covite tsars and such imperial predecessors as Peter the Great and Anne
The First Turkish War, 1768-74, was fought both on land and, more un-
usual for Russia, on sea A Russian army commanded by Rumiantsev
advanced into Bessarabia and the Balkans, scoring impressive victories
over large Turkish forces and appealing to the Chnsttaus to rise against
their masters, another Russian army invaded and eventually captured the
Crimea A Russian fleet under Alexis Orlov sailed from the Baltic to
Turkish waters and sank the Ottoman navy in the Bay of Chcsme on
July 6, 1770, however, it did not dare to try to force the Straits After
Alexis Orlov s expedition Russia maintained for a considerable pc nod of
tune a dtrect interest in the Mediterranean — witness Paul’s efforts at the
end of the century to gain Malta and the Ionian islands — and gave up its
attempt to obtain a permanent foothold there only in the reign of Alex-
ander I, under Bntish pressure In spite of the fact that the Russian drive
into the Balkans had bogged down, Turkey was ready in the summer of
1774 to make peace
By the Treaty of Kuchuk Kamarji, Russia received the strategic points
of Kinbum, Yenikale and Kerch in and near the Crimea as well as part
of the Black Sea coast, west and east of the peninsula, reaching almost
to the foot of the Caucasian range and including Azov The Crimean
Tartars were proclaimed independent, although they recognized the sultan
as caliph, that is, the religious leader of Islam Russia obtained the right of
free commercial navigation in Turkish waters, including permission to
send merchantmen through the Straits Moldavia and Wallachia were
returned to Turkey, but they were to be leniently ruled, and Russia re-
served the prerogative to intervene on their behalf Also, Russia acquired
the right to build an Orthodox church in Constantinople, while the Turks
promised to protect Christian churches and to accept Russian represents
tioris in behalf of the new church to be built in the capital The provisions
of Ihc treaty relating to Christians and Christian worship became the basis
of many subsequent Russian claims in regard to Turkey
266
RUSS.
IMPERIAL
Although the First Turkish War in Catherine the Great’s reign marked
the first decisive defeat of Turkey by Russia and although the Treaty of
Kucliuk Kainarji reflected the Russian victory, Russian aims had received
only partial satisfaction. Some of the northern .littoral of the Black Sea
remained Turkish, while the Crimea became independent. From the Otto-
man point of view, the war was a disaster which could only be remedied
by exaction of revenge and by restoration of Turkey’s former position
by force of arms. The unstable political situation in the Crimea added to
the tension. In 1783 Russia moved in to annex the Crimea, causing many
Crimean Tartars to flee to the sultan’s domain. By 1785 Russia had built
a sizable fleet in the Black Sea, with its main base in Sevastopol. At the
same time Potemkin made a great effort to populate and develop the newly-
won southern lands. The display which Potemkin put up for Catherine the
Great, Emperor Joseph II of Austria, and the Polish king Stanislav.' Ponia-
towski when they visited the area in early 1787 gave rise to the expression
“Potemkin villages,” i.e., pieces of stage decor which passed at a distance
for real buildings and communities. Actually, without minimizing Potem-
kin’s showmanship, recent studies by Soloveytchik and others indicate
that progress in southern Russia had proved to be real enough.
At that time Potemkin and Catherine the Great nursed very far-reaching
aims which came to be known as “the Greek project.” Roughly speaking,
the project involved conquering the Ottomans, or at least their European
possessions, and establishing — re-establishing the sponsors of the project
insisted — a great Christian empire centered on Constantinople. Catherine
the Great had her second grandson named Constantine, entrusted him to a
Greek nurse, and ordered medals struck with a reproduction of St, Sophia!
Austria finally agreed to allow the project after receiving assurance that
the new empire would be entirely separate from Russia and after an offer
of compensations in the Balkans and other advantages. Yet, like many
other overly ambitious schemes, the Greek project proved to be ephemeral.
Neither it nor its chief promoter Potemkin survived the Second Turkish
War.
Turkey declared war on Russia in 1787 after the Russians rejected an
ultimatum demanding that they evacuate the Crimea and the northern
Black Sea littoral. The Porte enjoyed the sympathy of several major Euro-
pean powers, especially Great Britain which almost entered the war in 1791,
and before long Sweden gave active support by attacking Russia. Catherine
the Great had Austria as her military ally. The Second Turkish War,
1787—92, was confined to land action. Russian troops led by Suvorov
scored a series of brilliant victories over Turkish forces, notably in 1790
when Suvorov stormed and won the supposedly impregnable fortress of
Ismail. Incidentally, it was Michael Kutuzov, the hero of 1812, who
first broke into Ismail. At the end of the war, Suvorov was marching on
CATHERINE THE GREAT AND PAUt 267
Constantinople By the Treaty of Jassy, signed on January 9. 1792, Russia
gained the fortress of Ochakov and the Black Sea shore up to the Dniester
River, while Turkey recognized Russian annexation of the Crimea Russia
had reached what appeared to be her natural boundaries in the south, the
Turkish problem could be considered essentially solved
The Partitioning of Poland
Catherine the Great’s Polish policy turned out to be as impressive as
her relations with Turkey In a sense the partitioning of Poland, on im-
portant European stale, represented a greater tour de force than the cap-
ture of a huge segment of a largely uninhabited steppe from the Ottomans
Bui, whereas the settlement with Turkey proved definitive and, as many
scholars have insisted, logical and natural, the same could not be asserted
by any stretch of the imagination in the ease of Poland Indeed, the parti-
tioning of that country left Russia and Europe with a constant source of
pain and conflict
It has often been sud, and with some reason, that Poland was ready
for partitioning in the second half of the eighteenth century Decentraliza-
tion and weakening of central power in that country rapidly gathered mo-
mentum from about the middle of the seventeenth century Elected kings
proved increasingly unable to control their unruly subjects The only
other seat of central authority, the se/m, or diet, failed almost entirely to
function Composed of instructed delegates from provincial diets, the sejm
m its procedure resembled a diplomatic congress more than a national legis
lature The objection of a single deputy, the notorious liberum \eto, would
defeat a given measure and, in addition, dissolve the sejm and abrogate all
legislation which it had passed prior to the dissolution Between 1652 and
1674, for example, forty eight of the fifty five diets were so dissolved,
almost one-third of them by the veto of a single deputy The only tradmonat
recourse when the sejm was dissolved consisted in proclaiming a confeder-
ation, that is, a gathering of the adherents of a given position, a confedera-
tion could no longer be obstructed by a liberum veto, and it tried to impose
its views by force The Polish political system has been described as “an-
archy tempered by civil war ”
The weakness of the Polish government acquired additional significance
because that government had to face many grave problems The Polish
king ruled over Poles, Lithuanians, White Russians, Ukrainians, and Jews,
not to mention smaller ethnic groups, over Catholics, Orthodox, Protestants,
and subjects of Hebrew faith He had to contend with an extremely strong
and independent gentry, which, composing some eight per cent of the
population, arrogated to itself all "Polish liberties,’ while keeping the bulk
of the people, the peasants, in the worst condition of serfdom imaginable
2 68 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
And be had to deal with powerful and greedy neighbors who surrounded
Poland on three sides.
The last point deserves emphasis, because, after all, Poland did not par-
tition itself: it was divided by three mighty aggressors. In fact, in the eight-
eenth century, Polish society experienced an intellectual and cultural re-
vival which began to spread to politics. Given time, Poland might well have
successfully reformed itself. But its neighbors were determined that it would
not have the time. It was the misfortune of Poland that precisely when its
political future began to look more promising, Catherine the Great finally
agreed to a plan of partition of the kind which Prussia and Austria had
been advancing from the days of Peter the Great.
The last king of Poland — and Catherine the Great’s former lover—
Stanislaw Poniatowski, who reigned from 1764 to 1795, tried to in-
troduce certain reforms but failed to obtain firm support from -Russia and
Prussia, which countries had agreed in 1764 to co-operate in Polish af-
fairs, In 1766-68 the allies reopened the issue of the dissidents, that is,
the Orthodox and the Protestants, and forced the Polish government to
grant them equal rights with the Catholics. That concession in turn led
to violent protest within Poland, the formation of the Confederation of
Bar, and civil war, with France lending some support to the Confederation,
and Turkey even using the pretext of defending “Polish liberties" to declare
war on Russia. Eventually Russian troops subdued the Confederates, and
the first partition of Poland came in 1772.
That unusual attempt to solve the Polish problem stemmed in large part
from complicated considerations of power politics: Russia had been so suc-
cessful in the Turkish War that Austria was alarmed for its position;
Frederick the Great of Prussia proposed the partition of a part of Poland as
a way to satisfy Catherine the Great’s expansionist ambitions and at the same
time to provide compensation for Austria — which in effect had taken the
initiative in 1769 by seizing and “re-incorporating” certain Polish border
areas — as well as to obtain for Prussia certain long-coveted Polish lands
which separated Prussian dominions. By the first partition of Poland
Russia obtained White Russian and Latvian Lithuania to the Dvina and
the Dnieper rivers with some 1,300,000 inhabitants; Austria received so-
called Galicia, consisting of Red Russia, with the city of Lemberg, or Lvov,
of a part of western Podolia, and 'of southern Little Poland, with a total
population of 2,650,000; Prussia took the so-called Royal, or Polish,
Prussia, except Danzig and Thorn. Although moderate in size and con-
taining only 580,000 people, the Prussian acquisition represented the
most valuable gain of the three from the political, military, and financial
points of view. In all, Poland lost about one-third of her territory and more
than a third of her population.
This disaster spurred the Poles finally to enact basic reforms. Changes
began in 1773 and culminated in the activities of the celebrated Foui
Years' Diet of 1788-92 and m the constitution of May 3, 1791 The
monarchy was to become hereditary, and the king obtained effective execu-
tive pov.ee, legislative authority was vested In a two-chamber diet with the
tower chamber in a dominant position, the hberurti \eto disappeared m
miinrtlv nil/- thr /h?t IfM'Sjjdffft rfnrptCfinhvM of I bf. Tnidlih-
270 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
a cabinet of ministers, organized along modern lines, was created and
made responsible to the diet. The Polish reform party profited from the
benevolent attitude of Prussia, which hoped apparently to obtain further
concessions from new Poland; Russia and Austria were again preoccupied
with a Turkish war. But the May constitution brought matters to a head.
While Prussia and Austria accepted it, Russia instigated the organization of
the Confederation of Targowica in defense of the old order in May 1792.
When the Russian army entered Poland on the invitation of the Confedcra-
ion, the Prussians reversed themselves and joined the invaders. The second
partition of Poland followed in January 1793. This time Russia took more
of Lithuania and most of the western Ukraine with a total of 3,000,000
inhabitants; Prussia seized Danzig, Thorn, and Great Poland with a com-
bined population of 1,000,000; Austria did not participate. In addition,
Russia obtained the right to move its troops into what remained of Poland
and control its foreign policy.
The Poles responded in March 1794 with a great national uprising led
by Thaddcus Kosciuszfco. But, in spite of their courage, their fight was hope-
less. The Poles were crushed by the Russians, commanded by Suvorov, and
the Prussians. Austria rejoined her allies to carry out the third partition
of Poland in October 1795. By its provisions, Russia acquired the re-
mainder of Lithuania and the Ukraine, with 1,200,000 inhabitants, as well
as the Duchy of Courland, where Russian influence had predominated from
the time of Empress Anne; Prussia took Mazovia, including Warsaw, with
1,000,000 people; Austria appropriated the rest of Little Poland, with
Cracow, and another 1,500,000 inhabitants. Poland ceased to exist as an
independent state.
The partitioning of Poland brought tragedy to the Poles. Its impact on
the successful aggressors is more difficult to assess. As Lord and other
historians have shown in detail, Prussia, Russia, and Austria scored a re-
markable, virtually unprecedented, diplomatic and military coup. They
dismembered and totally destroyed a large European state, eliminating an
old enemy, rival, and source of conflicts, while at the same time adding
greatly to their own lands, resources, and populations. Eastern Europe
fell under their complete control, with France deprived of her old ally.
Significantly, after the division of Poland, the three east European mon-
archies for a long time co-operated closely on the international scene —
partners in crime, if you will. Yet, even some of the philosopher praised
at least the first partition of Poland, calling it “a triumph of rationality.”
But the Poles thought differently and never accepted the dismemberment.
As a result, Poland, Polish rights, and Polish boundaries remained an un-
resolved problem, or series of problems, for Europe and the world all
the way to the Oder-Neisse line of today. For imperial Russia, the pat*
CATHERINE THE GREAT AND FAUl 271
Utioning of Poland resulted in, among other things, the Polish support of
Napoleon m 1812 and the great rebellions of 1831 and 1863
Russian scholars like to emphasize that the Russian case contrasted
sharply with those of Prussia and Austria tn the three partitions of
Poland Russia took old Russian lands once part of the Kievan state, popu
latcd principally by Orthodox Ukrainians and White Russians, whereas
the two German powers grabbed ethnically and historically Polish terri-
tory, the Russians therefore, came as liberators, the Prussians and the
Austrians as oppressors If Catherine the Great deserved blame, it was not
for her own acquisitions but for allowing Prussia and Austria to expand at
the expense of the poles Much can be said for this point of view, for it
states the facts of the dismemberment correctly, jet at least two caveats
seem In Order The brutal Russian policy toward Poland had to allow for
the interests of other aggressors and indeed led to further rcpartitiomng,
with Warsaw and the very heart of the divided country linked to Russia
in 1815 Also Catherine the Great herself cared little about the faith or the
ethnic origins of her new subjects She thought simply in terms of power
politics position and prestige — everything to the greater glory ot Rus-
sia and of course to her awn greater glory' After suppressing the Con
federation of Bar, Russian troops also suppressed a desperate uprising
of Ukrainian peasants against their Polish and polonized landlords These
landlords continued to dominate and exploit the masses quite as effectively
after the partitions as before them In fact, some Ukrainian historians have
complained that the oppression increased, because the strong Russian
government maintained law and order more successfully than had the weak
Polish authorities
Foreign Policy Certain Other Matters
Catherine the Greats foreign policy encompassed a wide range of ac-
tivities and interests m addition to the relations with Turkey and Poland
Important developments included the Russian role in the League of Armed
Neutrality, a war against Sweden, and the empress s reaction to the
Trench Revolution Russia advanced the doctrine of armed neutrality at sea
in 1780 to protect the commerce of non-combatant states against arbitrary
actions of the British who were engaged in a struggle with their American
colonies Several other European countries supported Russian proposals
which eventually became part of international maritime law Russia and
her partners in the League insisted that neutral ships could pass freely from
port to port and along the coast to combatants, that enemy goods in neu-
tral ships, except contraband, were not subject to seizure, and that to be
legal a blockade had to be enforced, rather than merely proclaimed
272 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
Sweden, as already mentioned, attacked Russia in 1788, when the Rus-
sian armies were engaged in fighting Turkey, The Swedes repeatedly threat-
ened St. Petersburg; however, the war proved inconclusive. The Treaty of
Werala signed in August 1790, merely confirmed the pre-war boundary.
Denmark, allied with Russia, participated in the hostilities against Sweden.
The French Revolution made a strong impression on Catherine the
Great. At first she tried to minimize the import of the events in France
and to dissociate them from the main course of European history and the
Enlightenment. But, as the Revolution became more radical, the empress
reacted with bitterness and hostility. At home she turned against critical
intellectuals and indeed against much of the cultural climate that she her-
self had striven so hard to create. In respect to revolutionary France, she
became more and more antagonistic and broke off relations in 1793 after
the execution of Louis XVI. Of course, she also used the confusion and
disarrangement produced in Europe by the French Revolution to carry
out the second and third partitions of Poland without interference. Some
historians believe that only the empress’s sudden deatli prevented her from
joining a military coalition against France.
Evaluations of Catherine the Great
Much has been written for and against Catherine the Great. The
sovereign’s admirers have included many intellectuals, from eighteenth-
century philosophes led by Voltaire to Sidney Hook, who not long ago
proclaimed her an outstanding example of the hero who makes history. The
empress has received praise from numerous historians, in particular special-
ists in the cultural development, foreign relations, and expansion of Rus-
sia, including such judicious scholars as B. Nolde and Isabel de Madariaga.
A few, for instance V. Leontovich, also commended her policy toward the
gentry, in which they saw the indispensable first step in the direction of
liberalism — rights, privileges, and advantages had to be acquired first by
the top social group, and only after that could they percolate downward.
The critics of Catherine the Great, who have included many pre-
revolutionary Russian historians as well as the Soviet scholars as a group,
have concentrated overwhelmingly on the empress's social policy and the
social conditions during her reign. Above aU, they have castigated the
reign as the zenith of serfdom in Russia. For this reason many of them
would deny that Catherine II, in spite of her display and championing of
culture, was an enlightened despot in the sense in which this term would
apply to Emperor Joseph II of Austria, who did care for the masses. Even
though very few social historians have ascribed personally to die empress
a fundamental influence on the evolution of Russian society, they have
CATHERINE THE CHEAT AND PAUL 27j
been repelled by the contrast between her professedly progressive views
and her support of serfdom, as well os by the case and thoroughness of
her accommodation to that great evil Her immediate successors, Paul and
Alexander I, showed different attitudes
But whatever judgment we make of the empress — and it should be
clear that the views mentioned above rarely clash directly covering as they
do different aspects of Catherine the Greats activity — wc must recognize
the importance of her reign In foreign policy, with the acquisition of south-
ern Russia and the partitioning of Poland, in internal affairs, With the de-
velopment of serfdom and of the gentry position and privileges, and in
culture, with striking progress in Westernization, the time of Catherine
the Great marked a culmination of earlier trends and set the stage for
Russian history in the nineteenth century But before we turn to Russia in
the nineteenth century, we have to consider the reign of Paul and some
broad aspects of the evolution of Russia from Peter the Great to Alex-
ander I
The Reign of Pout
Emperor Paul was forty two years old when he ascended the throne
In the course of the decades during which his mother had kept him away
from power be came to hate her, her favorites, her advisers, and every-
thing she stood for Reversing Catherine the Great’s decisions and undoing
her work was therefore, one salient trait of Paul s brief reign, I796-IS01
Another stemmed directly from bis character and can best be described
as petty tyranny Highly suspicious irritable, and given to frequent out-
breaks of rage, the emperor promoted and demoted his assistants with
dazzling rapidity and often for no apparent reason He changed the drill
and the uniforms of the Russian army, himself entering into the minutest
details, imperial military reviews inspired terror in the participants Paul
generously freed from prison and exile those punished by Catherine the
Great, including liberal and radical intellectuals and leaders of the Polish
rebellion such as KosciuS2ko But their places were quickly taken by others
who had m some manner displeased the sovereign and the number of the
victims kept mounting Above all, the emperor insisted on his autocratic
power and majesty even in small things like dancing at a palace festival
and saluting As Paul reportedly informed the French ambassador, the
only important person m Russia was the one speaking to the emperor,
and only while he was so speaking With the same concept of the majesty
of the Russian monarchy in mind, and also rcaclfng, no doubt, to his own
long and painful wait for the crown, Paul changed the law of succession to
the Russian throne at the time of his coronation in 1797 primogeniture
274
IMPERIAL RUSSIA
in the male line replaced Peter the Great’s provision of free selection by the
reigning monarch. Russia finally acquired a strictly legal and stable system
of succession to the throne.
The emperor’s views and attitudes found reflection in his treatment of
the crucial problem of serfdom and the gentry. On the one hand Paul
continued Catherine the Great’s support and promotion of serfdom by
spreading it to extreme southern Russia, so-called New Russia, in 1797
and by distributing state lands and peasants to his favorites at an even
faster rate than had his mother. Also, he harshly suppressed all peasant
disturbances and tolerated no disobedience or protest on the part of the
lower classes. Yet, on the other hand, Paul did not share his mother’s con-
fidence in and liking for the gentry. For this reason he tried for the first
time to regulate and limit the obligations of the serfs to their masters by
proclaiming in 1797 that they should work three days a week for their
landlords and three days for themselves, with Sunday sanctified as a
day of rest. Although Paul’s new law was not, and possibly could not be,
enforced, it did represent a turning point in the attitude of the Russian
government toward serfdom. From that time on limitation and, eventu-
ally, abolition of serfdom became real issues of state policy. The emperor
gave further expression to his displeasure with the gentry through such
measures as the restoration of corporal punishment for members of that
class as well as for the townspeople, and through increased reliance on the
bureaucracy in preference to the gentry in local self-government and in
general administration.
It was in the field of foreign policy and especially of war that Paul’s
reign left its most lasting memory. Just before her death, Catherine the
Great had come close to joining an anti-French coalition. Paul began with
a declaration of the Russian desire for peace, but before long he too,
provoked by French victories and certain mistakes of tact on the part of
France, turned to the enemies of the revolutionary government. Russia
entered the war against France as a member of the so-called Second Coali-
tion, organized in large measure by Paul and composed of Russia, Great
Britain, Austria, Naples, Portugal, and Turkey. In the campaigns that
followed, a Russian fleet under the command of Theodore Ushakov sailed
through the Straits, seized the Ionian Islands from the French, and es-
tablished there a Russian-controlled republic under the protectorate of
Turkey. Russian influence extended even further west in the Mediterranean,
for Paul had accepted his election as the grand master of the Knights of
Malta and thus ruler of that strategic island.
The main theater of operations, however, remained on land. Russian
troops joined allied armies in the Low Countries and in Switzerland, bnt
their most effective intervention took place in northern Italy. There a force
CATHERINE THE GREAT AND PAUL 275
of 18,000 Russians and 44,000 Austrians led by Suvorov drove out the
French tn the course of five months in 1798-99, winning three major bat*
ties and about a dozen lesser engagements and capturing some 25 fortresses
and approximately 80,000 prisoners Suvorov wanted to Invade France
Instead, because of defeats on other fronts and the change of plans in
the allied high command, he had to TCtreat In 1799-1800 to southern
Germany through the Swiss Alps held by a French force His successfully
managing the retreat has been considered one of the great feats of military
history On the whole, Suvorov, who died very shortly after the Swiss cam-
paign at the age of seventy, is regarded as the ablest military commander
Russia ever produced — and this is a high honor The qualities of this eccen-
tric and unpredictable general included heavy reliance on speed and
thrust and remarkable psychological rapport with his soldiers
Disgusted with Austria and also with Great Britain, which failed to
support Russian troops adequately in the Netherlands, Paul abandoned
the coalition In fact, m 1800 he switched sides and joined France, con-
sidering the rise of Napoleon to be a guarantee of stability and the end
o! the revolution The new alignment pitted Russia against Great Britain
Having lost Malta to the British, Paul, m a fantastic move, sent the Don
cossacks to invade distant India over unmapped territory The empcror‘s
death interfered at this point, and Alexander I promptly recalled the
cossacks
Paul was killed in a palace revolution in March 1801 Hts rudeness,
violent temperament, and unpredictable behavior helped the conspiracy
to grow even among the emperor’s most trusted associates and indeed
within his family His preference for the troops trained at his own estate
of Gatchina antagonized, and seemed to threaten, the guards The em-
peror’s turning against Great Britain produced new enemies Count Peter
Pahlen, the military governor of St Petersburg, took an active part in the
plot, whereas Grand Duke Alexander, Paul’s son and heir, apparently as-
sented to it It remains uncertain whether murder entered into the plans of
the conspirators — Alexander, it seems, had not expected it — or whether
it occurred by accident
XXIII
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIA
IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
Serfdom in its fullness lasted longer in Russia than in Western coun-
tries because its economic disadvantages did not earlier outweigh its
advantages; because the increase of population did not cause suffi-
ciently acute land shortage among the peasantry until the first half of
the nineteenth century; because the middle classes were weak in com-
parison with the serf-owners; because humanitarian and other ideas
of the value of the individual spirit were little developed; because the
reaction against the ideas of the French Revolution strengthened the
vis inertias inherent in any long-established institution; lastly, because
serfdom was not merely the economic basis of the serf-owners but
also a main basis of the Russian state in its immense task of somehow
governing so many raw millions.
SUMNER
It is significant that none of the contemporary western European
authors who have written on Russian economics in the late eighteenth
century and the early nineteenth speaks of Russia as an economically
backward country. In fact, during some part of the eighteenth century,
Russian industry, at least in some branches, was ahead not only of all
the other Continental countries but of England as well. This was par-
ticularly true of the metal industries. In the middle of the eighteenth
century Russia was the world’s largest producer of both iron and
copper, and it was not until the 1770’s in the case of copper, and the
very end of the century in the case of iron, that English production
became equal to that of Russia.
KARPOVICH
As we have already had occasion to observe, the reign of Peter the
Great marked an important divide in the economic and social development
of Russia as well as in the political history of the country. One of the most
significant and least explained changes occurred in the nature of the
population curve, which, it might be added, paralleled the curves in other
European countries; whereas the population of Russia apparently remained
largely stationary for a century and longer prior to the time of Peter the
Great, and whereas it might have decreased during the reformer’s hard
reign, it rose rapidly from then on. Within the Russian boundaries of 1725
there lived some thirteen million people in that year, nineteen million in
1762, and twenty-nine million in 1796. Counting approximately seven
million new subjects acquired as a result of Catherine the Great’s suc-
276
ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY 1700-1800 277
ccssful foreign policy, the Russian Empire hail by the end of the eighteenth
century over thirty six million inhabitants
In addition to the immediate increase in population, the expansion of
Russia m the eighteenth century produced a number of other results
important for the economic life of the country Peter the Greats victory m
the Great Northern War gave his state access to the Baltic, and citizens of
such ports as Riga, who were more proficient in navigation and com-
merce than the Russians, were then brought into the empire ‘ A window
into Europe * referred as much to economic affairs as to culture or poll
tics Catherine the Greats huge gams from the partitions of Poland also
brought Russia closer to other European countries and Included towns and
areas with a relatively more developed economy Both the German land-
lords of the Baltic region and the Polish or Polomzed gentry of what came
to be known as the western provinces were in certain respects more ad-
vanced than their Russian counterparts The acquisiuons to the south
proved similarly significant Catherine the Great’s success fn the two
Turkish wars opened vast fertile lands of southern Russia — a further
extension of what had been obtained in the preceding decades and cen-
turies — for colonization and development, and established the empire
firmly on the Black Sea Although serfdom restricted mobility, popula-
tion tn the south grew rapidly by means of voluntary migration and the
transfer of serfs and state peasants In the words of one histonan con-
cerned with the density of population
Prior to the eighteenth century a comparatively dense and settled poputa-
lion in the Russian Empire was to be found only m the center of the
plains of European Russia the region of Moscow with the immediately
adjoining provinces, and the upper valley of the Volga Somewhat less
densely seltled were the northern part of the Ukraine, and the ancient
Smolensk and Novgorod regions, to the west and northwest of Moscow
respectively Finally, starting from central Russia n narrow strip of
fairly dense settlement stretched out toward Archangel, along the met
Dvina and another strip was to be found along the middle course of the
Volga and farther east in the direction of Siberia To this limited area
of comparatively dense settlement now was added a vast territory m the
south and the southeast of European Russia
/4 £71 Culm re and Other Occupattons
Differentiation accompanied expansion The fertile, mostly 1 black-earth "
agricultural areas of the south became more and more distinct from the
wore barren regions of the center and north The system of barshchma,
that is, of work for one’s master, prevailed in the south, that of obrot, or
payments to the landlord in kind or money, in the north On the rich black
278 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
earth of the south the serfs tilled their masters’ fields as well as their own
plots, and they also performed other tasks for the master such as cutting
firewood or mowing hay. In addition to the increase in grain and other
agricultural products, cattle-raising developed on. a large scale. The land-
lords generally sold the products of their economy on the domestic market
but toward the end of the century export increased.
In the provinces of the center and north, where the earth was not so
fertile, the obrok, or quitrent, practice grew. There only modest harvests
of rye and other grains suitable to the rigorous climate could be obtained
from the soil, so that the peasant population had to find different means
to support itself and to discharge its obligations to the landlord and the
state. Special crafts developed in various localities. In some places peasants
produced iron implements, such as locks, knives, and forks; in others they
made wooden utensils, spoons, cups, plates, toys, and the like, or leather
goods. Where no such subsidiary local occupations emerged, many peasants
left their homes periodically, especially for the winter, to find work else-
where. Often groups of peasants sought employment together in associa-
tions known as arteli — singular artel — and became carpenters, house-
painters, or construction workers. Others earned money in industrial pro-
duction, transportation, or petty trade. These varied earnings, together with
their meager agriculture, made it possible for a large number of peasants to
pay their quitrent to the landlord, meet their obligations, and support them-
selves and their families — although at a very low standard of living. It
has been estimated that about one quarter of the peasant population of the
less fertile provinces left their villages for winter employment elsewhere.
The great extent and the continuing expansion of agriculture in Russia
did not mean that it was modem in technique or very productive. Russian
agriculture remained rather primitive, and, because of the backward tech-
nique of cultivation, even excellent land gave relatively low yields. Serfdom
contributed heavily to the inefficient use of labor and to rural overpopula-
tion. In agriculture Westernization came very slowly indeed. By the end
of the century, in spite of the efforts of the Free Economic Society es-
tablished in 1765 and a few other groups as well as certain individuals, no
substantial modernization had occurred. As Marxist historians have re-
peatedly emphasized, serfdom with its abundant unskilled labor still could
effectively satisfy the needs of the rather sluggish and parochial Russian
rural economy in the eighteenth century.
Industry and Labor Force
In a sense, the Russians during that period made greater advances in
industry. The number of factories grew from 200 or 250 at the time of
ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY 17 0 0-18 0 0 279
Peter the Great’s death to 1,200 by the end of the century, to cite one
opinion, or possibly even over 3,000, if the smallest manufacturing es-
tablishments are included The total number of workers rose to a
considerable figure which has been variously estimated between 100,000
and 225,000 Many factories employed hundreds of hands, with the high-
est known number in the neighborhood of 3,500 The vitally important
mining and metal industries developed so spectacularly as to give Rus-
sia a leading position m Europe m this type of production The Ural area
produced at that tune some 90 per cent of Russian copper and some 65
per cent of the pig iron Lesser centers of metal industry existed in
Olonets, which is In the north near the Finnish border, and in Tula, south
of Moscow The textile industry flounshed In and around Moscow and
in some neighboring provinces and, to a lesser extent, in the St Petersburg
area A number of other industries also developed in eighteenth-century
Russia
However, in the context of Russian society, the acquisiUon of a suitable
labor force often created special problems, Russian manufacturing estab-
lishments reflected and in turn affected the social structure of the empire
Thus, in addition to owning and operatmg some factories outright, the
state established in areas of scarce labor supply numerous "possessional
factories, ” which were operated by merchants and to which stale peasants
were attached as possessional workers ” They were, in fact, industrial
serfs, but they belonged to a factory, not to an individual These pos-
sessional factones acquired special prominence in heavy industry Some
landlords, in their turn, set up manorial factones, especially for light in-
dustry, where they utilized the bonded labor of their serfs Nevertheless,
free labor also played an increasingly important role in the industrial
development of Russia in the eighteenth century Ever when it represented,
as it often did, the labor of someone else’s serfs out to earn their quitrent, it
led to new, more ' capitalistic,” relationships in the factories Soviet studies,
for example those of Khromov and Poliansky, in contrast to some earlier
Marxist works, such as Liashchenko’s well-known writings, have empha-
sized the large scope and vital importance of this free labor and of so-called
“merchant” or “capitalist" enterprises based on that labor For instance,
m the middle of the century merchants owned some 70 per cent of texule
factones in Russia as well as virtually the entire industry of the Moscow
and St Petersburg regions
In addition to government managers, merchants, and gentry en-
trepreneurs, businessmen of a different background, including peasants and
even serfs, made their appearance In a number of instances, peasant
crafts were gradually industrialized and some former serfs became factory
owners, as, for example, in the case of the textile industry in and around
,&UcU
k. Tron o:-c mining 4 0>p pur Smelter'S li? Gloscrrtjking
' Iron foundries £ smelters - 0 Copper processing > -Q Leather process
■ Metal processing ITTexfeifes •**■' Shipbuilding
! Hand-operated blast Furnaces, ^.Sailcloth Europe O Principal. Fairs
Ivanovo-Voznesensk in central European Russia. Indeed, if we are .to fpl- -
low Poliansky’s statistics, peasant participation in industry. -grew . very ■ .
rapidly and became widespread in the last quarter of the century.
In eighteenth-century Russia the state engaged directly in Industrial
development but also encouraged private enterprise. This encouragement .
was plainly evident in such measures as the abolition of '.various, re- :., ;
ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY J700-1800 281
strictions on entering business — not-ibly making n possible lor the gentry
to fake part m every phase of economic fife — and the protective tariffs of
1782 and 1793
Trade
Trade also grew m eighteenth-century Russia Domestic commerce was
stimulated by the repeal of internal tariffs that culminated in Empress
Elizabeth’s legislation In 1753, by ihe building of new canals following
the example of Peter the Great, by territorial acquisitions, and especially
by the quickened tempo and increasing diversity of economic life In
particular, the ferule south sent its agricultural surplus to the center end
the north in exchange for products of industries and crafts, while the coun
tryside as a whole supplied the cities and towns with gram and other
foods and raw materials Moscow was the most important center of internal
commerce as well as the main distribution and transit point for foreign
trade Other important domestic markets included St Petersburg, Riga,
Archangel, towns in the heart of the gram producing area such as Penza,
Tambov and Kaluga and Volga ports like larostavl, Nizhnu Novgorod,
Kazan and Saratov In distant Sibcn3, Tobolsk, Tomsk, and Irkutsk de-
veloped as significant commercial as well as administrative centers Many
large fairs and uncounted small ones assisted the trade cycle The best
known among them included the celebrated fair next to the Monastery of St
Macarius on the Volga m the province of Ntzhnu Novgorod the fair near
the southern steppe town of Kursk, and the Irbit fair in the Ural area
Foreign trade developed rapidly, especially in the second half of the cen-
tury The annual ruble value of both exports and imports more than tripled
»n die course of Catherine the Greats reign, an impressive achievement
even after we make a certain discount for inflation After the Russian vie
lory in the Great Northern War, the Baltic ports such as St Petersburg,
Riga, and Hbau became the main avenue of trade with Russia, and they
maintained this dominant position into the nineteenth century Russia
exported to other European countries umber, hemp, flax, tallow, and some
other raw materials, together with iron products and certain textiles,
notably canvas for sails Also the century saw the beginning of the grain
trade which was later to acquire great prominence This trade became pos
siblc on a large scale after Catherine the Great's acquisition of southern
Russia and the development of Russian agriculture there as well as the con-
struction of the Black Sea ports, notably Odessa which was won from the
Turks in 1792 and transformed into a port tn 1794 Russian imports con-
sisted of wine, fruits, coffee, sugar, and fine cloth as well as manufactured
goods Throughout the eighteenth century exports greatly exceeded imports
in value Great Britain remained the best Russian customer, accounting for
282 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
something like half of Russia’s tola! European trade. The Russians con-
tinued to be passive in their commercial relations with the West; foreign
businessmen who came to St. Petersburg and other centers in the empire
handled the transactions and carried Russian products away in foreign
ships, especially British and Dutch. Russia also engaged in commerce
with Central Asia, the Middle East, and even India and China, channeling
goods through the St. Macarius Fair, Moscow, Astrakhan, and certain other
locations. A considerable colony of merchants from India lived in Astrakhan
in the eighteenth century.
The Peasants, the Gentry, and Other Classes
Eighteenth-century Russia was overwhelmingly rural. In 1724, 97 per
cent of its population lived in the countryside and 3 per cent in towns; by
1796 the figures had shifted slightly to 95.9 per cent as against 4.1 per
cent. The great bulk of the people were, of course, peasants. They fell into
two categories, roughly equal in size, serfs and state peasants. Toward
the end of the century the serfs constituted 53.1 or even 55 per cent of
the total peasant population. As outlined in earlier chapters, the position
of the serfs deteriorated from the reign of Peter the Great to those of Paul
and Alexander I and reached its nadir around 1 800. Increasing economic
exploitation of the serfs acompanied their virtually complete dependence
on the will of their masters, without even the right to petition for redress.
It has been estimated that the obrok increased two and a half times in
money value between 1760 and 1800, while the barshchina grew from
three to four and in some cases even five or more days a week. It was this
striking expansion of the barshchina that Emperor Paul tried to stem with
his ineffectual law of 1797. Perhaps the most unfortunate were the
numerous household serfs who had no land to till, but acted instead as
domestic servants or in some other capacity within the manorial household.
This segment of the population expanded as landlords acquired new tastes
and developed a more elaborate style of life. Indeed, some household serfs
became painters, poets, or musicians, and a few even received education
abroad. But, as can be readily imagined, it was especially the household
serfs who were kept under the constant and complete control of their
masters, and their condition could barely be distinguished from slavery.
State peasants fared better than serfs, although their obligations, too, in-
creased in the course of the century. At best, as in the case of certain areas
in the north, they maintained a reasonable degree of autonomy and prosper-
ity. At worst, as exemplified by possessional workers, their lot could not
be envied even, by the serfs. On the whole the misery of the Russian
countryside provides ample explanation for the Pugachev rebellion and for
repeated lesser insurrections which occurred throughout the century.
ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY 1700-1 800 283
By contrast, the eighteenth century, especially the second half during
the reign of Catherine the Great, has been considered the golden age of
Russian gentry Constituting a little over one per cent of the population,
this class certainly dominated the life of the country \V tth the lessening and
finally the abolition of their service obligations, the landlords took a greater
interest in their estates, and some of them al»o pursued other lines of
economic activity, such as manufacturing The State Lending Bank, es-
tablished by Catherine the Great in 1786, had as its mam task the sup-
port of gentry landholding Moreover, it was the gentry more than any
other social group that experienced Wesierni ration most fully and dc
veloped the first modern Russian culture And of course, the gentry con
tinned to surround the throne, to supply officers for the army, and to fill
administrative posts
While the gentry prospered the position of the clergy and their de-
pendents declined This sizable group of Russians about one per cent of
the total — it should be remembered that Orthodox priests marry and
raise families — suflered from the anti ecclesiastical spirit of the age and
especially from the secularization of Church lands in 1764 In return for
vast Church holdings populated by serfs the Church received an annua)
subsdy of 450 000 rubles representing about one-third of the revenues
from the land and utterly insufficient 10 support the clergy With time and
inflation the value of the subsidy dropped Never rich, the Russian priests
became poorer and more insecure financially after 1764 They had to
depend almost entirely on fees and donations from theic usually im-
poverished parishioners In the country especially the style of life of the
priests and their families differed little from that of peasants In post
Pctnnc Russia, in contrast to some other European states, the clergy had
little wealth or prestige
Most of the peasants, the gentry, and the clergy lived in rural areas
The bulk of the town inhabitants were divided into three legal categories
merchants, artisans and workers These classes were growing for instance,
peasants who established themselves as manufacturers or otherwise suc-
cessfully entered business became merchants Nevertheless none of these
classes were numerous or prominent tn eighteenth-century Russia As usual,
it was the government that tned to stimulate initiative public spirit, and a de-
gree of participation In local affairs among the townsmen by such means as
the creation of guilds and the charter of 1785 granting urban self govern-
ment As usual, too, these efforts failed
Ftnnncc Concluding Remarks
The fiscal policies of tbe state deserve notice The successors of Peter
the Great, not unlike the reformer himself, ruled in ® situation of continu-
284
IMPERIAL RUSSIA
ous financial crisis. The state revenue rose from 8.5 million rabies in
1724 to 19.4 million in 1764 and over 40 million in 1794. But expenses
tended to grow still more rapidly, amounting to 49.1 million in the last
year mentioned. Of that sum, 46 per cent went to the army and the navy,
20 per cent to the state economy, 12 per cent for administration and jus-
tice, and 9 per cent to maintain the imperial court. A new item also
appeared in the reign of Catherine the Great: this was the state debt, which
accounted for 4.5 per cent of the total state expenses in 1794. To make up
the difference between revenue and expenses, the government borrowed at
home and, beginning in 1769, borrowed abroad too, mainly in Holland,
The government also issued paper money on a large scale, especially after
the outbreak of the Second Turkish War. By the end of Catherine the
Great’s reign a paper ruble was worth only 68 per cent of its metallic
counterpart. Taxes remained heavy and oppressive.
In effect, the rulers of imperial Russia, perhaps even more than the
Muscovite tsars who preceded them, insisted on living beyond their
means and thus strained the national economy to the limit. Although a
poor, backward, overwhelmingly agricultural, and illiterate country, Rus-
sia had a large and glorious army, a complex bureaucracy, and one of the
most splendid courts in Europe. With the coming of Westernization, the
tragic, and as it turned out fatal, gulf between the small enlightened and
privileged segment at the top and the masses at the bottom became wider
than ever. We shall consider this again when we deal with Russian culture
in the eighteenth century and, indeed, throughout our discussion of im-
perial Russian history.
RUSSIAN CULTURE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
The new culture burn as a result of the Petrine revolution constituted
in the beginning nothing but & heterogeneous collection of imported
articles but the new elite assimilated them so rapidly that by the
end of the eighteenth century there already existed a Russian culture,
more homogeneous and more stable than the old one That culture
was Russian m the strictest sense of the word expressing emotional
states and creating values that were properly Russian and iX the
people no more than half understood it this transpired not because it
was not sufficiently national, but because the people were not yet a
nation
SVEtHLE
A mixture of tongues.
The language of T ranee with that of Nizhnil Novgorod
CMOEKJV
The eighteenth century constitutes a distinct period in the history of
Russian culture On one hand it matked a decisive break with the Mus-
covite past, although, as wc know, tf\3t break had been foreshadowed
and assisted by certain influences and trends Peter the Great’s violent
activity was perhaps most revolutionary in the domain of culture All of a
sudden, skipping entire epochs of scholasticism. Renaissance, and Reforma-
tion, Russia moved from a parochial, ecclesiastical, cjuast-mcdiesal civili-
zation to the Age of Reason On the other hand, Russian culture of the
eighteenth century also differed significantly from the culture of the fol-
lowing penods From the beginning of Peter the Great’s reforms to the
death of Catherine the Great, the Russians applied themselves to the
huge and fundamental task of learntng from the West They still had much
to learn after 1800, of course, nonetheless, by that time they had ac-
quired and developed a comprehensive and well integrated modem cul-
ture of their own, which later on attracted attention and adaptation
abroad The eighteenth century in Russia then was an age of apprenticeship
and imitation par excellence It has been said that Peter the Great, during
the first decades of the century, borrowed Western technology, that Empress
Elizabeth, in the middle of the period, shifted the mam interest to Western
fashtons and manners, and that Catherine the Great, in the course of the
last third of the century, brought Western ideas into Russia Although
much too simple, this scheme has some truth It gives an indication of
285
286 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
the stages in the Russian absorption of Western culture, and it suggests
that by 1800 the process had spread to everything from artillery to
philosophy.
The Russian Enlightenment
The culture of the Enlightenment, which Russia borrowed, had a
number of salient characteristics. It represented notably the triumph of
secularism and thus stood in sharp contrast to the Church-centercd
civilization of Muscovy. To be sure. Orthodoxy remained in imperial Rus-
sia and even continued, in a sense, to be linked to the state and occupy a
high position. But instead of being central to Russian life and culture, it
became, at least as far as the government and the educated public were
concerned, a separate and rather neglected compartment. Moreover, within
this compartment, to follow Florovsky and other specialists, one could
detect little originality or growth. The secular philosophy which dominated
the stage in eighteenth-century Europe emphasized reason, education, and
the ability of enlightened men to advance the interests of society. The last
point applied especially to rulers, so-called enlightened despots, who Iiadlhc
greatest means at their disposal to direct the life of a country. These views
fitted imperial Russia remarkably well. Indeed, because of the magnitude
and the lasting impact of Peter the Great’s efforts to modernize his state,
he could be considered the outstanding enlightened despot, although a
very early one, while Catherine the Great proved only too eager to claim
that title.
In addition to the all-pervasive government sponsorship, Enlighten-
ment came to Russia through the educated gentry. After the pioneer years
of Peter the Great, with liis motley group of foreign and Russian assistants,
the gentry, as we know, increasingly asserted itself to control most
phases of the development of the country. Despite some striking indi-
vidual exceptions, modern Russian culture emerged as gentry culture and
maintained that character well into the nineteenth century. It became the
civilization of an educated, aristocratic elite, with its salons and its knowl-
edge of French, a civilization which showed more preoccupation with an
elegant literary style and proper manners than with philosophy or politics.
Nonetheless, this culture constituted the first phase of modern Russian in-
tellectual and cultural history and the foundation for its subsequent de-
velopment.
Education
- The glitter of the age of Catherine the Great was still far away when
Peter the Great began his work of educating the Russians. Of necessity.
culture* 1700-1800 287
hts efforts were aimed in many directions and dealt with a variety of funda-
mental matters As early as 1700 he arranged for publication of Ru«m
books by a Dutch press; several years later the publishing was transferred
to Russia Six hundred different books published m the reign of the re-
former have come down to our time In 1702 the fust Russian newspaper,
Vedomosti or News, began to be published, ihe monarch himself editing
its first issue Next Peter the Great took part in reforming the alphabet to
produce what came to be known as the civil Russian alphabet Composed
of Slavonic, Greek, and Latin letters, the new alphabet represented a con-
siderable simplification of the old Slavonic The old alphabet was allowed
for Church books, but, following a decree m early 1710, all other works
had to use the new system Also, Peter the Great introduced Arabic
numerals to replace the cumbersome Slavonic ones
peter the Great sent, altogether, hundreds of young Russians to study
abroad, and he Opened schools of new types in Russia For example, as
early as 1701 he established in Moscow a School of Mathematical and
Ny»S'MsOSY2v\ Sciences RssenVwdly a secondary school, that tntmtvAvon
stressed the teaching of arithmetic, geometry, trigonometry, astronomy,
and geography The number of its students reached five hundred by 1715,
and two elementary schools were founded to prepare Russian boys to
enter it In 1715 a Naval Academy for three hundred pupils opened in St
Petersburg Moscow, in turn, received an artillery and an engineering
academy of the S3tne general pattern Some other special schools, such as
the so-called “admiralty” and ’mathematical” ones, also appeared m the
course of the reign In 1716, in an attempt to develop a broader educa-
tional system, the government opened twelve elementary "cypher * schools
in provincial towns By 1722 their number had increased to forty-two In
1706 a medical school with a student body of fifty began instruction in
Moscow, m 1709 another medical school, this time with thirty students,
started functioning in St Petersburg Peter I also organized small classes
to study such special subjects as Chinese and Japanese and the languages
of some non-Russi3D peoples vathitv the empire In addition to establish-
ing state schools, the reformer tried »o improve and modernize those of the
Church Finally, education in Russia expanded by means of private schools
w hich began to appear m the course of his reign
peter the Great’s measures to promote enlightenment in Russia also in-
cluded the founding of a museum of natural science and a large general
library in St Petersburg Both were opened free to the public But the
reformer’s most ambitious cultural undertaking was the creatiort of the
Imperial Academy of Science Although the Academy came into being
only some months after Peter the Great’s death, it represented the realiza-
tion of a major project of the reformer’s last years The Academy had three
departments, the mathematical, physical, and historical, as well as a sec-
288
!MPE
AL
USS'
tion for the arts. The academicians gave instruction, and a high school
was attached to the Academy to prepare students for this advanced educa-
tion. Although the Academy operated at first on a small scale and con-
sisted of only seventeen specialists, all of them foreigners, it became be-
fore long, as intended, the main directing center of science and scholarship
in the Russian Empire. The enormously important Academy of Sciences
of the U.S.S.R. stems directly from the Petrine Academy. It has been noted
repeatedly, sometimes with an unbecoming derision, that Russia obtained
an Academy of Sciences before it acquired elementary schools — a signifi-
cant comment on the nature of Peter the Great’s reforms and the role of
the state in eighteenth-century Russian culture.
After the death of Peter the Great, there followed a certain decline in
education in Russia. Once the government relaxed its pressure, state
schools tended to empty and educational schemes to collapse. Church
schools, which were much less dependent on the reformer, survived better.
They were to produce many trained Russians, some of whom became
prominent in a variety of activities in the eighteenth and subsequent cen-
turies. On the whole, however. Church schools served Church needs, i.e,
the training of the clergy, and stood apart from the main course of educa-
tion in Russia. With the rise of the gentry in the eighteenth century, ex-
clusive gentry schools whose graduates were given certain privileges became
increasingly important. Peter the Great’s artillery and engineering acade-
mics were restricted to members of that class, while new cadet schools
were opened under Empress Anne and her successors to prepare sons of
the nobility to assume the duties of army officers, in contrast to the first
emperor’s insistence on rising through the ranks. Home education, often
by foreign tutors, also developed among the gentry. Increasing attention
was given to good manners and the social etiquette that the Russians began
to learn from tire West at the time of Peter the Great's reforms: the first
emperor had a manual on social etiquette, A Mirror j or Youth, translated
from the German as early as 1717. In the education of the gentry much
rime and effort were devoted to such subjects as proper bearing in society,
fencing, and dancing, as well as to French and sometimes to other foreign
languages. As noted in the scheme mentioned earlier. Western manners
and fashions came to occupy much of the attention of educated Russians.
While Russian schools showed relatively little vitality or development
between the reigns of Peter I and Catherine II, the government did take at
least one decisive step forward: in 1755 in Moscow the first Russian uni-
versity came into existence. Promoted by Ivan Shuvalov and Michael
Lomonosov, this first Russian Institution of higher learning was to be, all
in all, the most important one in the history of the country, as well as a
model for other universities. Responsible directly to the Senate and en-
dowed with considerable administrative autonomy, the university possessed
CULTURE* 1700-1800 269
three schools law, medicine, and philosophy. The school of philosophy
included both the humanities and sciences, much as reflected in the
range of the present day degree of Doctor of Philosophy The University of
Moscow started with ten professors end some assistants to the professors,
of the ten, two were Russians, a mathematician and a rhetorician In a
decade the number of professors about doubled, with Russians constituting
approximately hall of the total Originally instruction took place m Latin,
but in 1767 Russian began to be used in the university In 1756 the uni-
versity started to publish a newspaper, the MoskovsUe Vedomosti or
Moscow News Higher education in Russia, both at the Academy and m
the University of Moscow, had a slow and hard beginning, with few
qualified students and in general hale interest or support Indeed at one
time professors attended one another s lectures 1 Still, in this field, as U3 so
many others, the eighteenth century bequeathed to its successor the in-
dispensable foundations for further development
Catherine the Greats reign or roughly the last third of the century,
w lUvesytci a remarkable growth and io.tensvficau.on. of Russian *.uXyttal
life For instance, we know of 600 different books published m Russia m
the reign of Peter the Great, of 2,000 produced between 1725 and 1775,
and of 7,500 which came out in the period from 1775 to 1800 Catherine
the Great's edict of 1783, licensing private publishing houses, contributed
to the trend The me of the periodical press proved to be even more strik-
ing Although here too the origins went back to Peter the Great, there was
little development until the accession of Catherine II It was the empress's
personal interest in the propagation of her views, together with the inter-
ests and needs of the growing layer of educated Russians, that led to the
sudden first flowering of Russian journalism By 1770 some eight periodi-
cals entered the fiefd to comment on the Russian and European scene,
criticize the foibles of Russian society, and engage in lively debate with
one another, a debate in which Catherine the Great herself took an active
part Societies for the development and promotion of different kinds of
knowledge, such as the well-known Free Economic Soctcty, multiplied in
Catherine IPs reign
In the sphere of education proper, as in so many other fields, the em-
press had vast ambitions and plans Adapting the views of Locke, the
Encyclopedists, and Rousseau, Catherine the Great at first hoped to create
through education a new, morally superior, and fully civilized breed of
people Education, m this sanguine opinion, could "bestow new existence,
and create a new kind of subjects ” The empress relied on her close asso-
ciate and fellow enthusiast of the Enlightenment, Ivan Betsky, to formulate
and carry out her educational policy To be truly transformed, pupils had
to be separated from their corrupting environment and educated morally
as well as intellectually Therefore, Catherine the Great and Betsky relied
290 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
on select boarding schools, including the new Smolny school for girls, the
first and the most famous state school for girls in the history of the Russian
empire.
Catherine the Great, however, was too intelligent and realistic not to
see eventually the glaring weaknesses of her original scheme: boarding
schools were very expensive and took care of very few people; moreover
those few, it would seem, could not escape the all-pervasive environment
and failed to become paragons of virtue and enlightenment. Therefore
other approaches, broader in scope but more limited in purpose, had to
be tried. The empress became especially interested in the system of popu-
lar education instituted in the Austrian Empire in 1774 and explained to
her by Emperor Joseph II himself. In 1782, following the Austrian
monarch’s advice, she invited the Serbian educator Theodore Iankovich
de Mirievo from Austria and formed a Commission for the Establishment
of Popular Schools. The Commission approved Iankovich de Mirievo’s
plan of a network of schools on three levels and of the programs for the
schools. The Serbian educator then concentrated on translating and adapt-
ing Austrian textbooks for Russian schools, and also on supervising the
training of Russian teachers. A teachers’ college was founded in St. Peters-
burg in 1783. Its first hundred students came from Church schools and
were graduated in 1786. In that year a special teachers’ seminary began
instruction. It was to produce 425 teachers in the course of its fifteen years
of existence. Relying on its new teachers, the government opened twenty-
six more advanced popular schools in the autumn of 1786 and fourteen
more in 1788, all of them in provincial centers. It also proceeded to put
popular elementary schools into operation in district towns: 169 such
schools, with a total of 11,000 pupils began to function in 1787; at the
end of the century the numbers rose to 315 schools and 20,000 students.
Everything considered, Catherine the Great deserves substantial credit
in the field of education. Her valuable measures ranged from pioneering
in providing education for girls to the institution of the first significant
teacher training program in Russia and the spreading of schools to many
provincial and district towns. The empress and her advisers, it should be
noted, wanted to extend enlightenment to the middle class and hoped to
see an educated Third Estate arise in their homeland. Furthermore, as we
know, the government’s limited efforts did not represent all of Russian
education. Church schools continued, and education of the gentry ad-
vanced in the last third of the eighteenth century. When not attending ex-
clusive military schools of one kind or another, sons of the nobility received
instruction at home by private teachers, augmented, with increasing fre-
quency, by travel abroad. The French Revolution, while it led to the ex-
clusion of France from. Russian itineraries, brought a large number of
French emigres to serve as tutors in Russia. But in education, perhaps
CULTURE 1 700-1800 291
even more than in other fields, the division of Russian society was glar-
ingly evident Although the eighteenth century Witnessed the rise of modern
Russian schools and modem Russian culture, virtually none of this af-
fected the peasants, that is, the great bulk of the people
Language
The adaptation of the Russian language to new needs m the eighteenth
century constituted a major problem for Russian education, literature and
culture m general It will be remembered that on the cve of Peter the Great's
reforms Russian linguistic usage was in a state of transition as everyday
Russian began to assert itself in literature at the expense of the archaic,
bookish Slavomcizcd forms This basic process continued in the eighteenth
century but it was complicated further by a mass intrusion of foreign
words and expressions which came with Westernization and which had to
be dealt with somehow The language used by Peter the Great and His
associates was in a chaotic slate and at one time apparently the first cm
peror wanted to solve the problem by having the educated Russians adopt
Dutch as their tongue'
In the course of the century the basic linguistic issues were resolved,
and modern literary Russian emerged The battle of styles, although not
entirely over by 1800 resulted in a definitive victory for the contemporary
Russian over the Slavomcizcd for the fluent over the formal, for the prac-
tical and the natural over the suited and the artificial Nicholas Karamzin,
who wrote In the last decades of the eighteenth and the first of the nine-
teenth century, contributed heavily to the final decision by effectively
using the new style in his own highly popular works As to foreign words
and expressions, they were either rejected or gradually absorbed into the
Russian language, leading to a great increase in us vocabulary The Rus-
sian language of 1800 could handle many series of terms and concepts
unheard of in Muscovy That the Russian linguistic evolution of the eight-
eenth century was remarkably successful can best be seen from the fact
that the golden age of Russian literature, still the standard of linguistic and
literary excellence in modem Russian followed shortly after Indeed
Pushkin was botti in the last year of the eighteenth century
The linguistic evolution was linked to a conscious preoccupation with
language, to the first Russian grammars dictionaries, and philological and
Utetaty treatises These efforts which were on aspect of Westernization,
contnbuted to the establishment of modem Russian literary culture Lo-
monosov deserves special praise for the first effective Russian grammar,
published in 1755, which proved highly influential A nch dictionary com-
posed by some fifty authors including almost every writer of note appeared
in six volumes m 1759-94 Theoretical discussion and experimentation
292 IMPERIAL SUSSI A
by Basil Trcdiakovsky, Lomonosov, and others led to the creation of the
now established system of modern Russian versification.
Literature
Modern Russian literature must be dated from Peter the Great’s re-
forms. While, to be sure, the Russian literary tradition goes back to the
Kievan age in the Lay of the Host of Igor and other works, and even to the
prehistoric past in popular song and talc, the reign of the first emperor
marked a sharp division. Once Russia turned to the West, it joined the
intellectual and literary world of Europe which had little in common with
that of Muscovy. In fact, it became the pressing task of educated eight-
eenth-century Russians to introduce and develop in their homeland such
major forms of Western literary expression as poetry, drama, and the novel.
Naturally, the emergence of an original and highly creative Russian litera-
ture took time, and the slowness of this development was emphasized by
the linguistic evolution. The century had to be primarily imitative and in a
sense experimental, with only the last decades considerably richer in
creative talent. Nevertheless, the pioneer work of eighteenth-century writers
made an important contribution to the establishment and development of
modern Russian literature.
Antioch Kantemir, 1709—44, a Moldavian prince educated in Russia
and employed in Russian diplomatic service, has been called “the origina-
tor of modern Russian belles lettres.” Kantemir produced original works as
well as translations, poetry and prose, satires, songs, lyrical pieces, fables,
and essays. Michael Lomonosov, 1711-65, had a greater poetic talent than
Kantemir. In literature he is remembered especially for his odes, some of
which are still considered classics of their kind, in particular when they
touch upon the vastness and glory of the universe. Alexander Sumarokov,
1718-77, a prolific and influential writer, has been honored as the father
of Russian drama. In addition to writing tragedies and comedies as well
as satires and poetry and publishing a periodical, Sumarokov was the first
director of a permanent Russian theater. Sumarokov wrote his plays in the
pseudo-classical manner characteristic of the age, and he often treated his-
torical subjects.
The reign of Catherine the Great witnessed not only a remarkable in-
crease in the quantity of Russian literature, but also considerable improve-
ment in its quality. Two writers of the period, not to mention Nicholas
Karamzin who belongs to the nineteenth century as well as to the eight-
eenth, won permanent reputations in Russian letters. The two were Gabriel
Derzhavin and Denis Fonvizin. Derzhavin, 1743—1816, can in fairness be
called Catherine the Great’s official bard: he constantly eulogized the vain
empress and such prominent Russians of her reign as Potemkin and
CULTURE X 700— 18 00
293
Suvorov Like most court poets, he wrote too much, yet at his best Dcrtfia-
vm produced superb poetry, both m his resounding odes, exemplified by
the celebrated God," and in some less known lyrical pieces The poet be-
longed to the courtly world that inspired him and even served as Minister
of Justice in the government of Alexander I
Fonvizm, 1745-92, has received wide acclaim as the first major Rus-
sian dramatist, a writer of comedies to be more exact Fonvmn's lasting
fame rests principally on a single work, the comedy whose title has been
translated as The Minor, or The Adolescent — m Russian Nedorosl
Pseudo-classical m form and containing a number of artificial characters
and contrived situations, the play, nevertheless, achieves a great richness
and realism in its depiction of the manners of provincial Russian gentry
The hero of the comedy the lazy and unresponsive son who, despite his
reluctance, in the changing conditions of Russian life has to submit to an
elementary educauon, and his doting domineering, and obscurantist mother
arc apparently destined for immortality In addition to The Minor, Fon-
vizw translated adapted, or wrote some other plays, including the able
comedy The Brigadier in which he ndiculcd the excessive admiration of
France in Russia, he also produced a senes of satirical articles and a note-
worthy sequence of critical letters dealing with his impressions of foreign
countries
While classicism or neo-classicism, represented the dominant trend tn
the European literature of the eighteenth century, other currents also came
to the fore toward the end of that period Again, the Russians eagerly trans-
lated, adapted, and assimilated Western originals Nicholas Karamzin,
1766-1826, can be called the founder of sentimentalism in Russtan litera-
ture His sensitive and laenmose Letters of a Russian Traveler and his
sensational although now hopelessly dated story, Poor Liz, both of which
appeared at the beginning of the last decade of the century, marked the
triumph of the new sensibility »n Russia Karamzin, it might be added,
succeeded also as a publisher, and generally helped to raise the st3ture of
the professional writer in Russian life Other pre-romantic trends in the writ-
ings of many authors • — rather prominent as Rogger’s recent study indicates
— included a new interest in folklore, a concern with the history of the
country, and an emphasis on things Russian as opposed to Western
Social Criticism
The history of ideas cannot be separated from literary history, least of
all in the Russian setting Social criticism constituted the dominant content
of both m eighteenth-century Russia This didactic tendency, highly char-
acteristic of the Age of Reason, found special application m Russia, where
so much had to be learned so fast Kantemir, ‘the originator of modern
294 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
Russian literature,” wrote satires by preference, while his translations in-
cluded Montesquieu’s Persian Letters. Satire remained a favorite geaxe
among Russian writers of the eighteenth century, ranging from the bril-
liant comedies of Fonvizin to the pedestrian efforts of Catherine the Great
and numerous other aspiring authors. The same satire, the same social
criticism inspired journalism; in fact, no clear line divided the two fields.
Russian writers and publicists inveighed against the backwardness, boor-
ishness, and corruption of their countrymen, and they neglected no op-
portunity to turn them toward civilization and light At the same time they
noticed that on occasion “the ungainly beasts” began to admire the West,
in particular France, too much and to despise their own country, and that
in turn was satirized and denounced throughout the century.
The spirit of criticism developed especially in the reign of Catherine the
Great and was aided by the sponsorship and example of the empress her-
self. Indeed, she gave, so to speak, official endorsement to the far-reaching
critiques and views of the philosophes. The Free Economic Society even
awarded its first prize to a work advocating the abolition of serfdom. A
certain kind oE Russian Voltairianism emerged, combining admiration for
the sage of Femey with a skeptical attitude toward many aspects of Rus-
sian life. Although some historians dismiss this Voltairianism as a superfi-
cial fashion, it no doubt served for some Russians as a school of criticism,
all the more so because it fitted extremely well the general orientation of
the Enlightenment.
Freemasonry became another school of criticism and thought for the
Russians, and a more complicated one, for it combined disparate doctrines
and trends. It came to Russia, of course, again from the West, from Great
Britain, Germany, Sweden, and France. Although the first fraternal lodges
appeared at the time of Empress Elizabeth, the movement became promi-
nent only in the reign of Catherine the Great. At that time it consisted of
about one hundred lodges located in St. Petersburg, Moscow, and some
provincial towns and of approximately 2,500 members, almost entirely
from the gentry. In addition to the contribution made by Freemasonry
to the life of polite society, which constituted probably its principal attrac-
tion to most members, specialists distinguish two main trends within that
movement in eighteenth-century Russia; the mystical, and the ethical and
social. The first concentrated on such commendable but elusive and es-
sentially individual goals as contemplation and self-perfection. The second
reached out to the world and thus constituted the active wing of the move-
ment. Socially oriented Freemasons centered around the University of
Moscow. They engaged in education and publishing, establishing a private
school and the first large-scale program of publication in Russia outside
of the government. They contributed heavily to the periodical literature
and its social criticism. Nicholas Novikov, 1744—1818, perhaps the most
cut. TV he 1 7 00- 18 00
295
active publicist of Catherine the Great’s reign, led the group which included
several other outstanding people
Of the many things to be criticized in Russia, serfdom loomed largest
Yet that institution was both so well accepted nnd so fundamental to Rus-
sian life that few in the eighteenth century dared challenge « Catherine
the Great herself, after some vague preliminary wavering, came out cn«
tirely on the side of the gentry and its power over the peasants Numerous
writers criticized certain individual excesses or serfdom, such as the cruelly
of (me master or the wastefulness of another, but they did not assail the
system itself Novikov and a very few others went further their image of
serf relations could not be ascribed to individual aberrations, and it cned
for reform StiU, It remained to Alexander Radishcbev to make the con-
demnation of serfdom total and unmistakably clear It was Radishchev’s
attack on serfdom that broke through the veneer of cultural progressivism
and well being typical of the reign of Catherine the Great, and served os
the occasion for a sharp break between the government and the radical or
even just liberal intellectuals
Radishcbev, 1749-1802 was educated at the University of Leipzig as
well as in Russia and acquired a wide knowledge of eighteenth-century
thought In particular, he experienced the impact of Rousseau, Mably, and
the entire egalitarian and generally more radical, tendency of the later
Enlightenment A member of the gentry, an official, and a writer of some
distinction, Radubehev left his mark on Russian history with the publica-
tion in 1790 of his stunning Journey from Petersburg to Moscow Tallow-
ing the first section called * the departure ” twenty-odd chapters of that
work, named after wayside stations, depteted specific and varied honors
of serfdom The panorama included such scenes as serfs working on a
Sunday, because they could till their own land only on that day, the rest
of the week, being devoted to the barshchinn, the sale at an auction of
members of a single family to different buyers, and the forced arrangement
of marriages by an overly zealous master Moreover, Radishcbev com-
bined his explicit denunciation of serfdom with a comprehensive philo-
sophical, social, political, and economic outlook, reflected in the Journey
and in other writings He assailed Russian despotism and administrative
corruption and suggested instead a republic with full liberties for the in-
dividual And he actually drew up a plan for serf emancipation ami an
accompanying l3nd settlement
Radishchev's philippic resulted in his being sentenced to death, changed
fortunately to ten year imprisonment m Sibena Frightened by the French
Revolution, Catherine the Great finally turned against the ideas of the En-
lightenment, which she h3d done so much to promote Novikov and his
fellow Masons in Moscow also suffered, and their educational work came
to an abrupt end Edicts against travel and other contacts wuh the revofu
296 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
tionary West multiplied, reaching absurd proportions in Paul’s reign. But
the import of the issue proved to be even more profound than a reaction to
the French Revolution. Until 1790 the state led Russia on the path of en-
lightenment. From that year on, it began to apply the brakes. Radishchev’s
Journey meant the appearance of a radical intellectual protest in Russia a
foretaste of the radical intelligentsia.
Science and Scholarship
While secular philosophy, literary debates, and social criticism stood
in the center of the Enlightenment, other aspects of culture also developed
at that time. Following the West as usual, Russia proceeded to assimilate
modern science, scholarship, and the arts. Science took root slowly in Rus-
sia, and for a number of decades the Russians had relatively little in this
field, except a number of scholars invited from abroad, some of them of
great merit. But — to underline the danger of generalizations and schemes
— the one great Russian scientist of the eighteenth century appeared quite
early on the scene; moreover. Iris achievements were very rarely if ever to
be matched in the entire annals of science in Russia. This extraordinary
man was Michael Lomonosov, bom in a peasant family in tile extreme
northern province of Archangel and educated both in Russia and for five
years in Germany, most of that time at Marburg University. Lomonosov,
1711-65, who has already been mentioned as a pioneer grammarian, an
important literary scholar, and a gifted poet, was also a chemist, a physicist,
an astronomer, a meteorologist, a geologist, a mineralogist, a metallurgist,
a specialist in navigation, a geographer, an economist, and a historian, as
well as a master of various crafts and a tireless inventor. Pushkin was to
refer to him, appropriately, as the first Russian university. In considering
the work of Lomonosov, we should remember that he lived before the time
of extreme scientific specialization, when a single mind still could master
many disciplines, and indeed advance them. Lomonosov represented, in
other words, the Russian counterpart of the great encyclopedic scholars
of the West.
Lomonosov probably did his best work in chemistry, physics, and the
border area between these two sciences. In fact, he developed and in 1751
taught the first course of physical chemistry in the world, and in 1752 he
published a textbook in that field. The Russian scientist’s other most out-
standing achievements included the discovery of the law of the preserva-
tion of matter and of energy long before Lavoisier, the discovery of atmos-
phere on Venus, brilliant studies in electricity, the theory of heat, and
optics, and the establishment of the nature and composition of crystals,
charcoal, and black earth. Lomonosov’s scientific work unfortunately
proved far ahead of his time, especially in Russia, where it found no
CULTURE. 1700-1800
297
followers anil was fully rediscovered only by Menvhutkm and other twen-
tieth-century scholars
Although Lomonosov remained essentially an isolated individual, the
eighteenth century was also noteworthy m Russian history for large-scale,
organized scientific effort That effort took the form of expeditions to dis-
cover, explore, or study distant areas of the empire and sometimes neigh-
boring seas and territories Geography, geology, mineralogy, botany, zool-
ogy, ethnography, and philology, as well as some other disciplines, all
profited from these well-thought-out and at times extremely daring under-
takings Begun by Peter the Great, the expeditions led to important results
even m the first half of the century For example, Alaska was discovered in
1732 The so-called First Academic Expedition which lasted from 1733
to 1742 and included 570 participants, successfully undertook the mam-
moth task of mapping and exploring the northern shore of Siberia Nu-
merous expeditions, often of great scholarly value, followed later in the
century Peter Simon Pallas, a versatile and excellent German scientist mi
Russian service, deserves special credit for his part in them
The Russians also applied themselves to what can be called the social
sciences and the humanities Mention has already been made of new Rus-
sian scholarship m connection with language and literature Modem Rus
sian study of economics dues from Peter the Great Ivan Pososhkov, a
wealthy peasant, an extraordinary ctiiic and admirer of the first emperor,
and the author of a remarkable treatise. Books about Poverty ond Wealth
has often been cited as its originator Pososhkov found his inspiration in
Peter the Great's reforms and in the issues facing Russia, not in Western
scholarship of which he was ignorant The study of history too developed
quickly in Russia, with the Russians profiting throughout the century from
the presence of foreign scholars, such as the outsiandmg German historian
Atigust-Ludwig von Schlozer Eighteenth-century Russian historians in-
cluded an important administrator and collaborator of Peter the Great,
Basil Tatishchev, Prince Michael Shcheibatov. who argued the case for the
rights of the gentry in Catherine the Great’s Legislative Commission and
produced a number of varied and interesting works, and Major General
Ivan Bolun From the time of Tatishchev, Russian histonans understand-
ably tended to emphasize the role of the monarch and the state
The Arts Concluding Remarks
Architecture flourished in eighteenth-century Russia because of the in-
terest and liberality of Peter the Great and lus successors Catherine the
Great proved to be a passionate builder, and the same was true or Paul, as
well as ot Alexander I and Nicholas I m the nineteenth century St Peters-
burg which rose from the swamps to become one of the truly beautiful and
298 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
impressive cities of the world, remains the best monument of this imperial
devotion to architecture. Baroque at the beginning of the century and the
neoclassical style toward the end of the century dominated European and
Russian architecture. The builders in the empire of the Romanovs in-
eluded a number of gifted foreigners, notably Count Bartolomeo Rastrelli
who came as a boy from Italy to Russia, when his sculptor father was in-
vited by Peter the Great, and who erected the Winter Palace and the
Smolny Institute in St. Petersburg and the great palace in Tsarskoe Selo
— now Pushkino — together with many other buildings. Some excellent
Russian architects, such as Basil Bazhenov and Matthew Kazakov, emerged
in the second half of the century.
Other arts also grew and developed. In the 1750’s the art section of the
Academy of Sciences became an independent Academy of Arts. In the
field of painting, portrait painting fared best, as exemplified by the work of
Dmitrii Levitsky, 1735—1822 — the son, incidentally, of a priest who
painted icons. Fedot Shubin, 1740-1805, like Lomonosov a peasant from
the extreme north, was the first important Russian sculptor. Having re-
ceived his initial training in his family of bone carvers, he went on to obtain
the best artistic education available in St. Petersburg, Italy, and France,
and to win high recognition abroad as well as at home. Shubin’s sculptures
are characterized by expressiveness and realism.
The eighteenth century also witnessed the appearance in Russia of
modern music, notably the opera, as well as ballet and the theater. AH of
these arts came from the West and gradually, in the course of the century,
entrenched themselves in their new locale. All were to be greatly enriched
in the future by Russian genius. As to theater, while Peter the Great in-
vited German actors and later sovereigns sponsored French and Italian
troupes, a native Russian theater became established only in the 1750’s.
Its creator was a merchant’s son, Theodore Volkov, who organized a suc-
cessful theater in laroslavl on the Volga and was then requested to do the
same in the capital. Catherine the Great herself contributed to the new
repertoire of Russian plays. By the end of the century Russia possessed
several public theaters, a theatrical school, and a periodical. The Russian
Theater, which began to appear in 1786. Furthermore, theater had won
popularity among the great landlords, who maintained some fifteen private
theaters in Moscow alone.
Russian culture of 1800 bore little resemblance to that of 1700. In brief,
Russia — that is, upper-class, educated Russia — had become Westernized.
The huge effort to learn that dominated Russian culture in the eighteenth
century was to bear rich fruit. Many Russians, however, from the time of
Peter the Great to the present, have worried about this wholesale borrow-
ing from the West. From Pososhkov and Lomonosov to the latest Soviet
specialists they have tried to minimize the role of the West and to emphasize
CULTURE* 1700-1800
299
native Russian achievements Unusual among the better pre-revolutionary
scholars, this view eventually received a heavy official endorsement m the
Soviet Union As a result, many Soviet discussions of Russia and the West
in the eighteenth century became ridiculous Although common, wounded
national pride is an unfortunate and usually unjustified sentiment To be
sure, the Russians not only borrowed from the West, but also assimilated
Western culture For that matter, only two major European countries,
England and France, can clatm a full continuity of intellectual, literary,
and cultural development, and even they, of course, experienced any num-
ber of foreign influences Besides — and to conclude — white the origin
of a heritage is important to the historian, its use may well be considered
still more significant We have seen something of that use m this chapter,
and shall sec much more of it in our subsequent discussions of Russian
culture
XXV
THE REIGN OF ALEXANDER I, 1801-25
The book of a brilliant, magnanimous reign opened! Victory is in-
scribed in it: the conquest of Finland, Bessarabia, Persian territories,
the defeat of Napoleon and of the armies of twenty nations, the
liberation of Moscow, the capture of Paris twice, the annexation to
Russia of the Kingdom of Poland. Magnanimity is inscribed in it:
the liberation of Europe, the placing of the Bourbons on the thrones
of France, Spain, and the Two Sicilies, the Holy Alliance, the sparing
of Paris. There love of learning pointed to the creation of six uni-
versities, an academy, a lyceum. There mercy wrote actions worthy of
it: rescue of the unfortunate ones, generous pardon of criminals and
even of those who insulted His Majesty. There justice marked the
affirmation of the rights of the gentry and the law giving the ac-
cused full freedom to defend themselves. All the virtues which en-
noble man and adorn a tsar mark in this book the reign of
Alexander. How many sovereigns of this earth stood impressive io
their power and glory, but were there many who, like him, com-
bined humility with power and goodness to enemies with the vic-
tories? Alexander of Greece! Caesar of Romcl your laurels arc
spattered with blood, ambition unsheathed your sword. Our Alex-
ander triumphed virtuously: he wanted to establish in the world
the peace of his own soul.
FEDOROV
If, during the two centuries which divide the Russia of Peter the
Great from the Bolshevik revolution, there was any period in which
the spell of the authoritarian past might have been overcome, the
forms of the state liberalized in a constitution, and the course of
Russian development merged with the historic currents of the west,
it is the earlier part of the reign of Alexander I. Or so, for a moment,
one is tempted to think.
CHARQUE5
Alexander I was twenty-three years old when, following the deposition
and assassination of his father. Emperor Paul, he ascended the Russian
throne. The new monarch’s personality and manner of dealing with other
men had thus already been formed, and it is the psychology of the emperor
that has fascinated those who became acquainted with him, both his con-
temporaries and later scholars. Moreover, there seems to be little agree-
ment about Alexander I beyond the assertion that he was ‘‘the most com-
plex and most elusive figure among the emperors of Russia.” This unusual
sovereign has been called “the enigmatic tsar,” a sphinx, and “crowned
Hamlet,” not to mention other similarly mystifying appellations. Strik-
300
ALEXANDER 1 3Q1
wg contradictions or alleged contradictions appear in the autocrat’s char-
acter and activities Thus Alexander I was hailed as a literal by many men,
Thomas Jefferson among them, and denounced as a reactionary by numer-
ous ethers, including Byron He was glorified as a pacifist, the originator
of thcHoly Alliance, and m general a man who did the utmost to establish
peace and a Christian brotherhood on earth Yet this “angel” - — an epithet
frequently applied to Alexander I, especially within the imperial family
and In court circles — was also a drill sergeant and a parade-gtound en-
thusiast Some students of Alexander Ps foreign policy have concluded that
the tsar was a magnificent and extremely shrewd diplomat, who consistently
bested Napoleon Napoleon hunsclf, it might be added, called him "a
cunning Byzantine ” But other scholars, again on good evidence, have em-
phasized the Russian ruler's mysticism and even bis growing detachment
from reality
Various elements in the emperor s background have been cited to help
account for his baffling character There was to begin with. Alexander’s
difficult childhood and boyhood, m particular his ambiguous relations with
his father, Paul, and his grandmother, Catherine the Great, who hated
each other Alexander spent more time with Catherine than with his par-
ents, and he learned early the arts of flattery, dissimulation, and hypocrisy,
or at least so his boyhood letters indicate The empress took a great liking
to Alexander from the very beginning and apparently wanted to make
him her successor, bypassing Paul Quite possibly only the suddenness of
her death upset this plan Education also influenced the future catpceoe's
character, views and activities Catherine the Great took a personat inter-
est in Alexander s upbringing, which was guided by the ideas of the En-
lightenment A prominent Swiss plulosophe and liberal, Fieddnc-C6sar
de LaHarpe, acted as the grand duke’s chief tutor and became his close
friend Yet LaHaxpe’s instruction, full of progressive ideas and humane
sentiments, had its disadvantages LaHarpe, that “very liberal and garru-
lous French booklet,” as Kliuchcvsky described the tutor, and his teaching
had little in common with Russian reality The contrast between theory and
practice characterjsuc of Alexander Is reign has been derived by some
scholars from this one sided education The circumstances of Alexander
Ps accession to the throne have also been analyzed for their effect on the
sovereign’s character and rule Alexander found himself in a precarious
position during Pauls reign especially because Paul thought of divorcing
bis wife and of disinheriting Alexander and his other sons by her The
young grand duke almost certainly knew of the conspiracy against his
father, but the murder of Emperor Paul came to him apparently as a sur-
prise and a shock Certain cnucs attribute to the tragedy of his accession
Alexander l’s strong feeling of guilt and his later mysticism and lack of
balance
302
imjer:
IA.L RUSSIA
Behind Alexander I’s reactions to particular incidents and situations of
his life there was, of course, his basic character. Alexander I remains a
mystery in the sense that human personality has not been and perhaps
cannot be fully explained. Yet his psychological type is not especially un-
common, as psychiatrists, psychologists, and observant laymen attest. The
emperor belonged with those exceedingly sensitive, charming, and rest-
less men and women whose lives display a constant irritation, search and
disappointment. They lack balance, consistency, and firmness of purpose.
They are contradictory. Alexander I’s inability to come to terms with him-
self and pursue a steady course explains his actions much better, on the
whole, than do allegations of cynicism or Machiavellianism. As is char-
acteristic for the type, personal problems grew with the passage of time:
the emperor became more and more irritable, tired, and suspicious of
people, more dissatisfied with life, more frantically in search of a religious
or mystical answer; he even lost some of his proverbial charm. The autocrat
died in 1825, only forty-eight years old. However, as if to continue the
mystery of Alexander I, some specialists insist that he did not die, but
escaped from the throne to live in Siberia as a saintly hermit Theodore, or
Fedor, Kuzmich. Based on such circumstantial evidence as the emperor’s
constant longing to shed the burdens of his office, and a court physician's
refusal to sign the death warrant, this supposition needs further proof, al-
though it cannot be entirely dismissed. Suicide might offer another ex-
planation for a certain strangeness and confusion associated with the
sovereign’s death.
Liberalism and Reform
The Russians rejoiced at the accession of Alexander I. In place of an
exacting and unpredictable tyrant, Paul, they obtained a young ruler of
supreme charm and apparently enormous promise. Alexander I seemed to
represent the best of the Enlightenment — that humaneness, progressive-
ness, affirmation of human dignity, and freedom, which educated Russians, ’
in one way or another, fervently desired. The new emperor’s first acts con-
firmed the expectations. An amnesty restored to their former positions up
to twelve thousand men dismissed by Paul; the obnoxious restrictions on
travel abroad and ou the entry into Russia of foreigners as well as of foreign
books and periodicals were abrogated; the censorship was relaxed, and
private publishing houses were again allowed to open; torture in investiga-
tion was abolished; and the charters granted by Catherine the Great to the
gentry and to towns regained their full force. But, of course, these welcome
measures marked at best only the beginning of a liberal program. The key
issues to be faced included serfdom and autocracy, together with the gen
eral backwardness of the country and the inadequacy and corruption of its
Alexander i
303
administrative apparatus In contrast to Catherine the Great and Paul,
Alexander 1 brought these problems up for consideration, although, as wc
shall see, the tangible results of his efforts proved to be slight The reign
of Alexander I contained two liberal periods, from 1801 to 1805 and
from 1807 to lg!2, each incidentally, followed by war with France
The first period of reform, following immediately upon Alexander l’s
acquisition of the crown, was the most far ranging in purpose and the
most hopeful The new emperor decided to transform Russia with the help
of four young, cultivated, intelligent, and liberal friends, the so-called Un
official Committee The members of the committee, Nicholas Nov osiltscv.
Count Paul Stroganov, Count Victor Kochubey, and a Polish patriot Prince
Adam Czartorysht, reflected the enlightened opinion of the period, ranging
from Angloplulism to Jacobin connections While they could not be cl3ssi
fled as radicals or hotheads the four did represent a new departure after
Paul s administration The emperor spoke of them jokingly as his * Com-
mittee of Public Safety,’ a reference to the French Resolution which would
have made his predecessors shudder He met with the committee informally
and frequently, often daily over coffee
Our information about the work of the Unofficial Committee — which
includes Stroganov s notes on the meetings — .suggests that at first Alex-
ander I intended to abolish autocracy and serfdom However, the dangers
and difficulties associated with these issues, as v-elt as the unpreparedness
for reform of the administration and the mass of people, quickly became
apparent Serfdom represented, so to speak, the greatest single interest in
the empire, and its repeal was bound to affect the entire Russian society,
in particular the extremely important gentry class As to autocracy, the
emperor himself, although at one time he had spoken of a republic, hesi-
tated in practice to accept any diminution of his authority Characterise
cally, he became disillusioned and impatient with the proceedings and
called the Unofficial Committee together less and less frequently The war
of 1805 marked the conclusion of its activities Rassia, thus, went un-
regenerated and unreformed Even more limited projects such as the proc-
lamauon of a Russian charter of nghts failed to be translated into practice
Although the grand scheme of reform failed, the first years of Alex-
ander’s icign witnessed the enactment of some important specific measures
For example, the Senate was restored, or perhaps promoted, to a very high
position in the state It was to be the supreme judicial and administrative
institution in the empire, and its decrees were to carry the authority of those
of the sovereign, who alone could stop their execution Peter the Great’s
colleges, which hod a checkered and generally unhappy history In the eight
eernh century, were gradually replaced in 1802 and subsequent years by
ministries, with a single minister m charge of each At first there were
eight the ministries of war, navy, foreign affairs, justice, interior, finance.
304
Russia
commerce, and education. Later the ministry of commerce was abolished
and the ministry of police appeared.
The government even undertook some limited social legislation. In 1801
the right to own estates was extended from the gentry to other free Rus-
sians. In 1803 the so-called “law concerning the free agriculturists” went
into effect. It provided for voluntary emancipation of the serfs by their
masters, assuring that the emancipated serfs would be given land and
establishing regulations and courts to secure the observance of all pro-
visions. The newly emancipated serfs were to receive in many respects the
status of state peasants, but, by contrast with the latter, they were to enjoy
stronger property rights and exemption from certain obligations. Few land-
lords, however, proved eager to free their peasants. To be more exact,
under the provisions of the law concerning the free agriculturists from the
time of its enactment until its suspension more than half a century later on
the eve of “the great reforms,” 384 masters emancipated 115,734 working
male serfs together with their families. It may be added that Druzhinin and
other Soviet scholars have disproved the frequently made assertion that
Alexander I gave no state peasants, with state lands, into private ownership
and serfdom.
Russian backwardness and ignorance became strikingly apparent to the
monarch and his Unofficial Committee as they examined the condition of
the country. Education, therefore, received a high priority in the official
plans and activities of the first years of the reign. Fortunately too this effort
did not present quite the dangers and obstacles that were associated with
the issues of serfdom and autocracy. Spending large sums of money on
education for the first time in Russian history, Alexander I founded several
universities to add to the University of Moscow, forty-two secondary
schools, and considerable numbers of other schools. While education in
Russia during the first half of the nineteenth century will be discussed in a
later chapter, it should be noted here that Alexander I’s establishment of
institutions of learning and his entire school policy were distinctly liberal
for his time. Indeed, they have been called the best fruits of the monarch’s
usually hesitant and brittle liberalism.
The second period of reform in Alexander I’s reign, 1807-12, corres-
ponded to the French alliance and was dominated by the emperor’s most
remarkable assistant, Michael Speransky. Speransky, who lived from 1772
to 1839, was fully a self-made man. In contrast to the members of the Un-
official Committee as well as to most other associates of the sovereign, he
came not from the aristocracy but from poor village clergy. It was Spe-
ransky’s intelligence, ability to work, and outstanding administrative capacity
that made him for a time Alexander I’s prime minister in fact, if not m
name, for no such formal office then existed. As most specialists on
Speransky believe, that unusual statesman sought to establish in Russia
ALEXANDER I 305
strong monarchy firmly based on law and legal procedure, and thus free
from arbitrariness, corruption, and confusion In other words, Speransky
found his inspiration in the vision of a Hechtsstaat, not in advanced liberal
or radical schemes Still, Raclf, the latest major author on the subject, goes
too far when he denies that the Russian statesman was at all liberal In
Russian conditions Speranskys views were certainly liberal, as his con-
temporaries fully realised Furthermore, they could have been developed
more liberally, if the opportunities had presented themselves
In 1809, at the emperor’s request, Speransky submitted to him a thor-
ough proposal for a constitution In his customary methodical manner,
the statesman divided the Russians info three categories the gentry, peo-
ple of "the middle condition,” that is, merchants, artisans, and peasants or
other small proprietors who owned property of a certain value, and,
finally, working people including serfs, servants, and apprentices The plan
also postulated three kinds of rights general civil rights, special civil rights,
such as exemption from service, and political rights, which depended on a
property qualification The members of the gentry were to enjoy all the
rights Those belonging to the middle group receded general civil rights
and political rights when they could meet the property requirement The
working people too obtained general civil rights, but they clearly did not
own enough to participate m politics Russia was to be reorganized on four
administrative levels the volost— a small unit sometimes translated as
"canton” or 'township - the district, the province, and the country at
large On each level there were to be the following institutions legislative
assemblies — or dumy — culminating m the state duma for all of Russia,
a system of courts, with the Senate at the apex, and administrative boards,
leading eventually to the ministries and the central executive power The
stale duma, the most intriguing part of Speranskys system, showed the
statesman’s caution, for in addition to the property restriction imposed on
its electorate, it depended on a sequence of indirect elections The assem
bhes of the volosti elected the district assemblymen, who elected the pro-
vincial assemblymen, who elected the members of the stale duma, or national
assembly Also the activities of the state duma were apparently to be
rather narrowly restricted But, on ihe other hand, the state duma did
provide for popular participation in the legislative process That, together
voth Speranskys insistence on the division of functions, strict legality, and
certain other provisions such as the popular election of judges, if success-
fully applied, would have in time transformed Russia Indeed, it has been
observed lhat Speranskys fourfold proposal of local self-government and
a national legislative assembly represented a farsighted outline of the
Russian future Only that future took extremely long to materialize, offer-
ing— -in the opinion of many specialists — a classic example of too little
and too late Thus Russia received district and provincial self-government
by the so-called zemstvo reform of 1864, a national legislature, the Duma
in 1905-06, and volost self-government in 1917.
In 1809 and the years following, Alexander I failed to implement
Speransky’s proposal. The statesman’s fall from power in 1812 resulted
from the opposition of officialdom and the gentry evoked by his measures
and projects in administration and finance, from the emperor’s fears, sus-
picions, and vacillations, and also from the break with Napoleon, Spcransky
having been branded a Francophile. Although Spcransky was later to re-
turn to public office and accomplish further useful and important work, he
never again had the opportunity to suggest fundamental reform on the
scale of his plan of 1809. The second liberal period of Alexander I’s reign,
then, like the first, produced no basic changes in Russia.
Yet, again like the first, the second liberal period led to some significant
legislation of a more limited nature. In 1810, on the advice of Speransky
— actually this was the only part of the statesman’s plan that the monarch
translated into practice — Alexander I created the Council of State modeled
after Napoleon’s Conseil d’Etat, with Speransky attached to it as the Sec-
retary of State. This body of experts appointed by the sovereign to help
him with the legislative work in no way limited the principle of autocracy;
moreover, the Council tended to be extremely conservative. Still, it clearly
reflected the emphasis on legality, competence, and correct procedure so
dear to Speransky. And, as has been noted for the subsequent history of
the Russian Empire, whereas “all the principal reforms were passed by
regular procedure through the Council of State, nearly all the most harmful
and most mischievous acts of succeeding governments were, where possible,
withdrawn from its competence and passed only as executive regulations
which were nominally temporary.” Speransky also reorganized the minis-
tries and added two special agencies to the executive, one for the supervi-
sion of government finance, the other for the development of transport. A
system of annual budgets was instituted, and other financial measures were
proposed and in part adopted. Perhaps still more importantly, Speransky
did yeoman’s service in strengthening Russian bureaucracy by introducing
something in the nature of a civil service examination and trying in other
ways to emphasize merit and efficient organization.
Speransky’s constitutional reform project represented the most outstand-
ing but not the only such plan to come out of government circles in the
reign of Alexander I. One other should be noted here, that of Novosiltsev.
Novosiltsev’s Constitutional Charter of the Russian Empire emphasized
very heavily the position and authority of the sovereign and bore strong
resemblance to Speransky’s scheme in its stress on legality and rights and
its narrowly based and weak legislative assembly. Novosiltsev differed,
however, from Speransky’s rigorous centralism in allowing something to the
federal principle: he wanted the Russian Empire, including Finland an
ALEXANDER I
307
Russian Poland, to be divided Into twelve large groups of provinces which
were to enjoy a certain autonomy The date of NovosiltscVs project de-
serves attention its second and definitive version was presented to Alex-
ander I in 1820, late in his reign Furthermore, the monarch not only
graciously accepted the plan, but — jt has been argued — proceeded to
implement it m small part Namely, by combining several provinces, he
created as a model one of the twelve units proposed by NovosiHscv Only
after Alexander Is death in 1825 was Novosiltscv’s scheme completely
abandoned, and the old system of administration re-established m the
experimental provinces The story of Novosiltsevs Charter, together with
certain other developments introduces qualifications into the usual sharp
division of Alexander l s reign into the libera! first half and the reactionary
second half, and suggests that a constitution remained a possible alterna-
tive for Russia as long as (he enigmatic tsar presided over its destinies
Russian Foreign Policy J80I-J2
While the first part of Alexander s rule witnessed some significant de-
velopments in internal affairs it was the emperor s foreign policy that came
to occupy the center of the stage Diplomacy and war w the early years of
Alexander I s reign culminated in the cataclysmic events of 1812
At the beginning of Alexanders reign, peaceful intentions prevailed
After succeeding Paul, who had both fought France and later joined it
against Great Britain, the new emperor proclaimed a policy of neutrality
Vet Russia could not long stay out of conflicts raging in Europe A variety
of factors, ranging from die vast and exposed Western frontier of the em-
pire to the psychological involvement of the Russian government and edu-
cated public in European affairs, determined Russian participation in the
struggle Not surprisingly, Alexander I joined the opponents of France
Economic lies with Great Bn tain, and traditional Russian friendship with
Austria and Great Britain, together with the equally tradiuonal hostility to
France, contributed to the decision Furthermore, Alexander 1 apparently
came early to consider Napoleon as o menace to Europe, all the more so
because the Russian sovereign had his own vision of a new European
order An outline of the subsequent Holy Alliance and concert of Europe,
without the religious coloration, can be found m the instructions issued m
1804 to the Russian envoy in Great Britain
The War of the Third Coalition broke out in 1805 when Austna, Rus-
sia, and Sweden joined Great Britain against France and its ally, Spain
The combined Austrian and Russian armies suffered a crushing defeat at
the hands of Napoleon on December 2, 1805, at AusterUtz Although
Austria was knocked out of the war, the Russians continued to fight and
in 1806 even obtained a new ally, Prussia But the French amues, in a
308
M P ER
L Russi,
nineteenth-century version of the Blitzkrieg, promptly destroyed the Prus-
sian forces in the battles of Jena and Auerstadt, and, although they could
not destroy the Russians, finally succeeded in inflicting a major defeat on
them at Friedland. The treaties of Tilsit between France and Russia and
France and Prussia followed early in July 1 807. The Franco-Prussian set-
tlement reduced Prussia to a second-rate power, saved from complete
destruction by the insistence of the Russian sovereign. The agreement
between France and Russia was a different matter, for, although Alex-
ander I had to accept Napoleon’s redrawing of the map of Europe and even
had to support him, notably against Great Britain, Russia emerged as the
hegemon of much of eastern Europe and the only major power on the con-
tinent other than France.
It was the temporary settlement with France that allowed the Russians
to fight several other opponents and expand the boundaries of the empire
in the first half of Alexander’s reign. In 1801 the eastern part of Georgia,
an ancient Orthodox country in Transcaucasia, joined Russia, and Russian
sway was extended to western Georgia in 1803—10. Hard-pressed by their
powerful Moslem neighbors, the Persians and the Turks, the Georgians
had repeatedly asked and occasionally received Russian aid. The annexa-
tion of Georgia to Russia thus represented in a sense the culmination of a
process, and a logical, if by no means ideal, choice for the little Christian
nation. It also marked the permanent establishment of Russian authority
and power beyond the great Caucasian mountain range.
As expected, the annexation of Georgia by Russia led to a Russo-
Persian war, fought from 1804 to 1813. The Russians proved victorious,
and by the Treaty of Gulistan Persia had to recognize Russian rule in
Georgia and cede to its northern neighbor the areas of Daghestan and
Shemakha in the Caucasus. The annexation of Georgia also served as one
of the causes of the Russo-Turkish war which lasted from 1806 to 1812.
Again, Russian troops, this time led by Kutuzov, scored a number of suc-
cesses. The Treaty of Bucharest, hastily concluded by Kutuzov on the eve
of Napoleon’s invasion of Russia, added Bessarabia and a strip on the
eastern coast of the Black Sea to the empire of the Romanovs, and also
granted Russia extensive rights in the Danubian principalities of Moldavia
and Wallacliia. Finally, in 1808—09 Alexander I fought and defeated
Sweden, with the result that the Peace of Frederikshamn gave Finland to
Russia. Finland became an autonomous grand duchy with the Russian
emperor as its grand duke.
The first half of Alexander’s reign also witnessed a continuation of Rus-
sian expansion in North America, which had started in Alaska in the late
eighteenth century. New forts were built not only in Alaska but also )°
northern California, where Fort Ross was erected in 1812.
ALEXANDER 1
309
310
MF ERI AL HUS:
1812
The days of the Russian alliance with Napoleon were numbered. The
agreement that the two emperors reached in Tilsit in 1 807, and which was
renewed at their meeting in Erfurt in 1808, failed in the long run to satisfy
either side. The Russians, who were forced to accept it because of their
military defeat, resented Napoleon’s domination of the continent, lus dis-
regard of Russian interests, and, in particular, the obligation to participate
in the so-called continental blockade. That blockade, meant to eliminate
all commerce between Great Britain and other European countries and to
strangle the British economy, actually helped Russian manufactures, es-
pecially in the textile industry, by excluding British competition. But it did
hurt Russian exporters and thus the powerful landlord class. Russian
military reverses at the hands of the French cried for revenge, especially
because they came after a century of almost uninterrupted Russian victories.
Also, Napoleon, who had emerged from the fearful French Revolution,
who had upset the legitimate order in Europe on an unprecedented scale,
and who had even been denounced as Antichrist in some Russian propa-
ganda to the masses, appeared to be a peculiar and undesirable ally,
Napoleon and his lieutenants, on their part, came to regard Russia as an
utterly unreliable partner and indeed as the last major obstacle to their
complete domination of the continent.
Crises and tensions multiplied. The French protested the Russian per-
functory, and in fact feigned, participation in Napoleon’s war against
Austria in 1809, and Alexander I’s failure, from 1810 on, to observe the
continental blockade. The Russians expressed bitterness over the develop-
ment of an active French policy in the Near East and over Napoleon’s ef-
forts to curb rather than support the Russian position and aims in the
Balkans and the Near East: the French opposed Russian control of the
Danubian principalities, objected to Russian bases in the eastern Mediter-
ranean, and would not let the Russians have a free hand in regard to Con-
stantinople and the Straits. Napoleon’s political rearrangement of central
and eastern Europe also provoked Russian hostility. Notably his deposing
the Duke of Oldenburg and annexing the duchy to France, a part of the
rearrangement in Germany, offended the Russian sovereign who was a close
relative of the duke. Still more ominously for Russia, in 1809 after the
French victory over Austria and the Treaty of Schonbrunn, West Galicia
was added to the Duchy of Warsaw, a state created by Napoleon from
Prussian Poland. This change appeared to threaten iu turn the hold of
Russia on the vast lands that it had acquired in the partitions of Poland.
Even Napoleon’s marriage to Marie Louise of Austria added to the ten-
sion between Russia and France, because it marked the French emperor s
ALEXANDER | 3i ,
final abandonment of plans to wed a Russian princess, Alexander's sister
Anne Behind specific tensions, complaints, and crises there loomed the
fundamental antagonism of two great powers astride a continent and two
hostile rulers In June 1812, having made the necessary diplomatic and
military preparations, NapotcOn invaded Russia
France had obtained the support of a number of European states, allies
and satellites, including Austria and Prussia the twelve invading tongues
jn the popular Russian tradition Russia had just succeeded in malang
peace with Turkey, and it had acquired active allies in Sweden and Great
Britain Some 420 000 troops crossed the Russian border with Napoleon
to face only about 120,000 Russian soldiers divided into two separate
armies, one commanded by Prince Michael Barclay de Tolly and the other
by Prince Peter Bagration Including later reinforcements, an approximate
total of 600,000 troops invaded Russia In addition to its tremendous
numbers, Napoleon s army had the reputation of invincibility and what
was considered to be an incomparably able leadership Yet all the advan-
tages were not on one side Napoleons Grande Armie contained a sur-
prisingly small proportion of veterans Also, Frenchmen constituted less
than half of it, while of the allied troops only the Poles, who fought for a
great independent Poland, acquitted themselves with distinction With the
Tetum of Uic Russian forces from the Turkish front, the arrival of other
Russian reinforcements, and the extension of French lines of communica-
tion which had to be protected, the invaders gradually lost their numerical
superiority Moreover, on the whole the country rallied solidly behind
Alexander I, and the Russian soldiers fought with remarkable tenacity
Indeed, Napoleon’s expectations that their early defeats would force the
Russians to sue for peace proved groundless An early and exceptionally
cold winter contributed its share to the Russian cause But, above all, prob-
lems of logistics involved in the French campaign turned out to be much
mote difficult to resolve than Napoleon and his assistants had foreseen
Napoleon advanced into the heart of Russia along the Vilna-Vitcbsk*
Smolensk line, just as Charles Xlf had done a century earlier The Rus-
sians could not stop the invaders, and lost several engagements to them, in-
cluding the bloody battle of Smolensk However, Russian troops inflicted
considerable losses on the enemy, repeatedly escaped encirclement, and
continued to oppose Trench progress Near Smolensk the two separate Rus-
sian armies managed to effect a junction and thus present a united from
to the invaders Under the pressure of public opinion incensed by the con-
tinuous French advance, Alexander I put Prince Michael Kutuzov in
supreme command of the Russian forces A disciple of Suvorov, and a
veteran of many campaigns, the stxty-scvcn-ycar old Kutuzov dtd agree
in fact with Barclay de Tolly’s policy of retreat Still, he felt it incumbent
upon him and his army to fight before surrendering Moscow, ard so gave
312
IMPERIAL RUSSIA
Napoleon a major battle on the seventh of September near the village of
Borodino, seventy-five miles from the great Russian city. The battle of
Borodino had few equals in history for the severity of the fighting. Al-
though it lasted but a single day, the Russians suffered 42,000 casualties
out of 112,000 combatants, the French and their allies 58,000 out of
130,000. The casualties included scores of generals and thousands of
officers, with Prince Bagration and other prominent commanders among
the dead or fatally wounded. By nightfall the Russians in the center and on
the left flank had been forced to retreat slightly, while they held fast on
the right. Kutuzov, however, decided to disengage and to withdraw south-
east of Moscow. On the fourteenth of September Napoleon entered the
Kremlin.
His expectations of final victory and peace were cruelly deceived. In a
rare demonstration of tenacity, Alexander I refused even to consider peace
as long as a single French soldier remained on Russian soil, and the
country backed its monarch. Far from providing sumptuous accommoda-
tions for the French emperor and his army, Moscow, still constructed largely
of wood, burned down during the first days of the French occupation. It is
possible that Count Theodore Rostopchin, the Russian governor and mili-
tary commander of the city, deliberately started the conflagration — as
most French and some Russian specialists assert — but this remains a
disputed issue. Unable to obtain peace from Alexander and largely iso-
lated in the Russian wasteland, Napoleon had to retreat before the onset
of winter. The return march of the Grande Armee, which started on
October 19, gradually became a rout. To begin with, the action of the
Russian army at Maloiaroslavets prevented the French from taking a new
road through fertile areas untouched by war and forced them to leave
the way they had come. As Napoleon’s soldiers marched slowly westward
winter descended upon them and they were constantly pressed by the pur-
suing Russian forces — although Kutuzov chose to avoid a major en-
gagement — and harassed by cossacks and other irregulars, including
peasant guerrillas. The French and their allies perished in droves, and
their discipline began to break down. Late in November, as the remnants
of the Grande A unde crossed the Berezina River, they were lucky to escape
capture through the mistake of a Russian commander. From 30,000 to
50,000 men, out of the total force of perhaps 600,000, finally struggled
out of Russia. By the end of the year no foreign soldiers, except prisoners,
remained in the country.
The epic of 1812 became a favorite subject for many Russian his-
torians, writers, and publicists, and for some scholars in other lands. Leo
Tolstoy’s peerless War and Peace stands out as the most remarkable, albeit
fictionalized, description of the events and human experiences of that
cataclysmic year. Other treatments of the subject range from an excellent
ALEXANDER 1 313
seven-volume history to some of the best known poems m Russian
literature While wc cannot discuss the poets here, certain conclusions of
the historians deserve notice Tor example, It has been established that the
Russian high command had no over-all ‘ Scythian policy” of retreat with
the intention of enticing Napoleon’s army deep into a devastated country'
The French advance resulted rather from Russian inability to stop the
invader and from Napoleons determination to sent Moscow, which he
considered essential for victory The catastrophic French defeat can be
ascribed to a number of factors the fig hung spint of the Russian army,
Kutuzov’s wise decisions, Napoleons crucial mistakes, Alexander’s deter-
mination to continue the war the winter, and others But the breakdown
of the transportation and supply of the Grand Armie should rank high
among the reasons for its collapse More soldiers of Napoleon died from
hunger and epidemics than from cold, for the supply services, handicapped
by enormous distances insecure lines of communication, and bad planning,
failed on the whole to sustain the military effort Finally, it is worth noting
that the war of 1812 deserves its reputation m Russian history as a
popular patriotic war Except for certain small court circles, no defeatism
appeared in the midst of the Russian government, educated pubtic, or
people Moreover, the Russian peasants not only fought heroically in the
ranks of the regular army but also banded into guerrilla detachments to
attack the enemy on their own, on activity unparalleled at the time except
in Spain In fact, as the revising of Tatlc’s study of the war of 1812 and
other works indicate, Soviet historians, while they once neglected it, now
tend to overstate the role of the Russian people in the defeat of the French
invaders
Russian Foreign Policy. J 81 2-2 5
Alexander I continued the war beyond the boundaries of Russia Prus-
sia and several months later Austria switched sides to join Russia, Sweden,
and Great Britain The combined forces of Austria, Prussia, and Russia
finally scored a decisive victory over Napoleon in the tremendous Battle
of Leipzig, known as ihc “Battle of the Nations,” fought from the sixteenth
through the nineteenth of October, 1813 Late that year they began to
cross the Rhine and invade France After more desperate fighting and in
spite of another display of the French emperor’s military genius the allies
entered Paris triumphantly on March 31, 1814 Alexander t referred to that
day as the happiest of bis life. Napoleon had to abdicate unconditionally
and retire to the island of Elba He returned on March 1, IS! 5, rapidly
won back the French throne, and threatened the allies until fus final de-
feat at Waterloo on the eighteenth of June The events of the “Hundred
Days” moved too quickly for the Russian army to participate in this last
314
MPE
war against Napoleon, although, of course, Alexander I was eager to help
his allies.
The French emperor’s abortive comeback thus failed to undo the new
settlement for Europe drawn by the victors at the Congress of Vienna.
The Congress, which lasted from September 1814, until the Act was
signed on June 8, 1815, constituted one of the most impressive and im-
portant diplomatic gatherings in history. Alexander I himself represented
Russia and played a leading role at the Congress together with Mcttcmich
of Austria, Castlereagh of Great Britain, Hardenberg of Prussia, and,
eventually, Talleyrand of France. It must be assumed that the reader has
a general knowledge of the redrawing of the political map of Europe and
of the colonial settlement that took place in Vienna; however, certain is-
sues in which Russia had a crucial part must be mentioned here. Alex-
ander I wanted to establish a large kingdom of Poland in personal union
with Russia, that is, with himself as king; and, by offering to support the
Prussian claim to all of Saxony, he obtained Prussian backing for his
scheme. Great Britain and Austria, however, strongly opposed the desires
of Russia and Prussia. Talleyrand used this opportunity to bring France
prominently back into the diplomatic picture, on the side of Great Britain
and Austria. The conflict, in the opinion of some specialists, almost pro-
voked a war. Its resolution — which angered the Russian public who ex-
pected "gratitude” for “liberating Europe from Napoleon” — constituted
a compromise: Alexander I obtained his Kingdom of Poland, but reduced
in size, while Prussia acquired about three-fifths of Saxony. More precisely,
the Kingdom of Poland contained most of the former Grand Duchy of
Warsaw, with Warsaw itself as its capital, but Prussia regained north-
western Poland, and Austria reoccupied Western Galicia which it had lost
in 1809; Cracow became a free city-state under the joint protection of
Russia, Austria, and Prussia. New Poland received a liberal constitution
from Alexander I, He thus combined the offices of autocratic Russian
emperor, constitutional Finnish grand duke, and constitutional Polish
king. It might be added that he also favored constitutionalism in France,
where the Bourbons returned to the throne as constitutional, not absolute,
monarchs.
Alexander I’s elated, mystical, and even messianic mood at the time of
the Congress of Vienna — a complex sentiment which the Russian sov-
ereign apparently shared in some measure with many other Europeans m
the months and years following the shattering fall of Napoleon, and
which found a number of spokesmen, such as Baroness Julie de Krudener,
in the tsar’s entourage — expressed itself best in a remarkable and peculiar
document known as the Holy Alliance. Signed on September 26, 1815, by
Russia, Austria, and Prussia, and subsequently by the great majority o
European powers, the alliance simply appealed to Christian rulers to live
ALEXANDER I 31J
as brothers and preserve peace n Europe While the Holy Alliance had
deep roots in at least two major Western traditions, Christianity and inter-
national law, n had singularly little relevance to the international problems
of the moment and provided no machinery for the application or enforce-
ment of Christian brotherhood Indeed, Castlercagh could well describe
it as a piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense, while the pope remarked
drily that from ume immemorial the papacy had been in possession of
Christian truth and needed no new interpretation of u
But, if the Holy Allnncc had no practical consequences, the Quadruple
Alliance, and the later Quintuple Alliance with which it came to be con-
fused, did The Quadruple Alliance represented a continuation of the war-
time association of the allies and dated from November 20, 1815 At
that time Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia agreed to maintain
the settlement with France — that is, the Second Treaty of Pans, which had
followed the ‘Hundred Days and has superseded the First Treaty of
Paris — and in particular to prevent the return of Napoleon or his dynasty
to the French throne The alliance was to last for twenty years Moreover,
its sixth article provided for periodic consultations among the signatory
powers and resulted m the so-called “government by conference,” also
known as the Congress System or Confederation of Europe Conferences
took, place at Aix la Chapelle in 1818, Troppau and Laibach in J820-21,
and Verona in 1822 At Aix la Chapelle, with the payment of the in
demnity and the withdrawal of allied occupation troops, France shed Us
status as a defeated nation and joined the other four great European
powers in Lbc Quintuple Alliance The congresses of Troppau and Laibach
considered revolutions in Spain and Italy Finally, the meeting in Verona
dealt again with Spain and also with the Greek struggle against the Turks,
to which we shall return m the chapter on the reign of Nicholas I
After an impressive start, highlighted by the harmony and success of
the Aix la Chapelle meeting, the Congress System failed to work A funda-
mental split developed between Great Britain which, as the British state
paper of May 5, 1820, mads plain, opposed intervention m the internal
affairs of sovereign states, and Austria, Prussia, and Russia, who, as the
Protocol of Troppau spelled out, were determined to suppress revolution,
no matter where it raised its head France occupied something of an inter-
mediate poshton, although it did invade Spam to crush the liberal regime
there Mcttemtch tended to dominate the joint policies of the eastern
European monarchies, especially in the crucial years of 1820-22 when
Alexander f, frightened by a mutiny m the elite Semcnovsku guard regi-
ment and other events, followed the Austrian chancellor in his eagerness
to combat revolution everywhere The Semenov sku uprising, it might be
added, really resulted from the conflict between ihe regiment and its
commanding officer, not from any liberal conspiracy
ALEXANDER I
31?
The reactionary powers succeeded in defeating hberel revolutions on
the continent of Europe, except m Greece, where Christians fought their
Moslem masters and the complexity of the issues involved upset the usual
diplomatic attitudes and alignments To be sure, these victories of reaction
proved to be short-hved, as the subsequent history of Europe in the
nineteenth century was to demonstrate Also, the British navy prevented
their possible extension across the seas, thus barring reactionary Spam
and us allies from sny attempt to subdue the former Spanish colonics in die
new world that had won their independence The Monroe Doctrine, pro-
claimed on December 2, 1823, and aimed at preventing European Inter-
vention on “the American continents,” represented the response of the
United Stales to the potential threat to the countries of the Western hemi-
sphere posed by the reactionary members of the Confederation of Europe,
and also, incidentally, a response to the Russian expansion m North Amer-
ica
The Congress System has been roundly condemned by many historians
as a tool of reaction, both noxious and essential!) ineffective in maintaining
order and stability m Europe Yet at least one more positive aspect of that
Unusual political phenomenon and of Alexander l’s role in it deserves
notice The architects of the Congress System, including the Russian
emperor, created what was at us best more than a diplomatic altiance fn
the enthusiastic words of a British scholar writing about the Congress of
Aix-la-Chapelle
It is clear that at this period the Alliance was looked upon even by
British statesmen as something more than a mere union of the Great
Powers for preserving peace on the basis of the treaties, and in effect,
during its short session the Conference acted, not only as a European
representative body, hut as a sort of European Supreme Court, which
beard appeals and received petitions of all kinds from sovereigns and their
subjects alike
To be sure, this European harmony did not fast, and ‘’the Confederation
of Europe” seems too ambitious a designation for the alliance following the
Congress of Vienna Yet, if a true Confederation of Europe ever emerges,
the Congress S)stem will have to be accepted as its early, in a sense
prophetic, predecessor And it wras Alexander I who, more than an) other
European leader, emphasized the broad construction of the Quadruple and
the Quintuple alliances and tried to develop co-opera non and unity in
Europe. Although Austrian troops intervened in the Italian states and
French troops in Spam, the Russian ruler was also eager to contribute his
men to enforce the decisions of the powers In fact, he proposed forming a
permanent international army to guarantee the European settlement and
318 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
offered his troops for that purpose, but the suggestion was speedily re-
jected by CastJercagh and Metternich. He also proposed, and again un-
successfully, disarmament.
The Second Half of Alexander's Reign
While “the emperor of Europe” attended international meetings and
occupied himself with the affairs of foreign countries, events in Russia took
a turn for the worse. The second half of Alexander’s reign, that is the
period after 1812 , saw virtually no progressive legislation and few
plans in that direction; Novosiltsev’s constitutional project formed a
notable exception. In Poland the constitutional regime, impressive on
paper, did not function well, largely because Alexander I proved to be a
poor constitutional monarch because he quickly became irritated by
criticism or opposition and repeatedly disregarded the law. Serfs were
emancipated in the Baltic provinces, but, because they were freed witiiout
land, the change turned out to lie a doubtful blessing for them. Serfdom
remained undiminished and unchallenged in Russia proper, although ap-
parently to the last the sovereign considered emancipating the serfs.
While Speransky was Alexander I’s outstanding assistant in the first
half of the reign, General Alexis Arakcheev came to occupy that position
in the second half — and the difference between the two men tells ns
much about the course of Russian history in the first quarter of the nine-
teenth century. Arakcheev, who was once a faithful servant of Paul, was
brutal, rude, and a martinet of the worst sort. He became Alexander’s minis-
ter of war and eventually prime minister, without the title, reporting to the
sovereign on almost everything of importance in the internal affairs of
Russia and entrusted with every kind of responsibility. Yet the rather com-
mon image of the evil genius Arakcheev imposing his will on the emperor
badly distorts the relationship. In fact, it was precisely the general’s un-
questioning and prompt execution of Alexander’s orders that made him
indispensable to the monarch who was increasingly peremptory and at the
same time had lost interest in the complexities of home affairs.
Although Arakcheev left his imprint on many aspects of Russian life
during the second half of the reign, his name came to be connected es-
pecially with the so-called “military settlements.” That project apparently
originated with Alexander, but it was executed by Arakcheev. The basic
idea of military settlements was suggested perhaps by Turkish practices, a
book by a French general, or the wonderful precision and order which
reigned on Arakcheev’s estates — where, among other regulations, every
married woman was commanded to bear a child every year — and it had
the appeal of simplicity. The idea was to combine military service with
farming and thus reduce drastically the cost of the army and enable its
ALEXANDER l
51 9
men to lead a normal family life Indeed, in one of their aspects the
military settlements could be Considered among the emperor's humanitarian
endeavors The reform began m 1810, was interrupted by war, and attained
its greatest impetus and scope between 1816 and 1821, with 3botH one-
third of the peacetime Russian army established in military settlements
Troubles and uprisings m the settlements, however, checked their growth
After the rebellion of 1831 Nicholas I turned definitely against the reform,
but the last settlements were abolished only much later. Alexander I’s
and Arakcheev’s scheme failed principally because of lire extreme regi-
mentation and minute despotism that it entailed which became unbearable
and resulted in revolts and most cruet punishments In addition— as
Pipes has forcefully pointed out — Russian soldiers proved to be very poor
material for this venture m state direction and paternalism, resenting even
useful sanitary regulations Arakcheev himself, it may be noted, lost his
position with the accession of a new ruler
Until 1824 two important areas of Russian life, religion and education,
remained outside Arakcheevs reach because the) formed the domain of
another favorite of Alexander s later years. Prince Alexander Golitsyn Very
different from the brutal general, that aristocrat, philanthropist, and presi-
dent of the important Bible Society in Russia nevertheless had disastrous
effects on his country Like the emperor, Golitsin was affected by certain
mystical and pietistic currents then widespread m Europe — the favorite's
eventual fall resulted from allegations of insufficient Orthodoxy He be-
lieved that the Bible contained all essential knowledge and distrusted other
kinds of education it was during Golitsyn’s service as minister of education
that extreme, aggressive obscurantists, such as Michael Magnitsky and
Dmitru Rumch, purged several universities Magnitsky in particular made
of the University of Kazan a peculiar kind of monastic barracks he purged
the faculty and the library of the pernicious influences of the Age of
Reason, flooded the university with Bibles, instituted a most severe dis-
cipline among the students, with such support as mutual spying and com-
pulsory attendance at religious services, and proclaimed a double system
of chronology, the one already m use and a new one dating from the ref-
ormation of the university Magnitsky s fall swiftly followed the change of
rulers, for In a secret report he had accused Emperor Nicholas, then a
grand duke, of free thinking 1
The Decembrist lifoi ement emd Rebellion
Disappointment with the course of Alexander I’s reign played on Impor-
tant role m the emergence of the first Russian revolutionary group, which
came to be known after its unsuccessful uprising in December 1825 as the
Decembrists Most of the Decembrists were army officers, often from
320 imperial Russia
aristocratic families and elite regiments, who had received a good educa-
tion, learned French and sometimes other foreign languages, and obtained
a first-hand knowledge of the West during and immediately after the
campaigns against Napoleon. Essentially the Decembrists were liberals in
the tradition of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution; they wanted
to establish constitutionalism and basic freedoms in Russia, and to abolish
serfdom. More specifically, the Decembrist plans ranged from those of
Nikita Muraviev, who advocated a rather conservative constitutional
monarchy, to those of Colonel Paul Pestel, the author of the RHjjiun
Justice, who favored a strongly centralized republic along Jacobin lines as
well as a peculiar land reform program that would divide land into a public
and a private sector and guarantee every citizen his allotment within the
public sector. While the Decembrists — “our lords who wanted to become
shoemakers,” to quote Rostopcbin’s ironical remark — included some
of the most gifted and prominent Russian youth, and while they enjoyed the
sympathy of many educated Russians, including such literary luminaries
as Pushkin and Griboedov, they had little social backing for their rebel-
lion. That the standard of liberalism had to be carried in the Russia of
Alexander I by aristocratic officers of the guard demonstrates well the
weakness of the movement and above all the feebleness and backward-
ness of the Russian middle class. Russian liberalism in the early nineteenth
century resembled Spanish liberalism, not English or French.
At first the liberals who later became Decembrists were eager to co-
operate with the government on the road of progress, and their early so-
cieties, the Union of Salvation founded in 1816 and the Union oE Welfare
which replaced it, were concerned with such issues as the development of
philanthropy, education, and the civic spirit in Russia rather than with
military rebellion. Only gradually, as reaction grew and hopes for a liberal
transformation from above faded away, did the more stubborn liberals
begin to think seriously of change by force and to talk of revolution and
regicide. The movement acquired two centers, St. Petersburg in the
north and Tulchin, the headquarters of the Second Army in southern
Russia. The northern group lacked leadership and accomplished little. In
the south, by contrast, Pestel acted with intelligence and determination.
The Southern Society grew in numbers, developed its organization, dis-
covered and incorporated the Society of the United Slavs, and established
contacts with a Polish revolutionary group. The United Slavs, who pur-
sued aims vaguely similar to those of the Decembrists and had the addi-
tional goal of a democratic federation of all Slavic peoples, and who ac-
cepted the Decembrist leadership, consisted in particular of poor army
officers, more democratic and closer to the soldiers than were the aristo-
crats from the guard. Yet, when the hour of rebellion suddenly arrived, the
NDER I
321
Southern Society, handicapped by Pestcl 3 arrest, proved to be little better
prepared than the Northern
Alexander J’s unexpected death in southern Russia in December 1825
led to a dynastic crisis, which the Decembrists utilized to make their bid
for power The deceased emperor had no sons or grandsons, therefore
Grand Duke Constantine, his oldest brother, was his logical successor But
the heir presumptive had married a Polish aristocrat not of royal blood
in 1820, and, in connection with the marriage, had renounced his rights to
the throne Nicholas, the third brother, was thus to become the next
ruler of Russia, the enure matter having been stated clearly in JS22 in a
special manifesto confirmed by Alexander Is signature The manifesto,
however, had remained unpublished and only a few people had received
exact information about it, even the two grand dukes were ignorant of
its content Following Alexander Is death Constantine and the Polish
kingdom where he was commander m chief swore allegiance to Nicholas,
but Nicholas, the Russian capital, and the Russian arm) swore allegiance
to Constantme Constantine acted with perfect consistency Nicholas
however, even after reading Alexander Is manifesto abo felt impelled
to behave as he did Alexander Is decision could be challenged as con-
trary to Paul s law of succession and also tor remaining unpublished dur-
ing the emperors own reign, and Nicholas was under pressure to step
aside in favor of his elder brother, who was generally expected to follow
Alexander 1 on the throne Only after Constantme s uncompromising te-
nffirmauon of his position and a resulting lapse of time, did Nicholas de-
cide to publish Alexander s manifesto and become emperor of Russia
On December 26 1825 — December 14, Ofd Style — when the guard
regiments in St, Petersburg were to swear allegiance for the second time
within a short while, this time to Nicholas, the Northern Society of the
Decembrists staged its rebellion Realizing that they had a unique chance
to act, the conspiring officers used their influence with the soldiers to start a
muuny In several units by entreating them to defend the nghtful interests
of ConstanUne against his usurping brother Altogether about three thou-
sand misled rebels came tn military formation to Senate Square in the
heart of the capital Although the government was caught unprepared, the
mutineers were soon faced by troops several times their number and
strength The two forces stood opposite each other for several hours
The Decembrists failed to act because of their general confusion and lack
ol leadership, the new emperor hesitated to start his reign with a mas-
sacre of his subjects, hoping that they could be talked into submission
But, as verbal inducements failed and dusk began to gather on the after-
noon of that northern winter day, artillery was brought into action Several
canister shots dispersed the rebels, killing sixty or seventy of them Large-
322
IMPERIAl Mssn
the Northern Society, the poet Conrad Ryleev, were executed, while 1
most three hundred other participants suffered lesser punislutient
Nicholas I was firmly in the saddle.
THE REIGN OF NICHOLAS 1, 1825-S5
Here tin the army] ihere n order, l\c*e n a strict uneondjuonal
legality, no impertinent claims lo know all the ansv.cn, no con-
tradiction, all things Pow logically one from the other, no one
commands betore he has himself learned to obey, no one steps itt
front of a ns one else without lawful reason, ever) thing u subordi-
nated to one definite goal, everything has Ms purpose That »i why I
fee! so well among these people, and why 1 shall always hold in honor
the calling of n soldier 1 consider the enure hmnaft hfe lo be merely
service, because everybody serves
NICHOLAS t
The most consistent of autocrats
SCttitvUNN
As man and ruler Nichotas I had little in common with his brother
Alexander 1 By contrast with his predecessor’s psychological paradoxes,
ambivalence, and vacillation, the new sovereign displayed determination,
singleness of purpose, and an iron will He also possessed an overwhelming
sense of duty and a great capacity (or work In character, and even in his
striking and powerful appearance, Nicholas 1 seemed to be the perfect
despot. Appropriately, he always remained an army man, a junior officer at
heart, devoted to his troops, to military exercises, to the parade ground,
down to the last button on a soldier's uniform — -m fact, as emperor he
ordered alterations of the uniforms, even changing the number of but-
tons And in the same spirit, the autocrat insisted on arranging and order-
ing minutely and precisely everything around him Engineering, especially
the construction of defenses, v. as Nicholas’s other enduring passion Even as
a child “whenever he built a summer house, for his nurse or his governess,
out Of chairs, earth, or toys, he never forgot to fortify it with guns — for
protection " Later, specializing In fortresses, he became head of the army
corps of engineers and thus the chief military engineer of his country,
perhaps his most important assignment during the reign of his brother,
still later, as emperor, he staked all on making the entire land an im-
pregnable fortress.
Nicholas’s views fitted his personality to perfection. Bom in 1796 and
nineteen years younger than Alexander, the new ruler was brought up, not
in the atmosphere of the fate Enlightenment like his brother, but ui that
of wars against Napoleon and of reaction. Moreover, Nicholas marntd a
Prussian pnnccss and established particularly close ties with his wife's
323 *- *
324 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
family, including his father-in-law King Frederick William III and his
brother-in-law King Frederick William IV who ruled Prussia in succession.
The Russian wing of European reaction, represented by Nicholas I and
his government, found its ideological expression in the doctrine of so-
called “Official Nationality.” Formally proclaimed in 1833 by Count
Serge Uvarov, the tsar’s minister of education. Official Nationality con-
tained three principles: Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality. Autocracy
meant the affirmation and maintenance of the absolute power of the
sovereign, which was considered the indispensable foundation of the Rus-
sian state. Orthodoxy referred to the official Church and its important role
in Russia, but also to the ultimate source of ethics and ideals that gave
meaning to human life and society. Nationality — narodnost in Russian
— referred to the particular nature of the Russian people, which, so the
official doctrine asserted, made the people a mighty and dedicated sup-
porter of its dynasty and government. However, with some proponents of
Official Nationality, especially professors and writers such as Michael
Pogodin and Stephen Shevyrev, nationality acquired far-reaching romantic
connotations. In particular, the concept for them embraced a longing for
a great future for Russia and Slavdom. In sum, in contrast to Alexander I
who never entirely gave up his dreams of change, Nicholas I was deter-
mined to defend the existing order in his fatherland, and especially to de-
fend autocracy.
Nicholas's ” System ”
The Decembrist rebellion at the beginning of Nicholas I’s reign only
hardened the new emperor’s basic views as well as his determination to
fight revolution to the end. No doubt it also contributed to the emperor’s
mistrust of the gentry, and indeed of independence and initiative on the part
of any of his subjects. Characteristically, Nicholas I showed minute per-
sonal interest in the arrest, investigation, trial, and punishment of the
Decembrists, and this preoccupation with the dangers of subversion
remained with him throughout his reign. The new regime became pre-
eminently one of militarism and bureaucracy. The emperor surrounded
himself with military men to the extent that in the later part of his reign
there were almost no civilians among his immediate assistants. Also, he
relied heavily on special emissaries, most of them generals of his suite, who
were sent all over Russia on particular assignments, to execute immediately
the will of the sovereign. Operating outside the regular administrative
system, they represented an extension, so to speak, of the monarch’s own
person. In fact, the entire machinery of government came to be permeated
by the military spirit of direct orders, absolute obedience, and precision, at
least as far as official reports and appearances were concerned. Corrup-
N ICHO LAS l
32S
non and confusion, however, lay immediately behind lins facade of dis-
cipline and smooth functioning
In his conduct of state affairs Nicholas I often bypassed regular
channels, and he generally resented formal deliberation, consultation, or
other procedural delay The importance of the Committee of Ministers, the
State Council, and the Senate decreased m the course of his reign In-
stead of making full use of them, the emperor depended more and more
on special bureaucratic devices meant to cany out his Intentions promptly
while remaining under his immediate and complete control As one favorite
method, Nicholas I made extensive use of ad hoc committees standing
outside the usual state machinery The committees were usually composed
of a handful of the most trusted assistants of the emperor, and, because
these were very few in number, the same men in different combinations
formed these committees throughout Nicholas s reign As a rule the com-
mittees carried on their work in secret, adding further complication and
confusion to the already cumbersome administration of the empire
The first, and m many ways the most significant, of Nicholas s com-
mittees was that established on December 6, 1826 and lasting until 1832
Count Kochubey served as its chairman, and the committee contained five
other leading statesmen of the period In contrast to the restricted assign-
ments of later committees, the Committee of the Sixth of December had
to examine the state papers and projects left by Alexander, to reconsider
virtually all major aspects of government and social organization in Russia,
and to propose improvements The painstaking work or this select group of
officials led to negligible results entirely conservative in outlook, the com
mittce directed us effort toward hair splitting distinchons and minor, at
times merely verbal, modifications, and it drastically qualified virtually
every suggested change Even its innocuous "law concerning the estates ’
that received impcnal approval was shelved after criticism by Grand
Duke Conslanutie This laborious fulihty became the characteristic pattern
of most of the subsequent committees dunng the reign of Nicholas I, m
spite of the fact that the emperor himself often took an active part m their
proceedings The failure of one committee to perform its task merely led to
the formation of another For example, some nine committees in the reign
of Nicholas tned to deal w ith the issue of serfdom
His Majesty’s Own Chancery proved to be more effective than the
special committees Organized originally as a bureau to deal with matters
that demanded the sovereign’s personal participation and to supervise the
execution of the emperor’s orders, the Chancery grew rapidly in the reign
of Nicholas I As early as 1 826, two rew departments were added to it
the Second Department was concerned with the codification of law, and
the Third with the administration of the newly created corps of gendarmes
In 1828 the Fourth Department was created for the purpose of managing
326 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
the charitable and educational institutions under the jurisdiction of the
Empress Dowager Mary. Eight years later the Fifth Department was created
and charged with reforming the condition of the state peasants; after two
years of activity it was replaced by the new Ministry of State Domains.
Finally, in 1843, the Sixth Department of His Majesty’s Own Chancery
came into being, a temporary agency assigned the task of drawing up an
administrative plan for Transcaucasia. The departments of the Chancery
served Nicholas I as a major means of conducting a personal policy which
bypassed the regular state channels.
The Third Department of His Majesty’s Own Chancery, the political
police — which came to symbolize to many Russians the reign of
Nicholas I — acted as the autocrat’s main weapon against subversion and
revolution and as his principal agency for controlling the behavior of his
subjects and for distributing punishments and rewards among them. Its
assigned fields of activity ranged from “all orders and ail reports in every
case belonging to the higher police” to “reports about all occurrences with-
out exception”! The new guardians of the state, dressed in sky-blue uni-
forms, were incessantly active:
In their effort to embrace the entire life of the people, they intervened
actually in every matter in which it was possible to intervene. Family
life, commercial transactions, personal quarrels, projects of inventions,
escapes of novices from monasteries — everything interested the secret
police. At the same time the Third Department received a tremendous
number of petitions, complaints, denunciations, and each one resulted
in an investigation, each one became a separate case.
The Third Department also prepared detailed, interesting, and remark-
ably candid reports of all sorts for the emperor, supervised literature — an
activity ranging from minute control over Pushkin to ordering various
“inspired” articles in defense of Russia and the existing system — and
fought every trace of revolutionary infection. The two successive heads
of the Third Department, Count Alexander Benckcndorff and Prince
Alexis Orlov, probably spent more time with Nicholas I than any of his
other assistants; they accompanied him, for instance, on his repeats d
trips of inspection throughout Russia. Yet most of the feverish activity of
the gendarmes seemed to be to no purpose. Endless investigations of sub-
version, stimulated by the monarch’s own suspiciousness, revealed very lit-
tle. Even the most important radical group uncovered during the reign,
the Petrashevtsy, fell victim not to the gendanneiy but to its great rival,
the ordinary police, which continued to be part of the Ministry of the
Interior. Short on achievements, the Third Department proved to be long
on failings. The gendarmes constantly expanded their pointless work to
increase their importance, quarreled with other government agencies.
NICHOLAS I 327
notably the police, and opened the way to some fantastic adventurers as
well as to countless run-of-the-mill informers, who flooded the gendarm-ry
with their reports The false reports lamed out to be so numerous that the
Third Department proceeded to punish some ol their authors and to stage
weekly burnings of the denunciations.
The desire to control to detail the lives and thoughts of the people and
above all to prevent subversion, which constituted the main aims of the
Thud Department, guided also the policies of the Ministry of Educaron
— which we shall discuss in a later chapter — specifically in censorship,
and, indeed, in a sense they guided the policies of Nicholas 5 entire regime
As ui the building of fortresses, the emphasis was defensive to hold fast
against the enemy and to prevent his penetration The sovereign himself
worked fndefatigably at shoring up the defenses He paid the most pains-
taking attention to the huge and difficult business of government, did his
own inspecting of the country, rushed to meet all kinds of emergencies,
from cholera epidemics and riots to rebellion m military settlements, and
bestowed special care on the army Beyond all that and be) one! even the
needs of defense, he wanted to follow the sacred principle of autocracy, to
be a true father of his people concerned with their daily lives, hopes, and
fears
The Issue of Reform
However, as already indicated, all the efforts of the emperor and his gov-
ernment bore little fruit, and the limitations of Nicholas's approach to
reForm revealed themselves with special clarity in the crucial issue of serf-
dom Nicholas I personally disapproved of that institution in the army
and in the countty at large he saw only too well the misery u produced, and
he remained constancy apprehensive of the danger of insurrection, also,
the autocrat had no sympathy for aristocratic privilege when it clashed
with the interests of the state Yet, ns he explained the matter in 1842 in
the State Council “There is no doubt that serfdom, as it exists at present
in our land, is an evil, palpable and obvious to all But to touch it now
would be a still mote disastrous evil The Pugachev rebellion proved
how far popular rage can go ” In fact throughout his reign the emperor
feared, at the same time, two different revolutions There was the danger
that the gentry might bid to obtain a constitution if the government decided
to deprive the landlords of thetr serfs On the other hand, an elemental,
popular uprising might also be unleashed by such a major shock to the
established order as the coveted emancipation
In the end, although the government was almost constantly concerned
with serfdom, it achieved very little New laws either left the change in
the serfs’ status to the discretion of their landlords, thus merely continuing
328 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
Alexander’s well-meaning but ineffectual efforts, or they prohibited only
certain extreme abuses connected with serfdom such as selling members of
a single family to different buyers. Even the minor concessions granted to
the peasants were sometimes nullified. For instance, in 1847, the govern-
ment permitted serfs to purchase their freedom if their master’s estate was
sold for debt. In the next few years, however, the permission was made in-
operative without being formally rescinded. Following the European revo-
lutions of 1848, the meager and hesitant government solicitude for the serfs
came to an end. Only the bonded peasants of Western Russian provinces
obtained substantial advantages in the reign of Nicholas I. As we shall see,
they received this preferential treatment because the government wanted
to use them in its struggle against the Polish influence which was prevalent
among the landlords of that area.
Determined to preserve autocracy, afraid to abolish serfdom, and sus-
picious of all independent initiative and popular participation, the emperor
and his government could not introduce in their country the much-needed
fundamental reforms. In practice, as well as in theory, they looked back-
ward. Important developments did nevertheless take place in certain areas
where change would not threaten the fundamental political, social, and
economic structure of the Russian Empire. Especially significant proved
to be the codification of law and the far-reaching reform in the condition
of the state peasants. The new code, produced in the late 1820’s and the
early 1830’s by the immense labor of Speransky and his associates, marked,
despite defects, a tremendous achievement and a milestone in Russian
jurisprudence. In January 1835 it replaced the ancient Ulozhenie of Tsar
Alexis, dating from 1 649, and it was destined to last until 1917.
The reorganization of the state peasants followed several years later
after Count Paul Kiselev became head of the new Ministry of State Do-
mains in 1837. Kiselev’s reform, which included the shift of taxation from
persons to land, additional allotments for poor peasants, some peasant
self-government, and the development of financial assistance, schools, and
medical care in the villages, has received almost universal praise from pre-
revolutionary historians. The leading Soviet specialist on the subject,
Druzhinin, however, claimed recently, on the basis of impressive evidence,
that the positive aspects of Kiselev’s reform had a narrow scope and appli-
cation, while fundamentally it placed an extremely heavy burden on the
state peasants, made all the more difficult to bear by the exactions and
malpractices of local administration. Finance minister Egor Kanknns
policy, and in particular his measures to stabilize the currency — often
cited among the progressive developments in Nicholas I’s reign — proved
to be less effective and important in the long run than Speransky s and
Kiselev’s work.
NICHOLAS t
329
The Last Years
But even limited reforms became impossible after 1848 Frightened b>
European revolutions, Nicholas I became completely reactionary Russians
were forbidden to travel abroad, an order which hit teachers and students
especially hard The number of student without government scholarships
was limited to three hundred per university, except for the school of medi-
cine Uvarov had to resign as minister of educa'son in favor of an entirely
reactionary and subservient functionary who on one Occasion told on
assistant of his “You should know that 1 have neither a mind nor a will of
my own— I am merely a blind tool of iht emperor s will ' New restrictions
further curtailed university autonomy and academic freedom Constitu-
tional law and philosophy were eliminated from the curricula, logic and
psychology were retained but were to be taught by professors of theology
In fact, in the Opinion of some historians, the universities themselves came
close to being eliminated and only the timely intervention of certain high
officials prevented this disaster Censorship reached ridiculous proportions,
with new agencies appearing, including “a censorship over the censors”
The censors, to c/re only a foiv instances of their activities, deleted “forces
of nature” front a textbook in physics, probed the hidden meaning of an
ellipsis in an arithmetic book, changed “were killed” to “pensbed * in an
account of Roman emperors, demanded that the author of a fortune-tellmg
book explain why m his opinion stars influence the fate of men, and
worried about the possiWe concealment of secret codes in musical pota-
tions Literature and thought were virtually stifled Even Michael Pogodin,
a Right wing professor of history and a leading exponent of the doctnnc of
Official Nationality, was impelled in the very last years of the reign to
accuse the government of imposing upon Russia * the quiet of a graveyard,
rotting and slinking, both physically and morally*' It was m this atmos-
phere of suffocation that Russia experienced its shattering defeat in the
Crimean War
Nicholas Vs Foreign Policy
If the Crimean debacle represented, as many scholars insist, the logical
termination of N'Cholas l*s foreign policy and reign, it was a case of his-
torical logic, unique for the occasion and difficult to follow For, to begin
With, the Russian emperor intended least of all to fight other European
powers Indeed, a dedicated supporter of autocracy at home, he became
a dauntless champion of legitimism abroad Nicholas I "as determined to
maintain and defend the extsung order in Europe, just as he considered it
330
IMPERIAL RUSSIA
his sacred duty to preserve the archaic system in his own country. He saw
the two closely related as the whole and its part, and he thought both to
be threatened by the same enemy: the many-headed hydra of revolution
which had suffered a major blow with the final defeat of Napoleon but
refused to die. Indeed it rose again and again, in 1830, in 1848, and on
other occasions, attempting to reverse and undo the settlement of 1815.
True to his principles, the resolute tsar set out to engage the enemy. In
the course of the struggle, this “policeman of Russia” assumed added re-
sponsibilities as the “gendarme of Europe.” The emperor’s assistants in the
field of foreign policy, led by Count Karl Nesselrode who served as foreign
minister throughout the reign, on the whole shared the views of their
monarch and bent to his will.
Shortly after Nicholas I’s accession to the throne, Russia fought a war
against Persia that lasted from June 1826 to February 1828. The hostilities,
which represented another round in the struggle for Georgia, resulted in the
defeat of Persia, General Ivan Paskevich emerging as the hero of the
campaigns. While the Treaty of Turkmanchai gave Russia part of Armenia
with the city of Erivan, exclusive rights to have a navy on the Caspian
sea, commercial concessions, and a large indemnity, Nicholas I character-
istically refused to press his victory. In particular, he would not support
a native movement to overthrow the shah and destroy his rule.
A few weeks after making peace with Persia, Russia declared war on
Turkey. This conflict marked the culmination of an international crisis
which had begun with the rebellion of the Greeks against their Turkish
masters in 1821, the so-called Greek War of Independence. The Russian
government vacillated in its attitude toward the Greek revolution for, on
one hand, the Russians sympathized with the Orthodox Greeks and were
traditionally hostile to the Turks, while, on the other hand, Russia was
committed to the support of the status quo in Europe. Moreover, the Greek
crisis had unusually complicated diplomatic ramifications and possibilities.
Other European powers also found it difficult to maintain a consistent
policy toward the struggle of the Greeks against the Turks. Acting more
firmly than his brother, Nicholas I tried, first with Great Britain and France,
and then on his own, to restrain Turkey and settle the Balkan conflict. On
October 20, 1827, in the battle of Navarino, the joint British, French, and
Russian squadrons destroyed the Egyptian fleet that had been summoned
to help its Turkish overlord. But it was not until April 1828 that the
Russo-Turkish hostilities officially began. Although the Porte proved to
be more difficult to defeat than the Russian emperor had expected, the
second major campaign of the war brought decisive, if costly, victory to
the Russian array and forced the Ottoman state to agree to the Treaty of
Adrianople in 1829.
That settlement gave Russia the mouth of the Danube as well as con-
1 C II O L A S I
33!
siderable territory m the Caucasus, promised autonomous existence, under
a Russian protectorate, to the Danubian puncip times of Moldavia and
Wallachia, imposed a heavy indemnity on Turkey, guaranteed the passage
of Russian merchant ships through the Straits, and, incidental]), assured
the success of the Greek revolution, which the tsar continued to detest
But In spite of these and other Russian gains embodied in the treaty, it
has often and justly been considered an example of moderation m inter-
national affairs The Russian emperor did not try to destroy his former
opponent, regarding Turkey as an important and dtslrable element in the
European balance of power In fact, the decision 10 preserve the Otto-
man state represented the considered judgment of a special committee
appointed by Nicholas I in 1829 to deal with the numerous problems raised
by the defeat of Turkey and the changing situation in the Balkans And the
committee’s report to the effect that ' the advantages offered by the preser-
vation of the Ottoman Empire in Europe exceed the inconveniences which
it presents,' received the Russian sovereign s lull endorsement
The revolution in Pans in July 1830 came as a great shock to the tsar,
and its impact was heightened by the Belgian uprising in September and
by unrest in Italy and Germany Nicholas I sent a special emissary to Ber-
lin to co-ordinate action with Prussia and, although the mission failed,
assembled an army in Poland prepared to march west When the regime of
Louis Philippe was promptly accepted by other European governments,
the Russian emperor still withheld official recognition for four months and
then treated the new French ruler in a grudging and discourteous manner
The revolution of the Belgians against the Dutch similarly provoked the
anger of the Russian autocrat who regarded it as another assault on the
sacred principle of legitimacy and, in addition, as a clear violation of the
territorial provisions of the Treaty of Vienna Once again failing to obtain
diplomatic support from other powers Nicholas I had to subscribe to the
international settlement of the issue, which favored the rebels, although
he delayed the ratification of the Treaty of London for several months and
did not establish regular diplomatic relations with the new state until 1852
It should be added that the early plans for a Russian military intervention
in western Europe might well have been realized except for the Polish
revolution, which broke out late m November 1830, and whtch took the
Russian government approximately a year to suppress
Patnotic Poles had never accepted the settlement of J815, which repre-
sented to them not a re-establishment of their historic state but the * Fourth
Partition of Poland ** They resented any link with Russia And they hoped
to regain the vast Lithuanian, White Russian, and Ukrainian lands that
Poland had ruled before it was partitioned Although Nicholas I observed
the Polish constitution much better than Alexander 1 had, tension increased
in Warsaw and elsewhere in the kingdom Finally m 1830, as revolutions
332
M P E
*• RUSSIA
spread in Europe, Warsaw rose against the Russians in late November.
The commander-in-chief in the kingdom. Grand Duke Constantine failed
in the moment of crisis, and before long Russia lost all control of Poland.
Poland, therefore, had to be reconquered in what amounted to a full-
fledged war, because the Poles had a standing army of their own that ral-
lied to the national cause. Still, although Paskevich’s Russian troops first
entered Warsaw nine months later and although more time was required
to destroy patriotic detachments and bands in dense Polish forests the
outcome was never in doubt. In addition to their weakness in comparison
to the Russians, the Polish nationalists did not keep the strong support of
the Polish peasants, and they rashly tried to carry the struggle beyond their
ethnic borders where the population would not support them.
The result was another tragedy for Poland. The Polish constitution of
1815 was replaced by the Organic Statute of 1832 that made Poland “an
indivisible part” of the Russian Empire. The Statute itself, with its
promises of civil liberties, separate systems of law and local government,
and widespread use of the Polish language, remained in abeyance while
Poland was administered in a brutal and authoritarian manner by its
conqueror, the new Prince of Warsaw and Nicholas’s viceroy. Marshal
Paskevich. The monarch himself carefully directed and supervised his
work. The estates of the insurgents were confiscated; Polish institutions of
higher learning were closed; the lands of the Catholic Church were secular-
ized and the clergy given fixed salaries. At the same time, Poland was
forced more and more into the Russian mold in legal, administrative, edu-
cational, and economic matters. The most striking steps in that direction
included the subordination of the Warsaw school region to the Russian
Ministry of Education in 1839, the abolition of the Polish State Council
in 1841, and the abrogation of the customs barrier between Russia and
Poland in 1850. The Russian language reigned in the secondary schools as
well as in the administration, while a stringent censorship banned the works
of most of the leading Polish authors as subversive.
A Russification more thorough than in Poland developed in the western
and southwestern provinces, with their White Russian and Ukrainian
peasant population and Polonized landlord class. Even prior to the insur-
rection of 1830-31 the government of Nicholas I had moved toward bring-
ing that territory into closer association with Russia proper, a process
connected with the emperor’s general penchant for centralization and stand-
ardization, After the suppression of the revolution, assimilation proceeded
swiftly under the direction of a special committee. Rebels from Lithuanian,
White Russian, and "Ukrainian provinces were denied the amnesty offered
to those from Poland. It was in this territory that the Orthodox Church
scored its greatest gain when, in 1839, the Uniates severed their connection
NICHOLAS I
333
with Rome and come into its fold in 1840 the Lithuanian Statute was
repealed in favor of Russian law Because the landlords represented the
Polish element, Nicholas I and his assistants changed the usual policy to
legislate against their interests They went so far as to Introduce in some
provinces “inventories" which defined and regularized the obligations of
the serfs to their masters and in 1851 to establish compulsory state service
for the gentry of the western region Thousands of poor or destitute families
of the petty gentry were reclassified os peasants or townspeople, some of
them being transferred to the Caucasus
But while the Russian gov ernment fought against Polish influence, it
showed equal hostility to budding Ukrainian nationalism, as indicated by
the destruction of the Brotherhood of Cyril and Methodius and the cmtl
punishment of its members, including the great Ukrainian poet Tnras
Shevchenko
Relative stabilization in Europe was followed by new troubles in the
Neat Cast D.nied Syria as his reward for help given to the sultan of
Turkey in the Greek war, Mohammed Ah of Egypt rebelled against hts
nominal suzerain and during the year of 1832, sent an army which con-
quered Syria and invaded Anatolia, smashing Turkish forces The sul-
tan s desperate appeals for help produced no tangible results in European
capitals, with the exception of St Petersburg Nicholas I's eagerness to
aid the Porte in its hour of need found ample justification in the political
advantages that Russia could derive from this important intervention
But such action also corresponded perfectly to the legitimist convictions
of the Russian autocrat, who regarded Mohammed All as yet another mayor
rebel, and it supported the Russian decision of 1829 favoring the preserva-
tion of Turkey On February 20, 1833, a Russian naval squadron arrived
at Constantinople and, several weeks later, some ten thousand Russian
troops were landed on the Asiatic side of the Bosporus — the only appear-
ance of Russian armed forces at the Straits in history Extremely worried
by this unexpected development, the great powers acted in concert to bring
Turkey and Egypt together, arranging the Convention of Kutahia between
the two combatants and inducing the sultan to agree to its provisions The
Russians withdrew immediately after Orlov hod signed a p3Ct with
Turkey, the Treaty of Unkiar Skclesst, on July 8, 1833 That agreement,
concluded for eight years, contained broad provisions for mutual con-
sultation and aid in case of attack by any third party, a secret article at
the same time exempted Turkey from helping Russia in exchange for keep-
ing die Dardanelles closed to alt foreign warships Although, contrary to
widespread supposition at the time and since, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi
did not provide for the passage of Russian men-of war through the Straus
-—a point established by Mosely — it did represent a signal victory for
334
MPE
RUSSIA
Russia: the empire of the tsars became the special ally and, to a degree,
protector of its ancient, decaying enemy, thereby acquiring important means
to interfere in its affairs and influence its future.
The events of 1830-31 in Europe, and to a lesser extent recurrent con-
flicts in the Near East, impressed on Nicholas I the necessity for close
co-operation and joint action of the conservative powers. Austria and in
a certain measure Prussia felt the same need, with the result that the three
eastern European monarchies drew together by the end of 1833. Agree-
ments were concluded at a meeting at Miinchengratz, attended by the em-
perors of Russia and Austria and the crown prince of Prussia, and at a
meeting soon after in Berlin. Russia came to a thorough understanding
with the Hapsburg empire, especially regarding their common struggle
against nationalism and their desire to maintain Turkish rule in the Near
East. Similarly, the Russian agreement with Prussia stressed joint policies in
relation to partitioned Poland. More far-reaching in its provisions and its
implications was the Convention of Berlin signed by all three powers on
October 15, 1833:
Their Majesties . . . recognize that each independent Sovereign has the
right to call to his aid, in case of internal troubles as welt as in case of an
external threat to his country, every other independent Sovereign. . . .
In the event that the material help of one of the three Courts, the
Austrian, the Prussian, and the Russian, is requested, and if any power
would want to oppose this by the force of arms, these three Courts would
consider as directed against each one of them every hostile action under-
taken with this goal in view.
The agreements of 1833 were thus meant to protect not only the immediate
interests of the signatory powers, but also the entire conservative order in
Europe. Nicholas I in particular proved eager to police the continent. It
was the Russian army that moved quickly in 1846 to occupy the city of
Cracow and suppress the uprising there, and it was the Russian emperor
who insisted to the somewhat slow and reluctant Austrian government that
this remnant of free Poland must become a part of the Hapsburg state, as
had been previously arranged among the eastern European monarchies.
The revolution of February 1848 in France opened a new chapter in
the struggle between the old order and the rising forces of the modern world
in nineteenth-century Europe. While the famous story of Nicholas I telling
his guests at a ball to saddle their horses because a republic had just been
proclaimed in France is not exact, the Russian autocrat did react immedi-
ately and violently to the news from Paris. Although delighted by the fall
of Louis-Pliilippe whom he hated as a usurper and traitor to legitimism,
the tsar could not tolerate a revolution, so he broke diplomatic relations
with France and assembled three or four hundred thousand troops in west-
NICHOLAS I
335
cm Russia in preparation for a march to the Rhine But rebellion spread
faster than the Russian sovereign s countermeasures in less than a month
Prussia and Austria •were engulfed in the conflagration, and the entire
established order on the continent began rapidly to crumble Into dust
In the trying months that followed, Nicholas I rose to his full stature
as the defender of legitimism: m Europe The remarkable ultimate failures
of the initially successful revolutions of 1848 and 1849 can best be ex-
plained m terms of the specific political, social, and economic conditions
of the different countries involved Sull, the Russian monarch certainly
did what he could to tip the balance in favor of reaction Following a
strange and thunderous manifesto against revolution, he proceeded to
exercise all his influence to oppose the numerous uprisings that had gripped
the continent For example, the Russian government suppticd Austria with
a loan of six mitlion rubles and pointed out to Great Britain that, if an
outside power were to support an Italian state against the Hapsburgs
Russia would join Austria as a full fledged combatant The first Russian
military intervention to suppress revolution occurred in July 1848 in the
Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, where Russia acted
for itself and for Turkey to defeat the Rumanian national movement The
most important action took place in the summer of 1849, when Nicholas
I heeded the Austrian appeal on the basis of the agreements of 1833
to help combat the revolt in Hungary, assigning Paskevich and almost two
hundred thousand troops for the campaign The successful Russian inter-
vention in Hungary — which earned the undying hvtred of the Hungarians
— was directed in part against the Polish danger, as Polish revolutionaries
were fighting on the Hungarian side But its chief rationale lay in the Rus-
sian autocrats determination to preserve the existing order in Europe,
for the Austrian empire was one of the main supports of that order Russia
also sided with Austria m the Austrian dispute with Prussia over hegemony
in Germany and thus helped the Hapsburgs to score a major diplomatic vic-
tory in the Punctation of OlmGtz of November 29, 1850, when the Prus-
sians abandoned their attempt to seize the initiative in Germany and ac-
cepted a return to the status quo and Austrian leadership in that area
The impressive and in certain ways dominant position which Russia
gained With the collapse of the revolutions of 1848-49 on the continent
failed to last In fact, the international standing of the “gendarme of Eu-
rope ’ and the country he ruled was much stronger in appearance than
m reality liberalism and nationalism although defeated, were by no means
dead, and they earned European public opinion from Poland and Hungary
to France and England, even the countries usually fncndl) to the tsar com-
plained of his interference with their interests, os in the ease of Prussia, or
at least resented his overbearing solicitude, as was true of Austria On the
other hand Nicholas I himself — m the opm on of *omc specialists- — re
336 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
acted to his success by becoming more biuni, uncompromising, doctrinaire
and domineering than ever before. The stage was set for a debacle.
The Crimean War
However, when the debacle did come, the accompanying circumstances
proved to be exceedingly complex, and they were related especially to
issues in the Near East. There the resumption of hostilities between Turkey
and Egypt in 1839-40 undid the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. European
powers acted together to impose a settlement upon the combatants under
terms of the Treaty of London of July 15, 1 840, and they also signed the
Straits Convention of July 13, 1841. The Convention, in which Great
Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and France participated, reaffirmed tile
closure of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles to all foreign warships in time
of peace, substituting an international guarantee of the five signatories
for the separate treaty between Russia and Turkey. Nicholas I proved will-
ing to co-operate with the other states, and, in the same spirit, made a
particular effort during the years following to come to a thorough under-
standing with Great Britain. In the summer of 1844 he personally traveled
to England and discussed the Near Eastern situation and prospects with
Lord Aberdeen, the foreign secretary. The results of these conversations
were summarized in an official Russian memorandum, prepared by Nes-
selrode, which the British government accepted as accurate. According to
its provisions, Russia and Great Britain were to maintain the Turkish
state as long as possible, and, in case of its impending dissolution, the two
parties were to come in advance to an understanding concerning the re-
partitioning of the territories involved and other problems.
Although the crucial Russo-British relations in the decades preceding
the Crimean War have been variously explicated and assessed by different
scholars, such as Puryear who saw the picture from the Russian side and
Temperley who observed it from the British side, several elements in the
situation stand out clearly. Nicholas I’s apparently successful agreement
with Great Britain had an illusory and indeed a dangerous character. The
two main points of the understanding • — the preservation and the partition-
ing of Turkey — were, in a sense, contradictory, and the entire agreement
was, therefore, especially dependent on identical, or at least very similar,
interpretation by both partners of developments in the Near East, a degree
of harmony never to be achieved. Moreover, the form of the agreement also
contributed to a certain ambivalence, and difference of opinion: while
Nicholas I and his associates considered it to he a firm arrangement of
fundamental importance, the British apparently thought of it more as a
secret exchange of opinions not binding on the subsequent premiers and
foreign ministers of Her Majesty’s government. The Russian emperors
M C IIOI AS
337
talks in January and February of 1853 with Sir Hamilton Seymour, the
British ambassador, when the tsar dwelt on the imminent collapse of the
Ottoman Empire and offered a plan of partition, served only to emphasize
the gulf between the two states The complex and unfortunate entanglement
with Great Britain was one of the chief bases for Nicholas I's mistaken be-
lief that his Near Eastern policy had strong backing in Europe
In 1 850 a dispute began in the Holy Land between Catholics and Ortho-
dox in regard to certain rights connected with some of the most sacred
shrines of Christendom Countering Napoleon Ill’s championing of the
Catholic cause, Nicholas I acted in his usual direct and forceful manner
by sending Prince Alexander Menshikov, in February 1853, with an
ultimatum to the Turks the Holy Land controversy was to be settled in
favor of the Orthodox, and the Porte was to recognize explicitly the rights
of the vast Orthodox population of its empire When Turkey accepted the
first series of demands, but would not endorse Russian interference on
behalf of the Orthodox subjects of the Porte, considering It to be an in-
fringement of Turkish sovereignty Menshikov terminated the discussion
and left Constantinople Russian occupation of the Danubian principalities
as * material guarantees added Cud to the fire There is little doubt that
the rash actions of Nicholas 1 precipitated war, although it is probable
that he wanted to avoid a conflict After the first phases of the controversy
described above the Russian government acted in a conciliatory manner,
accepting the so-called Vienna Note as a compromise settlement, evacuat
mg the principalities and repeatedly seeking peace even after the outbreak
of hostilities The war guitt at this later stage should be divided principally
among Turkey, France, Great Britain, and even Austria who pressed
increasingly exacting demands on Russia In any case, after fighting be-
tween Russia and Turkey started in October 1853, and the Russians de-
stroyed a Turkish fleet and transports off Sinope on November 30, Great
Bntam and France joined the Porte in March 1854, and Sardinia inter-
vened the next year Austria stopped just short of hostilities against Rus
sia, exercising strong diplomatic pressure on the side of the allies Nicholas
I found his country fighting alone against a European coalition
The Russian emperors Near Eastern policy, which culminated In the
Crimean War, has received various interpretations Many historians
have emphasized Russian aggressiveness toward Turkey, explaining it by
the economic requirements of Russia, such as the need to protect gram
trade through the Black Sea or to obtain markets in the Near East, by the
strategic imperative to cootrot the Straits, or simply by 3 grand design of
political expansion more or less m the footsteps of Catherine the Great
Yet, as wc had occasion to observe, the tsar’s attitude toward the Otto-
mans long retained the earmarks of his basic belief m legitimism Even his
ultimate decision to partition the Turkish Empire can be construed as a
3^8 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
result of the conviction that the Porte could not survive in the modem
world, and that therefore the leading European states had to arrange for
a proper redistribution of possessions and power in the Balkans and the
Near East in order to avoid anarchy, revolution, and war. In other words
Nicholas’s approach to Great Britain can be considered sincere, and the
ensuing misunderstanding thus all the more tragic. However, one other
factor must also be weighed in an appreciation of Nicholas I’s Near East-
ern policy: Orthodoxy. Obviously, the Crimean War was provoked partially
by religious conflicts. And the tsar himself retained throughout his reign
a certain ambivalence toward the sultan. Pie repeatedly granted the
legitimacy of the sultan’s rule in the Ottoman Empire, but remained, never-
theless, uneasy about the sprawling Moslem state which believed in the
Koran and oppressed its numerous Orthodox subjects. Once the conflict
began, Nicholas I readily proclaimed himself the champion of the Cross
against the infidels.
Although the Crimean War involved several major states, its front
was narrowly restricted. After Austrian troops occupied Moldavia and
WaUachia separating the Russians from the Turks in the Balkans, the
combatants possessed only one common border, the Russo-Turkish frontier
in the Caucasus, and that distant area with its extremely difficult terrain
was unsuited for major operations. The allies controlled the sea and staged
a number of naval demonstrations and minor attacks on the Russian coasts
from the Black, the Baltic, and the White seas to the Bering Sea. Then, in
search of a decisive front, they landed in the Crimea in September 1854.
The war became centered on the allied effort to capture the Crimean naval
base of Sevastopol. Except for the Crimea, the fighting went on only in
the Caucasus, where the Russians proved rather successful and even seized
the important Turkish fortress of Kars. Sevastopol held out for eleven and
a half months Hgainst the repeated bombardments and assaults of French,
British, Turkish, and Sardinian forces with their superior weapons. While
the Russian supply service broke down and the high command showed
little initiative, the soldiers and the sailors of the Black Sea fleet, led by
such dedicated officers as the admirals Paul Nakhimov and Vladimir
Kornilov — both, incidentally, killed in combat — fought desperately for
their city. Colonel Count Edward Todtleben, the chief Russian military
engineer at Sevastopol, proved to be a great improviser of defenses, who
did more than any other man to delay the allied advance. The hell and the
heroism of the Crimean War were best related by Leo Tolstoy, himself an
artillery officer in the besieged city, in his Sevastopol Tales. In English
literature the War inspired Tennyson’s “Charge of the Light Brigade,” a
poetic description of an episode in the battle of Balaklttva. It might be
added that this conflict, which is considered by many scholars as unneces-
sary and a result of misunderstandings, was the more tragic since typhus
and other epidemics caused even more deaths than did the actual fighting
It was in the Crimean War that Florence Nightingale established a new
type of war hospital and worked toward the modernization of nursing, as
did French and Russian women
The Russian forces finally abandoned Sevastopol On September II, 1855,
sinking their remaining ships — others had been sunk earlier to block the
harbor — and blowing up fortifications Nicholas I had died m March, and
both his successor, Alexander II, and the allies effectively supported by
Austrian diplomacy, were ready early in 1856 to make peace An im-
pressive international congress met in Paris for a month, from laic Febru-
ary until late March Its work resulted m the Treaty of Paris, signed on the
thirtieth of March By the provisions of the Treaty, Russia ceded to Turkey
the mouth of the Danube and a part of Dcssarabia and accepted the
neutralization of the Black Sea — that is, agreed not to maintain a navy or
coastal fortifications there Further, Russia gave up its clams to a pro-
tectorate over the Orthodox m the Ottoman Empire The Danubian prin-
cipalities were placed under tbe pint guarantee of the signatory powers,
and an international commission was established to assure safe navigation
of the Danube The Treaty of Pans marked a striking decline or the Rus-
sian position m southeastern Europe and the Near East, and indeed in the
world at large
340 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
Concluding Remarks
With the major exception o£ the Marxist scholars, most historians of the
reign of Nicholas I — whether they concentrated, like Schilder, on court
and government, like Schiemann on foreign policy, like Polievktov on
internal developments, or like Lemke on political police and censorship
— have noted the importance of the emperor and his firm beliefs for the
course of Russian history. Nicholas I, to be sure, gave no new direction to
the development of his country. Rather he clung with a desperate deter-
mination to the old system and the old ways. The creator of the doctrine
of Official Nationality, Count Uvarov, once remarked that he would die
with a sense of duty fulfilled if he could succeed in “pushing Russia back
some fifty years from what is being prepared for her by the theories.” In a
sense, Nicholas I and his associates accomplished just that: they froze
Russia as best they could for thirty — although not fifty — years, while
the rest of Europe was changing. The catastrophe of the Crimean War un-
derlined the pressing need for fundamental reforms in Russia as well as the
fact that the hour was late.
However, before we turn to Alexander II and the “great reforms” we
shall consider the development of Russian economy, society, and culture
in the first half of the nineteenth century. In those fields, as we shall see,
by contrast with Nicholas’s politics, movement prevailed over stagnation.
XXVII
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIA
IN THE TIRST HALF OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
Hie development of an exchange or money economy, much more
rapid and widespread than formerly must certainly be recogm>ed at
the main feature of the economic historj of Russia in the first half
of the nineteenth century or — more precisely — until the abolition
of serfdom A money economy began perceptibly to develop m
Russia bs early as (he middle of the sixteenth century, but at first
this process went on very slowly and encompassed relatively small
g-oups of the population. Only in the nineteenth century did the
money economy begin to evolve tnto its second stage of development,
when a majority of the people becomes engulfed in the trade ejele.
works for the market, and to satisfy its own needs buys products of
someone else'* labor, also brought to the market bs merchandise
aorutov
The second HALr of the eighteenth century marked the zenith of manorial
economy and serf agriculture tn Russia, but the first decades of the nine-
teenth witnessed significant changes in the economic picture Russian estates
sent more and more produce to the market, at home and even abroad, as
southern Russia began to export grain via the Black Sea New opportuni-
ties for marketing, together with a continuing growth of population, led to
a strong and steady rise in land prices Yet while possibilities beckoned,
Russian agriculture could evolve in the capitalistic direction only to a
limited extent and at great human and economic cost, for it was restricted
by the social structure and the institutions of the country
Most landlords, entirely unprepared for the task by their education and
outlook, failed to adjust effectively to competition and to establish efficient
production on their estates In the first half of the nineteenth century, the
proportion of non- gentry landownership grew, despite the fact that only
members of the gentry could own serfs In addition, the indebtedness of the
gentry to the state increased rapidlj, acquiring tremendous proportions by
the middle of the century. It has been estimated that on the eve of the
emancipation of the serfs m 1861 the state held in mortgage two-thirds of
all the serfs. Small estates were especially hard hit While substantial land-
lords on the -whole adjusted more or less effectively to the new conditions,
their poorer brethren, lacking capital or other sufficient assets, lost out in
the competition. The first half of the century thus saw a concentration of
34t
342
m p e:
L RUSS
gentry landholding, and a decline, often pauperization, of small gentry
landowners.
Serfdom, of course, Jay at the heart of pre-reform Russian agriculture.
Considerable evidence indicates that the landlords first responded to the
new market opportunities and the generally rising tempo of economic life
by trying to obtain a greater yield from their own fields. Barshchina, there-
fore, increased in scope and became more intensive, a process culminating
in the 1840’s. But serf labor offered no solution to the problem of achieving
efficient, improved production: illiterate, unskilled, and uninterested, die
serfs were plainly poor producers. Above all, they lacked incentive and
initiative. As a result, in the 1840’s and especially in the 1850’s obrok in-
creased at the expense of barshchina. Its monetary value rose very mark-
edly; an individual peasant had to pay his master perhaps ten times as much
in 18(50 as in 1800, while he was encouraged to work hard by the fact that
he could retain what remained after the payment. Serfs received additional
land in return for obrok, and more of them earned their — and, indeed,
their masters' — keep in factories, in transportation, and in other occupa-
tions, including agricultural work away from their home. Significantly,
more and more free labor came to be hired in agriculture, especially in the
Volga region and the Black Sea provinces. Agricultural wages generally
rose, although both the amount of rise and the wages themselves remain
very difficult to calculate. The increase of free labor in agriculture — even
though, of course, that labor frequently represented the work of someone
else’s serfs hired temporarily — acquires added importance when con-
sidered in conjunction with the growth of free labor in industry and, indeed,
in virtually all aspects of Russian economy.
While Russian agriculture in the first half of the nineteenth century re-
acted in a strained and pained manner to new conditions and demands, a
certain advance and modernization were achieved. With the use of ma-
chinery and fertilizers and improved organization and technique, some es-
tates became successful “capitalistic” producers. In general, too, produc-
tivity increased somewhat as Russian agriculture became more intensive.
Also, the produce gradually became more diversified. Old staple crops,
notably rye and wheat, continued to be grown on a large scale and in fact
for the first time attained prominence among Russian exports. But certain
new items rose to positions of some importance in the agriculture of the
country. These included potatoes and sugar beets, and, in the south, wine,
the successful production of which required considerable knowledge and
skill. The production of potatoes quintupled in the 1840’s, the production
of wine tripled between the early 1830’s and 1850, and the spread of sogar
beets in Russia can be gauged by the number of sugar beet factories: 7 in
1825, 57 in 1836, 206 .in 1844, 380 in the early 1850’s. The culture of silk
and certain vegetable dyes developed m Transcaucasia. Fine wool began
ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY. 1800-1860 343
to be produced with the introduction into Russia o[ a new and superior
breed of sheep in 1803. With government aid, the number of these sheep
increased from 150,000 m 1812 to some 9 million m 1853
Industry
Industry, no less than agriculture, was affected by the growth of a
market economy Russian manufacturing establishments, counting only
those that employed more than fifteen workers, increased in number from
some 1,200 at the beginning of the century to 2,818 by 1860. The labor
force expanded even faster from between one and two hundred thousand
in 1800 to between five and nine hundred thousand on the cvc of the
"great reforms " The striking discrepancy in the statistics compiled by
various specialists results from both inadequate material and the problem
of definition, including definition of the key concepts, * factory” and
“worker*' Soviet scholars, especially more recently, have on the whole
emphasized and exaggerated the industrial development of Russia, but
they have also provided some valuable documentation to support certain
of their claims
The relatively new cotton industry grew most rapidly Its output in-
creased sixteen times over in the course of the half century, and at the end
of the period Russia possessed about one million cotton spindles The
cotton industry required capital, and, in contrast to older woolen and linen
manufactures, it was run by free, not serf, labor On the whole, free labor
gamed steadily over bonded labor, and “capitalist" factories over both
possessional and manorial ones According to one count, by 1 825 “capi-
talist” factories constituted 54 per cent of all industrial establishments
Wages, although very low to be sure, kept going up
At the same time, especially after the first quarter of the century, the
use of machinery and steam power steadily increased in Russian manu-
facturing The Russians imported machinery to the value of 42,500 silver
rubles in 1825, 1,164,000 silver rubles in 1845, and 3,103,000 in 1860
Moreover, they began to build their own machines the country possessed
19 machine-building factories with their annual output valued at 500,000
rubles in 1851, and 99 with an output worth 8,000,000 rubles m 1860
Russian industry, however, remained largely restricted to the Urals, the
Moscow area, the rapidly growing SL Petersburg Baltic region, and several
other already well-established centers In particular, none had as yet arisen
in the vast Russian south
Trade and Transportation
Trade also reflected the quickening tempo of economic life in Russia
in the first half of the nineteenth century. Internal trade experienced
344 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
marked growth. The differentiation of the country into the grain-producing
south and the grain-consuming center and north became more pronounced,
providing an ever stronger basis for fundamental, large-scale exchange.
Thus the north and the center sent the products of their industries and
crafts south in return for grain, meat, and butter. Certain areas developed
their own specialties. For example, the northwestern region produced flax
far virtually all of Russia. A district in the distant Archangel province
raised a special breed of northern cows. Several Ukrainian provinces be-
came famous for their horses, while the best sheep were bred in southern
Russia, between the Volga and the Don. Even such items as woolen stock-
ings became objects of regional specialization. A number of scholars have
noted how, in the first half of the nineteenth century, purchased clothing
began gradually to displace the homespun variety among the peasants.
Merchant capital grew and lairs expanded. The famous fair near the
Monastery of St. Macarius in the Nizhnii Novgorod province was trans-
ferred in 1817 to the town of Nizhnii Novgorod itself and there attained
new heights. In 1825 goods worth 12,700,000 rubles were sold at that fair;
in 1852 the sum rose to 57,500,000. A number of other fairs also did
a very impressive business. The total turnover in Russian internal trade
for 1825 has been estimated at the considerable sum of 900,000,000
rubles.
Transportation also developed, if rather slowly. Rivers and lakes con-
tinued to play an extremely important role in trade and travel. A number
of canals, especially those constructed between 1804 and 1810, added to
the usefulness of the water network, by linking, for instance, the Western
Dvina to the Dnieper and St. Petersburg to the Volga, thus making it
possible to send goods from the upper Volga to the Baltic Sea. The first
steamship appeared in Russia in 1815, on the Neva. In 1820 regular steam
navigation commenced on the Volga to be extended later to other im-
portant rivers and Jakes. Following by several years the construction of
a small private railroad to serve the needs of a factor)', the first public
Russian railroad, joining St. Petersburg and the suburban imperial resi-
dence of Tsarskoe Selo — present-day Pushfcino — was opened to traffic in
1837. In 1851 the first major Russian railroad went into operation, linking
St. Petersburg and Moscow on a remarkably straight line as desired by
Nicholas I. The Russians even proceeded to establish a railroad industry
and build their own locomotives and cars, a development in which Ameri-
cans, including George Whistler, the father of the painter James McNeill
Whistler, played a prominent part. But, considering the size of the country,
the systems of transportation remained thoroughly inadequate. In partic-
ular, in 1850 Russia possessed only a little over three thousand miles of
first-class roads. The Russian army in the Crimea proved to be more
ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY 1 800-1860 345
isolated from its home bases than the allied forces, which were supplied
by sea, from theirs
Foreign trade — about which we have more precise data than we have
concerning domestic commerce — grew swiftly in the Erst half of the
nineteenth century The annual value of Russian exports on the eve of
the ‘ great reforms has been estimated at 230 million robles, and of itn
ports at 200 million, compared to only 75 and 52 million respectively at
the beginning of the century Russia continued to export raw materials,
such as Umber and timber products, hemp, flax, tallow, and increasing
quantities of grain The gram trade resulted from the development of
agriculture, notably the raising of wheat, m southern Russia, from the
organization of gram export largely in Greek ships, via the Black Sea,
and from the pressing demand for gram m industrializing western Europe
From bare beginnings at the turn of the century, the gram trade rose to
35 per cent of the total value of Russian exports in 1855 It led to the
rapid rise of such ports as Odessa and Taganrog and made the Black Sea
rival the Baltic as an avenue for commerce with Russia Russian manu-
factures by contrast found no demand m the West but — a foretaste of
the future — they attracted some customers m Turkey, Central Asia,
Mongolia, and China The Russian imports consisted of tropical produce,
such as fruits and coffee, and factory goods, including machinery, as has
already been noted
Social Composition
The population in Russia continued to increase rapidly throughout the
period from 36,000,000 m 1796 to 45,000 000 in 1815 and 67,000,000
in 1851 At the same time its social composition underwent certain
changes While the serfs multiplied in the eighteenth century to constitute,
according to Blum, 49 per cent of the total population of Russia in 1796
and as much as 58 per cent in 1811, they failed to keep pace with other
social groups after that date In 1858 they composed 44 5 per cent of the
total Indeed some scholars have argued that the serfs did not Increase
in number at all during the decades preceding the emancipation Semevsky
and other students of serfdom have shown what a tremendous and
progressively heavier burden of obligations the serfs had to carry, and how
hard their life frequently was These crushing conditions of existence
limited the expansion of serfdom and somewhat diminished its relative
social weight in Russia m the first half of the nineteenth century
By contrast Russian urban population grew both absolutely and ax a
proportion of the total between 1800 and the “great reforms*’ — vn this
case continuing and accelerating an eighteenth-century trend Townspeople
346 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
constituted about 4.1 per cent of the inhabitants of the empire at the turn
of the century and 7.8 per cent in 1851.
To be sure, die upper class, the gentiy, retained its dominant social
and economic position and its leadership in most phases of Russian life.
Yet, as our brief account of the economic evolution of the country in-
dicated, its problems and difficulties increased. Most landlords failed to
adjust effectively to the changing economic conditions, sank gradually
deeper into debt, and often slid further toward poverty. The differentiation
of the gentry, from successful landed magnates at one extreme to the
numerous poor and even destitute gentry at the other, became increasingly
prominent. If the reign of Catherine the Great represented the golden age
of the Russian gentry, the reigns of Alexander I and Nicholas I witnessed
the development of processes leading unmistakably to its decline.
Evaluations of the Russian Economy and Society
There are several ways of looking at Russian economy and society in
the first half of the nineteenth century. To many foreign observers, some
older Marxist historians, and certain other critics the main characteristics
of Russian life in the period preceding the “great reforms” consisted of
backwardness, stagnation, and oppression. As a reaction to this extreme
view, many historians — ranging from Soviet specialists to such 6migr6
scholars as Karpovich — have stressed the achievements of the Russians
during those difficult decades. They have pointed to a wide variety of
phenomena in support of their emphasis: the brilliant Russian literature
and culture of the period — which we shall discuss in the next chapter -V-
and Kiselev’s reform of the condition of the state peasants; the early
penetration of capitalism into the country and certain technological im-
provements made by the Russians; railroads and the cotton industry; the
growing middle class and the expanding trade.
Yet this approach, in its turn, must be kept within its proper frame of
reference. For, while Russian economy and society certainly did develop
in the first half of the nineteenth century, the empire of the tsars failed
to keep pace with other European countries. Whereas capitalism be-
gan to affect Russia, it was revolutionizing Great Britain, Belgium, and
France. Russian industry was less important in the total European and
world picture in I860 than in 1800, and it had to be protected by very
high tariffs. Although the Russian urban classes rose rather rapidly during
the first half of the nineteenth century, they remained extremely weak
compared to the bourgeoisie in different countries of western Europe.
Whereas the country obtained some steamships and railroads, its trans-
portation system failed to serve adequately either the peacetime needs or
the needs of the Crimean War. The Russians’ weapons and military equip-
ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY'. 1 800~-1860 34?
ment proved inferior to those of their European opponents; the Black
Sea fleet, composed of wooden sailing vessels, could not compete with the
steam-propelled warships of the allies And, obviously, in the middle of
the nineteenth century Russia could aflord even less than at the time of
Peter the Great to disregard other states and to live entirely as a wotld
apart This international dimension of the Russian problem brings into
clearer focus Alexander I’s vacillations, Nicholas I’s stubborn refusal to
move, and the urgent need of “great reforms ”
XXVIII
RUSSIAN CULTURE IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY
Pushkin represents an extraordinary and, perhaps, a unique mani-
festation of the Russian spirit, said Gogol. I shall add on my own:
also prophetic. . . . His appearance helps greatly to illuminate our
dark road with a guiding light.
DOSTOEVSKY
Every age, every nation contains in itself the possibility of original
art, provided it believes in something, provided it loves something,
provided it has some religion, some ideal.
KHOMIAKOV
It has often been noted that the farther east in Europe one goes the
more abstract and general political ideals become. The English agi-
tated for the particular and historic rights of Englishmen; the French
for the universal and timeless rights of man; the Germans sought
freedom in the realm of the “pure" or ’'absolute” idea. ... It is also
roughly true that the farther east one goes, the more absolute, cen-
tralized, and burcavcralic governments become, while tbc middle
groups between an ignorant peasantry and a military state grow
smaller and weaker. Moreover, the greater the pressure of the state
on the individual, the more formidable the obstacles to his inde-
pendence, and the greater his social loneliness are, the more sweeping,
general, and abstract arc ideologies of protest or compensation.
MAL1A
In culture, the eighteenth century in Russia had represented a period of
learning from the West. The learning, to be sure, continued in the nineteenth
century and, in fact, became all the time both broader and deeper. But,
beginning with the reign of Alexander I, Russia developed a glorious
literary culture of its own, which in time became the accepted standard
of excellence in its homeland and a model to be imitated by many writers
in other countries. The “golden age of Russian literature” has been dated
roughly from 1820 to 1880 — from Pushkin’s first major poems to
Dostoevsky’s last novel — most of it thus falling in the period preceding
the “great reforms.” While the arts in Russia did not keep up with Russian
literature, they too advanced in the first half of the nineteenth century.
Music, for example, developed along creative and original lines, leaving
far behind the imitative efforts of the time of Catherine the Great. Russian
science and scholarship also showed noteworthy progress. If the eighteenth
348
CULTURE. 1800-1860
349
century had its Michael Lomonosov, the reign of Nicholas I witnessed
the epoch making work of Nicholas Lobachevsky Moreover, whereas
Lomonosov had remained something of a paradox m his age, unique,
isolated, and misunderstood, learning tn Russia in the first half of the
nineteenth century gradually acquire! a broader and more consecutive
character, with its own schools of thought, traditions, and contributions
to the total intellectual effort of Western civilization Even philosophical,
political, social, and economic doctrines grew and developed in a re-
markable manner in spite of autocracy and strict censorship
Although people from the lower classes began to acquire promtnencc
on the eve of the “great reforms," Russian culture of the reigns of
Alexander 1 and Nicholas I was essentially gentry culture Its tone and
charm have been best preserved m magnificent works by tts representa-
tives, such as Tolstoy's War and Peace. Turgenev's A Gentry Nest, and
Serge Aksakov s family chronicle Supported by the labor of serfs and
confined in a narrow social group — not unlike the culture of the ante-
bellum South in the United States — Russian culture of the Tint half of
the nineteenth century marked, just the same, a great step forward for
the country and left many creations of lasting value The educated gentry,
whose numbers grew, continued to enjoy a cosmopolitan, literary up-
bringing at home, with emphasis on the French language and with the aid
of a battery of foreign and Russian tutors. Tor illustration one can turn
to Tolstoy’s autobiographical trilogy as well as to a host of other remi-
niscences of the period Next, the sons of the gentry often attended select
military schools before entering the army as officers, where again the
French language and proper social manners were emphasized Also, mem-
bers of the gentry often collected valuable libraries on their estates, fol-
lowed with interest developments m the West, and even frequently traveled
abroad to learn about western Europe and its culture first hand More and
more of them attended universities, both at homo and in foreign countries
Education
University education, as well as secondary education in state schools,
became more readily available after Alexander 1 s reforms With the crea-
tion of the Ministry of Education in 1802, the empire was divided into
$)X educational regions, each headed by a curator The plan called for
a university In every region, a secondary school in cv cry provincial center,
and an improved primary school m every district Ry the end of the reign
the projected expansion had been largely completed Russia then possessed
6 universities. 48 secondary slate schools, and 337 improved primary state
schools Alexander I founded universities in Kazan, Kharkov, and St
Petersburg — the latter first being established as a pedagogical institute —
350 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
transformed the “main school,” or academy, in Vilna into a university, and
revived the German university in Dorpat, which with the University of
Moscow made a total of six. In addition, a university existed in the Grand
Duchy of Finland: originally in Abo — called Turku in Finnish — and
from 1827 in Helsingfors, or Helsinki. Following a traditional European
pattern, Russian universities enjoyed a broad measure of autonomy. White
university enrollments numbered usually a few hundred or less each, and
the total of secondary school students rose only to about 5,500 by 1825,
these figures represented undeniable progress for Russia. Moreover, private
initiative emerged to supplement the government efforts. It played an im-
portant part in the creation of the University of Kharkov, and it established
two private institutions of higher education which were eventually to be-
come the Demidov Law School in laroslavl and the Historico-Philological
Institute of Prince Bezborodko in Nczhin. Finally, it may be noted that
the celebrated Imperial Lyceum in Tsarskoe Sclo, which Pushkin at-
tended, was also founded during the reign of Alexander I.
The obscurantist purges of the last years of Alexander’s rule hurt
Russian universities, especially the one in Kazan. But Magnitsky and his
associates held power only briefly. The many educational policies under
Nicholas I that proved to be noxious rather than beneficial to Russian
schools and learning were of greater importance. During the thirty years
of Official Nationality, with Uvarov himself serving as minister of educa-
tion from 1833 to 1849, the government tried to centralize and standardize
education; to limit the individual’s schooling according to his social back-
ground, so that each person would remain in his assigned place in life;
to foster the official ideology exclusively; and, above all, to eliminate every
trace or possibility of intellectual opposition or subversion.
As to centralization and standardization, Nicholas I and his associates
did everything in their power to introduce absolute order and regularity
into the educational system of Russia. The state even extended its minute
control to private schools and indeed to education in the home. By a
series of laws and rules issued in 1833—35, private institutions, which were
not to increase in number in the future except where public schooling
was not available, received regulations and instructions from central au-
thorities, while inspectors were appointed to assure their compliance.
“They had to submit to the law of unity which formed the foundation of
file reign.” Home education came under state influence through rigid
government control of teachers; Russian private tutors began to be con-
sidered state employees, subject to appropriate examinations and enjoying
the same pensions and awards as other comparable officials; at the same
time the government strictly prohibited the hiring of foreign instructors
who did not possess the requisite certificates testifying to academic com-
petence and exemplary moral character. Nicholas I himself led the way in
CULTURE* l&OO— I860
351
supervising and inspecting schools in Russia, and the emperor's assistants
followed his example
The restrictive policies of the Ministry of Education resulted logically
from its social \icws and aims In order to assure that each class of Rus-
sians obtained only ‘That part which it needs from the general treasury
of enlightenment," the government resorted to Increased tuition rates and
to such requirements as special certificates of leave that pupils belonging
to the lower layers of society had to obtain from their village or town
before they could attend secondary school Members of the upper class,
by contrast, received inducements to continue their education, many board-
ing schools for the gentry being created for that purpose Ideally, in the
government's scheme of things — and reality failed to live up to the ideal
—children of peasants and of lower classes in general were to attend
only parish schools or other schools of similar educational level, students
of middle-class origin were to study tn the district schools, while secondary
schools and universities catered primarily, although not exclusively, to the
gentry Special efforts were made throughout the reign to restrict the
education of the serfs to elementary and “useful*' subjects Schools for
girls, which were under the patronage of the empress and the jurisdiction
of the Fourth Department of His Majesty’s Own Chancery, served the
same aims as those for boys
The inculcation of the true doctrine, that of Official Nationality, and
a relentless struggle against all pernicious ideas constituted, as we Know,
essential activities of the Ministry of Education Only officially approved
views received endorsement, and they had to be accepted without question
rather than discussed Teachers and students, lectures and books were
generally suspect and required a watchful eye In 1834 full-time inspectors
were introduced into universities to Keep vigil over the behavior of students
outside the classroom Education and knowledge, in the estimate of the
emperor and his associates, could easily become subversion’ As already
mentioned, with the revolutionary year of 1848 unrelieved repression set
in
Still, the government of Nicholas I made some significant contributions
to the development of education m Russia Thus, it should be noted that
the Ministry of Education spent large sums to provide new buddings,
laboratories, and libraries, and other aids to scholarship such as the ex-
cellent Pulkovo observatory, that teachers’ salaries were substantially in-
creased — extraordinarily increased in the case of professors, according
to the University Statute of 1835; that, in general, the government of
Nicholas I showed a commendable interest in the physical plant necessary
for education and in the material well-being of those engaged in instruc-
tion Nor was quality neglected Uvarov in particular did much to raise
educational and scholarly standards in Russia m the sixteen years during
352
MPERIAL RUSS.
which he headed the ministry. Especially important proved to he the
establishment of many new chairs, the corresponding opening up 0 £
numerous new fields of learning in the universities of the empire, and the
practice of sending promising young Russian scholars abroad for extended
training. The Russian educational system, with all its fundamental flaws,
came to emphasize academic thoroughness and high standards. Indeed
the government utilized the standards to make education more exclusive
at all levels of schooling. Following the Polish rebellion, the Polish Uni-
versity of Vilna was closed; in 1833 a Russian university was opened in
Kiev instead. The government of Nicholas I created no other new uni-
versities, but it did establish a number of technical and "practical” institu-
tions of higher learning, such as a technological institute, a school of
jurisprudence, and a school of architecture, as well as schools of arts and
crafts, agriculture, and veterinary medicine.
Science and Scholarship
With the expansion of higher education, science and scholarship grew
in Russia. Mathematics led the way. Nicholas Lobachevsky, who lived
from 1793 to 1856 and taught at the University of Kazan, was the
greatest Russian mathematician of that, or indeed any, period. The
"Copernicus of geometry” left his mark in the history of thought by
formulating a non-Euclidian geometry. Starting from an attempt to prove
the old Euclidian axiom that on a given plane it is possible to draw through
a point not on a given line one and only one line parallel to the given
line, and proceeding by trying to refute other alternatives, Lobachevsky
found his task impossible. He then faced the consequences of his discovery
and went on to postulate and develop a non-Euclidian geometry, within
which the Euclidian scheme represented but a single instance. While
Lobachevsky’s revolutionary views received scant recognition from his
contemporaries either in Russia or in other countries — although, to be
exact, he was not quite alone, for a few Western scholars were approach-
ing similar conclusions at about the same time — they nevertheless repre-
sented a major breakthrough in the direction of the modern development
of mathematics and the physical sciences. Several other gifted Russian
mathematicians of the first half of the nineteenth century also contributed
to the growth of their subject.
Astronomy too fared exceptionally well in Russia in the first half of
the nineteenth century. In 1839 the celebrated Pulkovo observatory was
constructed near St. Petersburg. Directed by one of the leading astronomers
of the age who was formerly professor at the University of Dorpat,
Frederick William Jacob Struve, and possessing the largest telescope in
the world at that time and in general the most up-to-date equipment,
Pulkovo quickly became not only a great center of astronomy in Russia,
CULTURE 1800-1860
353
but also a valuable training ground for astronomers from other European
countries and the United States Struve investigated over three thousand
double stars, developed methods to calculate the weight of stars and to
apply statistics to a study of them, and dealt with such problems as the
distribution of stars, the shape of our galaxy, and the absorption of light
m interstellar space, a phenomenon which he Was the first to establish
Struve’s associates and students — in fact, several other members of the
Struve family — further expanded the study of astronomy In Russia.
Physics and chemistry also developed In the reigns of Alexander I and
Nicholas 1 Russian contributors to these branches of knowledge included
an early experimental physicist in electricity and other fields, Professor
Basil Petrov, who was on the staff of the Medical-Surgical Academy and
taught himself physics, and a distinguished chemist, professor Nicholas
Zinin Zinin worked and taught m Kazan and St Petersburg and estab-
lished the first prominent school of Russian chemists He Is perhaps best
remembered as a pioneer m the production of aniline dyes
The natural sciences in Russia grew with the physical, their practitioners
including such luminaries as the great Baltic German embryologist Acad-
emician Charles Ernest Baer As in tire eighteenth century, the natural
sciences were enriched by some remarkable expeditions and discoveries
Russians continued to explore Siberia and traveled repeatedly from the
Baltic “around the world * to Alaska. They discovered numerous islands
in the Pacific Ocean, which, however, the Russian government did not
choose to claim And in 1821 on expedition led by Thaddt us Bchngsbauscn
discovered the antarctic continent
The humanities and the social sciences progressed similarly in Russia
in the first decades of the nineteenth century Oriental studies, for example,
profited both from Russia's proximity to much of Asia and from U varov’s
special patronage They became established in several universities and
made important contributions to knowledge, ranging from pioneer de-
scriptions of some Central Asiatic peoples to Father lakinf Bichurin's
fundamental work on China Indeed the Russian Orthodox mission in
Peking served from the time of Peter the Great to the revolutions of 1917
as an institute of sinology
The writing of history was developed and gained a new public Nicholas
Karamzin, who must be mentioned more than once in connection with
the evolution of the Russian language and literature, also became the first
widely popular historian. His richly documented twelve-volume History
of the Russian State, which began to appear m 1816 and which was left
unfinished m the account of the Time of Troubles when the author died
in 1826, won the enthusiastic acclaim of the educated public, who enjoyed
Karamzin’s extremely readable reconstruction of the colorful Russian past
The historian, to be sure, tried to edify as well as entertain, he argued
354
IMPERIAL RUSSIA
throughout his work that autocracy and a strong state made Russia great
and must remain inviolable. In 1811 Karamzin had expressed similar views
more succinctly in his secret Memoir on Ancient and Modern Russia given
to Alexander I to counteract Speransky’s reformist influence. In Russian
universities new chairs were founded in history. Tiie hard-working Michael
Pogodin, a proponent of Official Nationality, became in 1835 the first
professor of Russian history proper at the University of Moscow, to be
succeeded in 1845 by a much greater scholar. Serge Soloviev, the bulk of
whose work, however, belongs to Alexander IPs reign.
Language and Literature
The Russian language evolved further, and so did linguistic and literary
studies. If the writings of Karamzin marked the victory of the new style
over the old, those of Pushkin already represented the apogee of modem
Russian language and literature and became their classic model. The
simplicity, precision, grace, and flow of Pushkin’s language testify to the
enormous development of the Russian literary language since the time
of Peter the Great. Such opponents of this process as the reactionary
Admiral Alexander Shishkov, who served from 1824 to 1828 as minister
of education, fought a losing battle. While writers developed the Russian
language, scholars studied it. The first decades of the nineteenth century
witnessed the work of the remarkable philologist Alexander Vostokov and
the early studies of several other outstanding linguistic scholars. Literary
criticism rose to a new prominence. The critics ranged from conservative
university professors, typified by Stephen Shevyrev of the University of
Moscow, who adhered to the doctrine of Official Nationality, to' the radical
firebrand Vissarion Belinsky. Indeed, wc shall see that with Belinsky lit-
erary criticism in Russia acquired sweeping social, political, and generally
ideological significance.
Literature constituted the chief glory of Russian culture in the first
half of the nineteenth century, owing to the genius of several writers. It
remains the most highly prized legacy from the time of Alexander I and
Nicholas I, whether in the Soviet Union with a virtual cult of Pushkin or
in other countries where such works as Eugene Onegin or The Dead Souls
are read.
Karamzin’s sentimentalism, mentioned in an earlier chapter, which was
popular at the end of the eighteenth and in the first years of the nineteenth
century, gradually lost its appeal, while Karamzin himself turned, as we
know, to history. New literary trends included what both pre-revolutionary
and Soviet scholars have described as romanticism and realism in their
various aspects. Romanticism produced no supreme literary figure in
Russia except the poet Theodore Tiutchev, 1803-73, who spent much of
CULTURE 1800-1860
355
hts life in Germany and had Utile influence in his native land It did, how-
ever, attract a number of gifted poets and writers and also contributed to
the artistic growth of such giants as Lermontov, Pushkin, and Gogol Of
the Russian romanticists proper, Basil Zhukovsky deserves mention
Zhukovsky who lived from 1783 to 1852, faithfully reflected in his poetry
certain, widespread romantic moods and traits sensitivity and concern
with subjective feelings, an interest m and idealization of the past, a
penchant for the mysterious and the weird On the whole the poet repre
seated the humane, elegiac, and contemplative, rather than the “demonic’
and active, aspects of romanticism Zhukovsky s value for Russian litera-
ture lies in the novel lightness and music of his verse, in the variety of
literary forms that he utilized successful!) for his poetry, and m his
numerous and generally splendid translations In addition to translating
superbly into Russian some works of such contemporary or near-
contemporary Western writers as Schiller Zhukovsky gave his readers an
enduring Russian text of Homers Odyssey translated characteristically
enough from the German Incidentally in 1829 Russians obtained
Nicholas Gnedich s excellent translation of the Iliad from the Greek
Realism fared better ta Russia than romanticism, a fact which many
ninctccnth-century and especially Soviet critics have not ceased to point
out They have felt, furthermore, that with realism Russian literature
finally achieved true independence and originality and established a firm
foundation for lasting greatness A difficult concept to use, the term realism
has been applied to a variety of literary developments in Russia in the
first half of the nineteenth centuiy It* 8 sense, the writer of fables, Ivan
Krylov, was its best practitioner Krylov, who lived from 1768 to 1844,
but began to write fables only m his late thirties alter concentrating un-
successfully on comedy, tragedy, and satire, achieved something like
perfection in his new genre, rivaling such world masters of the fable as
Aesop and La Fontaine Krylov's approximately two hundred fables,
which became best sellers as they appeared during the authors lifetime
and have remained best sellers ever since win the reader by the richness
and raciness of their popular language, the vividness, precision, and im-
peccable wording of their succinct narrative, and their author s power of
human observation and comment While animals often act as protagonists,
their foibles and predicaments serve as apt illustrations both of Krylov's
Russia and of the human condition m general
Alexander Griboedov’s allegiance to realism seems less convincing than
Krylov's That brilliant writer, whose life began in 1795 and ended
violently in 1829 when a Persian mob killed him in the Russian legation
in Teheran, achieved immortality through one work only the comedy
Core ot lima, translated into English as Hoe from IV*r or as The Mis-
fortune of Being Clever This masterpiece was finished in 1824, but.
356 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
because of its strong criticism of Russian high society, was put on the
stage only in 1831 and then with numerous cuts. Gore ot uma is neo-
classical in form and contains very little action, but it overflows with wit.
It consists almost entirely of sparkling, grotesque, or caustic statements
and observations by its many characters, from a saucy maid to the em-
bittered hero Chatsky — all set in the milieu of Muscovite high society.
Its sparkle is such that Griboedov’s play possesses an eternal freshness and
effervescence, while many of its characters’ observations — like many
lines from Krylov's fables — have become part of the everyday Russian
language. Nor, of course, does a comic form exclude serious content.
Gore ot uma has been praised as the outstanding critique of the leading
circles of Russian society in the reign of Alexander I, as a perspicacious
early treatment of the subject of the conflict of generations — a theme
developed later by Turgenev and other Russian writers — and as providing
in Its main character, Chatsky, a prototype of the typical “superfluous”
hero of Russian literature, at odds with his environment.
Like Griboedov, Alexander Pushkin, the greatest Russian writer of the
age, was born near the end of the eighteenth century and became famous
in the last years of Alexander Fs reign. Again like Griboedov, Pushkin had
but a short life to live before meeting violent death. He was born in 1799
and was killed in a duel in 1837. Between 1820, which marked the com-
pletion of his first major poem, the whimsical and gently ironic Ruslan and
Liudmila, and his death, Pushkin established himself permanently as,
everything considered, the greatest Russian poet and one of the greatest
Russian prose writers, as a master of the lyric, the epic, and the dramatic
forms, and even as a literary critic, publicist, and something of a historian
and ethnographer. Pushkin’s early works, such as The Fountain of
Bakhchisarai and The Prisoner of the Caucasus, magnificent in form,
reflected a certain interest in the unusual and the exotic that was character-
istic of the age. However, as early as Eugene Onegin, written in 1822-31,
Pushkin turned to a penetrating and remarkably realistic treatment of
Russian educated society and its problems. Onegin became one of the most
effective and compelling figures in modern Russian literature, while both
he and the heroine of the poem, Tatiana Larina, as well as their simple
story, were to appear and reappear in different variations and guises in
the works of Lermontov, Turgenev, Goncharov, and many other writers.
While Eugene Onegin was written in most elegant verse, Pushkin also
contributed greatly to the development of Russian prose, especially by
such tales as the celebrated A Captain’s Daughter. In his prose even more
than in his poetry Pushkin, has been considered a founder of realism in
Russia and thus an originator of the main current of modern Russian lit-
erature. Pushkin’s deeply sensitive and versatile genius ranged from un-
surpassed personal lyrics to historical themes — for example, in the tragedy
CULTURE 1800-1860 357
Boris Godunov and in the long poem, Poltava glorifying his recurrent
hero, Peter the Great — and from realistic evocations of the Russia of
bis day to marvelous fairy tales in verse He -was busily engaged in publish
mg a leading periodical. The Contemporary, and m historical studies when
he was billed
Pushkin’s genius has oftca been described as •‘classical ” Its outstanding
characteristic consisted in an astounding sense of form, harmony, and
measure, which resulted in perfect works of art The writer s fundamental
outlook reflected something of the same classical balance it was humane,
sane, and essentially affirmative and optimistic Not that it excluded
tragedy A long poem. The Bronze Horseman perhaps best expressed
Pushkin’s recognition of tragedy in the world It depicted a disastrous
conflict between an average little man, Eugene and the bronze statue of
the great founder of St Petersburg, who built bis new capital on virtually
impassable terrain, where one of the recurrent floods killed Eugene's
beloved a conflict between an individual and the state, human desire and
necessity, man and his fate Yet — although a minority of specialists,
including such important critics as Briusov and Lednicki, reject this read
ing of the poem — The Bronze Horseman too, affirms Peter the Great s
work, modern Russia, and life itself
Pushkins genius appeared m Russia at the nght tim- A century of
labor since Peter the Greats reforms had fashioned a supple modern
language, developed literary forms, and established Russia as a full
participant in the intellectual life of Europe Pushkin who knew French
almost as well as Russian profited greatly by the nches of Western litera
turc — from Shakespeare to Pushkin’s contemporaries — as well as by
Russian popular speech and folklore Yet, while the stage had been set
for Pushkin, it was not cluttered The great writer could thus be the fi*st
to realize the potential of modem Russian verse as well as modern
Russian prose, of lync poetry as well as factual narrative, and set the
standard His sweeping influence extended beyond language and literature
to the other arts in Russia, and especially to music — wfrrc composers,
ranging m tune from Glinka and Dargomyzhsky through Muxorgsky,
Rimsky Korsakov, and Tchaikovsky to Rachmaninov and Stravinsky,
created more than twenty operas on the basis of his works. Indeed, he
appeared to incarnate the entire glonous spring of Russian literature and
culture Another very great fyrnc poet, Theodore Tiutchev, expressed this
best when he concluded a poem devoted to the tragedy of Pushkin’s death
"You like first lov e, the heart of Russia will cot forget.”
If Pushkin is generally regarded as the greatest Russian poet, Michael
Lermontov, who also lived and wrote m the first half of the nineteenth
century, has often been considered the second greatest Born tn 1814
and killed tn a duel in 1841, Lermontov began wrung at a very early age
358 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
and left behind him a literary legacy of considerable size. Very different
in temperament and outlook from Pushkin, Lermontov came closest to
being the leading romantic genius of Russian letters, the “Russian Byron.”
His life was a constant protest against his environment, a protest which
found expression both in public gestures, such as his stunning poem con-
demning Russian high society for the death of Pushkin, and in private
troubles which resulted in his own death. Lermontov often chose fantastic,
exotic, and highly subjective themes, set in the grandeur of the Caucasus,
where he spent some time in the army. Throughout most of liis life he
kept writing and rewriting a magnificent long poem called A Demon:
I am he, whose gaze destroys hope,
As soon, as hope blooms;
I am he, whom nobody loves.
And everything that lives curses.
Yet to describe Lermontov as a romantic poet, even a supreme romantic
poet, does not do him full justice. For Lermontov’s poetic genius had a
broad range and kept developing — many critics think it developed toward
realism. Also, through his prose writings, particularly his short novel A
Hero of Our Times, he became one of the founders of the Russian realistic
novel, in subject matter as well as in form. Such a discerning critic as
Mirsky considers Lermontov’s superbly powerful, succinct, and trans-
parent prose superior even to Pushkin’s. Lermontov, no doubt, could have
done much else had he not been shot dead at the age of twenty-six.
While Pushkin and Lermontov were, in spite of their enormous con-
tribution to Russian prose, primarily poets, Nicholas Gogol’s early venture
into poetry proved to be an unmitigated disaster. But as a prose writer
Gogol had few equals and no superiors, in Russia or anywhere else. Gogol,
who lived from 1809 to 1852, came from provincial Ukrainian gentry,
and the characteristic society of his stories and plays stood several rungs
lower on the social ladder than the world of Chatsky and Onegin. Gogol’s
first collection of tales. Evenings on a Farm near Dikanka, which came
out in 1831 and received immediate acclaim, sparkled with a generally
gay humor and the bright colors of Ukrainian folklore. The gaiety and the
folklore, as well as a certain majestic tone and grand manner — much
admired by some critics, but considered affected by others — were to
appear in Gogol’s later works, for example, the famous cossack prose
epic, Taras Bulba, which dealt with the struggle of the Ukrainians against
the Poles. However, gradually, the real Gogol emerged in literature: the
Gogol of the commonplace and the mildly grotesque, which he somehow
shaped into an overwhelming psychological world all his own; the Gogol
who wrote in an involved, irregular and apparently clumsy style, which
culture: 1800-1860
359
proved utterly irresistible Occasionally, for instance m the stones
Note; of a Madman and A Nose, vend content paralleled these magical
literary powers More frequently, as in the celebrated play, The Inspector
General, and in Gogol’s masterpiece, the novel Dead Souls, the subject
matter contained nothing out of the ordinary and the plot showed btde
development
Dead Souls, published in 1842, demonstrates the scope and might of
Gogol’s genius and serves as the touchstone for different interpretations
of Gogol That simptc story of a scoundrel, Chichikov, who proceeded to
visit provincial landlords and buy up their dead serfs — serfs were called
‘souls” in Russia — to use them jn business deals as if they were alive,
has been hailed, and not at all unjustly, by critics all the way from
Belinsky to the latest Soviet scholars as a devastating realistic, satirical
picture of rural Russia under Nicholas I But there seems to be much
more to Gogol’s novel The landlords of different psychological types
whom Chichikov meets, as well as Chichikov himself, appear to grow m
vitality with the years, regardless of the passing of that society which they
are supposed to mirror faithfully, for indeed, they are “much more real
than life " Russian formalist critics and such writers as Merezhkovsky and
Nabokov deserve credit for emphasizing these other “non realistic" aspects
and powers of Gogol The great novelist himself, it might be added, did
not know what he was doing His withering satire, applauded by the op-
ponents of the existing system in Russia, stemmed directly from his weird
genius, not from any ideology of the Left. In fact, in the second volume
of Dead Souls Gogol tned to reform his characters and save Russia That
project, of course, failed Still trying to resurrect Russian society, Gogol
published in 1847 his unbelievably naive and reactionary Selected Passages
from Correspondence with Fnends which suggested, for examp’e, that
serfs should remain illiterate, which shocked educated Russia Gogol
attempted also to find salvation for himself — and, by extension, for
Russia — m religious expencnce, but to no avail He died in 1852 after
a shattering nervous breakdown when he burned much of the sequel to
the first volume of Dead Souls
Karamzin, Zhukovsky, Krylov, Gnbocdov, Pushkin, Lermontov, and
Gogol were by no means the only Russian authors m the reigns of
Alexander I and Nicholas I While no extended discussion of the subject
can be offered in a textbook, it should be realized, for instance, that
Pushkin did not stand alone, but was the outstanding member of a brilliant
generation of poets Again, the prose writers included, m addition to those
already mentioned, the magnificent narrator of provincial gentry life.
Serge Aksakov, and other girted authors Moreover, pre-reform Russia
saw much of the work of another supreme lyric poet who has already been
360
IMPERIAL RUSSIA
mentioned, Theodore Tiutchev, as well as the first publications of such
giants of Russian literature as Turgenev, Dostoevsky, and Tolstoy. It was
a golden age.
Ideologies
In spite of the reaction of the last part of Alexander’s reign and the
steady repression under Nicholas, the first half of the nineteenth century
proved to be creative not only in literature but also in Russian political
and social thought and in the building of ideologies in general. Herzen
could well refer to it as an amazing period of outward political slavery
and inward intellectual emancipation. Again Russia profited from its as-
sociation with the West and from the work performed throughout the
eighteenth century in developing education and culture in the country. As
we saw earlier, educated Russians shared in the Enlightenment, and indeed
after the outbreak of the French Revolution, produced the first Russian
martyrs of the radical ideas of the Age of Reason, such as Novikov and
especially Radishchev. Eighteenth-century liberalism or radicalism per-
sisted in the nineteenth century in groups as different as Alexander I’s
Unofficial Committee and the Decembrists. But on the whole the intel-
lectual scene began to change drastically. Romanticism and German
idealistic philosophers replaced the Enlightenment and French philosophes
as guides for much of European thought. The new intellectual Zeitgeist
affirmed deep, comprehensive knowledge — often with mystical or reli-
gious elements — in opposition to mere rationalism, an organic view of
the world as against a mechanistic view, and the historical approach to
society in contrast to a utilitarian attitude with its vision limited to the
present. It also emphasized such diverse doctrines as struggle and Ihe
essential separateness of the component parts of the universe in place
of the Enlightenment ideals of harmony, unity, and cosmopolitanism. And
it stressed the supreme value of art and culture. In the new world of
romanticism such strange problems as the true nature of nations and the
character of their missions in history came to the fore.
Romanticism and idealistic philosophy penetrated Russia in a variety
of ways. For example, a number of professors, typified by Michael Pavlov
who taught physics, mineralogy, and agronomy at the University of Mos-
cow, presented novel German ideas in their lectures in the first decades
of the nineteenth century. Educated Russians continued to read voraciously
and were strongly influenced by Schiller and other brilliant Western
romanticists. Of course, the subjects of the tsar were also Europeans and
thus could not help but be part of European intellectual movements.
While some Russians showed originality in developing different currents
of Western thought, and while in general the Russian response to romantic
fllfP?
CULTURE 1800-1860
361
ideas can be considered creative rather than merely imitative, there is no
convincing reason lor dissociating Russian intellectual history of the fust
half of the nineteenth century from that of the rest of Europe, whether
in the name of the alleged uniquely religious nature of the ideological
development in Russia or in order to satisfy the peculiar Soviet nationalism
In particular, two German philosophers, Schelltog first and then Hegel,
exercised strong influence on the Russians Schellmg aflcctcd certain
professors and a number of poets — the best Russian expression of some
Schcllingian views can be found in Tiutchev’s unsurpassed poetry of na
turc — and also groups of intellectuals and even schools of thought, such
as the Slavophile It was largely an interest in Schellmg that led io the
establishment of the first philosophic ‘circle and the first philosophic
review m Russia In 1823 several young men who had been discussing
Schellmg in a literary group formed a separate society with the study of
German idealistic philosophy as us main object The circle chose the
name of The Lovers of Wisdom and came to contain a dozen members
and associates, many of whom were to achieve prominence m Russian
intellectual life It published four issues of a journal Mnemosyne The
leading Lovers of Wisdom included a gifted poet, Drnnm Venevitinov,
who died in 1827 at the age of twenty two and Prince Vladimir Odoevsky,
1803-69, who developed interesting views concerning the decline of the
West and the great future of Russia to issue from the combination and
fruition of both the pre Petrine and the Petrine heritages The Lovers of
Wisdom reflected the romantic temper of their generation in a certain kind
of poetic spiritualism that pervaded their enure outlook, In their worship
of art, in their pantheistic adoration of nature, and in their disregard for
the * crude” aspects of life, including politics The group disbanded after
the Decembrist rebellion in order not to attract police attention
A decade later, the question of the nature and destiny of Russia was
powerfully and shockingly presented by Pcfer CJmadaev In hrs Philo-
sophical Letter, published in the Telescope in 1836, Chmdaev argued, In
effect, that Russia had no past, no present, and no future It had never
really belonged to cither the West or the East and it had contributed noth
mg to culture In particular, Russia lacked the dynamic social principle of
Catholicism, which constituted the basis of the enure Western civilization
Indeed, Russia remained “a gap in the intellectual order of things M
Chaadacv, who w as officially proclaimed deranged by the incensed authori-
ties after the publication of the letter, later modified his thesis fn his
Apology of a Madman Russia, he came to believe, did enter history
through the work of Peter the Great and could obtain a glorious future by
throwing all of us fresh strength into the construction of the common cul-
ture of Christendom
Russian intellectual life grew apace in the 1 840 s and 1 850 s Spurred
362
M PER
by Schelling, by an increasing Hegelian influence, and by German ro-
mantic thought in general, as well as by the new importance of Russia in
Europe ever since the cataclysm of 1812 and by the blossoming of Russian
culture, several ideologies emerged to compete for the favor of die educated
public. Official Nationality, which we considered in an earlier chapter,
represented the point of view of the government and the Right. While it
cannot be included in what Herzen called “intellectual emancipation,” it
did possess influential spokesmen among professors and writers, not to
mention censors and other officials, and played a prominent role on the
Russian scene. On the one hand, Official Nationality may be regarded as
a culmination of reactionary currents in Russia, which found earlier pro-
tagonists in such figures as Rostopchin, Shishkov, Magnitsky, and in part
Karamzin. On the other hand, it too, in particular its more nationalistic
wing that was typified by the Moscow University professors Michael Po-
godin and Stephen Shevyrev, testified to the impact of German romanticism
on Russia. The Slavophiles and the Westernizcrs developed the two most
important independent, as opposed to government-sponsored, schools of
thought. The Pctrashevtsy, by contrast, had a briefer and more obscure his-
tory. But they did represent yet another intellectual approach to certain key
problems of the age.
The Slavophiles were a group of romantic intellectuals who formulated a
comprehensive and remarkable ideology centered on their belief in the su-
perior nature and supreme historical mission of Orthodoxy and of Russia.
The leading members of the group, all of them landlords and gentlemen-
scholars of broad culture and many intellectual interests, included Alexis
Khomiakov who applied himself to everything from theology and world
history to medicine and technical inventions, Ivan Kireevsky who has been
called the philosopher of the movement, his brother Peter who collected
folk songs and left very little behind him in writing, Constantine Aksakov, a
specialist in Russian history and language, Constantine’s brother Ivan, later
prominent as a publicist and a Pan-Slav, and George Samarin who was to
have a significant part in the emancipation of the serfs and who wrote
especially on certain religious and philosophical topics, on the problem of
the borderlands of the empire, and on the issue of reform in Russia. This
informal group, gathering in the salons and homes of Moscow, flourished
in the 1840’s and 1850’s until the death of the Kireevsky brothers in 1856
and of Khomiakov and Constantine Aksakov in 1860.
Slavophilism expressed a fundamental vision of integration, peace, and
harmony among men. On the religious plane it produced Khomiakov's con-
cept of sobornost, an association in love, freedom, and truth of believers,
which Khomiakov considered the essence of Orthodoxy. Historically, so
the Slavophiles asserted, a similar harmonious integration of individuals
CULTUHE 1800-1860 363
could be found in the social life of the Slavs, notably in the peasant com
munc — described as ‘a moral choir* by Constantine Aksakov — and in
such other ancient Russian institutions as the zemskit sobor Again the
family represented the principle of integration in love, and the same spirit
could pervade other associations of men As against love, freedom, and
co-operation stood the world of rationalism, necessity, and compulsion It
too existed on many planes from the religious and metaphysical to that
of everyday life Thus it manifested itself m the Roman Catholic Cbutch -—
which had chosen rationalism and authority in preference to love and
harmony and had seceded from Orthodox Christendom — and, through
the Catholic Church tn Protestantism and in the entire civilization of the
West Moreover, Peter the Great introduced the principles of rationalism,
legalism, and compulsion into Russia where they proceeded to destroy or
stunt the harmonious native development and to seduce the educated pub-
lic The Russian future lay dearly in a return to native principles in over-
coming the Western disease After being cured, Russia would take its
message of harmony and salvation to the discordant and dying West It is
important to realize that the all embracing Slavophtle dichotomy repre
sewed — as pointed out by Steppun and others — the basic romantic con
trast between the romantic ideal and the Age of Reason In particular, as
well as in general, Slavophilism fits into the framework of European roman-
ticism although the Slavophiles showed considerable originality m adapting
romantic doctrines to their ovm situation and needs and although they also
experienced the influence of Orthodox religious thought and tradition
In its application to the Russia of Nicholas I the Slavophile teaching
often produced paradoxical results, antagonized the government, and baf
fled Slavophile friends and foes alike In a sense, the Slavophiles were re-
ligious anarchists for they condemned all legalism and compulsion in the
name of their religious ideal Yet, gnen the sinful condition of man, they
granted the necessity of government and even expressed a preference for
autocracy in addition to its historical roots in ancient Russia, autocracy
possessed the virtue of placing the enure weight of authority and com
pulsion on a single individual, thus liberating society from that heavy
burden, besides, tire ifaiopbrfes rents, ned bmlicrjbly opposed io Western
constitutional and other legalistic and formalistic devices Yet this justifi-
cation of autocracy remained historical and functional, therefore relative,
never religious and absolute furthermore, the Slavophiles desired the
emancipation of the serfs and crthct reforms, and, above all, insisted on the
freedom of the life of the spirit,” that is freedom of conscience, speech,
and publication As Constantine Aksakov tried to explain to the govern-
ment ‘Man was created by God as an intelligent and a talking being”
Also, Khomiakov and his friends opposed such nspccts of the established
IMPERIAL RUSSIA.
order as the death penalty, government intrusion into private life, and
bureaucracy in general. “Thus the first relationship of the government and
the people is the relationship of mutual non-interference. . , Mo won-
der Slavophile publications never escaped censorship and prohibition for
long.
The Westemizers were much more diverse than the Slavophiles, and
their views did not form a single, integrated whole. Besides, they shifted
their positions rather rapidly. Even socially the Westernizers consisted of
different elements, ranging from Michael Bakunin who came from a gentry
home like those of the Slavophiles, to Vissarion Belinsky whose father was
an impoverished doctor and grandfather a priest, and Basil Botkin who
belonged to a family of merchants. Yet certain generally held opinions and
doctrines gave a measure of unity to the movement. The Slavophiles and
the Westernizers started from similar assumptions of German idealistic
philosophy, and indeed engaged in constant debate with each other, but
came to different conclusions. While Khomiakov and his friends affirmed
the uniqueness of Russia and the superiority of true Russian principles over
those of the West, the other party argued that the Western historical path
was the model that Russia had to follow. Russia could accomplish its mis-
sion only in the context of Western civilization, not in opposition to it.
Naturally, therefore, the Westernizers took a positive view of Western po-
litical development and criticized the Russian system. Contrary to the
Slavophiles, they praised the work of Peter the Great, but they wanted
further Westernization. Also, whereas the Slavophiles anchored their en-
tire ideology in their interpretation and appraisal of Orthodoxy, the West-
emizers assigned relatively little importance to religion, while some of
them gradually turned to agnosticism and, in the case of Bakunin, even to
violent atheism. To be more exact, the moderate Westernizers retained re-
ligious faith and an essentially idealistic cast of mind, while their political
and social program did not go beyond mild liberalism, with emphasis on
gradualism and popular enlightenment. These moderates were typified by
Nicholas Stankevich, who brought together a famous early Wcstemlzer
circle but died in 1840 at the age of twenty-seven before the movement
really developed, and by Professor Timothy Granovsky, who lived from
1813 to 1855 and taught European history very successfully at the Uni-
versity of Moscow. The radical Westernizers, however, largely through
Hegelianism and Left Hegelianism, came to challenge religion, society, and
the entire Russian and European system, and to caff for a revolution. Al-
though few in number, they included such major figures as Vissarion Be-
linsky, 1811-48, Alexander Herzen, 1812—70, and Michael Bakunin,
1814-76.
Belinsky, the most famous Russian literary critic, exercised a major in-
CULTURE 1800-1860
365
fluence on Russian intellectual life in general He had the rare good for-
tune to welcome the works of Pushkin, Lermontov, and Gogol and the
debuts of Dostoevsky, Turgenev, and Nekrasov Belinsky’s commentary on
the Russian writers became famous for its passion, invective, and eulogy,
as well as for its determination to treat works of literature In the broader
contexts of society, history, and thought, and to instruct and guide the
authors and the reading public Belinsky's own views underwent important
changes and had not achieved cohesiveness and stability at the time of his
death His impact on Russian literature, however, proved remarkably dura-
ble and stable it consisted above all m the establishment of political and
social criteria as gauges for evaluating artistic works As Nekrasov put it
later, one did not have to be a poet, but one was under obligation to be a
citizen Following Belinsky’s powerful example, political and social ideolo-
gies, banned from direct expression in Russia came to be commonly ex-
pounded in literary cniicnm
Doth Herzen and Bakunin became prominent uv the I830‘s and 1840 s,
but lived well beyond the reign of Nicholas 1 Moreover, much of their
activity, such as Herzen’s radical journalistic work abroad and Bakunin's
anarchist theorizing and plotting belonged to the time of Alexander 11 and
will have to be mentioned in a subsequent chapter Yet their intellectual
evolution in the decades preceding the “great reforms" formed a significant
part of that seminal period of Russian thought Herzen, whose autob o-
graphical account lf> Past and Thoughts is one of the most remarkable
works of Russian literature, came from a well established gentry family,
like the Slavophiles and Bakunin, but was an illegitimate child He became
a leading opponent of Khomiakov in the Muscovite salons and a progres-
sive Weslcrnizer Gradually Herzen abandoned the doctrines of idealistic
philosophy and became increasingly radical and critical m his position,
stressing the dignity and freedom of the individual In 1847 he left Russia,
never to return Bakunin has been described as ‘ founder of nihilism and
apostle or anarchy ’ — Herzen said he was born not under a star but under
a comet — but he began peacefully enough as an enthusiast of German
thought, especially Hegel’s Several years earlier than Herzen, Bakunin too
left Russia Before long he turned to Left Hegelianism and moved beyond
it to anarchism and a sweeping condemnation of state, society, economy,
and culture in Russia and m the world Bakunin emphasized destruction,
proclaiming in a signal early article that the passion for destruction was
itself a creative passion While Herzen bitterly witnessed the defeat of the
revolution of 1848 in Pans, Bakunin attended the Pan-Slav Congress in
Prague and participated in the revolution in Saxony Afler being handed
over by the Austrian government to the Russian, he was to spend over a
decade in fortresses and in Siberian exile Both Herzen, disappointed in the
366 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
West, and Bakunin, ever in search of new opportunities for revolution and
anarchism, came to consider the peasant commune in Russia as a superior
institution and as a promise of the future social transformation of Russia
a point made earlier by the Slavophiles, although, of course, from different
religious and philosophical positions — thus laying the foundation for sub-
sequent native Russian radicalism.
The Petrashevtsy were another kind of radicals. That informal group of
two score or more men, who from late 1845 until their arrest in the spring
of 1849 gathered on Fridays at the home of Michael Butashevich-Petra-
shevsky in St. Petersburg, espoused especially the teaching of the strange
French utopian socialist Fourier. Fourier preached the peaceful transfor-
mation of society into small, well-integrated, and self-supporting com-
munes, which would also provide for the release and harmony of human
passions according to a fantastic scheme of his own invention. Many Petra-
shevtsy, however, added to Fourierism political protest, demand for reform,
and general opposition to the Russia of Nicholas I. The government took
such a serious view of the situation that it condemned twenty-one men to
death, although it changed their sentence at the place of execution in favor
of less drastic punishments. It was as a member of the Petrashevtsy that
Dostoevsky faced imminent execution and later went to Siberia. The
Petrashevtsy, it might be added, came generally from lower social strata
than did the Lovers of Wisdom, the Slavophiles, and the Westernizers, and
included mostly minor officials, junior officers, and students.
Several trends in the intellectual histoiy of Russia in the first half of the
nineteenth century deserve attention. If we exclude the Decembrists as
belonging ideologically to an earlier period, Russian thought moved from the
abstract philosophizing and the emphasis on esthetics characteristic of the
Lovers of Wisdom, through the system-building of the Slavophiles and, to
a lesser extent, the Westernizers to an increasing concern with the pressing
issues of the day, as exemplified by the radical Westernizers and, in a dif-
ferent sense, by the Petrashevtsy. At the same time radicalism grew among
the educated Russians, especially as German idealistic philosophy and ro-
manticism in general disintegrated. Moreover, socialism entered Russian
histoiy, both through such individuals as Herzen and his life-long friend
Nicholas Ogarev and through an entire group of neophytes, the Petra-
shevsty. Also, the intellectual stratum increased in number and changed
somewhat in social composition, from being solidly gentry, as the
Slavophiles still were, to a more mixed membership characteristic of the
Westernizers and the Petrashevtsy. All in all, Russian thought in the reigns
of Alexander I and Nicholas I, and especially the “intellectual emancipa-
tion” of the celebrated forties, was to have a great impact on the intellec-
tual evolution of Russia and indeed on Russian history all the way to
1917 and even beyond.
CULTURE* 1800-1860
367
The Arts
While contemporaries and later many scholars showed special interest in
the Russian literature and thought of the first half ol the nineteenth cen-
tury, the fine arts, too, continued to develop in the reigns of Alexander I
and Nicholas I Both emperors were enthusiastic builders in the tradition of
Peter and Catherine At the time of Alexander the neo-classical style, often
skillfully adapted to native traditions, readied its height in Russia It
affected not onty the appearance of St Petersburg, Moscow, and other
towns, but also the architecture of countless manor houses all over the
empire throughout the nineteenth century The leading architects of Alex-
ander’s Kign included Hadrian Zakharov, who created the remarkable
Admiralty building in St. Petersburg, and Andrew Voronikhin, of serf
origin, who constructed the Kazan Cathedral in the capital and certain
imperial palaces outside it Under Nicholas neo-classicism gave way to an
eclectic mixture of styles
Largely guided by the Academy of Arts, painting evolved gradually
from neo-classicism to romanticism as exemplified by Karl Briulfov’s enor-
mous canvas ‘The Last Day of Pompeii" A few more realistic genre
painters also began to appear Mustc grew in quantity, quality, and appeal
In particular, Russian opera developed, and it obtained a lasting position in
Russia and elsewhere through the genius of Michael Glinka, 1804-57, and
the talents of other able composers such as Alexander Dargomyzhsky,
1813-69 As elsewhere in Europe, Russian opera and the Russian musical
school generally stressed folk songs, melodies, and motifs The theater, the
ballet, and the opera attracted increasing state support and public interest.
The theater profited from the new Russian dramatic literature, which in-
cluded such masterpieces as Woe from Wit and The Inspector General,
and the emergence of brilliant actors and even traditions of acting Public
theaters existed m many towns, while some landlords continued to estab-
lish private theaters on their estates, with serfs as actors In the ballet too,
under the guidance of I~ rench and Italian masters, standards improved and
a tradition of excellence developed
On the whole, Chaadaev’s claim that Russia had contributed nothing to
culture, outrageous in 183b, would have found even Jess justification in
1855 or 1860 Yet, as the Slavophiles, Herzen, and other thinking Russians
realized, not alt was well there remained an enormous gulf between the
educated society and the people, between the fortunate few on top and the
broad masses Something had to be done The future of Russia depended on
the "great reforms "
XXIX
THE REIGN OF ALEXANDER II, 1855-81
However, sounds of music reached our ears, and we all hurried back
to the hall. The band of the opera was already playing the hymn,
which was drowned immediately in enthusiastic hurrahs coming from
all parts of the hall, 1 saw Bavcri, the conductor of the band, waving
his stick, but not a sound could be heard from the powerful band.
Then Baveri slopped, but the hurrahs continued. I saw the slick
waved again in the air; I saw the fiddle-bows moving, and musicians
blowing the brass instruments, but again the sound of voices over-
whelmed the band. . . . The same enthusiasm was in the streets.
Crowds of peasants and educated men stood in front of the palace,
shouting hurrahs, and the Tsar could not appear without being fol-
lowed by demonstrative crowds running after his carriage. ... I
was in Nikolskoe in August, 1861, and again in the summer of 1862,
and I was struck with the quiet, intelligent way in which the peasants
had accepted the new conditions. They knew perfectly. well how diffi-
cult it would be to pay the redemption tax for the land, which was in
reality an indemnity to the nobles in lieu of the obligations of serf-
dom. But they so much valued the abolition of their personal enslave-
ment that they accepted the ruinous charges — not without mur-
muring, but as a hard necessity — the moment that personal freedom
was obtained. . . . When I saw our Nikolskoe peasants, fifteen
months after the liberation, I could not but admire them. Their in-
born good nature and softness remained with them, but ail traces of
servility had disappeared. They talked to their masters as equals talk
to equals, as if they never had stood in different relations.
KROPOTKIN
The abolition of serfdom signified the establishment of capitalism as
the dominant socio-economic formation in Russia.
ZAIONCHKOVSKV
Alexander U succeeded his father, Nicholas I, on the Russian throne at
the age of thirty-seven. He had received a rather good education as well as
considerable practical training in the affairs of state. Alexander’s teachers
included the famous poet Zhukovsky, who has often been credited with
developing humane sentiments in his pupil. To be sure, Grand Duke Alex-
ander remained an obedient son of his strong-willed father and showed no
liberal inclinations prior to becoming emperor. Indeed he retained an essen-
tially conservative mentality and attitude throughout his life. Nor can
Alexander II be considered a strong or a talented man. Yet, forced by the
logic of the situation, the new monarch decided to undertake, and actually
carried through, fundamental reforms unparalleled in scope in Russian
368
ALEXANDER ,, J®
history since Peter the Great These reforms, although extremely important,
failed to cute all the ills ot Russia and in fact led to new problems and per-
turbations, which resulted, among other things, in the assassination of the
“Tsar-Liberator "
The Emancipation of the Serfs
The last words of Alexander U’s manifesto announcing the end of the
Crimean War promised reform, and this produced a strong impression on
the public The new emperor's first measures, enacted even before the
termination of hostilities, included die repeal of some of the Draconian re-
strictions of Nicholas l s final years such as those on travel abroad and on
the number of students attending universities All this represented a prom-
ising prologue, the key issue as it was for Alexander 1, the last ruler who
wanted to transform Russia, remained serfdom However, much had
changed in regard to serfdom during the intervening fifty or fifty-fisc years
Human bondage, as indicated in an earlier chapter, satisfied less and less
effectively the economic needs of the Russian Empire With the growth of
a money economy and competition for markets, the deficiencies of low-
grade serf labor became ever more obvious Many landlords, especially
those with small holdings, could barely feed their serfs, and the gentry
accumulated an enormous debt As we know, free labor, whether really
free or merely the contractual labor of someone else's serfs, became more
common throughout the Russian economy during the first half of the nine-
teenth century Moreover, the serfs perhaps declined in absolute number in
the course of that period, while their numerical weight m relation to other
classes certainly declined from 58 per cent of the total population of
Russia in 1811 to 44 5 per cent on the eve of the “great reforms," to cite
Blum’s figures again Recent interpretations of the Russian economic crisis
in mid-nineteenth century range all the way from Kovalchcnko's emphatic
restatement, with the use of quantitative methods, of the thesis of the
extreme and unbearable exploitation of the serfs to Ryndziunsky’s stress on
the general loosening of the social fabric In any event, whether the land-
lords were willing to recognize it or not — and large vested interests seldom
obey even economic reason — serfdom was becoming increasingly ana-
chronistic
Othw powerful arguments for emancipation reinforced the economic
Oppressed and exasperated beyond endurance, the serfs kept rising against
their masters While no nineteenth-century peasant insurrection could at
all rival the Pugachev rebellion, the uprisings became more frequent and
on the whole more serious Semevsky, using official records, had counted
550 peasant uprisings tn the nineteenth century prior to the emancipation
A Soviet historian, Ignatovich, raised the number to 1,467 and gave the
370
ERIAL RUSS'
following breakdown: 281 peasant rebellions, that is, 19 per cent of the
total, in the period from 1801 to 1825; 732 rebellions, 49 per cent, from
1826 to 1854; and 474 uprisings, or 32 per cent, in the six years and two
months of Alexander II’s reign before the abolition of serfdom. Ignatovich
emphasized that the uprisings also increased in length, in bitterness, in the
human and material losses involved, and in the military effort necessary to
restore order. Still more recently, Okun and other Soviet scholars have
further expanded Ignatovich’s list of uprisings. Moreover, Soviet scholar-
ship claims that peasant rebellions played the decisive role in the emancipa-
tion of the serfs, and that on the eve of the “great reforms” Russia experi-
enced in effect a revolutionary situation. Although exaggerated, this view
cannot be entirely dismissed. Interestingly, it was the Third Department,
the gendarmery, that had stressed the danger of serfdom during the reign
of Nicholas I. Besides rising in rebellion, serfs ran away from their masters,
sometimes by the hundreds and even by the thousands. On occasion large
military detachments had to be sent to intercept them. Pathetic mass flights
of peasants, for example, would follow rumors that freedom could be ob-
tained somewhere in the Caucasus, while crowds of serfs tried to join the
army during the Crimean War, because they mistakenly believed that they
could thereby gain their liberty.
A growing sentiment for emancipation, based on moral grounds, also
contributed to the abolition of serfdom. The Decembrists, the Slavophiles,
the Westernizcrs, the Petrashevtsy, some supporters of Official Nationality,
together with other thinking Russians, all wanted the abolition of serfdom.
As education developed in Russia, and especially as Russian literature
came into its own, humane feelings and attitudes became more widespread.
Such leading writers as Pushkin and particularly Turgenev, who in 1852
published in book form his magnificent collection of stories, Sportsman's
Sketches, where serfs were depicted as full-blown, and indeed unforgettable,
human beings, no doubt exercised an influence. In fact, on the eve of the
abolition of serfdom in Russia — in contrast to the situation with slavery
in the American South — virtually no one defended that institution; the
arguments of its proponents were usually limited to pointing out the dangers
implicit in such a radical change as emancipation.
Finally, the Crimean War provided additional evidence of the deficiencies
and dangers of serfdom which found reflection both in the poor physical
condition and listlessness of the recruits and in the general economic and
technological backwardness of the country. Besides, as Rieber recently
emphasized, Russia had essentially to rely on a standing army without a
reserve, because the government was afraid to allow soldiers to return to
villages.
At the time of the coronation, about a year after his assumption of
power, Alexander II, addressing the gentry of Moscow, made the celebrated
AlEXANOB* u
371
statement that it would be better to begin to abolish serfdom from above
than to wait until it would begin lo abolish itself from below, ami asked
the gentry to consider the matter Although the government experienced
great difficult) in eliciting any initiative from the landlords on the subject
o! emancipation, it finally managed to seize upon an offer by the gentry of
the three Lithuanian provinces to discuss emancipation without land The
ensuing imperial rescript made it dear that emancipation was indeed offi-
cial policy and, furthermore, that emancipauon would have to be with land.
At about the same time restrictions were lifted from the discussion of the
abolition of serfdom in the press In the wave of expectation and enthusiasm
that swept the liberals and radicals after the publication of the rescript
even Herzen exclaimed to Alexander II “Thou hast conquered, O Gali-
lean*"
Eventually, in 1858, gentry committees were established in all provinces
to consider emancipation, while a bureaucratic Main Committee of nine
members w-3S set up in St Petersburg Except for a few diehards, the land-
lords assumed a realistic position and accepted the abolition of serfdom
once the government had made us will clear, but they wanted the reform
to be carried out as advantageously for themselves os possible The gentry
of southern and south-central Russia, with its valuable, fertile sod, wanted
to retain as much land as possible and preferred land to a monetary recom-
pense, the gentry of northern and north-central Russta, by contrast, con-
sidered serf labor and the resulting obrok as their mam asset and, therefore,
while relatively willing to part with much of their land, insisted on a high
monetary payment in return for the loss of serf labor Gentry committees
also differed on such important issues as the desirable legal position of the
liberated serfs and the administration to be provided for them.
The opinions of provincial committees went to the Editing Commission
— actually two commissions that sat together and formed a single body —
created at the beginning of 1859 and composed of public figures interested
in the peasant question, such cs the Slavophiles George Samann and Prince
Vladimir Cherkassky, as well 3s of high official* After twenty months of
work the Editing Commission submitted ns plan of reform to the Main
Committee, whence it went evrowaJJ/ to the Stare Colircd After its ijuicfc
consideration by the State Council, Alexander II signed the emancipation
manifesto on March 3, 1861 —February 19, Old Style Public announce-
ment followed twelve days later.
Throughout its protracted and cumbersome formulation and passage the
emancipation reform faced the hostility of conservatives in government and
society That a far-reaching law was finally enacted can be largely credited
to the determined efforts of so-called “liberals," including officials such as
Nicholas Mihutin, the immediate assistant to the minister of the interior
and the leading figure in the Editing Commission, and participants from
372 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
the public like George Samarin. Two members of the imperial family, the
tsar’s brother Grand Duke Constantine and the tsar’s aunt Grand Duchess
Helen, belonged to the “liberals.” More important, Alexander II himself
repeatedly sided with them, while his will became law for such devoted
bureaucrats as Jacob Rostovtsev — a key figure in the emancipation
who cannot be easily classified as either “conservative” or “liberal.” The
emperor in effect forced the speedy passage of the measure through an
antagonistic State Council, which managed to add only one noxious pro-
vision to the law, that permitting a “pauper’s allotment,” which will be
mentioned later. Whereas the conservatives defended the interests and rights
of the gentry, the “liberals” were motivated by their belief that the interests
of the state demanded a thoroughgoing reform and by their views of what
would constitute a just settlement.
The law of the nineteenth of February abolished serfdom. Thenceforth
human bondage was to disappear from Russian life. It should be noted,
however, that, even if wc exclude from consideration certain temporary
provisions that prolonged various serf obligations for different periods of
time, the reform failed to give the peasants a status equal to that of other
social classes: they had to pay a head tax, were tied to their communes,
and were judged on the basis of customary law. In addition to landowners’
serfs, the new freedom was extended to peasants on the lands of the im-
perial family and to the huge and complex category of stale peasants.
Together with their liberty, serfs who had been engaged in farming re-
ceived land: household serfs did not. While the detailed provisions of the
land settlement were extremely complicated and different from area to
area, the peasants were to obtain roughly half the land, that part which
they had been tilling for themselves, the other half staying with the land-
lords. They had to repay the landlords for the land they acquired and, be-
cause few serfs could pay anything, the government compensated the
gentry owners by means of treasury bonds. Former serfs in turn were to
reimburse the state through redemption payments spread over a period of
forty-nine years. As an alternative, serfs could take one-quarter of their
normal parcel of land, the so-called “pauper's allotment," and pay noth-
ing. Except in the Ukraine and a few other areas, land was given not to
individual peasants, but to a peasant commune — called an obshchina or
mir, the latter terra emphasising the communal gathering of peasants to
settle their affairs — which divided the land among its members and was
responsible for taxes, die provision of recruits, and other obligations to the
state.
The emancipation of the serfs can be called a great reform, although an
American historian probably exaggerated when he proclaimed it to be the
greatest legislative act in history. It direedy affected the status of some fifty-
two million peasants, over twenty million of them serfs of private land
ALEXANDER II 373
owners That should be compared, for example with the almost simul-
taneous liberation of four million black slaves in the United States, ob-
tained as a result of a huge Civil War, not by means of a peaceful legal
process The moral value of the emancipation was no doubt tremendous, if
incalculable It might be added that the arguments of Pokrovsky and some
other historians attempting to show that the reform was a clever conspiracy
between the landlords and the government at the expense of Use peasants
lack substance they arc contradicted both by the actual preparation and
passage of the emancipation legislation and by its results, for K contributed
m a major manner to the decline of the gentry By contrast, those Soviet
specialists and others who emphasize the importance of the abolition of
serfdom for the development of capitalism tn Russia stand on much firmer
ground The specific provisions of the new settlement have also been de-
fended and even praised especially on the basis of the understanding that
the arrangement had to be a compromise not a confiscation of everything
the gentry owned Thus the emancipation of serfs in Russia has been
favorably compared to that in Prussia at the beginning of the nineteenth
century and land allotments of Russian peasants to allotments in several
other countries
And >ct the emancipation reform aho deserves thorough criticism The
land allotted to the former serfs turned out to be insufficient While in theory
they were to retarn the acreage that they had been tilling for themselves
prior to 1861, in fact they received 18 per cent less land Moreover, in the
fertile southern provinces their loss exceeded the national average, amount-
ing in some cases to 40 per cent or more of the total Also, in the course
of the partitioning former serfs often failed to obtain forested areas or ac-
cess to a river with the result that they had to assume additional obligations
toward their onetime landlords to satisfy their needs Khodsky estimated
that 13 per cent of the former serfs received liberal allotments of land, 45
per cent, allotments sufficient to maintain their families and economics, and
42 per cent, insufficient allotments Ltasbchenko summarized the settle-
ment as follows “The owners, numbering 30,000 noblemen retained own
crship over some 95 million dcssyatins of the better land immediately after
the Reform, compared with 116 million dessyatins of suitable land left to
the 20 million ‘emancipated* peasants ” Other scholars have stressed the
overpopulation and underemployment among former serfs who, at least
after a period of transition were no longer obliged to work for the land-
lord and at the same time had less land to cultivate for themselves State
peasants, although by no means prosperous, received, on the whole, better
terms than did the serfs of private owners
The financial arrangement proved unrealistic and impossible to execute
Although liberated serfs kept meeting as best they could the heavy redemp-
tion payments, which were not related to their current Income, the arrears
374 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
kept mounting. By the time the redemption payments were finally abolished
in 1905, former serfs paid, counting the interest, one and one half billion
rubles for the land initially valued at less than a billion. It should be noted
that while officially the serfs were to redeem only the land, not their per-
sons, actually the payments included a concealed recompense for the loss
of serf labor. Thus, more had to be paid for the first unit of land, the first
desiatina, than for the following units. As a whole the landlords of southern
Russia received 340 million rubles for land valued at 280 million; those of
northern Russia, where obrok prevailed, 340 million rubles for land worth
180 million rubles. The suspect Polish and Polonized landlords of the
western provinces constituted an exception, for they were given slightly
less money than the just price of their land.
The transfer of land in most areas to peasant communes rather than to
individual peasants probably represented another major error, although
this is an extremely complex issue. Arguments in favor of the commune
ranged from the Slavophile admiration of the moral aspects of that institu-
tion to the desire on the part of the government to have taxes and recruits
guaranteed by means of communal responsibility and to the assertion that
newly liberated peasants would not be able to maintain themselves but
could find protection in the commune. While some of these and other simi-
lar claims had a certain validity - — indeed, as a practical matter the govern-
ment could hardly have been expected to break up the commune at the
same time the serfs were being freed — the disadvantages of the commune
outweighed its advantages. Of most importance was the fact that the com-
mune tended to perpetuate backwardness, stagnation, and overpopulation
in the countryside precisely when Russian agriculture drastically needed
improvement and modernization.
The emancipation reform disappointed Russian radicals, who considered
it inadequate, and it also, apparently, failed to satisfy the peasantry, or at
least many peasants, for a rash of agrarian disturbances followed the aboli-
tion of serfdom, and the misery, despair, and anger in the countryside re-
mained a powerful threat to imperial Russia until the very end of imperial
rule.
Other "Great Reforms”
The emancipation of the serfs made other fundamental changes much
more feasible. Alexander II and his assistants turned next to the reform of
local government, to the establishment of the so-called zemstvo system. For
centuries local government had remained a particularly weak aspect of
Russian administration and life. The arrangement that the “Tsar-Liberator
inherited dated from Catherine the Great’s legislation and combined bu-
ALEXANDER JI 375
rcaucranc management with some participation by the local gently, the
considerable manorial jurisdiction of the landlords on their estates formed
another prominent characteristic of the pre reform countryside The new
law, enacted m January 1864, represented a strong modernization and
democratization of local government, as well as a far reaching effort on the
pan of the state to meet the many pressing needs of rural Russia and to do
tins largely by stimulating local initiative and activity Institutions of self-
government, zemstvo assemblies and boards, were created at both the dis-
trict and provincial levels — the word 2 emst%o itself connotes land, coun
try, or people, as distinct from the central government The electorate of
the district zemstvo assemblies consisted of three categories the towns,
the peasant communes, and all individual landowners, including those not
from the gentry Representation was proportional to Jandownership, with
some allowance for the possession of real estate m towns The elections
were indirect Members of district assembles in turn, elected from their
own nudst regardless of class delegates to their provincial assembly
Whereas the district and provincial zemstvo assemblies in which the
i«nsm wttfeotvty tended met tt&lf we* a yew t® daai wnb vucVi amcis is
the annual budget and basic policies they elected zemstvo boards to serve
continuously as the executive agencies of the system and to employ pro-
fessional staffs A variety of local needs fell under the purview of zemstvo
institutions education medicine, veterinary service, insurance roads, the
establishment of food reserves for emergency, and many others
The zemstvo system has legitimately been criticized on a number of
counts For example for a long lime it encompassed only the stnctly Rus-
sian areas of the empire some thirty four provinces not the borderlands
Also, it possessed a limited many would say insufficient, right to tax in
broader terms, jt represented merely a junior partner to tht central govern-
ment, which retained police and much administrative control m the CQun
tryside, a governor could in various ways interfere with the worfc of a
zemstvo, but not vice versa The smallest zemstvo unit, the district, proved
too large for effective and prompt response to many popular needs, and
the desirability of further zemstvo subdivision soon became apparent The
democracy of the system too had its obvious limitations because they
owned much land, members of the gentry were very h-avily represented in
the district assemblies, and even more so in the provincial assemblies and
the zemstvo boards, where education, leisure and means to cover the ex-
penses incurred favored gentry delegates Thus, according to one count the
gentry generally held 42 per cent of the dirtnet assembly scats, 74 per cent
of the scats in the provincial assembles, and 62 per cent of the positions on
the zemstvo boards Yet. even such a system constituted a great step toward
democracy for autocratic and bureaucratic Russia It nught be added that
376 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
the zemstvo institutions functioned effectively also in those areas, such as
large parts of the Russian north, where there were no landlords and where
peasants managed the entire system of local self-government.
Yet, in spite of its deficiencies - — • and it should be noted that most of
the above-mentioned criticisms refer in one way or another to die insuffi-
cient extent of the reform and not to substantive defects in it — the zemstvo
system accomplished much for rural Russia from its establishment in 1864
until its demise in 1917. Especially valuable were its contributions to public
education and health. In effect, Russia obtained a kind of socialized medi-
cine through the zemstvo long before other countries, with medical and
surgical treatment available free of charge. As G. Fischer and other scholars
have indicated, the zemstvo system also served, contrary to the intentions
of the government, as a school for radicalism and especially liberalism
which found little opportunity for expression on the national, as distinct
from local, scene until the events of 1905 and 1906.
In 1870 a municipal reform reorganized town government and applied
to towns many of the principles and practices of the zemstvo administra-
tion. The new town government, which was “to take care of and administer
urban economy and welfare,” consisted of a town council and a town ad-
ministrative board elected by the town council. The town council was
elected by all property owners or taxpayers; but the election was according
to a three-class system, which gave the small group on top that paid a third
of the total taxes a third of the total number of delegates, the middle tax-
payers another third, and the mass at the bottom that accounted for the last
third of taxes the remaining third of delegates.
At the end of 1864, the year that saw the beginning of the zemstvo ad-
ministration, another major change was enacted into law: the reform of.
the legal system. The Russian judiciary needed reform probably even more
than the local government did. Archaic, bureaucratic, cumbersome, cor-
rupt, based on the class system rather than on the principle of equality be-
fore the law, and relying entirely on a written and secret procedure, the old
system was thoroughly hated by informed and thinking Russians. Butaslic-
vich-Pelrashevsky and other radicals attached special importance to a
reform of the judiciary. A conservative, the Slavophile Ivan Aksakov,
reminisced: “The old court! At the mere recollection of it one’s hair stands
on end and one’s flesh begins to creep!” The legislation of 1864 fortunately
marked a decisive break with that part of the Russian past.
The most significant single aspect of the reform was the separation of the
courts from the administration. Instead of constituting merely a part of the
bureaucracy, the judiciary became an independent branch of government.
Judges were not to be dismissed or transferred, except by court action. Ju-
dicial procedure acquired a largely public and oral character instead of the
former bureaucratic secrecy. The contending parties were to present their
ALEXANDER II
377
cases in court and base adequate legal support In fact, the reform virtually
created the class of lawyers in Russia, who began rapidly to acquire great
public prominence Two legal procedures, the general and the abbreviated
one, replaced the chaos of twenty-one alternate ways to conduct a cose
Tnal by jury was introduced for serious criminal olTenscs, while justices of
the peace were established to deal with minor civil and criminal cases The
courts were organized into a single unified system wnh the Senate at the
apex All Russians were to be equal before the law and receive the <ame
treatment Exceptions to the general system were the military and ecclesias-
tical courts, together with special courts for peasants who lived for the
most part by customary law
The reform of the judiciary which was largely the work of the Minister
of Justice Dmum Zarmatnm his extremely important assistant Serge Za-
rudny, and several other enlightened officials, proved to be the most suc-
cessful of the "great reforms ** Almost overnight it transformed the Russian
judiciaiy from one of the worst to one of the best in the civilized world
Later the government tried on occasion to influence judges for political rea-
sons, and, what is more important, in its struggle against radicalism and
revolution it began to withdraw whole categories of legal eases from the
normal procedure of 1864 and to subject them to various forms of the
courts martial But, while the reform of the judiciary could be restricted
in application, it could not be undone by the imperial government, and, as
far as the reform extended, modem justice replaced arbitrariness and con-
fusion Russian legal reform followed Western, especially French, models,
but, as Kucherov and others have demonstrated, these models were skill-
fully adapted to Russian needs It might be added that the courts, as Well as
the zemstvo institutions, acquired political significance, for they served as
centers of public interest and enjoyed a somewhat greater freedom of ex-
pression than was generally allowed in Russia
A reorganization of the military service in 1874 and certain changes
within the army have usually been grouped ns the last ‘great reform “ In-
spired by military needs and technically complex, the reform nevertheless
exercised an important general impact on Russian society and contributed
to the modernization and democratization of the country It was executed
by Minister of War Dmitru Miliuun, Nicholas Miliuun's brother, who
Wanted to profit by the example of the victorious Prussian army He intro-
duced a variety of significant innovations, of which the most important
was the change io military service The obligation to serve was extended
from the lower classes alone to all Russians, while at the same line the
length of active service was drastically reduced — from twenty five years
in the beginning of Alexarder Il’s reign to six after the reform of 1874 —
and a military reserve was organized Recruits were to be called up by lot,
different exemptions were provided for hardship cases, and, m addition.
378 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
terms of enlistment were shortened for those with education, a not unwar-
ranted provision in Russian conditions. Miliutin also reformed military law
and legal procedure, abolished corporal punishment in the army, strove to
improve the professional quality of the officer corps and to make it some-
what more democratic, established specialized military schools, and, a par-
ticularly important point, introduced elementary education for all draftees.
Measures similar to Miliutin’s were carried out in the navy by Grand Duke
Constantine.
Other reforms under Alexander II included such financial innovations as
Valery Tatarinov’s establishment of a single state treasury, publication of
the annual budget, and the creation in 1866 of the State Bank to centralize
credit and finance, as well as generally liberalizing steps with regard to edu-
cation and censorship.
The “great reforms” went a long way toward transforming Russia. To
be sure, the empire of the tsars remained an autocracy, but it changed in
many other respects. Vastly important in themselves, the government’s re-
forms also helped to bring about sweeping economic and social changes,
which will be discussed in a later chapter. The growth of capitalism in Rus-
sia, the evolution of the peasantry, the decline of the gentry, the rise of the
middle class, particularly the professional group, and also of the proletariat
— all were affected by Alexander Il’s legislation. Indeed, Russia began to
take long strides on the road to becoming a modem nation. Nor could the
changes be undone: there was no return to serfdom or to pre-reform justice.
The Difficult Sixties
However, although the government could not return to the old ways, it
could stop advancing on the new road and try to restrict and limit the
effectiveness of the changes. And in fact it attempted to do so in the second
half of Alexander IFs reign, under Alexander III , and under Nicholas II
until the Revolution of 1905. While the need for reforms had been ap-
parent, the rationale of reaction proved less obvious and more complicated.
For one thing, the reforms, as we know, had their determined opponents
in official circles and among the Russian gentry, who did their best to
reverse state policy. Special circumstances played their part, such as
peasant uprisings, student disturbances, the unexplained fires of 1862, the
Polish rebellion of 1863, and Dmitrii Karakozov’s attempt to assassinate
the emperor in 1866. More important was the fact that the government
failed to resolve the fundamental dilemma of change: where to stop. The
“great reforms,” together with the general development of Russia and the
intellectual climate of the time, led to pressure for further reform. Possibly
the granting of a constitutional monarchy and certain other concessions
would have satisfied most of the demand and provided stability for the
At- 63C A N t> E ft 11 379
empire But neither Alexander II nor cemmly his successor were willing
to go that far Instead they turned against the proponents of more change
and fought to preserve the established order The “great reforms had
come only after the Crimean War had demonstrated the total bankruptcy
of the old system and they owed little to any far reaching liberalism or
vision on the part of Alexander II and his immediate associates The sequel
showed how difficult it was for the imperial government to learn new ways
After the political stillness and immobility of Nicholas 1 s reign and
stimulated by the great reforms the early 1860 s in Russia were loud
and active Peasant riots occurred with great frequency and on a large
scale In 1861 and 1862 disturbances provoked largely by the clumsy and
authoritarian policies of the new minister of education Count Admiral
Evfimii Putiatin swept Russian universities In 1862 the provincial as
sembly of the Tver gentry led by Alexis Unkovsky renounced us gentry
privileges and demanded the convocation of a constituent assembly repre
sentmg the entire people to establish a new order in Russia And in the
same year of 1862 a senes of mysterious fires broke out in St Petersburg
and in a number of towns along the Volfca Also in 1861 and 1862 leaflets
urging revolution began to appear m different Russian cities In 1863
Poland erupted in rebellion
In Poland too Alexander II had instituted a liberal policy Thus in
1862 much of the former Polish autonomy was restored The change in the
Russian attitude found favorable response among Polish mod rates led
by Marquis Alexander Wiclopolski but failed to satisfy the nationalists
who wanted complete independence and the historic greater Poland
Recent successes of Italian unification the sjmpatby of Napoleon III and
influential French circles and the general nationalistic spirit of the age
encouraged Polish extremists Following a series of disorders the govern
went took steps to draft the unruly element students in particular into
the army A rebellion followed in January 1863 Although this time in
contrast to the situation in 1831 the Poles possessed no regular army and
had to fight for the most part os guerrilla bands the insurrection spread
to Lithuanian and White Russian lands and was not finally suppressed
until May 1864 Great Britain France and Austria tried to aid the Polish
cause by diplomatic interventions but were rebuffed by Russia As a
result of the rebellion Poland 3gatn lost its autonomous position and
became fully subject to Russian administration Nicholas Mibutin Samann,
and Cherkassky were dispatched to conquered Poland to study the con
ditions there and propose appropriate measures Of their recommendations
however only those referring to the emancipation of the serfs and land
settlement were adopted Peasants m Poland obtained a more favorable
arrangement than those in Russia while th“ Polish landlords fared much
worse than there Russian counterparts Otherwise the government chose
380 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
to rely on centralization, police control, and Russification, with the Russian
language made compulsory in Polish schools. A still more intense Russifica-
tion developed in the western borderlands of Russia, where eveiy effort
was made to eradicate the Polish influence. A 10 per cent assessment was
imposed there on Polish estates, the use of the Polish language was for-
bidden, and the property of the Catholic Church was confiscated. In 1874
the Uniates were forcibly reconverted to Orthodoxy.
In spite of the serious troubles of the early 1860’s, Alexander II and his
associates continued to reform Russia, and the future course of state policy
appeared to hang in the balance. For example, while the authorities
penalized disaffected Russian students and punished severely — some-
times, as in the case of Nicholas Chcmyshevsky, rather clearly on insufficient
evidence — those connected with the revolutionary agitation, a consider-
ably more liberal official, Alexander Golovnin, replaced Admiral Putiatin
in 1862 as minister of education, and a new and much freer University
Statute became law in 1863. Even the Polish rebellion, while it resulted
in oppression of the Poles, did not seem to affect the course of reform in
Russia. The decisive change away from reform came, in the opinion of
many historians, in 1866, following an attempt by an emotionally un-
balanced student, Dmitrii Karakozov, to assassinate the emperor. In that
year the reactionary Count Dmitrii Tolstoy took charge as minister of
education, and the government proceeded gradually to revamp schooling
in Russia, intending that stricter controls and heavy emphasis on the
classical languages would discipline students and keep their attention away
from the issues of the day. Over a period of years reaction also expressed
itself in the curbing of the press, in restrictions on the collection of taxes
by the zemstvo and on the uses to which these taxes could be put, in the
exemption of political and press cases from regular judicial procedure, in
continuing Russification, in administrative pressure on magistrates, and
the like. On the other hand, despite the reactionary nature of the period,
the municipal reform took place in 1870 and the army reform as late
as 1874.
New Radicalism and the Revolutionary Movement
Russian history came increasingly to be dominated by a struggle between
the government Right and the radical and revolutionary Left, with the
moderates and the liberals in the middle powerless to influence the funda-
mental course of events. The government received unexpected support
from the nationalists. It was in 1863, at the time of the Polish rebellion
and diplomatic pressure by Great Britain, France, and Austria on behalf
of Poland, that the onetime Westernizer, Anglophile, and liberal, journalist
Michael Katkov, came out emphatically in support of the government and
ALEXANDER II
381
Russian national interests Katkov’s stand proved very popular during the
Polish war In a sense Katkov and his fellow patriots who enthusiastically
defended the Russian state acted much like the liberals in Prussia and
Germany when they swung to the support of Bismarck Yet, in the long
run, it proved more characteristic of the situation in Russia that, although
the revolutionaries remained a small minonty, they attracted the sympathy
of broad layers of the educated public.
While the intellectual htstcry of Russia in the second half of the ntne
t eenth century will be summarized in a later chapter, some aspects of
Russian radicalism of the 1860 s and 1870 s must be mentioned here
Following Turgenev, it has become customary to sp»ak of the generation
of the sixties as * sons and nihilists' and to contrast these * sons’* with
the fathers ' of the forties A powerful contrast does emerge The
transformation in Russia formed part of a broader change m Europe which
has been described as a transition from romanticism to realism. In Russian
conditions the shift acquired an exaggerated and violent character
Whereas the fathers" grew up on German idealistic philosophy and
romanticism in general, with its emphasis on the metaphysical, religious,
aesthetic and historical approaches to reality, the “sons,” led by such
young radicals as Nicholas Chentyshcvsky, Nicholas Dobroliubov, and
Dmitm Pisarev hoisted the banner of utilitarianism, positivism, material
ism and especially “realism * Nihilism” — and also in large part • real
ism particularly critical realism — meant above all else a fundamental
rebellion against accepted values and standards against abstract thought
and family control, against ljnc poetry and school discipline, against
religion and rhetoric The earnest young men and women of the 1860 s
wanted to cut through every polite veneer, to get nd of all conventional
sham, to get to the bottom of things What they usually considered real
and worthwhile included the natural and physical sciences — for lh3t was
the age when science came to be greatly admired in the Western world —
simple and sincere human relations, and a society based on knowledge
and reason rather than ignorance, prejudice, exploitation, and oppression
The casting down of idols — and there surety were many idols in mid
nmetccnth-ccntury Russia, as elsewhere — emancipation and freedom
constituted the moral strength of nihilism Yet few in our age would fait
to see the narrowness of its vision or neglect the fact that it erected cruel
idols of its own
It has been noted that the rebels of the sixties, while they stood
poles apart from the Slavophiles and other idealists of the 1830 s and
1840’s, could be considered disciples of Herzen, Bakunin and to some
extent Belinsky, in their later, radical, phases True in the very important
field of doctnnc, this observation disregards the difference m tone and
manner as Samaria said of Herzen, even the most radical \\ cstemirerj
382 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
always retained “a handful of earth from the other shore,” the shore of
German idealism and romanticism, the shore of their youth; the new
critics came out of a simpler and cruder mold. Socially too the radicals
of the sixties differed from the “fathers,” reflecting the progressive
democratization of the educated public in Russia. Many of them belonged
to a group known in Russian as raznochintsy, that is, people of mixed
background below the gentry, such as sons of priests who did not follow
the calling of their fathers, offspring of petty officials, or individuals from
the masses who made their way up through education and effort. The
1860’s and the 1870’s with their iconoclastic ideology led also to the
emancipation of a considerable number of educated Russian women
quite early compared to other European countries — and to their entry
into the arena of radical thought and revolutionary politics. The word and
concept “intelligentsia," which came to be associated with a critical ap-
proach to the world and a protest against the existing Russian order,
acquired currency during that portentous period. Finally, the consecutive
history of the Russian revolutionary movement — which, to be sure, had
such early and isolated forerunners as the Decembrists — began in the
years following the “great reforms.”
The Russian revolutionary movement can be traced to the revolutionary
propaganda and circles of the 1860’s. It first became prominent, however,
in the 1870’s. By that time the essentially individualistic and anarchic
creed of nihilism, with its stress on a total personal emancipation, became
combined with and in part replaced by a new faith, populism — narod-
nichestvo — which gave the “critical realists” their political, social, and
economic program. While populism also has a broad meaning which could
include as adherents Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, certain ideologists of the Right,
and other diverse Russian figures, in the narrow sense it came to be as-
sociated with the teachings of such intellectuals as Herzen, Bakunin,
Nicholas Chemyslievsky, Peter Lavrov, and Nicholas Mikhailovsky — who
will be discussed in a later chapter — and the main trend of the Russian
radical and revolutionary movement in the last third of the nineteenth
century. If nihilists gloried in their emancipation, independence, and
superiority to the rotten world around them, populists felt compelled to
turn to the masses, which in Russia meant the peasants. They wanted to
repay their debt for acquiring education — which had brought the precious
emancipation itself — at the expense of the sweat and even the blood of
the muzhik, and to lead the people to a better future. The intellectuals, it
must be added, desired to learn as well as to teach. In particular, following
Herzen and Bakunin, they believed in the unique worth and potential of
the peasant commune, which could serve as an effective foundation for
the just social order of the future. In one way or another most populists
hoped to find in the people that moral purity and probity — truth, if you
ALEXANDER II
33 ?
will — Which their own environment had denied them Whether their
search stemmed from critical realism or not, represents another matter
Venturi, Itenberg, and others, with all thesr determined erudition, cannot
quite convince the reader that reason ruled the populist movement
The climax came in 1873, 1874, and the years immediately following
When in 1873 the imperial government ordered Russian students to
abandon their studies in Switzerland— .where Russians, especially women,
could often pursue higher education more easily than in their fatherland
— and return home, a considerable number of them, together with numer-
ous other young men and women who had stayed in Russia, decided to
"go to the people " And they went to the villages, some two and a half
thousand of them to become rural teachers, scribes, doctors, veterinarians,
nurses, or storekeepers Some meant simply to help the people as best
they could Others nurtured vast radical and revolutionary plans In
particular, the followers of Bakunin put their faith in a spontaneous,
elemental, colossal revolution of the people which they had merely to
help start, while the disciples of Lavrov believed in the necessity of gradual-
ism mote exactly, in the need for education and propaganda among the
masses before they could overturn the old order and establish the new
The populist crusade failed The masses did not respond The only
uprising that the populists produced resulted from an impressive but
forged manifesto in which the tsar ordered his loyal peasants to attack
his enemies, the landlords Indeed the muzhiks on occasion handed over
the strange newcomers from the cities to the police The police, in turn,
were frantically active, arresting all the crusaders they could find Mass
trials of the 193 and of the 50 in 1877 marked the sad conclusion of the
"going to the people stage of populism The peasants, to repeat, would
not revolt, nor could satisfactory conditions be established to train them
for later revolutionary action
Yet, one more possibility of struggle remained the one advocated by
another populist theoretician Peter Tkachev, and by an amoral ard
dedicated revolutionist Serge Nechaev, and given the name “Jacobin in
memory of the Jacobins who seized power to transform France during the
great French Revolution. If the peasants would not act, tt remained up
to the revolutionaries themselves to fight and defeat the government
Several years of revolutionary conspiracy, terrorism, and assassination
ensued The first instances of violence occurred more or less spontaneously,
sometimes as countermeasures against brutal police officials Thus, early
m 1878 Vera Zasulich shot and wounded the military governor of St
Petersburg, General Theodore Trepov, who had ordered a political prisoner
to be flogged, a jury failed to convict her, with the result that political
cases weTe withdrawn from regular judicial procedure But before long an
organization emerged which consciously put terrorism at the center of
384 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
its activity. The conspiratorial revolutionary society “Land and Freedom ”
founded in 1876, split in 1879 into two groups: the “Black Partition,” or
“Total Land Repartition,” which emphasized gradualism and propaganda,
and the “Will of the People” which mounted an all-out terroristic offensive
against the government. Members of the “Will of the People” believed
that, because of the highly centralized nature of the Russian state, a few
assassinations could do tremendous damage to the regime, as well as
provide the requisite political instruction for the educated society and the
masses. They selected the emperor, Alexander II, as their chief target and
condemned him to death. What followed has been described as an “em-
peror hunt” and in certain ways it defies imagination, The Executive Com-
mittee of the “Will of the People” included only about thirty men and
women, led by such persons as Andrew Zhcliabov who came from the
serfs and Sophia Petovskaia who came from Russia’s highest administrative
class, but it fought the Russian Empire. Although the police made every
effort to destroy the revolutionaries and although many terrorists perished,
the “Will of the People” made one attempt after another to assassinate
the emperor. Time and again Alexander II escaped through sheer luck.
Many people were killed when the very dining room of his palace was
blown up, while at one time the emperor’s security officials refused to let
him leave his suburban residence, except by water!
After the explosion in the Winter Palace and after being faced by strikes,
student disturbances, and a remarkable lack of sympathy on the part of
the educated public, as well as by the dauntless terrorism of the “Will of
the people,” the emperor finally decided on a more moderate policy which
could lead to a rapprochement with the public. He appointed General
Count Michael Loris-Melikov first as head of a special administrative com-
mission and several months later as minister of the interior. Loris-Melikov
was to suppress terrorism, but also to propose reforms. Several moderate
or liberal ministers replaced a number of reactionaries. Loris-Melikov’s
plan called for the participation of representatives of the public, both
elected and appointed, in considering administrative and financial reforms
— not unlike the pattern followed in the abolition of serfdom. On March
13, 1881, Alexander II indicated his willingness to consider Loris-Melikov’s
proposal. That same day he was finally killed by the remaining members
of the “Will of die People.”
Foreign Policy
The foreign policy of Alexander IPs reign, while perhaps not quite as
dramatic as its internal history, also deserves careful attention. It began
with the termination of the Crimean War and the Treaty of Paris, possibly
the nadir of the Russian position in Europe in the nineteenth century, and
ALEXANDER t T 385
it did much to restore Russian prestige Notably, the Russians fought a
successful -war against Turkey and largely redrew the map of the Balkans
Also, in the course of the reign, the empire of the Romanovs made a
sweeping expansion in the Caucasus Central Asia, and the Far Hast But
not everything went well Russia experienced important diplomatic set-
backs as svell as victories Moreover, tbc changing pattern of power rela-
tions in Europe — fundamentally affected by the unification of Germany,
which the tsarist government helped more than hindered — was in many
ways less favorable to the state of the Romanovs in 1881 than it had
been fifty years earlier
The Crimean War meant the coll3pse of the world of Nicholas T. the
world of legitimism with himself as its leader Specifically, it left the
Russian government and public bitterly disappointed with Austria, which,
in spue of the crucial Russian help in 1849 did everything to aid Russia’s
enemies short of actually fighting As Tiutchev insisted no * Austrian Judas”
could be allowed to pay last respects to Nicholas 1 on behalf of the
Hapsburgs 1 It is worth noting that when the new minister of foreign affairs.
Prince Alexander Gorchakov, surveyed the situation he turned to France
as a possible ally, and Napoleon III indicated reciprocal interest Yet at
that ume — tn contrast to what happened thirty years later — the Franco-
Russian rapprochement foundered on the Polish rebellion of 1863 As
already mentioned, both the French ruler and his people sympathized
with the Poles, and, as in the case of Great Britain and Austria, France
intervened diplomatically on behalf of the Poles, arguing that from the
time of the Congress of Vienna and the creation of the Kingdom of Poland
the fate of that country was of international concern and not simply an
internal Russian affair The imperial government could reject the argument
of these powers and rebuff their intervention only because of the strong
support that it obtained from the Russian public and afso from Prussia
Bismarck, who realized the danger of Polish nationalism for Prussia and
wanted to secure the goodwill of the tsar, sent Count Constantine Afvens
leben to promise the Russians cooperation against the Polish rebels and
to sign a convention to that effect Bismarck’s astute handling of the
Russians contributed, no doubt, to the rather benevolent attitude on the
pan of the tsarist government toward the unification of Germany under
Prussia, which involved the defeat of Austria m 1866 and of France in
1870 In retrospect, the fact that Russia did nothing to prevent the
emergence of Germany as the new continental giant has been called the
worst mistake that tsarist diplomacy ever made To qualify that charge.
It should at least be noted that Russian statesmen were not the only ones
in that crucial decade totally to misjudge the situation and prospects w
Europe Also Russia did obtain some compensation through the abro*
ganon of the Black Sea provisions of the Treaty of Pans at a time when
386 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
European attention centered on the Franco-Prussian war, Gorchakov
with Bismarck’s backing, repudiated the vexatious obligation not to have
a warfieet or coastal fortifications on the Black Sea that Russia had as-
sumed under the Treaty. The British protested and an international con-
ference was held in London in March 1871, but the Russian action was
allowed to stand, although the principle of general consent of the sig-
natories as against unilateral action was reaffirmed.
When in the 187Q’s the tsarist government looked again for allies, it
once more found Prussia, or rather Germany, and Austria, which had
become Austria-Hungary. For a century the HohenzoIIerns had remained,
on the whole, the best friends of the Romanovs; as to the Hapsburgs, the
Russian rancor against them, generated by their behavior at the time of
the Crimean War, had somewhat subsided in the wake of Austrian defeats
and other misfortunes. The new alliance, the so-called Three Emperors’
League, was formed in 1872 and 1873. Russia’s part in it involved a
military convention with Germany, according to which each party was
to assist with 200,000 troops if its partner were attacked by a European
power, and a somewhat looser agreement with Austria-Hungary. The
League could be said to represent a restoration of the old association of
conservative eastern European monarchies determined to preserve the
established order. But, in contrast to earlier decades when Alexander I
and Nicholas I led the conservative coalition, the direction of the new
alliance belonged to Bismarck. In fact, the Russian government was grateful
to be admitted as a partner. Moreover, Russian and German interests did
not correspond in some important matters. The lack of harmony became
obvious in 1875 when Russia and Great Britain exercised strong pressure
on Germany to assure that it would not try a preventive war against France.
The Three Emperors’ League finally collapsed over the issue of Turkey
and the Balkans, which in the 1870’s led to a series of international crises
and to war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Beginning with the
insurrection against Turkish rule in Herzegovina and Bosnia in July 1875,
rebellion swept the Balkans. The year 1.876 witnessed a brutal Turkish
suppression of a Bulgarian uprising, as well as fighting and massacres in
other parts of the peninsula, and the declaration of war on the Porte by
Serbia and Montenegro. The Russian public reacted strongly to these
developments. Pan-Slavism — hitherto no more than a vague sentiment,
except for certain small circles of intellectuals — for the first time became
an active force. Pan-Slav committees sent up to five thousand volunteers,
ranging from prominent members of society to simple peasants and in-
cluding about eight hundred former Russian army officers, to fight in the
Serbian army, which had been entrusted to another Russian volunteer,
General Michael Chennaev. But the Turks defeated the Serbs, hence the
last hope of Balkan nationalities in their uneven contest with the Ottomans
ALEXANDER H
3S7
rested on Russian intervention The imperial government considered inter
vention carefully and without enthusiasm The international situation,
with Great Britain and Austria Hungary hostile to Russia, argued against
war, and so did the internal conditions, for reforms were m the process
of enactment, notably in the military and financial domains, and there was
populist unrest Besides, Gorchakov and other responsible tsarist officials
did not believe at all m Pan Slavism, the exception being the Russian
ambassador to Constantinople, Count Nicholas Ignattev However, as the
Balkan struggle continued, as international diplomacy failed to bring
peace, and as Russia became gradually more deeply involved in the
conflict, the tsarist government, having come to an understanding with
Austria Hungary, declared war on Turkey on April 24, 1877
The difficult, bitter, and costly war, highlighted by such engagements as
the Russian defense of the Shipka pass in the Balkan mountains and the
Turkish defense of the fortress of Plevna resulted in a decisive Russian
victory The tsarist troops were approaching Constantinople when the
fighting ceased The Treaty of San Stef ano signed in March 1878, reflected
the thorough Ottoman defeat Russia obtained important border areas
in the Caucasus and southern Bessarabia, for the latter, Rumania, which
had fought jointly with Russia at Plevna and elsewhere, was to be com-
pensated with Dobrudja Serbia and Montenegro gained territory and were
to be recognized along with Rumania as fully independent, while Bosnia
and Herzegovina were to receive some autonomy and reform, moreover,
the treaty created a large autonomous Bulgaria reaching to the Aegean
Sea, which was to be occupied for two years by Russian troops, Turkey
was to pay a huge indemnity
But the Treaty of San Stefano never went into operation Austria
Hungary and Great Britain forced Russia to reconsider the settlement
Austria Hungary was particularly incensed by the creation of a large
Slavic Slate in the Balkans, Bulgaria, which Russia had specifically prom
ised not to do The reconsideration took the form of the Congress of
Berlin Presided over by Bismarck and attended by such senior European
statesmen as Disraeli and Gorchakov, who was still the Russian foreign
minister, it met for a month m the summer of 1878 and redrew the map
ot the Balkans While, according to the arrangements made m Berlin
Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania retained their independence and Russia
held on to southern Bessarabia and most of her Caucasian gams, such as
Batum, Kars, and Ardakhan, other provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano
were changed beyond recognition Serbia and Montenegro lost some of
their acquisitions More important, the large Bulgaria created at San
Stefano underwent division into three parts Bulgaria proper, north ot
the Balkan mountains, which was to be autonomous. Eastern Rumcha,
south of the mountains, which was to receive a special organization under
ALEXANDER *1
389
East Also, m 1867, the tsarist government withdrew Irom the Western
hemisphere by selling Alaska to the United States for S7, 200, 000
As mentioned earlier, Georgian recognition of Russian rule and success-
ful wars against Persia and Turkey in the first decades of the nineteenth
century had brought Transcaucasia and thus all of the Caucasus under the
sway of the tsars But imperial authority remained nominal or nonexistent
so far as numerous mountain tribes were concerned Indeed, Moslem
mountaineers reacted to the appearance of Russian troops by mobilizing
all their resources to drive the invaders out and by staging a senes of
desperate “holy wars ” The pacification of the Caucasus, therefore, took
decades, and military service in that majestic land seemed for a time almost
tantamount to a death warrant Beginning in 1857, however, Russian
troops commanded by Prince Alexander Bariatinsky, using a new and
superior nHc against the nearly exhausted mountaineers, staged another,
thu Ume decisive, offensive In 1859 Bariatinsky captured the legendary
Shamil, who for twenty-five years had been the military, spiritual, and
political leader of Caucasian resistance to Russia That esent has usually
been considered as the end of the fighting in the Caucasus, although more
time had to pass before order could be fully established there A large
number of Moslem mountaineers chose to migrate to Turkey
The Caucasus needed pacification when Alexander II ascended the
throne, but Central Asia had yet to be taken That was accomplished by
a senes of daring military expeditions in the period from 1865 to 1876
Led by such able and resourceful commanders as Generals Constantine
Kaufmann and Michael Skobelev, Russtan troops, in a senes of converg-
ing movements m the desert, encircled and defeated the enemy Thus m
the course of a decade the Russians conquered the khanates of Kokand,
Bokhara, and Khiva, and finally, in 1881, also annexed the Transcaspian
region, Russian expansion into Central Asia bears a certain resemblance
both to colonial wars elsewhere and to the American westward movement
Central Asia proved attractive for commercial reasons, for the peoples
of that area could supply Russia with raw materials, for example cotton,
and at the same tune provide a market for Russian manufactured goods
Also, Russian settlements had to be defended against predatory neighbors,
and that led to further expansion More important, it would seem that
the fluid Russian frontier simply had to advance in one way or another,
at least until it came up against more solid obstacles than the khanates
of Bokhara and Khiva In Central Asia, as in the Caucasus, the establish-
ment of Russian rule usually interfered little with the natoc economy',
society, law, or customs
The Russian Far Eastern boundary remained unchanged from the Treaty
of Nerchinsk drawn in 1689 until Alexander ll’s reign In the intervening
period, however, the Russian population in Siberia had increased con-
IMPERIAL RUSSIA
siderably, and the Amur river itself had acquired significance as an artery
of communication. In 1847 the energetic and ambitious Count Nicholas
Muraviev -known later as Muraviev-Amursky, that is, of the Amur—
became governor-general of Eastern Siberia. He promoted Russian advance
in the Amur area and profited from the desperate plight of China, at
war with Great Britain and France and tom by a rebellion, to obtain two
extremely advantageous treaties from the Celestial Empire: in 1858, by
the Treaty of Aigun, China ceded to Russia the left bank of the Amur
river and in 1860, by the Treaty of Peking, the Ussuri region. The Pacific
coast of the Russian Empire began gradually to be settled: the town of
Nikolaevsk on the Amur was founded in 1853, Khabarovsk in 1858,
Vladivostok in 1860. In 1875 Russia yielded its Kurile islands to Japan
in return for the southern half of the island of Sakhalin.
XXX
THE REIGN OF ALEXANDER 111, 1881-94, AND THE
FIRST PART OF THE REIGN OF NICHOLAS II, 1894-190$
The mtunt conclusion is that Russians live in a period which Shake-
speare defined by saying “The time is out of Joint "
M KOVALEV SCT
The feign of Alexander III and the reign of Nicholas II until the Revolu-
tion of 1905 formed a period of continuous reaction In fact, as has been
indicated, reaction had started earlier when Alexander II abandoned a
liberal course in 1866 and the years following But the **Tsar'Liberator”
did enact major reforms early In his rule, and, as the Loris-Mchkov episode
indicated progressive policies constituted a feasible alternative for Russia
as long as he remained on the throne Alexander III and Nicholas II
saw no such alternative Narrow-minded and convinced reactionaries, they
not only rejected further reform, but also did their best to limit the
effectiveness of many changes that had already taken place Thus they
instituted what have come to be known in Russian historiography as
“counterrefomis ” The official estimate of Russian conditions and needs
became increasingly unreal The government relied staunchly on the gentry,
although that class was in decline It held high the banner of “Orthodoxy -
autocracy- nationality," in spite of the fact that Orthodoxy — helped, or
rather hindered, by police and other more direct compulsive measures —
could hardly cement together peoples of many faiths in an increasingly
secular empire, that autocracy was bound to be even more of an anachro-
nism and obstacle to progress in the twentieth than In the nineteenth
century, and that a nationalism which had come to include Russification
could only split a multinational state Whereas the fast two Romanovs to
rule Russia agreed on principles and policies, they differed in character
Alexander 111 was a strong man, Nicholas II a weak one, under Nicholas
confusion and indecision complicated further the fundamentally wrong-
headed efforts of the government
Alexander HI, born in 1845, was fnll of strength and vigor, when he
ascended the Russian throne after the assassination of his father The new
ruler was determined to suppress revolution and to maintain autocracy,
a point that he made clear in a manifesto of May 11, 1881, which led
to the resignation of Lons-Mebkov, Dmitnt Mihutm, Grand Duke Con-
tot
392
IMPERIAL RUSS
staatine, and the minister of finance, Alexander Abaza. Yet it took a
number of months and further changes at the top before the orientation
represented by Loris-Melikov was entirely abandoned and the government
embarked on a reactionary course. The promoters of reaction included
Constantine Pobedonostsev, formerly a noted jurist at the University of
Moscow, who had served as tutor to Alexander and had become in 1880
the Obcr-Procurator of the Holy Synod; Dmitrii Tolstoy, who returned
to the government in 1882 to head the Ministry of the Interior; and Ivan
Delianov, who took charge of the Ministry of Education in the same year.
Pobedonostsev, the chief theoretician as well as the leading practitioner
of reaction in Russia in the last decades of the nineteenth century, char-
acteristically emphasized the weakness and viciousness of man and the
fallibility and dangers of human reason, hated the industrial revolution
and the growth of cities, and even wanted “to keep people from inventing
things. ” The state, he believed, had as its high purpose the maintenance
of law, order, stability, and unity among men. In Russia that aim could
be accomplished only by means of autocracy and the Orthodox Church.
“Temporary Regulations” to protect state security and public order,
issued late in the summer of 1881, gave officials in designated areas broad
authority in dealing with the press and with people who could threaten
public order. Summary search, arrest, imprisonment, exile, and trial by
courts-martial became common occurrences. The “Temporary Regula-
tions” were aimed primarily at the “Will of the People,” which lasted long
enough to offer the new ruler peace on conditions of political amnesty and
the convocation of a constituent assembly! Although the "Will of the
People” had been largely destroyed even before the assassination of the
emperor and although most of its remaining members soon fell into the
hands of the police, the “Temporary Regulations” were not rescinded, but
instead applied, as their vague wording permitted, to virtually anyone
whom officials suspected or simply disliked. For many years after the
demise of the “Will of the People,” terrorism died down in Russia, although
occasional individual outbreaks occurred. Yet the “Temporary Regula-
tions,” introduced originally for three years, were renewed. Indeed, the
tsarist government relied on them during the rest of its existence, with
the result that Russians lived under something like a partial state of
martial law.
Alexander Ill’s government also enacted “counterreforms” meant to
curb the sweeping changes introduced by Alexander II and to buttress the
centralized, bureaucratic, and class nature of the Russian system. New
press regulations made the existence of radical journals impossible and
the life of a mildly liberal press precarious. The University Statute of 1884,
which replaced the more liberal statute of 1863, virtually abolished uni-
m
ALEXAHOER III ANB NICHOLAS II To 1905
versvty autonomy and also emphasized that students were to be considered
as “individual visitors,” who had no right to form organizations or to
claim corporate representation In fact most policies of the Ministry of
Education — which will be summarized m a later chapter — whether
they concerned the emphasis on classical languages in secondary schools,
the drastic curtailment of higher education for women, or the expansion
of the role of the Church in elementary teaching, consciously promoted the
reactionary’ aims of the regime.
The tsar and his associates used every opportunity to help the gentry
and to stress theic leading position m Russia, as, for example, by the crea-
tion in 1885 of the State Gentry Land Bank. At the same time they
imposed further restrictions on the peasants, whom they considered es-
sentially wards of the state rather than mature citizens The policies of
bureaucratic control of the peasants and of emphasizing the role of the
gentry in the countryside found expression in the most outstanding “counter-
refona” of the reign, the establishment in 18S9 of the office of zemskli
nachalntk, zemstvo chief, or land captain That official — who had
nothing to do with the zemstvo self-government — was appointed and
dismissed by the minister of the interior following the recommendation
of the governor of the land captain’s province His assigned task consisted
m exercising direct bureaucratic supervision over the peasants and, in
effect, in managing them Thus the land captam confirmed elected peasant
officials as well as decisions of peasant meetings, and he could prev ent the
officials from exercising their office, or even fine, arrest, or imprison them,
although the fines imposed by the land captain could not exceed several
rubles and the prison sentences, several days Moreover, land captains
received vast judicial powers, thus, contrary to the legislation of 1864.
again combining administration and justice In fact, these appointed
officials replaced for the peasants, that is, for the vast majority of the
people, elected and independent justices of peace The law of 1889 stip-
ulated that land captains had to be appointed from members of the local
gentry who met a certain property qualification Each district received
several land captains, each land captain administered several volosti,
that is, townships or cantons Russia obtained in this manner a new
administrative network, one of land captaincies
The following year, 1890, the government made certain significant
changes in the zemstvo system The previous classification of landholders,
that of 1864, had been based on the form of proj*rty, so that members
of the gentry and other Russians who happened to hold land in individual
ownership were not distinguished In JS90 the members of the gentry
became a distinct group • — and their representation was markedly increased.
Peasants, on the other hand, could thenceforth elect only candidates for
394
IMPERIAL russi.
zemstvo seats, the governor making appointments to district zemstvo as-
semblies from these candidates, as recommended by land captains. In
addition, the minister of the interior received the right to confirm chair-
men of zemstvo boards in their office, while members of the boards and
zemstvo employees were to be confirmed by their respective governors.
In 1892 the town government underwent a similar “counterreform,”
which, among other provisions, sharply raised the property requirement
for the right to vote. After its enactment, the electorate in St, Petersburg
decreased from 21,000 to 8,000, and that in Moscow from 20,000 to
7,000.
The reign of Alexander III also witnessed increased pressure on non-
Orthodox denominations and a growth of the policy of .Russification. Even
Roman Catholics and Lutherans, who formed majorities in certain western
areas of the empire and had unimpeachable international connections and
recognition, had to face discrimination: for instance, children of mixed
marriages with the Orthodox automatically became Orthodox, and all but
the dominant Church were forbidden to engage in proselytizing. Old
Believers and Russian sectarians suffered greater hardships. The govern-
ment also began to oppose non-Christian faiths such as Islam and Bud-
dhism, which had devoted adherents among the many peoples of the
empire.
Russification went hand in hand with militant Orthodoxy, although the
two were by no means identical, for peoples who were not Great Russians
such as the Ukrainians and the Georgians belonged to the Orthodox
Church. Although Russification was practiced earlier against the Poles,
especially in the western provinces following the rebellions of 1831 and
1863 and to a somewhat lesser extent in Poland proper, and was also
apparent in the attempts to suppress the budding Ukrainian nationalism,
it became a general policy of the Russian government only late in the
nineteenth century. It represented in part a reaction against the growing
national sentiments of different peoples of the empire with their implicit
threats to the unity of the state and in part a response to the rising na-
tionalism of the Great Russians themselves. Alexander III has often been
considered the first nationalist on the Russian throne. Certainly, in his
reign measures of Russification began to be extended not only to die
rebellious Poles, but, for example, to the Georgians and Armenians in
Transcaucasia and even gradually to the loyal Finns.
The Jews, who were veiy numerous in western Russia as a result of
the invitation policy of late medieval Polish kings, were bound to suffer
in the new atmosphere of aggressive Orthodoxy and Russification. And
indeed old limitations came to be applied to them with a new force, while
new legislation was enacted to establish additional curbs on them and
ALEXANDER III AND NICHOLAS IJ TO 1 905 395
their activities Thus, m contrast to the former lax enforcement of rules,
Jews came to be rigorously restricted to residence in the “Pale of Jewish
Settlement,' that is, the area in western Russia where they had been living
for a long time, with the added proviso that even within the Pale they
could reside only in towns and smaller settlements inhabited by merchants
and craftsmen, but not in the countryside Educated or otherw ise prominent
Jews could usually surmount these restrictions, but the great bulk of the
poor Jewish population was ued to its location In 1837 the government
established quota? for Jewish students in institutions of higher learning
10 per cent of the total enrollment within the pale of Jewish Settlement,
5 per cent in other provinces, and 3 per cent in Moscow and St Petersburg
In 1881, pogroms — the sad word entered the English language from the
Russian — that is, violent popular outbreaks against the Jews, oceuned
in southwestern Russian towns and settlements, destroying Jewish property
and sometimes taking Jewish lives They were to recur sporadically until
the end of impenal Russia Local authorities often did little to prevent
pogroms and on occasion it is rather clear, even encouraged them As
Pobedonostscv allegedly remarked, the Jewish problem in Russia was to
be solved by the conversion to Orthodoxy of one-third of the Russian
Jews, the emigration of one third and the death of the remaining third It
should be added that the Russtan government defined Jews according to
their religion, Jews converted to Christianity escaped the disabilities im-
posed on the others
Yet even under Alexander 111 state policies could not be limited to
cutting the great reforms*’ and generally promoting reaction Certain
more constructive measures were enacted in the domains of finance and
national economy where the government had to face a difficult and chang-
ing situation, and where it profited from the services of several able min-
isters While the development of the Russian economy and of society after
the “great reforms’’ will be discussed in a later chapter, it should be noted
here that Nicholas Bunge, who headed the Ministry of Finance from 1881
to 1887, established a Peasant Land Bank, abolished the head tax, intro-
duced the inheritance tax, and also began laboT legislation in Russia. His
pioneer factory laws included the limitation of the working day to eight
hours for children between twelve and fifteen, the prohibition of night
work for children and for women in the textile industry, and regulations
aimed at assuring the workers proper and regular pay from their employers,
without excessive fines or other illegitimate deductions Factory inspectors
were established to supervise the carrying out of the new legislation It
is significant that Bunge had to leave the Ministry of Finance because
of the strong opposition to his measures and accusations of socialism His
successors, Ivan Vyshncgradsky, 1887-92, and Setge Witte, 1892-1902,
396 imperial Russia
strove especially to develop state railways in Russia and to promote heavy
industry through high tariffs, state contracts and subsidies, and other
means.
Nicholas II
Nicholas H, Alexander Ill’s eldest son, who was born in 1868, became
the autocratic ruler of Russia after his father’s death in 1894. The last
tsar possessed certain attractive qualities, such as simplicity, modesty, and
devotion to his family. But these positive personal traits mattered little in
a situation that demanded strength, determination, adaptability, and vision.
It may well be argued that another Peter the Great could have saved the
Romanovs and imperial Russia. There can be no doubt that Nicholas II
did not. In fact, he proved to be both narrow-minded and weak, unable to
remove reactionary blinders even when circumstances forced him into
entirely new situations with great potentialities, and at the same time unable
to manage even reaction effectively. The unfortunate emperor struck many
observers as peculiarly automatic in his attitudes and actions, without the
power of spontaneous decision, and — as his strangely colorless and un-
differentiating diary so dearly indicates — also quite deficient in perspec-
tive. Various, often unworthy, ministers made crucial decisions that the
sovereign failed to understand fully or to evaluate. Later in the Teign the
empress, the reactionary, hysterical, and willful German princess Alex-
andra, became the power behind the throne, and with her even such an in-
credible person as Rasputin could rise to the position of greatest influence
in the state, A good man, but a miserable ruler lost in the moment of
crisis — no wonder Nicholas II has often been compared to Louis XVI.
As Trotsky and other determinists have insisted, the archaic, rotten Rus-
sian system, which was about to collapse, could not logically produce a
leader much different from that ineffective relic of the past. Or, as an old
saying has it, the gods blind those whom they want to destroy.
Reaction under Nicholas II
Reaction continued unimpeded. The new emperor, who had been a
pupil of Pobedonostsev, relied on the Ober-Procurator of the Holy Synod
and on other reactionaries such as his ministers of interior Dmitrii Sipiagin
and Viacheslav Plehve. The government continued to apply and extend the
“Temporary Regulations,” to supervise the press with utmost severity, and
as best it could to control and often restrict education. The zemstvo and
municipal governments experienced further curtailments of their jurisdic-
tions. For example, in 1900 the limits of zemstvo taxation were strictly
fixed and the stockpiling of food for emergency was taken away from
ALEXANDER lit AND NICHOLAS II TO 19 0 5 397
zemstvo jurisdiction and transferred to that of the bureaucracy. Moreover,
the authorities often refused to confirm elections of zemstvo board mem-
bers or appointments of zemstvo employees, trying to assure that only
people of unimpeachable loyalty to the regime -would hold public positions
of any kind
Religious persecution grew. Russian sectarians suflcred the most, m
particular those groups that refused to recognize the state and perform
such state obligations as military service Many of them were exiled from
central European Russia to the Caucasus and other distant areas It was
as a result of the policies of the Russian government that the Dukhobory
and certain other sects — helped, incidentally, by Leo Tolstoy — began
to emigrate In large numbers to Canada and the United States The state
also confiscated the estates and charity funds of the Armenian Church
and harassed other denominations in numerous ways The position of the
Jews too underwent further deterioration Additional restrictions on them
included a prohibition from acquiring real estate anywhere in the empire
except m the Cities and settlements of the Jewish Pale, while new pogroms
erupted m southwest Russia, including the horrible one in Kishinev in
1903
But the case of Finland represented in many respects the most telling
instance of the folly of Russification As an autonomous grand duchy from
the time it was won from Sweden in 1809, Finland received more rights
from the Russian emperor, who became the Grand Duke of Finland, than
it had had under Swedish rule, and remained a perfectly loyal, as well as a
relatively prosperous and happy, part of the state until the very end of
the nineteenth century and the introduction of a policy of Russification
Finnish soldiers helped suppress the Poles, and in general the Finns
participated actively and fruitfully in almost every aspect of the life of
the empire Ycl the new nationalism demanded that they too be Russified
While some preliminary measures in that direction had been enacted as
early as m the reign of Alexander 111, real Russification began with the
appointment of General Nicholas Bobrikov as governor-general of Finland
and of Plehvt as stale secretary for Finnish affairs in 189$ Russian au-
thorities argued that Finland’ could remain different from Russia only so
far as local matters were concerned, while it had to accept the general
system in what pertained to the entire state With that end in view, a
manifesto concerning laws common to Finland and Russia and a new
statute dealing with the military service of the Finns were published in
1899. Almost overnight Finland became bitterly hostile to Russia, and
a strong though passive resistance developed new laws were ignored,
draftees failed to show up, and so on In 1901 freedom of meetings was
abrogated in Finland In 1902 Governor-General Bobrikov received the
right to dismiss Finnish officials and judges and to replace them with
398 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
Russians, In 1903 he was vested with extraordinary powers to protect
state security and public order, which represented a definitive extension
of the “Temporary Regulations” of 1881 to Finland. In 1904 Bobrikov
was assassinated. The following year the opposition in Finland became
part of the revolution that spread throughout the empire.
Witte and the Ministry aj Finance
However, under Nicholas II, as in the reign of Alexander III, the
Ministry of Finance pursued a more intelligent and far-sighted policy than
did the rest of the government; and this affected many aspects of the
Russian economy and life. The minister, Serge Witte, was an economic
planner and manager of the type common in recent times in the govern-
ments of western Europe and the United States, but exceedingly rare in
the high officialdom of imperial Russia. Witte devoted his remarkable
energy and ability especially to the stabilization of finance, the promotion
of heavy industry, and the building of railroads. In 1897, after accumulating
a sufficient gold reserve, he established a gold standard in Russia, a
measure which did much to add stability and prestige to Russian economic
development, and in particular to attract foreign capital. Witte encouraged
heavy industry by virtually every means at his command, including govern-
ment orders, liberal credits, unceasing efforts to obtain investments from
abroad, tariff regulations, and improved transportation. As to railroads,
the minister, who had risen to prominence as a railroad official, always
retained a great interest in them: the Russian railroad network doubled
in mileage between 3 895 and 1905, and the additions included the
enormous Trans-Siberian line, built between 1891 and 1903 — except for
a section around Lake Baikal completed later — the importance of which
for Siberia can be compared to the importance of the Canadian Pacific
Railroad for Canada. Witte’s activities, as we shall see presently, affected
foreign policy as well as domestic affairs.
Russian Foreign Policy after the Congress of Berlin
Russian foreign policy had been undergoing important changes in the
decades that followed the Congress of Berlin. The most significant develop-
ments were the final rupture with Austria-Hungary and Germany and the
alliance with France. Although the Three Emperors’ League had foundered
in the Balkan crisis, a new Alliance of the Three Emperors was concluded
in June 1881 for three years and renewed in 1884 for another three years.
Its most essential provision declared that if one of the contracting powers
Germany, Austria-Hungary, or Russia — engaged in war with a fourth
power, except Turkey, the other two were to maintain friendly neutrality.
ALEXANDER Il| A N O NICHOLAS !| TO 1905 399
But, because of their conflicting interests in the Balkans, it proved im-
possible for Russia and Austria-Hungary to stay in the same alliance Tire
next major crisis occurred over Bulgaria where- — as Jelavich and other
specialists have demonstrated — Russia destroyed a great amount of
popularity and goodwill by an overbearing and stupid policy. The Russian
quarrel with the Bulgarian ruler, Alexander of Battenberg, and the Russian
refusal to sanction the unification of Bulgaria and Eastern Kumelia in
1885 failed to stop the unification but resulted m the abdication of
Alexander of Battenberg and the election by the Bulgarian Assembly of
the pro-Austrian Ferdinand of Saxc-Coburg to the Bulgarian throne
Bulgaria abandoned the Russian sphere of influence and entered the
Austrian, leaving the empire of the tsars virtually without Balkan allies
At the same time tension in relations between Russia and Austna-Hungary
increased almost to the breaking point Howes er, Germany, by contrast
with Austna-Hungary and despite the fact that m 1879 it had become
a close partner of the Hapsburg state, tried at fust to retain the Russian
connection Thus when the Alliance of the Three Emperors expired in
1887, Germany and Russia concluded in secret the so-called Reinsurance
Treaty, Bismarck's “wire to St Petersburg’’ and a veritable lour de force
of diplomacy each party was to remain neutral in case the other fought
a war, with the exception of an aggressive war of Germany agamst France
or of Russia against Austria-Hungary — the exception making it barely pos-
sible for Germany to square the Reinsurance Treaty with its obligations
to Austria-Hungary Nevertheless, following Bismarck’s forced resignation
in 1890, Germany discontinued the Reinsurance Treaty and thus severed
its connection with Russia
The Russian rupture with the Germanic powers and the general isolation
of Russia appeared all the more ominous because of Anglo-Uussian tension
over the expansion of the Russian Empire in Central Asia, which, the
British felt, threatened India That tension attained us high point in 1885
when the Russians, having reached as far south as the vague Afghan border,
dashed with the soldiers of the amir Although an Anglo-Rusxian war was
asoided and the boundary settled by compromise. Great Britain and Russia
remained hostile to each other well past the turn of the century as they
competed for influence and control in vast lands south of Russia, especially
m Iran
Political realities pointed to a Franco-Russtan alliance — Bismarck's
nightmare and the reason bchmd the Reinsurance Treaty — for France
was as isolated as Russia and more threatened Alexander III, his cautious
foreign minister Nicholas Giers, and other tsarist high officials reached that
conclusion reluctantly, because they had no liking for the Third Republic
and no confidence m it, and because the traditional German orientation in
Russian foreign policy died hard Yet France remained the only possible
400 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
partner, and it had much to offer. In particular, Paris alone provided a great
market for Russian state loans — the Berlin financial market, it might be
added, was closed to Russia in 1887 — and thus the main source of foreign
financial support much needed by the imperial government. In fact, French-
men proved remarkably eager to subscribe to these loans as well as to in-
vest directly in the Russian economy. Economics thus joined politics, al-
though it would be fair to say that politics led the way. The alliance was
consolidated in several stages, beginning with the diplomatic understanding
of 1891 and ending with the military convention of December 1893-Janu-
ary 1894. B. Nolde, Langer, and other scholars have indicated how through
the drawn-out negotiations the French pressed for an ever firmer and more
binding agreement, gradually forcing the hand of the hesitant Russians. In
its final form the alliance provided that if France were attacked by Ger-
many, or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia would employ all avail-
able forces against Germany, and if Russia were attacked by Germany, or
by Austria-Hungary supported by Germany, France would employ all
available forces against Germany. Additional articles dealt with mobiliza-
tion, the number of troops to be contributed, and other specific military
plans. The Franco-Russian agreement was to remain in force for the
duration of the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy.
Nicholas II approved Alexander Ill’s foreign policy on the whole and
wanted to continue it. However, as we shall see, the new emperor proved
to be less steady and more erratic than his father in international relations
as in domestic affairs. Also, while Alexander III relied on the careful and
experienced Giers throughout his rule, Nicholas II had several foreign
ministers whose differences and personal preferences affected imperial di-
plomacy. In addition, the reign of the last tsar witnessed more than its share
of court cliques and cabals which on occasion exercised a strong and at
the same time irresponsible influence on the conduct of Russian foreign
policy.
Nicholas II appeared prominently on the international scene in 1899,
when he called together the first Hague Peace Conference attended by
representatives of twenty-six states. Although instigated by Russian financial
stringency and in particular by the difficulty of keeping up with Austrian
armaments, this initiative was in accord with the emperor’s generally peace-
ful views. While the Conference failed to agree on disarmament or com-
pulsory arbitration of disputes, it did pass certain “laws of war” — later
often disregarded in practice, as in the case of the temporary injunction
against the use of “projectiles thrown from balloons” — and set up a per-
manent court of arbitration, the International Court of Justice at the Hague.
More important, it became the first of a long series of international con-
ferences on disarmament and peace, on which the hopes of mankind ride
today. The Second Hague Peace Conference, in 1907, was also attended
401
ALEXANDER III AND NICHOLAS II to 1905
by Russian representatives, but again it could not reach agreement on the
major issues under discussion
The Russo Japanese }Var
Nicholas IPs own policy, however, did not always contribute to peace
Aggressiveness and ad'cmurous involvement characterized Russian be-
havior m the Far East around the turn of the century, which culminated in
the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 The construction of the Trans-Siberian
railroad between 3 S9 1 and 1903, entirely justified in terms of the needs of
Siberia, served also to link Russia to Manchuria, China, Korea, and even,
indirectly, to Japan Japan had just gone through a remarkable moderniza-
tion and in 1894-95 it fought and defeated China, obtaining by the Treaty
of Shimonoscki the Chinese territories of Formosa, the Pescadores Islands,
and the Liaotung Peninsula together with other gains, including the recog-
nition of full independence for Korea Before Japan could profit from the
Liaotung Peninsula Russia France and Germany forced her to give it up
Next Russia concluded a secret agreement w ith China, whereby in return
for guaranteeing Chinese territory against outside aggression it obtained
the right to construct a railroad through Manchuria to the coast Although
the new railroad the East China Railway, belonged nominally to a private
company with a large Chinese participation it marked in effect the estab-
lishment of a Russian sphere of influence in northern Manchuria an in-
fluence centered in Harbin and extending along railroad tracks and proper-
ties guarded by a special Russian railroad guard
While Russia had legitimate commercial and other interests in Asia —
for one thing selling the products of its factories in the East when they
could not compete in the West — and while up to that point Russian im-
perialism in the Far East had limited itself to peaceful penetration, the
situation became increasingly tense Moreover, Russia responded to new
opportunities more and more aggressively Thus, when the murder of two
German missionaries In November 1897 led to the German acquisition of
Kiao-chow through a ninety-nine year lease, Nicholas II demanded and
obtained a twenty five year lease of the southern part of the Liaotung
Peninsula with Port Arthur — in spite of Witte's opposition to that move
and in flagrant disregard of the Russian treaty with China Witte w turn
proceeded to make the most of the situation and rapidly develop Russian
interests in southern Manchuna Following the so-called Boxer rebellion
of the exasperated Chinese against foreigners in 1900-1901 , which Russian
forces helped to suppress, tsarist troops remained in Manchuna on the pre-
text that local conditions represented a threat to the railroad In addition, a
group of adventurers with strong connections at the Russian court began
to promote a scheme of timber concessions on the Yalu River meant to serve
as a vehicle for Russian penetration into Korea. Witte, who objected ener-
getically to the dangerous new scheme, had to leave the Ministry of Fi-
nance; the Foreign Office failed to restrain or. control Russian policy in
the Far East; and Nicholas II himself sided cheerfully with the adventurers,
apparently because he believed in some sort of Russian mission in Asia
and, in, common with almost everyone else, grossly underestimated Japan.
Russian policy could hardly be defended in terms of either justice or. wis-
dom, in spite of the efforts of such able scholars as Malozemoff.
. Japan proved to be the more skillful aggressor. Offering partition, which'
would give the Russians northern Manchuria and the Japanese southern
■ Manchuria and Korea, the Japanese gauged the futility, of negotiating,'
chose their time well, and on February 8^ 1904, attacked successfully the
unsuspecting Russian fleet in the. outer harbor of Port Arthur — thus ac-
complishing, the original PearFHarbor. What followed turned out to be a ;
humiliating war for the Russians. The Russian colossus suffered defeat after
ALEXANDER 111 AND NICHOLAS II TO 1905 403
defeat from the Japanese pigmy This outcome, so surprising at the tune,
resulted from ample causes. Japan was ready, well-organized, and in effect
more modem than Russia, while Russia was unprepared, disorganized,
troubled at home, and handicapped by a lack ot popular support and even
by some defeatism, Japan enjoyed an alliance with Great Britain and the
favor of world public opinion, Russia found Itself diplomatically isolated,
Japan used short lines of communication, Russian forces had to rely on
the enormously long single-track Trans-Siberian railroad, with the section
around Lake Baikal still unfinished In any case, although Russian soldiers
and sailors fought with their usual courage and tenacity, the Japanese de-
stroyed the Russian navy in the Far East, besieged and eventually captured
Port Arthur, and gradually, in spite of bitter engagements near Mukden
and elsewhere, pushed the mam Russian army north in Manchuria. Finally,
on May 27-29, 1905, in the battle of Tsushima Strait, they annihilated
Admiral Ztnovu Rozhdestvensky's antique fleet which had been sent to the
Far East alt the way from the Baltic That fleet, it might be added, had
caused a serious international incident when on its journey to the Far East
it had fired by mistake at some English fishing vessels on the Dogger Bank,
inflicting casualties
An armistice followed soon after Tsushima The Russians had suffered
numerous defeats, and the government had io cope with revolutionary un-
rest at home The Japanese had exhausted their finances and, despite their
victories, could not destroy the mam Russian army or force a conclusion In
response to a secret Japanese request. President Theodore Roosevelt ar-
ranged a peace conference at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in August
1905 The provisions of the Treaty of Portsmouth reflected the skillful
diplomacy of Witte, who headed the Russian delegation, and represented,
everything considered, a rather satisfactory settlement for Russia Russia
acknowledged a paramount Japanese interest in Korea and ceded to Japan
its lease of the Liaotung Peninsula, the southern part ot the railroad up to
Cbang-chun, and the half of the island of Sakhalin south of the fiftieth de-
gree of latitude, both countncs agreed to restore Manchuria to China, in
spite of strong Japanese insistence, there was no indemnity
The Russian government ended the war against Japan none too soon,
for, as fighting ceased, the country was already in the gnp of what came to
be known as the Revolution of 1905.
XXXI
THE LAST PART OF THE REIGN OF NICHOLAS II: THE
REVOLUTION OF 1905 AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PERIOD, 1905-17
Russia at the dawn of the twentieth century knew no more magic
word than •‘revolution.*' The idea of revolution was viewed with fear
and hatred by the propertied classes of the population, and was laved
and revered by all who dreamed of liberty. To the Russians who
longed for a new life, there was enchantment in the very sound of
the word. Even as they conceived it, even as they pronounced the
sacred words, "Long Live the Revolution,” Russians felt obscurely
that they were already halfway to liberation.
STEIKBERO
There is an easier and more convincing explanation for the failure of
the constitutional monarchy: it puts the blame primarily on the king
himself. Although Louis was well-meaning and showed occasional
flashes of insight, his narrow mind had a stubborn and devious qual-
ity about it, too. The king did little to consolidate the new system,
even though it left him a role of real importance. . . .
. . . The explanation may lie in the constant pressure of the queen
and her advisers, which weakened Louis’s resolution and changed his
flabby mind. Or it may be that this pious king had serious pangs of
conscience at some of the reforms built into the new system. ... Or
again, perhaps the course of events brought out his own true charac-
ter as an irritable, small-minded, stubborn man who built up a neu-
rotic resentment at his loss of initiative after 1789. It is true that even
if Louis XVI had been ideally suited to his new role, the system
might have broken down nevertheless.
WRIGHT
Whereas actually the main weakness of the Russian monarchy of the
imperial period consisted not at all in representing the interests of a
"minority," restricted in this or that manner, but in the fact that it
represented no one whatsoever.*
Nd. Kovalevsky and many other Russians hoped that the period of blind
reaction, "the time out of joint," which descended upon Russia in the sec-
ond half of Alexander II’s reign and was certainly present in the reigns of
Alexander III and Nicholas II, would give way to a new wave of sweeping
liberal reforms. But the government refused to change its course. Instead
the country finally exploded into the Revolution of 1905.
*, Italics in the original.
404
NICHOLAS II 1 905-17
405
The Background of the Revolution of 1905
The Revolution of 1905 could occur because of the social transformation
that had been going on in the empire of the tsars and because of the con-
comitant growth of opposition to the regime In the decades that followed
the ' great reforms,’* capitalism at last became prominent in Russia In fact,
the 1880 s and 1890 s witnessed rapid industrialization of the country with
resulting social changes and tensions While the Russian society of that
penod will be discussed in a later chapter, no special exposition is needed
to make the point that the growth of capitalism led to the rise of two social
groups, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat The middle class, traditionally
weak in Russia at least after the times of Kiev and Novgorod, began finally
to come into its own Even though the Russian commercial and industrial
bourgeoisie remained still relatively underdeveloped and inarticulate, pro-
fessional people seemed eager and ready to participate in politics These
professional groups — whether they should be classified as part of the
middle class or as a separate adjoining stratum is of no consequence here
— had profited especially from the great reforms* thus, the judicial re-
form of 1864 had virtually created the lawyers, while the introduction of
the zemstvo system provided numerous openings for doctors, veterinarians,
teachers statisticians, and many other specialists, the so-called "third etc
ment of the zemstva Liberalism found particularly propitious circum-
stances for development among the professionals, as well as among some
gentty landlords of the zemstva The rise of the proletariat and the emer-
gence of a labor movement pointed in their turn to a more radical trend
in Russian opposition And, of course, behind dissatisfied bourgeois, criti-
cal intellectuals, and bitter workers there spread the human ocean of desti-
tute and desperate peasants — an ocean that had risen in uncounted storms
through centuries of Russian history
The opposition began to organize The frightful famine of 1891-92
marked the end of a certain lull in Russia and the resumption of social and
political activity with emphatic cnticism of the regime The liberals, who
could boast of many prominent names in their ranks and who represented
at that time the elite of the opposition eventually formed the Union of
Liberation in 1903, with its organ. The Liberation published abroad by
the noted economist Peter Struve In 1905 they organized the Constitu-
tional Democratic party — or ‘Cadet,’* 3 word based on the two initial
letters m the Russian name — led by the historian Paul Miliukov and en
compassing liberal* of different kinds, both constitutional monarchists end
republicans
The radicals formed two important parties around the turn of the cen-
406
M FERIAL RUSSIA
tury: the Social Democratic, or “SD,” and the Socialist Revolutionary, or
"SR.” The Social Democrats were Marxists, and the creation of their party
represented a landmark in the development of Marxism in Russia. Pro-
pounded by George Plekhanov and other able intellectuals, Marxism be-
came prominent in the empire of the tsars in the 1880’s and especially in
the 1890’s. Its close association with the labor movement dated at least from
1883, when Plekhanov organized the Emancipation of Labor Group; but
a Marxist political party, the Social Democratic, appeared only in 1898. In
fact, the convention of 1898 — although commemorated in the U.S.S.R. as
the first and founding congress — proved abortive, and most of its few
participants were shortly arrested. The party became a reality only after
the second convention held in Brussels and London in 1903. At that time
the Social Democrats also split into the Bolsheviks, led by Vladimir Ulia-
nov, better known as Lenin, who wanted a tightly knit organization of pro-
fessional revolutionaries, and the Mensheviks, who preferred a somewhat
broader and looser association. In time the ramifications of that relatively
slight initial difference acquired great importance. The Socialist Revolu-
tionaries, who engaged in a running debate with the Marxists concerning
the nature of Russian society and its future, represented essentially the
older populist tradition of Russian radicalism, even though they too were
influenced by Marxism. They formed their party in 1901 and had Victor
Chernov as their most noted leader.
As the twentieth century opened, Russia was in turmoil. Strikes spread
throughout the country. Student protests and disturbances became more
frequent, constituting an almost continuous scries from 1898 on. Sporadic
peasant disturbances kept the tension high in rural areas and offered in-
creased opportunities to the Socialist Revolutionaries, just as the growth of
the labor movement encouraged the Social Democrats. In 1902, 1903, and
early 1904, committees dealing with the national economy, conferences of
teachers and doctors, and other public bodies all demanded reforms. More-
over, the Socialist Revolutionaries resumed the terrorist tactics of their
predecessors such as the “Will of the People.” Their “Battle Organization”
assassinated a number of important officials, including the two especially
reactionary ministers of the interior, Sipiagin in 1902 and Plehve in 1904,
and early in 1905 Grand Duke Serge, commanding officer of the Moscow
military region and Nicholas IPs second cousin and brother-in-law. The
war against Japan and resulting defeats added fuel to the fire. In Novem-
ber 1904, a zemstvo congress, meeting in St. Petersburg, demanded a repre-
sentative assembly and civil liberties. The same demands were made with
increasing frequency by numerous other public bodies. In particular, pro-
fessional organizations, such as unions of doctors and teachers, and other
associations spread rapidly throughout Russia and made their voices heard.
Several months after the zemstvo congress fourteen professional unions
NICHOLAS II ; \ 905- I 7 407
united to form a huge Union of Unions led by the Cadets The government
tried both repression and some conciliation, appealing for confidence, but
its generally ineffectual efforts only helped to swell the tide of opposition
The Revolution of 1905
January 22, 1905, came to be known In Russian history as “Bloody Sun-
day ” On that day the police of the capital fired at a huge demonstration of
workers led by an adventurer and priest named George Gapoa, killing,
according to the official estimate, one hundred and thirty persons and
wounding several hundred Ironically, Gapon’s union bad been essentially
a “police union," part of policeman Serge Zubatov's plan to infiltrate the
labor movement and direct it into officially desirable channels Ironically
too, the workers were converging on the Winter Palace — ignorant ot the
fact that Nicholas II was not there — with icons and the tsar's portraits, as
faithful subjects nay, children, of their sovereign, begging htm for redress
and help The entire ghastly episode thus tesafied to official incompetence
in more ways than one The massacre led to a great outburst of indignation
in the country and gave another boost to the revolutionary movement In
particular, as many authorities assert, it meant a decisive break between
the tsar and those numerous workers who had until that “Bloody Sunday”
remained loyal to him
Under ever-increasing pressure, Nicholas II declared early in March his
intention to convoke a "consultative” assembly, in further efforts toward
pacification, he proclaimed religious tolerance and repealed some legisla-
tion against ethnic minorities, nevertheless, the revolutionary tide kept
rising The summer of 1905 witnessed new strikes, mass peasant uprisings
m many provinces, active opposition and revolutionary movements among
national minorities, and even occasional rebellions m the armed forces,
notably in the celebrated instance of the battleship Potemkin ui the Black
Sea On August 19 an imperial manifesto created an elective Duma With
consultative powers, but that too failed to saUsfy the educated public or the
masses The revolutionary movement culminated m a mammoth general
strike which lasted from die twentieth to the thirtieth of October and has
been described as the greatest, most thoroughly earned out, and most suc-
cessful strike w history Russians seemed to act with a single will, as they
made perfectly plain their unshakable determination to end autocracy U
was in the course of the strike, and m order to direct it, that workers m St
Petersburg organized a soviet, or council — a harbinger of the then un-
known future Paralyzed m their essential activities and forced at last to
recognize the immensity of the opposition, Nicholas 11 and his government
finally capitulated On October 30, the emperor, as advised by Witte, issued
the October Manifesto That brief document guaranteed civil liberties to
4 °8 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
the Russians, announced a Duma with the true legislative function of pass-
ing or rejecting all proposed laws, and promised a further expansion of the
new order in Russia. In short, the October Manifesto made the empire of
the Romanovs a constitutional monarchy.
Also, it split the opposition. The liberals and moderates of all sorts felt
fundamentally satisfied. The radicals, such as the Social Democrats, on the
contrary, considered the tsar’s concession entirely inadequate and wanted
in any case a constituent assembly, not handouts from above. Thus divided
the opposition lost a great deal of its former power. In the middle of De-
cember the government arrested the members of the St. Petersburg Soviet.
The Soviet’s appeal for revolution found effective response only in Moscow
where workers and some other radicals fought bitterly against the police
and the soldiers, including a guards’ regiment, from the twenty-second of
December until the first of January.
The year 1905 thus ended in Russia in bloody fighting. However, the
revolution had spent itself with that last effort. In the course of the winter,
punitive expeditions and summary courts-martial restored order in many
troubled areas. The extreme Right joined the army and the police; Rightist
active squads, known as the “Black Hundreds,” beat and even killed Jews,
liberals, and other intellectuals. Proto-fascist in nature, this newly awakened
Right throve on ethnic and religious hatreds and appealed especially to
wealthy peasants and to members of the lower middle class in towns. More
important, the great bulk of the people was tired of revolution and longed
for peace. It might be added that Witte further strengthened the hand of
the government by obtaining a large loan from France.
The Fundamental Laws
On May 6, 1906, virtually on the eve of the meeting of the First Duma,
the government promulgated the Fundamental Laws. These laws provided
the framework of the new Russian political system; the October Manifesto
had merely indicated some of its guiding lines. According to the Funda-
mental Laws, the emperor retained huge powers. He continued in complete
control of the executive, the armed forces, foreign policy — specifically
making war and peace - — succession to the throne, the imperial court, im-
perial domains, and so forth. He maintained unchanged his unique domi-
nating position in relation to the Russian Church. And he even retained the
title of autocrat. He was to call together the annual sessions of the Duma
and to disband the Duma, in which case, however, he had to indicate the
time of the election and of the meeting of the new Duma. He had the power
of veto over legislation. Moreover, in case of emergency when the Duma
was not in session, he could issue ukazes with the authority of laws, al-
NiCKOtAS II 1905-17
409
though they had to be submitted tor approval to the next session ct the
Duma no later than two months after its opening
The Duma, to be sure, received important legislative and budgetary
rights and Junctions by the Fundamental Laws, but these rights were greatly
circumscribed Notably, almost 40 per cent of the stale budget, encom-
passing such items as the army, the navy, the imperial court, and state
loans, stayed oulsidc the purview of the Duma, while the remainder, if not
passed by the Duma, was rc-cnacted in the amounts of the preceding year
Ministers and the entire executive branch remained responsible only to the
emperor, although the Laws did contain complicated provisions for inter-
pellation, that is, questioning of ministers by the Duma Furthermore, the
State Council, which had functioned since its creation by Alexander I as an
advisory body of dignitaries, became rather unexpectedly the upper legisla-
tive chamber, equal in nghts and prerogatives to the Duma and meant
obviously as a conservative counterweight to it * No more than half” of
the membership of the upper house was to be appointed by the emperor — •
appointed not even for life but by means of annual lists — and the other
half elected by the following groups 56 with very high property standing
by the provmcraf zemsfva, IS by the genfry, 12 by commerce and industry,
6 by the clergy, 6 by the Academy of Sciences and the universities, and 2
by the Furnish Diet
The First T*o Dumas
Whereas the Fundamental Laws introduced numerous restrictions on the
position and powers of the Duma, the electoral law emphasized its repre-
sentative character The electoral system, despite Us complexities and limi-
tations, such as the grouping of the electorate on a social basis, indirect
elections, especially in the case of the peasants, and a gross underrepresen-
tauon of urban inhabitants, allowed almost all Russian men to participate
in the elections to the Duma, thus transforming overnight the empire of the
tsars from a country with no popular representation to one which practiced
Virtually universal manhood suffrage The relatively democratic nature of
the electoral law resulted partly from Witte s decision in December 1905,
at the time when the law received its final formulation, to make concessions
to the popular mood More significantly, it reflected the common assump-
tion In government circles that the peasants, the simple Russian people,
would vote for then tsar and for the Right After fl free election, the First
Duma convened on May 10, 1906
Contrary to its sanguine expectations, the government had suffered a
decisive electoral defeat According to Walsh, the 497 members of the
First Duma could be classified as follows 4S deputies belonged to parties
410 imperial Russia
of the Right; 32 belonged to various national and religious groups, for
example, the Poles and the Moslems; 184 were Cadets; 124 were repre-
sentatives of different groups of the Left; and 112 had no party affiliation.
The Cadets with 38 per cent of the deputies thus emerged as the strongest
political party in the Duma, and they had the added advantage of an able
and articulate leadership well-versed in parliamentary procedure. Those to
the Left of the Cadets, on the other hand, Jacked unity and organization
and wanted mainly to fight against the regime, purely and simply. The cause
of the Left in the First Duma had been injured by the fact that both the
Socialist Revolutionaries and the Social Democrats had largely boycotted
the election to the Duma. The deputies with no political affiliation were
mostly peasants who refused to align themselves permanently with any of
the political groupings, but belonged in a general sense to the opposition.
The government received support only from the relatively few members
of the unregenerate Right and also from the more moderate Octobrists.
The Octobrists, as their name indicates, split from the Cadets over the
October Manifesto, which they accepted as a proper basis for Russian
constitutionalism, while the Cadets chose to consider it as the first step on
the road to a more democratic system.
Not surprisingly, the government and the Duma could not work to-
gether. The emperor and his ministers clearly intended the Duma to occupy
a position subordinate to their own, and they further infuriated many depu-
ties by openly favoring the extreme Right. The Duma, in its turn, also
proved quite intractable. The Left wanted merely to oppose and obstruct.
The Cadets, while much more moderate and constructive, seem to have
overplayed their hand: they demanded a constituent assembly, they con-
sidered the First Duma to be, in a sense, the Estales-General of 1789, and
they objected to the Fundamental Laws, thus in effect telling the govern-
ment to abdicate. Similarly, while they insisted on a political amnesty, they
refused to proclaim their opposition to terrorism, lest their associates to the
Left be offended. But the most serious clash came over the issue of land:
the Duma wanted to distribute to the peasants the state, imperial family,
and Church lands, as well as the estates of landlords in excess of a certain
maximum, compensating the landlords; the government proclaimed aliena-
tion of private land inadmissible, even with compensation. The imperial
regime continued to the last to stand on the side of the landlords. After
seventy-three days and forty essentially fruitless sessions, Nicholas II dis-
solved the First Duma.
The dissolution had a strange sequel. Some two hundred Duma deputies,
over half of them Cadets, met in the Finnish town of Viborg and signed a
manifesto that denounced the government and called for passive resistance
by the people. It urged them not to pay taxes or answer the draft call until
the convocation of a new Duma. Although the Viborg Manifesto cited as
NICHOLAS II 1905-17 411
Its justification certain Irregularities hi the dissolution ot the First Duma,
In itself it constituted a rash und unconstitutional step And it turned out
to he a blunder as well, for the country failed to respond The Viborg par-
ticipants were sentenced to three months in jail More Important, they lost
the right to stand for election to the Second Duma which was Urns deprived
of much of its potential leadership
In contrast to the first election, the government exerted all possible pres-
sure to obtain favorable results m the election to the Second Dum3, and
it was assisted by the fact that much of Russia remained in a state of emer-
gency. But the results again disappointed the emperor and his associates.
Although - — as one authoritative calculation has it — the Duma opposition,
including mainly the Cadets and the Left, might have declined from 69 to
68 per cent of the total number of deputies, it also became more extreme.
In fact, o polarization of political opinion, with both wings gaining at the
expense of the center, constituted the most sinking aspect of the election
More Specifically, the Cadet representation declined from 184 to 99 depu-
ties, while the Social Democrats and the Socialist Revolutionaries, who
this time participated fully in the election, gained respectively 64 and 20
seats The entire Left membership tn the Duma rose from 124 to 216
deputies Significantly, the Duma personnel underwent a sweeping change,
with only 31 members serving, both m the First Duma and in the Second, a
result not only of the penalties that followed the Viborg Manifesto, but
also of a preference for more extreme candidates Significantly too, the
number of unaffifiated deputies declined by about SO per cent in the Second
Duma
The Second Duma met on March 5, 1907, and lasted for a little more
than three months It also found itself promptly in an impasse with the
government Moreover, us special opponent, the pnmc minister, was no
longer the nonentity Ivan Goremykin — who had replaced the Erst consti-
tutional prime minister, Witte, early ta 1906 — but the able and deter-
mined Peter Stolypm Before it could consider Stolyptn's important land
reform, he had the Second Duma dissolved on the sixteenth of June, using
as a pretext its failure to comply immediately with his request to lift the
immunity of fifty-five, and particularly of sixteen, Social Democratic depu-
ties whom he wanted to arrest for treason
The Change in the Electoral Law and the Last Two Dumas
On the same day, June 16, 1907, Nicholas II and his minister arbitrarily
and unconstitutionally changed the electoral law. The tsar mentioned as
justification hit histone power, his nght to abrogate what he Had granted,
and his intention to answer for the destinies of the Russian state only before
the altar of God who had given him his authority' The electoral change
412 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
was, of course, meant to create a Duma that would co-operate with the
government. The peasant representation was cut by more than half and
that of the workers was also drastically cut, whereas the gentry gained rep-
resentation quite out of proportion to its number. Also, Poland, the Cau-
casus, and some other border areas lost deputies; and the representation of
Central Asia was entirely eliminated on the ground of backwardness. At
the same time the election procedure became more indirect and more in-
volved, following in part the Prussian model. In addition, the minister of
the interior received the right to manipulate electoral districts. It has been
calculated that the electoral change of June 1907 produced the following
results: the vote of a landlord counted roughly as much as the votes of four
members of the upper bourgeoisie, or of sixty-five average middle-class
people, or of 260 peasants, or of 540 workers. To put it differently, 200,000
members of the landed gentry were assured of 50 per cent of the seats in
the Duma.
The electoral change finally provided the government with a co-operative
Duma. And indeed, by contrast with the first two Dumas which lasted but
a few months each, the Third Duma served its full legal term of five years,
from 1907 to 1912, while the Fourth also continued for five years, from
1912 until the revolution of March 1917, which struck just before the
Fourth Duma was to end. In the Third Duma the government had the sup-
port of some 310 out of the total of 442 deputies: about 160 representa-
tives of the Right and about 150 Octobrists. The opposition, reduced to
120 seats, encompassed 54 Cadets, smaller_numbers of other moderates,
and only 33 deputies of the former Left. The Socialist Revolutionaries, it
might be noted, boycotted the Third and Fourth Dumas. To indicate an-
other aspect of the change, it has been calculated that whereas non-Great
Russians had composed almost half of the membership of the First Duma,
in the Third there were 377 Great Russians and 36 representatives of all
the other nationalities of the empire.
In the election of 1912 the government made a determined effort to ob-
tain a Right majority that would eliminate its dependence on the Octobrist
vote, but it could not quite accomplish its purpose. The Fourth Duma con-
tained approximately 185 representatives of the Right, 98 Octobrists, and
150 deputies to the left of the Octobrists. Because of their crucial central
position, the Octobrists continued to play a major role in the Duma, al-
though their number had been drastically diminished. For the rest, the
gain of the Right found a certain counterbalance in the gain of the Left.
The Octobrists, who had replaced the Cadets after the electoral change
of June 1907 as the most prominent party in the Duma, represented both
the less conservative country gentry and business circles. While their Left
wing touched the Cadets, Right Octobrists stood close to the old-fashioned
NICHOLAS II 1905-17
413
Right The party enjoyed the advantages of skillful leadership. In particu-
lar the leadership of Alexander Guchkov, and operated well m a parlia-
ment. The Octobrist deputies, it might be noted, were the wealthiest group
in the last two Dumas The Cadets, who became the loudest voice of the
Duma opposition were, above all, the party of professional people, al-
though their influence extended to large layers of the middle class, espe-
cially perhaps of the upper middle class, as well as to some landlords and
other groups The Right, which consisted of more than one party, defended
to the limit the interests of the landlords, although it also made demagogic
efforts to obtain broader support and paraded some priests and peasants In
the Dumas Bitter dissatisfaction, widespread among the Russian masses,
found a modicum of expression in the Duma Left
Slot) pin's Policy
With the Duma under control the government could develop its own
legislative program The architect of the program, Stolypin, has been de-
scribed as the Iasi truly effective and important minister of imperial Russia
Svotypwv’s wm corvsvsttd of ‘ p*cv6c&tw>u’ and reform * ’Pacvftwvon meant
an all-out struggle against the revolutionaries for, although the mass op-
position movements characteristic of 1905 no longer threatened the regime,
terrorism continued on a large scale Practiced especially by the Battle Or-
ganisation of the Socialist Revolutionaries and bv the Socialist Revolution
anes Maximalists who had split from the main party, terrorism caused
some 1 400 deaths in 1906 and as many as 3,000 In 1907 The victims in-
cluded police officers and agents, various officials high and low, and nu
merous innocent bystanders In August 1906, for example, the Maximalists
blew up Stoly pin's suburban residence, killing 32 persons and wounding
many others, including the prime minister s son and daughter, but not the
prime minister himself
Stolypin acted with directness and seventy By the end of 190$, 82 areas
in the Russian Empire had been placed under different categories of special
regulations, also, the publication of 206 newspapers had been stopped, and
over 200 editors had been brought to court Moreover, Stolypin introduced
summary courts-martial, consisting of officers without juridical training,
which tried those accused of terrorism and rebellion The trials and the
execution of sentences were carried out within a matter of some two days
or even a few hours Although the special courts martial lasted only several
months — because Stolypin never submitted the law creating them to the
Duma and it expired two months after the Second Duma h3d met — * they
led to the execution of well over a thousand persons ‘ Stolypio’s necktie**
-—the noose — became proverbial in Russia The policy of “pacification ’
414
mperial rtjs:
succeeded on the whole. The Maximalists and many other terrorists were
killed or executed, while numerous revolutionaries escaped abroad, A rela-
tive quiet settled upon the country.
It should be added that Stolypin continued to sponsor police infiltration
of the revolutionary movement and an extremely complex system of agents
and informers. Such police practices led, among other things, to the emer-
gence of remarkable double agents, the most notorious of whom, the un-
believable Evno AzelT, successfully combined the roles of the chief informer
on the Socialist Revolutionaries and of leader of their Battle Organization.
In the latter capacity he arranged the assassination of Plehve and other
daring acts of terrorism.
Stolypin intended his “pacification” to constitute a prelude to important
changes, especially to a fundamental agrarian reform. That reform, intro-
duced by an imperial legislative order in the autumn of 1906, approved by
the Third Duma in the summer of 1910, and developed by further legisla-
tive enactments in 1911, aimed at a break-up of the peasant commune and
the establishment of a class of strong, independent, individual farmers —
Stolypin’s so-called wager on the strong and the sober. The emergence of a
large group of prosperous and satisfied peasants would, presumably, trans-
form the Russian countryside from a morass of misery and a hotbed of
unrest into a conservative bulwark of the regime.
Tlic new legislation divided all peasant communes into two groups:
those that did not and those that did engage in land redistribution. In the
first type all peasants simply received their landholdings in personal owner-
ship. In the communes with periodic redistribution every householder could
at any time request that the land to which he was entitled by redistribution
be granted to him in personal ownership. He could also press the commune
to give him the land not in scattered strips, but in a single location; the
commune had in effect to comply with this request if separation occurred
at the time of a general communal redistribution of land, and it had to meet
the request “in so far as possible” at other times. Similarly, the commune
had to divide its land into consolidated individual plots if requested to do
so by not less than one-fifth of the total number of householders. Moreover,
separated peasants invariably retained rights to common lands, meadows,
forests, and the like. Indeed a partitioning even of pastures and grazing
lands was permitted in 1911. Finally, the commune could be entirely
abolished: by a majority vote in the case of nonrepartitional communes,
and by a two-thirds vote in the case of those that engaged in a redistribu-
tion of land. It is significant that the reform made the household elder the
sole owner of the land of the household, replacing the former joint family
ownership which remained only in the case of households containing mem-
bers other than the elder’s lineal descendants.
NICHOLAS II. 1905 — 17 41 $
Stolypm's major agrarian reform — the impact of which on Russian
economy and society will be discussed in a later chapter — received support
from a number of related government policies and measures Notably, the
Teasant Land Bank became much more active in helping peasants to buy
land, while considerable holdings of the state and the imperial family were
put up for sale to them Also, reversing its earlier attitude, the government
began finally to encourage and help peasant migration to new lands in Si-
beria and elsewhere in the empire Stol) pin's reform, it should be added,
made peasants more equal legally to other classes, not only by reducing the
power of the commune , but also by limiting that t»l land captains, and by
exempting peasants from some special restrictions In a different field of
action, the ministers and the Dumas worked together to develop education,
which made important advances during the last years of the imperial re-
gime In fact a law of 1908 foresaw schooling for all Russian children by
1922 The government also broadened labor legislation, worked to
strengthen the army and national defense, and engaged in a variety of other
useful activities
However, all this fell short of fundamental reform Only Stolypm's con-
troversial agrarian legislation attempted a sweeping change in the condition
of the Russian people, and even that legislation had perhaps too narrow a
scope, for Stolypin was determined not to confiscate any gentry land, even
with recompense Moreover, progressive measures remained intertwined
with reaction Thus constitutional Russia witnessed a terrorism of the Right
— for example the assassinations in 1906 and 1907 of two Cadet deputies
to the Fust Duma — as well 3 $ a terrorism of the Left, am! the terrorism
of the Right usually went unpunished Stolypin, himself from the Western
borderlands, acted as a nationalist and a Russificator, for one thing re-
viving the ill fated policy of try mg to Russify Finland Besides, the govern-
ment lacked stability The prime minister, who was after all something of a
constitutionalist, antagonized much of the Right in addition to tbc Left.
He managed to have one important piece of legislation enacted only by
having the emperor prorogue the legislature for three days and suspend
two leading members of the State Council, his high handed taeUcs made
the Octobrist leader Guchkov resign as chairman of the Third Duma On
September 14, 1911, Stolypin was fatally shot by a police agent associated
with a revolutionary group Stolypm’s successor. Count Vladimir Ko-
kovtsov, possessed intelligence and ability, but not his predecessor’s deter-
mination or influence within the government After a little more than two
years he was replaced by the weak and increasingly senile Goremykin, who
thus became pnme minister for the second time Goremykin assumed the
leadership of the government in early 1914, m a matter of a few months
he and Russia had to face the devastating reality of the First World War.
416
M P ERIA L
SS1A
Russian Foreign Policy, 1905—14
Like the other powers, Russia stumbled into the First World War. The
tsarist government contributed its share to international alignments, ten-
sions, and crises, and in the fateful summer of 1914 it decided to support
Serbia and thus resort to arms. Yet its part of the celebrated "war guilt”
should not be exaggerated or singled out. Russian ambitions and eagerness
for war were no greater than those of other countries, while Russian pre-
paredness for an armed conflict proved to be less. The empire of the tsars
took no part in the race for colonies overseas which constituted an impor-
tant aspect of the background of the First World War. Russian interests
and schemes in the Balkans and the Near Hast were paralleled by those of
Austria-Hungary and eventually also to some extent by those of Germany.
The Pan-Germans were authentic cousins of the Pan-Slavs; and — a point
which Fay and many others failed to appreciate — it was the German
government, not the Russian, which enjoyed widespread popular support
in its own country for a strong national policy. The fatal conflict erupted
first between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and both states can be charged
with a responsibility for its tragic outcome which preceded Russia’s. Even
the early Russian mobilization found its counterpart in the Austrian. Be-
sides, it deserves to be noted that in the summer of 1914 only Austria-
Hungary, of all the powers, desired war, although it thought merely of a
quick destruction of Serbia, not of a continental conflagration.
In the course of a personal meeting shortly before the opening of the
Portsmouth Peace Conference, Emperor William II of Germany talked
Nicholas II into signing a defensive alliance, known as the Treaty of
Bjorko. However, that agreement proved to be stillborn, because leading
officials in both governments expressed strong objections to it and especially
because France refused co-operation and held Russia to its obligations
under the treaty of 1891-94. The years that followed the Russo-Japanese
War witnessed an alienation of Russia from Germany, a virtual breakdown
of Russo-Austrian relations, and at the same time a further rapprochement
between Russia and France as well as the establishment of an Anglo-
Russian Entente. The agreement with Great Britain, signed on August 31,
1907, was a landmark in Russian foreign policy, for it transformed a
relationship of traditional and often bitter hostility into one of cordiality.
That result was achieved through compromise in those areas where the
interests of the two countries clashed: in Persia, Russia was assigned a
large sphere of influence m the northern part of the country, and Great
Britain a smaller one in the southeastern section, while die central area
was declared neutral; Russia agreed to consider Afghanistan outside its
sphere of influence and to deal with the Afghan ruler only through Great
KlCKOtAS II I 90 J- I 7 417
Britain, Great Britain in turn promising cot to change the status of that
country or interfere in its domestic affairs, both states recognized the su-
zerainty of China over Tibet Because Great Britain and France had
reached an agreement in 1904, the new accord marVed the emergence of
the Triple Entente of France, Russia, and Great Britain, poised against the
Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria Hungiry, and Italy On the Russian
side, the Entente meant an effective military and political alliance with
France and only a vague understanding with Great Britatn Yet, as already
indicated, that understanding represented a major reorientation of Russian,
as well as British, foreign policy, and it helped to group Europe into two
camps It should be added that the alignment with France and Great Britain
gained in popularity m Russia in the years preceding the First World War.
It attracted the support of liberals, of many radicals, of business Circles
closely linked to French and British capital, and also of numerous conserva-
tives who veered toward Pan Slavism or suffered from tariff wars with
Germany and objected to tariff arrangements with that country as detri-
mental to Russian agriculture
Alexander Izvolsky the Russ*an minister of foreign affairs from 1906 to
1910, not only made an agreement with Great Britain, but also developed
an active policy m the BalVans and the Near East In fact be, hts successor
Serge Sazonov who headed the ministry from 1910 to 1916, and their
various subordinates have been described as a new generation of Russian
diplomats eager to advance Russian interests agatnst Turkey and Austna-
Hungary after a quarter-century of quiescence To be sure, as early as 1896
tlie Russian ambassador m Constantinople, Alexander Nelidov, had pro-
posed to his government that Russia seize the Struts, but that proposal was
never implemented Izvolsky devised a different scheme In September 1908
in Buchlau, Moravia, he came to an agreement with the Austrian foreign
minister, Count Alois von Aehrcnthal Russia would accept the Austrian
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which Austria had been adminis-
tering according to a decision of the Congress of Berlin, Austria-Hungary
m turn would not object to the opening of the Straits to Russian warships
Austria-Hungary proceeded to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina before Rus-
sia could prepare diplomaucally the desired reconsideration of the status
of the Straits — a betrayal of the mutual understanding according to Iz-
volsky, but not according to Aehrcnthal Betrayed or not, Russia was left
holding the bag, because other powers, especially Great Britan, proved un-
willing to see Russian warships in the Straits The tsarist government ex-
perienced further humiliation when it hesitated to endorse the Austrian
coup but was finally forced to do so after receiving a near-ultimatum from
Germany.
The years following the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina witnessed
repeated tensions, crises, and conflicts in the Balkans and the Near East
418
IMPERIAL RU!
Like Austria-Hungary and Russia, Germany also pursued a forward policy
in that area. William II visited Constantinople and made a point of de-
claring his friendly feelings for Turkey and the Moslems; German interests
pushed the construction of the Berlin-Baghdad railway — a project they
had initiated as early as 1898 — and more German military experts came
in 1913 to reorganize the Ottoman army. Two important Balkan wars were
fought in 1912 and 1913. First Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro
combined to defeat Turkey and expand at Turkish expense. Next, the vic-
tors quarreled and the Bulgarians suffered a defeat by the Serbians, the
Greeks, and the Montenegrins, as well as by the Rumanians and by the
Turks, who resumed hostilities to regain some of their losses. The Balkan
wars left a legacy of tensions behind them, in particular making Bulgaria a
dissatisfied and revisionist state and further exacerbating the relations be-
tween Austria-Hungary and Serbia.
When the heir to the Habsburg throne, Archduke Francis Ferdinand,
was assassinated by Serbian patriots on June 28, 1914, and Austria de-
livered a crushing ultimatum to Serbia, the Russian government decided to
support Serbia — the alternative was another, and this time complete,
defeat in the Balkans. With the alliances operating almost automatically,
Germany backed Austria-Hungary, while France stood by Russia. Austria-
Hungary declared war on Serbia on July 28, Germany on Russia on
August 1 and on France on August 3. The German attack on Belgium
brought Great Britain to the side of France and Russia on August 4.
Europe entered the First World War.
Russia in the First World War
From the summer of 1914 until its collapse during the months that fol-
lowed the overthrow of the imperial regime in 1917, the Russian army
fought tenaciously and desperately under most difficult circumstances. The
improvised offensive into East Prussia, which opened the hostilities and
helped France at the most critical moment, ended in a shattering defeat of
the Russians in the battles of Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes. This
offensive, General Michael Alekseev’s epic retreat in Poland in 1915, the
repeated offensives and counteroffensives in Galicia, and heavy fighting
in numerous other sectors of the huge and shifting Eastern front cost the
Russians enormous casualties. Quickly the Russian army ran out of its sup-
ply of weapons and ammunition, and for a period of time in 1915 up to 25
per cent of Russian soldiers were sent to the front unarmed, with instruc-
tions to pick up what they could from the dead. Although later the Russian
supply improved, the Russian forces remained vastly inferior to the German
and the Austrian in artillery and other weapons.
420 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
The Allies could help little, for the German navy controlled the Baltic
and approaches through the Black Sea were cut off when Turkey joined
the Central Powers in the autumn of 1914. The so-called Gallipoli cam-
paign of the Allies, which aimed to break the Turkish hold on the Straits
failed in 1915. Bulgaria joined the Central Powers in October 1915 to help
crush Serbia. The Rumanian entry into the war on the side of the Entente
at the end of August 1916 led to a catastrophic defeat of the Rumanians
and served to extend the Russian front. Yet the Russian troops went on
fighting. In fact, they generally outfought the Austrians, and they also
scored successes on the Caucasian front against Turkey. More important,
in spite of many defeats and the necessity of retreating, they continued to
force Germany to wage a major war on two fronts at the same time. As a
present-day British historian has put it: “Despite all defects and difficulties
the Russians fought heroically, and made a decisive contribution to the
course of the war.” In the field of diplomacy, devoted during those years
to the prosecution of the war and the formulation of war aims, the Russian
government made a striking gain when in the spring of 1925 Great Britain
and France agreed to the Russian acquisition of Constantinople, the Straits,
and the adjoining littoral at the peace settlement. Italy, which joined the
Entente at the end of August 1916, acquiesced in the arrangement.
While the Russian command made its share of military mistakes, the
political mistakes of the Russian government proved to be both greater and
more damaging. Nicholas II and his ministers failed to utilize the national
rally that followed the outbreak of the war. In fact, they continued to rely
on exclusively bureaucratic means to mobilize the resources of the nation,
and they proceeded to oppress ethnic and religious minorities in the areas
temporarily won from Austria as well as in home provinces. In particular,
they failed to make the necessary concessions to the Poles. Russian defeats,
the collapse of Russian supply, and the utter incompetence of the war
minister, General Vladimir Sukhomlinov, as well as of some other high
officials, did lead, to be sure, to certain adjustments. The Duma was finally
called together in August 1915 for a short session, Sukhomlinov and three
of his colleagues had to resign, and the government began to utilize the
efforts of society to support the army. These efforts, it should be added,
which were led by public figures and industrialists such as Guchkov, had
developed on a large scale, ranging from work in the Red Cross to wide-
spread measures to increase production of military materiel. The Zemstvo
Union and the Union of Towns, which joined forces under the chairman-
ship of Prince George Lvov, and the War Industry Committee, led by
Guchkov, became especially prominent.
But the rapprochement between the government and the public turned
out to be slight and fleeting. Nicholas II would not co-operate with the
newly created, moderate Progressive Bloc led by Miliukov, which included
Nicholas ii 1905-1? 42j
the entire membership of the Duma, except the extreme Right and the
extreme Left, and which won majority support even in the State Council
Instead he came to rely increasingly on hts wife Empress Alexandra and
on her extraordinary advisor, the peasant Gregory Rasputin Moreover, m
spite of the protests of ten of his twelve ministers, the sovereign unwisely
took personal command of the armed forces, which had been commanded
by his unde, Grand Duke Nicholas, leaving Alexandra and Rasputin m
effective control in the capital Thus a narrow minded, reactionary, hysteri-
cal woman and an ignorant, weird peasant — who apparently made de-
cisions simply in terms of his personal interest, and whose exalted position
depended on the empress’s belief that he could protect her son from hemo
philia and that he had been sent by God to guide her, her husband, and
Russia— had the destinies of an empire in their hands Ministers changed
rapidly in what has been described as a ministerial leapfrog, ’ and each
was more under Rasputin’s power than his predecessor Eventually, after
Rasputin’s assassination, one of them claimed communion with Rasputin’s
spirit' That assassination, long and gruesome, took place at the end of Dc
ccmber, 1916 It was engineered by a leader of the extreme Right, a mem-
ber of the imperial family, and another aristocrat related to the imperial
family by marriage, who each tried to save the dynasty and Russia As the
year 1917 began, there were rumors of a palace coup that would restore
sanity and leadership to the imperial government But a popular revolution
came first
XXXII
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIA
FROM THE “GREAT REFORMS” UNTIL THE REVOLUTIONS
OF 1917
The last sixty years of Imperial Russia axe not only in themselves a
period of great historical interest: they are significant for other coun-
tries and other periods. The pattern of this period in Russia has re-
peated and is repeating itself elsewhere. It is not only in Russia, and
not only in Europe, that the impact of the nineteenth- or twcnticth-
century West on a backward country has caused distortions and
frustrations, has released revolutionary forces. New countries have
been drawn into the world capitalist economy, into the rapid exchange
of goods and ideas. The loss of centuries has to be made up in a few
years. Improved communications, public order and sanitation increase
population faster than output. The impoverished masses become more
impoverished. The new ways create a new intelligentsia. The shriek-
ing contrast between the old and the new drive a part of the intelli-
gentsia to revolutionary ideas, and if political conditions make this
necessary, to conspiratorial organization. The force which keeps such
societies together is the bureaucracy. It holds the power, the privileges
and the means of repression. From it and through it come such re-
forms as are permitted. It is outwardly impressive. It weighs heavily
on the backs of the people. But like cast iron, though heavy it is also
brittle. A strong blow can shatter it to pieces. When it is destroyed
there is anarchy. Then is the moment for a determined group of con-
spiratorial revolutionary intellectuals to seize power.
H. SETON-WATSON
Whether the general well-being of the peasantry had shown improve-
ment or decline — whether there had been within the peasant mass a
tendency to draw together or to draw apart — still, as the day of
revolt approached, there was no doubt of the existence in the
countryside of a morass of penury sufficiently large, an antithesis
between poverty and plenty sufficiently sharp, to give rise to what-
ever results might legitimately be bred and born of economic misery
and economic contrast.
ROBINSON
Who lives joyfully.
Freely in Russia?
NEKRASOV
The “great reforms” made a division in the economic and social devel-
opment of Russia. Even if we disregard the peculiar Soviet periodization,
which considers Russia as feudal from the late Kievan era until the emaa-
422
423
ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY 1861-1917
cap a lion of the serfs and capitalistic fwm ibc emancipation of the serfs
until 1917, the crucial significance of the “great reforms” must stdl be
emphasized In particular, these reforms contributed Immensely to the
economic changes and the concomitant social shifts which characterized
the empire of the Romanovs during its last fisc or six decades and culmi
nated in its downfall
Every social class felt the impact of the “great reforms” and of their
aftermath The gentry, to be sure, remained the dominant social group in
the country In fact, as already indicated, both Alexander 111 and Nicholas
II made every effort to strengthen the gentry and to support its interests
Court circles consisted mainly of great landlords The bureaucracy that ran
the empire was closely linked on its upper levels to the landlord class The
ministers, senators, members of the Stale Council, and other high officials
in the capital and the governors vice governors, and heads of various
departments in the provinces belonged predominantly to the gentry With
the establishment in 1889 of land captains u» be appointed from the local
gentry, Russia obtained a new network of gentry officials who effeclivefy
controlled the peasants A year later the zemstvo countcrretorm” greatly
strengthened the role of the gentry In local self government and emphasized
the class principle within that government In the army most high positions
were held by members of the landlord class, while virtually the entire
officer corps of the navy belonged to the gentry The government supported
gentry agriculture by such measures as the establishment m 1885 of the
State Gentry Land Bank which provided funds for the landlords on highly
fovorabte terms
Nevertheless, the gentry class declined after the "great reforms * r Mem-
bers of the gentry owned 73 1 million desialtn * of land according to the
census of 1877, 65 3 million according to the census of 1 887. 53 2 in 1905
according to a statistical compilation of that year, and only 43 2 million
desialtn m 1911 according to Oganovsky’s calculations At the same time,
to quote Robinson “The average size of their holdings also diminished,
from 538 2 desiattnas in 1887 to 4S8 in 1905, and their total possession
of work horses from 546,000 in 1888-1891, to 499,000 in 1904-1906 —
that is, by 8 5 per cent ’ Although the emancipation settlement was on the
whole generous to the gentry, it should be kept tn mind that a very large
part of the wealth of that class had been mortgaged to the state before 1861
and that, therefore, much of the compensation that the landlords received
as part of the reform went to pay debts rather little remaining for develop-
ment and modernization of the gentry economy Moreover, most landlords
failed to make effective use of their resources and opportunities Deprived
of serf labor and forced to adjust to more intense competition and other
• A detuxtlna equals 2 7 acres
424 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
harsh realities of the changing world, members of the gentry had little in
their education, outlook, or character to make them successful capitalist
farmers, A considerable number of landlords, in fact, preferred to live in
Paris or Nice, spending whatever they had, rather than to face the new
conditions in Russia. Others remained on their estates and waged a struggle
for survival, but, as statistics indicate, frequently without success. Un-
counted “cherry orchards” left gentry possession. The important fact, much
emphasized by Soviet scholars, that a small segment of the gentry did
succeed in making the adjustment and proceeded to accumulate great
wealth in a few hands does not fundamentally change the picture of the
decline of a dominant class.
The Industrialization of Russia
If the “great reforms” helped push the gentry down a steep incline, they
also led to the rise of a Russian middle class, and in particular of in-
dustrialists, businessmen, and technicians — both results, to be sure, were
not at all intentional. It is difficult to conceive of a modern industrial state
based on serfdom, although, of course, the elimination of serdom constituted
only one prerequisite for the development of capitalism in Russia. Even
after the emancipation the overwhelmingly peasant nature of the country
convinced many observers that the empire of the tsars could not adopt the
Western capitalist model as its own. The populists argued that the Russian
peasant was self-sufficient, producing his own food and clothing, and that
he, in his egalitarian peasant commune, did not need capitalism and would
not respond to it. Perhaps more to the point, the peasant was miserably
poor and thus could not provide a sufficient internal market for Russian
industry. Also the imperial government, especially the powerful Ministry
of the Interior, preoccupied with the maintenance of autocracy and the
support of the gentry, for a long time in effect turned its back on industri-
alization.
Nevertheless, Russian industry continued to grow — a growth traced in
detail by Goldsmith and others — and in the 1890’s it shot up at an amazing
rate, estimated by Gerschcnkron at 8 per cent a year on the average. Russian
industrialists could finally rely on a better system of transportation, with
the railroad network increasing in length by some 40 per cent between
1881 and 1894 and doubling again between 1895 and 1905. In addition
to Russian financial resources, foreign capital began to participate on a
large scale in the industrial development of the country: foreign investment
in Russian industry has been estimated at 100 million rubles in 1880, 200
million in 1890, and over 900 million in 1900. Most important, the Ministiy
of Finance under Witte, in addition to building railroads and trying to
attract capital from abroad, did everything possible to develop heavy m-
ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY 1861-1917 425
dustry *n Russia To subsidize that industry Witt t increased Russian ex-
ports, drastically curtailed imports balanced the budget, introduced the
gold standard, and used heavy indirect taxation on items of everyday
consumption to squeeze the necessary funds out of the peasants Thus in
Russian conditions, the state played the leading role in bringing laTgc scale
capitalist enterprise into existence
Toward the end of the century Russia possessed eight basic industrial
regions, to follow the classification odopicd by Liashchcnkc The Moscow
industrial region, comprising six provinces comaired tcxnlc industries of
every sort, as welt as metal processing and chemical plants The St Peters-
burg region specialized in metal processing machine building and textile
industries The Polish region w uh such centers as Lodz and Warsaw had
textile, coal, iron metal processing and chemical industries The recently
developed south Russian Ukrainian region supplied coal iron ore, and
basic chemical products The Ural area continued to produce iron, non
ferrous metals and minerals The Baku sector m Transcaucasia contributed
oil The southwestern region specialized in beet sugar Finally the Trans-
caucasian manganese coal region supplied substantia) amounts of its two
products
The new Russian industry displayed certain striking character nttes De-
cause Russia industrialized late and rapidly the Russians borrowed ad-
vanced Western technology wholesale with the result that Russian factories
were often more modern than their Western counterparts Yet this progress
m certain segments of the economy went together with appalling backward-
ness in others Indeed the industrial process frequently juxtaposed campli
cated machinery and primitive manual work performed by o cheap, tf
unskilled, labor force For technological reasons, but also because of
government policy, Russia acquired huge plants and larg«- scale industries
almost overnight Before long the capitalists began to organize a metal-
lurgical syndicate was formed in 1902, a coal syndicate in 1904, and several
others in later years Russian entrepreneurs and employers, it might be
added, came from different classes — from gentry to former serfs — with
a considerable admixture of foreigners Their leaders included a number of
old merchant and industrialist families who were Old Relievers, such as
the celebrated Morozovs As to markets since the poor Russian people
could absorb only a pari of tbe products of Russian factories, the industr-
alists reJied on huge government orders and also began to sell more abroad
In particular, because Russian manufactures were generally unable to com-
pete successfully m the West, export began on a large scale to the adjacent
Astatic countries of Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan. Mongolia, and China
Again Witte and the government helped all they could by such means as
the establishment of the Russo Persian Bank and the Russo-Cfunese Bank,
and the building of the East China Railway, not to mention the Trans-
426 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
Siberian. As already indicated, Russian economic activity in the Far East
was part of the background of the Russo-Japanese War.
The great Russian industrial upsurge of the 1890’s ended with the de-
pression of 1900, produced by a number of causes, but perhaps especially
by the “increasing weakness of the base,” the exhaustion of the Russian
peasantry. The depression lasted several years and became combined with
political unrest and finally with the Revolution of 1905. Still, once order
had been restored and the Russians returned to work, industrialization
resumed its course. In fact, the last period of the economic development
of imperial Russia, from the calling of the First Duma to the outbreak of
the First World War, witnessed rapid industrialization, although it was
not as rapid as in the 1890’s, with an annual industrial growth rate of
perhaps 6 per cent compared to the 8 per cent of the earlier period. The
output of basic industries again soared, with the exception of the oil
industry. Thus, counting in millions of pudy * and using 1909 and 1913
as the years to be compared, the Russian production of pig iron rose from
175 to 283, of iron and steel from 163 to 246, of copper from 1.3 to 2.0,
and of coal from 1,591 to 2,214.
The new industrial advance followed in many ways the pattern of the
previous advance, for instance, in the emphases on heavy industry and on
large plants. Yet it exhibited some significant new traits as well. With the
departure of Witte, the government stopped forcing the pace of industrializa-
tion, decreased the direct support of capitalists, and relaxed somewhat the
financial pressure on the masses. Russian industry managed to make the
necessary adjustments, for it was already better able to stand on its own
feet. Also, the industry often had the help of banks, which began to assume
a guiding role in the economic development of the country. But, financial
capital aside, the Russian industrialists themselves were gradually gaining
strength and independence. Also, it can well be argued that during the
years immediately preceding the First World War Russian industry was
becoming more diversified, acquiring a larger home market, and spreading
its benefits more effectively to workers and consumers.
To be sure, the medal had its reverse side. In spite of increasing produc-
tion in the twentieth century, imperial Russia was falling further behind the
leading states of the West — or so it is claimed by many analysts, especially
Marxist analysts. Just as the Russian government relied on foreign loans,
Russian industry remained heavily dependent on foreign capital, which
rose to almost two and a quarter billion rubles in 1916/17 and formed
approximately one-third of the total industrial investment. The French, for
example, owned nearly two-thirds of the Russian pig iron and one-half of
the Russian coal industries, while the Germans invested heavily in the
* A pud equals 36 pounds.
'Industry
' 186J-I917
■Jp'Area! oequirwri during
428 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
chemical and electrical engineering industries, and the British in oil. On
the basis of investment statistics some Marxists even spoke of the “semi-
colonial” status of Russia! More ominously, Russian industry rose on top
of a bitter and miserable proletariat and a desperately poor peasant mass.
Labor
The industrialization of Russia created, of course, a considerable working
class. While Russians began to work in factories in the Urals and elsewhere
far back in history, as mentioned in previous chapters, a sizeable industrial
proletariat grew in Russia only toward the end of the nineteenth century.
Russian industrial workers numbered over two million in 1900 and perhaps
three million out of a population of about 170 million in 1914. Not im-
pressive in quantity in proportion to total population, the proletariat was
more densely massed in Russia than in other countries. Because of the
heavy concentration of Russian industry, over half of all the industrial
enterprises in Russia employed more than 500 workers each, with many
employing more than a thousand each. The workers thus formed large and
closely knit groups in industrial centers, which included St. Petersburg and
Moscow.
True, the term “worker” may be too definitive and precise as applied
to the Russian situation. Populists, Marxists, and scholars of other per-
suasions have heatedly debated the extent to which Russian workers re-
mained — or ceased to be — peasants. These workers usually came from
the village. Often they belonged to the village commune, left their families
behind in the village, and spent a part of every year there, gathering harvest
and performing other peasant tasks. For them the village remained their
home, while the factory became a novel way to earn obrok, so to speak.
When a close relationship with the village ceased, many factory hands still
maintained their membership in it and sought to retire to it to end their
days in peace. And even after all important ties with the countryside were
broken and workers were left entirely and permanently on their own in
towns and cities, they could not shed overnight their peasant mentality and
outlook. The Russian proletariat tended to be not only the pride but also
the despair of the Marxists both before and after 1917. In fact, in the
years following the October Revolution much of it vanished into the
countryside. Nevertheless, the Marxists were right in their argument with
the populists to the extent that they emphasized the continuing growth of
capitalism and the proletariat in Russia. With all due qualifications, from
the 1880’s on, an industrial working class constituted a significant com-
ponent of Russian population, an essential part of Russian economy, and
a factor in Russian politics.
As noted in an earlier chapter, the government initiated modem labor
ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY 1861-1917 429
legislation in the lB80s, when Minister of Finance Bunge tried to eliminate
or curb certain glaring abuses of the factory sy stem and established factory
inspectors to supervise the cany mg out of new laws More legislation fol
lowed later, with a law m 1897 applicable to industrial establishments
employing more than 20 workers that limited day work of adults to eleven
and a half hours and night work to ten hours The ten hour day was also
to prevail on Saturdays and on the eve of major holidays, while no work
was allowed on Sundays or the holidays in question Adolescents and chil-
dren were to work no more than ten and nine hours a day respectively A
pioneer labor insurance law, holding the employers responsible for accidents
in connection with factory work, came out m 1903, but an improved and
effective labor insurance act, covering both accidents and illness, appeared
only in 1912 Unions were finally allowed m 1906, and even then exclusively
on the local, not the national, level
However, in spite of labor legislation, and also in spite of the fact that
wages probably increased in ihc years preceding the First World War — a
point, incidentally, strongly dented by Soviet scholars — Russian workers
remained in general in miserable condition Poorly paid, desperately over-
crowded and with very little education or other advantages, the proletariat
of imperial Russia represented in effect an excellent example of a destitute
and exploited labor force characteristic of the early stages of capitalist
development and described so powerfully by Marx in Capital
Not surprisingly, the workers began to organize to better their lot Indeed,
they exercised at times sufficient pressure to further labor legislation,
notably m the case of the law of 1 897, and they could not be deterred by the
(act that unions remained illegal until after the Revolution of 1905 and were
still hampered and suspected by the government thereafter The first signifi-
cant strikes occurred in St Petersburg m 1B78 and 1879 and at a Morozov
textile factory near Moscow in 1885 The short-lived but important North-
ern Workers* Union, led by a worker and populist, Stephen Kh3ltunn,
helped lo organize the early labor movement in the capita! Major strikes
took place in the ’90's, not only in St Petersburg, but also in Riga, m
industrnl areas of Russian Poland, and in new plants m the Ukraine In
addition, raihvaymcn struck in several places The strike movement again
gathered momentum in the first years of the twentieth century, culminating,
as we know, m the Revolution of 1905, the creation and the activities of
the St Petersburg Soviet, its arrest by the government, and the unsuccessful
armed uprising of workers in Moscow at the very end of the year A lull
of several years followed these events However, the Russian labor move-
ment revived shortly before the outbreak of the First World War Strikes
became frequent after the massacre of workers in the Lena gold fields in
April 1912, when police fired into a crowd of protesting workers killing
and wounding more than s hundred of them In 1912, 725,000 workers
430 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
went out on strike, 887,000 in 1913, and over a million and a quarter from
January to July in 1914. Their demands, it should be noted, were often
political, as well as economic, in character. The Social Democrats, both the
Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks, developed large-scale activities in the Rus-
sian labor movement.
The Peasant Question
Peasants constituted the vast majority of the Russian people, at least
three-quarters of the total population according to the census of 1897. In
a sense, they were the chief and the most direct beneficiaries of the “great
reforms,” particularly since the serfs received their freedom and the state
peasants escaped some of their bondage to the state. Yet, after the reforms,
their condition remained the largest and the gravest problem in Russia.
As mentioned, the emancipation provisions proved to be insufficient to
develop a healthy peasant economy — whether any provisions would have
sufficed is another matter — and some of these provisions were shown to
be entirely unrealistic: at the time of the partition former serfs received
considerably less than their half of the land, and they simply could not
meet the redemption payments. Moreover — a point which we have not
discussed in any detail — the emancipation took a long time and followed
an uneven course throughout Russia, with periods of transition and other
delays to the peasants’ full acquisition of their new status. And even that
status, when finally attained, did not make the peasants equal to other
social groups. Thus they possessed a separate administration and courts
and, besides, were tied to the peasant commune in most of European Russia.
The communes, which received the land at the time of the emancipation,
were made responsible for taxes and recruits and were in general intended
to serve as bulwarks of order and organized life in the countryside. No
doubt they helped many peasants keep their bearings in post-reform Russia,
and they usually provided at least minimal security for their members.
Even industrial workers, as mentioned above, often planned to retire in
their villages. But the price of communal services was high. Communes
tended to perpetuate backward, indeed archaic, agricultural production:
they continued their traditional, ignorant ways, including the partitioning
of land into small strips so that each household would receive land of
every quality; and they lacked capital, education, and initiative for modern-
ization. Individual householders, even when more progressively inclined,
to a large extent had to follow the practices of their neighbors and, besides,
acquired little incentive to improve their strips in those communes which
periodically redivided the land. At the same time communes greatly
hampered peasant mobility and promoted ever-increasing overpopulation
in the countryside. Members of a commune frequently found it difficult to
ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY 1861-1917 431
obtain permission Vo leave, because their departure would force the com
mune Vo perform its set obligations to the state with fewer men Also,
where communes periodically redivided the land among the households,
the head of the household could prevent the departure of one of its members
on the ground that that would result in a smaller allotment of land to the
household at the next reapportionment As GcrschcnVron commented
* Nothing was more revealing of the irrational way in which the village
commune functioned than the fact that the individual household had to
retain the abundant factor (labor) as a precondition for obtaining the
scarce factor (land) "
Population in Russia grew rapidly after the emancipation from over
73 million in 1861 to over 125 million according to the census of 1897
and almost 170 million in 1917 Land prices more than doubled between
1860 and 1905 and almost doubled again between 190S and 1917 In
spite of the fact that peasants purchased much of the land sold over a
period of time b) the gentry, individual peasant allotments kept shrinking
Russian economic historians have calculated that 28 per cent of the
peasant population of the country could not support itself from its land
allotments immediately after the emancipation and that by 1900 that
figure had risen to 52 per cent That the allotments still compared reason-
ably well with the allotments of peasants in other countries proved to be
cold comfort for with the backward conditions of ignculture in Russia
the) plainly did not suffice The average peasant ownership of horses also
declined sharply, with approximately one third of peasant households own-
ing no horses by 1901 The peasants, of course, tried a variety of ways
to alleviate their desperate plight, from periodic employment m the cities
to migration, but with limited success at best They worked as hard as
they could, exhausting themselves and the land, and competing for every
bit of it Jn this margins} economy droughts became disasters, and the
famine of 1891 was a shattering catastrophe But even without outright
famine peasants died rapidly At the beginning of the twentieth century,
the annual death rate for European Russia with the countryside leading
the cities stood at 31 2 per thousand, compared to 19 6 in France and
16 in England Naturally, conditions differed in the enormous Russian
Empire, with Siberian peasants, for example, reasonably prosperous On
the other hand, perhaps the worst situation prevailed in the thickly pop-
ulated provinces of central European Russia — caused by the so-calted
“pauperization of the center" How the peasants themselves felt about
their lot became abundantly clear in the massive agrarian disturbances
culminating in 1905
To appreciate the burden that the Russian peasant had to carry, we
should take further note of the fiscal system of the empire Thus, an official
inquiry Indicated that after the emancipation the peasants paid annually
432 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
to the state in taxes, counting redemption payments, ten times as much
per desiatina of land as did members of the gentry. And even after the head
tax was abolished in 1886 and the redemption payments were finally
canceled in 1905, the impoverished masses continued to support the state
by means of indirect taxes. These taxes, perennially the main source of
imperial revenue, were levied on domestic and imported items of everyday
consumption such as vodka, sugar, tea, tobacco, cotton, and iron. The tax
on alcohol, which Witte made a state monopoly in 1894, proved especially
lucrative. While relentless financial pressure forced the peasants to sell all
they could, the government, particularly Witte, promoted the export of
foodstuffs, notably grain, to obtain a favorable balance of trade and finance
the industrialization of Russia. Foodstuffs constituted almost two-thirds in
value of all Russian exports in the first years of the twentieth century com-
pared to some two-fifths at the time of the emancipation.
However, the last years of imperial Russia, the period from the Revolu-
tion of 1905 to the outbreak of the First World War, brought some hope
and improvement — many authorities claim much hope and great improve-
ment — into the lives of the Russian peasants, that is, the bulk of the
Russian people. The upswing resulted from a number of factors. As already
indicated, the industrialization of Russia no longer demanded or obtained
the extreme sacrifices characteristic of the 1890's, and the new Russian
industry had more to offer to the consumer. The national income in fifty
provinces of European Russia rose, according to Prokopovich’s calculation,
from 6,579.6 million rubles in 1900 to 11,805.5 million in 1913. In 1913
the per capita income for the whole Russian Empire amounted to 102.2
rubles, a considerable increase even if highly inadequate compared to the
figures of 292 rubles for Germany, 355 for France, 463 for England, or
695 for the United States. Luckily, the years preceding the First World War
witnessed a series of bountiful harvests. Russian peasants profited, in ad-
dition, from a remarkable growth of the co-operative movement, and from
government sponsorship of migration to new lands. Co-operatives multiplied
from some 2,000 in 1901 and 4,500 in 1905 to 33,000 at the outbreak
of the First World War, when their membership extended to 12 million
people. Credit and consumers’ co-operatives led the way, although some
producers’ co-operatives, such as Siberian creamery co-operatives, also
proved highly successful. As to migration, the government finally began to
support it after the Revolution of 1905 by providing the necessary guiding
agencies and also by small subsidies to the migrants, suspension of certain
taxes for them, and the like. In 1907 over half a million people moved to
new lands and in 1908 the annual number of migrants rose to about
three-quarters of a million. After that, however, it declined to the im-
mediate pre-war average of about 300,000 a year. Land under cultivation
increased from 88.3 million desiatin in 1901—5 to 97.6 million in 1911—13.
433
ECONOMICS AND SOC1ETV 1861-1917
Mso as mentioned earlier, the Peasant Land Bank became much more
active, helping peasants to purchase over 4 3 million dcsiatm or land ja
the decade from 1906 to 1915, compared to 0 96 million in the preceding
ten years State and imperial family lands amounting to about a million
and a quarter dcsiatm were offered for sale to the peasants
Stotyplns land reform could well be considered the most important
factor of all in the charging rural situation, because it tried to transform
the Russian countryside Stolypin’s legislation of 3906, 1910, and 1911
outlined in the preceding chapter — aimed at breaking up the peasant com-
mune and at creating a strong cl3ss of peasant proprietors These peasant
proprietors were to have their land in consolidated lots, not m strips To
summarize the results of the reform m the words of a hostile critic Lia-
shchcnko
By January 1. 1916 requests for acquisition of land m personal ownership
were submitted by 2 755 000 householders in European Russia Among
these, some 2 008 000 householders with a total acreage of 14 123 000
dessyatms separated from the communes In addition 470 000 house
holders with an aggregate acreage of 2 796 000 destyawu obtained ‘cer-
tified deeds" attesting to their acquisition of phonal holding* in com
munes not practicing any redistribution Altogether, 2 478 000 house
holders owning an area of 16 919 000 dessyaiins left the communes and
secured their land in personal ownership Tim constituted about 24 per
cent of the total number of households m forty provinces of European
Russia
Oganovsky. Robinson, Florinsky. Karpovich and others have arrived at
roughly the same figure of about 24 per cent of formerly communal house-
holds completing their legal withdrawal from the commune In contrast
to Ltashchenko, however, some specialists emphasize a greater spread and
potentiality of the reform Notably they stress the fact that, although only
470,000 households in ronrepartitional communes had time to receive legal
confirmation of then new independent status, the law of 1910 made in
effect all householders in such communes individual proprietors Two mil-
lion would thus be a more realistic figure than 470 000 If we make this
adjustment and if wc add to the newly established independent households
the three million or more hereditary tenure households in areas where
communal ownership had never developed we obtain for European Russia
at the beginning of 1916 over seven million individual proprietary house-
holds out of the total of thirteen or fourteen million In other words,
peasant households operating within the framework of the peasant commune
hid declined to somewhat less than half of all peasant households in
Russia Consolidation of strips, a crucial aspect of the reform, proceeded
much more slowly than separation from the commune, but it too made
some progress One important set of figures indicates that of the almost two
434 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
and a half million households that had left communes somewhat more
than half had been provided with consolidated farms by 1916.
Still, these impressive statistics do not necessarily indicate the ultimate
wisdom and success of Stolypin’s reform. True, Stolypin has received much
praise from many specialists, including such present-day American scholars
as Treadgold, who believe that the determined prime minister was in fact
saving the empire and that, given time, his agrarian reform would have
achieved its major objective of transforming and stabilizing the countryside.
But critics have also been numerous and by no means limited to populists
or other defenders of the commune as such. They have pointed, for example,
to the limited scope of Stolypin’s reform which represented, in a sense,
one more effort to save gentry land by making the peasants redivide what
they already possessed, and to the element of compulsion in the carrying
out of the reform. They argued that the reform had largely spent itself
without curing the basic ills of rural Russia. Moreover, it added new prob-
lems to the old ones, in particular by helping to stratify the peasant mass
and by creating hostility between the stronger and richer peasants whom
the government helped to withdraw from the commune on advantageous
terms and their poorer and more egalitarian brethren left behind.
Conclusion
To conclude, various evaluations have been given of the development
of Russian industry in the last years of the empire, of the development of
Russian agriculture, and indeed of the entire economy of the country.
Whereas Gerschenkron, Karpovich, Pavlovsky and other scholars have
emphasized progress and grounds for optimism, Soviet authorities, as well
as such Western specialists as Von Laue, have concluded that in spite of
all efforts — perhaps the maximum efforts possible under the old regime —
Russia was not solving its problems either in terms of its own requirements
or by comparison with other countries. Most close students of the period
have come out with the feeling — so pronounced in Robinson’s valuable
work on rural Russia — that, whether the conditions of life in Russia im-
proved or declined on the eve of the First World War, they remained
desperately hard for the bulk of the population.
It has been said that revolutions occur not when the people are utterly
destitute, oppressed beyond all measure, and deprived of hope — crushing
conditions lead only to blind and fruitless rebellions — but when there is
growth, advance, and high expectation, hampered, however, by an archaic
and rigid established order. Such a situation existed in Russia in the early
twentieth century: in economic and social matters as well as in politics.
X X X I 1 1
RUSSIAN CULTURE FROM THE “GREAT REFORMS” UNTIL
THE REVOLUTIONS Or 1917
Theft i* only one evil amonj men — Ignorance agamst this evil
there is only one medicine — learning but this medicine mutt be
taken not tn homeopathic doves, but by the paU and by the forty
part barrel
fjsakcv
The three points where the new man thought he had made himself
most secure were first his liberation from all the values and
institutions of the jro/m quo second his complete faith tn human
reason and the principles it made known to him, and finally hi*
assurance (hat he was the personal inurnment of the historical
process They were convinced that they had found the path to
a state of personal engagement which could sustain them in their
struggle with the tsanst svstem because they believed in the justice
of their assault and in the inevitability of it* ultimate issue But if
we view it critically we note that « rested on an 'adjustment* that
was composed m large p«rt of hostility to existing institutions and
in equally large part of commitment to a world that had not yet
come into being Described so, its precariousness becomes obvious
Mvnrewso*i
Various forces were at work In the 1890 s in opposition to the
Gorky Andreyev school, anj particularly to the dominance of social
significance and nihilistic thought in literature There was a definite
turning away from civic morality to aestheticism, from duty to
beauty and cultural and individual values were stressed at the ex
perssc of political and social values Most of the part clpator* in this
movement were brilliant intellectuals ahd their efforts represented
a loftv degree of cultural refinement that had never been achieved
by any literary group in Russia hitherto
SIMMONS
The decades that elapsed between the emancipation of the serfs and the
revolutions of 1917 constituted an active, fruitful, and fascinating period
in the history of Russian culture Education continued to grow at all levels,
tn spite of obstacles and even governmental “count erref arms"; m the
twentieth century the rate of growth increased sharply Russian science
and scholarship, already reasonably well-established at the time of Nicholas
I’s death, developed further and blossomed out. In a word, Russia became
a full-fledged contributor to and partner tn the intellectual and academic
efforts of the Western world, its new high position in that respect antedating
435
436 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
by decades the October Revolution. Russian literature continued its
“golden age,” although primarily in prose rather than in poetry and largely
through the achievements of several isolated individuals, such as Turgenev
Tolstoy, and Dostoevsky. Later, when the giants died or, as in the case
of Tolstoy, stopped writing fiction and the “golden age” came to its end,
Chekhov, Gorky, and some other outstanding authors maintained the great
tradition of Russian prose. Moreover, the very end of the nineteenth century
and the first part of the twentieth witnessed another magnificent literary
and artistic revival, designated sometimes as the “silver age.” In literature
that renaissance meant the appearance once again of superb poetry, es-
pecially Alexander Blok’s, the introduction of a wide variety of new trends,
and the emergence of exceptionally high standards of culture and craftsman-
ship. The “silver age” also extended to the theater, music, ballet, painting,
and sculpture, and in effect to every form of creative expression. It proved
especially beneficial to the visual arts, which had produced little of distinc-
tion in the age of arid realism, and it scored perhaps its most resounding
successes in the ballet and the theater. In the history of ideas, as well as
in literature and art, the period can be divided into two uneven parts:
from the 1860’s to the end of the century and indeed to the revolutions
of 1917, the creed of radicalism, utilitarianism, and materialism first pro-
claimed by left-wing Wcsternizcrs dominated student and other active
intellectual circles, finding its best expression in nihilism, different forms of
populism, and Marxism; yet with the turn of the century and the “silver age”
in culture members of the intellectual elite began to return to idealistic
metaphysics and religion. The First World War and later the revolutions
struck when Russian intellectual and cultural life was exhibiting more
vitality, diversity, and sophistication than ever before.
Education
The death of Nicholas I and the coming of the “great reforms” meant
liberalization in education as in other fields. The university statute of 1863
reaffirmed the principle of university autonomy, while Nicholas I’s special
restrictions on universities were among the first regulations to disappear
in the new reign. The zemstvo reform of 1864 opened vast opportunities
to establish schools in the countryside. In towns or rural areas, the increasing
thirst for knowledge on the part of the Russians augured well for education
in a liberal age. However, as already mentioned, official liberalism did not
last long, and reaction logically, if unfortunately, showed a particular con-
cern for education. As a result, the growth of education in Russia, while it
could not be stopped, found itself hampered and to an extent deformed by
government action.
After Dmitrii Tolstoy replaced Alexander Golovnin in 1866 as minister
CULTURE. 1861-1917 437
of education, the ministry did fts best to control education and to direct
it into desirable channels As in the days of Uvarov, high standards were
used in universities and secondary schools to keep the number of students
down, hindering especially the academic advancement of students of low
social background In secondary education, the emphasis fell on the so*
Called classical gymnasia, which became the only road to universities proper,
as distinct from more specialized institutions of higher learning. These
gymnasia concentrated on teaching the Latin and Greek languages, to the
extent of some 40 per cent of the total class time Largely because of the
rigorous demands, less than one-third or those "who had entered the
gymnasia were graduated In addition to the natural obstacles that such
a system presented to “socialty undesirable” elements, ministers of educa-
tion made direct appeals in their circulars to subordinates to keep “cook’s
sons” out of the gymnasia, as did one of Dmitrn Tolstoy’s successors, Ivan
Delianov, in 1887 In general, the government tried to divide education
into airtight compartments that students as a rule could not cross Under
Alexander 111 and Pobcdonostsev, Church schools received special attention
Following the statute of 1884 concerning Church-parish schools, an effort
was made to entrust elementary education os much os possible to the
Church, the number of Church-pamh schools increasing from 4,500 in
1882 to 32,000 in 1894 While inferior in quality, these educational
institutions were considered “safe " By contrast, advanced education for
women, barely begun in Russia, came to be increasingly restricted And
in all schools and at nil levels the Ministry of Education emphasized
“conduct” and tried to maintain iron discipline
Yet, in spile of all the vicissitudes, education continued to grow in
Russia The impact of the zemstva proved especially beneficial Thus, ac-
cording to Charnolussky's figures, the sixty provinces of European Russia
in 1880 possessed 22,770 elementary schools with 1,141,000 students,
68 5 per cent of the schools having been established after the zemstvo
refotm of 1864 In addition to the exclusive classical gymnasia, ReaUcliulc.
which taught modern languages and science in place of Greek and Latin,
provided a secondary education that could lead to admission to technical
institutions ol higher learning Other kinds ol schools also developed In
addition to the activities of the ministries of education, war, navy, and of
the Holy Synod, Witte promoted commercial schools under the jurisdiction
of the Ministry of Finance, establishing some 150 of them between 1896
and 1902, and well over 200 altogether In 1905 these schools were trans-
ferred to the Ministry of Trade and Industry Moreover, after the Revolution
of 1905 schools in Russia profited from a more liberal policy as well as
from an increasing interest in education on the p3rt of both the government
and the public. As mentioned earlier, plans were drawn to institute schooling
for all Russian children by 1922, or, according to a revised estimate fol-
438
M FERIAL RUS:
lowing the outbreak of the First World War, by 1925. Educational prospects
had never looked brighter in Russia than on the eve of the revolutions
of 1917.
The problem, however, remained immense. Russians needed all kinds
of training but above all the acquisition of simple literacy. Although by
the end of the nineteenth century Russia had 76,914 elementary schools
for children and 1,785 for adults with a total of 4.1 million students, and
by 1915 the number of students had grown to over 8 million, on the eve
of the October Revolution somewhat more than half of the population of
the country was illiterate. To be more precise, in 1917 literacy extended in
all probability to only about 45 per cent of the people.
At the other end of the educational ladder, universities increased in num-
ber, although slowly. The so-called Novorossiiskii University — referring
to the name of the area, Novorossiia, or New Russia — was founded in
Odessa in 1864, the University of Tomsk in Siberia in 1888, the University
of Saratov in 1910, of Perm in 1915, and of Rostov-on-Don in 1917. That
gave Russia a total of twelve universities, all of them belonging to the state.
However, in 1917 the empire also possessed more than a hundred special-
ized institutions of higher learning: pedagogical, technological, agricultural,
and other. Gradually it became possible for women to obtain higher educa-
tion by attending special “courses” set up in university centers, such as the
“Guerrier courses,” named after a professor of history, Vladimir Guerrier,
which began to function in 1872 in Moscow, and the “Bestuzhev courses,”
founded in 1878 in St. Petersburg and named after another historian,
Constantine Bestuzhev-Riumin. The total number of students in Russian
institutions of higher learning in 1917 has been variously estimated between
100,000 and 180,000. It should be noted that while the university statute
of 1884 proved to be more restrictive than that of 1863 and over a period
of time led to the resignation of a number of noted professors, most of
the restrictions disappeared in 1905. In general, and especially after 1905,
the freedom and variety of intellectual life in imperial Russian universities
invite comparison with the Western universities, certainly not with the
Soviet system.
Science and Scholarship
The Academy of Sciences, the universities, and other institutions of
higher learning developed, or rather continued to develop, science and
scholarship in Russia. In fact, in the period from the emancipation of the
serfs until the revolutions of 1917, Russians made significant contributions
in almost every area of knowledge. In mathematics, while no one quite
rivaled Lobachevsky, a considerable number of outstanding Russian math-
ematicians made their appearance, including Pafnutii Chebyshev in St.
CULTURE 1861-19J7
439
Petersburg and a remarkable woman, Sophia Kovalcvskaia, who touch! at
the University of Stockholm Chemistry m Russia achieved new heights m
the works of many talented scholars, the most celebrated of them being
the great Draum Mendeleev, who lived from 1834 to 1907 and whose
periodic table of elements, formulated m 1869, both organized the known
elements into a system and made an accurate forecast of later discoveries
Leading Russian physicists included the specialist in magnetism and elec-
tricity, Alexander Stolctov, and the brilliant student of the properties of
light, Peter Lebedev, as well as such notable pioneer inventors as Paul
lablochkov, who worked before Edison in developing electric light, and
Alexander Popov, who invented the radio around 1895, shortly before
Marconi Russian inventors even more than Russian scholars m general
frequently received less than their due recognition in the world both because
of the prevalent ignorance abroad of the Russian language and Russia and
because of the backwardness of Russian technology, which usually failed
to utilize their inventions
Advances in the biological sciences rivaled those tn the physical Alex-
ander Kovalevsky produced classic works in zoology nnd embryology,
while his younger brother Vladimir the husband of the mathematician
made important contributions to paleontology — and, incidentally, was
much appreciated by Darwin The famous embryologist and bacteriologist
Elijah Mechmkov, who did most of his work m the Pasteur Institute in
Paris concentrated on such problems as the funetton of the white corpuscles,
immunity, and the process of aging Medicine developed well in Russia
during the last decades of the empire, both in terms of quality and, after
the zemstvo reform in terms of accessibility to the masses Following the
lead of an outstanding anatomist, surgeon teacher, and puhfic figure,
Nicholas Pirogov, who died in 1881, and others, Russian doctors exhibited
a remarkable civic spirit nnd devotion to their work and their patients
Russian contributions to physiology were especially striking and 1 m
ponant, and they overlapped into psychology Ivan Sechenov, who taught
in several universities for about half a century and died in 1905, did
remarkable research on gases in btood nerve centers and reflexes and on
other related matters Ivan Pavlov, who lived from 1 S49 to 1936 and whose
epoch making experiments began in the 1880 s, established through hi$
studies of dogs' reactions to food the existence and nature of conditioned
reflexes, and, further developing his approach, contributed enormously to
both theory and experimental work in physiology and to behavioral psy-
chology
The socml sciences and the hum3ntties also prospered Russian scholars
engaged fruitfully m everything from law to oriental studies and from
economics to folklore In particular, Russian historiography flourished in
the last decades of the nineteenth and the first of the twentieth century
440 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
Building on the work of Serge Soloviev and other pioneers, Basil Kliu-
chevsky, Serge Platonov, Matthew Liubavsky, Paul Miliukov, and their
colleagues in effect established Russian history as a rich and many-sided
field of learning. Their works have not been surpassed. Other Russians
made notable contributions to the histories of other countries and ages, as
did the medievalist Paul Vinogradov and the specialist in classical antiquity
Michael Rostovtzeff. While Russian historiography profited greatly from
the sociological emphasis characteristic of the second half of the nineteenth
century, the “silver age” stimulated the history of art, which could claim
in Russia such magnificent specialists as Nikodim Kondakov, Alexander
Benois, and Igor Grabar, and it led to a revival of philosophy, esthetics,
and literary criticism.
Literature
After the “great reforms” as before them, literature continued to be the
chief gloiy of Russian culture, and it also became a major source of Russian
influence on the West, and indeed on the world. That happened in spite
of the fact that the intellectual climate in Russia changed and became
unpropitious for creative expression. Instead of admiring art, poetry, and
genius, as had been common in the first half of the nineteenth century, the
influential critics of the generation of the sixties and of the following dec-
ades emphasized utility and demanded from the authors a clear and simple
social message. Logically developed, civic literature led to Chcmyshevsky’s
novel, What Is To Be Done?, a worthless literary effort, whatever its intel-
lectual and social significance. With belter luck, it produced Nicholas Ne-
krasov’s civic poetry, which showed inspiration and an effective use of lan-
guage, for Nekrasov was a real poet, although he wrote unevenly and too
much. Fortunately for Russian literature, the greatest writers rejected criti-
cal advice and proceeded to write in their own manner. That was especially
true of the three giants of the age, Ivan Turgenev, Fedor Dostoevsky, and
Leo Tolstoy.
Ivan Turgenev lived from 1818 to 1883 and became famous around
1850 with the gradual appearance of his Sportsman’s Sketches. He re-
sponded to the trends of the time and depicted with remarkable sensitivity
the intellectual life of Russia, but he failed eventually to satisfy the Left. Six
novels, the first of which appeared in 1855 and the last in 1877, described
the evolution of Russian educated society and Russia itself as Turgenev, a
gentleman of culture, had witnessed it. These novels are, in order of pub-
lication, Rudin, A Gentry Nest, On the Eve, the celebrated Fathers 'and
Sons, Smoke, and Virgin Soil. Turgenev depicted Russia from the time of
the iron regime of Nicholas I, through the “great reforms,” to the return of
reaction in the late ’60’s and the ’70’s. He concerned himself especially with
CULTURE 1861—1917
441
the idealists of the *40 s and the later liberals, nihilists, and populists In-
deed, it was Turgenev’s hero, Bazarov, who gave currencj to the concept
nihilist and to the term itself Although he was a consistent Westernizcr
and liberal, who was appreciative of the efforts of young radicals to change
Russia, Turgenev advocated gradualism, not revolution, in particular he
recommended patient work to develop the Russian economy and educa-
tion And he refused to be one sided or dogmatic In fact, critics debate to
this day whether Rudm and Bazarov are essentially sympathetic or un-
sympathetic characters Besides, Turgenevs novels were by no means sim-
ply romans & thfoe The reader remembers not only the nuthor's ideological
protagonists, but also his remarkable, strong heroines, the background, the
dialogue, and, perhaps above all the consummate artistry As writer, Tur-
genev resembled closely his friend Flaubert, not at all Cherny she vsky In
addition to the famous sequence of novels, Turgenev wrote some plays and
a considerable number of stories — he has been described as a better story
writer than novelist
Fedor — that ts, Theodore — Dostoevsky who lived from 1821 to
1881, also became well known before the great reforms * He was already
the author of a rove} Poor Folk which was scch'Wd by Bchasky when
it was published in 1845, and of other writings, when he became involved,
as already mentioned with the Pctrashevtsy and was sentenced to death,
the sentence being commuted to Siberian exile only at the place of execu-
tion Next the writer spent four years ot hard labor and two more as a sol
dicr in Siberia before returning to European Russia in 1856, following a
general amnesty proclaimed by the new emperor Dostoevsky recorded his
Siberian experience in a remarkable book. Notes from the House of the
Dead, which came out in 1861 Upon his return to literary life, the one-
time member of the Peimhcvtsy became an aggressive and prolific Right-
wing journalist, contributing to a certain Slavophile revival Pan Slavism,
and even outright chauvinism His targets included the Jews, the Poles, the
Germans, Catholicism, socialism, and the entire West While Dostoevsky’s
journalism added to the sound and fury of the period, his immortal fame
rests on his late novels, four of which belong among the greatest ever writ-
ten These were Crime and Punishment, The Idiot , The Possessed, and The
Brothers Karamazov, published in 1866, 1868, 1870-72, sad 1879—80
respectively In fact, Dostoevsky seemed to go front strength to strength
and was apparently at the height of his creative powers in working on a
sequel to The Brothers Karamazov when he died
Dostoevsky has often been represented as the most Russian of writers
and evaluated m terms of Russian mcssi3hship and the mysteries of the
Russian soul — an approach to which he himself richly contributed Yet, a
closer study of the great novelist’s so-called special Russian traits demon-
strates that they are either of secondary importance at best or even entirely
442 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
imaginary. To the contrary, Dostoevsky could be called the most inter-
national or, better, the most human of writers because of his enormous coa-
cem with and penetration into the nature of man. The strange Russian
author was a master of depth psychology before depth psychology became
known. Moreover, he viewed human nature in the dynamic terms of ex-
plosive conflict between freedom and necessity, urge and limitations, faith
and despair, good and evil. Of Dostoevsky’s several priceless gifts the
greatest was to fuse into one his protagonists and the ideas — or rather
states of man’s soul and entire being — that they expressed, as no other
writer has ever done. Therefore, where others are prolix, tedious, didactic,
or confusing in mixing different levels of discourse, Dostoevsky is gripping,
in places almost unbearably so. As another Russian author, Gleb Uspensky,
reportedly once remarked, into a small hole in the wall, where the general-
ity of human beings could put perhaps a pair of shoes, Dostoevsky could
put the entire world. One of the greatest anti-rationalists of the second
half of the nineteenth century, together with Nietzsche and Kirkegaard,
Dostoevsky became with them an acknowledged prophet for the twentieth,
inspiring existential philosophy, theological revivals, and scholarly at-
tempts to understand the catastrophes of our time — as well as, of course,
modern psychological fiction.
It has been said that, if Dostoevsky was not the world’s greatest novelist,
then Tolstoy certainly was, and that the choice between the two depends
on whether the reader prefers depth or breadth. These are quite defensible
views, provided one remembers the range of Dostoevsky, and especially
his very numerous secondary and tertiary characters who speak their own
language and add their own comment to the tragedy of man, and provided
one realizes that Tolstoy too cuts very deep.
Count Leo Tolstoy lived a long, full, and famous life. Bom in 1828 and
brought up in a manner characteristic of his aristocratic milieu — mag-
nificently described in Childhood, Boyhood, and Youth — he received a
cosmopolitan, if dilettante, education; engaged in gay social life; served in
the army, first in the Caucasus and later in the siege of Sevastopol; and
became a happy husband, the father of a large family, and a. progressive
landowner much concerned with the welfare of his peasants. In addition to
these ordinary activities, however, Tolstoy also developed into one of the
greatest writers in world literature and later into an angry teacher of man-
kind, who condemned civilization, including his own part in it, and called
for the abandonment of violence and for a simple, moral life. In fact, he
died in 1910 at the age of eighty-two as he fled from his family and estate
in yet another attempt to sever his ties with all evil and falsehood and to
find truth. It is indeed difficult to determine whether Tolstoy acquired more
fame and influence in his own country and all over the world as a writer or
as a teacher of nonresistance and unmasker of modern civilization, and
CULTURE 1861-1917
443
whether Anna Karenina or A Confession — on account or the crisis that
split his life in two — carries the greater impact lo Russt 3 at least, Tol-
stoy’s position as the voice of criticism that the government dared not si-
lence, as moral conscience, appeared at times even more extraordinary and
precious than his literary creations
But, whatever can be said against Tolstoy as thinker — and much has
been justly said about his extraordinary' naTvetd, his stubborn and at the
same umc poorly thought-out rationalism, and his absolute insistence on
such items ns vegetanantsm and painless death as parts of hts program of
saFvation — Tolstoy as writer needs no apologies While a prolific author,
the creator of many superb stones and some powerful plays, Tofsfoy, fifee
Dostoevsky, fs remembered best for his novels, especially War and reace,
published in 1869, and Anna Karenina published in 1876 In these novels,
as in much else written by Tolstoy, there exists a boundless vitality, a driv-
ing, overpowering sense of life and people And life finds expression on a
sweeping scale H'ar and Peace contains sixty heroes and some two hundred
distinct characters, not to mention the unforgettable battle nrd mob scenes
and the general background The war of 1812 is depicted at almost every
level from Alexander 1 and Napoleon, through commanders and officers,
to simple soldiers, and among civilians from court circles to the common
people Anna Karenina, while more restricted in scope, has been praised no
less for its construction and its supreme art
The Russian novel, which in the second half of the nineteenth century
won a worldwide reputation because or the writings of Turgenev, Dostoev-
sky, and Tolstoy, had other outstanding practitioners as well Ivan Gon-
charov, who lived from 1812 to 1891. produced at least one great novel,
Obtomav, published two years before the emancipation of the serfs and
representing ifl a sense a farewell, spoken with mixed feelings, to the de-
parting patriarchal Russia, and a welcome, again with mixed feelings, to
the painfully evolving new order Oblomov himself snored ha way to fame
as one of the most unforgettable as well as most “superfluous” heroes of
Russian literature Oiher noteworthy novelists of the period included Nicho-
las Leskov who developed a highly individual language and style and wrote
about the provincial clergy and similar topics associated with the Church
and the people, and Gleb Uspensky, a populist and a pessimist, deeply con-
cerned wuh peasant life as well as with the intelligentsia An able satirist,
Michael Saltykov, who wrote under the pseudonym of N Shchedrin, fitted
welt into that critical and realistic age ami acquired great popularity. A
highly talented dramatist, Alexander Ostrovsky, wrote indefaugably from
about 1850 until his death in 1886, creating much of the basic repertoire
of the Russian theater and contributing especially to the depiction of mer-
chants, minor officials, and the lower middle class in general.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century and in the early twentieth new
444 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
writers came to the fore to continue the great tradition of Russian prose.
One was Vladimir Korolenko, a populist, optimist, and author of charm-
ing stories; another was Anton Chekhov; and a third was the restless Alexis
Peshkoy, better known as Maxim Gorky, who created his own world of
tramps and outcasts and went on to become the dean of Soviet writers,
Chekhov, who lived from 1860 until 1904, left a lasting imprint on Russian
and world literature. A brilliant playwright, he had the good fortune to be
writing just as the Moscow Art Theater was rising to its heights. He is even
more important as one of the founders and a master craftsman of the
modern short story, the literary genre that he usually chose to make his
simple, gentle, restrained, and yet wonderfully effective comments on the
world.
Poetiy fared less well than prose between the “great reforms” and the
turn of the century. The very great lyricist Fedor Tiutchev, perhaps the
world’s outstanding poet of late love and of nature in its romantic, pan-
theistic, and chaotic aspects, died in 1873, an isolated figure. In the decades
following the emancipation neither the small group of poets who cham-
pioned “art for art’s sake,” such as the gifted Athanasius Fet-Shenshin, nor
the dominant practitioners of “civic poetry,” led by Nekrasov, left much of
lasting value. The poetic muse had to wait for more propitious circum-
stances.
These circumstances emerged around 1900 with the dawning of the
“silver age.” Foreshadowed by certain literary critics and poets in the
1890’s, the new period has often been dated from the appearance in 1898
of a seminal periodical, The World of Art, put out by Serge Diaghilev and
Alexander Benois. What followed was a cultural explosion. Almost over-
night there sprung up in Russia a rich variety of literary and artistic creeds,
circles, and movements. As Mirsky and other specialists have noted, these
different and sometimes hostile groups had little or nothing in common, ex-
cept their denial of “civic art” and their high standards of culture and
craftsmanship. While much of the creative work of the “silver age” tended
toward pretentiousness, obscurity, or artificiality, its best products were
very good indeed. And even when short of the best, the works of the “silver
age” indicated a new refinement, richness, and maturity in Russian culture.
In literature, the new trends resulted in a great revival of poetry and
literary criticism, although some Temarkable prose was also produced, for
example, by Boris Bugaev, known as Andrei Bely. Among the poets, the
symbolist Alexander Blok, who lived from 1880 to 1921 and wrote verses
of stunning magic and melody to the mysterious Unknown Lady and on
other topics, has been justly considered the greatest of the age and one of
the greatest in all Russian literature. But Russia suddenly acquired many
brilliant poets; other symbolists, for example, Innokentii Annensky, Bely,
Valery Briusov, and Constantine Balmont; “acmeists,” such as Nicholas
cuituhs 1561—1917
445
Gumilev and Osip Mandelstam, futurists, such as Vclcimr Khlebnikov and
Vladuntf Maiakovsky , or peasant poets, such as Serge Esenin The poet
and novelist Boris Pasternak, who died in I960, and the poetess Anna
Akhmatova, who lived until 1966 as probably the last Russian poet of the
first rank, also belong fully to the “silver age ” In literary cnLctsm, too, the
new trends continued to enrich Russian culture after 1917, producing
notably an mteresung school of formalist critics, until destroyed by Soviet
regimentation and “socialist realism “
The Arts
In ait, as m literature, ''realism*' dominated the second half of the nine-
teenth century, only to bo enriched and in large part replaced by the varied
new currents of the “silver age *’ In painting the decisive turning to realism
can even be precisely dated m 1863 fourteen young painters, led by Ivan
Kramskoy and constituting the enure graduating class of the Academy of
Arts, refused to paint their examination assignment, “A Feast m Valhalla ”
Breaking with the su fling academic tradition they insisted on painting real-
istic pictures Several years later they organtzed popular circulating exhibi-
tions of their works and came to be known as the * itinerants ” With new
painters joining the movement and us influence spreading "critical realism”
asserted itself in Russian art just as it had in Russian literary criticism and
literature In accord with the spirit of the age. the ‘itinerants” and their
disciples believed that content was more important than form that art had
to serve the higher purpose of educating the masses and championing thetr
interests, and they depicted such topics as the exploitation of the poo% the
drunken clergy, and the brutal police Basil Vereshchiagtn, Tor example,
observed wars at firsthand until he went down with the battleship Tetropax-
lossX when Jt was sunk by the Japanese He painted numerous and often
huge canvases on the glaring inhumanity of wars, characteristically dedi-
cating his “Apotheosis of War,” a pyramid of skulls, "to all great con-
querors, present, past, and future " To be sure, painting could not be lim-
ited to social protest, and realism naturally extended to protraits, genre
scenes, landscapes, historical topics — well handled by Basil Sunkov — and
other subject matter Still, (he Russian artists ot the period demonstrated
earnestness rather than talent, and added more to the polemics of the age
than to an Even the most famous of them, Elijah Repin, who hved from
1844 to 1930, IS less likely to be remembered for his contribution to crea-
tive art, than for bis active participation in Russian life and culture, and
for certain paintings that have become almost inseparable from tbelr sub-
ject matter, such as one uf the Dnieper cossacks and one of Ivan the Terri-
ble just after be had mortally wounded his vjn Ivan
The development of music followed a somewhat different pattern It, too,
responded to the demands of the age, as «cen, for example, m Modest
Musorgsky’s emphasis on content, realism, and closeness to the masses.
Music, however, by its very nature could not be squeezed into the frame-
work of critical realism, and fortunately it attracted much original talent
in Russia at the time. The second half of the nineteenth century witnessed a
great spread of musical interest and education in the empire, with a con-
servatory established in St. Petersburg in 1862, headed by the noted com-
poser and magnificent pianist Anton Rubinstein, another one in Moscow in
1866, headed by Anton Rubinstein’s younger brother, Nicholas, and still
other musical schools in other cities in subsequent years. Moreover, quite
a number of outstanding Russian composers came to the fore at that time.
The most prominent of them included Peter Tchaikovsky and dilettante
members of the celebrated “Mighty Bunch,” Modest Musorgsky, Nicholas
Rimsky- Korsakov, Alexander Borodin, and Caesar Cui. The “Mighty
Bunch," or “The Five" — Milii Balakirev, a professional, trained musician,
must be added to the four already mentioned — in effect created the na-
tional Russian school of music, utilizing folk songs, melodies, tales, and
legends, and a romanticized vision of the Russian past to produce such
famous operas as Musorgsky’s Boris Godunov, Borodin’s Prince Igor, and
Rimsky-Korsakov’s Sadko and The Tale of the Town of Kitezh. It hardly
needs to be mentioned that much of the instrumental and vocal music of
the “Mighty Bunch” has entered the basic musical repertoire all over the
world. The same, of course, holds true of Tchaikovsky, who stood apart
from “The Five,” developing an elegiac, subjective, and psychological ap-
proach of his own. Indeed, few pieces in the world of music are better
known than Tchaikovsky’s Sixth Symphony or his ballets, Swan Lake and
The Sleeping Beauty.
The “silver age” brought a renaissance in the fine arts as well as in litera-
ture. In music, where Alexander Scriabin initiated the change, it marked
the appearance of the genius of Igor Stravinsky and of other brilliant young
composers. In a sense, the new ballet masterpieces, for example, Stravin-
sky’s The Firebird, Pelrouchka — which also belongs to Benois — and he
Sacre du printemps, combining as they did superb music, choreography,
dancing, and decor, expressed best the cultural refinement, craftsmanship,
and many-sidedness of the “silver age.” The Russian ballet received over-
whelming acclaim when Diaghilev brought it to Paris in 1909, starring such
choreographers as Michael Fokine and such dancers as Anna Pavlova and
Waslaw Nijinsky. From that time on Russian ballet has exercised a funda-
mental influence on ballet in other countries. On the eve of 1917 Russia
could also boast of leading artists in other musical fields, for instance, the
bass Theodore Chaliapin, the conductor Serge Koussevitzky, and the pia-
nist, conductor, and composer. Serge Rachmaninov, to mention three of
the best-known names.
CULTURE 1861-1917 447
Dtaghilcv's ballets made such a stunning impression in the West in part
because of the superb ddcor and staging Benois, Constantine Korovin, and
other gifted artists of the “silver age created a school of stage painting that
gave Russia world leadership m that field and added immeasurably to
operatic and theatrical productions as well as to the ballet. Other Russian
artists, notably Marc Chagall and Basil Kandinsky, broke much more
radically with the established standards and became leaders of modernism
in painting Still another remarkable development m the ’ silver age was
the rediscovery of icon painting both a physical rediscovery, because an
cient icons had become dark, been ovcrlaiJ with metal, or even painted
over, and began to be restored to their original condition only around 1900,
and an arusbc rediscovery, because these icons were newly appreciated,
adding to the culture and the creative influences of the period
Theater, like the ballet a combination of arts, also developed splendidly
m the “silver age" In addition to the fine imperial theaters private ones
came into prominence The Moscow Art Theater, directed by Constanuirc
Stanislavsky who emphasized psychological realism, achieved the greatest
and most sustained fame and exercised the strongest influence on acting in
Russia and abroad But it is important to realize that it represented only
one current in the theatrical life of a period remarkable for its variety, vi
tahty, and experimentation Russian art at well as Russian literature in the
“silver age’ formed an inseparable part of the an and literature of the
West, profiting hugely, for example, from literary trends in France or from
German thought, and in turn contributing to virtually every form of literary
and artistic argument and creative expression In a sense, Russian culture
was never more “Western” than on the eve of 1917
Ideologies
Russian social, political, and philosophical thought also underwent con-
siderable evolution between the emancipation of the serf* and the First
World War As already menuoned, the radicals of the generation of the
sixties, Turgenev’s “sons,” found their spiritual home first In nihilism,
in the denial of all established authorities As their spokesman, the gifted
young literary entic Dmitni Pisarev, 1840-68, said “What can be broken,
should be broken " The new radical spint reflected both the general ma-
terialistic and realistic character of the age and special Russian condi-
tions, such as n reaction to the stifling of intellectual life under Nicholas I,
the autocratic and oppressive nature of the regime, the v. eak development
o! the middle class or other elements of moderation and compromise, and
a gradual democratization of the educated public.
While nihilism emancipated the young Russian radicals from any alle-
44S
IMPERIAL RUSSIA
giance to the established order, it was, to repeat a point, individual rather
than social by its very nature and lacked a positive program — both Pisarev
and Turgenev’s hero Bazarov died young. The social creed came with a
vengeance in the form of narodnichestvo, or populism, which arose in the
1860’s and ’70’s to dominate much of Russian radicalism until the October
Revolution. We have already seen its political impact in such events as
the celebrated “going to the people” oE 1874, the terrorism of the “Will of
the People,” and the activities of the Socialist Revolutionary party. Al-
though in a broad sense Russian populism belonged ideologically to the
general European radicalism of the age, it also possessed a distinctively
Russian character — for Russia was a peasant country par excellence
and numerous Russian prophets. The first prophets were the radical West-
ernizers Herzen and Bakunin, the former surviving until 1870 and the latter
until 1876, who both preached that radical intellectuals should turn to the
people and proclaimed the virtues of the peasant commune. Bakunin's vio-
lent anarchism in particular inspired many of the more impatient populists.
Anarchism, it might be added, appealed to a variety of Russian intellec-
tuals, including such outstanding figures as Tolstoy and Prince Peter Kro-
potkin, a noted geographer, geologist, and radical, who lived from 1842 to
1921 and devoted most of his life to the spreading of anarchism, Kropot-
kin’s activities as a radical included a fantastic escape from the Peter and
Paul Fortress, which was described in his celebrated Memoirs of a Revolu-
tionist written in English for The Atlantic Monthly in 1898-99.
Whereas Herzen and Bakunin were Emigres, populist leaders also arose
in Russia after 1855. Nicholas Chemyshevsky, whose views and impact
were not limited to populism, but who nevertheless exercised a major in-
fluence on Russian populists, deserves special attention. Born in 1828,
Chemyshevsky actually enjoyed only a few years of public activity as jour-
nalist and writer, especially as editor of a leading periodical, The Con-
temporary, before his arrest in 1862. He returned from Siberian exile only
in 1883 and died in 1889. It was probably Chemyshevsky more than any-
one else who contributed to the spread of utilitarian, positivist, and in part
materialist views in Russia. A man of vast erudition, Chemyshevsky con-
cerned himself with esthetics — developing further Belinsky's ideas on the
primacy of life over art — as much as with economics, and wrote on
nineteenth-century French history, demonstrating the failure of liberalism,
as well as on Russian problems. His extremely popular novel. What Is To
Be Done?, dealt with the new generation of “critical realists,” their ethics
and their activities, and sketched both the revolutionary hero and forms of
co-operative organization. As to the peasant commune, Chemyshevsky
showed more reserve than certain of his contemporaries. Yet he generally
believed that it could serve as a direct transition to socialism in Russia,
culture; 1861-1917 449
provided socialist revolution first triumphed in Europe For a time Cherny-
shevsky collaborated closely m spreading bis ideas with an able radical
literary critic, Nicholas Dobroliubov, who died m 1861 at the oge of twenty-
five.
Chemyshevsky’s and Dobrotiubov’s work was continued, with certain
differences, by Peter Lavrov and Nicholas Mikhailovsky, Lavrov, 1823-
1900, another erudite adherent of positivism, utilitarianism, and populism,
emphasized in his Historical Letters of 1870 and In other writings the crucial
role of “critically thinking individuals” in the revolutionary struggle and
the transformation of Russia Mikhailovsky, a literary critic who lived from
1842 to 1904, employed the “subjective method” in social analysis to stress
moral values tather than mere objective description and to champion the
peasant commune, which provided for harmonious development of the in-
dividual, by contrast with the industrial order, which led to narrow speciali-
zation along certain lines and the atrophy o* other aspects of pcrsooalilj.
The populist defense of the peasant commune became more desperate with
the passage of time, because Russia was in fact developing into a capitalist
country and because on articulate Marxist school arose to point that out
as proof that history was proceeding according to Marxist predictions Yet
the Socialist Revolutionaries of the twentieth century, led by Victor Cher-
nov, although they borrowed much from the Marxists and had to modify
their own views, remained essentially faithful to populism, staking the fu-
ture of Russia on the peasants and on a “socialization of land ”
Marxists proved to be strong competitors and opponents of popuhsts
While Marxism will be discussed in a later chapter, it should be kept in
mind that Marxism offered to us followers an “objective knowledge" of
history instead of a mere "subjective method” and a quast-scicnufic cer-
tainty of victoiy in lieu of, or rather in addition to, moral earnestness and
indignation It claimed to be "tough,” where populism was “soft ” More-
over, the actual dev elopment of Russia seemed to follow the Marxist rather
than the populist blueprint Beginning with the 1890's Marxism made im-
portant Inroads among Russian intellectuals, gaining adherents both among
scholars and in the radical and revolutionary movement The Social Demo-
crats, divided into the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, and their rivals, the
Socialist Revolutionaries, gave political expression to the great ideological
debate and cleavage of radical Russia
To be sure, not all thinking and articulate Russians were radicals But
the Right, the conservatives and the reactionaries, had very little to offer
The government did little more than repeat the obsolete formula of Official
Nationality, and its ablest theoretician, Constantine Pobedonoslsev, deter-
minedly refused to come to terms with the modem world A few reactionary
intellectuals not associated with the government, such as the brilliant writer
450
IMPERIAL RUS
Constantine Leontiev, engaged in violent but fruitless criticism of the trends
of the time and placed their hopes — desperate hopes indeed — in freezing
the social process, in freezing everything!
Perhaps the new-style violent and demagogic Right had brighter pros-
pects than the conservatives did. Its potential might be suggested by the
nationalist rally led by Katkov in 1863, by Pan-Slavism in the late 1870’s
and at certain other times — although Pan-Slavism, especially when it ex-
panded, was by no means limited to the Right • — and by the "Black Hun-
dreds” of the twentieth century. Yet all these movements lacked effective
organization, continuity, and cohesion, as well as solid ideology. Pan-
Siavism, for example, although it had several prophets, including Dostoev-
sky, and a painstaking theoretician of the quasi-scientific racist variety,
Nicholas Danilevsky, whose magnum opus, Russia and Europe, was pub-
lished in 1869, remained an “attitude of mind and feeling” rather than an
“organized policy or even a creed.” In other words, in times of Balkan
crises many Russians sympathized with the Balkan Slavs, but they forgot
them once a crisis passed. As a political factor, Pan-Slavism was more a
Western bugaboo than a reality. And, in general, whatever racist and fascist
possibilities existed in imperial Russia, they failed to develop beyond an
incipient stage. Their flowering required a more modern setting than the
one offered by the ancien regime of the Romanovs.
It can be argued that liberalism, on the other hand, represented a promis-
ing alternative for Russia. Moreover, Karpovich, Fischer, and other schol-
ars, as well as a wealth of sources, have demonstrated that Russian liberal-
ism was by no means a negligible quantity. On the contrary, with its bases
in the zemstvo system and the professions, it gained strength steadily and
it produced able ideologists and leaders such as Paul Miliukov and Basil
Maklakov. The important position of the Cadets in the first two Dumas, the
only Dumas elected by a rather democratic suffrage, emphasizes the liberal
potential. But the government never accepted the liberal viewpoint, nor, of
course, did the Russian radical and revolutionary movement accept it. The
liberals thus had little opportunity to influence state policies or even to
challenge them. Whether liberalism could have satisfied Russian needs will
remain an arguable question, because Russian liberalism never received its
chance in imperial Russia.
The “silver age" affected Russian thought as well as Russian literature
and art. Notably, it marked a return to metaphysics, and often to religion
eventually, on the part of a significant sector of Russian intellectuals. Other
educated Russians, especially the writers and the artists, tended to become
apolitical and asocial, often looking to esthetics for their highest values.
The utilitarianism, positivism, and materialism dominant from the time of
the ’60’s, finally had to face a serious challenge.
Philosophy in Russia experienced a revival in the work of Vladimir
cot-TURt 1861-1917
451
Soloviev and his followers Soloviev, a son of the historian Serge Soloviev,
lived from 1853 until 1900 and wrote on a variety of difficult philosophical
and theological subjects A study in ethics, A Justification of the Good, is
generally considered his masterpiece A trenchant critic of the radical creed
of the age, as welt as of chauvinism and reaction, Soloviev remained a
rather isolated individual during his lifetime but came to exercise n pro*
found influence on the intellectual elite of the “silver age *’ In effect almost
everything he had stood for, from imaginative and daring theology to a
sweeping critique of the radical intelligentsia, suddenly came into promi
nence in the early twentieth century
The new critique of the intelligentsia found its most striking expression
in a slim volume entitled Signposts — Vekhl — which appeared in 1909
Signposts contained essays by seven authors including such prominent con
verts from Marxism as Peter Struve Nicholas Berdiaev, and Serge Bulga
kov, and constituted an all out attack on the radical intelligentsia Russian
radicals were accused of an utter disregard for objective truth, religion, and
law, and of an extreme application of the maxim that the end justifies the
means, with destruction as their only effective passion Although Signposts
represented a minority of Russian intellectuals and attracted strong re-
buttals a new cleavage among educated Russians became apparent — a
Cleavage all the more revealing because the critics of the intelligentsia could
by no means be equated with the Right Eventually Struve 1870-1944, be-
came a leading thinker and political figure of the moderate conservatives,
Bcxdiaev, 1874-1948, acquired world fame as a pcrxonalist philosopher
and champion of ‘creative freedom , and Bulgakov, 1871-1944 entered
the priesthood and developed into the most controversial Orthodox theo-
logian of the twentieth century Other prominent intellectuals of the * silver
age” included ihe ‘biological mystic’ Basil Rozanov, who was especially
concerned with ihe problem of sex the brilliant anti rationalist Leo Shcstov
— a pseudonym of Leo Schwartzmann — and the metaphysicians Semen
Frank — another contributor to Signposts — and Nicholas Lossky By
comparison with the 1860 s or even llic 1890 s, the Russian intellectual
scene had indeed changed on the cvc of the First Woild War
Concluding Remarks
The development of Russian culture in the years preceding 1917 suggests
certain significant parallels to the political economic and social condition
of the country Most sinking was the disparity between the few and the
many In the early twentieth century, Russia possessed a rich variety of
pocuc schools and the best ballet in the world, but the majority of the peo-
ple remained illiterate It was even difficult to communicate across the
chasm One is reminded of Chekhov’s story, “The Malefactor,” where a
452 imperial rdssu
peasant brought to court for stealing a bolt from the railroad tracks to
weight his fishing tackle fails to see his guilt, explains that enough bolts ate
left for the train, and in describing his activities constantly refers to “we,"
meaning the peasants of his village, the people, Again, it can be argued that
on the eve of the revolutions Russia exhibited progress and vigorous activity
in intellectual as well as in other matters, straining against the confines of
the established order, But, contrary to the Soviet view, this intellectual de-
velopment did not lead ineluctably to Bolshevism, More than that, the
cultural climate of the “silver age” indicated that the Russian educated pub-
lic was finally moving away from the simple materialistic, utilitarian, and
activist beliefs professed by Lenin and his devoted followers, It would ap-
pear that the Bolsheviks had to succeed soon or not at all, How they did
succeed will be told in the next chapter.
XXXIV
THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1917
The collapse of the Rouxnov autocracy In March 1917 was one of
the most leadcrlcsi, spontaneous anonymous revolutions of all time.
While almost every thoughtful observer in Russia In the winter of
1916-17 foresaw ihe livelihood of the crash of the esistinj regime
po one, even among ihe revofui otury leaders realized that the
strikes and bread riots which bro».e out us Pttroprad on March 8
would culminate irt the mutiny of the garrison and the overthrow
Of the government four days later
cm»ocxn*J
The enemies of Bolshevism were numerous, but they were also
weak, poorly organized divided and ^paiheti: The strategy of
Lenin wis calculated to emphasu* iheir divisions neutralise their
opposition and capitalize on th“u apathy In 1902 m llltat h To
Be Done * Lenin had written. Give us an organization of revolt)
tionaries, and we shall overturn the wtio’e of Russia’" On November
7, 1917, Cfie wish was fulfilled and the deed accomplished
fAIVSOt)
As has been indicated in preceding chapters, the constitutional period ol
Russna imperial history has continued to evoke much controversy, jo cue
only the contributions by Haimson and other American scholars Optimistic
students of the development of Russia from the Revolution of 1905 to the
First World War and the revolutions of 1917 have emphasized that Russia
ha<l finally left autocracy behind and v.as evolving toward liberalism and
political freedom The change m 1907 itt the electoral law indicated that
the Duma could no longer be abolished Moreover, the reformed Russian
legislature proceeded to play an important part in the affairs of the country
and to gam ever-increasing prestige and acceptance at home, among both
government officials and the people, as well as abroad As an Englishman
observed, “the atmosphere and instincts of parliamentary life” grew, in the
empire of the Romanovs Besides, continue the optimists. Russian society
at the time was much more progressive and democratic than the constitu-
tional framework alone would indicate, and waz> becoming increasingly so
every year. Modern education spread rapidly at different levels and
was remarkably humanitarian and liberal -—as were Russian teachers as a
group — not at nil likely to serve as a buttress for antiquated ideas or
obsolete Institutions. Russian universities enjoyed virtually full freedom and
a rich creative life Elsewhere, too, on energetic discussion went on Even
the periodical press, in spite of various restrictions, gave some represents*
453
454 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
tion to every point of view, including tlie Bolshevik. Government prohibi-
tions and penalties could frequently be neutralized by such simple means as
a change in the name of a publication or, if necessary, by sending the
nominal editor to jail, white important political writers continued their
work. To be sure, grave problems remained, in particular, economic back-
wardness and the poverty of the masses. But, through industrialization on
the one hand and Stolypin’s land reform on the other, they were on the
way to being solved. Above all, Russia needed time and peace.
Pessimistic critics have drawn a diSercnt picture of the period. Many of
them refused even to call it “constitutional," preferring such terms as
Scheinkonstitutionalismus — that is, sham constitutionalism — because,
both according to the Fundamental Laws and in fact, the executive branch
of the government and the ministers in particular were not responsible to
the Duma. In any case, the critics asserted, whatever the precise character
of the original arrangements, they were destroyed by the arbitrary electoral
change of 1907, and by Nicholas IPs entire authoritarian and reactionary
policy. On the whole, the government refused to honor even its own nig-
gardly concessions to the public. Nonentities, like Goremykin and Sukbom-
linov, and the fantastic Rasputin himself, were logical end products of the
bankruptcy of the regime. Other aspects of the life of the country, ranging
from political terrorism, both of the Left and of the Right, to Russification
and interminable "special regulations" to safeguard order, emphasized
further the distance that Russia had to travel before it could be considered
progressive, liberal, and law-abiding. Social and economic problems were
still more threatening, according to the pessimists. Fundamental inequality
and widespread destitution could not be remedied by a few large-scale
“hothouse” industries and by a redivision of the peasants’ inadequate land.
Workers in particular, including those concentrated in St. Petersburg and
in Moscow, were becoming more radical and apparently more willing to
follow the Bolsheviks. Moreover, the government never wanted real reform,
because it remained devoted to the interests of the landlords and, secondly,
of the great capitalists. Russia was headed for catastrophe.
The optimists, thus, believe that imperial Russia was ruined by the First
World War. The pessimists maintain that the war provided merely the last
mighty push to bring the whole rotten structure tumbling down. Certain!)'
it added an enormous burden to the load borne by the Russian people.
Human losses were staggering. To cite Golovin’s figures, in the course of
the war the Russian army mobilized 15,500,000 men and suffered greater
casualties than did tire armed forces o! any other country involved in the
titanic struggle: 1,650,000 killed, 3,850,000 wounded, and 2,410,000
taken prisoner. The destruction of property and other civilian losses a!>( ^
displacement escaped count The Russian army tried to evacuate the popu-
THE REVOLUTIONS OP 19 1? 455
Jation as it retreated, adding to the confusion and suffering It became ob-
vious during the frightful ordeal that the imperial government had again
failed irt its tasks, as In the Crimean War and the Russo-Japanese War, bat
on a much larger scale As mentioned earlier, the Russian minister of war
and many other high officials and generals failed miserably m the test of
war, Russian weapons turned out to be inferior to the enemies’, Russian
ammunition in short supply Transportation was generally bogeed down
and on numerous occasions it broke down altogether. Tn addition to the
army, the urban population suflered as a result of this, because it experi-
enced serious difficulties obtaining food and fuel Inflation ran rampant
Worst of all, the government refused to learn any lessons instead of liberal-
izing state policies and relying more on the public, which was eager to help,
Nicholas II In an anachronistic gesture handed over supreme power to the
reactionary empress, and through her to Rasputin, w hen he assumed com-
mand at the front.
The February Revolution and the Provisional Government
The imperial regime died with hardly a whimper Popular revolution,
which came suddenly, was totally unprepared fn the course of the mo-
mentous days of March 8 to 11, 1917 (February 23 to 26, Old Style)
nots and demonstrations in the capital — renamed * Pctrograd" instead of
the German ‘ St Petersburg” during the war — occasioned by a shortage
of bread and coal assumed n more serious character On March 10 reserve
battalions sent to suppress the mutineers fraternized with, them instead, ami
there were no other troops m the city Resolute action, such as promptly
bringing in loyal forces from elsewhere, might have saved the imperial
government Instead, with Nicholas H away at the front, authority simply
collapsed and many officials went u»o hiding Seemingly with one mind,
the population of Pclrograd turned to the Duma for leadership
On March 11 members of the Duma sidestepped an imperial dissolution
decree, and the next day they created a Provisional Government, composed
of a score of prominent Duma leaders and public figures pnnee George
Lvov, formerly chairman of the Union of Zemslva and Towns, assumed the
positions of chairman of the Council of Ministers, that is, prune minister,
and of minister Of the interior Mis more important colleagues included the
Cadet leader Mdiukov as minister of foreign affairs, the Octobrist leader
Guchkov as minister of war and of the navy, and Alexander Kerensky, the
only socialist m the cabinet — associated with the Socialist Revolutionary
party — as minister of justice The new go\ ernment closely reflected the
composition and views of the Progressive Bloc in the Duma, with the
Cadets obtaining the greatest single representauon
Nicholas II bowed to the inevitable and on the fifteenth of March abdi-
cated for himself and his only son, Alexis, in favor of his brother, Michael
who in turn abdicated the next day in favor of the decision of the con-
stituent assembly, or in effect in favor of the Provisional Government pend-
ing that decision. Nicholas H, on his side, had appointed Lvov prime
minister before renouncing the throne. Thus ended the rule of the Ro-
manovs in Russia.
The Provisional Government was quickly recognized, and hailed, by the
United States and other Western democracies. But, in spite of its rapid and
general acceptance in Russia and abroad, the new government had to deal
from the very beginning with a serious rival: the Petrograd Soviet of
Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, which was modeled on the 1905 Soviet.
The new Soviet was formed on the twelfth of March, established itself in
the Duma building, and proceeded to assert its authority. True, dominated
by moderate socialists until the autumn of 1917, it did not try to wrest
power from the “bourgeoisie,” for it considered Russia unprepared for a
socialist revolution, but it made its weight strongly felt nevertheless. In fact,
the Provisional Government had been set up by the Duma in consultation
with the Soviet and had to take its unofficial partner into account iu all its
policies and activities. Moreover, the Soviet acted authoritatively on its
own, sometimes in direct contradiction to the efforts of the ministers.
Notably, as early as March 14 it issued the famous, or notorious, Order
No. 1 to the troops which proclaimed that military units should be run by
elected committees, with officers entitled to command only during tactical
operations, and which played a role in the demoralization and eventual
collapse of the Russian army. Following the Petrograd lead, Soviets began
to be formed all over Russia. The first All-Russian Congress of Soviets,
which met in the capital on the sixteenth of June, contained representatives
from more than 350 local units. The delegates included 285 Socialist
Revolutionaries, 245 Mensheviks, and 105 Bolsheviks, as well as some
deputies from minor socialist parties. The Congress elected an executive
committee which became the supreme Soviet body. Soviets stood much
closer to the restless masses than did Lvov and his associates, and thus
enjoyed a large and immediate following.
The Provisional Government lasted approximately eight months: from
March 12 until November 7, 1917. Its record combined remarkable liberal-
ism with an inability to solve pressing, crucial problems. The new regime
promoted democracy and liberty in Russia. All citizens achieved equality
before the law, Full freedom of religion, speech, press, assembly, unions,
and strikes became a reality. Town and country administration was re-
vamped to make it more democratic, with zemstvo institutions finally intro-
duced at the level of the volost, that is, the township or canton. In addition
to equal rights, ethnic minorities received autonomy, while Poland was de-
THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1917
457
clarcd independent Labor legislation Included the introduction of an eight-
hour day for some categories of workers
However, although the Provisional Government demonstrated what
liberalism might have done for Russia, it failed to overcome the quite
extraordinary difficulties that beset the country, and those who ruled It, In
1917 The new government continued the war in spue of the fact that
defeatism spread among the people and that the army became daily less
able to fight on While convinced that all available land should belong to
the peasants, it made no definitive land settlement leaving that to the con-
stituent assembly and thus itself fading to satisfy the peasantry It proved
unable to check inflation, restore transportation, or increase industrial pro-
duction In fact, Russian economy continued to run rapidly downhill
A large part of this failure stemmed from the limited authority and power
of the new regime As already menuoned it had nt all times to contend
with the Soviet It had little in the way of an effecUte administrative appa-
ratus, the tsarist police in particular having largely gone into hiding While
the high command of the army supported the government, enlisted men
remained an uncertain quantity, the Petrograd garrison itself was devoted
to the Soviet What is more the Provisional Government had to promise
the Soviet not to remove or disarm that garrison Kerensky’s derisive appel-
lation ‘ persuader in-chief,’ was in part a refaction of his unenviable
position
The government also made mistakes It refused to recognize the cata-
strophic condition of the country and misjudged the mood of the people
Thus, os mentioned, it continued the war, believing that the Russians like
the French at the time of the great French Revolution, would fight better
than ever because they were finally free men In internal affairs, a moderate
and liberal position, generally difficult to maintain in tunes of upheaval,
proved quixotic in a country of desperately poor and largely Illiterate
peasants who wanted the gentry land above all else The government s
temporaiy ’provisional," nature constituted a special weakness Its mem
bers were deeply conscious of the fact that they had acquired their htgh
authority by chance, that the Duma itself had been elected by the ex-
tremely restricted suffrage of 1907, and that the future of Russia must
be settled by a fully democratic constituent assembly Such basic decisions
as those involved in the land settlement and in the future status of the
national minorities had, therefore, to be left to that assembly In the
suggestive, if controversial, words of a political scientist "This lack of
a representative and responsible parliament helped greatly to distinguish
the course of the Russian Revolution from its English, French and Ameri-
can predecessors * Yet, if a constituent assembly meant so much to the
members of the Provisional Government, they made perhaps their worst
mistake m not calling it together soon enough While some of the best
458 imperial Russia
Russian jurists tried to draw a perfect electoral law, time slipped by. Whea
a constituent assembly finally did meet, it was much too late, for the
Bolsheviks had already gained control of Russia.
The Bolshevik victory in 1917 cannot be separated from the person
and activity of Lenin. He arrived, together with some of his associates
at the Finland Station in Petrograd on the sixteenth of April, the Germans
having let them through from Switzerland in hopes that they would dis-
organize the Russian war effort. In contrast to the attitude of satisfaction
with the course of the revolution and co-operation with the Provisional
Government prevalent even in the Soviet, Lenin assumed an extreme and
intransigent position in his “April Theses” and other pronouncements. He
declared that the bourgeois revolution had already been accomplished in
Russia and that history was moving inexorably to the next stage, the
socialist stage, which had to begin with the seizure of power by the
proletariat and poor peasants. As immediate goals Lenin proclaimed peace,
seizure of gentry land by the peasants, control of factories by committees
of workers, and “all power to the Soviets.” “War to the palaces, peace to
the huts!” shouted Bolshevik placards. “Expropriate the expropriators!"
Although Lenin found himself at first an isolated figure unable to win
a majority even in his own party, events moved his way. The crushing
burden of the war and increasing economic dislocation made the position
of the Provisional Government constantly more precarious. In the middle
of May, Miliukov and Guchkov were forced to resign because of popular
agitation and pressure, and the cabinet was reorganized under Lvov to
include five socialists rather than one, with Kerensky taking the ministries
of war and the navy. The government declared itself committed to a
strictly defensive war and to a peace “without annexations and indemni-
ties.” Yet, to drive the enemy out, Kerensky and General Alexis Brusilov
started a major offensive on the southwestern front late in June. Initially
successful, it soon collapsed because of confusion and lack of discipline.
Entire units simply refused to fight. The Germans and Austrians in turn
broke through the Russian lines, and the Provisional Government had to
face another disaster. The problem of national minorities became ever
more pressing as ethnic and national movements mushroomed in the dis-
organized former empire of the Romanovs. The government continued its
increasingly hazardous policy of postponing political decisions until the
meeting of a constitnent assembly. Nevertheless, four Cadet ministers
resigned in July because they believed that too broad a recognition had
been accorded to the Ukrainian movement. Serious tensions and crises in
the cabinet were also demonstrated by the resignation of the minister of
trade and industry, who opposed the efforts of the new Social. Democratic
minister of labor to have workers participate in the management of
Industry, and the clash between Lvov and Victor Chernov, the Socialist
THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1917 459
Revolutionary leader who had become minister of agriculture over the
implementation of the land policy The crucial land problem become more
urgent as peasants began to appropriate the land of the gentry on their
own, without waiting for the constituent assembly
The general crisis and unrest iq the country and, m particular, the
privations and restlessness in the capital led to the so-called "July days,"
from the sixteenth to the eighteenth of July, 1917, when radical soldiers,
sailors, and mobs, together with the Bolsheviks tried to seize power m
Pctrograd Lenin apparently considered the uprising premature, and the
Bolsheviks seemed to follow their impatient adherents as much ax they
led them Although sizeable and threatening the rebellion collapsed
because the Soviet refused to endorse it because some military units
proved loyal to the Provisional Government, and because the government
utilized the German connections of the Bolsheviks to accuse them of
treason Several Bolshevik leaders fled, including Lenin who went to
Finland from whence he continued to direct the party, certain others were
jailed But the government did not press its victory and try to eliminate
its opponents On the twentieth of July prince Lvov resigned and Kerensky
took over the position of prime minister, socialists once more gamed to
the reshuffling of the cabinet
Ministerial changes helped the regime little The manifold crisis lq the
country deepened In addition to the constant pressure from the Left, ibe
Provisional Government attracted opposition from the Right which ob-
jected to its inability to maintain firm control over the army and the people,
its lenient treatment of the Bolsheviks, and its increasingly socialist com-
position In search of a broader base of understanding and support, the
government arranged a State Conference in late August in Moscow, at-
tended by some two thousand former Duma deputies and representatives
of various organizations and groups, such as Soviets unions, and Jocol
governments The Conference produced no tangible results, but underlined
the nft between the socialist and the non-socialist approaches to Russian
problems Whereas Kerensky expressed the socialist position and received
strong support from socialist deputies the Constitutional Democrats, army
circles, and other “middle-class” groups rallied around the recently qp-
pointed commander in chief, General Lavr Kornilov Of simple Cossack
origin. Kornilov had no desire to restore the old regime, and he could
even be considered a democratic general But the commander In chief,
along with other military men, wanted above all to rc-cstabhsh discipline
in the army and law and order iq the country, disapproving especially
of the activities of the Soviets
The “Kornilov affair ' remains something of a mystery, although
Ukraintsev’s testimony and certain other evidence indicate that Kerens^,
rather than Kornilov, should be blamed for its peculiar course and its
460 IMPERIAL RUSSIA
being a fiasco. Apparently the prime minister and the commander in chief
had decided that loyal troops should be sent to Petrograd to protect the
government. Apparently, too, that “protection” included the destruction
of Soviet power in the capital. In any case, when Kornilov dispatched an
army corps to execute the plan, Kerensky appealed to the people “to save
the revolution” from Kornilov. The break between the prime minister and
the general stemmed probably not only from their different views on the
exact nature of the strengthened Provisional Government to he established
in Russia, and on Kerensky’s position in that government, but also from
the strange and confusing activities of the man who acted as an interme-
diary between them.
The revolution was “saved.” From the ninth to the fourteenth of
September the population of the capital mobilized for defense, while the
advancing troops, faced with a railroad strike, encountering general op-
position, and short of supplies, became demoralized and bogged down
without reaching the destination; their commanding officer committed
suicide. Only the Bolsheviks really gained from the episode. Their leaders
were let out of jail, and their followers were armed to defend Petrograd.
After the Kornilov threat collapsed, they retained the preponderance of
military strength in the capital, winning ever more adherents among the
increasingly radical masses.
The Provisional Government, on the other hand, came to be bitterly
despised by the Right for having betrayed Kornilov — whether the charge
was entirely justified is another matter — while many on the Left suspected
it of having plotted with him. The cabinet experienced another crisis and
was finally able to reconstitute itselE — for the third and last time — only
on the twenty-fifth of September, with ten socialist and six nonsocialist
ministers, Kerensky remaining at the head. It should be added that the
Kornilov fiasco, followed by the arrest of Kornilov and several other
generals, led to a further deterioration of military discipline, making the
position of officers in many units untenable.
The October Revolution
The Bolsheviks finally captured a majority in the Petrograd Soviet on
September 13 and in the Moscow Soviet a week later, although the ex-
ecutive committee elected by the first All-Russian Congress of Soviets
continued, of course, to be dominated by moderate socialists. Throughout
the country the Bolsheviks were on the rise. From his hideout in Finland,
Lenin urged the seizure of power. On October 23 he came incognito to
Petrograd and managed to convince the executive committee of the party,
with some division of opinion, of the soundness of his view, Lenin ap-
parently considered victory a great gamble, not a scientific certainty, but
TBl llEVOnmorta OF 1917 461
he correctly estimated that the fortunate circumstances had to be ex
plotted and he did not want to wait until th* meeting of the const tuent
assembly His opinions pics ailed over the [udgment ol those ol his col
leagues who m more orthodot Marxist fashion considered Russia m
sufficiently prepared for a Bolshevik revolution and then party lacking
adequate support in the country at hrge Leon Trotsky— a pseudonym
of Leon Btonstein— who first h'came prominent is the St Pttetsbutg
Soviet of 1905 and tvho combined oratorical brilliance and outstanding
intellectual qualities with energy and oigamiational ability proved to he
Lenin s ablest and most active assistant m staging the Bolsheviks seizure
of power
The revolution succeeded with little opposition On November 1 —
October 25 Old Style hence the Great October Revolution —Red
troops occupied various strategic points in the capital In the early night
hours of November 8 the Bolshcnk ltd sold ers of the Pctrograd garrison
sailors from Kronstadt and the workers Red Gu’rds stormed the Winter
Palace weakly defended by youngsters from military schools and even by
a women s battalion and arrested trnnbcis of the Provisional Government
Kerensky him'clf had managed to escape some hours earlier Soviet gov
emment was established in Pctrograd and m Russia
Part VI SOVIET RUSSIA
XXXV
SOVIET RUSSIA- AN INTRODUCTION
The philetop»=M have only interpreted ihe world in various ways,
the point however is to change it *
MktX
The conception of a community as an organic growth, which the
statesman can only aflccl to ft limited extent, ia In the msirt modern,
and has been greatly strengihencd by tbc theory of evolution . .
It might, however, be maintained that the evolutionary view of
society though tiue in the past is no longer applicable, but mtitt. for
the present and the future, he ic placed by a much more mechanistic
view In Russo and Germany new societies have been created. In
much the same way as the mythical Lycurgus was supposed «u have
created the Spartan polity The a-icient law giver was a benevolent
myth, the modern law giver is a terrifying seatiiy
RUVSLIX
Communist ideology, the Communist party, and Communist direction
have constituted the outstanding characteristics of Soviet Russia, that is,
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics To be sure, other factors,
ranging from the economic backwardness of the country to its position as
a great power m Europe, Asia, and the world, have proved to be of major
importance Still, it would not be an exaggeration to say that, whereas other
elements in the situation hive exercised very significant influences on
Soviet policies, without communism there would have been no Soviet
policies at all and no Soviet Union Moreover, it w frequently impossible
to draw the line between the communist and the noncommunist aspects
of Soviet Russia and between communist and noncomrmuust causes of
Soviet behavior because the two modes have influenced and interpenetrated
each other and because Soviet leaders have viewed everything within the
framework of their ideology.
Marxism
The doclnne of communism represents a variant of Marxism, based
on the works of Marx and Engels as developed by Ixnm Working for
several decades, beginning in the 1840't, Marx and Engels constructed
* Italics iq the original
465
466
SOVIET Rtl S
a huge and comprehensive, although not entirely consistent, philosophical
system. The roots of Marxism include eighteenth-century Enlightenment
classical economics, utopian socialism, and German idealistic philosophy
— in other words, some of the main traditions of Western thought Most
important, Marx was “the last of the great system-builders, the successor
of Hegel, a believer, like him, in a rational formula summing up the
evolution of mankind.” While an exposition of Marxism would require
another book, certain aspects of the doctrine must be constantly kept in
mind by a student of Soviet history.
Marxism postulates dialectical materialism as the key to and the essence
of reality. While applicable to philosophy, science, and in fact to every-
thing, dialectical materialism exercised its greatest impact on the study
and later manipulation — of human society, on that combination of
sociology, history, and economics that represented Marx’s own specialty.
“Materialism” asserts that only matter exists; in Marxism it also led to
a stress on the priority of the economic factor in man’s life, social organiza-
tion, and history.
In the social production of their means of existence men enter into defi-
nite, necessary relations which are independent of their will, productive
relationships which correspond to a definite stage of development of their
material productive forces. The aggregate of these productive relation-
ships constitutes the economic structure of society, the real basis on which
a juridical and political superstructure arises, and to which definite forms
of social consciousness correspond. The mode of production of the ma-
terial means of existence conditions the whole process of social, political
and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines
their existence, but, on the contrary, it is their social existence that deter-
mines their consciousness.
The fundamental division in every society is that between the exploiters
and the exploited, between the owners of the means of production and
those who have to sell their labor to the owners to eam a living. A given
political system, religion, and culture all reflect and support the economic
set-up, protecting the interests of the exploiters. The base, to repeat, de-
termines the superstructure.
“Dialectical” adds a dynamic quality to materialism, defining the process
of the evolution of reality. For the Marxists insist that everything changes
all the time. What is more, that change follows the laws of the dialectic
and thus presents a rigorously correct and scientifically established pattern.
Following Hegel, Marx and. Engels postulated a three-step sequence of
change: the thesis, the antithesis, and the synthesis. A given condition, the
thesis, leads to opposition within itself, die antithesis, and the tension
between the two is resolved by a leap to a new condition, the synthesis.
The synthesis in turn becomes a thesis producing a new antithesis, and
AN INTRODUCTION 467
the dialectic continues The historical dialectic expresses itscU in class
struggle "The history of all hitherto existing society » the history of class
struggles " As an antithesis grows within a thesis, “the material productive
forces of a society" always developing, * come into contradiction with the
existing productive relationships," and social strife ensues Eventually
revolution leads to a transformation of society, only to become itself the
new established order producing a new antithesis In this manner the
Italian towns and the urban classes in general revolted successfully against
feudalism to inaugurate the modem, bourgeois pc nod of European history
That period in turn ran its prescribed course, culminating in the full flower-
ing of capitalism But, again inevitably, the capitalists, the bourgeois,
evoked their antithesis, their "grave-diggers," the industrial workers or the
proletariat In the words oE Marx foretelling the coming revolution
The expropriation is brought about by the operation of the immanent
laws of capitalist production by the centralization ©f capital . The
centralization of the means of production and the socialization of labor
reach a point where they prove incompatible with ihclr capitalist husk
This hush bums asunder The inch ol capitalist private property sounds
The expropriators ore expropriated
Interestingly if illogically, the victorious proletarian revolution would maik
the end of all exploitation of man by man and the establishment of a just
socialist society In a sense, humanity would return to prehistory, when,
according to Marx and the Marxists, primeval communities knew no social
differentiation or antagonism.
Lcmnism
Lenin s theoretical contribution to Marxism could in no sense nval
the contributions of the two originators of the doctrine Still, he did his
best to adapt Marxism to the changing conditions in the world as well as
to his own experience with the Second International and to Russian cir-
cumstances, and he produced certain important additions to and modifica
lions of the basic teaching More to the point for students of Soviet history
is the fact that these amendments became gospel tn the Soviet Union,
where the entire ideology has frequently been referred to as Marxism-
Leninism ”
Among the views developed by Lenin, those on the party, the revolu
tion, and the dictatorship of the proletariat, together with those on the
peasantry and on imperialism, descrv e special attention As already men-
tioned, it was a disagreement on the nature of the party that in 1903 split
the Russian Social Democrats into the Lenin led Bolsheviks and the
468 SOVIET RUSSIA
Mensheviks. Lenin insisted on a tightly knit body of dedicated professional
revolutionaries, with clear lines of command and a military discipline. The
Mensheviks, by contrast, preferred a larger and looser organization. With
characteristic determination and believing in the imminent worldwide
overthrow of the capitalist system, Lenin decided in 1917 that he and his
party could then stage a successful revolution in Russia, although at first
virtually no one, even among the Bolsheviks, agreed. After the Bolsheviks
did seize power in the October Revolution, Lenin proceeded to emphasize
the role of the party and the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Lenin’s revolutionary optimism stemmed in part from his reconsidera-
tion of the role of the peasantry in bringing about the establishment of
the new order. Marx, Engels, and Marxists in general have neglected the
peasants in their teachings and relegated them, as petty proprietors, to the
bourgeois camp. Lenin, however, came to the conclusion that, if properly
led by the proletariat and the party, poor peasants could be a revolutionary
force: indeed later he proclaimed even the middle peasants to be of some
value to the socialist state. The same April Theses that urged the trans'
formation o£ the bourgeois revolution into a socialist one stated that poor
peasants were to be part of the new revolutionary wave.
Lenin expanded Marxism in another, even more drastic manner. In his
book Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, written in 1916 and
published in the spring of 1917, he tried to bring Marxism up to date
to account for such recent developments as intense colonial rivalry,
international crises, and finally the First World War. He concluded that
In its ultimate form capitalism becomes imperialism, with monopolies and
financial capital ruling the world. Cartels replace free competition, and
export of capital becomes more important than export of goods. An
economic and political partitioning of the world follows in the form of
a constant struggle for economic expansion, spheres of influence, colonies,
and the like. International alliances and counteralliances arise. The dis-
parity between the development of the productive forces of the participants
and their shares of the world is settled among capitalist states by wars.
Thus, instead of the original Marxist vision of the victorious socialist
revolution as the simple expropriation of a few supercapitalists, Lenin
described the dying stage of capitalism as an age of gigantic conflicts,
relating it effectively to the twentieth century. Still more important, this
externalization, so to speak, of the capitalist crisis brought colonies and
underdeveloped areas in general prominently into the picture. The capital-
ists were opposed not only by their own proletariats, but also by the alien
peoples whom they exploited, more or less regardless of the social order
and the stage of development of those peoples. Therefore, the proletarians
and the colonial peoples were natural allies. Lenin, it is worth noting,
paid much more attention to Asia than did Western Marxists. Eventually
H JHTfcQDUCTJO
469
— m a dialectical tour de force — even the fact that the socialist revolu
lion came to Russia, rather than to such industrial giants as Great Britain
Germany, and the United Stales, could he explained by the theory of the
‘ weakest link,” th3t is, by the argument that m the empire of the Romanovs
various forms of capitalist exploitation, both native and colonial or serm-
colonial, combined to make capitalism particularly paradoxical and un-
stable, so that the Russian link in the capitalist chain snapped first
Many cntics have pointed out that Lenin’s special views, while differing
from the ideas of Marx and Engels, found their rauon ditre both in
Russian reality and in the Russian radical tradition A land of peasants,
Russia could not afford to rely for its future on the proletariat alone, and
at least the poor peasants, if not the wealthier ones, had to be included
to bring theory into some correspondence with the facts Again in con-
trast to, for example, Germany, socialism never acquired in Imperial
Russia a legal standing or a mass following remaining essentially a
conspiracy of intellectuals If Lenin wanted results, he had to depend on
these intellectuals, on a small dedicated party Moreover, m doing so he
followed the tradition of Cliemyshcvsky, of Tkachev especially, of the
SVitl of the People ” and even, broadly speaking — though he would
have denied it vehemently — of such populists as Lavrov and Mikhailov
sky, who emphasized the role of the critically thinking individuals’ as
the makers of history Bom in 1870 Lenin grew up odrainng Chcmy-
shevsky, and his oldest brother, Alexander, was executed in 1887 for
his part in a popuiistlikc plot to assassinate Alexander HI Lenin s later
persistent and vtolcnt attacks on the populists should not, it has been
argued, obscure his basic indebtedness to them.
Yet, although this line of reasoning has some validity and helps to
situate the great Bolshevik leader m the history of Russian radicalism —
where he certainly belongs as much ns m the history of world Marxism —
it should not be pursued too far After all. Lenin dedicated his entire
mature life to the theory and practice of Marxism, which he considered to
be infallibly true Besides, while one does not have to subscribe to the
official Soviet view that Lenin is the perfect creative Marxist, neither docs
one have to endorse the view, common among Western Social Democrats,
that Lenin and communism betrayed Marxism tn fact, both Lenin s
• hard ' line, emphasizing the role of ibe party, revolution, and nithlessness,
and the ’ soft approach of Western revisionists can be legitimately deduced
from the vast and sometimes inconsistent writings of Marx and Engels
The intolerance
Comprehensiveness and ruthless intolerance have been among the most
important salient features of Marxism Leninism While provoked to an
470
SOVIET RU
extent by such practical circumstances as the requirements of ruling a
state — states, eventually — and the strong and manifold opposition that
had to be overcome, these traits nevertheless reside at the heart of the
ideology itself. As already explained, Marxism constitutes an all-inclusive
view of the world, metaphysical rather than empirical, which omits nothing
of importance and possibly — at least so it can be argued in theory
nothing at all. Moreover, its teachings are believed to have the conclusive-
ness of scientific laws. In other words, to its adherents Marxism-Leninism
represents a science, and those who oppose it are regarded by them as
absolutely and demonstrably wrong. No matter how sophisticated, these
critics ultimately deserve no more consideration than misguided, supersti-
tious women who object to inoculation against cholera. More precisely,
they are either misguided or class enemies; in the latter case they obviously
deserve no favorable consideration at all.
Ruthlessness has also been promoted by the peculiar Marxist ethics,
or rather absence of ethics. Ethics, which belongs to the “superstructure”
of society, has no independent existence in Marxism. According to that
teaching, men behave as they do because of their class nature, because
of the fundamental economic and social realities of their lives. Only a
change in these realities can and will alter human conduct Therefore,
there will be no moral turpitude and no crime in the ideal society of
the future. In the meantime, one is invited to hate the unregenerate world
and all its standards and to struggle, with few inhibitions, if any, for the
victory of communism.
A pseudo science, Marxism-Leninism also possesses numerous earmarks
of a pseudo religion. Berdiaev and other commentators have emphasized
tile extent to which it proclaims itself to be the truth, the ultimate and
entirely comprehensive total, the first and the last, alpha and omega. It
determines in effect the right and the wrong and divides the world into
white and black. More specifically, it has been suggested that communism
has its doctrine of salvation: its Messiah is the proletariat; its paradise is
classless society; its church is the party; and its Scriptures are the writings
of Marx, Engels, Lenin and, until recently, Stalin. The dialectic of class
struggle will suddenly cease when man attains the just society — when
man leaps from the kingdom of necessity into the kingdom of freedom.
It is probably this pseudorcligious aspect of Marxism-Leninism, even more
than its explicit materialism, that makes its frequently fanatical disciples
detenmined enemies of Christianity and of every other religion — for no
man can serve two gods.
Needless to say, Marxism-Leninism is not a democratic teaching. While
its followers remain convinced that it represents the interests of the masses,
the correctness of the ideology and the need to carry it out in practice do
AN INTRODUCTION 471
not depend in the least on popular approval or disapproval More than
that, Marxism 'Lenmism has been remarkably exclusive Where roost
other major beliefs appeal to all men, Marx began with the assumption
that the exploiting classes can never have a change of heart, but must
be overthrown Struggle and violence — ruthless ness once more — form
the very fabric of the Marxist doctrine Even among the exploited, Lenin
insisted, few could fully comprehend their own situation and the course
of history Left to themselves, workers develop nothing more promising
than a trade union mentality Only the Party, onlj an elite, can really see
the light And communist parlies have invariably continued to be ex-
clusive
The Appeal
What makes a communist 7 The ideology itself has no doubt offered
numerous attractions to the intellect and helped many people to under-
stand the world It docs represent one of the most impressive systems in
the history of Western thought and it is related to a number of mam
intellectual currents of the Western tradition Its greatest strength lies
perhaps in its explanation of human exploitation and misery and in its
reasoned promise to end both Those who fail to see the intellectual attrac-
tions of communism on either side of the * iron curtain * should consider
carefully the itsumony ot such nmers as Milosz who left the Polish
* people’s democracy,” or of the several brilliant ex Communists who
contributed to the book The Cod That Failed Yet rational persuasiveness
stops far short of accounting entirely for the appeal of communism Of
course, both materialism and the dialectic, which 3rc enormously important
assumptions, remain unproved More specific Marxist doctnnes, for
instance, the crucial labor theory of value, have been very etlccuvely
criticized In addition, Marxist predictions have often been disproved by
time To cite only two of the more important examples, with the middle
class growing rather than declining, a polarization into capitalists and
workers has failed to take place in capitalist societies, also, in these
societies the standard of living of the workers has been improving rather
than deteriorating Marxism possesses no invincible logic, and no scientific
certainly, ar docs provide an elaborate intellectual rationalization and a
splendid intellectual facade for those who subscribe to the teaching for
nonintellectual reasons
Especially significant, therefore, might be the link between Marxism-
Leninism on the one hand and alienation and protest on the other
Communism has become the vehicle for almost eveiy kind of criticism of
the established order, and it has profited from a wide variety of weaknesses
472
OVIET RUSS
and mistakes of noncommunist societies. Indeed, communists seized power
not, as predicted, in the advanced industrial countries of the West, but in
Russia and in China where relatively backward economic conditions
very different In degree in the two instances — were combined with misery
and great tensions and crises. And in both countries the rising class of
intellectuals refused to identify itself with the existing system and led the
struggle against it. However, even if we allow much for alienation and
protest as factors in the rise of communism, we are faced with the question
as to why it is communism, rather than some other teaching, that has at-
tracted so many sensitive or dissatisfied people.
To suggest one answer among many, one might mention the four
reasons for the appeal of Marxism emphasized by Isaiah Berlin. These
include, to begin with, its comprehensiveness and its claim to be the key to
knowing everything in the present, the past, and the future. Moreover, the
doctrine itself and the knowledge that it gives are allegedly scientific: many
social teachings in the nineteenth century, such as Fourier’s peculiar uto-
pian socialism or Comte’s positivism, claimed scientific validity, but
Marxism managed to identify itself more successfully with science than
any other. Comprehensiveness and scientific authority become especially
attractive with the abandonment of religion and other secure moorings.
In the third place, Marxism, in spite of its deterministic aspect, is an
activist and optimistic teaching: history is moving in the right direction,
and every true believer can have a useful role in furthering its progress.
Finally, Marxism possessed from the start a ready-made audience so to
speak, the working class, which was invited to take over the world. Later
Lenin tried his best to extend the audience to the poor peasants and to
colonial peoples.
To move From Berlin’s “ semirationaV ’ reasons for the appeal of Marx-
ism, Lasswell might serve as a representative guide to the slippery area
of the irrational appeal. In the language of social psychology and psycho-
analysis, he selected such qualities of Marxism-Leninism as its stress on
the transitory nature of the present social order, which leads to a redefini-
tion of expectancies about the future and encourages projection. Marxism
condemns the capitalist system in clearly moral terms, accusing it in
particular of denying affectionate care and attention to the individual and
of giving unfair advantage to some over others. The doctrine gains from
its prestigious “scientific” form and from its alleged objective quality as
well as from specificity, i.e., in analyzing the unjust capitalist society,
Marxists point to “surplus value” and “profits” rather than merely to such
general factors as human greed or corruption. The extremely vague
Marxist utopia, too, serves valuable purposes: it gives free rein to every
individual’s choice and his craving for omnipotence, and it protects the
Marxist ideal from being tied to unpopular or transitory social phenomena.
AN INTRODUCTION
473
Doctrines, it should be added, arc held no less firm!) when they are held
irrationally, In fact, it can be argued that they are held mote firmly it
irrationally.
Cm cMflg Rtnmks
When Communists seized power in Russia in 1917 they had to face an
untoreseen situation, revolution erupted m Russia rather than in the
industrial West, and it came to one country only rather than to the entire
capitalist world While Lenin and his associates tried to adjust to these
(acts, (hey had also to deal with countless other problems, some ot them
of utmost urgency Alter the first hectic months, and years too, Soviet
history has continued to he a story of great pressures, crises, and conflicts
Under these difficult, and at times desperate, circumstances it is rcmathble
not how little but how much Russian Communist leaders adhered to the
pursuit of their ideological goals— from Lenin’s determination to build
socialism on the morrow ol the Revolution, to Stalin’s fantastic five-year
plans, and to Khrushchev's efforts to speed the establishment ol a truly
communist society An account ol this pursuit belongs to the following
XXXVI
WAR COMMUNISM, 1917-21, AND THE NEW ECONOMIC
POLICY, 1921-28
You will never be alive again,
Never rise from the snow:
Twenty-eight bayonet.
Five fire wounds,
A bitter new garment
I sewed for my friend.
It does love, does love blood —
'Die Russian earth.
AKHMATOVA
Where are the swans? And the swans have left.
And the ravens? And the ravens have remained.
TSVETAEVA
Of all the Governments which were set up in Russia to combat revo-
lutionary rule, only one, that of the Social Revolutionaries at Sa-
mara, had the wisdom to assure the peasants that the counterrevolu-
tion did not mean the restoration of the land to the landlords. A11
the rest, in greater or less degree, made plain their policy of re-
establishing or compensating them. It was this, and no transcendent
virtue in the Bolsheviks, which decided the issue of the three years’
struggle, in despite of British tanks and French munitions and Japa-
nese rifles and bayonets.
MAYNARD
Although the Bolsheviks seized power easily in Russia in November
1917, they managed to consolidate their new position only after several
years of bitter struggle. In addition to waging a major and many-faceted
civil war, the Soviet government had to fight Poland and deal with the
Allied intervention. The Bolsheviks, in a desperate effort to survive,
mobilized the population and resources in the area that they controlled
and instituted a drastic regime which came to be known as “War Com-
munism.” Communist rule did survive, although at a tremendous price.
To revive an utterly exhausted, devastated, and starving country, the so-
called “New Economic Policy” replaced War Communism and lasted from
1921 to 1928, until the beginning of Stalin’s First Five-Year Plan. The
period of the New Economic Policy has been rightly contrasted with that
of War Communism as a time of relaxation and compromise. Yet, on
474
WAR COMMUNISM AND THE N E P.
47 S
the whole the Soviet government showed more continuity than change in
its policies and pursued its set goals with intelligence and determination —
as a brief treatment of the first decade of Communist rule should indicate
The New Government Lenin
The Soviet government was organized two days after the October
Revolution, on November 9, 1917, under the name of the Council of
Peoples Commissars Headed by Lenin as chairman, the Council con-
tained such prominent members of the Bolshevik party as Trotsky who
became commissar for foreign affaire, Alexis Rykov who became com-
missar of the interior, and Joseph Dzhugashvili better known as Stalin,
who assumed charge of national minorities Lenin thus led the govern-
ment os well as the party and W3S recognized as by far the most important
figure of the new regime in Russia
Lemrt was bom in an intellectual family — his father was a school
inspector — in 1870 in a town on the Volga named Simbirsk, now
Ulianovsk Vladimir Ulianov proved to be a brilliant student both in
secondary school and at the University of Kazan, where fie studied faw
He early became a radical — the execution of his eldest brother in 1887
for participating in a plot to assassinate Alexander III has sometimes been
considered a turning pouit for him — and then became a Marxist, suffer-
ing imprisonment in 1896 and Siberian exile for the three years following
He participated in the publication of a Social Democratic newspaper, The
Spark, which was printed abroad beginning m 1900, and in other revolu-
tionary activities often under the pseudonym of N Lenin At first awed
by the * father of Russian Marxism," Plekhanov, Lenin before long struck
out on his own, leading the Bolshevik group in the Social Democratic party
split in 1903 We have already met Lenin as an important Marxist
theoretician But practice meant more than theory for the Bolshevik
leader Most of his writings in fact were polemical, bncf, and to the point
they denounced opponents or deviationnts in ideology and charted the
nght way for the faithful As Lenui remarked when events in 1917 inter-
rupted his work on a treatise. The State and Rexolution “It is more
pleasant and more useful to live through the experience of a revolution
than to write about it "
The Great Octo bet-Rcvolution, masterminde d by Lenin, g ave him
power that he conti nued to exercise m futf untjrtargel y i ncapacita ted by"
a strokeTn M ay 1922 After that he stdl kept some control until hi3 death *
orT January 21 7 1 924 Morcovcr,~m contrast to StalmVlatef tcfrorisntr”
Lemn s leadership' ofthc party did not depend at all on the secret police,
but rather on his own personality, ability, and achievement Perhaps' ap-
476 SOVIET RUSSIA
propriately, whereas Stalin’s cult has experienced some remarkable re-
versals of fortune since his demise, that of Lenin has been if anything
steadily gaining in popularity throughout the communist world.
_~^tThe communist myth of Lenin does not stand far from reality in many
respects. For Lenin was a dedicated Bolshev ik, who lived and breathed
revolution and communism. Moreover, he did so naturally, compulsively
to be more exact, rather than as an imposition or a burden. Although not
superhumanly clever and virtually Infallible, as Soviet propaganda would
have it, he did combine high intelligence, an ability for acute theoretical
thinking, and practical sense to become a great Marxist “realist.” The
amalgam proved ideal for communist purposes: Lenin never wavered in
his Marxist faith; yet he knew how to adapt it, drastically if need be, to
circumstances. Other outstanding qualities of the Bolshevik leader included
exceptional will power, persistence, courage, and the ability to work ex-
tremely hard. Even Lenin’s simple tastes and modes t, almost ascetic, way
of life were transposed easily and appropriately from the actual man to
his mythical image.
To be sure, there is another way to look at this paragon of Communist
virtues. Devotion to an exclusive doctrine led to narrow vision. In the
opinion of some specialists, the break between Plckhanov and Lenin, be-
tween the older Marxist who never lost humanistic standards and culture
and the young fanatic confident that the end justified the means, repre-
sented a fundamental division in modem Russian history. Ruthlcssncss
followed from fanaticism as well as from Lenin’s conviction that lie, and
sometimes only he, knew the right answer. In the name of a future utopia,
horrible things could be sanctioned in the present. Churchill once com-
mented on Lenin: “His aim to save the world. His method to blow it
up.” The two objectives go ill together.
The First Months
The Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which met in Petrograd
on the seventh of November, approved the Bolshevik revolution, although
moderate socialists walked out of the gathering. In Moscow Soviet au-
thority was established only after a week of fighting, because some
military units remained loyal to the Provisional Government. Relying on
local Soviets, the Bolsheviks spread their rule to numerous other towns
and areas. The first serious challenge to the Bolshevik government oc-
curred in January 1918, when the Constituent Assembly, for which
elections had been held in late autumn, finally met. The 707 members
who assembled in the capital on January 18 included 370 Socialist
Revolutionaries, 40 Left Socialist Revolutionaries who had split from the
main party, only 170 Bolsheviks, and 34 Mensheviks, as well as not quite
WAR COMMUNISM AND THE N F V
477
one hundred deputies who belonged to m nor parties or had no party
affiliation In other words the Socialist Revolutionaries possessed an
absolute majority Chernov was elected chairman of the Constituent As
Xcmbly It should be remembered that that Assembly had been awaited
for months by almost all political groups m Russia as the truly l’gitunat-
and definitive authority in the country Lenin himself had denounced the
Provisional Government for failing to summon it promptly Yet jn the
changed circumstances he acted in his usual decisive manner and had
troops disperse the Constituent Assembly on the mom ng of the nine
tcenth of January No major repercussions followed and Soviet rule ap-
peared more secure than ever The lack of responsejo the disbanding of
the a ssembly resulted in part from the fact that it had no organized force
behind it and m port fromjhe fact lhat on the very morrow of the revolu
liorTtfi T Sovict government had declared its inten tion t o make peace' and -
afso had In 'etlect grante d th e peasan ts gentryjand, Thus taking jte ps~ito~
sa tisfy the t^grntaTiTcfem atms of the people The Bolsheviks even enjoyed
the co-opcrotion of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries who received three
cabinet positions including the ministry of agriculture
Bui the making of peace proved both ditT cult and extremely costly with
the very existence of the Soviet state hanging in the balance The Allies
failed to respond to the Soviet bid for peace and in fact ignored the Soviet
government not expecting it to last Discipline in the Russian army col
lapsed entirely with soldiers often massacring their officers After the
conclusion of an armistice with the Germans in December 1917. the
front simply disbanded in chaos most men trying to return home by what
ever means they could find The Germans proved willing to negotiate but
they offered Draconian conditions of peace Trotsky who 3 s commiss ar
for foreign affa irs repre sent ed t he Soviet government, felt comp e lled to
fuTir~tticm down proclaiming a new policy no war no pcac ci” The
Germans then proceeded to advance occupying more territory nmTseiamg
an enormous amount of military materiel I n Pctrograd many Bolshevik
leaders as well a s the L eft Socialist Revolutionaries ag reed with' Trotsky
that German demands could not fc*. accepted Only Lenin s authority arid
determination swung the ba[ance - m~favor~ of the humiliating peace By
sacrificing much else Lcnm tn all ptobabtUty_s aye d C o mmuni st rule tn
Russia for the young Soviet government was in n o position whatsoever^
to t gh t (Jg rTnariy '
The Soviet German Treaty of Brest Litovsk was signed on March 3,
19 IS To sum up its results in Vernadsky’s words
The peace conj t om were disastrous to Russ a The Ukraine Poland
Finland Lithuan 3 Estonia and Latvia received their independenc e Pa rt r
of Transcaucasia was ceded to Turkey Russ a lost 2 6 per cent of her
478
VIET RUSS
total population; 27 per cent of her arable land; 32 per cent of her average
crops; 26 per cent of her railway system; 33 per cent of her manufactur-
ing industries; 73 per cent of her iron industries; 75 per cent of her coal
fields. Besides that, Russia had to pay a large war indemnity.
Or to put it in different terms, Russia lost over sixty million people and
over five thousand factories, mills, distilleries, and refineries. Puppet states
dependent on Germany were set up in the separated border areas. Only
the ultimate German defeat in the First World War prevented the Brest-
Litovsk settlement from being definitive, and in particular made it possible
for the Soviet government to reclaim the Ukraine.
Since Lenin's firm direction in disbanding the Constituent Assembly
and capitulating to the Germans had enabled the Soviet government to
survive, the great Soviet leader and his associates proceeded rapidly to
revamp and even transform Russia politically, socially, and economically.
In addition to letting peasants seize land, the government assigned control
over the factories to workers’ committees and nationalized all banks,
confiscating private accounts. Foreign trade became a state monopoly,
and a special commissariat was created to handle it. In December 1917,
the existing judicial system was declared abolished: the new revolutionary
tribunals and people’s courts were to be guided by the “socialist legal
consciousness.” Titles and ranks disappeared. Authorities gradually as-
sumed control over the scarce housing and other material aspects of
life. Those who belonged to the upper and middle classes often lost
their property, suffered discrimination, and were considered by the new
regime to be suspect by definition. Church property was confiscated and
religious instruction in schools terminated. The Gregorian or Western
calendar — New Style — was adopted on January 31, 1918. The Con-
stitutional Democrats, Socialist Revolutionaries — except for the Left
Socialist Revolutionaries until their break with the Bolsheviks — and
to an extent Mensheviks, all of whom opposed the new regime, were to be
suppressed and hunted down as counterrevolutionaries. As early as Decem-
ber 20, 1917, the government established the Extraordinary Commission
to Combat Counterrevolution, Sabotage, and Speculation, the dreaded
“Cheka,” headed by Felix Dzerzhinsky. From that time on the political
police became a fundamental reality of Soviet life.
War Communism and New Problems
With the summer of 1918, War Communism began to acquire a definite
shape. The nationalization of industry, which began shortly after the
revolution, was extended by the law of June 28, 1918. To cite Carrs
listing, the state appropriated “the mining, metallurgical, textile, electrical,
WAR COMMUNISM AH 0 THE N E p 479
timber, tobacco, resin, glass and pottery, leather and cement Industries,
all steam-driven mills, local utilities and private railways together with a
few minor industries’ Eventually private industry disappeared almost
entirely Compulsory labor was introduced Private trade was gradually
suppressed to be replaced by rationing and by government distribution
of food and other necessities of life On February 19, 1918, the na-
tionalization of land was proclaimed all l3nd became state property to
be used only by those who would cultivate It themselves The peasants,
however, had little interest in supplying food to the government because,
with state priorities and the breakdown of the economy, they could not
receive much in return Therefore under the pressure of the Civil War
nnd of the desperate need to obtain food tor the Red Army and the urban
population, the authorities finally decreed a food levy, m eflcct ordering
the peasants to turn in their entire produce, except for a minimal amount
to be retained for their own sustenance and for sowing As the peasants
resisted forcible requisitioning and repression became common Com
munism military and militant swung into full force
The rigors of War Communism on the home front largely resulted
from and paralleled the bitter struggle the Soviet regime was waging with
its external enemies Beginning with the summer of 1918 the country en
tered a major many faceted and cruel Civil War, when the so-called
Whites — who had rallied initially to continue the war against the Gcr
mans — rose to challenge the Red control of Russia Numerous national!
ties situated as a rule m the border areas of the former empire of the Ro-
manovs proceeded to assert their independence from Soviet authority A
score of foreign states intervened by sending some armed forces Into Rus
sia nnd supporting certain local movements and governments, as well ns by
blockading Soviet Russia from October 193 9 to January 1920 In 1920,
Poland fought a war against the Soviet government to win much of the
western Ukraine and White Russia It appeared that everyone was trying
to strike a blow against the Communist regime
The Civil War
The counterrevolutionary forces, often called vaguely and somewhat
misleadingly the White movement, constituted the greatest menace to the
Soviet rule, because, in contrast to Poland and various border naiionali
ties, which had aims limned to particular regions, and to the intervening
Allied powers which had no clear aims the Whites meant to destroy the
Reds The counterrevolutionaries drew their strength from army officers
and cossacks, from the ‘bourgeoisie,’ including a large number of sec-
ondary school students and other educated youth and from political
groups ranging from the far Right to the Socialist Revolutionaries Such
480
SOVIET RUSSIA
prominent former terrorists as Boris Savinkov fought against the Soviet
government, while the crack units of the White Army included a few
worker detachments. Most intellectuals joined or sympathized with the
White camp.
After the Soviet government came to power, civil servants staged an un-
successful strike against it. Following their break with the Bolsheviks in
March 1918 over the latter’s determination to promote class struggle in
the villages, the Left Socialist Revolutionaries tried an abortive uprising in
Moscow in July. At about the same time and in part in response to the
action of the Left SR’s, counterrevolutionaries led by the local military
commander seized Simbirsk, while Savinkov raised a rebellion in the center
of European Russia, capturing and holding for two weeks the town of
Iaroslavl on the Volga. These efforts collapsed, however, because of the
insufficient strength of the counterrevolutionaries once the Soviet govern-
ment could concentrate its forces against them. Indeed, it became in-
creasingly clear that the Communist authorities, in particular the Cheka,
had a firm grip on the central provinces and ruthlessly suppressed all oppo-
nents and suspected opponents. True to their tradition, the Socialist Revo-
lutionaries tried terrorism, assassinating several prominent Bolsheviks,
such as the head of the Petrograd Cheka, and seriously wounding Lenin
himself in August 1918. Earlier, in July, a Left Socialist Revolutionary had
killed the German ambassador, producing a diplomatic crisis. Yet even
the terrorist campaign could not shake Soviet control in Moscow — which
had again become the capital of the country in March 1918 — Petrograd,
or central European Russia. And it provoked frightful reprisals, a veritable
reign of terror, during which huge numbers of “class enemies” and others
suspected by the regime were killed.
The borderlands, on the other hand, offered numerous opportunities to
the counterrevolutionaries. The Don, Kuban, and Terek areas in the south
and southeast all gave rise to local anti-Bolshevik cossack governments.
Moreover, the White Volunteer Army emerged in southern Russia, led
first by Alekseev, next by Kornilov, and after Kornilov’s death in combat
by an equally prominent general, Anthony Denikin. Other centers of oppo-
sition to the Communists sprang up in the east. In Samara, on the Volga,
Chernov headed a government composed of members of the Constituent
Assembly. Both the Ural and the Orenburg cossacbs turned against Red
Moscow. The All-Russian Directory of five members was established in
Omsk, in western Siberia, in September 1918, as a result of a conference
attended by anti-Bolshevik political parties and local governments of east-
ern Russia. Following a military coup the Directory was replaced by an-
other anti-Red government, that of Admiral Alexander Kolchak. A com-
mander of the cossacks of Transbaikalia, Gregory Semenov, ruled a part
of eastern Siberia with the support of the Japanese. New governments
WAR COMMUNISM AND THE U E.
4 82 SOVIET RUSSIA
emerged also in Vladivostok and elsewhere. Russian anti-Bolshevik forces
in the east were augmented by some 40,000 members of the so-called
Czech Legion composed largely of Czech prisoners of war who wanted
to fight on the side of the Entente. These soldiers were being moved to
Vladivostok via the Trans-Siberian Railroad when a series of incidents led
to their break with Soviet authorities and their support of the White move-
ment. In the north a prominent anti-Soviet center arose in Archangel,
where a former populist, Nicholas Chaikovsky, set up a government sup-
ported by the intervening British and French. And in the west, where the
non-Russian borderlands produced numerous nationalist movements in
opposition to the Soviet government. General Nicholas ludenich estab-
lished a White base in Estonia to threaten Petrograd.
The Civil War, which broke out in the summer of 1918, first went fa-
vorably for the Whites. In late June and early July the troops of the
Samara government captured Simbirsk, Kazan, and Ufa. Although the
Red Army managed to eliminate that threat, it immediately had to face a
greater menace: the forces of Kolchak, supported by the Czechs, and those
of Denikin, aided by cossacks. Kolchak’s units, advancing from Siberia,
took Perm in the Urals and almost reached the Volga. At this time, on the
sixteenth of July, Nicholas II, the empress, their son, and four daughters
were killed by local Bolsheviks in Ekaterinburg, where they had been con-
fined, when the Czechs and the Whites approached the town. Denikin’s
army, after some reversals of fortune, resumed the offensive, and its right
wing threatened to link with Kolchak’s army in the spring of 1919. While
Kolchak’s forced retreat eliminated this possibility, Denikin proceeded to
occupy virtually all of the Ukraine and to advance on Moscow. In the
middle of October his troops took Orel and approached Tula, the last im-
portant center south of Moscow. At the same time ludenich advanced
from Estonia on Petrograd, seizing Gatchina, only thirty miles from that
city, on October 16, and besieging Pulkovo on its outskirts. As a recent
historian of these events has commented: “In the middle of October it
appeared that Petrograd and Moscow might fall simultaneously to the
Whites.”
But the tide turned. Iudenich’s offensive collapsed just short of the for-
mer capital. Although the Red Army had had to be created from scratch,
it had constantly improved in organization, discipline, and leadership under
Commissar of War Trotsky, and it managed finally to turn the tables on
both Kolchak and Denikin. The admiral, who had assumed the title of
“Supreme Ruler of Russia” and had received recognition from some other
White leaders, suffered crushing defeat in late 1919 and was executed by
the Bolsheviks on February 7, 1920. The general was driven back to the
area of the Sea of Azov and the Crimea by the end of March 1920. At
that point the Soviet-Polish war gave respite to the southern White Army
WAR COMMON ISM AND THE N E P
435
and even enabled Demon’s successor General Baron Peter Wreogtl to re-
capture a large section of southern Russia But with the end of the Polish
war in the autumn the Red Army concentrated again on the southern
front After more bitter fighting, Wrangc! his remaining army, and a con-
siderable number of civilians, altogether about 100,000 people, were evac-
uated on Allied ships to Constantinople in mid November Other and
weaker counterrevolutionary strongholds, such as that in Archangel, had
already fallen By the end of 1920 the White movement had been effec-
tively defeated
Allied Intervention
The great Civil War in Russia was complicated by Allied intervention,
by the war between the Soviet government and Poland, and by bids for
national independence on the part of a number of peoples of the former
empire of the Romanovs who were not Great Russians The intervention
began m 1918 and involved fourteen countries, the Japanese in particular
sent a sizeable force into Russia — over 60,000 men Great Britain dis
patched altogether some 40 000 troops, France and Greece two divisions
each and the United States about 10,000 men, while Italy and other coun-
tries — except for the peculiar case of the Czechs — sent smaller, and
often merely token, forces The Allies originally wanted to prevent the Ger-
mans from seiaing war matincl in such ports as Archangel and Murmansk,
as welt as to observe the situation white the Japanese wanted to exploit the
opportunities presented in the Far Hast by the collapse of Russian power
Japanese troops occupied the Russian part of the island of Sakhal n and
much of Siberia cart of Lake Baikal Detachments of American, British,
French, and Italian troops followed the Japanese into Siberia, while other
Allied troops landed, as already mentioned, m northern European Russia,
as well as m southern ports such as Odessa, occupied b) the Trench, md
Datum, occupied by the British Allied forces assumed a hostile attitude to-
ward the Soviet government, blockaded the Soviet coastline from October
1919 to January J920, and often helped White movements by providing
military supplies — such as some British tanks for Denikin’s aimv — and
by their very presence and protection. But they often avoided actual fight-
ing This fruitless intervention ended in 1920 with the departure of Allied
troops, except that the Japanese stayed in the Maritime Provinces of the
Russian Far East until 1922 and in the Russian part of Sakhalin until 1925
The War against To! and
The Soviet Polish war was fought in 1920 from ihe end of April until
mid October The government of newly independent Poland opened hostili-
484
s o
ET RUSSIA
ties to win the western Ukraine and western White Russia, which the Poles
considered part of their “historic heritage,” although ethnically the areas
in question were not Polish. The ancient struggle between the Poles and
the Russians resumed its course, with this time the Russians, that is, the
Soviet government, in an apparently desperate situation. Actually the war
produced more than one reversal of fortune. First, in June and July the
Poles overran, western Russian areas; next the Red Army, led by Michael
Tukhachevsky and others, staged a mighty counteroffensive that reached
the very gates of Warsaw; then the Poles, helped by French credits and
Allied supplies, defeated the onrusliing Reds and gained the upper hand.
The Treaty of Riga of March 18, 1921, gave Poland many of the lands it
desired, establishing the boundary a considerable distance east of the
ethnic line, as well as of the so-called Curzon Line, which approximated
the ethnic line and which the Allies had regarded as the just settlement.
National Independence Movements
National independence movements in the former empire of the Ro-
manovs during the years following 1917 defy comprehensive description
in a textbook and have to be left to special works, such as Pipes’s study.
As early as 1917 Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and White Russia declared
their independence. They were followed in 1918 by Estonia, the Ukraine,
Poland — once German troops were evacuated — the Transcaucasian
Federation — to be dissolved into the separate states of Azerbaijan, Ar-
menia, and Georgia — and certain political formations in the east. The
Soviet government had proclaimed the right of self-determination of peo-
ples, but it became quickly apparent that it considered independence move-
ments as bourgeois and counterrevolutionary. Those peoples that were
successful in asserting their independence, that is, the Finns, the Estonians,
the Latvians, and the Lithuanians, as well as the Poles, did so in spite of
the Soviet government which was preoccupied with other urgent matters.
Usually they had to suppress their own Communists, sometimes, as in the
case of Finland, after a full-fledged civil war. All except Poland and Lithu-
ania became independent states for the first time. In other areas the Red
Army and local Communists combined to destroy independence.
Developments in the Ukraine turned out to be perhaps the most compli-
cated of all. There the local government, the Rada or central council, and
the General Secretariat, proclaimed a republic of the Ukrainian people
after the fall of the Provisional Government in Petrograd. Soviet authori-
ties recognized the new republic, but in February 1918 the Red Army over-
threw the Rada, Soviet rule, established in the spring of 1918, was in turn
War COMMUNISM AND THE n e p. 485
overthrown by the advancing German arm) , The Germans at first accepted
the Rads, but before long they Sponged instead a Right-wing government
under Paul Skoropadsky After the Germans left, the Director) ot the Rada
deposed Skoropadsky m December 191S, only to be driven out In short
order b) Denikin’s White forces Following Denikin's withdrawal in the
autumn of 1919, Soviet troops restored Soviet authority in the Ukraine
Nett the Directory of the Rada made an agreement with the Poles, only
to be left out at the peace treaty terminating the Soviet-Polish Wat which
simply divided the Ukraine between Soviet Russia and Poland Ukrainians
supported different movements and Fought in different armies as well as in
countless anarchic peasant bands Political divisions survived the collapse
of the Ukrainian bid for independence and lattt dmded Ukrainian dm'v
grfs Yet it remains an open question to what extent the young Ukrainian
nationalism, nurtured especially among the Ukrainian intellectuals in Aus-
trian Galicia, had penetrated the peasant masses of the Russian Ukraine
Among the peoples living to the south and southeast of European Rus-
sia, many of whom had been joined to the Russian Empire as late os the
nineteenth century, numerous independence movements arose and inde-
pendent states were proclaimed The new states included the Crimean Tartar
republic, the Transcaucasian republics of Georgia, Armenia, and Azer-
baijan, the Bashkir, Kirghiz, and Kokand republics, the emirates of Bo-
khara and Khiva, and others Time and again local interests clashed and
bitter local civil wars developed In certain instances foreign powers, such
os Turkey, Germany, and Great Britain, played important roles The Men-
shevik government of Georgia distinguished itself by the relative stability
and effectiveness of us rule But — without going into complicated and
varied detail — whether new authorities received much or hftfc popular
support, they succumbed eventually to Soviet strength allied with local
Communists The fall of the independent Georgian government m 1921
marked essentially the end of the process, although native partisans in
Central Asia, the “Basmachi," were not finally suppressed uuUt 1926
Reasons for the Red Victory
Tew observers believed that the Bolsheviks would survive the ordeal of
Civil War, national independence movements, war against Poland, and
Allied intervention Lenin himself, apparently, had serious doubts on that
score. The first years ot the Soviet regime have justly become a legendary
Communist epic, its lustre undimmed even by the titanic events of the
Second World War Yet, a closer look puts the picture into a better focus
and helps to explain the Bolshevik victory without recourse to magic in
48 6 SOVIET RUSSIA.
Marxism or superhuman qualities of Red fighters. To begin with, Allied
intervention — the emphatic Soviet view to the contrary notwithstanding
• — represented anything but a determined and co-ordinated effort to stran-
gle die new Communist regime. Kennan, Ullman, and other scholars have
shown how much misunderstanding and confusion went into the Allied
policies toward Russia, which never amounted to more than a half-hearted
support of White movements. Allied soldiers and sailors, it might be added,
saw even less reason for intervening than did their commanders. The
French navy mutinied in the Black Sea, while the efficiency of American
units was impaired by unrest as well as by a fervent desire to return home.
The Labor party in Great Britain and various groups elsewhere exercised
what pressure they could against intervention. Ill-conceived and poorly
executed, the Allied intervention produced in the end little or no result.
The Poles, by contrast, knew what they wanted and obtained it by means
of a successful war. Their goals, however, did not include the destruction
of the Soviet regime in Russian territory proper. National independence
movements also had aims limited to their localities, and were, besides,
usually quite weak. The Soviet government could, therefore, defeat many
of them one by one and at the time of its own choosing, repudiating its
earlier promises when convenient, as in the cases of the Ukraine and the
Transcaucasian republics.
The White movement did pose a deadly threat to the Reds. Ultimately
there could be no compromise between the two sides. The White armies
were many, contained an extremely high proportion of officers, and often
fought bravely. The Reds, however, had advantages that in the end proved
decisive. The Soviet government controlled the heart of Russia, including
both Moscow and Petrograd, most of its population, much of its industry,
and the great bulk of military supplies intended for the First World War.
The White armies constantly found themselves outnumbered and, in spite
of Allied help, more poorly equipped. Also, llie Red Army enjoyed the
inner lines of communication, while its opponents had to shift around on
the periphery. Still more important, the Reds possessed a strict unity of
command, whereas the Whites fought, in fact, separate and unco-ordinated
wars. Politics, as well as geography, contributed to the White disunity.
A.nti-Bolshevism represented the only generally accepted tenet in the camp,
which encompassed everyone from the monarchists to the Socialist Revo-
lutionaries. Few positive programs were proposed or developed. Tire
Whites’ inability to come to terms with non-Russian nationalities constituted
a particular political weakness. White generals thought naturally in terms
of “Russia one and indivisible” and reacted against separatism; or at
least, they felt it quite improper to decide on their own such fundamental
questions as those of national independence and boundaries. Thus Denikin
WAR COMMUNISM AND THE N E T 487
antagonized the Ukrainians by his measures to suppress the Ukrainian
language and schools, and Iudeiuch weakened his base in Estonia because
he would not promise the Estonians independence
In the last analysis, the attitude ot the population probably determined
the outcome of the Cnd War in Russia Whereas the upper and middle
classes favored the Whites, and the workers, with some notable exceptions,
backed the Reds, the peasants, that is, the great majority of the people,
assumed a much more cautious and aloof attitude. Many of them came to
hate both Sides, for White rule, as well as Red rule, often brought mobiliza-
tion, requisitions, and terror — as cruel as, if less systematic than, that of
the Cheka In many areas anarchic peasant bands attacked both com-
batants Still, on the whole, the peasants apparently preferred the Reds to
the Whites After all, they had obtained the gentry land following the Oc-
tober Revolution, while the Whites were associated m their minds — and
not entirely unjustly — with some kind of restoration of the old order, a
possibility that evoked hatred and fear in the Russian Ullage \t mates
mutandis one is reminded of the later circumstances of the Communist
victory in the civil war in China
The RSFSR and the USSR
The first Soviet constitution was adopted by the Fifth All-Russian Con-
gress of Soviets and promulgated on Juty 10, 1918 It created the Russian
Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, or the R S T S R Local Soviets elected
delegates to a provincial congress of Soviets, and provincial congresses in
turn elected the membership of the All Russian Congress ot Soviets The
Inter elected the Executive Committee, which acted in the intervals be-
tween congressional sessions, and the Council of People's Commissars
Elections were open rather than secret, and they were organized on a class
basis, with the industrial workers especially heavily represented By con-
trast, the “non-toiling classes" received no vote In effect, the Communist
party, particularly its Central Committee and Political Bureau headed by
Lenin, from the beginning dominated the government apparatus and ruled
the country Besides, the same leading Communists occupied the lop po-
sitions in both party and government, with Lenin at the head of both On
December 30, 1922, the Union of Soviet Socialist Repubtics came into
being as a federation of Russia, the Ukraine, White Russia, and Trans-
caucasia Later in the ’20's three Central Asiatic republics received "Union
Republic" status Compared to the empire of the Romanovs, the new state
had lost Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Polish territories, alt
of which had become independent, and had lost the western Ukraine and
western White Russia to Poland, Bessarabia to Rumania, and the Fare-
SOVIET RTJSSI.
Ardakhan area in Transcaucasia to Turkey. Also, as already mentioned,
Japan evacuated all of the Siberian mainland of Russia only in 1922, and
the Russian half of the island of Sakhalin in 1925. In spite of these re-
ductions in size, the U.S.S.R. emerged as an enormous country.
The Crisis
At the end of the Civil War Soviet Russia was exhausted and ruined.
The droughts of 1920 and 1921 and the frightful famine during that last
year added the final, gruesome chapter to the disaster. In the years fol-
lowing the originally “bloodless” October Revolution epidemics, starva-
tion, fighting, executions, and the general breakdown of the economy and
society had taken something like twenty million lives. Another million had
left Russia — with Wrangel, through the Far East, or in numerous other
ways — rather than accept Communist rule, the emigres including a high
proportion of educated and skilled people. War Communism might have
saved the Soviet government in the course of the Civil War, but it also
helped greatly to wreck the national economy. With private industry and
trade proscribed and the state unable to perform these functions on a
sufficient scale, much of the Russian economy ground to a standstill. It
has been estimated that the total output of mines and factories fell in 1921
to 20 per cent of the pre-World War level, with many crucial items experi-
encing an even more drastic decline, for example cotton fell to 5 per cent,
iron to 2 per cent, of the prewar level. The peasants responded to requisi-
tioning by refusing to till their land. By 1921 cultivated land had shrunk
to some 62 per cent of the prewar acreage, and the harvest yield was only
about 37 per cent of normal. The number of horses declined from 35 mil-
lion in 1916 to 24 million in 1920, and cattle from 58 to 37 million during
the same span of time. The exchange rate of an American dollar, which
had been two rubles in 1914, rose to 1,200 rubles in 1920.
The unbearable situation led to uprisings in the countryside and to
strikes and violent unrest in the factories. Finally, in March 1921, the
Kronstadt naval base, celebrated by the Communists as one of the sources
of the October Revolution, rose in rebellion against Communist rule. It is
worth noting that the sailors and other Kronstadt rebels demanded free
Soviets and the summoning of a constituent assembly. Although Red
Army units ruthlessly suppressed the uprising, the well-nigh general dis-
satisfaction with Bolshevik rule could not have been more forcefully
expressed. And it was against this background of utter devastation and
discontent that Lenin, who, besides, had finally to admit that a world revo-
lution was not imminent, proceeded in tire spring of 1921 to inaugurate
his New Economic Policy in place of War Communism. Once more Lenin
WAR COMMUNISM AMO THE N . £ . I* . 4S9
proved to be the realist who had to overcome considerable doctrinaire op-
position to have Jus views prevail in the party and, therefore, in the entire
country.
The New Economic Policy
The New Economic Policy was a compromise, a temporary retreat on
the road to socialism, in order to give the country an opportunity to re-
cover, and it was so presented by Lenin Tire Communist party, of coarse,
retained full political control, the compromise and relaxation never ex-
tended to politics In economics, the state kept its exclusive hold on the
“commanding heights,” that is, on finance, on large and medium Industry,
on modern transportation, on foreign trade, and on all wholesale commerce
Private enterprise, however was allowed in small industry, which meant
plants employing fewer than twenty workers each, and m retail trade The
government's change of policy toward the peasants was perhaps still more
important Instead of requisitioning their produce, as had been done during
War Communism, it established a definite tax in kind, particularly in gram,
replaced later by a money tax The peasants could Veep and sell on the
free market what remained after the payment of the tax, and thus they
were given an obvious incentive to produce more Eventually the authori-
ties even permitted a limited use of hired labor in agriculture and a re-
stricted lease of land The government also revamped and stabilized the
financial system, introducing a new monetary unit, the chervonets, and it
put into operation new legal codes to help stabilize a shattered society.
The New Economic Policy proved to be a great economic success After
the frightful starvation years of 1921 and 1922 — years, incidentally, when
many more Russians would have perished, but for the help received from
the American Relief Administration headed by Herbert Hoover, from the
Quakers, and from certain other groups — the Russian economy revived
in a remarkable manner In 1928 the amount of land under cultivation al-
ready slightly exceeded the pre-World War area Industry on the whole also
reached the prewar level It should be added that during the N E P. period,
m contrast to the time of War Communism, the government demanded that
state industries account for costs and pay for themselves It was highly
characteristic of the NEP that 75 per cent of retail trade fell into private
hands In general, the so-called Nepmen, the small businessmen allowed
to operate by the new policy, increased in number in towns, while the
Kulaki — or kulaks, for the term has entered the English language —
gained id the villages Kulak, meaning “fist,” came to designate a prosper-
ous peasant, a man who held tightly to his own, the term, used extensively
by Soviet sources, also has connotations of exploitation and greed
490 SOVIET RUSSIA
These social results of the New Economic Policy naturally worried the
Communists. The Eleventh Party Congress declared as early as 1922 that
no further “retreat” could be tolerated. In 1924 and 1925 the government
introduced certain measures to restrict the Nepmen, and in 3 927 to limit
the kulaks. The Party long debated the correct policy to determine the
future development of the country. Ideological arguments came to be
closely linked to personalities and to the struggle for power that gained mo-
mentum after Lenin’s death in January 1924.
The Struggle for Power after Lenin’s Death
Three main points of view emerged among the Russian Communists dur-
ing the twenties. The so-called Left position, best developed by Trotsky,
maintained that, without world revolution, socialism in Russia was doomed.
Therefore, the Bolsheviks had to support revolutionary movements abroad
and at the same time pursue a militant and socialist policy at home. An
opponent of the N.E.P., Trotsky also came to criticize Stalin for his co-
operation with bourgeois forces abroad and for his destruction of democ-
racy within the Party. Such prominent Communist leaders as Gregory
Zinoviev — born Radomyslsky — and Leo Kamenev — born Rosenfeld
— essentially shared Trotsky’s view. The Right faction, led by a prominent
theoretician, Nicholas Bukharin, agreed with the Left that socialism in
Russia depended on world revolution. But the members of this group con-
cluded that, because such a revolution was not immediately in prospect,
the Soviet government should not quixotically force the pace towards so-
cialism, but rather continue the existing compromise and develop the New
Economic Policy. Finally, the third faction, the Center headed by Stalin,
came to the conclusion that, in spite of the fact that world revolution failed
to materialize, socialism could be built within the one country of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, with its huge size, large population, and tre-
mendous resources. The Center therefore called for a great effort to trans-
form the Soviet Union. Putting the Right group aside, it should be realized
that Trotsky as well as Stalin wanted to build socialism in Russia — Stalin,
in fact, has been accused of simply borrowing the Left program — and
that Stalin as well as Trotsky aimed at world revolution. The ideological
difference between the two was that of emphasis, not of fundamental belief.
Yet emphasis can be very important at certain moments in history. More-
over, Stalin’s approach for the first time gave Russia, or rather the Soviet
Union, the central position in Communist thought and planning.
As has often been described and analyzed, the struggle for power that
followed Lenin’s death was decided by Stalin’s superior control of the Party
membership. Acting behind the scenes as the general secretary of the Party,
Stalin managed to build up a following strong enough to overcome Trots-
WAR. COMMUNISM AND THE N t p 491
ky’s magnificent rhetoric and great prestige, as well as Kamenev’s Party
organization in Moscow and Zinoviev’s in Petrograd — named Leningrad
after Lenin’s death Stalin intrigued skillfully, first allying himself with
Kamenev and Zinoviev against Trotsky, whom they envied and considered
their rival for Party leadership, then v-ith the Right group against the Left,
and eventually, when sufficiently strong suppressing the Right as welL He
kept accusing his opponents of factionalism, o[ disobeying the established
Party line and splitting the Party Final victory came at the fifteenth All
Union Congress of the Communist party, which on December 27, 1927,
condemned all “deviation from the general Party line’ ns Interpreted by
Stahn The general secretary’s rivals and opponents recanted or were
exiled, in any case, they lost their former importance Trotsky himself was
expelled from the Soviet Union in January 1929 and was eventually* mur-
dered in exile in Mexico m 1940 almost certainly on Stalin s orders
Still, although Stalin's rise to supreme authority can well be considered
an impressive, if gruesome study m power politics, its ideological aspect
should not be forgotten After all, of the three alternate views present In
the Party, the general secretary's possessed the greatest attraction by far
for Soviet Communists The Right, in effect, simply admitted defeat in
spite of the tremendous struggle and all the efforts, socialism could not suc-
ceed in the Soviet Union until the uncertain coming of world revolution
Trotsky’s Left position, while more sanguine, also tied the Soviet future to
world revolution and thus made Bolshevik activity of limited importance
and effectiveness at best Only Stalin offered a sweeping program and a
majestic goal to be achieved by Soviet efforts alone Only he proposed to
advance Marxism in the Soviet Union without dependence on problematic
developments elsewhere The same Party congress that condemned all
deviations from Stalms line enthusiastically adopted measures that signi-
fied the end of the New Economic Policy and the beginning of the First
Five-Year Plan
XXXVII
THE FIRST THREE FIVE-YEAR PLANS, 1928-41
Enough of living by the law
Given by Adam and Eve.
The jade of history we will ride to death.
Left!
Left!
Left!
MMAKOVSKY
It [the First Five-Year Plan] asked no less than a complete trans-
formation from backward agricultural individualism to mechanized
collectivism, from hothouse subsidized industry to self-sufficient in-
dustry on the greatest, most modern scale, from the mentality of
feudalism, far behind the Western industrial age, to socialism still
ahead of it.
riURANTY
"When a forest is cut down, splinters fly." Of course, it is unfortunate
to be a splinter.
THE REMARK OF A SOVIET CITIZEN
TO THE AUTHOR IN THE SUMMER OF 1958
Stalin’s sweeping victory at the Fifteenth All-Union Congress of the
Communist Party in December 1927 marked the inauguration of the era
of Stalin and his five-year plans. The general secretary was to direct the
destinies of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and of world Com-
munism for twenty-five eventful years, becoming in the course of that
quarter of a century perhaps the most totalitarian, powerful, and feared
dictator of all time.
Stalin
Stalin began his life and career humbly enough. In fact, it has often been
mentioned that he was one of the few Bolshevik leaders of more or less
proletarian origin. Born a son of a shoemaker in 1879 in the little town
of Gori near the Georgian capital of Tifiis — or Tbilisi — Joseph Dzhu-
gashvili attended a Church school in Gori until 1894 and then went to the
theological seminary in Tifiis, In 1899, however, he was expelled from the
seminary for reasons that are not entirely clear. By that time, apparently,
Stalin had become acquainted with some radical writers and in particular
with Marx and Lenin. He joined the Social Democratic party and when it
THE FIRST THREE FIVE-YEAR PLANS 493
Split in 1903 sided firmly with the Bolsheviks Between 1902 and 1913
Dzhugashvili, or rather Stahn as he came to be known, engaged in a variety
of conspiratorial and revolutionary activities, suffering arrest and exile
several times He managed to escape repeatedly from exile, which has
suggested police collusion to certain specialists Stalin’s last exile, however,
continued from 1913 until the February Revolution Apparently the
Georgian Bolshevik first attracted Lenin’s attention when, he organized
a daring raid to seize funds for the Party Stalin's revolutionary activity
developed jn such Transcaucasian centers as Tiffis, Batum. and Baku, os
well as m St Petersburg In contnst to many other Bolshevik leaders,
Stalin never lived abroad, leaving the Russian empire only to attend a tew
meetings Because or Stalin’s Bolshevik orthodoxy and Georgian origin,
the Party welcomed him as an expert on the problem of nationalities, a
subject to which he devoted some of his early writings
One of the first prominent Bolsheviks to arrive m Petrograd Stalin par.
ticipated in the histone events of 1917, and after the October Revolution
be became the first commissar for national minorities As a member of the
Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front he played a role in
the Civil \N ar, for example, in the defense of Tsaritsyn against the Whites
Incidentally, Tsaritsyn was renamed Stalingrad m 1925 and Volgograd m
1961 It might be noted that in the course of executing his duties he quar-
reled repeatedly with Trotsky But Stalins real bid for power began in
1922 With his appointment as general secretary of the Party, a position that
gave him broad authority in matters of personnel The long time official
Soviet view of Stahn as Lenin's anointed successor distorts reality, for, in
tact the ailing Bolshevik leader come to resent the general secretary’s
rigidity and rudeness and m his so-called testament warned the Party lead-
ership against Stahn But Slahn's rivals faded to heed Lenin’s fate fore-
bodings, and, before too long, Stalins Party machine rolled over all op-
ponents The complete personal dictatorship which began in 1925 was to
last until the dictator’s death m 1953
The amount of lime th3l has elapsed since Stahn’s death has not been
nearly enough for historians to pass a definitive judgment on the Soviet
dictator and Ins historical role Views of Stalin have ranged from the
utterly fantastic eulogy of htm as a universal gefirus, expounded for many
years by the propaganda machine of Russian and world communism to the
extremely hostile impression that he was a blood soaked, man-devouring,
oriental monster Many commentators have made interesting attempts to
explain the general secretary, hts importance, and his work Stalin has
been credited, for example, with * inflexible will, unwiflingness to yield,
realistic statesmanship and high organizing abilities ’ Hardheaded realism
and common sense have been mentioned frequently as the dictator’s out-
standing traits Deutscher’s well known book presents him as a hard-
4 94 SOVIET RUSSIA
pressed Marxist realist carrying out a consistent policy and reacting
intelligently to the needs of the moment. Yet, as in the case of Ivan the
Terrible, there was madness in Stalin’s method. That madness, formerly a
matter of suspicion and controversy, received fully convincing documenta-
tion in Khrushchev’s celebrated speech to the Twentieth Party Congress in
1956 and especially during the session of the Twenty-second Party Con-
gress in October 1961, as well as in the memoirs of Stalin’s daughter,
Svetlana Alliluyeva, published in 1967, and other recent material. In addi-
tion to fighting real battles and struggling against actual opponents, Stalin
lived in the paranoiac world of constant threat and wholesale conspiracy.
Fact and fantasy were blended together, making the detection of the
dictator’s motives extremely difficult. Still, in retrospect, Stalin’s proverbial
ruthlessness and vindictiveness and his passion for discovering ever-new
enemies and plots find their explanation in abnormal psychology rather
than in any compelling objective necessity or in any alleged rational
advantages of a “permanent purge.” That causation is given central atten-
tion in Tucker’s study of Stalin and it is reflected, in a different sense, in
mam’s recent important book on the general secretary. Paranoiac ten-
dencies joined with Marxism in transforming the Russian scene.
The First Five-Year Plan
The First Five-Year Plan and its successors hit the Soviet Union with
tremendous impact. The U.S.S.R. became a great industrial nation: from
being the fifth country in production when the plans began, it was even-
tually second only to the United States. I n agricul tur.e-indL v i dt ia l _pe asant
cultivation gave w ay, to a new system of collective farming. Indeed 1928
and 1929 have been described as the true revolutionary years in Russia: it
was then that the mode of life of the peasants, the bulk of the people, under-
went a radical change, whereas until the First Five-Year Plan "they’ con-
tinued to live much as they had for centuries. A vast social transformation
accompanied the economic, while at the same time the entire Soviet system
as we have come to know it acquired its definitive form in the difficult
decade of the ’30’s.
Perhaps paradoxically, the five-year plans are not easy to explain. Marx-
ist theory did not specifically provide for them and certainly did not spell
out the procedures to be followed. To be sure, the needs of the moment
affected the decisions of Soviet leaders. Yet Stalin’s and his associates’
response to the needs constituted only one alternative line of action, and
often not the most obvious. In fact, the leadership rapidly reversed itself
on such key subjects as the speed of collectivization.
Certain considerations, however, help to explain the five-year plans. To
begin with, although Marxism did not provide for industrialization it in-
THE FIRST THREE FIVE-YEAR PUNS 495
sbied on a high level of it The dictatorship of the proletariat m a land
of peasants remained an anomaly If, contrary to the doctrine, industries
and workers were not there In the first place, they had to be created Marx-
ists in general, and Bolsheviks in particular, thought of socialism entirely
in terms of an advanced industrial society Such authors as Ularn have
demonstrated ui a rather convincing manner the close and multiple ties
between Marxism and industrialization The collectivization of agriculture,
in turn, represented the all-important step from an individual and, there-
fore, bourgeois system of ownership and production to a collective economy
and, therefore, to socialism As already mentioned, after the October Revo-
lution the Soviet government proceeded to nationalize Russian industry,
Leiun showed a special interest in electrification, popularizing the famous
slogan “Electrification plus Soviet power equals communism ” In 1921
the State Planning Commission, known ns Caspian was organized to draft
an economic plan for the entire country It studied resources and proposed
production figures, eventually it drew up the five-year plans
Although the New Economic Policy constituted a retreat from social-
ism, that retreat was undertaken only as a temporary measure and out of
sheer necessity In addition to its social results, unacceptable to most Com-
munists, the N E P raised serious economic problems While by 1926
Russian industry had regained its pre- World War level, a further rapid ad-
vance appeared quite uncertain With the industrial plant restored and in
operation — a relatively easy accomplishment — the Soviet Union needed
investment in the producers’ goods industries and a new spurt in pro-
duction Yet the "socialist sector” of the economy lacked funds, while the
free sector," particularly the peasants, faded to rise to government ex-
pectations The Soviet economy in the 1920's continued to be plagued hy
pricing problems, beginning with the disparity between the low agricultural
prices and the high prices of manufactured consumers’ goods, resulting in
the unwillingness of peasants to supply grain and other products to the
government and the cities — a situation well desen bed as the “scissors
crists” Gcrschenkron and other specialists have argued that the Bolsheviks
had good reason to fear that a continuation of the N E P would stabilize a
peasant society at the point where it was interested in obtaining more con-
sumers’ goods, but neither willing nor able to support largc-scatc industri-
alization As already indicated, Stalin’s Five-Year Plan proved attractive to
the Party because it promised a way out of the impasse the Soviet Union
could abandon the New Economic Policy and become a truly socialist
country without waiting for world revolution "Socialism in one country”
gripped many imaginations and became the new Bolshevik battle cry.
Once the Plan went into operation, the economic factors involved in its
execution acquired great significance, all the more so because the planners
set sail in essentially uncharted waters and often could not foresee the re-
496
Viet bus
suits of their actions. In particular, according to Gerschenkron, A. Erlich
and certain other scholars, the fantastically rapid collectivization of agri-
culture came about as follows: while the Plan had called for a strictly
limited collectivization, set at 14 per cent, the unexpectedly strong re-
sistance on the part of the peasants led to an all-out attack on individual
farming; moreover, the government discovered that the collectives, which
finally gave it control over the labor and produce of the peasants, enabled
it to squeeze from them the necessary funds for industrial investment. It
has been estimated that the Soviet state paid to the collectives for their grain
only a distinctly minor part of the price of that grain charged the consumer;
the remaining major part constituted in effect a tax. That tax, plus the turn-
over or sales tax that the Soviet state charged all consumers, together with
the ability of the government to keep the real wages down while produc-
tivity went up, produced the formula for financing the continuous indus-
trialization of the Soviet Union.
In addition to ideology and economics, other factors entered into the
execution of the five-year plans. Many scholars assign major importance to
considerations of foreign policy and of internal security and control. Prepa-
ration for war, which affected all major aspects of the five-year plans, began
in earnest after Hitler came to power in Germany in 1933, and while Japan
was further developing its aggressive policies in the Far East. The stress on
internal security and control in the five-year plans is more difficult to
document. Yet it might well be argued that police considerations were
consistently uppermost in the minds of Stalin and his associates. Collectivi-
zation, from that point of view, represented a tremendous extension of
Communist control over the population of the Soviet Union, and it was
buttressed by such additional measures — again combining economics and
control — as the new crucial role of the Mach ine Tractor Stations, the
M.T.S., which will be menti oned late r. ~
"”'”~The Firs t Five- Year Plan lasted from October 1, 1928, to December 31,
1932, that is, four "years and three "months. The factjth'at 'Soviet authori-
"Ties~tried to complete a five-year plan in four years is a significant com-
ment on the enormous speed-up typical of the new socialist offensive. JEhe_
main goal of„the,jy an ,was to develop heavy industry, includin g machine-
building, and that emphasis has remained characteristic of Soviet i ndus-
“TfializatfonTrom tha pj ime om) According to Baykov’s calculation, 86 pef^
cenrofairindustrial investment during the First Five-Year Plan went into
heavy industry. Whole new_ branches oMndustcy, juch as the chemical,
automobile, agricultural machinery, aviat ion, machine tool, and “electrical
were created from slight beginnings jar even from scratcKTOver fift e en hun-
dre3' new factories were" built Gigantic industrial complexes' exemplified""
"Ijy'MSg^ostt^^ Kuznetsstroi in western Siberia, began to
T HE FIRST THREE FIVE-YEAR PUN
497
take shape Entire cities arose in the wilderness Magnitogorsk, for in
stance, accoutred in a few years a population of a quarter of a million
The First Five-Year Plan was proclaime d a g r eat success officially it
was fulfilled in industry to the extent of 93 7 per cent in' four years and
three mon ths Furthermore, heavy industry , concerne d with means of p ro-
duction , excecdctritsTguota , registering 103 4 per cent while I^ghTor con-
sumcrs*~goo3s~in(3ust ry prod uced R4 9 per cent of its assigned total Of
course, Soviet production claims included exaggerations, difficuTCto'* esti-
mate because of the limited and often misleading riaiuic^rSovict 'statistics
for the period A rcccnfcxpett judgment states
Yet when everything is said and done the results in terms of growth of
industrial output were unprecedented in the history of modern industrial
■ration in "Russia True the Soviet official index exaggerated the speed of
growth The rates of 20 and more per cent a year that were claimed
never materialized in reality fi is however possible now on the basts of
the computations performed by American economists and statisticians to
conclude that the average annual rate of industrial growth in Russia
throughout the first ten years after the initiation of the First Five Year
Plan was somewhere between 12 and 14 per cent
Or to put it very conservatively and without percentages “The fact re-
mains beyond dispute that quantitatively, during llie years covered by ihc
F Y P , industrial production did increase and very substantially “ Quality,
however, was often, sacrificed to quantity, and the production results
achieved varied greatly from item to item with remarkable overfuifilltncnts
of the plan in some cases and undcrfulfillmcnts in others Besides, the great
industrial spurt was accompanied by shortages of consumers’ goods, ra-
tioning and various other privations and hardships which extended to all
of the people, who at the same time were forced to work harder than ever
before The whole country underwent a quasi military mobilization remi-
niscent of War Communism
But the greatest transformation probably occurred in the countryside
As already mentioned, the collectivization of agriculture, planned originally
as a gradual advance, became a flood Tens of thousands of trusted Com-
munists and proletarians — the celebrated ‘ twenty five thousand* in one
instance, actually twenty seven thousand — were sent from towns into
villages to organize kolkhozes and establish socialism Local authorities
and Party organizations, with the police and troops whete necessary,
forced peasants into collectives A tremendous resistance developed About
a million of the so-called kulaks, some five million people counting their
families, disappeared in the process, often having been sent to concentra-
tion camps in far-ofl Siberia or Central Asia A frightful famine swept the
Ukraine Peasants slaughtered their cattle and horses rather than bring
498
SOVIET RUSSIA
them into a kolkhoz. Thus from 1929 to 1933 in the Soviet Union the
number of horses, in millions, declined from 34 to 16.6, of cattle from
68.1 to 38.6, of sheep and goats from. 147.2 to 50.6, and of hogs from
20.9 to 12.2, Droughts in 1933 and 1932 added to the horrors of the tran-
sition from private to collectivized farming.
Stalin himself applied the brakes to his own policy after the initial fifteen
months. In his remarkable article, “Dizzy with Success,” published in
March 2930, he criticized the collectivizers for excessive enthusiasm and
re-emphasized that collectives were to be formed on the voluntary princi-
ple, not by force. At the same time he announced certain concessions to
collective farmers, in particular their right to retain a small private plot of
land and a limited number of domestic animals and poultry. The new stress
on the voluntary principle produced striking results: whereas fourteen mil-
lion peasant households had joined collective farms by March 1930, only
five million remained in collectives in May. But before long their number
began to increase again when the authorities resorted to less direct pres-
sure, such as a temporary suspension of taxes and priority in obtaining
scarce manufactured goods. By the end of the First Five-Year Plan more
than fourteen million peasant households had joined the kolkhoz system.
According to one count, at that time 68 per cent of all cultivated land in
the Soviet Union was under kolkhoz agriculture, and 10 per cent under
sovkhoz agriculture, while only 22 per cent remained for independent
farmers. The Plan could well be considered overfulfilled.
A sovkhoz is essentially an agricultural factory owned by the state, with
peasants providing hired labor. Although sovkhozes, serving as experi-
mental stations, as enormous grain producers in newly developed regions,
and in many other crucial assignments, have been more important for the
Soviet economy than their number would indicate. Communist authorities
have so far refrained from establishing them as the basic form of agricul-
tural organization in the country. Instead they have relied on the kolkhoz
as the norm for the Soviet countryside. A kolkhoz — kollcktivnoe kho-
ziaistvOj collective economy or farm — is owned by all its members, al-
though it must undertake to deliver the assigned amount of produce to the
state and is controlled by the state. Significantly, the produce of a collective
farm has generally been allocated as follows: first, the part required by
the state, both as taxes and as specified deliveries at set prices; next, the
seed for sowing and the part to serve as payment to the Machine Tractor
Station that aided the kolkhoz; after that, members of the collective receive
their shares calculated on the basis of the “workdays” — a unit of labor to
be distinguished from actual days — that they have put in for the kolkhoz;
finally, the remainder goes into the indivisible fund of the collective to be
used for its social, cultural, and other needs. The members also cultivate
their small private plots — and with remarkable intensity and success.
THE FIRST TIlREt FIVE YEAR PLAINS
499
The Machine Tractor Stations, finally abolished in 1953 provided indis
pensable mechanized aid to the collectives notably at harvest time help-
ing to co-ordinate the wort, of different kolkhozes and acting as another
control over them While it might be noted that the Soviet government
found it easier to introduce collective farms in those regions where com
munal agriculture preva led than in areas of individual proprietors such as
the Ukraine the kolkhoz bore very little resemblance to the commune
Members of a commune possessed their land m common but they farmed
their assigned lots separately und sturbed and m their own traditional
way Organization and regimentation of labor became the very essence ol
the kolkhoz.
The Second and Third Five Year Plans
The Second Five Year Finn uh ch lasted from 1933 through 1937 and
the Third which began in 1938 and was inlemipjcd by the German in
vasion tn June 1941 continued on the whole the aims and methods of the
initial Plan They stressed the development of heavy industry completed
the collectivization of agriculture and did their hest to mobilize the man
power and other resources of the country to attain the objectives The So-
viet people lived through eight and a half more years of quasi wartime
exertion Yet these plans also differed tn certain ways from the first and
from each other The Second Five Year Plan drawn on the basis of ac
quired knowledge m ore exp ertly thanjh e first tried t o balance production
to avoid^cstrgmc over _or undcrfulfillmcnl It emphasized mastering the
technique including the making of especially complicated machine tools
precision instruments and the like Also it allowed a little more for con
sumers goods than the first plan did However, in the course of the
Second Five Year Plan and especially during the third military con
sidcrations became paramount Military consul-rations linked to ideology
had of course always been present in the planning of Soviet leaders From
the beginning of industrialization Stahn and his associates had insisted that
they had to build a powerful socialist state quickly perhaps in a decade or
be crushed by capitalists In the 1930 s the threat became increasingly real
and menacing Soviet leaders did what they could to arm and equip Red
forces and they accelerated the development of industries inland east of
the Volga away from the exposed frontiers
Both the Second Five Year Plan and the third as far as It went were
again proclaimed successes and again the official clatms in spite of theif
exaggeration had some sound basis in fact. Industry especially heavy m
dustry, continued to grow On the basis of official — and doubtful — •
figures the Soviet share in world production amounted to 13 7 per cent m
1937, compared to 3 7 in 1929 and to 2 6 for the Russian Empire in. 1913
50J
THE FIRST THREE FIVE-YEAR PLANS
In the generation of electrical power, for example, the Soviet Union ad-
vanced from the fifteenth place among the countries of the world to the
third, and it was second only to the United Slates tn machine building,
tractors, trucks, and some other lines of production. Moreover, the Soviet
Union made its amazing gams while the rest of the world experienced a
terrible depression and mass unemployment
In agriculture collectivization was virtually completed and, except for
the wilderness, the Soviet countryside became a land of kolkhozes and
sovkhozes Slightly less than 250,000 kolkhozes replaced over 25 million
individual farms The famine and other horrors of the First Five-Year
Plan dul not recur In fact , agricultural production .jnc reused somewhat,
and fo od rationing was abolished m 1935 Still, the economic siicc c5S~~of~
Soviet agricultural policy remained much more doubtful than the achieve”
ments of Soviet ind ustrialization Peasants regularly failed to meet tltetr
production qu otas They showed far greater dcv olion to their_SLuaH_pnvatc*~
plots than to the vast kolkhoz posse ssioniT' In other ways, too, they re-
mained particularly unresponsive to the wishes oF Communist authorities'
A full evaluation of Soviet social engineering should also take account of
the cost s As one author summarized the salient human aspects of Jlovict
agricultural policies during ihc socialist offensive
As a result of collectivization the number of families on the land di-
minished from 26 000 000 to 21 000 000 This means that 5,000,000
families or opprcxumicly 24 000000 individuals must have left the
countryside Of these the increase in the towns accounts for one half
Twelve millions arc not accounted for A part of them has undoubtedly
perished the olher part has found new possibilities in the Far Hast, In the
Arctic, or in Central Asia
An Evaluation o! the Plans
Any over-all judgment of the first three five-year plans is of necessity a
complicated and controversial matter, as the writings of Bergson, Gross-
man, and other economists clearly indicate The plans did succeed — and
succeed strikingly — m developing industry, particularly heavy industry,
and m collectivizing agriculture Skepticism its to the feasibility of the
plans, extremely widespread outside the Soviet Union, turned to astonish-
ment and sometimes admiration To repeat, not only did production greatly
increase, but entire new IndusUics appeared, while huge virgin territories,
including the distent and difficult far north, began to enter the economic
life of the country Red armed forces, by contrast with the tsarist army,
obtained a highly developed industrial and armaments base, a fact whieh
alone justifies the five-year plans, in the opinion of some critics Moreover,
the entire enormous undertaking was carried out almost wholly by internal
manpower and financing, except for the very important contribution of
several thousand Western specialists in all fields who were invited to help,
and some short-term credit extended to the Soviet government by Ger-
man and other suppliers during the first years of industrialization. Con-
sidered by many as Stalin's chimera, the five-year plans proved to be att
effective way — - if not necessarily the only or the best way — to industrial-
ize a relatively backward country.
Yet the cost was tremendous. Soviet authorities could accomplish their
aims only by imposing great hardships on the people and by mobilizing the
country in a quasi-military manner for a supreme effort. The very termi-
nology of the five-year plans, with its iron or coal fronts, shock brigades,
and constant communiques, spoke of war. Piece work became common
and wage differentials grew by leaps and bounds. The new emphasis on
“socialist competition” culminated in the Stakhanov movement. In 1935
Alexis Stakhanov, a coal miner in the Donets Basin, was reported to have
overfulfilled his daily quota by 1400 per cent in the course of a shift hewing
coal. “Stakhanovite” results were soon achieved by other workers in nu-
merous branches of industry. Rewarding the Stakhanovitcs, whose accom-
plishments stemmed in different degrees from improved technique, enor-
mous exertion, and co-operation by their fellow workers, the goyernment
used their successes to raise general production norms over a period of
time. Most workers must have resented this speed-up — some Stakhano-
vifes were actually killed — but they could not reverse it. After the
October Revolution, and especially in the ’30’s, labor unions, to which
almost all workers belonged, have served as agencies of the state, to pro-
mote its policies and rally the workers behind them, rather than as repre-
sentatives of labor interests and point of view. Hardships of Soviet life
included a desperate shortage of consumers’ goods, as well as totally inade-
quate housing combined with a rigid system of priorities. As a result the
black market flourished, and indeed has remained an essential part of the
Soviet economic system. Criticisms of the first three five-year plans — in
fact, of their successors as well — have also pointed to top-heavy bureauc-
racy and excessive red tape, to a relatively low productivity per worker
and production per inhabitant, to the frequently poor quality of the items
produced, and to numerous weaknesses, perhaps outright failure, in agri-
culture. It can legitimately be asked whether a different regime could have
industrialized the country better and with Jess pain.
For extreme painfulness emerged as a fundamental aspect of the first
three five-year plans. While all suffered to some extent, some groups of the
population suffered beyond all measure. One such group, as already men-
tioned, was the kulaks and their families. Another, overlapping but by no
means identical with the kulaks, was the inmates of the forced-labor camps.
A history of Soviet forced labor remains to be written in full: it has been
TKr FIRST THREE FIVE-YEAR PLANS 503
ignored in Soviet publications as well as by such Soviet sympathizers as
Dobb in hts interesting and useful studies of the Soviet economy Scholars
who have tried to reconstruct reality have had to do so on the basis of
limited and sometimes controversial evidence Still, after the information
provided by numerous former inmates who left the Soviet Union during
the Second World War, the researches of such scholars as D Dallm and
Mcotaevsky, the writings of Sol 2 hcmtsyn, and other recent material, the
basic outlines of the Soviet forced labor system arc reasonably clear Hav-
ing begun sn the carl) 'thirties the system encompassed millions of human
beings on the eve of the Second World War, m spite of the extremely high
mortality rate in the camps Forced labor was used especially on huge con-
struction projects, such as the Baltic-White Sea and other canals, and for
hard work under prtmthve conditions in distant areas, as in the case of the
lumber and gold industries The political police — from 1922 to 1934
known as the G P U and the O G P 13 rather than the Cheka, after 1934
as the N K V D after the People s Commissariat of Internal Affairs, sub-
sequently asMVD and MGB, and since 1954 » KGB —which
guarded and administered forced labor, developed veritable conccntratton-
camp empires in the European Russian and Siberian far north, in the Far
East, and in certain other areas of the Soviet Union
The Great Purge
The great purge of the 1930*s helped to fill forced labor camps and
formed another major although perhaps unnecessary, aspect of the five-year
plans It also marked Stalin's extermination of all opposition or suspected op-
position and his assumption of complete dictatorial power Although earlier
some engineers and other specialists, including foreigners, had been ac-
cused of sabotaging or wrecking the industrialization of the country, the
real purge began in December 1934 with the assassination of one of the
patty leaders who was boss in Leningrad, Serge Kirov, and (cached high
intensity from 1936 to 1938 The purge eventually became enormous in
scope, it was directed primarily against Party members, not against the
White Guards or other remnants of the old regime as repressive practices
had been before
The assassin of Kirov, proclaimed to be n member of the Left Opposi-
tion, was shot, together with about a hundred alleged accomplices Rev cla
lions at the Twenty second Party Congress strengthened the suspicions of
some specialists that Stalin himself was apparently responsible for Kirovs
murder A Parly purge followed While uncounted people disappeared, the
three great public tnals featured sixteen Bolshevik leaders, notably Zino-
viev and Kamenev, in 1936, another seventeen in 1937, and twenty one
more, jncJmUng Bukhann and Rykov. m 1938 The accused were charged
504
ET RUS
with association with Trotsky, counterrevolutionary conspiracy, “wreck-
ing,” and treasonable alliance with Soviet enemies abroad. Invariably they
confessed to the fantastic charges and in ail but four cases received the
death penalty. Observers and scholars such as Conquest have been trying
since to find reasons for the staggering confessions in everything from
torture to heroic loyally to Soviet communism. The purge spread and
spread, affecting virtually all Party organizations and government branches,
the army, where Marshal Tukhaclievsky and seven other top commanders
perished at the same time, and almost every other prominent institution,
including the political police itself. It reached its height when Nicholas
Ezhov — hence Ezhovshchina — directed the N.K.V.D. from late Septem-
ber 193(2 until the end of July 1938. Fainsod has written the best summary
of these events:
The period of the Yczhovshchina involved a reign of terror without
parallel in Soviet history. Among those arrested, imprisoned, and exe-
cuted were a substantial proportion of the leading figures in the Party and
governmental hierarchy. The Bolshevik Old Guard was destroyed. The
roll of Yezhov’s victims included not only former oppositionists but many
of the most stalwart supporters of Stalin in his protracted struggle with
the opposition. No sphere of Soviet life, however lofty, was left un-
touched. Among the purged Stalinists were three former members of the
Politburo . . . and three candidate members. ... An overwhelming
majority of the members and candidates of the Party Central Committee
disappeared. The senior officer corps of the armed forces suffered se-
verely. According to one sober account “two of five marshals of the Soviet
Union escaped arrest, two of fifteen army commanders, twenty-eight of
fifty-eight corps commanders, eighty-five of a hundred ninety-five divi-
sional commanders, and a hundred and ninety-five of four hundred and
six regimental commanders.” The havoc wrought by the purge among
naval commanding personnel was equally great. The removal of Yagoda
from the NKVD was accompanied by the arrest of his leading collabo-
rators. . . . The Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the diplomatic
service were hard hit. . . . Almost every commissariat was deeply af-
fected.
The purge swept out in ever-widening circles and resulted in wholesale
removals and arrests of leading officials in the union republics, secre-
taries of the Party, Komsomol, and trade-union apparatus, heads of in-
dustrial trusts and enterprises, Comintern functionaries and foreign Com-
munists, and leading writers, scholars, engineers and scientists. The atrest
of an important figure was followed by the seizure of the entourage which
surrounded him. The apprehension of members of the entourage led to
the imprisonment of their friends and acquaintances. The endless chain
of involvements and associations threatened to encompass entire strata of
Soviet society. Fear of arrest, exhortations to vigilance, and perverted
ambition unleashed new floods of denunciations, which generated their
Stalin's Funeral. From right: Khrushchev, Beria, Chou En-lai, Malenkov, Voroshilov,
Kasanovitch, Bulganin, Molotov.
Soviet leaders at Kremlih Meeting of, the Supreme Soviet Celebrating the Fiftieth An ruve,
;th'e-Boishevik Revoliition, -November 4, 1967. From left: Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgomy,
THE FIRST THREE FIVE YEAR PLANS 505
own avalanche of cumulative interrogations and detentions. Whole cate
goncs of Soviet citizens found themselves singled tut for arrest because
of their "objective characteristics " Old BotihevAs Red Partisans, for
eign Communists of German, Austrian, and Polish extraction Soviet ciu
zens who hid been abroad or had relations with foreign countries or for-
eigners and ' repressed elements * were automatically caught up in the
NKVD web of wholesale imprisonment The arrests mounted into the
millions, the testimony of the survivors is unanimous regarding crowded
prison cells and teeming forced labor camps Most of the prisoners were
utterly bewildered by the fate which had befsllen them The vast re-
sources of the NKVD were concentrated Dn one objective — ro document
the existence of a huge conspiracy to undermine Soviet power The ex
traction of real confessions to imaginary crimes I'ecamc a major industry
Under the zealous and ruthless immstrauons of NKVD examiners mil
lion* of innocents were transformed into traitors terrorists and enemies
of the people
Orders were even issued to arrest a certain percentage of the entire popu-
lation The total number of those taken by the political police has been
estimated at around eight million Before the great purge had run its course
Ezhov himself and many of hts henchmen fell victim to it after Lavrcntu
Berta, a Georgian like Stalin, took control of the N K V D
Stalin's System
Hie great purge assured Stalin’s complete control of the Party the gov
eminent, and the country As frequently pointed out the Old Bolsheviks
members of the Party before 1917 and thus not creatures of the general
secretary, suffered enormous losses Virtually all of those w ha had at any
time joined any opposition to Stalin perished But, as atready mentioned,
some devoted Stalinists also fell victim to the purge, it wax on the whole
that group, together with the military men that wns posthumously vindi-
cated by Khrushchev When the Eighteenth All-Union Party Congress
gathered in 1939, Old Bolsheviks composed only about 20 per cent of its
membership compared to 80 per cent at the Seventeenth Congress in 1934
Moreover, except for a few lieutenants of Staff n, such as Viacfrsfav Afofo-
tov, bom Sknabrn, almost no leaders of any prominence were left For
example, with the exception of Stalin himself and of Trotsky, who was
murdered in 1940, Lenin’s entire Politburo had been wiped out
Absolute personal dictatorship set m While the Politburo remained by
far the most important body in the country, because tlx fourteen or so
members and candidate members were the general secretary’s immediate
assistants, there is much evidence that they, too, implicitly obeyed their
master Other Party organizations followed the instructions they received
as best they could to the letter Significantly, no Party congress «a> caffccf
506 SOVIET RUSSIA
between 1939 and 1952. The so-called "democratic centralism” within
the Party, that is, the practice of discussing and debating issues from the
bottom up, but, once the Party line had been formed, executing orders as
Issued from the top down, became a dead letter: even within the Com-
munist party framework no free discussion could take place in the Soviet
Union, and almost every personal opinion became dangerous.
Through the Communist party apparatus and the several million Party
members, as well as through the political police, Stalin supervised the
government machine and controlled the people of the country. The peculiar
relationship between the Party and the government in the Soviet Union,
in which the Party is the leading partner as well as a driving force in
carrying out state policies, has been elucidated in such studies as Fainsod’s
analysis of the Soviet regime in the Smolensk area, based on the Smolensk
Party archives which had fallen into Western hands, and Armstrong’s
investigation of the Communist party in the Ukraine. Not in vain did
Article 126 of the Soviet Constitution of 1936, still in operation, declare:
... the most active and most politically conscious citizens in the ranks
of the working class and other sections of the working people unite in
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), which is the van-
guard of the working people in their struggle to strengthen and develop
the socialist system and is the leading core of all organizations of the
working people, both public and state.
The Party, as will be shown in a later chapter, has in fact dominated the
social and cultural, as well as the political and economic life in the Soviet
Union.
The Constitution of 1936
The Stalinist Constitution of 1936, which replaced the constitution of
1924 and was officially ha tied as marking a great advance in the develop-
ment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, retained in effect the
“dictatorship of the proletariat/' exercised by the Communist p arty and
its leadership, specifically Stalin. At the same time it was meant to reflect
the new “socialist" stage achieved in the Soviet Union, based on collective
ownership of the means of production and summarized in the formula:
“From each according to his ability, to each according to his work.” It
gave the ballot to all Soviet citizens — - for no “exploiters” remained in the
country — and made elections equal, direct, and secret. In fact, it em-
phasized democracy and contained in Chapter X a long list of civil rights
as well as obligations. Yet, as has often been demonstrated, the permissive-
ness of the new constitution never extended beyond the Communist frame-
work Thu* Chanter T affirmed that the basic structure of Soviet society
THE FIRST THREE FIVE-YEAR FLANS 507
could not be challenged The civil liberty articles began* “In conformity
with the interests of the working people, and in order to strengthen the
socialist system ” — and could be considered dependent on this con-
dition The Communist party, specifically recognized by the Constitution,
was the only political group allowed in the Soviet Union Still more im-
portant, the niceties of the Constitution of 1936 mattered little In a
country ruled by an absolute dictator, his party, and his police Ironically,
the height of the great purge followed the introduction of the Constitution
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics remained a federal state, its
component units being increased to eleven the Russian Soviet Federated
Socialist Republic, and ten Soviet Socialist Republics, namety, the Ukraine,
Bcloxuvsia or White Russia, Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan in Trans-
caucasia, and the Kazakh Kirghiz, Tajik, Turkmen, and Uzbek republics
in Central Asia While the larger nationalities received their own union
republics, smaller ones obtained, in descending order, autonomous repub-
lics, autonomous regions, and national areas Altogether, fifty-one na-
tionalities were granted some form of limited statehood Yet, like much
else in the constitution, thts arrangement is largely a sham while im-
portant m terms of cultural autonomy — a subject to be discussed in a
later chapter — as well as in terms of administration, in fact it gave no
political ot economic independence to the local units at all The Soviet
Union has been one of the most highly centralized states of modern times
A bicameral supreme Soviet replaced the congresses of Soviets as the
highest legislative body of the land One chamber, the Union Soviet,
represented the entire Soviet people and was to be elected in the proportion
of one deputy for every 300,000 inhabitants The other, the Soviet of
Nationalities, represented the component national groups and was to be
elected as follows twenty-five delegates from each union republic, eleven
from each autonomous republic, five from each autonomous region, and
one from each national area The two chambers received equal rights and
parallel functions, exercising some of them jointly and some separately
Elected for four years — although with the Second World War intervening
the second Supreme Soviet was not elected until 1946 — the Supreme
Soviet meets twice a year, usually for no mare than a week at a time In
the interims between sessions a Presidium elected by the Soviet has full
authonty Supreme Soviets have unanimously approved all actions taken
by their Presidiums In the words of one commentator "The brevity of
the sessions, already noted, the size of the body, and the complexity of
its agendas are all revealing as to the actual power and place of the
Supreme Soviet.*' Still more revealing has been the invariable acquiescence
and obsequiousness ot the Soviet legislature in its dealings with Soviet
rulers
In the Constitution of 1936 the executive authonty continued to be
508 SOVIET RUSSIA
vested in the Council of People’s Commissars, which had to be confirmed
by the Supreme Soviet, Commissariats were of three kinds; Union — that
is, central — Republican, and a combination of the two. Their number
exceeded the number of ministries or similar agencies in other countries
because many branches of Soviet economy came to be managed by
separate commissariats. In general, heavy industry fell under central
jurisdiction, while light industry was directed by Union-Republican com-
missariats.
The Soviet legal system, while extensive and complicated, has served
Party and state needs both explicitly and implicitly and has had only an
extremely limited independent role in Soviet society. Besides, the political
police has generally operated outside even Soviet law. It might be added
that the Soviet central government has served as the model for the govern-
ments of the union republics, although the latter have established single-
chamber, rather than bicameral, legislatures by omitting a chamber for
nationalities.
Stalin’s Soviet regime, which took its definitive shape in the thirties, was
to undergo before long the awesome test of the Second World War, In
a sense it passed the test, although it can well be argued that the war
raised more questions about the regime than it settled. But, before turning
to the Second World War, it is necessary to summarize Soviet foreign
policy from the time of Brest-Litovsk and Allied intervention to the
summer of 1941.
XXXVIII
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, 1921-41, AND THE
SECOND WORLD WAR, 1941-45
“Soldiers* wni Moscow behind it\t
Let us then die on the nj'prouches to Moscow.
As our brothers knew how to die*"
UWONTOV
Our Government committed no few mistakes at tunes our position
Wa* desperate as m 19+1— *2 when our army was retreating,
abandoning our native villages and towns lr the Ukraine, Byelorussia
Moldavia the Leningrad Region the Baltic Region and the Karelo-
Pmmsh Republic, abandoning ihetn because there v as no other
alternative Another people might have ‘aid to the government You
have not come up to our expeditions Gel out Wc shall appoint
another government which will conclude peace with Germany and
Cnsur. tranquillity for us But the Russian people did not do that,
for they were confident that the poli.v their Government was
Pursuing was correct and they made saer fleet to order to ensure
the defeat of Germany And this confide rcc which the Russian
People displayed m the Soviet Government proved to be the decisive
factor which ensured our histone victory over the enemy of mankind.
Over fascism
I thank the Russian people for this confidence!
To the health of the Russian people!
mils
Soviet foreign policy — one of the chief concerns of the world today
— can be considered in several contuts To begin with, there is the
Marxist Leninist ideology Tme, Marxism did not provide any explicit
guidance for the foreign relations of a Communist state in fact, n preached
a world revolution that would eliminate foreign policy altogether That
Lenin and his associates had to conduct international relations after their
advent to power represented, in Marxist terms, one of several major
paradoxes of their position Not surprisingly, they assumed for months
and even /or a Sew yean ihc imminence of a revolution that would
destroy the enure capitalist world system The alternative appeared to
be their own immediate destruction by the capitalists When neither hap-
pened, the Soviet leadership, in foretgn relations as in home affairs,
proceeded to adapt ideology to circumstances Marxism supplied the
goal of world revolution, although the time of that revolution could no
longer be predicted with exactitude Marxism, especially as developed by
509
510 SOVIET RUSSIA
Lenin, with such key concepts as finance capitalism and imperialism
provided also the framework within which the Soviet leadership sought to
understand and interpret the world.
However, when Lenin and his associates seized power in Petrograd,
they inherited an international position and interests that had nothing in
common with Marxism. The Bolsheviks did their best to break the ties
with tsarist Russia, repudiating treaties and debts and publishing secret
diplomatic documents. Still, they could not entirely divest the country of
its past or separate the communist from the noncommunist aspects o£
their new role in the world. In fact, as the Soviet regime developed and
after Soviet Russia explicitly became the center of Communist interest
following the inauguration of the First Five-Year Plan, Soviet foreign
policy evolved, in the opinion of many observers, in the direction o£
traditionalism and nationalism, acquiring a pronounced “Russian” char-
acter. Or, to make a different emphasis and suggest yet another context
for Soviet foreign relations, the U.S.S.R. can be analyzed simply as a
gigantic modem state, and its foreign policy as a product of such con-
siderations of Realpolilik as security, rather than considerations of Marxist
ideology or of national tradition.
The dichotomy between revolutionary idealism and conservative na-
tionalism, between the Communist International and the Commissariat for
Foreign Affairs, and even between Party and state interests has been most
frequently used to explain Soviet foreign policy. Often the issue is pre-
sented also id terms of a gradual shift from a revolutionary to a more
traditional position, whether the change is said to have occurred in the
twenties, the thirties, or during the Second World War. This approach, it
should be pointed out, although at times enlightening, has its grave dangers.
We have no documentary knowledge of how Soviet foreign policy is made:
this fact has caused some cautious scholars, such as Beloff, to omit this
subject from tbeir discussion of Soviet foreign relations, while it has
helped other writers to ascribe Soviet actions on the international scene to
everything from an all-embracing Communist conspiracy to a return of
alleged long-term Russian imperialism. On the basis of our limited infor-
mation, it seems best not to emphasize dichotomies and splits in a
remarkably monolithic system, which has tolerated no deviation. It seems
best also to allow generously for the importance of Communist ideology in
Soviet foreign policy. The crux of the matter may be not whether the
Soviet leaders are fanatics or realists, idealists or cynics, but the fact that,
whatever they are, they think naturally in Marxist categories. For example,
the argument that Soviet foreign policy should be understood primarily
in terms of defense, as a reaction to the threat from the outside, has some
validity. But it should be realized that this outside threat, the menace of
the capitalist world, has loomed large to the men in the Kremlin not only
POREJON POLICY, 1921-41, AND WORLD WAR II 511
because of the facts of the case, but also as a fundamental tenet of their
Ideology. Perhaps we have become too accustomed to thinking of interna-
tional relations as intercourse among a considerable number of rather
similar states, a situation that prevailed tn the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. In certain respects the world scene since 1917 appears to bear
a greater resemblance to the struggle between Christian and Moslem in
the Middle Ages or to the age of the Reformation and the Counter-
Rerormation those epochal rivalries eventually bogged down, to be sure,
in attenuation, particularism, and compromise
Soviet Foreign Policy in the Twenties
When Trotsky became commissar of war in 1918, his assistant, George
Chicherin, replaced him as commissar of foreign affairs Chichenn was to
occupy that position until 1930, because of Chicherin's ill health, how-
ever, his eventual successor, Maxun Litvinov, directed the commissariat
from 1928 Chichenn was of gentry origin and for many years of Men-
shevik, rather than Bolshevik, affiliation In fact, he never entered the
narrow circle of Communist lenders Nevertheless, because of his ability
and special qualifications for the post — .Chichenn had originally begun
his career m the tsarist diplomatic service and was a fine linguist with an
excellent knowledge of the international scene — he was entrusted for over
a decade with the handling of Soviet foreign pohey, although, to be sure,
he worked under the close supervision of Lenin, Stalin, and the Politburo
As mentioned previously, positions of real power in the Soviet system have
been at the top of the Party hierarchy, not in any of the commissariats
One ol Chichenn’s main tasks was to obtain rccognmou for the Soviet
Union and to stabilize its position in the world In spite of transitory
successes m Hungary and Bavaria, Communist revolutions had failed out-
side Soviet borders On the other hand, with the defeat of the White move-
ment and the end of Allied intervention, the Bolshevik regime appeared to
be firmly entrenched in Russia "Coexistence" became a reality, and both
sides sought a suitable modus vivendt Yet the Soviet Union supported the
Thud or Communist International — colled the Comintern — established
tn 1919 with Zinoviev as chairman, and it refused to pay tsarist debts ot
compensate foreigners for their confiscated property, demanding »n its
turn huge reparations for Allied intervention In particular the Comintern,
composed of Communist parties scattered throughout the world, who
were bent on subversion and revolution and w ere clearly directed from the
Soviet Union in Soviet interests, constituted a persistent obstacle to normal
diplomatic relations Most other states, on their side, looked at Soviet
Russia with undisguised hostility and suspicion.
The Soviet Union managed to break out of isolation in the spring of
512 SOVIET RUssxa
1922. A Soviet delegation attended then for the first time an international
economic conference, held in Genoa. Although the conference itself pro-
duced no important results, hogging down on the above-mentioned issues
of debts and reparations, among others, Soviet representatives used the
occasion to reach an agreement with Germany. The Treaty of Rapallo of
April 16, 1922, supplemented later by a commercial agreement, established
economic co-operation between the Soviet Union and Germany and even
led to some political and military ties. It lasted until after Hitler’s advent
to power. While the Treaty of Rapallo produced surprise and indignation
in many quarters , its rationale was clear enough and, as in the case of most
other Soviet agreements, it had nothing to do with the mutual sympathy or
antipathy of the signatories: both Soviet Russia and Germany were out-
casts in the post-Versailles world, and they joined hands naturally for
mutual advantage.
Early in 1924 Great Britain formally recognized the Soviet Union;
it was followed by France, Italy, Austria, Sweden, Norway, Denmark,
Greece, Mexico, and China before the end of the year. In 1925 Japan
established normal relations with the U.S.S.R., evacuating at last the
Russian part of the island of Sakhalin, although retaining certain oil, coal,
and timber concessions there. The recognition of Soviet Russia by many
states marked simply their acceptance of the existence of the Bolshevik
regime, accompanied sometimes by hopes of Improving trade relations,
rather than any real change in their attitude toward the U.S.S.R. Lloyd
George’s remark on trading even with cannibals has often been quoted.
Moreover, other countries, including notably the United States and most
Slavic states of eastern Europe, continued to ignore the Soviet Union and
refuse it recognition. Still, all in all, Chichctin succeeded in bringing
Soviet Russia into the diplomatic community of nations.
That the course of Soviet foreign policy could be tortuous and even
paradoxical became clear in the case of China. There Stalin chose to
support the Kuomintang, the nationalist movement of Sun Yat-sen and
Sun’s successor Chiang Kai-shek, sending hundreds of military specialists
to help the Nationalists and directing the Chinese Communists to follow
"united front” tactics. For a time Communist infiltration appeared success-
ful , and Soviet position and prestige stood high in China. But in 1927 as
soon as Chiang Kai-shek had assured himself of victory in the struggle
for the control of the countiy, he turned against the Communists, mas-
sacring them in Shanghai and evicting Soviet advisers. When the Chinese
Communists, on orders from Moscow, retaliated with a rebellion in Canton,
they were bloodily crushed. Yet, although defeated in China, the Soviet
Union managed to establish control over Outer Mongolia after several
changes of fortune. Also, in the mid-twenties it concluded useful treaties
of neutrality and friendship with Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan. It
vomiON pouicv, 192I-4J. akd world w*r tl 513
should be added that the Bolshevik regime renounced the concessions and
special rights obtained by the tsarist government in such Asiatic countries
as China and Persia But it held on to the Chinese Eastern Railway,
weathering a conflict over it with the Chinese in 1929.
So\ict Foreign Policy in the Thirties
Chicherm's efforts in the ’20 s to obtain recognition for his country
and to stabilize Soviet diplomatic relations developed into a more ambitious
policy m the ’30*s Devised apparently by Stalin and the Politburo and
executed by Maxim Litvinov, who served as commissar for foreign affairs
from 1930 until 1939, the new approach aimed at closer alliances with
status quo powers in an effort to check the mounting aggression of the
‘ have-nots ” It culminated in the Soviet entrance into the League of
Nations and Litvinov s emphasis on disarmament and collective security
To appreciate the shift in Soviet tactics it should be realized that the
Bolshevik leadership had for a long time regarded Great Britain and
France as their main enemies and the League of Nations as the chief
international agency of militant imperialism Indeed, the Politburo placed
its hopes, it would seem in the expected quarrels among leading capitalist
powers, and m particular m o war between Great Britain and the United^
States' Under the circumstances, the Japanese aggression that began on
the Chinese mainland m 1931 and especially the rise of Hitler to power
«n Germany in January 1933, together with his subsequent policies, came
as rude shocks The Soviet government, caught quite unprepared by the
appearance of Hitler was slow to appreciate the new danger — -ui all
fairness it should be added that other governments, although not handi-
capped by Marxist blinkers were equally surprised and slow Yet, once the
handwriting on the wall became dear, the Bolshevik leadership did what
Jl could ID counteract the Fascist enemy, for that purpose mobilizing Com
rounist parties all over the world as well as using orthodox diplomatic
means Hence the celebrated ' popuhl Roots' of the 1930 s and the
strange rapprochement between the U $S R and Western democracies as
well as a pew cordiality between the USSR and Chiang Kai-shek Based
on dire expediency rather than on understanding or trust and vitiated by
mistakes Of judgment on all sides, the rapprochement wuh the West col-
lapsed m a catastrophic manner m 1938 and 1939 to set the stage for the
Second World War
As early as 1929 the Soviet Union used the occasion of the making of
the Kellogg-Bnand Pact outlawing war to formulate the Lmmov Protocol,
applying the pact on a regional basis Poland. Rumania, Latvia, Estonia,
Lithuania, Turkey, Persia, and the Free City of Danzig proved willing to
sign the Protocol with the U S S R In 1932 the Soviet Union concluded
514
SOVIET RUSS],
treaties of nonaggression with Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Finland, as
well as with France, hi 1933 the United States finally recognized the
Soviet Union, obtaining from the Soviets the usual unreliable promise to
desist from Communist propaganda in the U.S. In the spring of 1934 the
nonaggression pacts with Poland and the Baltic states were expanded into
ten-year agreements. In the summer of that year the Soviet government
signed treaties with Czechoslovakia and Rumania — the establishment of
diplomatic relations with the latter country marked the long delayed, tem-
porary Soviet reconciliation to the loss of Bessarabia. And in the autumn
of 1934 the U.S.S.R. joined the League of Nations.
The following year witnessed the conclusion of the Soviet-French and
the Soviet-Czoch alliances. Both called for military aid in case of an un-
provoked attack by a European state. The Soviet-Czech treaty, however,
added the qualification that the U.S.S.R. was obliged to help Czechoslo-
vakia only if France, which had concluded a mutual aid treaty with the
Czechs, would come to their assistance. France, it is worth noting, failed
to respond to Soviet pressure for a precise military convention, while
neither Poland nor Rumania wanted to allow the passage of the Red
Army to help the Czechs in case of need.
Also in 1935 the Third International, which had become somewhat less
active as a revolutionary force in the course of the preceding years, at
its Seventh Congress proclaimed the new policy of popular fronts: Com-
munist parties, reversing themselves, were to co-operate in their respective
countries with other political groups interested in checking Fascist ag-
gression, and they were to support rearmament. In its turn the Soviet
government demanded in the League of Nations and elsewhere that severe
sanctions be applied to aggressors and that forces of peace be urgently
mobilized to stop them. Yet both the League and the great powers in-
dividually accomplished little or nothing. Italy completed its conquest of
Ethiopia, while Japan developed its aggression on the Asiatic mainland.
In the summer of 1936 a great civil war broke out in Spain, pitting
Franco’s Fascist rebels and their allies against the democratic and Left-
wing republican government. Once more, the Soviet Union proved eager
to stop Fascism, while France and Great Britain hesitated, compromised,
emphasized nonintervention, and let the Spanish republic go down.
Whereas Italian divisions and German airmen and tankmen aided Franco,
none but Soviet officers and technicians were sent to assist the Loyalists,
while the international Communist movement mobilized its resources to
obtain and ship volunteers who fought in the celebrated “international
brigades.” Although much in the Soviet intervention in Spain remains
obscure and controversial, studies by Cattell and others demonstrate both
the seriousness of the Soviet effort to defeat Franco and the remarkable
Rt.l> WAR II
FOREIGN FOtlCY, 1921-41, AND Wo
515
way m which the Communists, including the secret police, proceeded to
extend their hold on republican Spam and to dispose of their rivals But,
with massive Italian and German baclung, the insurgents v-on the bitter
civil war in Spain, hostilities ending in the spring of 1939
The position and prospects of the Soviet Union became graver and
graver in the course of the ’30 s In November 1936, Germany and Japan
concluded the so-called Anti Comintern Pact aimed specifically against
the U SS R Italy joined the Pact in 1937 and Spain in 1939 in the Tar
East in 1935 the Soviet Union sold its dominant interest in the Chinese
Eastern Railway to the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo, thus
eliminating one major source of conflict But relations between Japan and
the USSR remained tense, as Japanese expansion and ambiiions grew,
white the Soviet leaders continued to send supplies la Chung Kai shch
as well as to direct and support Communist movements in Asia In fact,
in 1938 and again in 1939 Japanese and Soviet troops fought actual battles
on the Manchurian and Mongolian borders the Red Army better than
holding its own and hostilities being terminated as abruptly as they had
begun Hitler's Germany represented an even greater menace to the
Soviet Union than Japan The Fuhicr preached die destruction of com-
munism and pointed to the tend* east as die natural area of German
expansion, its legitimate Lebensraum Again as in die eases of Japan
and Italy, the Western powers failed to cheek the aggressor Following the
remilitarization of the Rhineland m 1936 HnJer annexed Austria to the
Thud Ketch in March 1938, making a shambles of the Treat) of Ver-
sailles
Soviet Foreign Pohey from September 1938 until June 1941
The climax of appeasement came in September 1938 at Munich Great
Britain and France capitulated to Hitler’s demand for Germany's annexa-
tion of the Sudetcnland, a largely ethnically German area of Czechoslo-
vakia, Chamberlain and Daladtcr flew to Munich and sealed the arrange-
ment with Hitler and Mussolini The unpreparedness and unwillingness of
the Western democracies to fight, rather than an) coflusion of the West
with Hitler against the USSR, motivated the Munich surrender Still,
the extreme Soviet suspicion of the settlement can well be understood,
especially since the Soviet government was not invited to participate in it
Although u had expressed us readiness to defend Czechoslovakia, the
Soviet Union had been forced to remain a helpless bystander when France
failed to come to the aid of die Czechs and Prague had to occcpt its
betrayal by the great powers Moreover, alter Munich the Fran co-Russian
alliance appeared to mean very hide, and the USSR found itself, m
S16 S OVIET RUSSIA '
spite of all its efforts to promote . collective security, in highly dangerous -.
isolation. . ..
: -His appetite whetted by appeasement. Hitler in the meantime developed •
further aggressive designs in eastern Europe. In March 1939 he disposed
of what remained of Czechoslovakia, establishing the German protectorate
of Bohemia and Moravia and another one of Slovakia. This step both de-
stroyed the Munich arrangement and made plain Nazi determination to
expand beyond ethnic German boundaries. Next Hitler turned to Poland,
demanding the cession of Danzig to Germany and the right of extraterri-
torial German transit across the Polish “corridor” to East Prussia. The’ .
'alternative was war.
Poland, however, did not stand alone against Germany in the summer
of 1939. France and Great Britain finally saw the folly of . appeasement
after Germany had seized the remainder of Czechoslovakia. At the end
of March they made clear their determination to fight if Poland were at-
tacked. As war clouds gathered, the position of the Soviet Union became,
all the more significant. In May Molotov replaced Litvinov as commissar
for foreign affairs, retaining at the same time his office of Chairman of the
Council of People's Commissars, equivalent to prime minister, as well as'
his membership in the Politburo. Thus for the first time since Trotsky in
1918 a Communist leader of the first rank took charge of Soviet foreign
policy. Moreover, in contrast to his predecessor Litvinov, Molotov had
not been personally committed to collective security and, therefore, could
-more easily undertake a fresh start. In retrospect commentators have also
noted the fact that Molotov, again in contrast to Litvinov, was not Jewish.
After an exchange of notes in the spring of 1939, Great Britain and
France began in the summer to negotiate with the U.S.S.R concerning the
formation of a joint front against aggression. But the Western powers
failed to come to terms with the Soviet Union, or. even to press the •
negotiations, sending a weak and low-ranking mission to Moscow. The
Soviet government, on its side, remained extremely suspicious of the West, -
, ■ especially after the Munich settlement, and eagerly sought ways of diverting '
impending hostilities away from its borders. On August 23 a: German-
Russian agreement of strict neutrality, was signed in Moscow — secret-
talks had begun as eariy as May — an event which produced surprise
■ arid, shock in the world. Fortified by the pact, Hitler attacked Poland ori
the first of September. On the third, -Great Britain and France declared
war on Germany; The Second World War became a reality. " Vi
-. ..';.The Bolsheviks and the Nazis hated each other and , considered, them-.
/- selves to be irreconcilable enemies; That no illusions were involved in their
agreement is -indicated; among many other things; by the fact that Molotov, -.
/ .who signed the treaty for the Soviet Union and thus represented the- “pro--
517
FOREIGN POLICY, 1921-41, AND WORLD WAR II
German orientation,” retained his position and Stalin’s favor after Hitler
attacked the U S S R Yet both parlies to the pact expected to gam major
temporary advantages by means of « Germany would be free to fight
Western powers The Soviet Union would escape war, at least for the
time being Besides, the agreement was accompanied by a secret protocol
dividing the spheres of influence and enabling the Soviet Union to expand
in eastern Europe
The Red Army occupied eastern Poland, incorporating Us White Rus
sian and Ukrainian Areas into the corresponding Soviet republics Next
the Soviet government signed mutual assistance pacts with Estonia.
Latvia, and Lithuania, obtaining a lease of Baltic bases But in Jut) 1940
these states were occupied by Soviet troops and, following a vote of their
beleaguered parliaments, they were incorporated into the USSR as union
republics — .a procedure that the Western democracies have with excellent
reasons failed to recognize to this day Finland w as more troublesome tins
Finnish government turned down the Soviet demand that they move the
Finnish boundary some twenty miles further away from Leningrad, aban-
doning a Finnish defense line, in exchange for a strip of Karelia, a war
between the two countries resulted and lasted from the end of November
1939 until mid-March 1940 In spite of the heroic Finnish defense and
the surprising early reverses of the Red Army the Soviet Union eventually
imposed its will on Finland Finally »n the summer of 1940 the USSR
utilized its agreement with Germany to obtain from Rumania by means
of an ultimatum, the disputed region of Bessarabia as well as northern
Bukovma The new Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic was formed
from the territory acquired from Rumania In April 1941 the Soviet Union
signed a five-year nonaggress/on treaty with Japan, which bad chosen to
expand south rather than into Sibcrn
But, although the Soviet government did not know it. time was running
short for its efforts to strengthen US position on the European and Asiatic
comments Following his stunning victory in the west m the summer of
1940, Hitler decided to invade the Soviet Union In Dcceml’cr he issued
precise instructions for an attack in May 1941 The defeat that Germany
suffered in the autumn in the aertal Battle of Britain apparently only-
helped convince the Nazi dictator that he should strike his next major blow
in the east The schedule, however, could not quite be lept A change of
government nt Yugoslavia made the Germans invade Yugoslavia as well
as Greece, which had stopped an earlier Italian offensive While brilliantly
successful, the German campaign in the Balkans, together with a csrvttn
delay m supplying the German striking force with tanks and other vehicles
postponed by perhaps three weeks the invasion of Soviet Russia The new
date was June 22, nnd on that day German troops aided by Finnish.
518 soviet Russia
Rumanian, and other units attacked the U.S.S.R. along an enormous front
from the Baltic to the Black Sea.
The Soviet Union in the Second World War
The blow was indeed staggering. Hitler threw into the offensive some
175 divisions, including numerous armored formations. A huge and power-
ful air force closely supported the attack. Moreover, perhaps surprisingly,
the German blow caught the Red Army off guard. Apparently, although
Stalin and the Politburo were preparing for war, they had ignored Western
warnings and did not expect such an early, sudden, and powerful offensive.
The Germans aimed at another Blitzkrieg, intending to defeat the Russians
within two or three months or in any case before winter. Although it
encountered some determined resistance, the German war machine rolled
along the entire front, particularly in the north towards Leningrad, in the
center towards Moscow, and in the south towards Kiev and Rostov-on-
Don. Entire Soviet armies were smashed and taken prisoner at Bialystok,
Minsk, and Kiev, which fell in September. The southern wing of the inva-
sion swept across the Ukraine. In the north, Finnish troops pushed to the
Murmansk railroad, and German troops reached, but could not capture,
Leningrad. The city underwent a Iwo-and-a-half-year siege, virtually cut
off from the rest of the country; its population was decreased by starvation,
disease, and war from four to two and a half million. Yet the city would
not surrender, and it blocked further German advance north.
The central front proved decisive. There the Germans aimed their main
blow directly at Moscow. But they were delayed in fierce fighting near
Smolensk. The summer Blitzkrieg became a fall campaign. Hitler in-
creased the number of his and his allies’ divisions in Russia to 240 and
pushed an all-out effort to capture the Soviet capital. In the middle of
October German tanks broke through the Russian lines near Mozhaisk,
some sixty miles from Moscow. Stalin and the government left the city
for Kuibyshev, formerly Samara, on the Volga. Yet, instead of abandon-
ing Moscow as in 1812, its defender. Marshal George Zhukov, had his
troops fall slowly back on the capital, reducing the German advance to
a crawl. The Germans proceeded to encircle the city on three sides, and
they came to within twenty miles of it, but no further. Late in November
the Red Army started a counteroffensive against the extremely extended
German lines on the southern front, recapturing Rostov-on-Don at the
end of the month. In early December it struck on the central front, at-
tacking both north and south of Moscow as well as in the Moscow area
itself. The Germans suffered enormous losses and had to retreat. Winter
came to play havoc with unprepared German troops and to assist the
FOREIGN TOUCX, 1921-41. ANU WORLD U
519
Russians. On January 20 the Red Army recaptured Mozhaisk, thus elim-
inating any immediate threat to Moscow. But German troops had to retreat
much further west before they could stabilize the front. In fact, its lines
overextended, its troops unequipped for cold weather and exhausted, the
German army probably came near complete collapse in the winter of
1941/42. Some specialists believe that only Hitler’s frantic determination
to hold on prevented a catastrophic withdrawal. As it was, the German
army gave up about one hundred thousand square miles of Soviet territory,
but retained five hundred thousand when fighting finally quieted down.
In retrospect it seems clear that, in spite of its many splendid victories,
the great German campaign of 1941 in Russia failed. The Red Army
remained very much in the field, and the Blitzkrieg turned into a long war
on an enormous front. Quite possibly Hitler came close to crushing the
Soviet Union in 1941, but he did not come close again. Taking into
account Soviet resources and the determination to resist, the Nazis had
to win quickly or not at all. German losses in their initial eastern campaign,
large in quantity, were still more damaging in quality: the cream of
German youth lined the approaches to Moscow.
Furthermore, although the Soviet Union bore the brunt of Nazi armed
might from the summer of 1941 until the end of the Second World War
in Europe, it certainly did not fight alone. Churchill welcomed Soviet
Russia as an ally the day of the German attack — although shortly before
he had been ready to wage war against the U.S.S.R. in defense of Finland.
Great Britain and the United States arranged to send sorely needed sup-
plies to the Soviet Union; and after the Japanese strike at Pearl Harbor
on December 7, 1941, the United States became a full-fledged combatant.
In spite of German submarines and aircraft and the heavy losses they
inflicted, British convoys began to reach Murmansk and Archangel in the
autumn of 1941, while American aid through Persia started to arrive in
large quantity in the spring of 1942. More important, the Axis powers
had major enemies to fight in Africa, and eventually in southern and west-
ern Europe, as well as in the east.
The second great German offensive in Russia, unleashed in the summer
of 1942, was an operation of vast scope and power, even though it was
more limited in its sweep and resources than the original attack of 1941:
in 1942 the Germans and their allies used about 100 divisions and perhaps
, a million men in an attack along the southern half of the front, from
Voronezh to the Black Sea. Having occupied the Kerch area and captured
Sevastopol after a month of bitter fighting, the Germans opened their main
offensive early in July. They struck in two directions: east toward the
Volga, and south toward the Caucasus. Blocked on the approaches to
Voronezh, the German commander. Marshal Fedor von Bock had his
521
FOREIGN POLICY, 1921—41, AND WORLD WAR II
main army of over 300,000 men cross the Don farther south and drive
to the Volga At the end of August the Nazis and their allies reached
Stalingrad
That industrial city of half a million people, strung along the right bank
of the Volga, had no fortifications or other defensive advantages Vet
General Basil Chuikov’s 62nd Army, supported by artillery massed on the
other bank, fought for every house and every foot of ground Reduced to
rubble, the city became only more impassable to the invaders in spite of
all their weapons and aircraft Both sides suffered great losses Hitler, who
had assumed personal command of the German army m December 1941
and possibly saved his troops from catastrophe in the winter of 1941/42,
began to make disastrous strategic errors He kept pounding at Stalingrad
for fruitless weeks and even months and disregarding professional opinion,
would not let his troops retreat even when a Soviet counteroffensive began
to envelop them Eventually at the end of January 1943, Marshal
Fnednch Paulux and some 120 000 German and Rumanian troops sur-
rendered to the Red Army, their attempt to break through to the Volga
thus ending in a complete fiasco The German offensive southward had
captured Rostov on Don once more and had swept actoss the northern
Caucasus the attackers seizing such important points as the port of
Novorossmk and the oil center of Mozdok But again the extended Ger
man lines crumbled under Zhukovs counteroffensive in December The
invaders had to retreat fast into the southern Ukraine and the Crimea and
were fortunate to extricate themselves at all
After some further retreats and counterattacks in the winter of 1942/43,
the Germans tried one more major offensive in Russia the following
summer They struck early m July in the strategic watershed area of
Kursk Orel, and Voronezh with some forty divisions half of them
armored or motorized, totaling approximately half a million men But
after initial successes and a week or ten days of tremendous fighting of
massed armor and artillery the German drive was spent and the Red
Army in its turn opened an offensive Before very long the Red drive
gathered enough momentum to hurt the invaders out of the Soviet Union
and eventually to capture Budapest, Vienna, Prague, and Berlin stopping
only with the end of the war The smashing Soviet victory was made
possible by the fact that the German forces had exhausted themselves
Their quality began to decline probabfy about the end of 1941, while die
increasing numbers of satellite troops pressed into service, notably Ru
manians, could not at all measure up to the German standard Hitler can
unued to make mistakes Time and again as in the case of Stalingrad,
he would not allow his troops to retreat untd too late The Red Army,
on the other hand, in spite of its staggenng losses, improved m quality
and effectiveness. Its battle-tested commanders showed initiative and abil-
ity; its weapons and equipment rolled in plentiful supply both from Soviet
factories, many of which had been transported eastward and reassembled
there, and through Allied aid, while the German forces suffered from all
kinds of shortages. As long as they fought on Soviet soil, the Germans
had to contend with a large and daring partisan movement in their rear
as well as with the Red Army. And they began to experience increasing
pressure and defeat on other fronts, as well as from the air, where the
Americans and the British mounted a staggering offensive against German
cities and industries. The battle of Stalingrad coincided with Montgomery’s
victory over Rommel in Egypt and Allied landings in Morocco and Algeria.
Allied troops invaded Sicily in the summer of 1943 and the Italian main-
land that autumn. Finally, on June 6, 1944, the Americans, the British,
and the Canadians landed in Normandy to establish the coveted “second
front." As the Russians began to invade the Third Reich from the cast,
the Allies were pushing into it from the west.
The Red Army recovered much of occupied Soviet territory in the
autumn of 1943 and in the winter of 1943/44. On April 8, 1944, Marshal
Ivan Konev crossed the Pruth into Rumania. In the following months
Soviet armies advanced rapidly in eastern and central Europe, while
other armies continued to wipe out the remaining Gorman pockets on
Soviet soil. Rumania and Bulgaria quickly changed sides and joined the
anti-German coalition. The Red Army was joined by Tito partisans in
Yugoslavia and in September 1944 entered Belgrade. After some bitter
fighting, Red forces took Budapest in February 1945 and Vienna in mid-
April. In the north, Finland surrendered in September 1944. The great
offensive into Germany proper began in the autumn of 1944 when Red
forces, after capturing Vilna, penetrated East Prussia. It gained momentum
in January 1945 when large armies commanded by Konev in the south,
Zhukov in the center, and Marshal Constantine Rokossovsky in the north
invaded Germany on a broad front. On April 25, 1945, advanced Russian
units met American troops at Torgau, on the Elbe, near Leipzig. On the
second of May, Berlin fell to Zhukov’s forces after heavy fighting. Hitler
had already committed suicide. The Red Army entered Dresden on the
eighth of May and Prague on the ninth. On that day. May 9, 1945, fighting
ceased: the Third Reich had finally surrendered unconditionally to the
Allies, first in Rheims on the seventh of May and then formally in Berlin
on the eighth.
Urged by its allies and apparently itself eager to participate, the Soviet
Union entered the war against Japan on August 8, 1945, three months
after the German surrender. By that time Japan had already in fact been
defeated by the United States and other powers. The American dropping
523
FOREIGN POLICY, 1921-41, AND WORLD WAR II
of an atomic bomb on Hiroshima on the sixth of August and on Nagasaki
on the ninth eliminated the need to invade the Japanese mainland, con-
vincing the Japanese got eminent that further resistance was useless In
spite of subsequent claims of Soviet historians and propagandists, the role
of the USSR, in the conflict in the Tar Hast and the Pacific was, therefore,
fleeting and secondary at best Yet it enabled the Red forces to occupy
Manchurta, the Japanese pan of the island of Sakhalin, and the Kuthe
islands, and to capture many prisoners — nil at the price of considerable
casualties, for the Japanese did resist The formal Japanese surrender to
the Allies took place on board the U S battleship Missouri m Tokyo Bay
on September 2, 1945 It marked the end of the Second World War
11 iirtiiiie Diplomacy
Diplomacy accompanied military operations In the course of the war
the Soviet Union established close contacts uith its allies, in particular with
Great Britain and the United States It accepted the Atlantic Charter
formulated by Roosevelt and Churchill in August 1941, which promised
freedom self determination, and equality of economic opportunity to oil
countries and it participated fully m the preparation and the eventual
creation of the United Nations Organization It concluded a twenty year
agreement with Great Britain ' for the joint achievement both of victory
and of a permanent peace settlement* m June 1942 and later made a
treaty w ith F ranee also
Of the various high level conferences of the Allies during the war, the
three meetings of the heads of state were the most impressive and im-
portant They took place at Teheran in December 1943, at Yalta In the
Crimea in February 1945, and at Potsdam near Berlin m July and
August 1945 Stalin, who had assumed the position of prime minister and
generalissimo, that is, chief military commander, while rcmatnmg the gen-
eral secretary of the Party, represented the Soviet Union on all three
occasions Roosevelt headed the American delegation at Teheran and
Yalta, and Truman, after Roosevelt’s death, at Potsdam Churchill and
later Attlee spoke for Great Britain The heads of the three world powers
devoted large parts of their conferences to a discussion of such major
issues of the Second World War as the establishment of the “second
front* and the eventual entry of the Soviet Union into the struggle against
Japan But, especially as victory came nearer, they also made important
provisions for the time when peace would be achieved These included
among others Use division of Germany into zones of occupauon, with
Berlin receiving special status, the acceptance of the incorporation of the
Konigsberg district of East Prussia into the Soviet Union, the determma-
524
SOVIET RUSS
tion of the Polish eastern frontier, which was to follow roughly the Curzon
Line, Poland being granted an indefinite compensation in the west; the
decision to promote the establishment of democratic governments based
on free elections in all restored European countries; and provisions con-
cerning the formation of the United Nations. Considerable, if largely
deceptive, harmony was achieved. Roosevelt in particular exuded opti-
mism.
Yet even during the war years important disagreements developed among
the Allies. The Soviet Union was bitterly disappointed that the Western
powers did not invade France in 1942 or in 1943. In spite of the impor-
tance of contacts with the West and the enormous aid received from there,
Soviet authorities continued to supervise closely all relations with the
outside world and to restrict the movement and activities of foreigners
in the Soviet Union. Perhaps more important, early difficulties and dis-
agreements concerning the nature of postwar Europe became apparent.
Poland served as a striking case in point. After Germany attacked the
Soviet Union, Soviet authorities established relations with the Polish gov-
ernment in exile in London. But the co-operation between the two broke
down before long. The Polish army formed in the Soviet Union was trans-
ferred to Iran and British auspices, while the Soviet leadership proceeded
to rely on a smaller group of Left-Wing Poles who eventually organized
the so-called Lublin government in liberated Poland. The historic bitter-
ness between the Poles and the Russians, the problem of the frontier,
and other controversial issues were exacerbated by the events of the war
years. In April 1943, the German radio announced to the world the
massacre by the Reds of thousands of Polish officers in the Katyn Forest
near Smolensk before the capture of that area by German troops. This
charge, which led to the break in relations between Moscow and the
Polish government in London, has on the whole been supported by subse-
quent developments and investigations. Again, when the Red Army reached
the Vistula in August 1944, it failed to assist a desperate Polish rebellion
against the Germans in Warsaw, which was finally crushed in October.
In this manner it witnessed the annihilation of the anti-German, but also
anti-Soviet, Polish underground. The official assertion that Red troops
could not advance because they had exhausted their supplies and needed
to rest and regroup had its grounds. But Soviet authorities would not even
provide airstrips for Allied planes to help the Poles. Under the circum-
stances the Yalta decision to recognize the Lublin government expanded
by several representatives of the London Poles and to hold free elections
and establish a democratic regime in Poland proved unrealistic and
amounted in the end to a Western surrender to Soviet wishes. This and
other grave problems of postwar eastern Europe are treated in the next
chapter.
FOREIGN FOllCV, 1921-41, AND WOKID WAR II
525
The Soviet Union in the Second World War An 12\ ahtation
The Soviet performance in the Second World War presents a fascinating
picture of contrasts Seldom did a country and a regime do both so poorly
and so well m the same conflict Far from purposely enticing the Germans
into the interior of the country or executing successfully any other strategic
plan, the Red Army suffered catastrophic defeat in the first months of the
war Indeed, the Russians were smashed as badly as the French had
been a year earlier, except that they had more territory to retreat to and
more men in reserve Moreover, while the German army was at the time
the best jn the world Soviet forces did not at all make the roost of their
admittedly difficult position. Some top Red commanders such as the Civil
War cavalry hero Marshal Semen Budenny, proved to be as incompetent
as the worst tsarist generals The fighting spint of Soviet troops varied
greatly certain units fought heroically while others hastened to surrender
The enormous number of prisoners taken by the Germans testified not
only to their great military victory, but also Jo part to the Soviet wiwjftuig-
ncss to fight Ev en more significantly the Soviet population often welcomed
the Germans This was strikingly true In the recently acquired Baltic
countries and m large areas of the Ukraine and White Russia, but it also
occurred in Great Russian regions near Smolensk and elsewhere After
a quarter of a century of Communist rule many inhabitants of the U S S R
greeted invaders any invaders, as liberators In addition to Red partisans
there developed anti Soviet guerrilla movements, which were at the same
time anti German In the Ukraine, nationalist bands continued resisting
Red rule even long after the end of the Second World War To the great
surprise of the Western democracies, lens of thousands of Soviet citizens
liberated by Allied Brinies in Europe did all they could not to return to
their homeland.
But the Soviet regime survived In spite of its staggering losses, the Red
Army did finally hold the Germans and then gradually push them back
until their defeat became a rout Red infantry artillery, cavalry, and tanks
all repeatedly distinguished themselves fn the Second World War Un
counted soldiers acted with supreme heroism The names of such com
manders as Zhukov and Rokossovsky became synonymous with victory
In addition to the regular anny, daring and d*tcrmincd partisans also
fought the invader to the death The government managed under most
difficult conditions to organize the supply of the armed forces It should
be stressed that while Soviet military transportation depended heavily on
vehicles from Lend Lease, the Red Army was armed with Soviet weapons
Although many people died of starvation in Leningrad and elsewhere, gov-
ernment control remained effective and morale did not break on the home
526
SOVIET RUSSIA
front. Eventually the Soviet Union won, at an enormous cost, it is true,
a total victory.
Much has been written to explain the initial Soviet collapse and the
great subsequent rally. For example, it has been argued that the Germans
defeated themselves. Their beastly treatment of the Soviet population —
documented in A. Dallin’s study and in other works — turned friends into
enemies. It has even been claimed that to win the war the Nazis had
merely to arm Soviet citizens and let them fight against their own govern-
ment, but Hitler was extremely reluctant to try that. The Russian Libera-
tion Army of Andrew Vlasov, a Soviet general who had been taken
prisoner by the Germans and had proceeded to organize an anti-Com-
munist movement, received no chance to develop and prove itself in
combat until it was too late. Commentators have also rightly stressed the
importance of the Soviet appeal to patriotism and other traditional values.
The Communist government consciously utilized the prestige of Russian
military heroes of the past and the manifold attractions of nationalism.
It emphasized discipline and rank in the army, reducing the power of the
commissars. Concurrently it made concessions to the practice of religion
and spoke of a new and better life which would follow the end of the
war. Hie Russians, it has been maintained, proved ready to die for their
country and for that new life, while they felt only hostility to the Soviet
regime.
These and other similar explanations of the Soviet turnabout and of the
German defeat appear to contain much truth. Yet, in the last analysis,
they might give as one-sided a picture of the Soviet scene as the wholesale
admiration of the Communist regime and its virtues popular during and
immediately after the war in less critical Western circles, The salient fact
remains that in one way or another Stalin and his system prevailed over
extreme adversity. They should not be underestimated. Besides, whatever
its wartime appeals and promises, the regime did not change at all in
essence — as subsequent years were to demonstrate to the again astonished
world.
XXXIX
STALIN'S LAST DECADE, 1945-53
Wc demand that our comrades both as (ciders in literary affairs
and as writers be guided by the vital force of the Soviet order —
its politics Only thus can our joulh be reared rot in a devil m3y
care attitude and a spirit of ideotogcal indifference but in a strong
and vigorous revolutionary *jnm
ZHDVMOV
When the immediate passions of the war recede into the background
and it becomes possible to -view the decade after 1939 in greater
perspective the statesmanship exhibited during World War U by
Roosevelt Churchill and Stalin will doubtless be more fully under
stood What K remarkable is not that the Western democracies
and the Soviet Uruon failed to reach any general agreement as to
the postwar organization of Europe but rather that they were able
In ms ntam thear coatit on until the end of the war with so few
alarms and disagreements It is now clear that the success of the
coalition must be attributed more to the immediacy and gravity of
the common danger represented by the military might of Germany
and Japan than to any harmony of opmon among the Allies
regarding the political bases of a stabte peace Dunng the long
period sinre the winter of 1917-18 when the Bolsheviks had
negotiated a separate peace with the Central Powers agreement
between Russia and the West had been the exception rather than
the rule Close co-operation had been achieved almost as a last
resort in the lace of an immediate threat to their security and orwc
the enemy was defeated the differences in pol tical outlook, which
had been temporarily overlooked Inevitably Teappeatcd.
BLACK AND IILLX1KZICH
The Second World War brought tremendous human lasses and material
destruction to the Soviet Union In addition to the millions of soldiers who
dn_d, millions of civilians perished in the shifting battle zone and m
German-occupied territory Of the hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens
who went west, either as Nazi slave labor or of their own will, only a pare
ever rernmed to their homeland The brutality of the invaders defied
description Red Army prisoners starved to death in very large numbers
m German camps, whole categories of people, such as Jews Communists,
government officials and gypsies were exterminated wherever they could
bs found Partisan warfare led to horrible reprisals against the population
In contrast to the First World War, most atrocity stories of the Second
World War were true The total number of Soviet military and civilian.
527
528
OVIET RUS
dead in the dreadful conflict remains quite uncertain. In 1946 the Soviet
government set the figure at seven million. A similiar total has been
reached by a few specialists outside the Soviet Union, such as Mironenko.
Most foreign scholars, however, have arrived at much higher figures, for
instance, Prokopovich estimates fourteen million and Scliuman twenty
million. It is generally believed that the losses were about evenly divided
between the military and civilian. To the dead must be added perhaps
another twenty million for the children that were not born in the decade
of the forties. Population figures announced by the Soviet Union in the
spring of 1959 tend to support high rather than low estimates of the
Second World War losses. Significantly, the ratio of males to females
among the peoples of the U.S.S.R. in 1959 stood at 45 per cent males
to 55 per cent females.
Material losses were similarly enormous. In addition to the destruction
suffered in the fighting, huge areas of the country were devastated —
frequently more than once — at the hands of the retreating Red Army or
the withdrawing Germans. The Red Army followed the scorclied-earth
policy, trying to destroy all that could be of military value to the enemy.
The Nazis, when they were forced to abandon Soviet territory, attempted
to demolish everything, and often did so with remarkable thoroughness.
For example, they both flooded and wrecked mines and developed special
devices to blow up railroad tracks. Much of the Soviet Union became an
utter wasteland. According to official figures — probably somewhat ex-
aggerated as all such Soviet figures tend to be — Soviet material losses
in the war included the total or partial destruction of 1,700 towns, 70,000
villages, 6,000,000 buildings, 84,000 schools, 43,000 libraries, 31,000
factories, and 1,300 bridges. Also demolished were 98,000 kolkhozes and
1,876 sovkhozes. The Soviet economy lost 137,000 tractors and 49,000
combine-harvesters, as well as 7,000,000 horses, 17,000,000 head of cattle,
20,000,000 hogs, and 27,000,000 sheep and goats. Soviet authorities es-
timated the destruction in the U.S.S.R. at half the total material devasta-
tion in Europe during the Second World War. It may have also amounted
to two-thirds of the reproducible wealth of occupied Soviet areas and one-
quarter of the reproducible wealth of the Soviet Union.
The war affected Soviet Russia in other ways as well. It led to a strong
upsurge of patriotism and nationalism, promoted by the Communist gov-
ernment itself which did all it could to mobilize the people for supreme
effort and sacrifice. The army acquired new prominence and prestige,
whereas from the time of the Civil War it had been kept in the background
in the Soviet state. Religion, as already mentioned, profited from a more
tolerant attitude on the part of authorities. In addition, a striking religious
revival developed in German-occupied territory. While the Soviet govern-
529
StmiN'S tkSt DftCADE, 1945—53
meat maintained control over the people, in certain respects n relaxed
somewhat us iron grip Many Soviet citizens apparently felt more free than
before the war In particular, some kolkhozes simply collapsed, the peas-
ants dividing lhe land and farming it in private On the whole, because of
lessened controls and a great demand for food, many peasants improved
their position dunng the war years In the German rone of occupation the
people immediately disbanded the collectives The Nazis, however, later
in part reintroduced them as useful devices to control peasants and obtain
their produce The war also led to closer and friendlier relations with West-
ern allies and made widespread contacts of the Soviet and the non-Soviet
world inevitable Moreover, millions of Soviet citizens, prisoners of war,
deportees, escapees and victorious Red Army soldiers, had their first look
at life outside Soviet borders Other millions, the inhabitants of the Baltic
countries, eastern Poland, Bessarabia, and northern BuVovma, brought up
under alien systems and in different circumstances, were joined to the
Soviet Union
Another obvious result of the Second "World War "as the great rise In
the Soviet position and importance m the world The USSR, came to
dominate eastern Europe except for Greece, and much ot central Europe
Barring the Allied expeditionary forces it had no military nval on the
entire continent The international Communist movement, which had
reached its nadir with the Soviet-German treaty and Hitler's victory m the
west, was experiencing a veritable renaissance After the German attack
on the U S S R , Communists had played major roles m numerous resistance
movements, and they emerged as a great pohucal force in many European
countries, including such important Western states as France and Italy
With the total defeat and unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan,
the earlier defeat of Italy, and the collapse of France, only exhausted Great
Britain and the United States remained as major obstacles to Soviet am-
bition in the whole wide world
In a sense, Stalin and the Politburo had their postw ar policy cut out for
them They had to rebuild the Soviet Union and to continue the tndustnal
and general economic advance They had to rcimpose a full measure of
socialism on the recalcitrant peasant, and to supervise and control closely
such non-Marxist sources of inspiration and belief as religion and national-
ism They had lo combat the "contamination” that bad come to then
country from the non-Soviet world, and they had to make all their people,
including the inhabitants of the newly acquired territories. Into good Soviet
citizens They had to maintain complete control over the army They had
to exploit the new position of the USSR, and the new, sweeping oppor-
tunities open to the Soviet Union and international communism in the
postwar world Those numerous observers who were surprised by the
530 SOVIET RUSSIA
course o£ Soviet politics at home and abroad from 1945 until Stalin’s death
m the spring of 1953 for the most part either had altogether failed to under-
stand the nature of the Soviet system or believed that it had undergone a
fundamental change during the Second World War.
Reconstruction and Economic Development
To repair war damage and resume the economic advance, Stalin and the
Politburo resorted, characteristically, to a five-year plan, and indeed to a
sequence of such plans. The Fourth Five-Year Plan, which lasted from
1946 to 1950 and was proclaimed overfulfilled in four years and three
months, was cut out of the same cloth as its predecessors. It stressed heavy
industry, which absorbed some 85 per cent of the total investment, par-
ticularly emphasizing the production of coal, electrical power, jron, steel,
timber, cement, agricultural machinery, and trucks. The demobilization of
more than ten million men provided the needed additional manpower, for
the total number of workers and employees had declined from 31 million
in 1940 to 19 million in 1943. The rebuilding of devastated towns and
villages, which had begun as soon as the Germans had left, gathered mo-
mentum after the inauguration of the Plan. But the Fourth Five-Year Plan
aimed at more than restoration: Russian industry, especially heavy in-
dustry, was supposed to achieve new heights of production, while labor
productivity was to rise 36 per cent, based on an increase in the amount
of capital per worker of about 50 per cent. As usual, every effort was made
to force the Soviet people to work hard. A financial reform of December
1947 virtually wiped out wartime savings by requiring Soviet citizens to
exchange the money they had for a new currency at the rate of ten to one.
Piece work and bonuses received added emphasis. Official retail prices
went up, although the concurrent abolition of rationing and of certain
other forms of distribution alleviated somewhat the hardships of the con-
sumer. Foreign economists noted a certain improvement in the urban
standard of living as well as a redistribution of real income within the
urban population, primarily against the poorer groups.
The Fourth Five-Year Plan obtained a great boost from reparations
and other payments collected from defeated Germany and its allies. In
1947, for example, three-fourths of Soviet imports came from eastern Eu-
rope and the Soviet zone of Germany, that is, from the area dominated by
Red military might. The total value of Soviet “political” imports, including
reparations, especially favorable trade provisions, and other economic ar-
rangements, as well as resources spent by different countries for the sup-
port of Red Army troops stationed in those countries, has been estimated
at the extraordinary figure of over twenty billion dollars. Some reparations
STALIN S LAST DECADE, 1945-53 5 3l
were made m the form of complete factor es that were dismantled trans
ported to the Soviet Union and reassembled there
In the end the Plan could well be considered a success in industry much
like its predecessors in sp te of the frequently inferior qual ty of products
and uneven results wh eh included large overfulfillments and undcrfulfill
menls Wh le industry was rebuili and even expanded m the Ukraine and
other western areas the Plan marked a further industrial sh ft east which
grew in relative economic importance compared to the prewar penod By
mob;l zmg resources the Soviet Union managed to maintain during the
Fourth and Fifth Five Year Plans the very high annual industrial growth
rate characteristic of the first three plans and estimated by Western econo-
mists at some 12 to 14 per cent on the average — a figure composed of
much higher rates in the late forties and much lower in the early fifties
The Fifth Five Year Plan lasted from 1951 to 1953 and thus continued
beyond Stalin s rule S m tar to all the others in nature and accomplish
ments it apparently made great advances in such complex fields as aviation
and armament industries and atomic energy Its completed projects in
eluded the Volga Don canal
Agriculture as usual formed an csscnual aspect of the plans and aga n
as usual proved part cularly difficult to manage successfully The war to
repeat, produced sweeping destrucuon a further sharp decline in the al
ready insufficient supply of domestic an mals and at the same time a break
down of discipline m many kolkhozes where members proceeded to divide
the land and farm it individually or at least to expand their private plots at
the expense of the collective Discipline was soon restored By September
1 1947 about fourteen million acres had b^cn taken away from the private
holdings of members of collectives as exceeding the permissible norm
Moreover the Politburo and the government mounted a new offensive
aimed at turning the peasants al long last into good socialists This was to
be done by greatly increasing the size of the collectives — thereby decreas
mg their number — and at the same time increasing the size of working
units in a collective m the interests of further mechanization and division
of labor Nikita Khrushchev who emerged as one of the leaders in postwar
Soviet agriculture spoke even of grouping peasants m agrogoroda verita
ye agricultural towns, which would do away once and for all with the
diffusion of labor the isolation and the backwardness characteristic of the
countryside The agrogoroda proved unrealist c or at least premature but
authorities did move to consolidate some 250 000 kolkhozes into fewer
than 100 000 larger units In spite of all the efforts — some hostile critics
believe largely because of them — . peasants failed to satisfy the demands of
Soviet leaders and insufficient agricultural production remained a major
weakness of the Sonet economy as Khrushchev m effect admitted after
Stalin s death
532
IET
Politics and Administration
The postwar period also brought some political changes. As already
mentioned, the Soviet Union acquired five new republics during the time
of the Russo-German agreement. They were lost, together with other large
territories, when Germany and its allies invaded the U.S.S.R. and reac-
quired when the Red Army advanced west. The five Soviet Socialist Re-
publics, the Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Karelo-Finnish, and Moldavian,
raised the total number of component units of the U.S.S.R. to sixteen. In
July 1956, however, the Karelo-Finnish S.S.R. was downgraded to its pre-
war status of an autonomous republic within the R.S.F.S.R., reducing the
number of union republics to the present total of fifteen. The Karelo-Finnish
Republic, consisting both of some older Soviet lands and of territory ac-
quired from Finland in 1940 and again in 1944, largely failed as an expres-
sion of Finnish culture and nationality; in particular, because the inhabitants
had a choice of staying or moving to Finland, virtually no people remained
in the area that the Soviet Union annexed from Finland. The downgrading,
therefore, seemed logical, although it might have been connected with the
desire to Russify that strategic area still more effectively. While the number
of union republics increased as a result of the Second World War, the
number of autonomous republics was reduced: five of the latter, the Volga-
German Autonomous Republic and four in the Crimea, the northern Cau-
casus, and adjacent areas were disbanded for sympathizing with or assist-
ing the Germans, their populations being transported to distant regions.
In the case of the Volga Germans, the N.K.V.D. apparently staged a fake
parachute raid, pretending to be a Nazi spearhead in order to uncover the
sympathies of the people. Mass deportations also took place in the newly
acquired areas that were rapidly and ruthlessly incorporated into the Soviet
system. For example, most of the members of the upper and middle classes,
including a great many intellectuals, disappeared from the Baltic repub-
lics. The concentration-camp empire of Stalin and Beria bulged at the
seams. i
By contrast, although the Union expanded and rigorous measures were
applied to bring all parts of it into conformity with the established order,
the Soviet political system itself changed little. Union-wide elections were
held in 1946 for the first time since 1937, and again in 1950. The new
Supreme Soviets acted, of course, as no more than rubber stamps for Stalin
and the government. Republican and other local elections also took place.
The minimum age for office holders was raised from eighteen to twenty-
three. In 1946 people’s commissariats became ministries. More important,
their number was reduced in the postwar years and they were more strongly
centralized in Moscow. Shortly before his death, Stalin carried out a po-
STAUN'S LAST DRCAOE. 1945-53 $33
lermally important change in the top Party administration' die Politburo
as well as the Organizational Bureau were abolished and replaced by the
Presidium to consist of tea Politburo members, the eleventh being dropped,
plus another fifteen high Soviet leaders But Stalin died without calling to-
gtther the Presidium After bis death its announced membership was re-
duced to ten, so that as an institution it diflered from the Politburo in noth-
ing but name, and even the name was restored after Khrushchev’s fall.
The postwar years witnessed also a militant reaffirmation of Communist
orthodoxy in ideology and culture While more will be said about this sub-
ject m a later chapter, it might be noted here tb3t scholarship, literature,
and the arts all suffered from the imposition of a Party strait jacket More-
over, Andrew Zhdanov, a member of the Politburo and the Party boss of
Leningrad during the frightful siege, who led the campaign to restore or-
thodoxy, emerged as Stalin’s most prominent lieutenant from 1946 until
■Zhdanov’s sudden death in August That death — ~ engineered by
Stalin in the opinion of some specialists — again left the problem of suc-
cession wide open The aging dictator was surrounded during his last years
by a few sun iving old leaders, hts long-time associates, such as Molotov.
Marshal Clement Voroshilov, Lazarus Kaganovich, and An as t asms Miko-
yan, as well as by some younger men who had become prominent after the
great purge, notably Bfcria, Khrushchev, and George Malenkov Malenkov
in particular appeared to gain consistently in importance and to loom as
Stalin’s most likely successor
Foreign Policy
Stalin’s last decade saw extremely important developments in Soviet
foreign policy Crucial events of the postwar years included the expansion
of Soviet power in eastern Europe, the breakdown of the wartime co-
operation between the U S 5.R. and its Western allies, and the polarization
of the world into the Communist and the anU-Commumst blocs, headed by
the Soviet Union and the United States respectively That the Soviet Union
proved intractable in Us dealings with the West, that it did what it could
to expand its own bloc, and that it received support from the Communist
movement all over the world, followed logically from the nature and new
opportunities of Soviet communism A persistent refusal on the part of
many circles in the West to face reality testified simply to their wishful
thinking or ignorance Yet it does not follow that evdy Soviet move was
a cleverly calculated step of a prearranged conspiracy. It appears more
likely that the Soviet leaders, too, had prepared little for the postwar
period, and that in their preparation they had concentrated on such ob-
jectives as rendering Germany permanently harmless. The sweeping Soviet
expansion in eastern Europe occurred at least in part because of special
534 SOVIET RUSSIA
circumstances: the rapid Western withdrawal of forces and demobilization,
the fact that it became apparent that free elections in most eastern Euro-
pean countries would result in anti-Soviet governments, and the pressure
of local Communists as well as, possibly, the urging of the more activist
group within the Soviet leadership. In the opinion of Mosely and certain
other observers, Stalin embarked on a policy of intransigence and expan-
sion shortly after Yalta.
The Soviet Union and the Allies co-operated long enough to put into
operation their arrangement for dividing and ruling Germany and to bring
top Nazi leaders to trial before an international tribunal at Nuremberg in
1946. Also, in February 1947, the victorious powers signed peace treaties
with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland. The Soviet Union
confirmed its territorial gains from Rumania and Finland, including a lease
of the Finnish base of Porkkala, and obtained extensive reparations. Round-
ing out its acquisitions, the U.S.S.R. obtained the so-called Carpatho-
Ruthenian area from friendly Czechoslovakia in 1945. While most in-
habitants of that region spoke Ukrainian, they had not been connected with
any Russian state since the days of Kievan Russia.
But on the whole co-operation between the U.S.S.R. and the Western
powers broke down quickly and decisively. No agreement on the inter-
national control of atomic energy could be reached, the Soviet Union re-
fusing to participate in the Atomic Energy Commission created by the
United Nations in 1946. In the same year a grave crisis developed over
the efforts of the Soviet government to obtain significant concessions
from Persia, or Iran, and its refusal to follow the example of Great Britain
and the United States and withdraw its troops from that country after the
end of the war. Although, as a result of Western pressure and the airing
of the question in the United Nations, Soviet forces did finally leave Iran,
the hostility between former allies became increasingly apparent.
The Communist seizure of power in eastern Europe contributed very
heavily to the division of the world into two opposed blocs. While many
details of the process varied from country to country, the end result in
each, case, that is, in Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary,
and Poland, was the firm entrenchment of a Communist regime co-operat-
ing with and dominated by the Soviet Union. The same happened in eastern
Germany. Only Greece and Finland managed to escape the Communist
grasp. Liberated Greece fell into the British rather than the Soviet sphere,
and its government, supported by Great Britain and the United States,
managed to win a bitter civil war from the Communist-led Left. The fact
that Finland survived as a free nation remains puzzling. It could be that
Moscow first overestimated the strength of Finnish Communists, who did
play a prominent part in the government of the country immediately after
tb~n siwtstsv) Tint tn fnrrft the issue in a chansnne international
STALIN'S LAST »BCAt>Jt, 1943-53 535
situation after thfc Finnish Communists failed to sene power In particular,
the Soviet Union probably wanted to avoid driving Sweden into the camp
of Soviet enemies Similarly — at a greater distance from the U S SR —
the large and strong Communist and allied parties tn France and Italy, very
prominent in the first years following the war, were forced out of coalition
governments and had to 1mm themselves to the role of an opposition bent
largely on obstruction
It has frequently been said that communism won in Europe only In
countries occupied by the Red Army, and that point deserves to be kept in
mind. Yet It docs not tell the whole story Whereas in Poland, for example,
native Communists were extremely weak, in Yugoslavia and Albania they
had led resistance movements against the Axis powers and had attained
dominant positions at the end of the war Perhaps more important, the
Soviet Union preferred to rely in all cases on local party members, while
holding the Red Army in readiness as the ultimate argument Usually, the
“reactionary” elements, including monarchs where such were present and
the upper classes in general as well as Fascists, would be forced out of po-
litical life and a "united front" of "progressive” elements formed to govern
the country Next the Communists destroyed or at least weakened and
neutralized their partners in the front to establish m effect, if not always
tn form, their single-party dictatorship even though the party might be
known as the "workers’" or “socialist unity" party rather than simply
"Communist " It is worth noting that the eastern European Communists had
the most trouble with agrarian parties, just as the Bolsheviks had met their
most dangerous rivals in the Socialist Revolutionaries In Roman Catholic
countries, such as Poland and Hungary, they also experienced strong and
persistent opposition from the Church The Communist seizure of power
in Czechoslovakia proved particularly disturbing to the non Communist
world, because it occurred as fate as 1948 and disposed of a regime headed
by President BcneS which had enjoyed popular support and maintained
friendly relations with the Soviet Union The new totalitarian governments
m eastern Bui ope proclaimed themselves to be “popular democracies”
They followed the Soviet lead in introducing economic plans, industrializ-
ing, collectivizing agriculture — sometimes gradually, however — and es-
tablishing minute regulation of all phases of life, including culture As in
the U S S R., the political police played a key role in social transforma-
tion and control An “iron, curtain" came to separate the Communist world
from the non-Commumst,
Churchill, at the time out of office, in a speech in Fulton, Missouri, in
March 1946, stressed the danger to the democrauc world of the Communist
expansion. He was one of the first Western ststesmen to point out this
danger. When another year of negotiations with the USSR produced no
results. President Truman appealed to Congress for funds to provide null*
536
OVIET RUSSIA
tary and economic aid to the neighbors of the U.S.S.R. — Greece and
Turkey — the independence of which was threatened directly or indirectly
by the Communist state; this policy came to be known as the Truman Doc-
trine. In June 1947 the Marshall Plan was introduced to help rebuild the
economies of European countries devastated by war. Because the Soviet
Union and its satellites would not participate, the plan became a powerful
bond for the Western bloc. Next, in 1949, twelve Western countries, the
United States, Great Britain, Canada, France, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, and Portugal signed the
Atlantic Defense Pact of mutual aid against aggression. A permanent
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and armed force were subsequently
created, under General Eisenhower’s command. Also in 1949, the U.S,
Congress passed a broad Mutual Defense Assistance Program to aid
American allies all over the world. With these agreements and with nu-
merous bases girding the U.S.S.R., the United States and other countries
were finally organized to meet the Soviet threat
The Communist bloc also organized. In 1947 the Communist Informa-
tion Bureau, known as Cominform, replaced the Communist Internationa!
which had been disbanded in 1943. Bringing together the Communist
parties of the U.S.S.R., eastern Europe, France, and Italy, the Cominform
aimed at better co-ordination of Communist efforts in Europe. Zhdanov,
who represented the Soviet party, set the unmistakably militant tone of the
organization. But Communist co-operation was dealt a major blow by the
break between Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R., backed by its satellites, in the
summer of 1948. Tito chose to defy Stalin because he wanted to retain full
effective control of his own country and resented the role assigned to
Yugoslavia in the economic plans and other plans of the Soviet bloc. He
succeeded in his bold undertaking because he had a strong organization
and support at home in contrast to other eastern European Communist
leaders, many of whom were simply Soviet puppets, and because the Soviet
Union did not dare invade Yugoslavia, apparently from fear of the prob-
able international complications. Tito’s unprecedented defection created
the new phenomenon of "national” communism, independent of the Soviet
bloc. It led to major purges of potential heretics in other eastern European
Communist parties, which took the lives of some of the most important
Communists of eastern Europe and resembled in many respects the great
Soviet purge of the thirties.
The Western world confronted the Soviet in many places and on many
issues. Continuous confrontation in the United Nations resulted in little
more than Soviet Russia’s constant use of its veto power in the Council.
Thus, of the eighty vetoes cast there in the decade from 1945 to 1955,
seventy-seven belonged to the Soviet Union. The two sides also faced each
other in Germany. Because of the new enmity of the wartime allies, the
STALIN’S LAST DECADE, 1945-53 557
Allied Control Council In Germany faded to function almost from the be.
ginning, and no agreement could be reached concerning the unification of
Germany or the peace treaty with that country Finally, the Federal Re-
public of Germany with its government m Bonn was established in the
Western-occupied zones in May 1949, while the German Democratic Re-
public was created in the Soviet held area in October cf the same year The
first naturally sided with the West and eventually joined NATO The sec-
ond formed an integral part of the Soviet bloc Cold war in Germany
reached its height m the summer of 1948 when Soviet authorities stopped
the overland supply of the American, British, and French sectors of Berlin
Since that city, located 110 miles within the Soviet zone, has been under
the jurisdiction af the four powers, three of them Western, it, or rather
West Berlin, remains a highly provocative and disturbing “window of free-
dom” in rapidly Communized eastern Germany and eastern Europe But
Soviet hopes to force the Western powers to abandon their part of the city
failed a mammoth airlift was maintained for months by American and
British planes to keep West Berlin supplied until the Soviet Union discon-
tinued its blockade
Postwar events ut Asia were as important as the developments tn Eu-
rope Communists made bids to seize power in such different areas as Indo-
nesia, Malaya, and Burma They succeeded in China The great Chinese
civil war ended m 1949 with Chiang Kat sheks evacuation to Formosa —
or Taiwan — and the proclamation of the Communist Chinese People’s
Republic, with Mao Zedong at its head, on the mainland While the Soviet
Union took no direct part in the Chinese war and at first apparently even
tried to restrain Mao, it helped Chinese Communists with supplies and
backed fully Mao’s new regime And indeed Communist victory in a coun-
try of great size inhabited by some half a billion people meant an enormous
accretion of strength to the Soviet bloc, although it also created serious
problems China could not be expected to occupy the rofc of a satellite,
such as Bulgaria or Czechoslovakia, and the Communist world acquired m
effect a second center of leadership By an agreement concluded m 1950,
the USSR ceded to Communist China its railroad possessions in Man-
churia, although bnefiy retaining a naval base at Port Arthur
In Korea cold war turned to actual hostilities There, as in Germany, no
agreement could be reached by the victorious powers, and eventually two
governments were formed, one in Amcncan-occupicd southern Korea and
the other in the Soviet north, the thirty-eighth parallel dividing the two At
the end of June 1950, North Korea attacked South Korea In the ensuing
years of fighting, which resulted in the two sides occupying approximately
the same posiucns when the military action stopped as they had in the
beginning, U S forces and some contingents from other countries came to
the assistance of South Korea in execution of a mandate of the United Na-
538
SOVIET RUSSIA
tions, whereas tens and even hundreds of thousands of Chinese “volun-
teers” intervened on the North Korean side, The Soviet army itself did not
participate in the war, although the North Koreans and the Chinese used
Soviet-made aircraft and weapons, and although it is more than likely that
Soviet advisers, as well as Soviet pilots and other technicians, were in
North Korea. Although the front became stabilized in the summer of 1951,
no armistice could be concluded until the summer of 1953, after Stalin's
death.
The End of Stalk
Stalin’s final months had a certain weird quality to them, It could be
that the madness that kept peering through the method during his entire
rule asserted itself with new vigor. In any case, events which then tran-
spired will have to be elucidated by future historians. With international
tension high, dark clouds gathered at home. In January 1953, nine doctors
were accused of having assassinated a number of Soviet leaders, including
Zhdanov. Beria’s police were charged with insufficient vigilance. The press
whipped up a campaign against traitors. Everything pointed to another
great purge. Then on March 4 it was announced that Stalin had suffered a
stroke on the first of the month, and on the morning of the sixth the news
came that he had died the previous night. Some of the dictator’s entourage
especially close to him disappeared at the same time.
X L
THE SOVTET UNION AFTER STALIN, 1953-83
One of the fundamental principles of party leadership is collectivity
in deciding all important problems of party work. It is impossible
to provide genuine leadership tf inner party democracy is violated
in the party organization if genuine collective leadership and widely
developed criticism and setf-crntcism are lacking Collectlveness and
the collegium principle represent a very great force in party leader-
ship .
SLEPOV
As long as we coniine ourselves in substance to denouncing the
personal faults of Stalin as the cause of everything we remain
within the realm of the “personality cult" First all that was good
was attributed to the superhuman, positive qualities of one man now
all that is evil is attributed to his equally exceptional ami even
astonishing faults In the one case, aa well as In the other, we are
outside the enlenon of judgment intrinsic In Marxism The true
problems arc evaded, which are why and how Soviet society could
reach and did reach certain forms alien to the democratic way and
to the legality which it had set for itself, even to the point of
degeneration
Toonvrn
It 11 difficult to exaggerate the historical significance of the Sino-
Soviei conllict It has influenced every facet of International life, not
to speak of the Soviet block Itself No analysis of the relationship
between Washington and Moscow, of the problem of nuclear pro-
liferation, or the orientation of Indian nationalism of ihe thrust
of revolutionary movements in the Third World would be complele
without taking into account the Impact of the Increasingly bitter
dispute between the two onriwic seemingly dose allies For the
international Communist movement, it has been a uagic disaster,
comparable in some respects to the split in Christianity several cen
tnries ago The Communist and Christian experience both showed
that in theologically or ideologically onented movements disagree
menu even only about means and Immediate tactical concerns can
escalate Into basic orgamxationai and doctrinal Indeed, even Into
national conflicts, fundamentally destructive of the movement s unity
PMEZINSKI
Stalin’s stroke — if its official dale is to be believed — was followed
by three days of silence from the Kremlin and, m all probability, by hard
bargaining among top Soviet leaders When the dictator’s demise was an-
539
540 SOVIET RUSSIA
nounced, the new leadership proclaimed itself ready to govern the coun-
try, emphasizing the solidarity of its members as well as its unity with the
people. The shrill tone and the constant repetition of both assertions must
have covered many suspicions and fears. Malenkov emerged clearly in the
chief role, for he became presumably both the senior Party secretary,
which had been Stalin’s most important office, and prime minister. Beria
and Molotov stood next to Malenkov, forming a triumvirate of successors
to the dictator. The three, in that order, were the key living figures during
the burial of Stalin in the Lenin Mausoleum in Red Square on the ninth
of March, making appropriate speeches on the occasion.
The Rise, Rule , and Fall of Nikita Khrushchev
As early as the middle of March, however, it was announced that Malen-
kov had resigned as the Party secretary, although he remained prime minis-
ter and continued to be treated as the top personage in the Soviet Union.
The new Presidium of the Party was reduced to ten members. Later it was
announced that Khrushchev had been promoted to the position of first
Party secretary, the title used instead of that of general secretary asso-
ciated with Stalin. In the summer of 1953, Beria was arrested and then exe-
cuted in secret, with a number of his followers, on charges of treason and
conspiracy; or, as Khrushchev related to some visitors, Beria was killed at
the Presidium meeting at which he had expected to assume full power. In
any case, it would seem that in the race to dispose of one another Beria bad
narrowly lost out. Beria’s fall marked a certain weakening in the power of
the political police. In February 1955, Malenkov resigned as prime minis-
ter, saying that he was guilty of mistakes made in the management of Soviet
agriculture and of having incorrectly emphasized the production of con-
sumer goods at the expense of heavy industry. Nicholas Bulganin, a promi-
nent Communist leader who had been a member of the Politburo since
1948, replaced Malenkov as head of the government. Bulganin and
Khrushchev, the chief of the government and the chief of the Party, then
occupied the center of the Soviet stage and also held the limelight in inter-
national affairs, suggesting to some observers the existence of something
resembling a diarchy in the U.S.S.R. Marshal Zhukov, a great hero of the
Second World War who had been reduced by Stalin to provincial com-
mands and had returned to prominence after Stalin’s death, took over Bul-
ganin’s former office of minister of defense. Zhukov’s rise marked the first
appearance of an essentially military, rather than Party, figure in high
governing circles in Soviet Russia.
The struggle in the Kremlin continued. Probably its most astounding
event was Khrushchev’s speech to a closed session of the Twentieth Parly
Congress in February 1956, in which the new first secretary denounced his
AFTER STALIN, 1953-83 541
predecessor, Stalin, as a cruel irrational, anil bloodthirsty tyrant, who had
destroyed many innocent with the guilty m his great purge of the Party and
the army in the thirties and at other times In fact Stalin and the "cult of
personality” he had fostered were blamed also for military unpreparedness
and defeats in the Second World War as well as for other Soviet mistakes
and weaknesses At the same time, paradoxically, Khrushchev presented
Stalin's colossal aberrations as mere deviations of an essentially correct
policy, entirely rectified by the collective leadership th3t replaced the des-
pot Khrushchev's explosive speech remains difficult to explain after all,
it was certain to produce an enormous shock among Communists and do
great damage to the Communist cause — to say the least the transition
from years of endless adulation of Stalin to Khrushchev’s revelations was
bound to be breathtaking, besides, Khrushchev could not help but impli-
cate himself and his associates, at least indirectly in Stalin's crimes and
errors The answer to the riddle of the speech lies probably in the exi-
gencies of the strangle for power among Soviet leaders Khrushchev’s sen-
sational denunciation of Stalin struck apparently at some ‘old Stalinists "
his main competitors Besides, it would seem that Khrushchev tried both
to put the blame for many of the worst aspects of the Soviet past on Stalin,
implying that these evils could not happen again, 3nd to set the coircct line
of policy for the future
The conflict at the top reached its culmination m the spring and early
summer of 1957, afier the Hungarian rebellion of the preceding autumn
and certain other events at home and abroad had raised grave questions
concerning the orientation and activities of the new Soviet administration
and indeed concerning the stability of the whole Soviet system Defeated
in the Presidium of the Party, Khrushchev took his case to its entire Central
Committee, successfully reversing the unfavorable, decision and obtaining
the ouster from the Presidium and other positions oE power of the * anti-
Party group” of Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Dmuru Shcpilov,
a recent addition to the Soviet front ranks While Khrushchev's enemies
were dropped from the Presidium, its membership was increased to fifteen,
giving the general secretary further opportunities to bring his supporters
into that extremely important body Marshal Zhukov, who it would seem,
had provided valuable assistance to Khrushchev in the latter’s bid for
power, again Tell into disgrace several months laier Finally m March 1958,
Bulgamn, who had been disloyal to Khrushchev the preceding year, re-
signed as head of the government Khrushchev himself replaced Bulganin,
thus combining the supreme effective authority of the Psrtj and of the
state Clearly that self-made man of peasant background and limited educa-
tion no longer had any equals within the collective leadership or elsewhere
in the U S S R
The remarkable Twenty-second Party Congress held m the second half
of October, 1961, confirmed on the whole Khrushchev’s dominant position.
As expected, it gave fulsome approval to the new leader’s twenty-year pro-
gram of “building communism” and denounced his enemies at home and
abroad. Another old leader, Voroshilov, was linked to the "anti-Party
group.” In a much more unexpected development, however, Khrushchev
and the Congress returned to the grizzly issue of Stalinism, detailing and
documenting many of its atrocities. The removal of Stalin’s body from the
mausoleum in Red Square, the renaming of the cities named after Stalin,
with Stalingrad becoming Volgograd, and the publicity given for the first
time to certain aspects of the great purge must have had a powerful impact
on many Soviet minds.
Yet, although Khrushchev managed to assert his will at the Twenty-
second Party Congress and even evict Stalin from the mausoleum, it can
be seen in retrospect that by 1961 his fortunes were on the decline. In fact,
1958 probably marked Khrushchev’s zenith. The year followed the new
leader’s decisive victory over the “anti-Party group,” and the sensational
Soviet inauguration of the space age the preceding autumn. It was blessed
with a bounteous harvest. In spite of serious problems, industrial produc-
tion continued to grow at a high rate. The ebullient Khrushchev could
readily believe that all roads led to a communism that was bound to bury
capitalism in the not-too-distant future.
Disillusionmcnts followed in rapid succession. Economic development
went sour; Khrushchev’s exhortations, and his economic, administrative,
and party reorganizations, together with his hectic campaigns to remedy
particular deficiencies ■ — all to be discussed later in this chapter — were
increasingly ineffective in resolving the crisis. In his last years and months
in office Khrushchev saw the rate of industrial growth decline sharply while
he had to resort to an unprecedented purchase of Canadian wheat to
forestall hunger at home. De-Stalinization or, more broadly, a certain
“liberalization” of Soviet life seemed to produce as many problems as it
resolved. It led in effect to soul-searching and instability rather than to any
outburst of creative communist energy. The world situation — also to be
discussed later — deteriorated even more sharply from the Soviet point of
view. In 1960 the conflict with China, which dated back at least to
Khrushchev’s original de-Stalinization of 1956, burst into the open, and
from about 1963 the break between the former allies seemed irreparable.
In the relations with the West, Khrushchev’s aggressive enthusiasm, spurred
by the successes of Soviet space technology, received repeated checks in
Germany and finally suffered a smashing defeat in November 1962 in the
crucial confrontation with the United States over the Soviet missiles in
Cuba. Khrushchev’s survival of the catastrophe of his apparently largely
personal foreign policy might be considered a tribute to Soviet totalitarian-
ism. Yet totalitarianism too was deteriorating in the Soviet Union. Ob-
AFTER STALIN, 1953-&3 343
servers noted that although the Twenty -second Party Congress confirmed
and extended Khrushchev’s victory over the “anti-Farty group” these en-
emies of the leader were not even expelled from the Party. New fissures and
problems appeared in the ensuing months and years It would seem that
during this time Khrushchev made the mistake of acting m an increasingly
autocratic and arbitrary manner even though his power was not nearly as
great as Stalin’s had been.
On October IS, 1964, It was announced in Moscow that Nikita Ser-
geevich Khrushchev was "released” from both his Party and his govern-
ment positions, because of “advanced age and deterioration of fits health."
Brezhnev and Kosygin
The ten years or so of Khrushchev's rule of the Soviet Union have often
been described as a transitional period, but they also marked a culmina-
tion When Khrushchev assumed power m the Kremlin he became both
the head of the U S S R and the leader of an essentially united, ever-
victonous, Bnd ever-expanding world communism. He could still believe
in the identity of interests of the state and the movement. Indeed he de-
lighted m counting the years, twenty or fifteen, at the end of which the
Soviet Union would enter lull communism, and additional years, perhaps
to the time of "our grandchildren,” which would establish communism all
over the globe Khrushchev's own rags- to- riches story was about to be
repeated on a universal scale By the time the enthusiastic leader "retired,”
communism was hopelessly split between the antagonistic centers of
Moscow and Peking, white the Cuban confrontation and defeat spelled
out lo the Sov3et leaders m an unforgettable manner the realities of the
atomic age, of which Marx and Engels and even Lenin had no inkling
At home dc-Stalimzation kept releasing new furies, and the economic
Situation called for emergency measures to improve productivity, dis-
tribution, and services rather than for blueprints of a communist utopia
All these, and many other problems, fell upon the shoulders of Khrush-
chev’s successors, and in particular on Leonid Brezhnev, who obtained
the top position in the Party, and Alexis Kosygin, w ho as prime minister
became the effective head of the government
The new leaders had the usual record of Party and government service,
and their views could not be easily distinguished from those of Khrushchev
In fact, Khrushchev apparently had thought of Brezhnev as his eventual
successor The Chinese and certain others who expected Soviet policy to
be transformed by the fall of Khrushchev were quickly disappointed. In-
stead of challenging Khrushchev on fundamentals, the new leadership as-
sailed his persona] performance and style of work, accusing him of “sub-
jectivism,” authoritarianism, ignorance, "hare-brained schemes,” and “mad
544
ET RU
improvisations.” Khrushchev’s sweeping reorganizational reforms were re-
pealed, some promptly and some after a period of time. It was a certain
businesslike, low-key quality of the new administration that presented a
striking contrast to the flamboyancy and bombast of the deposed leader.
The overturn of October 1964 could also be considered a reassertion of
collective leadership, eliminating as it did the latest cult of personality.
Although the fall of Khrushchev strengthened the forces opposed to de-
Stalinization, and although these forces have gradually become somewhat
more prominent in Soviet life, thus far they have been unable to gain the
upper hand. Instead the leadership resorted to compromise which found
its characteristic expression in the mammoth Twenty-third Party Congress
held in the spring of 1966. There were 4,942 delegates and additional rep-
resentatives of 86 foreign communist parties and sympathizing organiza-
tions — the number announced was 86, but there were actually somewhat
fewer. The Congress avoided mention of such crucial issues as China,
Stalin, or, for that matter, Khrushchev. With the Vietnam war in full
swing, it adopted doctrinaire, anti-imperialistic planks in foreign policy and
expounded a hard line in matters of ideology and culture. On the other
hand, it upheld a certain economic “liberalization” and took a more realis-
tic view of the economic and social development and potentialities of the
Soviet Union than had been customary under Khrushchev. In the words of
critical commentators, the Soviet authorities opted for economic develop-
ment without its consequences. It was by the decision of the Twenty-third
Congress that the Presidium became again, as in the days of Stalin, the
Politburo, and the first secretary of the Party became again the general
secretary.
Brezhnev was also the central figure and delivered the main address at the
Twenty-fourth Party Congress in March and April 1971, the Twenty-fifth
Party Congress in late February 1976, and the Twenty-sixth Party Congress
in February and March 1981. His authority grew with the years, and one
could speak even of a cult of Brezhnev, especially after the general secretary
of the Party also became, in 1976, a Marshal of the Soviet Union and his
autobiographical writings were given tremendous prominence. Yet he con-
tinued, apparently, to work closely with other leaders of the Politburo;
besides, Brezhnev, bom in 1906, was becoming increasingly an old and
sick man. His name and efforts came to be associated with the policy of
detente, which the Soviet propaganda machine preferred to call, until re-
cently, “irreversible,” with the great strengthening of the Soviet military
might vis-k-vis the United States, and also with economic policies emphasiz-
ing such crucial sectors as agriculture and energy. Living standards rose
markedly, and some commentators began to write of a Soviet version of con-
sumer attitudes and a consumer society. The Party and government elite
in particular came to enjoy high living, although, not surprisingly, it has
A.PTER STALIN. 19 5 3-83 545
remained touchy on that subject In the anecdotal words of Brezhnev’s
uneducated mother, at the sight of her son’s splendid collection of motor
cars “That is fine, my dear son, but what if the Bolsheviks mum’ * Vet,
as the Soviet economic situation became more difficult in the late 1970's
and early 1980’s, the Brezhnev government attempted essentially pallia-
tives rather than fundamental reform "the decision has been mode 'to
settle for short-run solutions to long-term problems ’ ’’ Certain observers
concluded that, although Brezhnev did not have complete control of the
Soviet Union, he had full veto power of any reforms and that, therefore,
no teal change could be expected as long as he remained at the helm
When Brezhnev died, finally, on November 10, 1982, at the age of
seventy-five, he had outlived such near-peers as Kosygin, by about tvvo
years, and the chief Party ideologist, Michael Suslov, by less than a year,
Nicholas Podgomy had been ousted from the leadership m 1977, Brezh-
nev’s long time lieutenant. Andrew Kirilenko, slightly older than his pa-
tron, lost bis Politburo position m 1982, whether for political or medical
reasons Yet the remaining leaders still belonged to the same well-
established group and were of comparable age and, as far as one could tell,
orientation Nicholas Tikhonov, who replaced Kosygin as prime minister,
was bom, like Brezhnev, in 1906, Constantine Chernenko, probably
closest to Brezhnev at the time of the latter’s death, is only five years
younger, Dmitm Ustinov, the man m charge of what may be described as
the Soviet military-industrial complex, was born in 1908 That the General
Secretaryship of the Party went to Iuru Vladimirovich Andropov, sixty-
eight, was not unexpected, although some observers were surprised by the
rapidity and smoothness of the transition Credited with uncommon intelli-
gence and general ability, ns well as a certain sophistication, Andropov
became well-known as the head of the K G B , the political police, for the
fifteen years before he switched m May 1982 to work in the Party secre-
tariat He has also been a prominent Politburo member since 1973 Andro-
pov’s earlier service included the position of ambassador to Hungary m
1954-57, when he became linked, apparently, both to the brutal suppres-
sion of the Hungarian revolt and to the institution of a liberal economic
policy m Hungary m its wake The choice of Brezhnev’s successor might
well have been the best available However, as Soviet ideologists never tire
of telling us, it is not the personalities, but the basic economic, social, and
political realities that matter. And it is these basic realities than Andropov
will now have to face, in full measure
Economic Development
When Stalin died, the Fifth Five-Year Flan was in full swing It was
duly completed in 1955, yielding the usual result of accomplishment in
546
SOVIET
industry — checkered, to be sure, with huge overfulfillments and under-
fulfillments - — based on great exertion and privation. The Sixth Five-Year
Plan, scheduled to run from 1956 to 1960, promptly succeeded the fifth.
Its period was truncated in 1958, however, and a Seven-Year Plan to last
from 1959 through 1965 was proclaimed instead. The official explanation
for the change, which stressed the discovery of vast new natural resources
that altered Soviet economic prospects, was not convincing. Apparently, the
Sixth Five-Year Plan had fallen considerably behind its assigned norms of
production and the Soviet leadership decided to try a fresh start.
Another change in Soviet economic life occurred in 1957, when Khru-
shchev, in a move aimed at a geographic dispersion, or deconcentration
— although not organizational decentralization — of authority, transferred
the direction of a good proportion of industry from the ministries in Mos-
cow to regional Economic Councils. Reflecting the constant Soviet search
for the most effective and efficient economic organization, this reform was
nevertheless considered by many observers as primarily political in motiva-
tion: it removed from Moscow large economic managerial staffs which, it
would seem, had supported Malenkov in the struggle for power within the
Kremlin. Another aim might have been to give the local Party bosses more
authority in economic matters.
The industrial goals of the Seven-Year Plan were pronounced real-
listic by such Western economists as Campbell and Jasny. While concen-
trating as usual on heavy industry, with special attention paid to, for exam-
ple, further electrification and development of the chemical industry, the
plan called for a rate of industrial growth approximately 20 per cent slower
than that achieved during the Fifth Five-Year Plan. In this sense it was
also less ambitious than the abortive Sixth Five-Year Plan. In evaluating
the Seven-Year Plan, Campbell made the following comparison between
the Soviet and the U.S. economies:
If it is assumed that industry in the United States will continue to expand
at the rate of about 4 per cent that has characterized the postwar period,
and that the rate of growth planned by the Russians for their industry is
actually achieved, iheir industrial output will rise from about 45 per cent
of ours at the beginning of the seven-year period to about 61 per cent at
the end. In other words they will still be a long way behind us (and even
further behind in terms of per capita output, it may be added), though
they will certainly have made a remarkable gain on us.
In fact, Campbell’s prediction proved to be generally intelligent, although
impossible to evaluate definitively with any degree of precision — inciden-
tally, such comparisons give vastly different results depending on whether
they are made in rubles or in dollars. After Khrushchev too, _ it might be
added, the Soviet economy continued to gain in relative output on the
AFTER STALIN, 1953-8 3 547
American economy, helped by such developments as the recession in the
United States and the Western world in general in the 1970 s and 1980 s
At present most Western specialists would not go beyond stating that the
Soviet Union has been gaining relatively and has become a superpower
and the second economic power m the world, although Still lar behind the
United States (See, however, calculations at the end of this section )
Although concentrating on capital goods, the Seven-Year Plan allowed
somewhat more for the everyday needs of the people than had generally
been true of previous Soviet industrialization Especially interesting was
the ambittous housing and general building program of the plan, which
aimed to increase the total Soviet building investment by 83 per cent
Even when executed not in its entirety and with buildings of inferior
quality, this aspect of the Seven Year Plan constituted a major contnbu
tion to the improvement of the Soviet standard of living Superior quality
and unflagging attention were devoted by contrast to such advanced
technical fields as atomic energy, rockets, missiles, and space travel From
the launching of the first artificial earth satellite. Sputnik I, m October 1957,
the U S S R has achieved a remarkable senes of pioneer successes m
rockets and space travel
Important developments took place in Soviet agriculture during the
Khrushchev years Indeed frantic efforts to raise agricultural production
constituted, together with certain concessions to the consumer, the salient
new features of Sovtct economic policy The magnitude of the Soviet farm
problem can be seen from the fact that, by contrast with industrial achieve
ments, the gross output of agriculture in 1952 was only some 6 per cent
above 1928 In 1954 Khrushchev set into full operation his sweeping
' virgin lands” project huge areas of and lands in Asiatic Russia, even
tually totaling some seventy million acres, were to be brought under culti-
vation The undertaking supported by great exertion as well as by o
mighty propaganda effort, gave remarkably mixed results from year to
year, depending in large part on weather conditions, but did not live up to
expectations The new first secretary also started a huge corn planting pro
gram He further decided to boost drastically the production of such foods
as meat, milk, and butter These items came to rival electric power and
steel in Soviet propaganda and to serve as significant gauges in “surpassing
America ”
Yet the condition of Soviet agriculture remained bad Official claims
and promises, especially the latter, differed sharply from reality Indeed,
the mass planting of corn, often in unsuitable conditions, and even the
huge gamble on the Mrgm lands, which arc difficult to cultivate, might
have been unwise To increase production Soviet authorities resorted to
the old method of further socialization Between 1953 and 1957 the num-
548
SOVIET RUSSIA
ber of sovkhozes increased from 4,857 to 6,000, while the number of
kolkhozes declined at the same lime From 91,000 to 78,900, reducing the
kolkhoz share of land under cultivation from 84 to 72 per cent. By 1961
the number of collective farms had fallen to 44,000 — and by the end of
the decade they were to be reduced further, through amalgamation, and
absorptions by the sovkhozes, to under 35,000; by 1974, there was in
the Soviet Union slightly more land under sovkhoz than under kolkhoz
cultivation, with only some 30,000 collective farms still in operation. As
late as September 1958, Khrushchev, other leaders, and the propaganda
machine still spoke of the more truly socialist nature, as well as of the tech-
nical superiority, of the sovkhoz system of agriculture over that of the
kolkhoz. Yet, apparently because of the strength of peasant resistance, es-
pecially of the passive kind, the first secretary stopped the attack on
kolkhozes in early 1959 at the Twenty-first Party Congress.
The official policy toward the collective farms continued to be ambiva-
lent. There is a consensus among experts that the income of the members
Of the kolkhozes, extremely low at the time of Stalin’s death, increased
markedly in subsequent years. The set prices paid by the state for com-
pulsory deliveries of collective farm produce were raised to more realistic
levels in 1956 and immediately afterward, enlarging the income of in-
dividual kolkhoz members by as much as 75 per cent, according to
Marchenko’s calculations. The collectives themselves also gained in
strength. In 1958, in an abrupt reversal of previous policy, the government
enacted measures to disband the Machine Tractor Stations, enabling the
kolkhozes to obtain in ownership all the agricultural equipment which they
needed. And, as already mentioned, early in 1959 attacks on the collectives
ceased and they were again recognized as the proper form of agricultural
organization at the given stage of development of the Soviet economy and
society.
But, on the other hand, state and Party pressure on the kolkhozes con-
tinued and in certain respects even gained momentum. The years witnessed
a great stress on increasing the “indivisible fund” of a collective — that is,
that part of its revenue which belongs to the entire kolkhoz and is not par-
celed out among individual members — and on using this fund for such
“socially valuable” undertakings as building schools and roads in the local-
ity. The purchase of M.T.S. machinery by the collectives in itself neces-
sitated heavy expenditure. Also, Khrushchev and other leaders returned to
the theme that the private plots of the members of a kolkhoz are meant
merely to augment a family’s food supply rather than to produce for the
market and that they should become entirely unnecessary with further suc-
cesses of socialist agriculture.
Moreover, the Seven-Year Plan goals of increasing agricultural produc-
AFTER STALIN, 1953-83 549
lion by *70 pci cent and raising labor productivity In the kolkhozes by
100 per cent and in the sovkhozes by 60 to 65 per cent proved to be im-
possible to attain Perhaps (hey had been predicated on a further drastic
socialization of Soviet agriculture, and in particular the elimination or near
elimination of the twenty million small priv ale plots of the members of the
collectives, which the leadership did not dare carry out
Again, m the opinion of Bergson and other Western observers, the agri-
cultural goals adopted by the Twenty-second Party Congress as part of the
program of creating a ’‘material basts" for communism by 1980 seemed
fantastically optimistic and quite unreal — an estimate that did not apply
to nearly the same extent to the industrial goals Khrushchev’s frantic ef-
forts after the Congress to bolster fann production — this time demanding
the abolition of the grass rotation system m favor of planting feed crops
such as sugar beets, corn peas, and beans — served to emphasize further
the crisis of Soviet agriculture Jl is also probably »n connection with the
economic, especially the agricultural, crisis that Khrushchev enacted, in
1962, his strangest reorganizations! measure the across-the-board division
of the hitherto monolithic Communist party into two party hierarchies,
one to deal wuh industry and the other with agriculture
Khrushchev's enthusiasm and ambition in the economic and other fields
found characteristic expression in his insistence on the early budding of
communism, which was to replace socialism as the culminating phase tn the
evolution of Soviet society The Twenty-second Party Congress, tn October
1961, paid much attention to this issue, proclaiming that the preconditions
for communism should be established in the U S S R by 1980 Although
the concept of communism remained fundamentally vague and lacked sub-
stantiating detail, Fcldmesser and other Western scholars have been able
to draw a generally convincing picture of the projected Soviet utopia
Communism would be based on an economy of abundance which would
satisfy all the needs of the population These needs, however, were to be
defined by the authorities In the words of Khrushchev, "Of course, when
We speak of Satisfying people’s needs, wc have in mind not whims or claims
to luxunfs, but the healthy needs of a culturally developed person ” Pre-
sumably, the authorities could also determine that some people had more
needs than others Nevertheless, the main thrust of communism would be
toward equality Income differentials would be drastically reduced More
than that, communism would finally eliminate the distinction between town
and country, industrial and agricultural work, mental and manual labor,
and thus the differences in the styles of life Members of the new society
would be “broad-profile workers,** that is, persons trained m two or three
related skills who would, m addition, engage v. ithout pay m one or more
other socially useful occupations in their feisurc hours
550
MISS
The collective would obviously dominate. Even some of the abundant
consumer goods would be available in the form of “appliance pools” of
refrigerators, washing machines, or vacuum cleaners. Apparently, Khru-
shchev objected to the last to private automobile ownership and projected
instead public car pools. On a still broader scale, life would become in-
creasingly socialized. Free public health services and transportation would
be followed, for example, by free public meals which would virtually elim-
inate kitchen drudgery for women. The Academician Stanislav Strumilin
and others constructed models of communal cities of the future, with
parents allowed a daily visit to their children, who would live separately
under the care of a professional staff. Indeed communism would seem to
imply a great diminution in the role of the family, if not its abolition, al-
though most Soviet commentators have refused to face this conclusion. By
contrast, the role of the school would expand, and so would the roles of
labor brigades, comrades’ courts, and other public organizations. Lenin’s,
or Khrushchev’s, authoritarian Marxist system would in no sense be di-
luted, or even diversified, in communism, but only strengthened and more
effectively “socialized,” so to speak, and internalized. In the end, only
mentally deranged persons would seriously object to it.
According to a bitter Chinese remark, largely applicable in the economic
as in other fields, the fall of Khrushchev resulted simply in Khrushchevism
without Khrushchev. Yet, as already indicated, it brought at least a striking
change in the manner of execution and in tone, if not in fundamental
policy. The new leaders abolished Khrushchev's ^organizational reforms,
such as the division of the Party in two and the creation of the sovnarkhozy,
and discontinued some of his pet projects. They stopped the discussion of
the imminent building of communism and the propaganda concerning the
early surpassing of the United States in the production of consumer goods.
Instead they revealed grave economic shortcomings and failures of the past
administration and took a more realistic view of the potentialities of the
Soviet economy.
It was in the middle and late 1960’$ especially that fundamental measures
were enacted to bolster Soviet agriculture. Collective farmers finally re-
ceived a guaranteed wage, which made their position comparable to that
of the sovkhoz workers, whereas earlier they had the last claim in the
distribution of gain, frequently rendering their very existence marginal, a
point emphasized by Lewin and other scholars. Also, pensions and social
services were extended to the kolkhoz members. Over a period of years
the state greatly increased the amount of resources devoted to agriculture
so that investment in agriculture came to constitute over a third in the
allocation of the total national investment. Another 4VS per cent of the
national income was assigned to subsidize retail food prices to consumers,
551
AFTER STALIN, 1953-83
to keep these prices down tn spite of heavy production costs StiJl other
large sums went into agricultural research If one adds to these huge
expenses some five billion dollars spent by the Soviet Union in 1975-76
alone to buy grain abroad, more money to buy meat and butter, as well as
similar huge purchases later, one can get an idea of the enormous effort
mounted by the Soviet leadership in the last decade end a half or so to
develop the agricultural sector and to supply the Soviet public with in-
creasing amounts of food at more or less stable prices Indeed it has been
said that instead of being the most depressed social group m iheit country
the Soviet peasants have become the most pampeted, at least in relative
terms, that is, by companion with the treatment they formerly received
This makes their poor condition and the poor condition of Soviet agricul-
ture today all the more remarkable
The new Five-Year Plan, 1966-70 — eventually designated as the
Eighth — presented by Kosygin to the Twenty-third Party Congress m
the spring of 1966. reset a number of Khrushchev’s economic goals from
1965 to 1970 The economy was to strive for a 49-52 per cent increase
m the output of heavy industry and a 43-46 per cent increase m consumer
goods, with the annual growth rate of 8 5 per cent and 7 7 per cent
respectively — a strikingly high figure for consumer goods in relation to
heavy industry, although in line with Khrushchev’s thought on the matter
on the eve of his fall Subsequently the Soviet government signed contracts
with Italian and Trench companies fo help develop the automobile industry
in the Soviet Union
The Eighth Five-Year Plan was followed by the Ninth, 1971-75, then
the Tenth was promoted as the "Five-Year Plan of Quality," the "Basic
Directions” for which came out m mid December 1975, some two months
before the Twentj-fifth Parly Congress Yet rather than recapturing the
earlier drive the new Plans seemed to testily to a slowdown of the Soviet
economy, accentuated by the disastrous crop failures of 1972 and especially
of 1975, which necessitated massive purchase of gram abroad — supplied,
particularly by the United States in 1972, on terms remarkably advan-
tageous, to be sure, to the Soviet Union To quote an expert evaluation of
the economic position of the USSR at the time of the Twenty-fifth
Party Congress
Soviet economic growth slowed down significantly during the Ninth
FYP period (1971-75), and the Plan's ambitious targets were generally
— sometime* widely- — missed, affected as Ihe USSR has been by declin-
ing reserves of labor amt other retardation al forces and under the blows
of two major crop failures Particularly hard fm was agricultural produc-
tion, and consumer goods output and consumption levels rose much less
than planned Civilian equipment production and capital formation also
552 SOVIET RUSSIA
fell short of expectations. Nonetheless, Soviet heavy industries expanded
at high rates, and (presumably) military production did well too. The re-
cession in the West made Soviet industrial performance look particularly
good.
The just-announced Tenth FYP (1976—80) provides for further re-
tardation in growth throughout the economy. The advance in consump-
tion levels is expected to slow down even further, as are fixed investment
and capital formation. Labor productivity will also rise more slowly. De-
spite the relative moderation of the Plan’s goals, they may still turn out
to be rather ambitious in relation to resources. No liberalizing reforms
seem to be in the wings; rather, there is strong emphasis on centralism in
planning and management, with considerable hope placed on mergers of
enterprises into rather large units and on computerization. Yet withal the
industrial basis of Soviet power — including military might — will cer-
tainly continue to grow at a pace that would be creditable for any ad-
vanced industrial power.
Since the fall of Khrushchev and in general since the death of Stalin the
standard of living of the urban, and especially of the poverty-stricken rural,
population has apparently continued to improve. At the same time the
Soviet Union has been bearing very heavy military expenditures, exempli-
fied by the deployment of anti-missile ballistic systems and by the tremen-
dous growth of the Soviet navy. Economic activities in the U.S.S.R. have
spread out, and the economic map of the country is undergoing constant
change. Recent illustrations of this change include the rise of Novosibirsk
as a great scientific and technological center in Siberia, the Bratsk Dam,
the Baikal-Amur mainline railway, the new problem of the industrial pollu-
tion of Lake Baikal, and the shift in the center of oil production since the
Second World War from its long-time location in the Caucasus to new
fields between the Volga and the Urals, and, most recently, also to oil and
natural gas fields beyond the Urals.
The new leadership also resorted to economic reform, described gen-
erally as an economic "liberalization” and associated with the name of a
Kharkov economist, Evsci Liberman. Faced with an economic slow-down,
characterized by a drop in the growth rate of the gross national product
and by a marked decline in the return from investment and in the growth
of productivity of labor as well as by a great loss accruing from an under-
utilization of capital and labor resources, the government decided to shift
the emphasis and the incentives from the sheer volume of production,
where they had been from the inauguration of the First Five-Year Plan, to
sales and profits. Under the new system managerial bonuses were to depend
not on the output as such, but on sales and profits, the latter factor finally
giving serious recognition to the clement of cost in Soviet production. In
January 1966 forty-three enterprises from seventeen industries, with a total
553
AFTER STALIN, 1953-83
of 300,000 workers, were switched to ibe new system Others followed in
subsequent months and years At present economic reform has been
realized In industry, transportation, and retail trade, and it is spreading
to the sovkhozes and to the construction sector Yet, ambivalent and
probably insufficient to begin with, it has been emasculated in the process
of implementation, with the result that there is very little difference be-
tween the new system and the old system before 1965 A notable excep-
tion is the new emphasis on material incentives, provisions of more and
more differentiated rewards However, although widely applied, these
incentives have not apparently led to an important improvement m per-
formance This kind Of liberalization is not likely to solve Soviet economic
problems or remain the last word m the economic development of the
Soviet Union
Indeed, the Tenth Five-Year Plan, 1976-80, and the Eleventh which
succeeded it, although on the whole less ambitious than their predecessors,
witnessed repeated inability of the Soviet economy to meet set goals, a de-
cline m the increase of tabor productivity, and other signs of stagnation
Some specialists considered 1979, ihe first of tbc unprecedented four suc-
cessive years of bad gram harvests, a disastrous turning point Then and in
the years immediately following, seemingly everything, from transportation
bottlenecks and difficulty m maintaining the supply of energy to ever-
incrcasing alcoholism and inflation, combined to retard Soviet economic
development 3nd to emphasize the seriousness of Soviet economic prob-
lems Other observers wrote more generally of the first successful period
of the Brezhnev regime, when the growth of Soviet military and industrial
might went hand in hand with a sharp nse in living standards, and of the
last stagnant and disappointing years with their ubiquitous shortages of
food and consumer goods At the time of Brezhnev’s death perhaps the
best evaluation of his eighteen-jcar stewardship of the Soviet economy,
from 1964 to 1982, went as follows (accompanied by a telling comparison
with the United States ) , On the one hand, there was
Steady growth of aggregate output over the eighteen-year period, averaging
3 8 per cent per year, with Industrial output growing at an average annual
rate of 4 9 per cent
Steady increase in living standards of the Soviet population, with per capita
consumption rising at an average annual rate of 2 7 per cent.
Significant growth in Soviet military power in absolute terms — achieved
through a steady increase in real Soviet defense expenditures averaging 4 to
5 per cent per year — as well as in relative terms vt-3-vij the United States
Reduction of the gap m aggregate and per capita output (GNP3 between
the Soviet Union and the United States, "Whereas »n 1965 Soviet GNP was
only about 46 per cent that of the United States (38 per cent on a per capita
basts), by 1932 it was 55 per cent (47 per cent on a per capita basil).
554 SOVIET RUSSIA
Reduction of the gap in productivity between the Soviet Union and the
United States. While in 1965 the productivity of an average Soviet worker
was only 30 per cent that in the United States, by 1982 it was 41 per cent.
Increase in the output of major industrial commodities to the point where, at
the beginning of the 1980’s, the physical output of many key commodities in
the Soviet Union equaled or exceeded that of the United States.
On the other hand, there also was
Steady deceleration in the growth of the Soviet economy. The average annual
growth of GNP declined from the peak of 5.2 per cent during 1966-70 to
3.7 per cent during 1971—75, to 2.7 per cent during 1976-80, and to an esti-
mated 2.0 per cent during 1981—82.
Steady deceleration in the growth of living standards, with the average annual
growth of per capita consumption declining from a peak of 4.3 per cent
during 1966—70 to 2.6 per cent during 1971—75, to 1.7 per cent during
1976-80, and to an estimated 1.2 per cent during 1981-82.
Failure to achieve satisfactory growth in Soviet agriculture. Over the eigh-
teen-year period the average growth rate of GNP originating in agriculture
amounted to only 1.7 per cent.
Lack of growth of agricultural productivity both in absolute terms and in
relative terms vis-i-vis the United States. While in 1965 the productivity of
an average Soviet farm worker was only 14 per cent that in the United States
(in the Soviet Union one worker supplied six persons; in the United States
one worker supplied forty-three persons), by 1981 it actually declined to a
mere 12 per cent (in the Soviet Union one worker supplied eight people; in
the United States the corresponding figure was sixty-five).
Although a significant effect of long-term weather cycles on grain output in the
Soviet Union cannot be ruled out, the most significant failure of the Brezhnev
era appears to be grain harvests, which after 1972 repeatedly fell far short of
expectations and needs. There were six of these poor harvests over the eleven
years: 1972, 1975, 3979, 1980, 1981, and 1982. Whereas the Soviets appeared
to be closing the gap in aggregate output with respect to the United States
through the mid-1 970’s, the dramatic slowdown that has taken place in the
Soviet Union since 1976 has resulted in some widening of the output gap. The
Brezhnev reign was characterized by the highest priority being given to the
growth of investment and defense spending except during the period 1964—70.
As a result, the per capita consumption of an average Soviet citizen today is
still not much more than one-third that In the United States — in fact, over the
eighteen-year period under Brezhnev’s rule the relative gap remained almost
constant.
But while the facts and the statistics seemed reasonably reliable, explana-
tions of them differed. Possibly the most important issue was to what extent
Soviet economic difficulties were of a temporary and relatively remediable
character and to what extent they were intrinsic to the system.
AFTER st al in, 1953-83
555
"The Thaw"
Soviet economic policies since the death of Stalin thus demonstrate both
lie continuation of the mam course of development pursued by the de-
ceased dictator, and certain hesitations, reversals, and changes. Also, they
indicate somewhat more attention to the immediate needs and wishes of
the population than had hitherto been the case Mutatis mutandis, the same
or similar generalizations can be made in regard to other aspects of the
c\ olutton of the Soviet Union in recent years Stalin's death and especially
Beria's fall in the summer of 1953 mailed in a considerable diminution
in the role and power of the political police Khrushchev’s denunciation
of Stalin gave another shock, to the state secunty apparatus, for it em-
phasized its horrible past crimes and mistakes and led to a vindication,
usually posthumous, of some of us prominent victims Two developments
m relation to the police since Statin's death deserve special notice ap-
parently, the numbers of forced-labor camps and their inmates have been
drastically reduced, also, it seems that Soviet citizens no longer feel the
immediate and all-pervasive dread of the political police which they had
acquired under Stalin But, although milder, the Soviet Union remains a
police state Besides, there is no guarantee that the terns which have been
loosened will not be tightened again
As we shall sec in a later chapter, Stalin’s death was also followed by
some relaxation of Party control in the field of culture Khrushchev’s de-
nunciation of the late dictator in itself suggested the need of thorough tt-
valuation of a great many former assumptions and assertions It also
created much confusion For a number of months in 1956 some Soviet
writers exercised remarkable freedom »n their approach to Soviet reality
and their criticism of it Bui, after the Polish crisis and the Hungarian up-
rising in the autumn of that year, severe restrictions reappeared Since
1956 Soviet culture, although not as much hampered ami badgered as in
the worst days of Stalin and Zhdanov, has on the whole faithfully reflected
totalitarian Party control Khrushchev’s fail made little difference in this
respect In fact, it can be argued that his successors have generally assumed
a harder line against dissent, as illustrated by the arrest, tnal, and sen-
tencing of Andrei Smiavshy and Julius Panicl m f 965-66 and numerous
other instances of cultural suppression since that trial
The amount of covert opposition and bitterness that this control and
the present Soviet system in genera! create can only be surmised That
such hostility does exist has been proved by overt explosions, os well as
by works of fiction and literary criticism Thus it should be noted that,
since Stalin's death, uprisings against Communist regimes have taken place
556
not only in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, but also
in the U.S.S.R. itself: notably in the Vorkuta forced-labor camps in the
north of European Russia in 1953; in Tbilisi — or Tiflis — the capital of
Georgia in 1956; in Temir-Tau in Kazakhstan among young Russian con-
struction workers, most of them members of the Union of Communist
Youth — or Komsomol — in 1959; and in Novocherkassk in 1962,
Sporadic riots, strikes, and student demonstrations against the government
have also occurred in the Soviet Union in more recent years, as in Dne-
prodzherzbinsk in 1973.
Short of physical violence, the thawing out of Soviet society and the
emerging opposilionary views have given rise to the blossoming of a striking
and varied samizdat, that is, self-published, illegally produced, reproduced
and distributed, literature, and to the appearance of dissenting intellectuals
and even groups of intellectuals on the fringes of official cultural life.
Harassed and suppressed in many ways, including on occasion incarcera-
tion in dreadful mental hospitals, the opposition has nevertheless been
delivering its message, or rather messages, ranging from a kind of conserva-
tive nationalism and neo-SIavophilism to former hydrogen-bomb physicist
Andrew Sakharov’s progressive, generally Westemizer, views and the late
Andrew Amalrik’s personal, catastrophic, almost Chaadaev-like vision.
And it produced the phenomenon of Alexander Solzhenitsyn. Whatever
one thinks of that writer, now an exile in the West, in terms of literary
stature, ideological acumen, or scholarly precision, most of his works, and
especially the Gulag volumes, are likely to be linked as indissolubly to the
Russia of Stalin as Pushkin’s Eugene Onegin or Turgenev’s Gentry Nest
have been linked to the Russia of the landed gentry — probably unto the
ages of ages. Isolated, weak, armed only with a belief in individual moral
regeneration, so prominent in Solzhenitsyn, the intellectual opposition has
nevertheless been a highly troublesome element in Soviet society, and its
future is no easier to predict than the future of that society.
Recent Jewish self-affirmation, protest, and massive migration to Israel
(about 235,000 emigrants up to the present, some 10 per cent of the total
Jewish population of the U.S.S.R., with many more applying) — together
with the permitted emigration of some non-Jews — have been another
development to disturb the post-Staliu Soviet scene, a development closely
linked to the intellectual opposition, although also quite distinct. One
suspects that the decision to let numerous dissatisfied Soviet citizens leave,
while solving the immediate problem of dealing with those people as well
as responding in a conciliatory way to world public opinion, potentially
raises more questions for the Soviet system than it settles. It is apparently
among many Soviet Jews that the alienation From the established order is
especially thoroughgoing, as in the anecdotal story of the Moscow lew.
557
AFTER STALIN, 1953-83
who was accused of receiving a letter from a brother m Tel Aviv, although
he had claimed that he had no relatives ahroad He explained “You don't
understand he is at home, 1 ana abroad "
The post «Stalm relaxation of restrictions appeared especially striking in
an area that spans domestic and foreign policies foreign travel and inter-
national contacts in general Modifying the former Draconian regulations,
which had made a virtually impenetrable “iron curtain ’ between the Soviet
people and the outside world, Soviet authorities began to welcome tourists,
including Americans, and allow increasing numbers of their citizens to
travel abroad Always strong on organization, they proceeded to arrange
numerous ’ cultural exchanges " ranging from advanced study In many
fields of learning to motion pictures and books for children Soviet scien-
tists, scholars, athletes, dancers and musicians not to mention the astro-
nauts, drew deserved attention in many countries of the world At the same
time Soviet citizens welcomed distinguished visitors from the West and
vigorously applauded their performances In 1976 following the Helsinki
agreements of the preceding year foreign travel and cultural exchange
gamed further strength, supplying the USSR, with more international
contacts than had been the case at any time since the discontinuance of the
HEP Still, considering the freedom of movement, personal relatiors,
education employment, and the like prevalent in the non-Soviet world,
the Soviet Union is a rigidly restricted country And, of course, new restric-
tions can easily be imposed by fiat at any time
foreign Relations
Soviet foreign policy after Stalin's death has also continued to follow
the established pattern m many respects as the U.S.S R and the Com-
munist bloc faced the United States and its allies No conclusive agree-
ments on such decisive issues as control of atomic weapons, genera!
disarmament, or Germany have been reached between the two sides
Crises in widely scallcrcd areas have appeared m rapid success ton The
Soviet Union made a special effort to profit by the emancipation of former
Asiatic and African colonies from Western rule Yd the post-Stalin policy,
especially as developed by Khrushchev, also had its more conciliatory side
The new party secretary elevated the fact of coexistence of the two worlds
into a dogma and asserted that all problems would be solved without war
The apparent contradiction of the two approaches probably stemmed from
a real inconsistency in Khrushchev's thinking rather than from tactical con-
siderations It reflected further the dilemma faced by aggressive communism
in an ago of hydrogen warfare Brezhnev was to pursue the substance, il
not the flamboyant style, of his predecessor’* foreign policy, engaging m an
558
E T Russ:
enormous arms race and pushing hard Soviet influence and interests in
Europe, Asia, the Near East, Africa, and elsewhere, while emphasizing at
the same time detente with the United States and the march of history
towards peaceful evolution and international cooperation.
Stalin’s death and Malenkov’s assumption of the leading role in the So-
viet Union marked some lessening of international tensions as well as some
relaxation at home. The new prime minister asserted that all disputed ques-
tions in foreign relations could be settled peacefully, singling out the United
States as a country with which an understanding could be reached. In the
summer of 1953 an armistice was finally agreed upon in Korea. In the
spring of 1954 an international conference ended the war in Indo-China
by partitioning it between the Communist Vietminh in the north and the
independent state of Vietnam in the south. Although the Soviet Union had
not participated directly in the Indo-Chinese conflict, that local war had
threatened to become a wider conflagration, and its termination enhanced
the chances of world peace. In January 1954, the Council of Foreign Minis-
ters of the four powers, inoperative for a long time, met in Berlin to discuss
the German and Austrian treaties, but without result. The Soviet Union
joined the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organiza-
tion, or UNESCO, and the International Labor Organization, or ILO, that
April. Malenkov spoke of a further improvement of international relations
and of a summit meeting.
That a policy of even moderate relaxation had its dangers for the Soviet
bloc became, however, quickly apparent. In early June 1953, demonstra-
tions and strikes erupted in Czechoslovakia, assuming a dangerous form in
Pilsen — or PJzeii — where rioters seized the city hall and demanded free
elections. In the middle of the month East Berlin and other centers in East
Germany rose in a rebellion spearheaded by workers who proclaimed a
general strike. Soviet troops re-established order after some bitter fighting.
Beria’s fall that summer might have been affected by these developments,
for the police chief had stressed relaxation and legality since the death of
Stalin. Malenkov’s resignation from the premiership in February 1955
ended the role of that former favorite of Stalin on the world scene.
Bulganin, who replaced Malenkov as head of the government, became
the most prominent Soviet figure in international affairs, although he
usually traveled in the company of and acted jointly with the Parly chief,
Khrushchev. Molotov, in the meantime, continued in charge of the foreign
office. “B. and K.” diplomacy, as it came to be known, included much
showy journeying on goodwill missions in both Europe and Asia. The So-
viet Union paid special court to India and other neutralist countries, which
had formerly been condemned as lackeys of imperialism. At the same time
the two Soviet leaders claimed to be ready to settle the points at issue with
AFTER STALIN 1953-83
559
the United States and the West And indeed m May 1955 the great
powers managed to come to an agreement and conclude a peace treaty with
Austria which included the permanent neutralization of that state as well
as certain Austrian payments and deliveries to the U S S R in recompense
for the Soviet return of German property m Austria to the Austrian govern
ment The height of (he detente was reached at the summit conference tn
Geneva in July 1955 While no concrete problems were solved at that
meeting the discussion took pface in a remarkably cordial atmosphere
with both Bulganin and Eisenhower insisting tl at their countries would
never engage m aggressive action The following month Soviet authorities
announced a reduction of their armed forces by 640 000 men In Scptem
ber the USSR returned the Porkkula base to Finland and concluded a
treaty of friendship with the Finns for twenty years Yet in the autumn of
1955 as soon as the ministers of foreign affairs tried to apply the attitude
of accommodation and understanding expressed by their chiefs to the
settlement of specific issues a deadlock resulted with Molotov not budging
an inch from the previous Soviet positions and demands The spirit of
Genev a proved to be an enticing dream rather than a reality
Since the rapprochement between the U S S R. and the West failed to
last the polarization of the world continued Following the Communist
victory in northern Indo-China the Manila pact of September 1954 created
the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization or SE.ATO Great Britain Tranee
Pakistan and Thailand joined the four countries already allied the United
States Australia New Zealand and the Philippines to establish a new
barrier to Communist expansion in Asia In Europe West Germany rose
steadily m importance as an American ally and a member of the Western
coalition The Soviet Union in its turn concluded the so-called Warsaw
Treaty with its satellites in May 1955 to unify the Communist military
command in Europe
The year 1956 was a memorable one m Soviet foreign policy Khru
shchev s February speech denouncmc Stalin further shook the discipline
tn the Communist world On the other hand the improvement in Soviet
Yugoslav relations which had begun with Bulganins and Khrushchevs
visit to Belgrade in 1955 received a boost ihe break between the two
states now being blamed on Stalin himself as well as on Beria In April
1956 the Commform was dissolved and tn June Shepilov replaced Molotov
as foreign minister The ferment in the Soviet satellite empire finally led
to explosions »n Poland and in Hungary In late June 1956 workers in
Poznan dashed with the police and scores of people were killed Polish
intellectuals and even many Polish Communists clamored for a relatatron
of controls and a generally milder regime On October 19 Wladyslaw
Gomulka who had been imprisoned as a Titoist and had been reinstated in
560
SOVIET RUSSIA
August, became the Party secretary. That same day Khrushchev and other
Soviet leaders flew to Warsaw to settle the crisis. In spite of extreme ten-
sion, an understanding was reached: the U.S.S.R. accepted Gomulka and
a liberalization of the Communist system in Poland and agreed to withdraw
Soviet troops from that country.
Events in Hungary took a graver turn. There, under the influence of the
happenings in Poland, a full-scale revolution took place in late October,
during which the political police were massacred. The army sided on the
whole with the revolutionaries. The overturn was spearheaded by young
people, especially students and workers. The new government of a re-
visionist Communist, Imre Nagy, constituted a political coalition rather
than single-party rule and withdrew Hungary from the Warsaw Treaty. But
on November 4, after only a few days of freedom, Soviet troops began
storming Budapest and crushed the revolution. The imprudent attack on
Egypt staged at that time by Great Britain, France, and Israel over the
issue of the Suez Canal helped the Soviet move by diverting the attention
of the world, splitting the Western camp, and engaging some of its forces.
While crushing the Hungarians, the U.S.S.R. championed the cause of
Egypt and threatened its assailants. But the moral shock of the Hungarian
intervention proved hard to live down: it led to the greatest popular con-
demnation of the Communist cause and the most widespread desertions
from Communist parly ranks in the free world since the Second World
War. There were strikes, demonstrations, and protests even in the Soviet
Union.
As already suggested, Khrushchev might have been lucky to survive
these grave perturbations in the Communist world. Yet he did defeat and
dismiss Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich, together with Shepilov who
sided with them, in the spring and summer of 1957. After Bulganin’s fall
in March 1958, the first secretary, now also prime minister, became the
undisputed chief of Soviet foreign policy, while Andrei Gromyko headed
tile foreign office. Khrushchev’s behavior on the international scene showed
a certain pattern. He remained essentially intransigent, pushing every ad-
vantage he had, be it troubles in newly independent states, such as the
Congo, or Soviet achievements in armaments and space technology. Never-
theless, he talked incessantly in favor of coexistence and summit confer-
ences to settle outstanding issues. Also, he paid friendly visits to many
countries, including the U.S.A. in 1959. The summit conference in the
summer of 1960 was never held, for two weeks before it was scheduled to
begin Khrushchev announced that an American U-2 spy plane had been
brought down deep in Soviet territory. But in 1961 Khrushchev met the
new American president, John F. Kennedy, in Vienna. In the summer of
1962 both aspects of Soviet foreign policy stood in bold relief: fanned by
AFtEE STALIN, 1953-83
561
the U S-S R., a new Berlin crisis continued to threaten world peace, jet, on
the other hand Khrushchev emphasised more than ever coexistence abroad
and peaceful progress ai home, having made that his signal theoretical
contribution to the program that was enunciated at the Twenty second
Party Congress To be sure, as officially defined in the Soviet Union co-
existence meant economic, political and ideological competition with the
capitalist world until the final fall o! capitalism But that fall, Soviet au-
thorities now asserted, will occur without a world war
However, in tlie autumn of that same )car Khrushchev overreached him
self and brought the world to the bank of a thermonuclear war The con
frontatlon between the U S A and the U S S R in October 1962 over the
Soviet missiles in Cuba which resulted m a stunning Soviet dcfcai, can be
explained, at least in part by the Soviet leader s enthusiasm and his con-
viction that the United States and capitalism in general were on the decline
and would retreat when hard pressed The outcome no doubt strengthened
the argument for peaceful coexistence and emphasized caution and con-
sultation in foreign policy symbolrzod by the celebrated hot line between
Washington and Moscow The Soviet Union proceeded to measure care
fully its reactions and its involvement even in such complicated and cn
tangling crises as the Israeli Arab wars of 1967 and 1973 and the
Vietnamese war In the latter conflict tlie Soviet Union denounced of course
'American imperialism and provided extremely valuable matfriel to
North Vietnam, but it avoided escalation Yet, following the complete
victory of communism m Indo-China m 1975 and the stunning impact of
the catastrophic American policy in Vietnam on the American public the
Soviet Union might have felt that it had a freer hand on the international
stage, in Angola or elsewhere
With the Soviet Union as well as the United States acquiring a second
strike capability, that is the ability to retaliate and inflict * an unacccp'able
damage* upon the enemy after absorbing a nuclear blow, a true balance
of terror has settled upon the world Ever improving technology has made
vmually all established strategic concepts obsolete Numerous bases and
indeed whole sections of the globe have lost theu importance in terms of
the possible ultimate show down between the two nuclear giants
From the mid seventies It was authoritatively estimated in die West —
and apparently realistically in contrast to earlier alarms about alleged 1 mis-
sile gaps" and the like — that the USSR has caught up with the USA
m overall nuclear military strength, and indeed has perhaps moved slightly
ahead Even the Soviet navy, insignificant compared to its American rival
at the end of the Second World War, has risen to be, according to man}
indices, the strongest fleet in the world, although still behind the Americans
in aircraft earners and perhaps in such iniang'bles as naval tradition and
5G2
SRI A L RUSSIA
the expertise and spirit of its personnel. Yet the enormous economic
burden, terror, and inconclusiveness of the arms race have not so far led
to an effective negotiated settlement. Important results have been achieved
to be sure. Following the earlier banning of nuclear tests in the atmosphere,
the nuclear non-proliferation agreement was signed by the two superpowers
and other states in early 1968. Other agreements were reached concerning
outer space, where 1975 witnessed the celebrated joint effort of the
Russians and the Americans. The crucial issue of military limitations itself
was tackled in numerous negotiations, including the so-called S.A-L.T. II
talks and President Ford's discussions with Brezhnev in Vladivostok in
1974. Still, in spite of a considerable measure of agreement, the S.A.L.T.
II talks remained inconclusive, primarily because of the problems of the
Backfire bombers on the Soviet side and of the cruise missile on the
American. Moreover, as Edward Teller and other scientists have pointed
out, the difficulty in the negotiations resides not only in the entire complex
of aims, attitudes, and policies of the two superpowers, but also in the veiy
nature of scientific and technological advance, which rapidly makes pre-
arranged schemes of limitation obsolete.
The very closely related but even larger issue of ddtente between the
Soviet Union and the United States also sailed to an uncertain future. With
explicit “cold war” a thing of the past, detente scored a resounding success
at the Helsinki conference in the summer of 1975, where the United States
and other Western countries accepted in effect the communist redrawing
of the map of central and eastern Europe following the Second World War
in exchange for unsubstantiated promises of greater contacts between the
two worlds and a greater degree of freedom in those contacts. But a com-
prehensive economic agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.
failed over the questions of the most favored nation clause, credits, and
the American concern with the fate of Soviet Jews. Furthermore, before
long detente was again swamped by new international developments, to be
detailed later in this chapter.
Ironically, while Soviet-Amcrican relations improved and became more
stable after the Cuban confrontation, and while the Soviet leaders found
welcome in Gaullist France and other capitalist countries, their standing
in the communist world deteriorated. The conflict with China broke out
into the open around 1960 and has widened and deepened since. After the
abrupt withdrawal of Soviet personnel from China in August of that year
and the discontinuance of assistance, relations between the two countries
quickly became those of extreme antagonism. To the sound of violent
mutual denunciations the two states and parties competed with each other
for the leadership of world communism, the Chinese usually championing
the revolutionary position against Soviet “revisionism.” Moreover, China
became an atomic power and formulated large claims on Soviet Asiatic
AFTER stalim, 1953-83
5C3
temtory Observers noted that international crises such as the war in
Vietnam only intensified the hostility between the two great communist
states Although China remained far behind the U S S R in industrial and
technological development and although it was fully preoccupied with a
“cultural revolution,** its aftermath, and other internal problems, » could
pose a major threat to the Soviet Union in the future, if not in the imme-
diate present
Problems in eastern Europe have prosed to be more pressing The twelve
years which followed the suppression of the Hungarian revolution wit-
nessed Soviet attempts to adjust lo changing times to allow for a commu-
nist pluralism with a considerable measure of institutional and eventually
even ideological diversity In Brzezinski s phrase, saieJlnes were to become
junior allies Even Tito usually received a hind of fraternal recognition,
and he spoke with authority Yet tensions persisted and indeed increased,
both between the different cast European countries and the Soviet Union
and within those countries as most of them proceeded w ith (fc Stafimzation,
economic liberalization and other important changes The break with China
led in 1961 to the unexpected departure of Albania into the Chinese
camp * Rumania under its new leader Nicholas Ceausescu showed a re-
markable, even stunning independence from the Soviet Union although
it remained barely within the communist bloc and continued a hard line
policy at home Roland, belying the promise of 1956 hod its progress
toward freedom arrested and concentrated its energy on trying to contain
by petty and persistent persecution the Catholic church, liberal mtellee
tuals and students and other forces favoring change Its problems and
plight might be particularly relevant to the future evolution of Soviet
society itself
The developments in Czechoslovakia led to a catastrophe That highly
Western country With a democratic tradition remained long under a form
of Stalmism practiced by Antonin Novotny and bis clique Blit when in
the carjy months of 1968 Novotny was finally deposed, the new Party
leadership, of Alexander DubCck and others championed an extremely
liberal course which included the abolition of censorship The sweeping
liberal victory in Czechoslovakia which was lo be confirmed and extended
at a forthcoming Party congress led to consternation in the governing circles
of the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, and possibly Hun-
gry Exchanges of opinion and an unprecedented face-to-face discussion
between the members of the Politburos of the Soviet Union and of Czecho-
slovakia seemed momentarily to resolve the conflict Then on the twentieth
of August, Soviet troops, assisted by the troops of the four allies invaded
Czechoslovakia and quickly occupied the country There was vtcy little
bloodshed, because the Czech armed forces had been instructed not to
resist Soviet intervention was probably caused, in no certain order of
564 SOVIET RUSSI
priority, by fear for the Warsaw Pact which the Czechs wanted to modi]
although not abandon, by the hatred of Czech liberalization with its critiqi
of the U.S.S.R., by the concern lest liberalism at home be too much er
couraged, and by the need to respond to the pleas of the Soviet allic
especially East Germany, who saw the developments in Czechoslovakia i
an immediate threat to their own regimes. The repercussions of the intei
vention lasted long after the summer of 1968.
The suppression itself of Czechoslovakia proved, of course, successfi
from the Soviet point of view. It is worth noting, besides, that “tk
Brezhnev doctrine” of military intervention when the established order
threatened in a fraternal state has not been directly challenged since tlu
time. Indeed it can be argued that in recent years the Soviet grip on easier
and central Europe and the Soviet threat to western Europe have grow
in power as communist armed units have gained in absolute and ielativ
strength compared to the countervailing Allied armies, while the negotif
lions on reducing the two forces have so far been ineffective. Still, the issu
of communist independence or at least autonomy would not die. Not t
mention Yugoslavia and Albania which are clearly outside the Sovic
sphere and can be returned to it only by a major reversal, Rumania hi
continued to affirm its peculiar semi-autonomy. Even entirely loyal sate
life states are not fully reliable, because of their own internal problem
and possible perturbations. In fact in Poland in December 1970 protes
and riots led to the resignation of Gomulka and to his replacement t
Edward Gierck, while all the Soviet client states of eastern Europe ha\
been suffering in the last few years grave added problems and hardshij
because of the unfavorable world economic conjuncture. Outside the Sovi
sphere, many communist parties, including the most important ones, sue
as the Italian and now definitely the French, are proceeding on the ros
of independence from Moscow and liberalization well beyond unfortuna
Dubcek’s dreams.
In Poland, the 1970 replacement of Gomulka by Gierek as Party seen
tary was followed by the introduction of an ambitious scheme to moderns
and expand Polish industry and trade with the aid of Western capital an
technology. By 1976, it was evident that Gicrek's loudly hailed econom
“acceleration” had begun to fail. Continuing world economic crisis an
mismanagement and corruption at all levels of Party and government aj
paratus, as well as the ever-increasing cost of participating in the Sovie
directed Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) and 11
Warsaw Pact, all contributed to Poland’s difficulties. In 1976, worker
protests and strikes over drastic increases in food prices were followed t
the rapid formation and activation of dissident organizations and clande
tine printing establishments. The Catholic Church, its traditional prestij
after STAtir* 1953-83
565
fortified by the election of the Archbishop of Cracow Cardinal Karol
Wojtyla to the papal throne (Pope John Paul 11), also spoke out strong
against many of the Communist go\ eminent s pol cies The Cierek resume
was unable to suppress the opposition e'Tectiv cl) m part at least, it would
seem because of its heavy dependence on continuing \\ cstern loans, re-
quired to keep the economy solvent and the convequ-nt need to avoid
drastic action which could lead to the cumne off of VS estern funds
The summer of 1980 wuh continuing labor unrest and economic near
collapse led to the change of Party leadership and to a formal abetment
between the Polish government and the treat majority of Polish workers
now mostly represented by independ nt Solidarity trade unions and led
by a charismatic veteran of the struegle for workers rights m Poland elec
tncian Lech \\ alesa The agreement accepted b\ the workers as a founda
non for a dialocue with the government appears to have been a tactical
maneuver of the Communist authorities. No regular contacts with the
Solidarity leadership and the Catholu. hierarchs aimed at creating a con
structive and meaningful national consensus were initiated by the govern
ment By exploiting its monopoly over the mass media and ovu the dis-
tribution of increasingly scarce food supplies and consumer goods the
government attempted to undermine the posmon of the opposition while at
the same tune strongly seconding Moscow s accusations that Soltdanty was
attempting to subvert the political structure and international position of
Peoples Poland The me to prominence of General Wojcicch JaruzcUVi
who progressively combined the posts of Minister of Defeme Premier and
First Secretary of the Tarty coincided with a gradual militarization of the
administration of important branches of government and industry
All this was done In preparation for the military coup which was cxc
Cutcd in close cooperation with ihc Soviet authorities on tb-ccmbcr 13
19SI Active resistance against the overwhelming forces of the regime was
quite limited and from a military standpoint the operation was earned
out rather effectively Nevertheless the “success of General JmizeLfci s
junta was very dubious Although thousands of Solidarity activists includ-
ing Lech Walesa and other dissidents were arrested and placed in intern
ment camps some leaden of the movement escaped arrest and an under
ground opposition began to form Western economic sanrtions and
continuing passive resistance to the regime in the factories offices schools
and universities were making the task of runninc the courtly extremely
difficult for the Jaruzchki regime By the end of 19S2 there appeared to be
two clear choices before the military co vent mem of Poland either to con
tmuc with the martial law administration further cl mating the population
and risking a total economic collapse of the country or to end martial law
and attempt to open the few remamms channels of contact wuh the great
S66 SOVIET RUSSIA
majority of the Polish population in an effort to reduce tensions and im-
prove the performance of the economy. The choice is not an easy one for
the Polish Communist authorities — and their Soviet sponsors.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979 produced a
strong impression in the world. The impression was exacerbated by the
fact that, although the so-called Afghan rebels could not match the Red
Army in open fighting, they could not be entirely destroyed either. More
than three years after the original invasion, the Soviet Union was still
employing perhaps 100,000 of its troops in the Moslem country, and it was
not clear how much of that country, outside the main cities, was under
Soviet control. Critics have pointed out that the Afghan invasion repre-
sented the first direct Soviet use of military force outside “its own” East
European empire since the Second World War. The massive intervention
has also been interpreted as the first step in a bid for the oil of the Middle
East and a general takeover of that region. It can well be argued, on the
other hand, that the decisive Soviet move was essentially defensive: com-
munism had actually come to Afghanistan some two years earlier in a
peculiar internal struggle which pitted two communist factions against each
other as well as against other groups; the Soviet choice in late 1979 was
that between intervention and witnessing a neighboring communist state,
which it had already welcomed and supported as part of the communist
world, go down to popular opposition. But, defensive or not, the Soviet
step was certainly a grave and disturbing one.
As of 1983, tension between the Soviet Union and the United States,
the East and the West, was not confined to the crucial problems of Afghan-
istan and Poland. Rather, the two sides opposed each other all over the
world, from Central America to southern Africa, Lebanon, and Cam-
puchea. To be sure, western European countries, in spite of strong United
States objections and even sanctions against particular companies, con-
tinued to support the building of a natural-gas pipeline from western
Siberia to western Europe. But they were also apparently prepared to
proceed with the installation of United States middle-range missiles to
counteract the already established Soviet ones, an installation most espe-
cially opposed for years by Brezhnev. The virtually all-important Soviet-
American disarmament negotiations remained deadlocked. S.A.L.T. II
was not ratified by the United States Senate, and its future chances ap-
peared slim, especially after the departure of Carter from the Presidency.
In fact, numerous critics accused the tougher anti-Soviet tone of the
Reagan administration as largely precluding adjustment and agreement.
Yet the administration itself and others claimed that it was precisely this
firmer approach, and especially the concurrent building up of the United
States nuclear and military might, that would force the U.S.S.R. to nego-
tiate effectively for disarmament.
X LI
SOVIET SOCIETY AND CULTURE
The Soviet Union 11 a contradictory society halfway between cap
itihsra and social sm in which (a) the prodvi uve forcci are *till
tar from adequate to give the state p omty a soda! st character
(b) the tendency toward primitive accumulation created by wart
breaks out through innumerable ports of the planned economy* (c)
norms of distribution presetting a bourgeois vhm-ter lie at the
basis of a new differentiation of society (d ) th- econo m c growth
while slowly bettering the situation of the to lers promotes a swi't
formation of privileged Strata (e) exploiting the «x>ci*l antagonisms
a bureaucracy ha* converted itself into an uncnrirolied caste »U»n 10
socialism (f) the social revolution betrayed Sy the rulir k party still
caisu in property relation* and in the consciousness of the to 'leg
masses <g) a further development of the accuwutat eg contradiction*
can as well lead to social *m as back to capita sm (hi on the
road to capitalism the counterrevolution wou d have to break jh»
resistance of the workers (i) on th- road to socialism the worker*
would have to overthrow the bureaucracy In the last analyst the
question will be decided by a struggle of living scicul forces boJi
on the national and the world arena.
YkcTsrr
The party leadership of literature nJst b- thoroughly pjr t ed ef nl
philistine influences Party members active m li traUre mutt not
only be the teachers of ideas which will nuiur the enercy of the
proletariat in all countries for the last bi He fer it* freedom the
party leadership roust la all it* cordi-ct sha# n rrorally au Son
Uiive force This force must imbue 1 Urary workers first and fore
most with a consciousness of their collective respcrsibilit fo 1*11
that happens in their midst Soviet literature wuh alt its diversity
of talents and the steadily growing number of tie* and * fteJ
writers, should be organized as an Integra’ colle-live body -t o
potent instrument of socialist culture.
GORKY
The Bolsheviks’ seizure of power in Russia in November 1917 racml
a social as well as a political revolution The decades that followed The
Great October” witnessed a transformation of Russian society into Soviet
society They also saw the emergence and development of an unmistakably
Soviet style of culture In spite of its enormous size, huge population and
tremendous variety of eihnic and cultural strains, the USSR ts a remark-
ably homogeneous land, for it reflects throughout its length anJ treadth —
“front Kronstadt and to Vladivostok," to quote a Soviet song — some
567
568 SOVIET RUSSIA
sixty-five years of Communist engineering, social and cultural as well as
political and economic.
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Communist party has played in fact, as well as in theory, the leading
role in Soviet society. Its membership, estimated at the surprisingly low
figure of less than twenty-five thousand in 1917, passed the half million
mark in 1921 and the million mark in the late twenties. The number of
Soviet Communists continued to rise, in spite of repeated purges which
included the frightful great purge of the thirties, and reached the total of
almost four million full members and candidates when Germany invaded
the U.S.S.R. While many Communists perished in the war, numerous new
members were admitted into the Party, especially from front-line units.
Postwar recruitment drives further augmented Party membership (o seven
to nine million in the immediate postwar years, as much as thirteen million
in 1967, and 16,380,000 in 1978.
These figures, of course, by no means tel! the entire story of Communist
penetration into Soviet life. As already emphasized, the party, in the Lenin-
ist view which served to differentiate the Bolsheviks from the Mensheviks,
comprises a fully conscious and dedicated elite, exclusive by definition, but
also educating and guiding other organizations and, indeed, the broad
masses. In addition to the Party proper, there exist huge youth organizations:
Little Octobrists for young children, Pioneers for those aged from nine to
fifteen, and the Union of Communist Youth, or Komsomol, with members
in the fourteen to twenty-six age range. The first two organizations, and,
of late, even the Komsomol, have acted as Party agencies for the general
education of the younger Soviet generations, opening their doors wide to
members. The Party has also worked with and directed uncounted institu-
tions and groups: professional, social, cultural, athletic, and others. In
fact, from the official standpoint, Soviet society has only one ideology and
only one outlook, the Communist; citizens and groups of citizens differ
solely in the degree to which they incarnate it. That sweeping assumption,
it might be added, expresses especially well the monolithic and totalitarian
nature of the Soviet system, and its modification would be one of the better
indications that the system has really changed.
The Party demands the entire man or woman. Lenin's example illus-
trates the ideal of absolute and constant dedication to Party purposes. The
word partiinost, translated sometimes as “Party-mindedness,” summarizes
the essential quality of a Communist’s life and work. While the early em-
phasis on austerity has been greatly relaxed since the thirties, especially in
the upper circles, die requirements of implicit obedience and hard work
generally remain. In particular. Party members are expected throughout
SOCIETY AND CULTURE
S&>
lh«r lives both to continue their own education In Marxism-Leninism and
to utilize their knowledge in all their activities, can) mg out Party directives
to the letter and influencing those with whom they come in contact While
exacting, the “Party ticket” opens many doors It constitutes in effect the
greatest single mark of status, importance and, above all, o! being an “in-
sider” in the Soviet Union Although, to be sure, many Soviet Communists
are people of no special significance, virtually all prominent figures in the
country are members of the Party Since the Second World War special
efforts have been made to assure that such fields as university teaching and
scientific research are largely in the hands of Communists Conversely, it
has become much easier for outstanding people to join the Patty
The social composition of the Communist party of the Soviet Union has
shown some fluctuation Ostensibly the true party of the proletariat, prior
to 1917 it had a largely bourgeois leadership and no mass following of any
kind The workers as a group however did support it m November 1917
and during the hard years that followed the Bolshevik seizure of power
The Party naturally welcomed them while at the same time displaying ex
tremc suspiciousness toward those of hostile class origin With the sta-
bilization of the Soviet system and the inauguration of the five jear plans
“Soviet intellectuals," in particular technical and administrative personnel
of all sorts, became prominent. On the cvc of the Second World War the
Party was described as composed 50 per cent of workers, 20 per cent of
peasants, and 30 per cent of Soviet intellectuals, with the last group on the
increase That increase has continued since the war as social ongm became
less significant with time and the authorities tried to bring all prominent
people into the Party It might be noted that, in relation to their numbers,
peasants have been poorly represented, indicating the difficulty the Com-
munists have experienced in permeating the countryside The proportion
of women has increased, and they constitute at present about one-quarter
of the membership af the Party
The Communist party of the Soviet Union is very thoroughly organized
Starting with primary units, or cells, which arc established where three or
more Communists can be found, that is, in factories, collective farms,
schools, military units, and so forth, the structure rises from level to level
to culminate in periodic Party congresses, which constitute important events
in Soviet history, and in the permanently active Central Committee, Secre-
tariat, and Politburo At every step, from an individual factory or collective
farm to the ministries and other superior governing agencies. Communists
are supposed to provide supervision and inspiration, making it their busi-
ness to sec that no undesirable trends develop and that production goals
arc overfulfilled At higher government levels, as already indicated, the
entire personnel consists of Communists, a fact which nevertheless docs
not eliminate Party vigilance and control In general, rotation between
SOCIETY AND CULTURE
571
full time government positions and Party administrative positions n com-
mon. It should be noted that the guiding role of the Party has asserted
itself with increased force since Stalins death for — as L. Schaptto and
other close students of Soviet communism have Indicated- the late
general secretary's dictatorial power had grown to such enormous propor-
tions that U had put even the Party into the shade
The Destruction of the Old Society
Whereas the Great October Revolution catapulted the Communist
party to power, it led to the destruction of enure social classes Indeed its
initial impact resulted m a sweeping leveling of traditional Russian society
The landowning gentry, for centuries the top social group in Russia, dis-
appeared rapidly in 1917 and 1918 as peasants seized their land The
upper bourgeoisie financial, industrial and commercial was similarly
eliminated when the Bolsheviks nationalized finance industry, and trade
The middle and especially the lower bourgeoisie to b<. sure staged a re-
markable comeback during the years of the New Economic Policy Their
final destruction, however, came with the implementation of the five year
plans If the gentry occupied the stage in Russia too long the bourgeoisie
was cut down before it came into its own The clergy, the monks and
nuns, and other people associated with the Church constituted yet another
group to suffer harsh persecution, although in their case it stopped short
of complete annihilation The great majority of the intellectuals too
found themselves in opposition to the new regime Many of them emi
grated Many others perished m the frightful years of civil war and
famine In fact, although some of its members remained, the intelligentsia
as a cohesive, articulate and independent group was no more
The Peasants
Whereas the Bolsheviks regarded the upper and middle classes as
enemies by definition, they believed themselves to be acting in the interests
or the masses, that is, of the workers and of the peasants As it turned out,
however, the peasants have borne the brunt of the privations and sacrifices
imposed by the Soviet * builders of socialism " The total population of the
USSR, was officially giv en in the spring of 1959 as only 70S, 826 000 — ■
and as 262 400,000 according to the census of 1979 — a low figure which
testifies to two demographic catastrophes the one associated wuh the
Fiist Five-Year Plan ,more especially the collectivization of agriculture,
and the "other resulting from thejSecond World War In both cases
peasants — and peasants as soldiers— suffered the most, dying by the
572
millions. The extent to which the Soviet Union has been a land of peasants
is indicated by the fact that the rural population, constituted 82 percent
pf-the totalvjn 1928 and that, after some .fift y-fiv e y ears of industrialization
r and urbanization, i t still. constitut es one- third of it toda y. ’’*™~
Of course, peasants have carried such a heavy burden in the U.S.S.R.
not only because of their vast numbers, but also because of the policies
pursued by the government. Lenin’s original endorsement of the , peas ant
seizure of gentry land had great appeal in the countryside. Influence<Tby~
the Bolshevik land policy and by revolutionary soldiers returning home —
a point effectively emphasized by Radkey — the rural masses proved
reasonably well inclined toward the new regime and on the whole ap-
parently preferred it to the Whites during the great civil war. But War
Communism antagonized many of them. Besides, the Bolsheviks tried to
split the peasants, inciting the poor against the better-off and later at-
tempting to utilize the poor and the middle peasant against the so-called
kulak. While some social differentiation did exist in the villages, the au-
thorities, applying abstract Marxist formulas where they did not fit, ex-
aggerated it beyond all measure and ended by, in effect, condemning and
punishing all peasants who did not behave in the prescribed manner.
The respite during the N.E.P., in the course of which rural Russia
recovered and In part even began to experience something akin to pros-
perity, was followed by the all-out offensive of the First Five-Year Flan.
Five million kulaks and members of their families disappeared. Countless
peasants, recalcitrant or relatively prosperous or simply unlucky, populated
forced- labor camps. Other uncounted peasants starved to death. Scenes
of horror in the once bounteous Ukraine defied description. Bui, as we
know, the peasants, in spite of their resistance, were finally pushed and
pulled into collectives. The typical member of a kolkhoz is a new phe-
nomenon in Russian history. The novelty lies not in his wretched poverty,
not even in the extremely heavy exactions imposed upon him, but in the
minute state organization and control of his work and life. While peasants
profited from certain Soviet policies, notably the spread of education, and
while some of them rose to higher stations in society, on the whole the
condition of the rural masses, the bulk of the Soviet people, remained
miserable and at times desperate. Largely supporting the five-year plans
by their labor, as already explained, Soviet peasants received very little
in return. After Stalin’s death, Khrushchev and other leaders admitted the
grave condition of the Soviet countryside, while writers presented some
unforgettable pictures of it during the relative freedom of expression that
prevailed for several months in 1956. Recent years, to be sure, have
witnessed an improvement Yet rural Russia remains poor. Moreover,
the Party and the government continue their social engineering, as clearly
SOCIETY AND CULTURE 573
Indicated in such postwar measures and projects as the increase in the
size o£ the collective farms, the abortive agrogoroda, the temporary em-
phasis on the sovkhoz form of agriculture, and the periodic campaigns
against the private plow of kolkhoz members Indeed — logically, from
their poult of view — Communists arc not likely to relax until peasants
disappear os a separate group, having been integrated into a completely
socialized, mechanized, and utbanued economy
The Workers
Industrial workers in many ways profited most from the Bolshevik rev-
olution That rcvoluuon was made m their name and they gave the new
regime its greatest social support. Because of this perhaps a million and
a half workers and their children rose to new importance They became
Party functionaries Red Army officers and even organizers of collective
farms Many received rapid tramtng to be graduated os technologists
Pinsons oi a proletarian background enjoyed pnomits in institutions of
higher learning and elsewhere The upward social mobility of workers was
all the more remarkable because their total number was not very large
and it contrasted sharply with the relatively static nature of tsarivt society
Many prominent Soviet people in all walks of life today owe their positions
to that rise
But, of course, while many workers went up the social ladder, new
men and women entered the factories After the inauguration of the five-
year plans the influx turned into a deluge Peasants of yesterday became
workers of today Russia finally acquired vast crowds of proletarians
charactensuc of the industrial revolution Whether the condition of the
workers in the Soviet Union improved compared to tsarist limes remains
an open question That u continued to be miserable cannot be reasonably
doubted Soviet workers profited from increased educational and cultural
opportunities, but their pitiful real wages probably remained below the
prerevolutionary level as late as the early ’fifties After all, the huge
industrialization was made possible by keeping industrial wages down as
well as by squeezing the peasants In addition workers suffered from the
totally Inadequate and deteriorating urban housing and, together with
other Soviet citizens, they had to contribute their efforts and their scarce
time to various ‘voluntary” projects, to their own and others' political
education, and to other prescribed activities In contrast to tsanst days
they could not strike or otherwise openly express their discontent The
matenal condition of the Soviet proletariat has improved, however, since
the death of Statin Moreover, with the great Industrial plant already built,
and the leadership promising, and to part already beginning to provide.
574 SOVIET RUSSIA
shorter hours, higher wages, much better housing, and more consumer
goods, Soviet workers might soon live a happier life, all the more so if
some of the pressing Soviet economic problems can be resolved.
The “ New Class ”
Whereas the initial impact of the Bolshevik revolution, coupled with
famine and other catastrophes, did much to level Russian society, smash-
ing the rigid class structure of imperial Russia and even destroying entire
classes, before long social differentiation began to grow again. In partic-
ular, the five-year plans produced a tremendous expansion of administra-
tive and technical personnel, which, together with the already existing
Party and government bureaucracies, became, broadly speaking, the lead-
ing class in the country. One author estimated that the Soviet economy
employed 1,700,000 bookkeepers alone! Scientists, writers, artists, pro-
fessors, and other intellectuals, purged and integrated into the new system,
became prominent members of the privileged group. Army and naval
officers and their families provided additional members. Altogether, the
privileged, distinguished primarily by their education and nonmanual oc-
cupations, came to compose about 15 per cent of the total population.
Relatively speaking — paradoxically, if you will — they have enjoyed
greater advantages compared to the masses than have their counterparts
in Western capitalist societies. It is also of interest that material differences
within the educated class and within the worker and peasant classes, who
are often paid according to some form of the piece rate, have been very
marked in Soviet Russia. Paid vacations and other rewards supplied by the
regime have been distributed in a similarly uneven manner. In fact, wages
and salaries have tended to show a greater differentiation in the U.S.S.R.
than in the West, although, of course, Soviet citizens cannot accumulate
fortunes based on profits, rent, or interest.
The “Great RgJreaJ''
As the new Soviet elite advanced to the fore, Soviet society lost many
oE its revolutionary traits and began, to acquire in certain respects a strik-
ingly conservative character. The transformation occurred essentially
during the thirties, but on the whole it continued and developed further
during the Second World War and in the postwar years. While state laws
and regulations were crucial in this process, they reflected, as well as
contributed to, basic social and economic changes.
Initially the Bolshevik regime took a disdainful and even negative ww
of the family. Marriages became matters of little importance in the eyes
of The slate, while divorce could be obtained simply by declaration of one
SOCIETY A ft D CtltTURE 575
of the parties involved Abortions were legal and extremely common
In the thirties, all that changed Authorities declared themselves m favor of
a strong Soviet family Particular emphasis was placed on having many
children Mothers with five or six living offspring received the Motherhood
Medal, those with seven or tight were awarded a decoration known as
Motherhood Glory, while those with ten achieved the status of Heroine
Mother Financial grants to large families helped further the implementa-
tion of the new policy. At the same time abortions lost their legal sanction,
while divorce became much more difficult to obtain in the U S S R than
in most countries m the West The family — the proper, Marxist, Soviet
family, to be sure — was hailed as a mainstay of the socialist order
Discipline improved in the army, and it made an effective reappearance
in schools and elsewhere Ranks, titles, decorations, and other distinctions,
whether bureaucratic, military, or academic, were restored and acquired
vast importance Even social manners made a comeback Pomp and cir-
cumstance re-entered the stage Uniforms blossomed everywhere, remind-
ing observers of tsarist Russia Generalissimo Stalin toasting his marshals
at a gargantuan Kremlin reception presented a far different picture from
Lenin m his worn-out coat haranguing workers in squares and factory
yards In a sense, the Soviet regime had arrived Equally important changes
took place, as wc shall see, in education and culture, where the avant-
garde and experimental approach of the early years gave place to rock-
ribbed conservatism Patriotism and historical tradition emerged again,
although in a minor key and as aids, rather than rivals, to the funda-
mentally Marxist ideology
Women and Feminism
Women have constituted half, actually considerably more than half, the
population of the Soviet Union, and they have certainly contributed their
share to its history In a very real sense they have carried half, or more,
of the burden of that history on their shoulders The communist program
included liberating women from oppression, discrimination, and drudgery
as part of the liberation of humankind The first decade or more after the
October Revolution was full of promise tor So\iet feminists, as well as of
new departures in the position and activities of Soviet women, pcrhap3
most notably and permanently so among the Islamic peoples of the
country But, for the Soviet leaders, feminist ideals were always ancillary
to the fundamental Marxist vision of class struggle and the building of
socialism And they were crushed, together with other autonomous views,
Once the USSR w as set in the firm Stalinist mold There has been some
relaxation but no basic change in the situation since the death of the crucial
dictator
576
SOVIET RUSSIA
Lapidus and other scholars have done much recently to present and
interpret the position of Soviet women in both its positive and its negative
aspects. The former include, notably, the great increase in education, to
where women are now proportionately better represented as students in
Soviet institutions of higher learning than men. Concurrently women have
risen remarkably in the professions, so that today, for example, the great
majority of the doctors of medicine in the U.S.S.R. are women. Yet, as it
has been repeatedly pointed out, few women reach the top rungs of their
profession, medicine included, and they are strikingly absent at the highest
levels of both Party and government. Moreover, Soviet women both hold
full-time jobs — to the point that, broadly speaking, there is no reserve of
employable women left at present in the Soviet economy — and perform
the great bulk of the work at home, a task made all the more difficult by
the hard conditions of life in the Soviet Union. It might be added that
feminism in the Western sense is at best in its incipient stage in the
U.S.S.R. today. Nor arc all its emphases — as a student of Soviet society
will readily understand — particularly relevant to the Soviet scene.
The Nationalities
Its multinational composition has been a major problem for the Soviet
Union as it was for the Russian Empire. While Great Russians form about
half of the population of the U.S.S.R., and Ukrainians and White Russians,
or Belorussians, approximately another quarter, the remaining quarter
consists of a staggering variety of ethnic and linguistic groups. The
Caucasus alone contains a fantastically complicated mixture of peoples.
More than a hundred and fifty languages and dialects are spoken in the
Soviet Union. Soviet nationalities range from ancient civilized peoples,
such as the Armenians and the Georgians, to primitive Siberian tribes.
They include Lutherans and Catholics as well as Orthodox, and Moslems
and Buddhists together with shamanists. Moreover, many of these peoples
showed nationalist tendencies in the years of revolution and civil war,
which corresponded only too well to the generally nationalist atmosphere
of the twentieth century.
Soviet authorities have developed several basic policies in dealing with
national groups. They have allowed them no independence in ideological,
political, economic, or social matters, and even no deviation from the
established official fine. The U.S.S.R. remains essentially a mosL highly
centralized state. The single Communist party of the Soviet Union acts
as an especially important foundation and guarantee of that unity. At
the same time Soviet rulers have granted a kind of cultural autonomy to
the nationalities in the Union, stating that their cultures should be “na-
tional in form, and socialist in content.” The form includes the language
SOCIETY AND CULTURE 577
and the cultural tradition of a given people, which however, must be
fitted, as in the case of the Russians proper, into the Soviet Marxist frame-
work Thus, the government has tried to destroy Islam as well as Orthodoxy
and has interpreted Georgian history as well as Russian in the simple terms
of a class struggle
But this dual approach to nationalities proved difficult to maintain in
practice Cultural autonomy could easily become cultural nationalism, and
that in turn would lead to separatism Always suspicious, the Soviet leader-
ship kept uncovering * bourgeois nationalists’ in union republics arid lesser
subdivisions of the U S S R In the crucially important case of the Ukraine,
for example, the Party aoparatus itself suffered several sweeping purges
because of its "deviations * Moreover, after a controlled measure of Great
Russian patriotism and nationalism became respectable in the Soviet
Union, Stalin and the Politburo began to stress the Russian language and
the historical role of the Great Russian people ns binding cement of their
multinational state This trend continued during the Second World War
and m the postwar years Eastern peoples of the USSR were made to
use the Cyrillic in place of the Latin alphabci for their native tongues,
while the Russian language received emphasis in all Soviet schools
Histones had to be rewritten again to demonstrate that the incorporation
of minority nationalities into the Russian state was a positive good rather
than merely the lesser evil as compared to other alternatives Basically
contrary to Marxism, the new mterpretauon was fitted into Marxist dress
by such means as stress on the progressive nature of the Russian proletanat
and the advanced character of the Russian revolutionary movement, which
benefited all the peoples fortunate enough to be associated with the Rus-
sians But Stalm, and some other Soviet leaders as well, went further,
giving violent expression to some of the worst kinds of prejudices Notably
the quite un-Marxist vice of anti Semittsra found fertile soil in the Soviet
Union Yiddish intellectuals were among the groups virtually wiped out
by the purges Today, for instance Jews are apparently excluded from the
Soviet diplomatic service Stalin's and Zhdanov’s fierce attack oh "cos-
mopolitanism” after the Second World War seemed particularly difficult
to reconcile w uh the international character of Marxism or wiih the legacy
of Lenin The present Jewish emigration from the USSR has more than
one sound reason behind it
education
Education has played an extremely important role in the development
of the Soviet Union Educational advances were a most important part of
state planning and made the striking Sovtet economic and technological
progress possible As already indicated, education also stood at the heart
578
SOVIET RUSS
of the evolution of Soviet society. In the future, too, it is likely to exercise
a crucial influence on the fortunes of the TJ.S.S.R.
Somewhat less than half of the Russian people were literate at the time
of the Bolshevik revolution. Furthermore, the years of civil war, famine
epidemics, and general disorganization that followed the establishment of
the Soviet regime resulted in a decline of iiteracy and in a general lower-
ing of the educational level in the country. Beginning in 1922, however,
the authorities began to implement a large-scale educational program, aim-
ing not only at establishing schools for all children, but also at eliminating
illiteracy among adults. By the end of the Second Five-Year Plan, that is,
by 1938, a network of four-year elementary schools covered the U.S.S.R.,
while more advanced seven-year schools had been organized for urban
children. The total elimination of illiteracy proved more difficult, although
the government created more than 19,000 “centers for liquidating il-
literacy” by 1925 and persevered in its efforts. The census of 1926
registered 51 per cent of Soviet citizens, aged ten and above, as literate;
that of 1939 81.1 per cent. Projecting the increase, 85 per cent of the
Soviet people must have been literate at the time of the German invasion.
Almost all are today.
The four-year and the seven-year schools became basic to the Soviet
system. But ten-year schools also appeared in quantity. This type of school,
for boys and girls from seven to seventeen, provides more class hours
in its ten years than does the American educational system in twelve. At
present, while the compulsory seven years of schooling have not yet in
practice been extended to all Soviet children, there is emphasis on the new
eight-year school. Although in 1940 tuition was introduced in the last
three years of the ten-year school, as well as in the institutions of higher
learning — and has been repealed and restored since — an extremely
widespread system of scholarships and stipends has been used at all times
to make advanced education available to those with ability.
After initial experimentation with some progressive education and
certain quite radical methods of teaching the young and combining school,
and life, Soviet education returned to entirely traditional, disciplinarian,
and academic practices. The emphasis is on memorization and recitation,
with a tremendous amount of homework. It has been estimated that, if
Soviet schoolchildren were to do all their assignments conscientiously and
to the full, they would be reading 280 printed pages a day! Soviet schools
are especially strong in mathematics and science, that is, in physics,
chemistry, biology, and astronomy, as well as in geography, and drafting.
But they also stress language, literature, foreign languages, and history,
together with certain other academic subjects, For instance, six years of
a foreign language are taught in a ten-year school. There are no electives.
society and culture
579
Before he lost power Khrushchev emphasized the need to bring schools
closer to life and to combine education in the upper grades with some
apprenticeship work in lactones and farms But educational reforms along
these lines proved to be abortive Many students, however, are forced to
spend at least two years ‘ in production," that is, in factory or agricultural
work, before proceeding from secondary to higher education The Soviet
Union also has special schools for children with musical and artistic gifts,
military schools, and the like In addition, many boarding schools for the
general education of Soviet children have been established They num-
bered 2,000, with 500,000 pupils, in the autumn of 1961, and were de-
scribed as the "new school of Communist society'’ at the Twenty-second
Party Congress Probably because of their great expense: and the generally
more modest tone of the new leadership, they have been given less prom-
inence jn recent years
Beyond secondary schools, there are technical and other special schools,
as well as full fledged institutions of higher learning The number of these
higher schools is constantly growing While Soviet authorities have de-
veloped the old university system, they have placed much more emphasis
in higher education on institutes that concentrate on a particular field,
such as technology, agriculture, medicine, pedagogy, or economics Study
in the institutes ranges from four to sut years, a university course usually
takes five years Applicants to universities and institutes must take
competitive entrance examinations, and it has been estimated that fre-
quently as many as two out of three qualified candidates have been re-
jected because of lack of space in recent years The older Soviet students,
as well as the schoolchildren must attend all their classes, are in general
subject to strict discipline, and follow a rigidly prescribed course of stud)
The educational effort of the Party and the government extends beyond
schools to libraries, museums, dubs, the theater, the cinema, radio,
television, and even circuses All of these, of course, are owned by the
state, arc constantly augmented, and arc closely co-ordinated to serve the
same purposes More peculiarly Soviet has been the practice of constant
oral propaganda in squares and at street corners, with more than two
million propagandists sponsored by the Party Bereday has written au-
thoritatively on the spread of education in the Soviet Union, and has com-
pared this spread with the situation in the United States
[In 1958] there were in the Soviet Union approximately 110,000
elementary four-year schools 60 000 seven year schools, and 25,000 ten-
year schools, a total of nearly 200000 regular school* of general educa-
tion There are, m addition some 7,000 auxiliary special and part time
schools, 3,750 technikurm and professional schools, 730 institutes of
higher education, and 39 universities The countryside is dotted by
580
T RUSS
150,000 libraries, 850 museums, 500 theaters, 2,700 Pioneer palaces, 500
stations for young technicians and naturalists, 240,000 movie theaters,
and 70 circuses. A task force of 1,625,000 teachers and other personnel
mans this extensive enterprise. . . . Population and school-attendance
figures substantiate the ambitions of the Soviet educational plan to reach
all the people. The figures now available estimate the situation as follows:
2,500 out of each 10,000 people were in some type of school in 1955-
1956; 814 of these were in grades five to ten of the general secondary
school, 100 were in professional secondary schools, and 93 were in insti-
tutions of higher learning. These figures, which account for one-fourth of
the total population, expand as we single out for consideration only the
present younger generation. Approximately 10 per cent of the appropriate
age group attend institutions of higher education, second largest propor-
tion in the world after the United States, with 33 per cent of its youth in
colleges. About 30 per cent of the appropriate age group complete sec-
ondary education, a close second after the United States, with 45 per cent.
At the age of fourteen 80 per cent of the age group are still in school, in
the United States some 90 per cent.
Education on the job and by correspondence is also extremely widespread
in the U.S.S.R. Moreover, a further expansion and diffusion of education
have constituted an essential part of the recent five-year plans, although the
rate of educational advance has slowed down compared to the earlier
period, while comparison with the United States has been affected by the
great expansion of American higher education in the 1960’s.
Soviet education, and indeed Soviet culture in general, has greatly
profited from the prerevolutionary legacy. The high standards, the serious
academic character, and even the discipline of Soviet schools date from
tsarist days. The main Communist contribution has been the dissemination
of education at all levels and on a vast scale, although it should be re-
membered that imperial Russia was, on the whole, moving in the same
direction and that given a little more time it would have established uni-
versal schooling. Many observers have noted that Soviet students study
with remarkable diligence and determination. That probably stems both
from the old tradition, which holds education in high esteem, and from
contemporary conditions of life: education provides for Soviet citizens
the only generally available escape from the poverty and drabness of the
kolkhoz and the factory. If generous subsidization and energetic pro-
motion have constituted the main Soviet virtues in education, the all-
pervasive emphasis on Marxism has been the chief vice. While a detailed
criticism of the Soviet school system must be left to DeWitt, Lilge, Kline,
and other specialists, it is important to realize that Soviet Marxism distorts
whatever it touches and that, therefore, the quality of Soviet education
and culture frequently deteriorates in direct proportion to its proximity to
SOCIETY AND CULTURE 58t
doctrine For this reason Soviet mathematics, in schools or universities,
is vastly preferable to Soviet history, and Soviet chemistry to Soviet
philosophy,
Soviet Culture
Soviet science, scholarship, literature, and arts reflect the same traits
of the Soviet regime as does education, from which, m any case, they
cannot be entirely separated The Soviet performance in all these fields is
noteworthy for its vast scope, liberal expenditure of funds, extremely
thorough organization, co-ordmatton, and planning, and ubiquitous party
control All Soviet intellectuals are m effect employed by the state Even
when their income depends primarily on royalties, their books cannot be
published nor their music played Without official authorization The quality
of Soviet creative work has ranged from some brilliant developments in
science and excellent compositions in music to the dreary poverty of
“socialist realism” m literature and its virtually unrelieved worthlessness
jn painting and sculpture But m almost all fields, fruitful as we!) as barren,
the stilling grip of the Party and its ideology has left its mark
Science and Scholarship
For a variety of reasons, science has been a privileged area of Soviet
culture It was obviously and immediately useful and, indeed, indispensable
if the U S S R were to become the military, technological, and economic
leader of the world It was fully endorsed by Marxism, which prided itself
on us own allegedly scientific character In fact, some writers have com-
mented on an almost religious admiration of science and technology in (he
Soviet Union, an expression in part of the old revolutionary titamsm and
determination to transform the world Yet science, while subject to the
dialectic, lies on the whole outside Marxist doctrines, which concentrate
on human society, and thus constitutes a “safer" field in the Soviet Union
than, for example, sociology or literature Not that >l escaped the parly
and the ideology altogether Communist interference with science included
such important instances as Soviet difficulties in accepting Einstein’s "petty
bourgeois" theories, as well as Trofim Lysenko's virtual destruction of
Soviet biology, particularly genetics, together with the elimination of a
number of leading Soviet biologUts, notably Nicholas Vavilov Lysenko,
an agricultural expert and a dangerous quack and fanatic, claimed to have
disproved the basic laws of heredity and obtained Parly support for bus
claims Lysenko's theories gave Marxist environmentalism a new dimen-
sion and made a Communist transformation of the world seem more
582
SOVIET
S SI A
feasible than ever — the only trouble was that Lysenko’s theories were
false. But Einstein’s views had to be accepted, at least for practical
purposes; and even Soviet biology staged a comeback, although it took
many years and several turns of fortune finally to dispose of Lysenko’s
authority. Moreover, thousands of scientists, in contrast, for example, to
writers, could continue working in their fields more or less undisturbed.
And science especially profited from the large-scale financing and organi-
zation of effort provided by the state.
The Sputniks, the shot at the moon, the photographing of the far side
of the moon, and Soviet astronauts’ orbiting of the earth, together with
atomic and hydrogen explosions, have emphasized the achievements of
Soviet applied science, and in particular Soviet rockets, missiles, and atomic
and space technology.* In these fields, as in others, the Soviet Union
profited from the prerevolutionary legacy, especially from the continu-
ing work of such scholars as the pioneer in space travel Constantine
Tsiolkovsky, 1857-1935. The contributions of espionage and of German
scientists brought to the U.S.S.R. after the Second World War are more
difficult to assess. The state, of course, financed and promoted to the full
all the extremely expensive technological programs referred to above. It
also organized, in connection with the five-year plans, a great search for
hew natural resources, vast geographic expeditions, and other, similar
projects. The work of Soviet scientists in the far north acquired special
prominence. The Academy of Sciences continues to direct Soviet science
as well as other branches of Soviet scholarship.
* Soviet "firsts” in space include: first earth satellite, Sputnik I, launched Octo-
ber 4, 1957; first satellite with animal aboard, Sputnik II, November 3, 1957; first
moon rocket, Lunik 1, January 2, 1959; first photographs of hidden side of moon,
October 18, 1959; first retrieval of animal from orbit, August 20, 1960; first launch-
ing from orbit, Venus probe, February 12, 1961; first man in space, Lieut. Col.
Iurii A. Gagarin, April 12, 1961; first double launching with humans, Major
Andrian Nikolaev, August 11, 1961, Lieut Col. Pavel Popovich. August 12, 1962;
first woman in space, Valentina Tereshkova, June 16, 1963; first triple-manned
launching. Col. Vladimir Komarov, space commander, Konstantin Fcoklistov, scien-
tist, Dr. Boris Egorov, physiologist, October 12, 1964; first man to walk in cosmic
space, Lieut. Col. Aleksei A. Leonov from Voskhod II (flight commander, Col.
Pavel Beliacv) March 19, 1965; first flight around the moon and return of an auto-
matic space craft, Zond 5, September 15-22, 1968; establishment of first orbital
experimental station during flight of Soyuz 4 and Soyuz 5 spaceships, January 1969;
first self-propelled automatic laboratory on the surface of the moon, Lunokhod- 1,
November 17, 1970; first manned research station, Salyut, in circumterrestrial orbit,
June 7, 1971; first soft landing on the surface of Mars and transmission of video
signal to Earth by Mars-3 probe, December 2, 1971; first soft landing on the sun-
ward surface of Venus by Venera-8 probe and transmission to Earth of atmospheric
and surface measurements for 50 minutes, July 22, 1972. The Soviet Union also an-
nounced the first loss of a man in actual space flight. Col. Vladimir Komarov,
Soyuz 1, April 24, 1967.
SOCIETY AND CULTURE 533
While Soviet applied science has now received perhaps too much praise
in the press of the world ihe over-all excellence of Soviet science has on
the whole not jet been sufficiently appreciated With theoretical phjsicixts
like Leo Landau experimental physicists like Abraham JolTe and Peter
Kapitza, chemists like Nicholas Semenov, mathematicians like Ivan Vino-
gradov astronomers like Victor Ambartsumian, geochemists like Vladimir
Vernadsky, and botanists like Vladimir Komarov — to select only a very
few out of many names — * the Soviet Union has had outstanding scientific
talent, while the scope of its scientific effort has exceeded that of all other
countries except the United States
Soviet social sciences and humanities do not compare with the sciences
The dead hand of Soviet Marxism has stilled virtually all growth m such
fields as philosophy and sociology Moreover, the official ideology has
proved to be remarkably barren with the result that even Marxist thought
in the USSR has been crude and undeveloped compared to certain
Western and satellite varieties Clcarlj and for a number of good reasons,
the best talent has gone into science To be sure there have been im
portant variations in the Soviet control of scholarship and the results
achieved
Thus, until the early and middle thirties Mikhail Pokrovskj s negatms-
tic school held sway in history A convinced Marxist Pokrovsky took an
extremely critical and bitter view of the Russian past in effect declaring it
of no importance With the Soviet consolidation and turn to cultural
conservatism in the thirties Pokrovsky and his school were denounced
and the authorities began to promote intense work in the field of history
and in such related disciplines as archaeology fn particular Soviet his-
torians have turned to collecting and editing sources Some valuable work
has also been done in social and economic history with at least one Soviet
historian, Boris Grekov, originally a prerevolutionary specialist making
contributions of the first rank Yet in general, in spite of the change in
the thirties and a certain further liberalization following Stalins death
Soviet historiography has suffered enormously from the Party strait jacket,
most especially in such fields as intellectual history and international
relations
Linguistic studies followed a somewhat different pattern There Nicholas
Marr, 1864 - 1934 , an outstanding scholar of Caucasian languages who ap-
parently fell prisoner to some weird theories of his own invention, played
the same sad role that Trofim Lysenko had played in biology Endorsed
by the Party, Marr's strange views almost destroyed philology and Im
guistics in the Soviet Union denying as they did the established families
of languages jn favor of a ubiquitous and multiform cvoJuikmj of four basic
sounds The new doctrine seemed Marxist because it related or at least
.584 SOVIET RUSSIA'
.could relate, different families of languages to different stages' of the
material development of a people, but its implications proved so con-:
fusing. and even dangerous that Stalin himself turned against the'Marr
school in 1950, much to the relief and benefit of Soviet scholarship.
Most areas of Soviet scholarship, however, profited much, more by
Stalin’s death than by his dicta. Since the spring of ' 1953 Soviet scholars
have enjoyed more contact with the outside world and somewhat , greater
freedom in their own work. In particular, they no longer have to praise ...
Stalin at every turn, prove that most things were invented first by Russians,
or deny Western influences in Russia- — as they had to do in the worst ;
days of Zhdanov. Entire disciplines or sub-disciplines, such as cybernetics
and certain kinds of economic analysis, have recently been permitted and
even promoted. Yet, while some of the excesses of Stalinism are gone,
compulsory Marxism-Leninism and partiinost remain. Soviet assertions
that their scholars are free men have a hollow — and indeed tragic — r ring.
Literature
Literature in Soviet Russia in the twenties continued in certain'ways the
trends of the “silver age,” in spite of the heavy losses of the revolutionary,
and civil war years and the large-scale emigration of intellectuals. Some
poets went on publishing excellent poetry, and writers created numeroiis
groups and movements. The formalist critics rose and flourished. All that,
of course, could not last under the new system. First, .the R.A.P.P.'— a
Russian abbreviation for the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers ■
t— came to dominate the scene, preaching, somewhat along Pokrovsky’s
lines, the discarding of all culture except the proletarian. Iri 1932 the
government disbanded the largely nihilistic R.A.P.P. and preceded to-."
organize all 'the writers into the Union of Soviet Writers arid to. impose
on them the new official doctrine that came to be known as . “socialist
realism”’ Guided by the correct principles, Soviet writers were to par-
ticipate fully and prominently in the “building of socialism” as, to quote •
Stalin, “engineers of human souls." “Socialist realism” became synonymous
with, literature in the Soviet Union, other approaches being proscribed. . ,
Most of the prominent figures of the “stiver age”, disappeared early in
the Soviet period: Blok died in 1921, Briusov in 1924, Bely in 1934,
Gumilev was shot as a counterrevolutionary in 1921, Esenin committed
.suicide in', 1925, and Maiakovsky,' whose futurist verses rang the praises
of .the. revolution and whose “Left March” had become almost its un- ,
official poetic manifesto, took his own life in 1-930. The. few outstanding
figures whb. remained, such as Akhmatova and Pasternak, either fell into
' silence — - at best .writing for themselves and their friends or concen- .
SOCIETY AND CULTURE 385
tratcd on translating from foreign languages Akhmatova was expelled
from the Union of Soviet Writers by Zhdanov in 1946, following the pub-
lication of some poems where she had displayed an unsocialist loneliness
among other vices, and Pasternak was ejected in 1958 after the appearance
abroad of his celebrated novel. Doctor Zhnago for which fic was offered
the Nobel prize
Although the concept of socialist realism sponsored by Stalin and the
Politburo was never made entirely dear, it refereed ostensibly to a realistic
depiction of life in its full revolutionary social dimension, in part in the
tradition of Pushkin and Tolstoy and indeed of the mam stream of modem
Russian, literature But because the Party had its own view of life, based
essentially on Marxist chchfs misapplied to Russian reality, socialist real-
ism turned into crude and lifeless propaginda Writers had to depict the
achievements of the five year plans and other significant subjects or
at least write realistic historical novels More important they had to do
it in a prescribed manner Black was lo be made black and white white
with no shades in between The Soviet hero had to be essentially a paragon
ol virtue with no fundamental inner conflicts and no psychological
ambiguities Instead of the grim world around them, authors were urged
to see things as they should appear and will appear in the future Pessimism
was banned
Not surprisingly, tn terms of quality the results of “socialist realism*
have been appalling After Gorky’s death in 1936 — *i death arranged by
Stalin, according to some specialists — no writer of comparable stature
rose tn Soviet letters A few gifted men such as Alexis N Tolstoy, 1883-
1945, the author of popular historical and contemporary novels and
Michael Sholokhov, 1905-, who wrote the novels The Quiet Don and
Vtrgm Soil Upturned, describing Don cossacks in civil war and collecuv
jzation, managed lo produce good works more or less in line with the
requirements of the regime although they too had to revise their writings
from ediuon lo edition to meet changing Party demands Other talented
writers, for instance, Iuru Otcsha failed on the whole to adjust to
"socialist realism ” More typical Soviet practitioners have turned out
simple, topical, and at times interesting, but unmistakably third rate pieces
An example is Constantine Simonov, a writer of stones, novelist, pfay
wright, and poet, as well as an editor and war correspondent who drew
international attention by his novel about the defense of Sta'ingrad, Days
and Nights, and his play concerning American attitudes toward the
USSR, The Russian Question The overwhelming bulk of Soviet lit
erature became extremely monotonous, drab and lacking in artistry or
m any kind of ability Soviet poetry, especially hampered by the injunction
to be simple and easy to understand, as well as socialist and realist, proved
586 SOVIET RUSSIA
to be inferior even to Soviet prose. The government no doubt contributed
more to the enjoyment of its readers by publishing on a large scale the
Russian classics and world classics in translation. As a matter of fact,
most of the best Russian literature during the last few decades has been
written abroad. Some of the outstanding expatriate authors were the novel-
ist, story writer, and poet Ivan Bunin and the highly orginal prose writer
with a unique style, Alexis Remizov, who both died in Paris, in 1953
and 1957 respectively. In all fairness, however, one should note a certain
revival in Soviet literature since Stalin’s death. Yet that revival too has a
tragic ring. Its leading figures, such as the poet Joseph Brodsky and indeed
Alexander Solzhenitsyn himself, were hounded in their native land until
their exile abroad, their works and thought forbidden to Soviet readers.
Ironically, Solzhenitsyn’s writings may well be considered to represent the
long-delayed success of socialist realism: they focus on central problems
and situations of Soviet life; they deal with common people, in fact all
kinds of people; they are meant for the masses; and they are certainly
realistic. G. Struve’s two books, one on Soviet and the other on 6migr6
writers, should be read together to obtain the best picture available of
Russian literature since 1917 and of its hard lot.
The Arts
The Soviet record in the arts has paralleled that in literature. Again,
the twenties, linked closely to the “silver age” and to contemporary trends
in the West, were an interesting and vital period. Notably, in architecture
functionalism flourished, producing some remarkable buildings, while new
and experimental approaches added vigor and excitement to other arts
also. However, once “socialist realism” established its hold on Soviet
culture, arts in the Soviet Union acquired a most conservative and indeed
antiquated character. Impressive in quantity, Soviet realistic painting and
sculpture are essentially worthless in quality, being in general poor imita-
tions of a bygone style. While Soviet architecture has on the whole had
more to offer, it too traveled the sad road from inspired and novel
creations in the earlier period of Communist rule to the utterly tasteless
and contrived Moscow skyscrapers of Stalin’s declining years, exemplified
by the much-publicized new university building. Although certain stirrings
have been detected since the late dictator’s death, and indeed although
many modern utilitarian buildings are now being erected, there has so far
been no basic change of orientation in Soviet arts. Music, it is true, has
been somewhat more fortunate throughout the period, both because of its
greater distance from Marxist and “realistic” injunctions — which never-
SOCIETY AND CULTURP
587
tbelcss did not prevent the Party from attacking “formalism” and modern-
ism in music and from tyrannizing in that field — and, perhaps, because
of the accident of talent In any case, the one time figure of the “silver age '
and 6migrd Serge Prokofiev, 1891-1953, the creator of such well-known
pieces as the Classical Symphony and Peter and the Wolf, and Dnutru
Shostakovich, 1908-75, together with a few other composers, have man-
aged to produce works of lasting value in spite of ideological obstacles
Short on creativity and development certain Soviet arts have been long
on execution and performance Again, the high standards were continua-
tions from tsarist days, aided by increased state subsidies and by the fact
that schooling and culture spread to more people Soviet musicians have
performed brilliantly on many instruments both at international competi-
tions of the thirties, and again in recent years when the best among them,
such as the violinist David Oistrakh and the pianists Sviatoslav Richter
and Emil Gilcls, have been allowed to tour the world The ballet, while
in a sense stagnant — the clock having slopped for most purposes in 1917
— continues to do its dances beautifully, and is apparcml) backed by
more funds and a better system of schools and selection than in any other
country The Moscow An Theater is still one of the most remarkable
centers of acting anywhere, allhough unfortunately its school of acting
now has a monopoly in the Soviet Union all other approaches to acting and
the theater having been proscribed Good acting has also characterized
many Soviet films In fact the Soviet cinema continued to be creative
longer than other Soviet arts — in part probably because it had no
nineteenth century tradition in the image of which it could be conveniently
frozen Soviet film directors have included at least one great figure. Serge
Eisenstexn, 1898-1948, as well as other men of outstanding ability
Religion
Religion in the Soviet Union constitutes an anomaly, a threat, and a
challenge from the Communist point of view Marxist theory considers
it an ‘opiate of the masses" and finds its ration dare in the c (Torts of
the exploiting classes to keep the people obedient and docile Russian
practice seemed to odd weight to the theory, for the Orthodox Church in
Russia was closely linked to the imperial regime, and it naturally sided
with the Whites in the Civil War Clearly, its social basis gone, religion
would cease to exist in a socialist society But this has not occurred
Therefore, the Soviet leadership has had to compromise and allow religion
a highly restricted position in the USSR, while looking forward u> Its
eventual, much delayed, disappearance Religion it might be added, has
also proved to be one of the main obstacles to the Communist transforma-
tion of man and society in other eastern European countries.
Outright persecution lasted well into the thirties. In addition to executing
and exiling many clerics, monks, and Orthodox laymen, confiscating
church implements “for victims of famine,” and closing churches and
converting them into antireligious museums, the authorities tried to break
up the Church from the inside by assisting a modernist “Living Church”
group within it — fruitlessly, for the people would not follow that group.
After the death in 1925 of Patriarch Tikhon — elected by a Church
council in 1918 to resume the patriarchal form of ecclesiastical organiza-
tion which had been discontinued by Peter the Great — the government
prevented any patriarch being elected in his stead, and Church leadership
fell to provisional appointees. Yet, according to an official report based
on the never-published census of 1936, 55 per cent of Soviet citizens still
identified themselves as religious — while many others presumably con-
cealed their belief.
That stubborn fact in conjunction with the general social stabilization
of the thirties made Stalin and the Politburo assume a more tolerant atti-
tude toward religion. The war and the patriotic behavior of the Church in
the war added to its acceptance and standing. In 1943 the Church was per-
mitted to elect a patriarch, the statesmanlike Metropolitan Sergius ob-
taining that position. After his death in 1945, Sergius was succeeded by
Alexis, who continued as “Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia" for a
quarter of a century. In 1971, following Alexis’s death, the present
patriarch, Pimen, was elected to head the Church. The ecclesiastical
authorities were also allowed to establish a few theological schools, re-
quired to prepare students for the priesthood, and to open a limited
number of new churches. The activities of the Union of the Godless and
anti-religious propaganda in general were curtailed. In return the patri-
archal Church declared complete loyalty to the regime, and supported,
for example, its international peace campaigns and its attempts to in-
fluence the Balkan Orthodox. More unfortunately, the two co-operated
in bringing the two or three million Uniates of former eastern Poland into
Orthodoxy. The Church in the U.S.S.R., however, remains restricted to
strictly religious, rather than more general social and educational, func-
tions — even the constitution proclaims merely the freedom of religious
confession, as against the freedom of anti-religious propaganda' — and,
while temporarily tolerated within limits, it remains a designated enemy
of Marxist ideology and Communist society. In fact, both Khrushchev and
liis successors have increased the pressures against religion even when
“liberalizing” other aspects of Soviet life. A remarkably tenacious relic of
the past, the Church has no future in the Communist view.
589
SOCIETY AND CULTURE
U might be added that other Soviet Christians, such as Baptists, and
other religious groups, such as the numerous Moslems have profiled with
the Orthodox from the policy of relative relaxation They, too, lead n
constricted and precarious existence within a fundamentally hostile system
X L I I
SOVIET RUSSIA: CONCLUDING REMARKS
The history of mankind is executing in our days one of the greatest,
most difficult turnings, of an unlimited, one can without the slightest
exaggeration say: of a world-liberating importance. . . . from an
abyss of suffering, torment, famine and barbarization to the bright
future of a communist society, general well-being, and firm peace.
LENIN
Human sacrifices
Does a canal redeem?
He is godless, your engineer.
And what power be acquired! *
PASTERNAK
Still one believes — suffering is not eternal,
Though there is little justice, it exists in the world.
Tenacious as the old hag is, just look.
Children will nevertheless outlive her!
KLENOVSKY
The Soviet Union has been described and analyzed in a flood of books
and articles. Unfortunately — although perhaps inevitably, considering the
contemporary and critical nature of the subject — the great bulk of this
writing leaves much to be desired. Omilting from discussion the Com-
munists’ own propaganda, one can designate the next most biased ap-
proach as the schdol of extreme and blind hatred. Authors of this tendency,
usually fortified by formidable and even invincible ignorance, typically
lump Russia and the Soviet Union together and denounce them un-
reservedly from top to bottom. Not satisfied wilh the actual Soviet record,
they invent additional sins and crimes, such as the alleged brotherly feel-
ing and even identity of the Communists and the Nazis. Regarding both
the activities of Communist parties everywhere and the pronouncements
of Marxists from Marx to Khrushchev on the eventual triumph of com-
munism as too vague, they produce more specific blueprints of world
conquest, ascribing them to Lenin, or Stalin, or even to Peter the Great.
As Brumberg and others have demonstrated, they have an easy way with
•Professor Vladimir Markov of the University of California in Los Angeles first
pointed out this inexact and extremely suggestive translation by Pasternak from
Goethe, which was changed in a later edition of Pasternak’s translation.
590
CONCLUDING REMARKS
S9t
quotations and attributions But on the whole, because ot its crude and
outspoken character, the school of blind hatred is not likely to mislead
people who are at all informed, unless they want to be misled
More complicated and controv ersial aTe the efforts ot genuine scholars
and other intellectuals who have really toed to understand the Soviet
Union but have nevertheless failed to form a realistic unapt of it Many,
for example, have confusctf the Soviet system with democratic socialism
and even With liberalism and the general progress of mankind Thus the
USSR has been interpreted by various persons primarily in terms of
economic democracy, a scientific outlook on life, or the emancipahon of
women Prominent commentators, such as Sidney and Beatrice Webb, or
even Schuman to take a contemporary example, have not been tmtmine
!q this approach Sometimes as m the ease of Gide, a tool at Soviet
reality set the perspective straight Others have persisted in them rosy
beliefs
More skeptical scholars have at umes been affected by the sheer weight
Of Soviet material and the nearly exclusive prominence of the Sov ict point
of view Many events of Soviet history are known only in the official
Version, while the great bulk of archival and other primary sources his
remained in the U S S R to be seen or published only by permission of
the authorities As a result even Carr — perhaps the best as well as the
most productive historian of the Soviet Union to date — has probably
relied too much on Lenm*s and on the government s versions of develop*
JT'enls Jr should be craphamed that an extremely reserved and cautious
general attitude toward Soviet reports and claims can easily be combined
in particular instances with an excessive dependence on Soviet sources,
frequently the only ones available
A different kind of error has threatened other interpreters of the Soviet
system, especially among social scientists, who have used their analytical
techniques to demonstrate the logicality, if not the inevitability, of the
Bolshevik regime Almost everything, from the swaddling of Russian babies
to the particular stage and configuration of the economic development of
the country, has been brought forth to explain “why they behave like
Russians” Usually it has been argued that, whereas the particular Soviet
regime did not necessarily have to come about, any possible substitute
Would have looked and aeted much the same Russians it has been as-
serted, could not make democracy work, in any case Also, their attitudes
toward civil liberties, political police, and govemrn'nt control were
basically different from those prevalent us the U esc The danger of ihtt
approach lies m underestimating the magnitude and novelty of Soviet social
engineering and in treating it as essentially rational and suited to the
Russian situation In its extreme form the approach tends to deny that
the Russian people have any human qualifies
592
IET
Many other observers of the Soviet development have recognized the
radical nature of the Bolshevik experiment, but have concluded that at
a certain point the Soviet regime either “betrayed the revolution” or at
least congealed into a more conservative, established system. This group
includes, for example, Trotsky and his followers, as well as certain other
Leftists. It might be noted, however, that Trotsky could never take a
completely negative view of the Soviet system, but preferred to regard
it as a mixture of genuine socialist revolution and Stalinist reaction.
By contrast, numerous proponents of the thesis of the Soviet retreat
from revolutionary positions to conservatism look at the U.S.S.R. from
the Right rather than from the Left. Most frequently they insist that at
a given time nationalism and need for social stability asserted themselves
with sufficient force in the Soviet Union to check the revolutionary current
and consolidate the new system, conservatism replacing revolutionaiy
dynamism. Examples of other revolutions, especially the great French
Revolution, are often adduced to support the argument. Thus the in-
auguration of the New Economic Policy was interpreted by many as the
end of the revolution and a return to the traditional Russian pattern.
Therefore, a number of Russian 6migr£ intellectuals, for instance the
gifted Nicholas Ustrialov, reversed their former position and proclaimed
their willingness to support the new regime in protecting and developing
Russian national interests. The group came to be known as smenove-
khovtsy, a name suggested by the title of their collection of articles and
meaning “those who changed the sign posts.” The Soviet leaders, however,
abolished the N.E.P. and switched to the all-out socialist offensive of
the five-year plans. Ustrialov later returned to the U.S.S.R. and dis-
appeared in the great purge.
Again, the conservative turning in social and cultural matters char-
acteristic of the Soviet Union in the thirties led some observers to believe
that the decisive break with the revolutionary past had arrived. Such well-
informed scholars as Timasheff and Sorokin expounded respectively the
thesis of the “great retreat” and the view that the democratic provisions
of the constitution of 1936 were sincerely meant and that the U.S.S.R.
was on its way to becoming a democracy. Other Russians, together with
some non-Russians, rejoiced simply at the return of Pushkin, of Russian
historical heroes, or of discipline in Soviet schools. Yet the retreat proved
to be highly limited and rigidly controlled. Most important, Stalin and the
Politburo retained full power and freedom of action, and, needless to say,
they never renounced their Marxist ideology or Communist intentions.
Stalin, if you will, assumed the roles of Mirabeau, Danton, Robespierre,
and even Napoleon, but he always remained the same ruthless Georgian
Bolshevik, relentless in his hatred and determined to pursue what he
considered to be correct Party goals.
CONCLUDING R
RKS
593
The Second World War, of course, suggested more turning po>nts as
nationalism ro-,e in Soviet Russia, the arm) acquired a new prominence,
and religion a new respectability Moreover, the USSR, was allied to
Western democracies in a titanic common struggle The immediate post
war years, therefore, proved to be the greatest disappointment of ■>!* to
the democratic world and possibly as well to Soviet citizens theT selves
bitter hostility and the cold war, punctuated by actual heavy fighting m
such restricted areas as Korea and Indo-Chma, replaced the 'wartime
eo-operauon between Communism and the West, while at home Stalin
and Zhdanov moved to isolate their people from foreign influence*, restore
Marxist orthodoxy, and punish the deviations Communism proceeded
to expand across the maps of Europe and Asia
Finally, the death of Stalin in the spring of 1953 and the events that
followed it convinced some observers (hat the Soviet system was at la't
breaking down or undergoing a radicat change With the brief rue of
Zhukov, much was written about the new power of the urn) and the
possibilities ol a military regime in the U S S R Other authors a«-gue<J
that the Party would have to give way to technicians and Indeed a
managerial society Actually nothing of the sort has so far occurred On
the contrary, the Party apparatus remains in full control, with the ruling
Politburo and Secretariat composed entirely of veteran professional Party
men, headed by Brezhnev and, until his death in 1980 Kosygin, them
selves completely creations ol the Party Soviet policies, too, since the
death of Stalin have shown no fundamental break with the past.
Of course, the fact that a fundamental change has not as yet taken
place does not mean that it never will Soviet economy and societv have
been undergoing a rapid evolution that eventually might wcV affect the
basic structure and nature of the regime The involved international situa
tion suggests additional compHcauons and possibilities Warn for exam
pie, has pointed out some parallels between communism and liberalism,
indicating lhai communism too might lose its dynamic force and be-
come one of the elements in the established order of things partly be
cause of its very success and partly because it would be superseded by
new problems and new movements To put it differently, great revolutions
such as the French and the Russian arc likely to have major but also
unpredictable results
There has been much success Starting as a small conspiratorial group
based on Lenin's interpretation of Marx, the Bolsheviks seized power m
a backward, although huge, empire and transformed it into the second
greatest industrial state in the world In the process they have defeated
domestic opponents as well as foreign enemies, including the tremendously
strong Nazi Germany, which lost the bulk of us army on the eastern front
Recouping the losses of Brcst-Litovsk and moving far beyond, the Soviet
594 SOVIET RUSSIA
sway extended to the Elbe and to Austria. At tiie same time communism
won control over neighboring China, with its enormous population, and
swept into northern Korea and Indo-China. Even Cuba in the Western
hemisphere came to be closely associated with the Communist bloc. No
wonder the Soviet leaders might exude confidence in their ideology and
their policies, and speak of Communist victory in the entire world.
However, they have to face serious problems, old and new. Most fright-
ening is the advent of hydrogen warfare, which has revolutionized military
and political considerations. Marx, Engels, and even Lenin never had to
cope with the possibility of ultimate and complete annihilation. Khru-
shchev’s emphasis on coexistence, which during his rule and since has been
acquiring the status of a dogma in Soviet teaching, represents one response
to this challenge. The implications for the Communist world of a prolonged
period of coexistence are at present very difficult to foretell.
Besides, that world itself is now divided. There exists the independent
Yugoslav communism, which, although but a small off-shoot compared to
the orthodox tree, presents all the attractions and dangers of a heresy, and
thus demands constant attention. Moreover, the orthodox realm possesses
two centers of gravity, Moscow and Peking. While both the Soviet and
the Chinese leaders are good Communists, they are at present bitter ene-
mies, with the future uncertain and threatening.
But perhaps especially germane to the future of the U.S.S.R. are the
problems and contradictions within the Soviet Union itself. The Soviet
nationalities policy, often cited as a great success, can also be interpreted
as a desperate holding action. The Second World War demonstrated the
continuation of separatist feelings in the U.S.S.R., and there is no reason
to believe that they have since disappeared. Khrushchev’s virgin lands
project in Central Asia has been interpreted by some observers as a major
effort to Russify that vast area. While it has achieved notable results in that
direction, the fact remains that other peoples of the Soviet Union grow and
develop quite as fast as the Great Russians, although, on the other hand,
many members of minority nationalities have become Russified. In fact,
recent statistics indicate a population explosion among the Turkic and
generally formerly Moslem peoples of the U.S.S.R. just when the birthrate
among the Slavic inhabitants of the Soviet Union has drastically declined.
In an important sense the Soviet system has been most beneficial for the
more backward ethnic groups, which have had virtually everything, from
alphabets to factories, created for them from scratch. In an age when
empires collapse, the Kremlin does rule at present the largest and the
most oppressed empire in the world. And while there exists considerable
doubt concerning how the Ukrainians and the Georgians feel about the
U.S.S.R., there is little doubt in regard to the feelings of the so-called satel-
CONCLUDtHO REMARKS 595
litc peoples of the Czechs the Poles the Hungarians, or the East Germans
Communist empires to be sure, differ peat!) from the traditional empires
created by western European countries Yet it would seem rash to assume
that in an age of nationalism they have solved permanently the problem of
nationalities
Also the Soviet Union has experienced great difficulties in eradicating
such survival* of the past as religion and the desire for private property
of the peasants and other groups although of course it has not given up
the struggle Concurrently, apiculture has remained one of the weak a?
pects of the system, with key problems like those relating to incentive and
productivity, still unresolved The Marxist outlook and police methods of
Soviet leaders which led to catastrophic expentnen ation in apiculture,
also resulted in the stifling of Soviet culture and in f3ct of all Soviet life
Indeed the Soviet regime remains firmly wedded to Marxist ideology, at
though that philosophy its vision narrow from the start is becoming ever
more dated Recent cautious Soviet attempts to brng Marxism up to date
for instance m its relationship to physics are not likely to be successful
The dilemma will remain and become more acute
The implications of the spread of education in the Soviet Union and the
nse of a large trained class of intellectuals technicians and administrators
deserve special attention So far the Party has managed to maintain full
control over this Soviet elite but the future remains uncertain It is worth
remembering that Stalin was preparing another great purge when he died
While today there is no suggestion of a g-neral purge the heralded transt
tion to communism within the USSR although underplayed since the
fall of Khrushchev bears watching In terms of the official doctrine the
Soviet Union is moving from socialism that is a system that embodies the
principle from each according to his ability and to each according to his
work to the higher stage of communism where the distribution will be
* from each according to his ability and to each according to his needs ” A
vague concept communism has often been Itnl cd both by Soviet authon
ties and by foreign commentators simply to the abundance of coi sumer
goods and the mtng standard of life But as indicated earlier more might
well be involved Only when the Party gives up large-scale social engi
seerrag or fads in the attempt to tmp'ement its plans will the new upper
class tn the Soviet Union be secure At present although large and ex
trerndy important, that class remains an aristocracy of Soviet merit, with
minimal private property, no effective legal guarantee of its position, and
no independent standing outside the system And the system to repeat, is
that of a Communist party dictatorship imposed by devoted Marxists-
Lemmsts
Inkeles and others have argued persuasively that several theoreUca! mod
596
SOVIET
RUSSIA
els help to explain Soviet society. Perhaps most useful are the totalitarian
model, the developing country model, and the model of a mature industrial
society. Totalitarianism has been the essence of the Soviet system in
particular of Stalinism. Concentration and ruthless application of force in
an effort to control and indeed shape every citizen according to the wishes
of the government have possibly been more characteristic of the U.S.S.R.
than of any other state in history. Secret police, purges, and forced-labor
camps have become as much symbols of the Soviet Union as the hammer
and sickle. Yet totalitarianism as such cannot explain the dynamism
and development of the U.S.S.R. That can be better understood jf we
think of the Soviet Union as a developing society mounting an enormous
effort in education, industrial growth, science and technology, and other
fields. As emphasized earlier, the Bolsheviks won control of a backward
agrarian country and transformed it into the second greatest industrial
power in the world. But, precisely because of this success, sixty-five years
after the Revolution the developing model is no longer as generally appli-
cable to the U.S.S.R. as it once was. Although the people are still poor,
and although very much remains to be done before the country is as mod-
ern and as prosperous as are the western European countries and the
United States, a great industrial base has been built, and the Soviet econ-
omy is moving into a new phase. The increasing relevance of the industrial
society model to the U.S.S.R. has found reflection in a variety of phenom-
ena, ranging from problems of Soviet industrial managers to a rise in juve-
nile delinquency and a new concern with leisure.
More concretely, the new level of development and sophistication of the
Soviet economy has made the single-minded Stalinist directive always to
maximize production, especially of capital goods, both increasingly dys-
functional and increasingly difficult to carry out. Economic “liberalization"
as presently applied represents a palliative at best, and it might fail to
serve even that function. The Soviet Union has yet to make a real effort to
decentralize its economy, a genuine attempt to bring local initiative and
interests into full play. If such an attempt is made, regionalism might well
develop in the enormous Soviet Union, changing its economic, and even-
tually its social and perhaps even its political, structure. Regionalism would
add to the significance of the problem of nationalities and also to the im-
pact of international relations and contacts, for example, between Japan
and the Soviet Union particularly in the Soviet Far East.
The problem of change in the U.S.S.R. is all the more vital, because in
certain important ways the Soviet system has not been functioning as in-
tended. Reference has already been made to the continuing agricultural
disaster and to the Tecent general slowing down of the economy. Even more
broadly speaking, Soviet society appears weak in incentive, innovation,
CONCLUDING REMARKS
597
originality* and creativity With terror as an immediate prod largely a thing
of the past, full employment, social services, and a slowly rising standard
of living, most Soviet workers and peasants apparently find little reason to
exert themselves Scientists, technicians, managers, and administrators, on
their part, have proved to be on the whole very conservative and ’un-
imaginative, whether because of tbeir authoritarian and dogmatic educa-
tion or because of the overwhelming bureaucratic red tape, the emphasis
onconfornuty and the entire structure of rewards and punishments tn the
Soviet system Typically, productivity per worker and the quality of the
product have been less satisfactory, even m the opinion of the Soviet
leaders themselves, than the gross output figures achieved by the five year
plans Moreover, recent years have witnessed an increase in work absen-
teeism and an increase tn a devastating alcoholism which has affected
Soviet heatth statistics in o major way It ts worth noting tl at the above-
mentioned negative characteristics of the Soviet order have become in-
creasingly apparent, as should indeed be the case if they arc intrinsic to
that order, which has now had sixty five years to assert i*$elf and to bury
"the relics of the past ’ Brezhnev’s determined pursuit of a dStenic with
the United States and the West as a whole may well have been inspired
even more by the general Soviet need of a broad access to the science and
technology of the West and to tts freer and more creative spirit than by
any particular economic desiderata Yet it is doubtful that creativity can
be borrowed
Of special significance for the future of the Soviet Union might be a
confluence of economic change and general liberal opposition and protest
If Stalinism represented deep winter, the entire period since the death of
the supreme dictator might be designated as the thaw The thaw continues
Timid though the voice of Soviet intellectuals is, compared with the voices
of intellectuals in other, even communist, countries its verv presence marks
a drastic change from the ’thirties, the ’forties, or the car!) 'fifties Whether
in the form of a somewhat juvenile reaffirmation of human values by such
poets as Eugene Evtushenko or the gifted Andrew Voznesensky, m the
form of an understated realistic description of existence m a forced labor
camp as in Solzhenitsyn’s A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich which
Khrushchev allowed to be published in 1962 as part of his dz-Siafimzation
campaign, or in its present more developed, p_ssimistic and painful form
the voice of the opposition, samizdat and all has become, in spite of its
isolation and weakness, part of Soviet life Neither repression nor the
recent policy of allowing, at times compelling a number of the leading
figures of the opposition to become exiles in the West has effectively stifled
d It is likely to be heard in the future
ft would thus seem that ui many respects the Soviet Union is neither a
598 SOVIET JUSSI*
stable - pace, Bialer and other specialists - nor a happy country. More-
over, its economy and society continue to evolve, Profound alterations in
the very foundations of the Soviet system appear, therefore, likely in the
not-too-distant future. But the problem of change in the Soviet Union has
quite a special character. The leadership and the Party, which have a
deadly grip on the country, will not relax that grip beyond a certain point,
in any case not to the point of losing control. It is not even clear that they
can afford to relax it much more than they already have since Stalin’s
death. In other words, the prospects of fundamental change by evolution
remain severely limited. The alternative, revolution, while it certainly can-
not be ruled out, must, for lack of evidence, be no more than sheer specu-
lation at present. To conclude, the Soviet system is not likely to last, not
likely to change fundamentally by evolution, and not likely to be over-
thrown by a revolution. History, to be sure, has a way of advancing even
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Work* include The History
of the Jcnlsh hliatars
Daracty, Waller (1884-1957) American journalist Works
in -1 tide Durant? Reports
602 bibliography
Russia; J Write as 1 Please; Stalin & Co.; The Politburo, the Men Who
Run Russia.
Dvornik, Francis (1893-1975) Czech- American historian. Works include The Slavs
in European History and Civilization; “Byzantine Influences in Russia,” in
The Geographical Magazine (1947); “The Kiev State and Its Relations
with Western Europe,” in Transactions oj the Royal Historical Society
0947); "Byzantine Political Ideas In Kievan Russia,” in Dumbarton Oaks
Papers (1956).
Erlich, Alexander (1912— ) American economic historian. Works include The
Soviet Industrialization Debate, 1924-1928.
Fainsod, Merle (J 907—1972) American political scientist. Works include How Russia
Is Ruled; Smolensk under Soviet Rule.
Fay, Sidney B. (1876-1967) American historian of Europe. Works include The
Origins oj the World War (2 vols.).
Fedotov, Georgii Petrovich (1886-1951) Russian-American historian of religion and
culture. Works include The Russian Religious Mind; Vol. I, Kievan Chris-
tianity, the Tenth to the Thirteenth Centuries; Vol. II, The Middle Ages, the
Thirteenth to the Fifteenth Centuries; S via rye Drevnei Rusi (X—XVH st.);
A Treasury of Russian Spirituality.
Fcldmcsscr, Robert A. (1925- ) American sociologist. Works include "Stratifica-
tion and Communism," in Prospects for Soviet Society (ed. A. Kassof).
Fischer, George (1923- ) American historian and political scientist. Works in-
clude Russian Liberalism, from Gentry to Intelligentsia; Soviet Opposition
to Stalin : A Case Study in World War II.
Florinsky, Michael T. (1894- ) Russian-American economist and historian.
Works include The End of the Russian Empire; Russia: A History and
Interpretation (2 vols.).
Florovsky, Georgii Vasilevich (1893-197 9) Russian-American Orthodox theologian
and intellectual historian. Works include Puri russkogo bogosloviia: “0
patriotizme pravednom i grekhovnom," in the Eurasian book Na pittlakh;
"The Problem of Old Russian Culture,” in Slavic Review (March 1962).
Gerschenkron, Alexander (1904-1978) Russian-American economist Works include
Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective; "Agrarian Policies and
Industrialization, Russia 186J-1917," Cambridge Economic History of
Europe, Vol. VI, Pt. 2; Continuity in History and Other Essays; Europe in
the Russian Mirror: Four Lectures in Economic Theory.
Gide, Andre (1869-1951) French writer. Works include Retour dp 1'U.R.SS. (Eng.
tr. Back from the USSR); Retouches d Rctour de 1'U.R.S.S. (Eng. tr.
Afterthoughts, A Sequel to Back from the USSR) .
Goldsmith, Raymond W. (1904— ) American economist. Works include "The
Economic Growth of Tsarist Russia 1860-1913," in Economic Develop-
ment and Cultural Exchange (April 1961).
Golikov, Ivan Ivanovich (1735-1801) Russian historian who collected source
material on Peter the Great. Works Include Deianlla Petra Velikogo,
mudrogo preobrazitelia Rossii: Sobrannye iz dostovernykh Istochnikov i
raspoIoT.il ennye po godam (12 vols.); Dopolnenie (18 vols.).
Golovin, Nikolai Nikolaevich (1875-1944) Russian general and author. Works in-
clude Rossiiskaia kontrrcvoliutsita v 1917-1918 gg. (5 vols.); The Russian
Army in the World War.
Golubinsky, Evgenii Evsigneevich (1834-1912) Russian Church historian. Works
include Istoriia russkoi iserkvi (2 vols.).
Gooch, George Peabody (1873-1968) British historian of Europe. Works include
Catherine the Great and Other Studies.
Grabar, Igor Emmanuilovich (1871-1960) Russian-Soviet specialist in art and art
history. Works include Istoriia russkogo iskusstva (6 vols.).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
603
Grekov Bom Pmitnevich. (1882-1953) Soviet historian Work* include Feadahye
otnostienna v kies shorn gosudarstse Klexskata Rus (Eng tr Kiev Rui)
Krestiane na Rusl s drestteishlkh xrtmen Jet XVII seka (Ctr tr Die
BauetP in der Rut t on den altcstcn Zeiten bit rum 17 Jo/irJi under/ 2 soli ),
ZotolOM Orda i ee padtnte (with A lu lakubovskn) (Fr tr La Horde
d'Or)
Grossman Gregory (1921- ) American economist Works ineU.dc Value and
plan Economic Calculation and Organization In Eastern Europe (ed ),
“National Income ’ vri So\let Economic Growth (ed A Bergson) “ANoxC
on the Fulfillment of the Fifth Five Year plan in IrJuilry" in laiiw
Studies (April 1957), “The Structure and Organization, of the Sou-t
Economy" «n Static Reslew (June 1962) “Thirty Years of Soviet Indus
trial nation," In Soviet Survey (Octobcr-Dccefnber 1938), “Notes for a
Theory of the Command Economy" in Soviet Studies (October 1963)
“The Soviet Economy and the Waning of the Cold War " tn Beyond the
Cold fVar (ed R Gofdwin) “Innovation and Information m the Soviet
Economy” in The American Economic Review (May 19661 “Economic
Reforms A Balance Sheet “ m Problems o/ Communism (Novcmber-
Decenther 1966) “Gold and the Sword Money in the Soviet Command
Economy," tn Industrialization in Two Systems Essays In Honor ol
Alexander Gerschenkron (ed H RosovsV)) “The Solid ary Society A
Philosophical Issue in Communist Economic Rt forms” in Essays In
Socialism and Planning (rt Honor of Cart fjmdauer The Economy at
Middle Age tn Problems erf Communism (March-April 19t6>
Crunwold Constantine de ( ) Russian French historian Works include
Alexandre I Le tsar mystique La Russia de Pierre le Grand (Eng tt
Peter the Great) Trots slides de diplomatic russe La Vie Jc 'heolas 1 "
(Eng tr Tsar Nicholas I)
Haimjon Leopold (1927- ) American historian Wo ks include “The ProM'tn of
Social Stability in Utban Russia 1905-1917” in Stevie Review (December
1964-Much 1965), The Russian Marxists end the Origins of BoUhe\Um
The politics of Rural Russia 1905-1914 (ed )
Halecki Oscar (1891-1973) Polish American historian Works include Borderlands
of Western Civilization A lltstory of East Central Europe h m Florence
to Brest ( 1459-1 596) A History of Poland The l an is and Divisions
of European lltstory Cambridge History of Poland (ed with W F
Reddaway. J H Penson and R Djboski 2 vols ) “Imperialism in Slavic
and East European History" in American Slavic and East European Ret e»
(February 1952)
Helhe Richard (1937— > American historian Works include Enjerfmnl and
Military Change In Muscovy Recent Soviet Historiograph/ on MeJievat
and Early Modern Russian Slavery In Russian Review (January 1976)
Nook Sidney (1902- ) American political philosopher Work* tncluj' Tram
lie get to Marx The Hero in History A Study In Limitation a id Posstht t)
Towards on Understanding of Karl Marx
Kwahfc'rdcy (CvviKi\yfc«V.y>, MALaA Swgtetich Ukia.n>m hniotun
Work* Include 1 st or ha Ukrojwy Rttsy (10 volt Eng tr of a different,
much bnefer study, A History of the Ukraine)
Ignatovich Inna Ivanovna (1879-1967) Russian-Soviet historian Wort* include
Borfio krestlan za or, obozhdenle Pomeshchtchi krtruone nolanune
ossobozhdtnHa “kiesitanskte volncnua pcrvoi cheivtrti XIX seta in
Voprosy Istoru (1950)
Inkelcs Alex (1920- ) American sociologist Works include “M odets and
in the Analysis of Soviet Society" in Survey (July 1966) How Die
Issues
Soviet
604
BIBLIOG
PHY
System Works (with R. Bauer and C. Kluckhohn); The Soviet Citizen
(with R. Bauer); Public Opinion in the Soviet Union.
Itenberg, Boris Samuilovich (1921— ) Soviet historian. Works include Dvizhenie
revolutsionnogo narodnichestva; Pervyi lntcrnatsional i revoitutsionnaia
Rossiia; luzhno-Tossiiskii soiuz rabochikh; vozniknovenie i dciatelnost.
Jafcobson, Roman (1896-1982) Russian-American philologist and historian of
literature. Works include Rcmarques sur Involution phonoiogique du russe
comparee a cetle des autres longues slaves; Russian Epic Studies (with
E. J. Simmons ) ; Slovo o Polku Igoreve v perevodakh kontsa vosemnadtsafogo
veka; La Geste du Prince Igor (ed. with Henri Gregoire and Marc Szeftcl).
Jasny, Naum (1883-1967) Russian-American economist. Works include The Social-
ized Agriculture of the US.S.R.: Plans and Performance; Soviet Industriali-
zation, 1928—1952; The Soviet 1956 Statistical Handbook: A Commentary;
“The Soviet Seven-Year Plan: Is it Realistic?" in Bulletin of the Institute
for the Study of the USSR (May 1959); “The Soviet Statistical Yearbooks,
1955-1960," in Slavic Review (March 1962).
Jelavich, Charles (1922— ) American historian of Eastern Europe. Works include
Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 1879—1886.
Karamzin, Nikolai Mikhailovich (1766-1826) Russian writer and historian. Works
include Istortta Gosudarstva Rossiiskogo (12 vols.); Karamzin’s Memoir
on Ancient and Modem Russia: The Russian Text (cd. R. E. Pipes) (Eng.
tr. Karamzin’s Memoir on Ancient and Modern Russia: A Translation and
Analysis, ed. R. E. Pipes).
Karpovich, Michael (1888-1959) Russian-American historian. Works include Eco-
nomic History of Europe since 1750 (with Witt Bowden and Abbott P.
Usher); Imperial Russia, 1801—1917; Russian sections of An Encyclopedia
of World History (ed. W. L. Langer); "A Forerunner of Lenin; P. N.
Tkachev,” in The Review of Politics (1944); “Two Types of Russian
Liberalism: Maklakov and Miliukov,” in Continuity and Change in Russian
and Soviet Thought (ed. E. J. Simmons); “Vladimir Soloviev on National-
ism,” in The Review of Politics (1946).
Keep, J. L. H. (1926- ) British historian. Works include “The Decline of the
Zemsky Sobor," in Slavonic and East European Review (December 1957);
"The Regime of Filaret,” ibid. (June 1960); The Russian Revolution; A
Study in Mass Mobilization.
Kennan, George F. (1904- ) American diplomat and historian. Works include
Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920: Russia Leaves the War (Vol. I),
The Decision to Intervene (Vol. II); Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1941;
“Russia and the Versailles Conference,” in The American Scholar (Winter
1960-61); “Soviet Historiography and America’s Role in the Intervention,”
in American Historical Review (January 1960); The Decline of Blsmarcfds
European Order: Franco-Russian Relations, 1875—1890.
Kerner, Robert J. (1887-1956) American historian. Works include Northeastern
Asia: A Selected Bibliography; Slavic Europe: A Selected Bibliography; The
Urge to the Sea: The Course of Russian History.
Khodsky, Leonid Vladimirovich (1854-1918) Russian economist Works include
Osnovy gosudarst vennogo khoziaistva; Poiiticheskaia ckonomiia v sviazi s
finansami; Pozemelnyi kredit v Rossii i otnoshenie ego k krestianskomu
zemlevladeniiu.
Khromov, Pavel Alekseevich (1907- ) Soviet economic historian. Works include
Ekonomicheskoe razvitie Rossii v XIX-XX vekakh; Ocherki ekonomiki
feodalizma v Rossii; Ocherki ekonomiki Rossii perloda monopolisticheskogo
kapitaiizma; Ocherki ekonomiki tekstilnoi promyshlennosti SSSR,
Kirchner, Walther (1905- ) German-American historian. Works include The His-
tory of Russia; Eine Rase durch Sibcrien ini achtzehnten Jahrhmd&U Die
IBLlOORAf flV
605
Fahrt des svhwetzer Doktors Jakob Frit: Tht Rise o} the Baltic Question
kiuvettcr Aleksandr Aleksandrovich (1366-1933) Russian historian Works include
Corodoute poloihenle Ekateriny II IstorJchesLIe oehtrkl Istorleheskle
olkltkl Ha ruhejie thukh staff til Vospomlnanlla ISS]~J9S4 Posodskala
obshcMn a v Root? v XV /II it Chapters in Hisrolre de Rustle (cd 1* N
Mil ukov C- Seignobos and L. Eisenmatm 3 vols > “Vnulrennlata pohtlkn
v tsarstvovanle H kolaia Pavlovlcha," in I start ta Rossrl Iv A/V ve/e
Vet I
Kline George L. C 1921- ) American specialist In Russian philosophy nnd cul
tur« Works include So\ta Education (ed ) ipfnoza In Russian Philosophy
(ed ) “Recent Soviet Philosophy ” in The Annals of the American Academy
of PfllWml and Social Science (January 195$) “Russia a Lacking School
System" in The New Leader (March 16 1959) Philosophy Ideology
and Pol cy in the Soviet Union" In Tice Review of Politics (April 1964)
Economic Crime ami Punishment," in Sur iey (October 1963)
Kluchevsky (Klyuchevsky) Vasilu Osipovich (1341-1911) Russian historian Works
Include Bolarsknta duma dremei Rusi I slot Ha sotloill v Rossll Kurs rut
skol htorll (S sols ) (Eng. tr A History of ftim/a) Opyty 1 issledovanlla
(3 vots )
Konovalov Sergei (1899 ) Russian British historian former ed itor and frequent
contributor to the Oxford Slavonic Papers
Kostomarov Nikolai lv a novicb (1617-1888) Ukrainian historian Works include
pi a fell russkol tserkvl \ starlnu Deux nationahtis raises IstorklitskU
monografii I IssUdotarma O znachenit V ehkogo Hosgoroda Russka a
istorllo v ^huneopisanilakh ec glavneishikh delatelel (3 sols)
Kovalchenko Ivan Dmitnevleh (1923- ) Soviet historian Works Include Rut
skoe kre post not krestiansu o v periol polounr YIX ceka
Kovalevsky Maksim Maksimovich (1851-1916) Russian sociologist political seien
till and historian Works include I stoma nashego \remeni Modern Cus
torn* and Ancient Lav. 1 of Russia Oehttk prolskl oih tenth I roivfrlitf semi
t rphjM rnnostl Le regime iconomique de la Rutsle Russian Political In
slltutlons La Russle sociale
Kuchcrov Samuel (1892-1972) Russian American specialist m legal history and
Soviet affairs Works include Courts Lawyers and Trials under tie Last
Three Tsars The Organs of Soxlet Administration of Justice Their History
and Operat an
Langer William 1— (1896- ) American h storian of Europe Works include The
Piplomo cy of Imperialism 1890-7902 (2 vols.) European Alliances and
Alignments 1870-1890 The Franco-Russian Affiance 1690-7894 An
Encyclopedia of M ortd History (ed )
LontrelT George V {1 892- 19S5) Russian American historian Works include Siberia
in the Seventeenth Century A Study in Colonial Administration. Eastward
to Empire (with R A Perce)
Lapulus Gail Warshofiky (1939- ) American political scientist. Works include
IV'omen in four/ Society Equality Development and Social Change
Women in Russia (ed *«h Dorothy Atkinson and Alexander Dalltn)
Lawn ell Harold D (ISO 1 ) Amrriean sociologist and psychologist Work* in
elude JVorfd Politics and Personal insecurity
Lednicki Waclaw (1891 —1967 ) Polish American specialist m Slavic and European
literature Works include Pushkins Bronte Horseman The Story of a
Master puce Russia Poland and the li'ejf Essas s in Ltierary and Cultural
History Russtan Polish Relations Their Historical Cultural and Political
Background
Lemke Mikhail Konstantin ovfeh (1872-1923) Russian historian Works include
606
BLIOGRAPH
Epokha tsenzumykh reform, 1859-1865; Poiitichcskie protsesy; Niko-
laevskie zhandarmy i literature;.
Leontovich (Leontovilsch) , Victor (1902-1960) German historian. Works include
Geschichte ties Liberalismus in Rttssland.
Lewin, Moshe (1921— ) British historian. Works include Russian Peasants and
Soviet Power ; A Study of Collectivization (tr.); "Soviet Policies of Agri-
cultural Procurements Before the War,” in Essays in Honor of E. H. Carr
(ed. Ch. Abramsky).
Liashchenko, Petr Ivanovich (1876-1955) Russian-Soviet economic historian. Works
include Istoriia narodnogo khoziaistva SSSR (Eng. tr. History of the Na-
tional Economy of Russia to the 1917 Revolution)’, Krestlanskoe delo i
poreformennaia zemteustroitelnaia politika; Ocherkl agrarnoi evoliutsii
Rossii; Russkoe zernovoe khozialstvo v sisteme mirovogo khoziaistva; Sot-
sialttaia ekonomiia selskogo khoziaistva (2 vois.).
Liige, Frederic (1911— ) German-American specialist in Soviet education. Works
include Anton Semyonovitch Makarenko : An Analysis of His Educational
Ideas in the Context of Soviet Society; “Impressions of Soviet Education,”
in International Review of Education (1959); “The Soviet School Today,”
in Survey (July 1963); “Lenin and the Politics of Education,” in Slavic
Review (June 1968).
Liubavsky, Matvei Kuzmich (1860-1937) Russian historian. Works include Lektsil
po drevnel russkoi istorii do kontsa shestnadtsatogo veka; Obrazovanie
osnovnol gosudarstvennoi territorii veiikorusskoi narodnosti; Ocherk istorii
LUovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva.
Lord, Robert Howard (1885-1954) American historian of European diplomacy.
Works include The Second Partition of Poland: A Study In Diplomatic
History; “The Third Partition of Poland,” in Slavonic and East European
Review (1925).
Madariaga, Isabel de (1919- ) British historian. Works include Britain, Russia,
and the Armed Neutrality of 1780; Russia in the Age of Catherine the
Great.
Makovsky, D. P. (1899-1970) Soviet Historian. Works include Razvitie tovarno-
denezhnyklt otnoshanii v sclskom khoziastve russkogo gosudarstva v XVI
veke.
Malia, Martin E. (1924— ) American historian. Works include Alexander Herzen
and the Birth of Russian Socialism, 1812—1855; “Schiller and the Early
Russian Left,” in Russian Thought and Politics (“Harvard Slavic Studies,”
Vol. IV); “What Is the Intelligentsia?” in The Russian Intelligentsia (cd.
R. Pipes); Comprendre la Revolution russe.
Maiozemoff, Andrew Alexander (1910-1954) American historian. Works include
Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881— 1 904, with Special Emphasis on the
Causes of the Russo-Japanese War.
Marchenko (Martschenko), Vasilii Pavlovich (1900- ) Soviet-Canadian econo-
mist- Works include Osnovnye cherty khoziaistva poslcsealinskoi epokhi, tn
Isslcdovaniia i matcriaiy of the Institute for the Study of the USSR (1959).
Markov, Vladimir (1920- ) American specialist on Russian language and litera-
ture. Works include “Unnoticed Aspect of Pasternak’s Translations,” tn
Slavic Review (October 1961).
Mathewson, Rufus W., Jr. (1918-1978) American specialist in Russian literature.
Works include The Positive Hero in Russian Literature; ‘"The Hero and
Society: The Literary Definition, 1855-1865, 1934-1939,” in Continuity and
Changes in Russian and Soviet Thought (ed. E. J. Simmons); The Sovie
Hero as the Literary Heritage,” in American Slavic and East European
Review (December 1953).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
607
Maynard Sir John Herbert <1865-1943) British historian Worts Include Russia In
Ftar Before October (abrideed <t* Russia In Flux) The Russian Peasant
onJ Other Studies
Mazon Andri (1881-1967) French specialist in Russian language and literature
Works include Le Sfovo etlgor
MenshUlkm Boris Nikolaevich (1874—1938) Russian -Soviet historian of science
Works Include Mikhail Vastlcikh Lomonosoi (Eng tr Russia's tame-
nosov Chemist Courtier Physicist Poet)
Merezhkovsky Dmitri Sergeevich (1863-1941) Russian writer and critic Works In
elude Gogol ( short Issledatanle
Miakotln Venedikt Aleksandrovich (1867-1937) Russian h stortan Works Include
Ocher kt sotsialnol Isiorh Ukralny v XVIl-XVHl vv (3 sols in 1) froro-
pop Aviakum ego thlzn I delatelnost Blograftcheskll oeherk Chapters In
Htstoire de Rustle (ed P N Miliukov C Seignobos, and L. Eisenmann
3 Vols.)
Miliukov Pavel Nikolaevich (1859-1943) Russ an historian and statesman Work*
Include CItnnye teehenlia russkol Utortchcskol mysU (Eng summary “The
Chief Currents of Russian Historical Thought " in The American Historical
Association Annual Report for 1904) Gosm/arriiennor Dioriafirvo Ross II
v pervol thetiern XVII! stoletlia t reforma Petra Vehkogo Iltstolre ife
Rutsle (with C Seignobos L. Eisenmann and other* 3 sots ) I* Istonl
ruttkol Intelhgentsll (Fr ver*ton Le mou\ ement Intrllectutl rime) Ocherkl
pa Istonl russkol kuliury (4 vol* ) (partial Eng tr Outlines of Russian
Culture partial Ft Tr Etsais sur I hlstotre de h chi isatlon raise) Russia
and Its Crisis Spornyc \oprosy flnansosol Isiorll moskovskogo gosudarstvo
Milosz, Czeslaw (1911- } Polish American poet, writer and specialist in Slavic
1 terature Work* include The Captne Mind
Mironenko lurii Pavlovich (1909- ) Soviet German specialist on the Soviet
Union Works Include “K voprosu o dinamike nasclenua Sovetikogo Sovuza
» 1939 po 1936 god “ in Vcstnlk Instltuta pa Uuchenllu SSSR (19J6)
Mirsky (Svlaiopolk Mirsky) Dmitrn Petrovich (1890-1938) Russian Bdtish hit*
tonan ol Russian literature Works include Contemporary Russian Lttera
tare 1631-1925 A History of Russian Literature from Its Beginnings to
1900 (ed Francis J Whitfield) A History of Russian Literature from I he
Earliest Times to the Death of Dostoei sky Russ a A Social History
Mostly Ph lip Edward (1905-1972) American historian and political scientist Works
include The Kremlin and World Politics Russian Diplomacy and the Open
mg of the Eastern Question In ISJS and 1839 Russia Since Stalin (ed )
Muratov P#vel Pavlovich (1881-1950) Russian French art historian Works include
L ancle nne print tire tuste Les leones tosses
Nabokov Vladimir V (1899-1977) Russian American writer Works include Nik olal
Gogol
Nicolaevsky Bon* 1 (1889-1966) Russian American specialist in the Russian revo-
lutionary movement and the USSR Work* include Azeff the Russian
Judos Forced Labor In the Soi let Union (with D 3 Dallrn)
Nolde Bart* £ (1876-1948) Russian French historian and legal scholar Work* In
elude L alliance fronco-rutse Les orlgtnes du syst/me diplomatique eTaiant
guerre Lemeien regime el la rfiotunon russt La formation de l empire
ruue (2 vol* ) Ocherkl russkogo gosudarstvennogo prat a Russia In she
Economic II ar VncshnUda pohtllo
Nosov Nikolai Evgenievich (1923- ) Soviet historian V orks include Ocherkl
pa htorll mestnogo uprovlrnila russkogo gosudarstva perxol polovlny XVI
veto
Obnorsky Sergei Petrovich (1888-1962) Soviet philologist and historian of liter*
608
GRAPH
ture. Works include Khrestomatiia po istorii russkogo iazyka ; Kultura rus-
skogo iazyka; Ocherki po istorii russkogo litcraturnogo iazyka star she go
perioda.
Obolensky, Dimitrii (1918— ) British historian. Works include “Russia’s Byzan-
tine Heritage,” in Oxiord Slavonic Papers (1950); “Byzantium, Kiev and
Moscow: A Study in Ecclesiastical Relations,” in Dumbarton Oaks Papers
(1957); The Byzantine Commonwealth.
Oganovsky, Nikolai Petrovich (1874- ) Russian economist. Works include
Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v sviazi s mirovym; Selskoc khoziaistvo Rossii
i' dvadtsatom veke.
Okun, Semen Bentsionovfch (1908-1972) Soviet historian. Works include Ocherki
istorii SSSR: Konels XVIH-pervaia chetvert XIX veka ; Ocherki istorii
SSSR: Vtoraia chetvert XIX veka; Rossi isko-Amcrikanskaia Kompaniia
(Eng. tr. The Russian -A merican Company).
Pares, Sir Bernard (1867-1949) British historian. Works include The Fall of the
Russian Monarchy; A History of Russia; My Russian Memoirs; Russia.
Pavlov-Silvansky, Nikolai Pavlovich (1869-1908) Russian historian. Works include
Feodallzm v drevnei Rusi; Fcodalizm v udclnoi Rust; Gosudarevy sluzhilye
Itudl: Proiskliozdenie russkogo dvorianstva; Ocherki po russkoi istorii
XVUI-XIX vv.
Pavlovsky, Georgii Alekseevich (1887- ) Russian-British agrarian historian.
Works include Agricultural Russia on the Eve of the Revolution.
Pipes, Richard E. (1923- ) American historian. Works include The Formation
of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923; Karamzin’s
Memoir on Ancient and Modern Russia: A Translation and Analysis;
Social Democracy and the St. Petersburg Labor Movement, 1885-1897;
"Karamzin’s Conception of the Monarchy,” in Harvard Slavic Studies
(1957); “The Russian Military Colonies,” in Journal of Modern History
(1950); The Russian Intelligentsia (ed.); Revolutionary Russia led.);
Struve: Liberal on the Left, 1870-1905; Russia Under the Old Re-
gime, Struve; Liberal on the Right, 1905-1944; U.S.-Soviet Relations in the
Era of Ddtente.
Platonov, Sergei Feodorovich (1860-1933) Russian historian. Works include Boris
Godunov (Fr. tr. Oorts Godounov, tsar de Russle, 1598-J60S ); Lektsii po
russkoi istorii (Fr. version Histoire de Russie ); Moskva i zapad v XVI-
XVU vekakh (Eng. tr. Moscow and the West) Ocherki po Istorii smuty v
moskovskom gosudarstvc XVI- XVII vv ; Petr Velikii, lichnost i deiatel-
nost; Smutnoe vremia: Sotsialnyi krizis smutnogo vremeni (Eng. tr. Time
of Troubles: A Historical Study of the Internal Crisis and Social Struggle
in 16th and 17th Century Muscovy); "Ivan Grozny! v russkoi istoriografii,"
in Russkoe proshloc, Vol. I. >
Pogodin, Mikhail Petrovich (1800-1875) Russian historian and Right-wing intel-
lectual. Works include Isslcdovaniia, zamcchaniia i lektsii o russkoi istorii
(7 vols.).
Pokrovsky, Mikail Nikolaevich (1868—1932) Russian-Soviet historian. Works include
Dekabristy : Sbornik statei; Diplomaliia i voiny tsarskoi Rossii v XIX
stoletii; Istorichcskaia nauka i borba klassov (2 vols,); Ocherk istorii russkoi
kultury; Russkaia istorichcskaia literatura v klassovom osveshchenii (2 vols.)
(ed.); Russkaia istoriia s drevneishikh vremen (5 vols.) (abridged Eng. tr.
History of Russia from the Earliest Times to the Rise of Commercial
Capitalism, 2 vols.); Russkaia istoriia v samom szhaiom ocherke (2 vols.)
(Eng. tr. Brief History of Russia, 2 vols.).
Poliansky, Fedor Iakovlevich (1907- ) Soviet historian. Works include Eko-
nomichcskii stroi martufaktury v Rossii XV1I1 veka; Istoriia narodnogo
BIBLIOGRAPHY
609
khotlalsrva SSSR Penonechatnot nakopteme kaphcla v Rossh Remeslo v
Rossii XVIII \eka
Policvktov Mikhail Aleksandrovich 0872-1946) Russian historian Work* include
Baltlhkll \oprn « v Hasten pohttke Nikolai I Blogrofila I ob^or tSarstvo-
Prcsmakov Aleksandr Evgenievich (1870-1929) Russian h dorian Works include
Knlazhoe prcvo v drexnrl Rust ocherh po tsiorh X Xll stoUtlla L ekltll
pa russkol ktoril Mei sltua Pm Moskovskoe tsarstvo Obraoovanic yellko-
russkogo gosujarstsa ocherkl po worn \ll A V stole til (Eng tr without
notes. The Formation of the Great Russ tun State')
PrtselVov Mikhail Dimmest h (1881-1941) Russian Sosiel historian Works include
OcherAil po <str kox no-pahtichesloi tsioeli hevskoi Rust X Yfl vs
Prokopovich Sergei Nikolaevich (1871-19J5) Russ an American economic historian.
Works include Krestlanskoe khojalstx o Narodnoe khodalstxo SSSR (Fr
tr Wstolre fconomtqite tie I URSS )
Purj ear Vernon J (1901 1970) American historian of European diplomacy Works
include England Ri ssla and the Straits Question 1844-1856 International
Economies and Diplomacy in the Near East A Study of British Commercial
Policy In the Levant 1834 1853 Napoleon and the Dardanelles
Radley Oliver Henry (1909- ) American historian Works include T he Agrarian
Foes of Be>lshe\Dm The Promise and Default of the Russian Social st Revo-
lutionaries fir Sickle under the Hammer Tie Russian Socialist Rtxofu
nonaries (n the Early Months of Sonet Rule The Elections to the Russian
Constituent Assembly o/ 1917 Chernov and Agrarian Socialism before
1918" in Continuity and Change In Russian and Soviet Thought (ed
E J Simmons) The Unknown Civil War In Soi ct Russia A Study of the
Green Movement in the Tamkov Region 1920-1921
Raeff Marc (1923- ) American historian Works include Michael Speransky
Statesman of Imperial Russia Siberia and the Reform of 1822 Origins of
the Russian Intelligentsia. The £./g(uffn//i-Cen/ury Nobility Imperial
Russia 1682-1825 The Coming of Age of Modern Russia
Rieber Alfred J <1931- ) American historian Works include The Politics of
Autocracy Letters of Alerander II to Prince A T Bariatinsky 1851-1864
(ed ) Merchants and Entrepreneurs in Imperial Russia
Robinson, Gcroid Tanquary (1892-1971) American historian Works Include Rural
Russia under the Old Regime
Rogger Hans ( 1923- ) American historian Works include National Conscious
ness In Eighteenth Century Russia “Russian Minuters and the Jewish Ques
tion 1881-1917 " m California Slavic Studies (197S)
RostovUeff Mikhail I (1870-1932) Russian American historian of the ancient
world Works Include Iranians and Greeks In South Russia “South Rossfa
in Ihe Prehistoric and Classical Period “ In American Historical Review
(January 1921)
Rozhkov Nikolai Aleksandrovich (1868 J927) Russ ismSov let historian Works in
elude Agrarnyl vopros v Ross i f ego reshente v programmakh ratltchnykh
par In Gorod l derex nla » russkot Istorli Ob’or russkoi Istoril s sotsiolog-
tcheskol tochkl zrenlia Russkaia tstorlla (12 vols ) “Efconomfchesipe
razviue Rossii v petvoi pol ovine XIX veka" and Fmansovala reforms
Rank tins I stoma Rossii v XI \ veke Vol I
Russell Bertrand Earl (1872-1970) British philosopher Works include Bofshevlwt
Practice and Theory A History of Western Philosophy
Rybakov, Bone Aleksandrovich (1908- ) Soviet historian. Works include Isforila
kultury drevnel Rusl Obra-ovanle drevnerusskogo godsudarstva Rtmesfo
drevnci Rusi ; “Predposylki obrazovaniia drevnerusskogo gosudarstva,” in
Ocherki istorii SSSRII1-IX vv,- Gerodotova Skifiia.
Ryndzlunsky, Pavel Grigorievich (1909- ) Soviet historian. Works include
Gorodskoe grazhdanstvo doreformennoi Rossii; Utverzhdenie kapUaiiuna
v Rossii, 1850—1880 g.
Savelev (Saveliev) Pavel Stepanovich (1814-1859) Russian numismatist and his-
torian. Works include Mukltammedanskaia numizmatika v otnoshenii k
russkoi istorii.
Schapiro, Leonard (1908- ) British historian and political scientist. Works in-
clude The Communist Party of the Soviet Union; The Origins of the
Communist Autocracy: Political Opposition in the Soviet State, First Phase,
1917—1922; Rationalism and Nationalism in Russian Nineteenth-Century
Political Thought .
Schiemann, Theodor (1847—1921) German historian. Works include Geschichte
Russlands unter Kaiser Nikolaus 1 (4 vols.).
Schilder (Sbilder), Nikolai Karlovich (1842-1902) Russian historian. Works include
Impcrator Aleksandr Pervyi, ego zhizn i tsarstvovanle (4 vols.); Imperator
Nikolai Pervyi, ego zhizn i tsarstvovanle (2 vols.).
Schldzer, August Ludwig von (1735-1809) German historian who worked in Russia.
Works include Nestor: Russische Armalen in Hirer slavonlschen Grurtd-
sprache vergllchen, ubersetzt und crkldrt von A. L. Schldzer; Tableaux de
I'histolre dc Russia; Probe r us shelter Annalen.
Schuman, Frederick L. (1904- ) American political scientist. Works include
Russia since 1917 ; Four Decades of Soviet Politics; Soviet Politics at Home
and Abroad.
Semevsky, Vasiiii Ivanovich (1848-1916) Russian historian. Works include Krestiane
v tsarstvovanle imperaxritsy Ekateriny 11; Krestianskil vopros v Rossii v
XVIll i pervoi polovine XIX veka (2 vols.); Obshchestvennye dvizheniia v
Rossii v pervttiu polovinu XIX veka (with V. I. Bogucharsky and P. E.
Shchegolev) ; PoUticheskle i obshchestvennye idei dckabrislov.
Seton-Watson, Hugh (1916- ) British historian. Works include The Decline of
Imperial Russia, 1855-1914; The East European Revolutions; Eastern
Europe Between the Wars, 1918-1941; From Lenin to Khrushchev; The
Russian Empire, 1801-1917.
Shakhmatov, Aleksei Aleksandrovich (1864-1920) Russian specialist in Slavic lan-
guages and literature. Works include Drevncishiia sudby russkogo plemcni;
Razyskaniia o drevneishikh russkikh leropisnykh svodakh; Povest vremen-
nykh let : Vvodnaia chast, Tckst, Primechanlia; "Povest vremennykh let"
i ee istochniki.
Shchnpov, Afanasii Prokofevich (1830-1876) Russian historian. Works include
Russkii raskol staroobriadstva, rassmatri vaemyi v sviazf s vnutrennim so-
stoianiem russkoi tserkvi i grazhdanstvennosti v XVII veke i pervoi polovine
XVIll; Sotsialno-pedagogicheskie usloviia umstvennogo razvitiia russkogo
naroda.
Shcherbatov, Mikhail Mikhailovich (1733-1790) Russian historian. Works include
Istoriia Rossiiskaia ot drevneishikh vremen (7 vols.); Kratkaia povest o
byvshikh v Rossii samozvantsakh; O povrezhdenii nravov v Rossii.
Simmons, Ernest Joseph (1903-1972) American historian and specialist in Russian
literature. Works include Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet
Thought (ed.); Dostoevsky: The Making of a Novelist; Leo Tolstoy; An
Outline of Modern Russian Literature; Pushkin; Through the Glass of
Soviet Literature; Views of Russian Society (ed.). _
Slepov, Lazar Andreevich (1905- ) Soviet journalist. Works include ‘Collectiv-
ity Is the Highest Principle of Party Leadership," in Prayda, reprinted in
A Documentary History of Communism (ed. R. V. Daniels).
B 1 B L I O 0 R A P H Y
611
Sotovev (Soloviev). Sergei Mikhailovich (1820-1879) Russian historian Wort* in-
clude Islorha otnoshenll mezhdu russllml knlazlaml Riurlkova dama,
I sterna Res si l * drevnelshikh \ remen (29 vols )
Soloveytcbik. (Solovclchik), George M dc (1902- ) Russian British author
Works include Potemkin Soldier, Statesman, Lover, end Consort of
Catherine of Russia
Sorokin, Pitinrn a ( 1889-1968) Russian- American sociologist Works include
Russia and the United Slates So\ remennoe sostolanle Rossti
Steinberg Isaac Nachman (1888-1957) Russian political figure and intellectual
Works include Or fevrafia po ofctfafcr 1917 g (Eng version In the Work'
shop of the Resolution)
Stender Petersen Adolph (1893-1963) Danish philologist and historian of litera-
ture Works include Geschichte der russlsehen Uteralur Slat tseh german-
Isehe Ortkunder Hint Siudtc Cher die SI re sir n germanlschen Lthn «
wdrter Im Slavhehen In sproch and kulturgeschlchlheher Beleuchtung Die
l arSgersage nil Quelle der altrUtshchen Chronlk (Acfa ] utlarul tea VI 1),
Varangtca
Steppun Fedor Avgustovich (1884-1965) Russian German intellectual historian
Works include “Die dcutschc Romantik und die GeschichtsphUosophie der
Slavophilcn." in Logos (1927), “Ncmctakii romantism i nisskoe at avia no-
filstvo" in Russkata M\xl (March 1910)
Stokes Antony Derek (1927- ) British historian Work* include “The Status of
the Russian Church 988-1037’ in Slavonic and East European Reilew
(June 1959) “Tmutanikan " ibid (June 1960)
Struve Gleb (1898- ) Russian American specialist in Russian literature Works
include Russkala llteratura v Wnonii Russian literature tinder Lenin and
Stalin 1917-1953
Sumner, Benedict Humphrey (1893-1931) British historian Works include Peter the
Creal and the Emergence of Russia Peter the Great and the Ottoman
Empire Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880 A Short llistorw of Russia
Tarle Evgenu Viktorovich (1874-1955) Russian-Soviet historian Works Include
Evropa v epokhu Imperlallzma 1871-1918 gg Kontlnentalnnla Blokada,
Krymskaia \otna (J vols ) Nttshestvte Kapaleona na Rossllu v 1812 godu
(Eng tr Napoleon j Invasion of Russia In 1812), Ochcrkt i kharakterutlkl
lc tslorll tvropelskago obsfiehesltennago d\ liheniia v XIX self Severnaia
soma I shvedskoe nashestvle na Rossiiu Concerning the revising oC Tarle s
study of Napoleons invasion of Russia mentioned in the teat see Ann K.
Erickson, “E V Tarle the Career of a Historian under the Soviet Regime,"
The American Slavic end East European Review Vol XIV. No 2 April
1960 pp 202-216
Tatishchev, Vasiln Nikitich (1686-1750) Russian historian Works include fstorlla
Rossihka/a s samykh drevnetshlkh vremen (7 vols )
Tcmperley. Harold W V (IB79-1939) British diplomatic historian Works include
England and the Near East the Crimea The F or? fen Policy of Canning
Thomsen. Vrthem Ludvig Peter (1842-1927) Danish philologist Works Include The
Relations Between Ancient Russia and Scandinavia and the Origins of the
Russian State
Tikhomirov, Mikhail Nikolaevich (1893-1965) Soviet hisionan Works include
Drevnerusskle goroda (Eng tr The Towns of Ancient Rut), Issledovonle
o russkot pravde Brasilia zhdente tektrov, Istochnikov tdenlc tstorll SSSR
{with S A Nikitin), Krestlan xkle I gored site vosstanlta na Rusl XI-XIJI
vv„ Ocher kl tstorll Isrortcheslol naukl v SSSR (ed with others 2 \oU)
"Soslovnoprcd suviteinye ucbxejbdemia (tcmskie sotory) v Rossu XYl
vekn,” in Voprosy islorll (1958)
TimashefT, Nikolai S (1886-1970) Russian American sociologist Works include
612
LIOGR
BY
The Great Retreat: The Growth and Decline of Communism in Russia;
Religion in Soviet Russia, 1917-1942.
Treadgold, Donald W. (1922- ) American historian. Works include The Great
Siberian Migration: Government and Peasant in Resettlement from Emanci-
pation to the First World War; Lenin and His Rivals: The Struggle for
Russia's Future; Twentieth-Century Russia; “Was Slolypin in Favor of the
Kulaks?” In American Slavic and East European Review (February 1955);
The West in Russia and China; Religion and Secular Thought in Modern
Times (Vol. I, Russia, 1472-1917 ).
Trotsky, Leon (Lev Davidovich Bronstein) (1879-1940) Russian revolutionary figure,
Soviet leader, and historian. Works available in many languages include in
English The History of the Russian Revolution (3 vols.); My Life; The
Permanent Revolution: The Revolution Betrayed: What Is the Soviet Union
and Where Is It Going?; Stalin: An Appraisal of the Man and His Influence.
Tucker, Robert C. (1918— ) American political scientist. Works include Stalin as
Revolutionary, 1879—1929: A Study in History and Personality; Philosophy
and Myth in Karl Marx; The Soviet Political Mind; The Marxian Revolu-
tionary Idea; The Great Purge Trial (ed. with S. F. Cohen).
Ukraintsev, N- ( ) Russian military jurist. Works include "Delo Kornilova,”
Novae russkoe stovo (August 12, October 21, and October 28, 1956) (Eng.
tr. ‘‘A Document in the Kornilov Affair,” in Soviet Studies, October 1973,
pp. 283-298).
Ulam, Adam Bruno (1922- ) American political scientist. Works include The
Unfinished Revolution: An Essay on the Sources of Influence of Marxism
and Communism; The New Face of Soviet Totalitarianism; The Bolsheviks;
Stalin: The Man and His Era; Expansion and Coexistence: The History of
Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967; In the Name of the People; Russia’s
Failed Revolutions: From the Decembrists to the Dissidents.
Ullman, Richard H. (1933- ) American historian. Works include Ang!o-So\iet
Relations, 1917—1921 (Vol. I, Intervention and the War; Vol. II, Britan
and the Russian Civil War. November 1918-February 1920; Vol. Ill, Anglo-
Soviet Accord) .
Ustrialov, Nikolai Vasilevich (1890-1930's?) Russian legal scholar. Works include
Na novom etape; Pod znakom rcvoliutsli; “Pntriotica,” in Smena Vekh,
(July 1921).
Vasilev (Vasiliev), Aleksandr Aleksandrovich (1867-1953) Russian-American his-
torian of Byzantium. Works include The Goths in the Crimea; The Russian
Attack on Constantinople in 860.
Venturi, Franco (1914- ) Italian historian. Works include 11 moto decabrista e i
frarclli Poggio; 11 populismo russo (2 vols.) (Eng. tr. Roots of Revolution:
A. History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineieemh-Centmy
Russia) .
Vernadsky, George (1887-1973) Russian-American historian. Works include A His-
tory of Russia (1 vol.); A History of Russia: Ancient Russia (Vol. I),
Kievan Russia (Vol. H), The Mongols and Russia (Vol. 111), Russia at
the Dawn of the Modern Age (Vol. IV); The Tsardom of Moscow, 1547-
1682 (Vol. V, 2 books); The Origins of Russia; " The Death of the Tsarevich
Dmitry; A Reconsideration of the Case,” in Oxford Slavonic Papers,
Vol. V. ,
Vladimirsky-Budanov, Mikhail Flegontovich (1838-1916) Russian legal historian-
Works include Gosudarstvo i narodnae obrazovanie v Rossii s XVII veka
do uchrczhdeniia ministerstv; Gosudarstvo i narodnoc obrazovanie v Rossu
XVlll veka; Obzoristorn russkogo prava.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
613
Von Laue, T H (1916- ) American historian Work* Include Sergei Wme and
the Industrialization of Russia Why Lenin ’ Why Stalin’, The Global City
Vo)«, Arthur (1889- ) American art historian Works include 7 he Mpteon
Kremim lu History, Architecture, and Art Treasures. Russian Architecture
Trends In Nationalism arid Modernism, The Art and Architecture of Medi-
ft al Russia
Walsh, Warren B { 1909- ) American historian Works Include Russia and the
Soviet Union Reading In Russian History led ), “Political Parties In the
Russian Dumas, 1 ' m /ournof ef Modern History (June 1950)
Webb, Sidney (1859-1947) and Beatrice (1858-1943) Lord and Lady Passf.eld
British writers and Fabian socialists Works include Soviet Communism
A Ne*> ci\ tlhatiOh The Truth About So Wet Has pa
Weidle, Wladimir (1895-1979) Russian-French historian of art and culture Work*
include La Rutste absente tt prtsente (Eng. lr Russia Absent and Present),
"Some Common Traits in Early Russian and Western Art" in Or lord
Slavonic Papers Vol IV
Wipper (Vipper), Robert lurevich (1859-1954) Russian-Soviet historian Works in-
clude /mn Grozny! (Eng tr /van Grozny)
Zaionchkovsky, Petr Andreevich (1904- ) Soviet hntonan. Works Jnclod?
Omena Ircpoitnopo pr a va a Rossii (Eng. tr The Abolition of Serfdom I rt
Russia) Prmtdeme v e/nzn kresttanskoi reformy 1861 g, Voennye reformy
1860-1870 godos \ Rotsh Kmis somoderzhat ha no rubejhe J870-I880
godov (Eng. tr The Russian Autocracy In Crisis, 1S78-I3&2), Rossuskoe
somoderthauc v kontse XIX stoletua (Eng tr The Russian Autocracy
under Alexander lit), Samoderzhavie t russkaia ornlia na rubezhe XIX'XX
stoletn 1681-1903
Zenkovsky, Serge A (1907- ) Russian American historian Works include Pan-
Turklsm and Islam In Russia "The Ideological World of the Denisov
Brothers," in Harvard Slavic Studies, Vol III, “The Russian Church
Schism Its Background and Repercussions," in Rtmfan Review (October
1957) , Russloe staroobrladchesn 0 dukhovnyt d'-lzheitlfa semnadtsatgogo
teka
Zimin, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich (1920-1980) Soviet historian Work* include IX
Peresvetov l ego sovremcnnlkl, ocherkl po Istotll russkol obththrstvenno-
poUtleheskoi mysli sereihny XVI veto. Reformy hand Groznogo, ocfierkf
roftmfoo-efconomicfies&ol ( pohllchtskol uforfi Kosstt serejmj XVI seta
Oprichnina ft a na Grotnogo, Rossha tut poroge novogo vremenl ocherkl
politlehtskol Istprh Rosili peroi trttl XVI vela Khotopy na Rust (i
rfmneijhlU) tremrn do kontsa XV veto), “Pripiska k Pskovskomu
Apostolu 1307 Gods l 'Slovo o polku Igoreve,*" in Rnnkaia Urereiiira
(1966), “Spornye voprosy tekstologu ‘Zadomhchmy,’ " in Russkaia Utera-
tura ((967)
Z9-S#*iu»2 j a
APPENDIXES
615
(HIOKOW U"»>
X: TABLE 4
xtngton, D C-. 1981.
A SELECT LIST OF READINGS IN
ENGLISH ON RUSSIAN HISTORY
FROM EARLIEST TIMES TO 1983
A Bibliography and Historiography
American Bibliography of Russian and East European Studies Bloomington, Indiana
Published annually siree 1957
Fisher, H H (Ed.) American Research on Russia Bloomington, Indiana, 1959
Grierson P Boohs on Soviet Russia 1917-1942 London, 1943
Horecky, P (Ed ) Basie Russian Publications A Selected and Annotated Ribliog
ra^ny on Russia and the So\iet Union Chicago and London, 1962
Horecky, p (Ed ) Russia and the Sown Union A Bi&f/ograpluc Guide to Western-
Language Publications Chicago and London. 1965
Hunt, R N (Ed ) Bools on Communism London and New York 1959
Kerner, R. J Slav 1C Europe A Selected Bibliography in the Western European Lan-
guages Cambridge Massachusetts 1918
Maichet K Guide to Russian Reference Bools Hoover Institution. Stinford, 1962
Martianov, N N Books Available in English by Russians and on Russia New York,
I960
Mazour, A G Modern Russian Historiography Princeton, 1958
Miller W W USSR Cambridge England 1961
Motley. C Guide to Research m Russian History Columbus, Ohio 1951
Pierce, R A Soviet Central Asia A Bibliography Part I I5S8-I866 Pori 2 166 7-
1917 Part 3 1917-1966 Berkeley, California Center for Slavic and East
European Studies University of California 1966
Pushkarev, S G (Comp ) Dictionary of Russian Historical Terms from the Eleventh
Century to 1917 Edited by G Vernadsky and R. fisher, Jr New Haven,
1970
Pushkarev, S G A Source Book for Russian History from Early Times to 1917
3 \ois Edited by A Ferguson et al New Haven. 1972
Schulz, H E, and Taylor, S S (Eds ) Whot Mho In the USSR 196 If 1962
Montreal, 1962
Shapiro, D A Selected Bibliography of It orki fit English on Russian History 1801-
1917 New York and London. 1962
Shteppa, K F Russian Historians and the Soviet State New Brunswick, New Jersey,
1962
Szeftel, M Russia before 1917 in Bibliographical Introduction to Legal History and
Ethnology Edited by I Ghssen Brussels, 1966
B Encyclopedias
Flortnsky, M T (Ed ) McGrow Hill Encyclopedia of Russia and the Saiht Union
New York, 1961
Kubijovyi, V , td al (Eds ) Ulroinr A Concise Ency'foprdi'i The Ukrainian Na-
tional Association Vol 1 Toronto, 1963
Utechin, S V Everyman s Concise Encyclopedia of Russia New York, 1961
C Geography and Demography
Chew, A- F An Atlas of Russian History Eleven Centuries of Changing Borders
New Haven. 1970
Cressey, G B So\ let Potentials. A Geographical Appraisal Syracuse, New York,
1962
Cdbert, M Russian History Atlas New York, 1972
€23
Hooson, D. J. The Soviet Union: People and Regions, Belmont, California, 1966.
Jorre, G. The Soviet Union: The Land and Its People. Translated by E. D. Laborde.
London, 1950. Third edition, 1967.
Loritner, F. The Population of the Soviet Union. Geneva, 1946.
D. Nationality Question
Allen, W. E. D. A History of the Georgian People. New York, 1971.
Baron, S. W. The Russian Jew under Tsars and Soviets. New York, 1964.
Becker, S. Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia : Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924.
Cambridge, Massachusetts. 1968.
Chase, T. The Story of Lithuania. New York, 1946.
Chirovsky, N. L. Old Ukraine : Its Socio-Economic History Prior to 1781. Madison,
New Jersey, 1963.
Dmytryshyn, B. Moscow and the Ukraine, 1918-1953. New York, 1956.
Doroshenko, D. History of the Ukraine. Edmonton, Alberta, 1941.
Dubnow, S. M. History of the Jews in Russia and Poland. 3 vols. Philadelphia, 1916.
Greenberg, L. S. The Jews in Russia, 2 vols. New Haven, Connecticut, 1944, 1951.
Grousset, R. The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia. Translated by
N. Walford. New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1970.
Halecki, O. A History of Poland. New York, 1943.
Hrushevskyi, M. A History of the Ukraine. New Haven, Connecticut, 1941.
Kazemzadeli, F. The Struggle for Transcaucasia, 1917-1921. New York and Oxford,
England, 1951.
KubijovyS, V„ et al. (Eds.) Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia. The Ukrainian Na-
tional Association. Vol. I. Toronto, 1963.
Lang, D. M. A Modem History of Georgia. London, 1962,
Nelbandian, L. The Armenian Revolutionary Movement. Berkeley, 1967.
Pierce, R. A. Russian Central Asia, 1867-1917: A Study in Colonial Rule. Berkeley,
1960.
Senn, A. R. The Emergence of Modern Lithuania. New York, 1959.
Sullivant, R. S. Soviet Politics and the Ukraine, 1917-1957. New York, 1962.
Tamils, A. N. Soviet Policy toward the Baltic States, 1918-1940. Notre Dame, Indi-
ana, 1959.
Thaden, E. C. (Ed.) Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland. Princeton,
1981.
Vakar, N. Belorussia: The Making of a Nation. Harvard, 1956.
Wheeler, G. The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia. London. 1964.
Zenkovsky, S. A. Pan-Turklsm and Islam in Russia. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1960.
E. General Histories
Auly, R., and Obolensky, D. (Eds.) An Introduction to Russian History. Vol. I.
Companion to Russian Studies. Cambridge, England, 1976.
Cbarques, R. A Short History of Russia. London, 1959.
Clarkson, J. A History of Russia. New York, 1961.
Florinsky, M. T. Russia: A History and an Interpretation. 2 vols. New York, 1953.
Harcavc, S. Russia: A History. Chicago, 1956.
Klyucbevsky (Kliucievsky), V. O. Course of Russian History. Translated by C. J.
Hogarth. 5 vols. New York, 1911-31.
Miliukov, P., Seignobos, C., Eisenmann, L., et al. History of Russia. Translated from
French, by C. L. Markmann. 3 vols. New York, 1968.
Pares, B. A History of Russia. London, 1926.
Pipes, R. E. Russia Under the Old Regime. New York, 1974.
Pokrovsky, M. N. Brief History of Russia. 2 vols. London, 1933,
Sumner, B. H. Survey of Russian History. London, 1944.
READINGS IN ENGLISH ON RUSSIAN HISTORY 625
Vernadsky. G A History of Russia New Haven, Connecticut 1919 Fifth revised
edition, 1961
Vernadsky, G., and Karpovich, M A History of Russia.
I Ancient Russia New Haven. Connecticut 1943
II Cretan Russia J94g
III The Mongols and Russia 1953
IV Russia at the Dawn of tht Modern Age 1959
V Tsardom of Moscow 1547-1632 1969 (2 books)
F Specialized Histories and Interpretative Ft says
Avnsh, P Russian Rebels I6O0-IS0O New York, 1972
BdUngton, I Tht Icon and the Ate An Interpretative Kitten of Russian Culture
New York, 1966
Black, C. et al The Modernization of Japan and Russia New York 1975
Blum, I Lord and Peasant in Russia from the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century
Princeton, New Jersey, 1961
Bulgakov, S N The Orthodox Church New York and London 1935
Chermavsky, M Tsar and People Studies In Russian Myths New Haven Con
necticut 1961
Chyihevskyi D History of Russian Literature from the Eleventh Century to the End
of the Baroque New York and The Hague 1960
Pennell, I , and Stokes A EarN Russian Literature Berkeley and Los Angeles 1974
Gasiorowska X The Image of Peter the Great in Russian Fiction Madison Wis
cousin 1979
Gerschenlron A Continuity In History and Other Essays Cambridge Maswhu
setts 1968
Gerschenkron A Europe in the Russian Mirror Four Lectures In Economic History
Cambridge Massachusetts 1970
Grey, 1 The Romanov i The Rise and Fall of a Dynasty Garden City, New York,
1970
Hans, N History of Russian Educational Policy 1701-19 17 London 1931
Hans N Thr Russian Tradition m Education London 1963
Hasthausen, A von The Russian Empire Its People Institutions and Resources
Translated by Robert Farie New York, 1970
Hingley, R The Russian Secret Police Muscovite imperial Russian and Soviet To-
llttca! Security Operations 1565-1970 New York 1970
Huncxak, T (Ed.) Russian Imperialism from Ivan the Great to tht Revolution New
Brunswick, New Jersey, 1974
Jswolsky, H Christ in Russia The History Tradition end Life of the Russian Church
Milwaukee, 1960
Kerner, R J The Urge to the Sea The Course of Russian History New York,
1971
Lamzeff G V and Pierce, R. A Eastward to Empire Montreal and London 197J
Lappo-Damfevsfcy, A. S “The Development of Science end Learning in Russia “ 10
Rumen Reofftiri and Problems Edited by J D D\s5 Cambridge, England,
1917
Leonard R A History of Russian Music London, 1956
Liashchcnko PI A History of the National Economy of Russia to the 1917 Revolu-
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Lincoln, IV B The Romanovs Autocrats of All the Russias New York. 1981
LcmgftOrth. P The Cossacks Five Centuries of Turbulent Life on she Russian
Steppes New York, 1970
J-Dssky, N O History of Russian Philosophy New York, 1951
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Masaryk, T. G. The Spirit of Russia. Translated from German 3 vols. New York
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Miliukov, P. N. Outlines of Russian Culture. Edited by M. Karpovich. Translated
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Miliukov, p. N. Russia and Its Crisis. Chicago, 1905.
Mirsky, D. S. A History of Russian literature. New York, 1927.
Mirsky, D. S. Russia: A Social History. London, 193 1.
Obolensky, D. The Byzantine Commonwealth. New York, 1971.
Pokrovsky, M. N. Russia in World History: Selected Essays. Ediied by Raman
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Rice, T. T. Russian Art. London, 1949.
Schmemann, A. The Historical Road of Eastern Orthodoxy. New York, 1963.
Soloviev, A. V. Holy Russia: The History of a Religious-Social Idea, New York,
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Thaden, E. C. Russia since I80J: The Making of a New Society. New York, 1971.
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Ulccbin, S. V. Russiati Political Thought: A Concise History. New York and London,
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Vinogradoff, P. Self-Government in Russia. London, 1955.
Volin, L. A Century of Russian Agriculture: From Alexander 11 to Khrushchev.
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Vucinich, A. S. Science in Russian Culture: A History to I860. Stanford, 1963.
Vucinich, A. S. Science in Russian Culture ( 1861-1917 ). Stanford, 1970.
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Zenkovsky, V. V. A History of Russian Philosophy. 2 vols. New York, 1953.
G. Collected Essays
Atkins, D., Dallin, A., and Lapidus, G. W. (Eds.) Women in Russia. Stanford, 1977.
Black, C. E. (Ed.) Rewriting Russian History : Soviet Interpretations of Russia's Past.
New York, 1956.
Curtiss, J. S. (Ed.) Essays in Russian and Soviet History in Honor of G. T. Robin-
son. Leiden, 1963.
Ferguson, A. D., and Levin, A. (Eds.) Essays in Russian History: A Collection Dedi-
cated to George Vernadsky. Hamden, Connecticut, 1964.
McLean, H., Malta, M., and Fischer, G. (Eds.) Russian Thought and Politics. (Har-
vard Slavic Studies, IV). Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1957.
Oberiander, E., et al. (Eds.) Russia Enters the Twentieth Century, 1894-1917. Trans-
lated by Gerald Onn. New York, 1971.
Oliva, L. Jay (Ed.) Russia and the West from Peter to Khrushchev. Boston, 1965.
Pipes, R. (Ed.) Revolutionary Russia. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1968.
Pipes, R. (Ed.) The Russian Intelligentsia. New York, 1961.
Rabinowitch, A., Rabi nowitch, I., and Kristof, L. (Eds.) Revolution and Politics in
Russia: Essays in Memory of B. I. Nicoiaevsky. Bloomington, 1972.
Simmons, E. J. (Ed.) Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought. Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, 1955.
Treadgold, D. W. (Ed.) The Development of the USSR: An Exchange of views.
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Trtadgold D W (EG ) Soviet and Chinese Communism Similarities and Differences
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Vucimch W S {Ed ) The Peasant [it Nineteenth Century Russia Stanford 1968
Vttcttueh W S (Ed ) Russia and Asia Essays on the Influence of Russia on the
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Harcavc S Readings In Russian History 2 vots New York, 1962
Page S W (Ed ) Russia In Revolution Selected Readings In Russian Domestic Ills
lory s nee 1855 Princeton 1965
Raeff M (Ed ) Russian Intellectual History An Anthology New York 1966
Riha T Readings in Rim [an Civilization 3 vols Chicago, 1964
Rubinstein A Z (Ed ) The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union New York
1960
Schmemann A Ultimate Questions An Anthology of Modern Russian Religious
Thougl t New York 1965
Senn A E. (Ed ) Readings In Russian Political and Diplomatic History 2 vols,
Homewood Illinois 1966
Walsh W B Readings In Russian Htstorv Syracuse New York, 1959
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Awakum The Life of the Archpriest Awakum by Himself Translated by V
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Baron S II (Ed and Trans) The Travels of Oleartus in Seventeenth-Century
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Cross S H and Sherbovitz Wctzor, O P (Trans and Eds ) The Russian Primary
Chronicle Laurenttan Text Cambridge Massachusetts 1953
Dewey H W “The White Lake Chapter A Medieval Russian Administrative
Statute" Speculum XXXII (1957)
Dmytryshyo B (Ed ) Medieval Russia A Source Bock 900 1700 New York 1967
Esper T (Ed and Trans ) Heinrich \on Stadtn The Land and Government of
Muscovy A Sixteenth-Century Account Stanford 1957
Fedotov G P A Treasury of Russian Spirituality New York, 1948
Fennell J (Ed and Trans.) The Correspondence between Prince A M Kurbsky and
Tsar No* ft' of Russia 1564-1579 with Russian Text New York and
Cambridge England 1955
Fletcher G Of the Russe Commonwealth 1591 Facsimile edition Introduction by
R Pipes Cambridge Massachusetts 1966
Howes R C. (Ed and Trans ) The Testaments of the Grand Princes of Moscow
Ithaca New York 1967
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Royal Historical Society Publicatons Camden Third Senes Vol XXV,
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Palmer W The Patriarch and the Tsar 6 vols. London 1871-76
Vernadsky G (Trans.) Med eta! Russian lows in A P Evans (Ed ) Records of
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Zenkovsky S A Medieval Russian Ep cs Chronicles and Tales New York 1963
8 Special! ed Studies
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Andreyev N “Fflofey and His Epistle to Ivan Vas ijevtch" Slavonic and East Euro-
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Andreyev, N. "Kurbsky’s Letters to Vasyan Muromtsev,” ibid., Vol. XXXIII (1955).
Baron, S. H. Muscovite Russia. London, 1980.
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Cherniavsky, M. "Old Believers and the New Religion,” Slavic Review, Vol. XXV
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Cherniavsky, M. Tsar and People : Studies in Russian Myths. New Haven, Connecti-
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of the Baroque. New York and The Hague, 1960.
Conybearc, F. C. Russian Dissenters. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1921.
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Dewey, H. W. "The 1497 Sudebnik: Muscovite Russia’s First National Law Code,”
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Dunlop, D. M. The History of the Jewish Kliazars. Princeton, 1954.
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Dvornik, F. The Slavs, Their Early History and Civilization. Boston, 1956.
Eckardt, H. Ivan the Terrible. New York, 1949.
Fedotov, O. The Russian Religious Mind. Vol. I Kievan Christianity: The Tenth to
the Thirteenth Centuries. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1946. Vol. II The
Middle Ages: The Thirteenth to the Fifteenth Centuries. Edited by I.
Meycndorff. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1966.
Fennell, J. “The Attitude of the Josephians and the Trans-Volga Elders to the Heresy
of the Judaiscrs,” Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. XXIX (1951).
Fennell, J. The Emergence of Moscow, 1304-1359. Berkeley, 1968.
Fennell, J. Ivan the Great of Moscow, London, 1961.
Florovsky, G. “The Problem of Old Russian Culture,” Slavic Review, Vol. XXI
(March 1962).
Fuhrmann, J. T. The Origins of Capitalism in Russia: Industry and Progress in the
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Chicago, 1972.
Graham, S. Boris Godunov . London, 1933.
Grekov, B. Kiev Rus. Translated from the Russian. Moscow, 1959.
Grey, Inn. Ivan III and the Unification of Russia. New York, 1964.
Hammer, D. P. “Russia and the Roman Law,” The American Slavic and East Euro-
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Hellie, R. Enscrfment and Military Change in Muscovy. Chicago, 1971.
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Slavery," Russian Review (January 1976).
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Kondakov N P The Russian Icon (Translation from the Russian) Oxford 192?
Lantech G Siberia in (he Seventeenth Century A Study 0 f Colonial Admlnlttratlon
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Medlin W K Moscow end East Rome A Political Study of the Relation of Church
and Stale In hluscoute Russia New Vorl and Geneva. J952
Medlin W K and Pat tin el is C G Renats once Influences and Religious Reforms
In Russia Western and Post Byzantine Impaett on Culture and Education
U6th-I7th Centuries) G-neva 1971
Norretranders D The Shaping of Tsardom under fieri Cro ny Copenhagen 1954
Nowak F Medici al Sltndom and the Rise of Russia Newkork 1970
Obolensky D “Byzantium Kiev and Moscow A Study In Ecclej atiical Relations "
Dumbarton Oaks Papers No 11 (1957) Cambridge Massachusetts
Obolensky D Russia i Byzantine Heritage Oxford Slawmc Papers J (|9J0)
O Brien C. B Muscovy and the Ukraine From the Perelosloil Agreement to the
Truce of Andrusovo Berkeley 1963
Paszkiewicz H. Tie Making of the Russian Nation London 1963
Paszkiewicz, H The Origin of Russia London 19J4
Pape R and Romanoff N Ivan tie Terrible New York 1975
Ptltnski J Russia and Ko on Conquest end Imperial Ideology ( 1 d3S~lJ6Cfs) The
Hague and Pans 1974
Platonov S F Moscow and tie HVsf Edited and Translated by J Wieczymki
Hattiesburg Missus ppi 1972
Platonov S F The Time of Troubles a Historical Study of the Internal Crists end
Social Struggle in Sixteenth and Seventeenth-Century Muscovy Translated
by J Alexander Lawrence Kansas, 1970
Pokrovsky M N History of Russ a from tit Earl esi Times to the Rue of Com
merclal Capitalism Translated and edited by j D Clarkson and M R
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Prawdin M The Mongol Empire Its Rise and Legacy Translated from Ibe German
by E. and C Paul New York and London 1940 Second edition 1967
Presniakov A E The Formation of the Ceeat Russian State A Study of Russian
History In the Thirteenth to Fifteenth Centuries Translated by A E. Moor
house Chicago 1970
Ratff M “An Early Theorist of Absolutism Joseph of Volokolamsk” The Amerl
can Slavic and East European Rale* Vol Vlll (1949)
Riasanovsky N V "The Norman Theory of the Origin of the Russian State " The
Russian Review Autumn 1947
Runciman S “Byzantium Russia and Caesaropapism " Canadian Slavonic Papers
Vo! II (1957)
Sevjcnko I “Byzantine Cultural Influences." in C Black (Ed ) Rewriting Russian
History Pnnceton 1962
Scvicnlo I "A Neglected Byzantine Source of Muscovite Ideology" Harvard Slavic
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Soloviev A V Holy Russia The History of a Religious-Social Idea pJe* York
J9J9
Spinka M “Patriarch Nikon and the Subjection of the Russian Church to the Slate "
Church History Vol X (1941)
Stremoukhoff D “Moscow the Third Rome Sources of the Doctrine *• Speculum
1953
Srcftel M “Aspect! of Feudalism in Russian History " in R. Coulborn (Ed )
Feudalism In History Princeton New Jersey 1956
Szcftel M Russian Institutions and Culture up to Peter the Great London 1975
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Thomsen, V. Relations Between Ancient Russia and Scandinavia and the Origins of
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Tikhomirov, M. N. The Towns of Ancient Rus (Translated from the Russian).
Moscow, 1959.
Vasihev, A. A. The Goths in the Crimea. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1936.
Vernadsky, G. Ancient Russia. New Haven, Connecticut, 1943.
Vernadsky, G. Bohdan, Hetman of Ukraine. New Haven, 1941.
Vernadsky, G. Kievan Russia. New Haven, Connecticut, 1948,
Vernadsky, G. The Mongols and Russia. New Haven, Connecticut, 1953.
Vernadsky, G. The Origins of Russia. Oxford, 1959.
Vernadsky, G. Russia at the Dawn of the Modem Age. New Haven, Connecticut
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Vernadsky, G. The Tsardom of Moscmv, 1547-1682. New Haven, Connecticut, 1959.
Voyce, A. The Art and Archiicctttre of Medieval Russia. Norman, Oklahoma, 1967.
Voyce, A. The Moscow Kremlin. Berkeley, 1954.
Voycc, A. Moscow and the Roots of Russian Culture. Norman, Oklahoma, 1964.
Wolff, R. L. ‘‘The Three Romes: The Migration of an Ideology and the Making of
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Zernov, N. St. Sergius, Builder of Russia. London, 1938.
Zernov, N. “Vladimir and the Origin of the Russian Church,” The Slavonic and East
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BarraU, G. R. V. Voices in Exile: The Decembrist Memoirs. Montreal and London,
1974.
Bing, E. J. (Ed.) The Letters of Tsar Nicholas and Empress Marie. London, 1937.
Bock, M. P. von Reminiscences of My Father , Peter A. Stolypin. Edited and trans-
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Buchanan, G. My Mission to Russia. 2 vols. Boston, 192.3.
Bulgakov, S. N. “Heroism and Service: Thoughts on the Religious Character of the
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Bulgakov, S. N. “The Russian Public and Religion,” Russian Review (London),
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Catherine the Great. The Memoirs of Catherine the Great. Edited by D. Maroger.
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Chaadaev, P. The Major Works of Peter Chaadaev. Translated and with commentary
by R. T. McNally. Notre Dame and London, 1969.
Cherniavsky, M. (Ed.) Prologue to Revolution: Notes of A. N. Iakhontov on the
Secret Meetings of the Council of Ministers, 1915. Englewood Cliffs, New
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Chernyshevsky, N. G. What Is To Be Done? New York, 1961.
Dostoevsky, F. M. The Diary of a Writer. Translated by R. Brasol. New York, 1954.
Giers, N. K. The Education of a Russian Statesman: The Memoirs of N. K. Giers.
Edited by C. and B. Jelavtch. Berkeley, 1962.
Golder, F. A. (Ed.) Documents of Russian History, 1914-1917. New York and
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Gurko, V. I. Features and Figures of the Past. Government and Opinion in the aeign
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Izvolsky A P Recollections of a Foreign Minister Garden City New York 1921
Karamzin N M Letters cl a Russian Traveler 17S9-1790 An Ateouns of a Young
Russian Gentlemans Tour through Germany Switzerland France and
England Translated by F Jonas Edited by E Simmons New York 1957
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KokovUC"*, V N Out of My Past Edited by H J1 Fube' Stanford 19)5
Kmchwsky S M (Stepniak) Underground Russia Remludonary Profiles and
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Kropotkin, P A, Memoirs of a Retoluilonlst New York 1899
Kropotkin P A Modern Science and Anarchism London 1913
Kropotkin P A The Stale Its Port in History London, 1898 1943
Lavrcv P Historical Letters Edited and translated by I P Saurian Berkeley 1967
Mikhkov V A Memoirs of V A Staktakov The Tint Jr ate Duma Contemporary
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Muutroff G P (Ed) The Political Philosophy of Bakunin Scftrllfic Anarchism
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Miliukov P Political Memoirs 1905-1917 Edited by A P M‘ndel Aon Arbor
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Pateotogue G An Ambassadors Memoirs 3 vols London 1925
Pares B "Conversations with Mr Stolypm Russian Rnlew (London) Vol II
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Pares B My Russian Memoirs London 1931
Pares B (Ed) Letters of tie Tsaritsa to the Tsar 1914-1916 London 1923
Pobedonostsev K. P Reflections Of a Russian Statesman London 1898
Radisbchev ANA Journey front St Petersburg to Moscow Edited with an intro
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RselT M (Ed ) The Decembrist Movement Englewood Cliff* New Jersey 1966
Rseff M [Ed ) plans for Political Reform In Russia 1730-1 905 Englewood Cldls
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Read H (Ed ) Kropotkin Selections from Ills Writings London 1942
Red da way W P (Ed) Documents of Catherine the Great Cambridge England
1931
Rieber A The Politics of Autocracy Letters of Alexander It to Prince A I
Banatinskll 1857-1864 Parts 1966
Rosen R R Forty Yean of Diplomacy 2 vols New York 1922
Rozanov V V Fallen Leases Translated by S S Koleliansky London, 1920
Rozanov V V Selected B orks Edited by G Ivask New York 1956
Sazonov S D Fateful Years 1 909-1916 New York 1928
Signposts (See Yekhl)
Soloviev V S Lectures on Godmanhood Poughkeepsie 1944 London i^b
S oloviev, V S Russia and the (/nit trial Church Translated by M Rees London
Soloviev, V S A Soloitev Anthology Edited by S L- Frank London. 1950
Soloviev V S War Progress and the End of lllston Translated by A Baksiry
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Tolstoy L. Works Translated by L- and A. Maude 21 vol*- London end New York
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Florinsky, M. T. The End of the Russian Empire. New Haven, Connecticut,
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Harcavc, S. Years of the Golden Cockerel: The Last Romanov Tsars, 1814-1917.
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Karpovich, M. Imperial Russia, 1801-1917. New York, 1932.
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Mavor, J. An Economic History of Russia. 2 vols. New York, 1925.
Maynard, J. Russia In Flux. New York, 1948.
Miliukov, P. Russia and Its Crisis. Chicago, 1905; New York, 1962.
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Pares, B. Russia: Between Reform and Revolution. Edited by F. B. Randall. New
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Vucihich, W. S. (Ed.) The Peasant in Nineteenth Century Russia. Stanford, 1968.
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Emmons, T The Russian Landed Gentry and the Peasant Emancipation of 1861
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Emmons, T (Ed ) Emancipation of the Russian Serfs New Y orfc, 1970
Field. D The End of Serfdom Nobility and Bureaucracy in Russia. 1855-186}
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Gooch, G P Catherine the Great and Other Studies London. 1954
Gronsky, P, and Astrov, N The IKer and the Ru’stan Government New Haven.
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H areas e, S Years of the Golden Cockerel The Lest Roman o\ Tsars, 1814-1917
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Hough, R. A The Fleet That Had to Die New York, 1561
Jones, R E The Emancipation of the Russian h ability, 1762-8} Princeton, 197J
Kennan. <3 Siberia and the Exile System 2 vois New lori 1691
Kovalevsky, M M Russian Political Institutions Chicago, 1902
Kucherov, S Courts, Lawyers and Trials under the Last Thee Tsars Ne* York,
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Levin, A The Second Duma A Study of the Social Democratic rurry and the Russian
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Lincoln, \V B Nicholas I Emperor and Autocrat of Alt the Russia* Bloomington
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M&cKenzie, D The Lion of Tashkent The Career of General W G Chernforv
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Madariaga, L de Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great New Haven and London,
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Miller, F Dimilrll Mihuiin and the Reform Era In Russia Nashville, 1968
Monas, S The Third Section Police and Soviet] under Nicholas I Cambridge Massa-
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Nichols, R. 1_, and StaVTOU, T. G (Eds ) Rwslrr Orthodoxy under the Old Regime
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Orlovsky, D. T. The. Limits of Reform: The Ministry of Internal Affairs in Imperial
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Paleologue, G. M. The Enigmatic Tsar: The Life of Alexander I of Russia. London,
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Raeff, M. Michael Speransky: Statesman of Imperial Russia. The Hague, 1957.
Raeff, M. Siberia and the Reforms of 1822. Seattle, 1956.
Raeff, M. (Ed.) Peter the Great: Reformer or Revolutionary? Boston, 1963.
Rodzianko, M. V. Reign of Rasputin: An Empire's Collapse. New York, 1927.
Rogger, H. "Russian Ministers and the .Jewish Question 1881-1917,” California
Slavic Studies, Vol. VIII (1975).
Ruud, C. A. Fighting Words: Imperial Censorship and the Russian Press, 1804-1906.
Toronto, Buffalo, and London, 1982.
Sinel, A. The Classroom and the Chancellery: State Education Reform in Russia
under Count Dimitrti Tolstoy. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1973.
Soloveytchifc, G. Potemkin: Soldier, Statesman, Lover and Consort of Catherine of
Russia. New York, 1947.
Starr, S. F. Decentralization and Self-Government in Russia, 1830-1870. Princeton,
1972.
Sumner, B. H. Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia. New York, 1962.
Trcadgold, D. W. The Great Siberian Migration: Government and Peasant in Re-
settlement from Emancipation to the First World War. Princeton, 1957.
Troyat, H. Catherine the Great. Translated by J. Pinkham. New York, 1980.
Walkin, I. The Rise of Democracy in Pre-Revolutionary Russia: Political and Social
Institutions under the Last Three Tsars. New York, 1962.
Wortman, R. S. The Development of a Russian Legal Consciousness. Chicago and
London, 1976.
Yaney, G. Systematization of Russian Government: Social Evolution In the Domestic
Administration of Imperial Russia, 1711-1905. Urbana, 1973.
Zaionchkovskii, P. A. The Russian Autocracy under Alexander III. Gulf Breeze,
Florida, 1976.
Zaionchkovskii, P. A. The Abolition of Serfdom in Russia. Gulf Breeze, Florida,
1978.
Zaionchkovskii. P. A. The Russian Autocracy in Crisis, 1878-1882. Gulf Breeze,
Florida, 1979.
Zelnik, R. E. Labor and Society in Tsarist Russia: The Factory Workers of St. Peters-
burg, 1855-1870. Stanford, 1971.
D. Specialized Studies: Foreign Affairs
Barker, A. J. The War Against Russia, 1854-1856. New York, 1971.
Bromley, J. S. (Ed.) The Rise of Great Britain and Russia, 1688-1715/25. (Vol. 6
of The New Cambridge Modern History.) Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1970.
Curtiss, J. S. Russia's Crimean War. Durham, North Carolina, 1979.
Dallin, 0. J. The Rise of Russia in Asia. New Haven, Connecticut, 1949.
Donnelly, A. S. The Russian Conquest of Bashkiria: A Case Study in Imperialism,
1552-1740. New Haven, Connecticut, 1968.
Fay, S. B. The Origins of the World War. 2 vols. New York, 1928.
Fisher, A. W. The Russian Annexation of the Crimea, 1772-1783. Cambridge,
England, 1970.
READINGS IN ENGLISH OK RUSSIAN HISTORY
635
Colder, F A Russian expansion on Ihe Pacific. 164J-IS50 Cleveland, 1914
Jelavieb, B, A Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 1814-1914 Nen York, 1954
Jelavlcfa. B Russia and Greece During the Regency of King Otton, 1B12-I83S
Thessalonika, 1962
Ielavkh, B Russia and the Greek Revolution of 1841 Munich, 1966
Jelavich. B Russia and the Rumanian National Cause 1*56-/859 Bloomraeton
Indiana, 1959 *
lelavich, B, and C. Russia In the East, 1876-1880 Leiden, 1959
Jelavich, C. Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism Russian Influence In the Internal
Affairs of Bulgaria and Serbia 1872-1886 Berkeley, 1958
Kaplan, H. H. The First Partition of Poland New York, 1962
Kerman, G F The Decline of Bismarck's European Order Franco-Russlan Rela-
tions 1875-/890 Princeton, 1979
Longer, \V L The Diplomacy of Imperialism 1898-1902 l vo's New York, 1935
Langer, W L. European Alliances and Alignments 1871-1890 New York. 1950
Longer, W L. The Franco-Russian Alliance 1890-1894 Cambridge, Massachusetts,
1929
Lederer, I (Ed) Russian Foreign Policy Essays In Historical Perspective New
Haven, Connecticut, 1962
Lensen, G A The Russian Push toward Japan Russo Japanese Relations 1697-/875
Princeton, New Jersey', 1959
Lobanov Rostovsky A Russia and Asia Ann Arbor Miwhlgan 1951
Lobanov Rostovsky, A Russia and Europe, J 787-1 825 Durham, North Carolina,
1947
Lobanov Rostovsky, A Russia and Europe, 1825-1878 Ann Arbor, Michigan 1954
Lord, R H The Second Partition of Poland Harvard 191'
Madariaga, 1 de Britain, Russia and the Armed Neutrality of 1780 London, 1962
Madariaga, T de Britain, Russia, and the Armed Neutrality of 1780 Sir James
Harris's Mission to St Petersburg During the American Resolution New
Haven, 1962
Malozemoff, A Runfan Far Eastern Policy 1881-1904 Berkeley 1958
Montesqulou Fezensac, R The Russian Campaign 1812 Translated by L. Kenneth
Athens, Georgia, 1970
Mosety, P Russian Diplomacy and the Opening of the Eastern Question In 1838 and
1839 Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1934
Mossc, W E The European Powers and the German Question 1 848-1 871 Cam-
bridge, England, 1958
Okon, S B The Russian-Amertcan Company Translated from Russian. Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 1951
Pierce, R A Russian Central Asia. 1867-1917 A Study in Colonial Rute Berkeley,
1960
Pierce, R A Russia’s Hawaiian Adventure. J815-1817 Berkeley 1965
Poryear, V J England, Russia end the Straits Question 18/4-ISS6 Berkeley, 1931
Ragsdale, If Ddiente ui the Napoleonic Era Bonaparte and the Russians Lawrence.
Kansas, 1980
Romanov, B Russia In Manchuria 1S92-1906 Translated by S lores Ann Arbor,
Michigan, 1952
Smith, C J. The Russian Struggle /or Power 1914-1917 A Study of Russian Foreign
Policy During the First World War New York, 1956
Sumner, B H Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire Oxford, 1949
Sumner, B H Russia and the Balkans, 1870-1880 Oxford, 19J7.
Sumner, B H Tsardom and Imperialism In the Far East and Middle East 1880-1914
London, 1940
Tarle, E. V. Napoleon's Invasion of Russia. 1812 Translated from the Russian first
edition New York, 1942
636
READ
ENGLISH ON RUS
5TOR
Taylor, A. J. P. The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918. Berkeley, 1931,
Thaden, E. C. Russia and the Balkan Alliance of 1912. University Park, Pennsylvania
1965.
Thomson, G. S. Catherine the Great and the Expansion of Russia. London, 1947.
Warner, D., and Warner, P. The Tide at Sunrise: A History of the Russo-Japanese
War, 1904-1905. New York, 1974.
White, J. A. The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War. Princeton, New Jersey, 1964,
E. Specialized Studies: Economic Development
Ames, E. "A Century of Russian Railway Construction, 1837-1936,” American Slavic
and East European Review. Vol. VI (1947).
Blackwell, W. L. The Beginnings of Russian Industrialization, 1800-1860. Princeton,
New Jersey, 1968.
Gerschenkron, A. “Agrarian Policies and Industrialization, Russia 1861-1917," in
The Cambridge Economic History. Vol. VI, part 2. Cambridge, England,
1966.
Gerschenkron, A “The Early Phases of Industrialization in Russia,” in W. Rostov/
(Ed.) The Economics of Take-Off into Sustained Growth. London, 1963.
Gerschenkron, A. Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 1962.
McKay, J. P. Pioneers for Profit- Foreign Entrepreneurship and Russian Industrializa-
tion, 1885-1913. Chicago, 1970.
Miller, M. S. The Economic Development of Russia, 1905-1914. London, 1926.
Pintner, W. W. Russian Economic Policy under Nicholas I. Ithaca, New York, 1967.
Portal, R. “The Industrialization of Russia," in The Cambridge Economic History.
Vol. VI, part 2. Cambridge, England, 1966.
Rieber, A. J. Merchants and Entrepreneurs in Imperial Russia. Chapel Hill, 1982.
Rozman, G. Urban Networks in Russia, 1750-1800, and Premodern Periodization.
Princeton, 1976.
Tugan-Baranovsky, M. I. The Russian Factory in the 19th Century. Translated by
A. Levin, C. Levin, and G. Grossman. Homewood, Illinois, 1970.
Von Laue, T. H. “Russian Labor between Field and Factory, 1892-1903," California
Slavic Studies. Vol. Ill (1964).
Von Laue, T. H. Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia. New York, 1963.
F. Specialized Studies: Intellectual History and the Revolutionary Movement
Ambler, E. Russian Journalism and Politics 1861-1881: The Career of Aleksei S.
Suvorln. Detroit, 1972.
Avrich, P. The Russian Anarchists. Princeton, New Jersey, 1967.
Baron, S. H. Plckhanov: The Father of Russian Marxism. Stanford, California,
1963.
Berdiaev, N. Constantin Leontieff. Translated by H. Iswolsky. Paris, 1937.
Berdiaev, N. The Russian Idea. Translated by R. French. London, 1947.
Berlin, I. The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy's View of History. New
York, 1953.
Berlin, I. “The Marvelous Decade,” Encounter (1955, 1956).
Berlin, I. Russian Thinkers. Edited by H. Hardy and A. Kelly. New York, 1978.
Billington, J. Mikhailovsky and Russian Populism. New York, 1958.
Bowman, H. Vissarion Bclinskii, 1811-1848: A Study in the Origins of Social Criti-
cism in Russia. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1954.
Broido, E. Memoirs of a Revolutionary. Edited and translated by V. Broido. New
York, 1967. . .
Brower, D. R. Training the Nihilists: Education and Radicalism in Tsarist Russia.
Ithaca, 1975.
READINGS IN ENGLISH ON RUSSIAN HISTORY
637
Brown E. I Siaitkmch and His Moscow Cinlt IS JO-1 84!) Stanford 1966
Byrnes R F Pobedortottsu His Life and Tl ougl i Bloomington Indiana 1968
Carr E. H Michael Bakunin New York 1961
Carr E H The Romantic Exiles A Awtereer th Century Portrait Gallery London
1933
Chmiclewski E Tribune of the Sla\ ophites Konstantin Aksakov Gainesville, Florida
1961 University of Florida Monograph Social Sciences No 12 (Fall 1961)
Christoff, 1* K An lalroifucilon to Nineteenth Crntury Russian Slavophilism A Study
in ideas Vof t A S \ompskov The Hague 1961
Christoff P K An Introduction to nineteenth Century Buss art Slot ophfhsni A
Study in Ideas Vot II / 1 Kirr c »s*f/Tbc Hague 1972
Christoff P K. Introduction to Nineteenth Cent /rv Russian Slavophilism Vo! Ill
If S Aksakov A Study in Ideas Princeton 1952
Christoff P K Third Heart Some Intellectual Ideological Currents In Russia 1800-
1850 The Hague 1970
Fadner P Seiertty Years of Ran-Shusm Karamzin to Pan letskti 1800-1870 Y>ash
ington D C 1962
Field D Rebels In the Name of the Tsar nosion 1976
Fischer G Russian Liberalism from Gentrv to I itelhgentsla Cambridge Massachu
setts 1938
Gerstem L Nikolai Strakhov Cambridge Massachusetts 1971
Geizler I Martov A Political Biography ol a Russian Social Democrat New York
1967
Haimson L H Tie Russian Marxists on I tie Origins ol Bolshevism Cambridge
Massachusetts 1935
Hare R Pioneers of Russian Social Thought Studies ol Non Marxian Formation in
Nineteenth Century Russia and of Its Partial Revival m the Soviet Union
New York 1951
Hare R Portraits of Russian Personalities between Reform and Revolution New
Lori 1959
Karpovich M P L Lavrov and Russian Socialism * California Slav ic Studies Vol
21 (1963)
Katz M Mikhail K Katkov A Political Biography 1818-1887 The Hague 1966
Keep 1 LX The Rise of Social Democracy In Russia Otford 1963
Kmdersley, R The First Russian Revlslonurs A Studv of Legal Marxism in Russia
Oxford 1962
Kobn, H Pan Slavism Its History and Ideology Nol’C Dame Indiana 1953 New
York 1960
Lampert E Sons against Fathers Stud es in Russian Radicalism an t Resolution
London, 1965
Lampert E Studies In Rebellion London 1957
Long D M The first Russian Radical Alexander Radix}, chec 1749-1802 New
York 1960
Ledmcki 3V Russia Poland and she West Essays in Llierarv and Cultural History
London and New York 1954
Leslie R F Reform and Insurrection fn Russian Poland 1856-1865 London 1963
Lukashevich S Han Aksakov 1823-1866 A Study In Russian Tl ought and Politics
Cambridge Massachusetts 196'
Lukashevivb, S Konstantin Leontcv 1831 1891 A Study In Russian Heroic f tiaf
Ism " New York 1967 _ , . ,
Ukashtvich S ft P Fedorov (1828-1903) A Study m Russm Eupsychlan and
Utopian Thought Newark New Jersey, and London, 1977
MacMaster, R E. Danilevsky A Russian Totalitarian philosopher Cambridge Mas-
sachusetu, 1961
638 READINGS IN ENGLISH ON RUSSIAN HISTORY
Malia, M. Alexander Herzen and the Birth of Russian Socialism, 1812-1855. Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, 1961.
Malia, M. “What Is the Intelligentsia?" in The Russian Intelligentsia, Edited by
R. Pipes. New York, 1961.
Mazour, A. The First Russian Revolution, 1825: The Decembrist Movement. Stan-
ford, 1937.
Mazour, A. G. Women in Exile: Wives of the Decembrists. Tallahassee, 1975.
McNally, R. T. Chaadaev and His Friends: An Intellectual History of Peter Chaadaev
and His Russian Contemporaries. Tallahassee, 1971.
McNeal, R. H. (Ed.) Russia in Transition, 1905-1914. Evolution or Revolution? New
York, 1970.
Mehlinger, H. D., and Thompson, J. M. Count Witte and the Tsarist Government in
the 1905 Revolution. Bloomington, 1972.
Mendel, A. P. Dilemmas of Progress in Tsarist Russia: Legal Marxism and Legal
Populism. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1961.
Mendel, A. P. Michael Bakunin: Roots of Apocalypse. New York, 1981.
Mochulsky, K. Dostoevsky: His Life and Work. Translated by M. Minihan. Princeton,
New Jersey, 1967.
Mohrenschildt, D. von. Russia in the Intellectual Life of 18th Century France. New
York, 1936.
Petrovich, M. B. The Emergence of Russian Pan-Slavism, 1856-1870. New York,
1956.
Pipes, R. Social Democracy and the St. Petersburg Labor Movement, 1885-1897.
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1963.
Pipes, R. Struve: Liberal on the Left, 1870-1905. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1970.
Pipes, R. Struve: Liberal on the Right, 1905-1944. Cambridge, Massachusetts, and
London, 1980.
Pipes, R. (Ed.) Revolutionary Russia. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1968.
Pipes, R. (Ed.) The Russian Intelligentsia. New York, 1961.
Plamenatz, J. German Marxism and Russian Communism. London, 1954.
Pollard, A. ‘The Russian Intelligentsia: The Mind of Russia,” California Slavic
Studies, Vol. Ill (1964).
Pomper, P. Peter Lavrov and the Russian Revolutionary Movement. Chicago, 1972.
Putnam, G. F. Russian Alternatives to Marxism: Christian Socialism and Idealistic
Liberalism in T wenticth-Century Russia. Knoxville, Tennessee, 1977.
Pyziur, E. The Doctrine of Anarchism of Michael A. Bakunin. Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
1955.
Rabinowitch, A. Prelude to Revolution: The Pctrograd Bolsheviks and the July 1917
Uprising. Bloomington, Indiana, 1968.
RaclF, M. Origins of the Russian Intelligentsia: The Eighteenth Century Nobility. New
York, 1966.
Randall, F. N. G. Chernyshevskil. New York, 1967.
Riasanovsky, N. V. A Parting of Ways: Government and the Educated Public in
Russia, 1801-1855. Oxford, 1976.
Riasanovsky, N. V. Nicholas 1 and Official Nationality in Russia. 1825-1855. Berke-
ley, 1959.
Riasanovsky, N. V. Russia and the West in the Teachings of the Slavophiles. Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, 1952.
Roggcr, H. National Consciousness in 18th Century Russia. Cambridge, Massachu-
setts, 1960. , ,
Sablinsky, W. The Road to Bloody Sunday. The Role of Father Gapon and the As-
sembly in the Petersburg Massacre of 1905. Princeton, 1976,
Scbapiro, L. Rationalism and Nationalism in Russian Nineteenth Century Politico
Thought. New Haven, Connecticut, 1967.
READINGS IN ENGLISH ON RUSSIAN H t ST OR Y
639
Schndderman, J Serge! Zubarev and Revolutionary Monism The Struggle tor the
Working Class In Tsarist Russ'a Ithica, 1976
Schwarz, S M The Russian Resolution of 1905 The Worker 4 Movement and the
Formation of Bolshevism anti Mensheusm Translated by G Vakar (later*
University Project on the History of the Menshevik Movement) Chicago
and London, 1967
Serge, V Memoirs of a Rev otaaonary 1901-1941 Translated by P Sedgwick Lon-
don 1963
Stitcs, R, The Womens Liberation Movement in Russia Feminism, Nihilism, and
Bolshevism, 1860-1930 Princeton, 1978
Thaden, E C. Coiuervctfi e Nationalism m 19th Century Russia Seattle 1964
TreadgoM, D \V Lenin and lUs Rivals The Struggle for Russia's Future, 1898-1906
New York, 1935
Trotsky, L. 1903 Translated by A Bostock New 5 ork 1971
Ulam, A B The Bolsheviks New York, 1965
mam, ABM the Name of the People rropliets and Conspirators In Prerevolu-
tionary Russia New korfc 1977
Venturi, F Roots of Resolution A His tors of the Popu'it) and Socialist Movements
In Ninereenih Century Russia Translated (rom Italian b) F Haskell New
York, i960
Vucinich, A Social Thought m Tsarist Russia The Quest for a General Science of
Society 1861-1917 Chicago end London 1976
Wglicki, A The Controversy Over Capitalism Oxford 1969
Wallekl, A The Slavophile Controxersy History of a Constrxailv e Utopia In tCme-
teenth Century Russian Thought Translated by H Andre* s-Rusiecka Ox
ford, 1975
Walickt A “Personality and Society in the Ideology of Russian Slavophiles A Study
in the Sociology of Knowledge*' California (lane Studies Vol II (1963)
Weeks A L The First Bolshevik A Political Biography of Peter Tkachev New
York, 1968
Wildman, A The Making of a Workers' Revolution Russian Social Democracy,
1891-1903 [Inter University Project on ihe History ol the Menshevik
Movement) Chicago and London 1967
Wilson, E To the Finland Station New York, 1940
Woehrlm, W F Chernyshevsly The Man and the Journalist Cambridge Missachu
setts, 1971
Wolfe, B E Three W ho Made a Revolution A Biographical History New York,
194*
Yarmolmsky, A Rood to Revolution A Century of Russian Radicalism London,
1957
Zcnkovsky, V V Russian Thinkers and Europe Translated from Russian Ann Arbor,
Michigan, 1953
Zetlin, M The Decembrists Translated from the Russian by G Famn New York,
1958
soviet RUSSIA, 1917-1983
A. Resolution and Civil War
(l) GENERAL STUDIES, NCllOtVS WORKS BY fARTtCt EASTS
Carr, EH A History of Soviet Russia Vols 1-111 The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-
1923 New York, 1951-53 Vo! IV The Interregnum 1923-1924 New
York, 1954 Vols V-V1I Socialism In One Country, 1924-1926 New York.
640 READINGS IN ENGLISH ON RUSSIAN HISTORY
1958. Vols. VUI-IX: Foundations of a Planned Economy, 1926-1929 (Vol,
VIII with R. W. Davies). New York. 1971-72.
Chamberlin, W. N. The Russian Revolution, 1917-1921. 2 vols. New York, 1935.
Chernov, V. The Great Russian Revolution. New Haven, Connecticut, 1936.
Curtiss, J. S. The Russian Revolutions of 1917. Princeton, New Jersey, 1957.
Denikin, A. I. The Russian Turmoil. London, 1922.
Footman, D. Civil War in Russia. New York, 1961.
Footman, D. The Russian Revolution. New York, 1962.
Katkov, G. Russia, 1917: The February Revolution. New York, 1967.
Kerensky, A. The Catastrophe: Kerensky’s Own Story of the Russian Revolution.
New York, 1927.
Kerensky, A. The Crucifixion of Liberty. New York, 1934.
Kerensky, A. Russia and History’s Turning Point. London, 1965.
Licbman, M. The Russian Revolution. Translated by A. Pomperans. New York, 1970.
Sukhanov, N. N. The Russian Revolution of 1917. New York, 1955.
Trotsky, L. The History of the Russian Revolution, 3 vols. New York, 1932-1957.
Tucker, R. C. (Ed.) The Lenin Anthology. New York, 1975.
Von Mohrenschildt, D. (Ed.) The Russian Revolution of 1917: Contemporary Ac-
counts. New York, 1971.
Woytlnsky, W. S. Stormy Passage. A Personal History through Two Russian Revo-
lutions to Democracy and Freedom: 1905-1960. New York, 1961.
(II) READINGS ON SPECIAL TOPICS
Adams, A. E. Bolsheviks in the Ukraine: The Second Campaign. New Haven, Con-
necticut, 1963.
Adams, A. E. (Ed.) The Russian Revolution and Bolshevik Victory: Why and How 7
Boston, 1960.
Anweiler, O. The Soviets: The Russian Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers Councils,
1905-1921. Translated from the German by R. Hein. New York, 1974.
Avrich, P. Kronstadt 1921. Princeton, 1970.
Browder, R., and Kerensky, F. (Eds.) The Russian Provisional Government, 1917.
3 vols. Stanford, 1961.
Bunyan, J. (Ed.) Intervention, Civil War and Communism in Russia, April-Decent-
ber, 1918: Documents. Baltimore, 1936.
Bunyan, J., and Fisher, H. H. (Eds.) The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1918: Docu-
ments. Stanford, 1934.
Carr, E. H. The October Revolution: Before and After. New York, 1969.
Dan, Th. The Origins of Bolshevism. London, 1964.
Daniels, R. V. Red October. The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. London, 1968.
Deutscher, I. (Ed.) The Age of Permanent Revolution: A Trotsky Anthology. New
York, 1964.
Ferro, M. The Russian Revolution of February 1917. Translated by J. L. Richards.
Englewood Cliffs, 1972.
Fischer, Louis. The Life of Lenin. New York, 1964.
Gankin, O. H., and Fisher, H. H. (Eds.) The Bolsheviks and the World War: Docu-
ments. Stanford, 1940.
Haims on, L. H. (Ed.) The Mensheviks: From the Revolution of 1917 to the Second
World War. Chicago, 1974.
Keep, J. The Russian Revolution: A Study in Mass Mobilization. New York, 1976.
Kennaa, G. F. So vlet-A merican Relations, 1917-1920. Vol. I: Russia Leaves the War.
Vol. II: The Decision to Intervene. Princeton, 1956-58. _
Laqueur, W. The Fate of the Revolution: Interpretations of Soviet History. New
York, 1967. ,
Lehovich, D. V. White Against Red: The Life of General Anton Denikin. New Yore,
1974.
READINGS IN ENGLISH ON RUSSIAN HISTORY 641
Ixmn V I Imperialism The Highest Stage of Capitalism New York 1927
Lenin V I The Slate and Revolution Sew York 1927
Lenin V I Collected Works New York 1927-42
Lenin VI H/uzi Is To Be Done * Moscow 1947
Lewin M Lenin s Last Straggle New York 1968
luckett R The White Generals An Accomt of the U hie Movement and the Rus
stan Ct\(l War New York 1971
Melgunov S P The Bolshevik Seizure of Tower Edited by S G Pushkarev and
B S Pusbkarcv Translated by J Beaver Santa Barbara 1972
Payne R The Life and Death of Lenin New York 1964
Pipes R The Formation of the Soviet Un on Can munlsm and Nationalism 1917-
1923 Cambridge Massachusetts 1954
Pipes, R (Ed ) Revolutionary Russia A Symposium Cambridge Massachusetts 2nd
e«L rev, 1968
Possony S T Lenin The Compulsive Revolutionary Chicago 1964
Rabiaowitch A The Bolsheviks Came to Power The Revolut on of 1917 In Petro-
grad New York 1976
Radkey O H The Election to the Rm*tan Constituent Assembly of 1917 Cambridge
Massachusetts 1950
Radkey O H The Agrarian Foes of Bolsl evlsm Promise nnd Default of the Russian
Socialist Revolutionaries February to October 1917 New York, 1958
Radkey 0 H The Sickle under the Hammer The Russian Social si Revolutionaries
in the Early Months of So let Rule New York 1963
Reed I Ten Days That Shook tie World New York 1960
Reshetar I S The Ukrainian Revoluton 1917-1920 Pnncelon New Jersey 1932
Rosenberg A A History of Bolslevlsm Garden City New York 1967
Rosenberg NV O A I Denikin and the Ami Bolshevik Movement in South Russia
Amherst Massachusetts 1961
Rosenberg W G Liberals in il e Russian Revolution The Constitutional Democratic
Party 1917-1921 Princeton 1974
Rosmer A Moscow under Lenin Translated by 1 Birchall New York 1972.
Serge V Tear One e>f the Russian Re' olution Translated by P Sedgwick New York.
1972
Shapiro L .Tie Origins of the Communist Autocracy Political Opposition in rhe
Soviet State First Phase 1917-1922 Cambridge Massachusetts, 1955
Smith, E E The Young Stalin New York 1967
Stewart G The Hhire Annies of Russia New York 1933
Suny R G The Baku Commune 1917-1918 Class and National ty In the Russian
Resolution Princeton 1972
Ukraintsev N “A Document m the Korn lov Affair" Soviet Studies (October 19731
Varaock E. and Fisher H H The Testimony of Kolchak end Other Siberian Ma-
terials and Documents Stanford 1935
Wheeler Bennett J \V 77 e Forgotten Fence Brest Litovsk New York 19)9
B Souet Period— General
Abramovitch R Tl e Soviet Resolution 1917-1939 New Toil 1962
Alliluyeva Svetlana 7»eufv Letters to a Friend New York 1967
Amalrik A Involuntary Journey to Siberia New York 1970
AmaJrik A IPiM lie 5<?u#r Union Survive until !9S4 f New York 1970
React S (Ed and Trans) The Ullage of Viriatlno An Ethnographic Study of a
Russian Village from before the Revolution to the Present Garden City
New York 1970
Berdiaev N Tl e Origins of Russian Communism London 1948
Berducv N The Russian Revolution. Two Essavs on Its Imp! cattot w in Religion and
Psychology London 1931
642 READINGS IN ENGLISH ON RUSSIAN HISTORY
Bialer, S. Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability, and Change in the Soviet Union.
Cambridge, England, 1980.
Breslauer, O. W. Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Budding Authority in Soviet
Politics. London, 1982.
Brumberg, A. (Ed.) In Quest of Justice: Protest and Dissent in the Soviet Union
Today. New York, 1970.
Carew-Hunt, R. N. The Theory and Practice of Communism. New York, 1958.
Chalidzc, V. To Defend These Rights: Human Rights and the Soviet Union. Trans-
lated by Gny Daniels. New York, 1974.
Crossman, R. (Ed.) The God That Failed. London, 1950.
Daniels, Robert V. A Documentary History of Communism. New York, 1960.
Daniels, Robert V. (Ed.) The Stalin Revolution : Fulfillment or Betrayal of Com-
munism? Boston, 1965.
Deutscher, I. Stalin: A Political Biography. New York, 1949. Second edition, 1966.
Deutscher, I. The Prophet Armed: Trotsky, 1879-1921. New York, 1954.
Deutscher, I. The Prophet Unarmed: Trotsky, 1921-1929. New York, 1959.
Deutscher, I. The Prophet Outcast: Trotsky, 1929-1940. New York, 1963.
Dmytryshyn, B. USSR: A Concise History. New York, 1971.
Dornberg, I. Brezhnev: The Masks of Power. New York, 1974.
Drachkovilch, M. (Ed.) Fifty Years of Communism in Russia. University Park,
Pennsylvania, and London, 1968.
Dunn, S. and E. The Peasants of Central Russia. New York, 1967.
Eissenslat, B. W. (Ed.) The Soviet Union: The Seventies and Beyond. Lexington,
Massachusetts, Toronto, and London, 1975.
Fischer, G. Soviet Opposition to Stalin: A Case Study in World War II. Westport,
Connecticut, 1970.
Friedrich, C. J., and Brzezinski, Z. K. Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, 1956.
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Galanskov, Ginzbcrg, Dobrovolsky and Lashkova, 1967-68. Edited by
P. Reddaway. Translated by J. Saprets, H. Sternberg, and D. Weissbort.
New York, 1972.
Geiger, H. K. The Family in Soviet Russia. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1968.
Gerstenmaier, C. The Pokes of the Silent. Translated by S. Hecker. New York, 1972.
Gurian, W. Bolshevism: An Introduction to Soviet Communism. Notre Dame, Indi-
ana, 1953.
Gurian, W. Bolshevism: Theory and Practice. London, 1932.
Hahn, "W. G. Postwar Soviet Politics: The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Mod-
eration, 1946-53. Ithaca and London, 19B2.
Hendel, S., and Braham, R. (Eds.) The USSR after 50 Years: promise and Reality.
New York, 1967.
Khrushchev, N. S. Khrushchev Remembers. Vol. I: Edited and translated by S. Tal-
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Introduction by 3. L. Schectcr. Boston and Toronto, 1970-1974.
Kulski, W. W, The Soviet Regime: Communism in Practice. Syracuse, 1954.
Lapkins, G. W. Women in Soviet Society: Equality, Development, and Social Change.
Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1978.
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RCADlhGS IN ENGLISH ON RUSSIAN HISTORY
643
McNcal, R H (Ed ) Lenin Slulm Khrushchev 1 oicts of Bolshevism Englewood
Ci fls New Jersey 1963
Medvedev R Lei History Judge 71 e Origins and Consequences of Sted nlsm Ediled
by D Joravsky and G Hauj>L Translated by C. Taylor New York mi
Medvedev, R On Socialist Democracy Edited and translated by Ellen de Kodt. New
York 1975
Medvedev Zh. A and Medvedev, R A A Question of Madness New York
197!
Meyer A Leninism Cambridge Massachusetts 1957
Meyer, A Marxism Cambridge Massachusetts I9'4
Meyer A Communism New York I960
Mdler W Russians as People London I'tftO
Nttfl 1 P The Sower AchlevMnenf London 1967
On Trial The Cose of Sinyaxsky (TerO and Daniel {Arzhak) Documents edited
by L. Labedr and Max Hayward Russian text translated by Many a Uarari
and Max Hayward French texts translated by Marjorie Viil ers London
1967
Pankratova A M (Ed ) A History of the USSR i sots Compiled by k. V Uaiile
vich et at New York 1970
Rabmowitch A and Rabinowitch J (Eds ) Rerol Hun and Tolu cs In Russia Essays
in Memory of B I Nicolaeviky Bloomington 1972
Rauch B von A History of Sower Russia New York 19J7
Reddaway P (Ed and Trans ) Uncemored Russ a Proleu and Dntcni In the Soviet
Union The Unofficial Moscow Journal A Chronicle of Current Events
London 1972
Reve K van het (Ed ) Dear Comrade Pave/ Urvnov and the I 0 ces of Sosiet Citi-
zens in Dissent New York, 1969
Rteber A J and Nelson R C A Stud » of il e USSR and Communism An llis
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Kothberg, A The Heirs of Stalin Dlssulcnce and the Soviet Regime 1953-1970
Ithaca, 1972
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Schulti, HE el al (Eds) Who Has Who in lie USSR A B ographlc Directory
Containing 5 015 B ograplues of Prominent Jov/er Historical Personalities
Metuchen New Jersey 1972
Schuirian F Russia since 1917 four Decades of Soviet Politics New York, 1957
Souvanne B Statin A Critical Survey of Bolshevism New York 1939
Treadgold D W Tnent eth Century Russ c Chicaco 1939 5th ed„ 19S1
Trotsky L. 7/ie Resolution Betray 1 New York 1937
Trotsky L Stall rt An Appro sal of 1 he Man and Ifts Influence New York 1941
Tucker R C The Sonet Political Mind New York 1963
Tucker R C Srafm ns Re \oh uonar, 1879-1929 A Study in History and Person
ntiry New York 1973
Ulam A B Stalm 77i e Man and His Era New York 197J
Von Laue T H Why Lftun 7 Why Slain 7 Philadelphia and New York 1964
Von Laue T H The Global City Phihdelph a and New York 1969
Webb S and B Soviet Communism A New C luhzatlon 7 2 vols New York 1936
IVcnb A. Russia The Pott Mar fears New York 1972
Westwood J N Endurance ar<f Endeavour Russian Hisory ISfi mo (The
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C Ideology Gcv ernmem Adn mlsiratlon and La"
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644
INGS IN ENGLISH ON RUSS!
AN HISTORY
Armstrong, J. A. The Politics of Totalitarianism: The Communist Party of the Soviet
Union. New Yorir, 1961.
Armstrong, J. A. The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite : A Case Study of the Ukrainian Ap-
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Avlorkbanov, A. Stalin and the Soviet Communist Party. Munich, 1959.
Azrael, I. R. Managerial Power and Soviet Politics. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1966.
Barghoorn, F. C. The Soviet Image of the United States. New York, 1950.
Barghoom, F. C. Soviet Russian Nationalism. New York, 1956.
Barron, J. KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Agents. New York, 1974.
Beck, F., and Godin, W. Russian Purge and the Extraction of Confession. New York,
1951.
Berman, H. J. Justice in Russia. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1950. Revised edition,
1963.
Berman, H. J., and Kemer, M. Soviet Military Law and Administration. Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 1955.
Berman, H. J., and Maggs, P. B. Disarmament inspection under Soviet Law. Dobbs
Ferry, New York, 1967.
Berman, H. J., and Spindler, J. W. (Trans.) Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure:
The RSFSR Code. Introduction and analysis by H. J. Berman. Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 1965.
Brzeztnski, Z. K. Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics. New York, 1962.
Brzezinski, Z. K. The Permanent Purge. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1956.
Cantril, H. Soviet Leaders and Mastery over Man. New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1960.
Conquest, R. The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties. Hammondsworth, re-
vised edition, 1971.
Dallin, A., and Larson, T. B. (Eds.) Soviet Politics since Khrushchev. Englewood
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Russia. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1960.
Deacon, R. A History of the Russian Secret Service. New York, 3972.
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Fedotoff-White, D. The Growth of the Red Army. Princeton, New Jersey, 1944.
Fischer, G. Soviet Opposition to Stalin. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1952.
Graham, Loren R. The Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Communist Party, 1927-
J932. Princeton, New Jersey, 1967.
Gsovsky, V. Soviet Civil Law. 2 vols. Ann Arbor, 1948-49.
Gsovsky, V., and Grybowski, K. Government, Law and Courts in the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe. New York, 1959.
Hammer, D. P. USSR: The Politics of Oligarchy. Hinsdale, Illinois, 1974.
Harcavc, S. The Structure and Functioning of the Lower Party Organizations in the
Soviet Union. University of Alabama, 1954.
Harvey, M. L., Gourc, L., and Prokofieff, V. Science and Technology as an Instru-
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Inlteles, A Bauer R and Kluckhohn C. Won ifcf So let S>j cm IPo ks Cambridge
Massachusetts 1956
Kara, 3 (Ed ) So « and East European Agr cut u t Be kele) 196’
Kassof A (Ed ) Prospects for So et Socle y New York 1968
Kuchetov S Tie Organs o/ So let Aim n s a on o! lus ce Tier Ills ary and
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Letts N and Remain. E R ual of t qufda on Tie Case of the Moscow 7rta?J
Glencoe 19J4
Leonard SV TJ e Kreml n s net Sain New Yo k, l°62
Levytsly B Tie Uses of Te ro Tie So let Sec et Pol ce 1*17 /970 Translated fy
H Pehler NfWVo k ]9r
Matthews M Class and Soc dj tn So kt Rus a New Yd k 1972
Matthews M (Ed) So let Co ernmen A Select on oj 08 i jI Doit menu on In
lernal Pol tier Neu York 197-j
Mciscl 1 H and Kozera E S (Eds ) Ma e wls to tie S uJy of he So I t Sys etn
Second ed on Ann Arbor 193J
Me liner B Tie Communist Pa y of I e So e Un on Pa y Leader h p New York
1956
Moore B So let Poll cs Tie D If inn a o / /’owe Can br dee Massaehuse tt 19J0
Odom \Y E Tie So let VcAunees Mode nl a n an! Bu eauc act In a Public
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Resheiar J S 4 Concise Kis ory of tie Conn un Party of le So let Un on New
York. 1960
Rgby T H Corner un st Pat Me be slip Inti e USSR 1917 \%7 Pf nee On New
Jersey 1968
Setup ro L. 11 Tie Com nun r Pa r> of tl e So et Union New York 1971
Schles ngcr R So et Legal Tl co London 1945
Schueller G The Pot tb o Startfo il 1951
Schuman F Co ern ent In tl e So let Un o New York 1961
Scott D ) R 8ut an Poll ail Ins I it e>ns New, Yo V 1958
Swearer H R and Rush M Tie Fed cs of Sutra on in t t USSR Met tots Pn
Kh usl cl e s R re ro Leatle si p Boston 1964
Tow s er J Poll cal Ponerln tie USSR 1917 194 7 New York 1948
Tucker R C Tie So let Poll cal flf nd New York 1961
Ulam A The Bolshe ks New Yo fc I96t
Ulam A Tl e hew pace of So et To at a an sn Camfcr dge Massachusetts, (963
Ulam A Tie Unfinished Re ol o An E, ay on tie So ce, oj Influence Of
Marx sm and Comm n s m New York I960
Vysh nsky A The Law of tl So et S a e New Yo k l°48
Weinberg, E A Tie De etopnem of Soc hlogy In lie So et Un on Boston, 1974
Wd n, S and SSuxser R. (Eds ) 77 e So et Secret Pol ce Ne* York 1957
D Economic De elapment
Baykov A 3'h f De elopment oj tl e So er Econom c System Camb dee England
1947
Bergson A and kuznets, S (Eds) Peonon c T end. In the So let Union Cam
brdge Massachusetts 1963
Bergson AT le Economics of So let Plann ng New Ifa en Connect cut, 1964
Bergson A Plann ng and Product I y i nde So et Soc at sm New Yo k, 1968
Bergson A Real No tonal I neon e oj So et Ra tia s nee 1918 Cambridge Mas**
chusetts, 1961
Bergson A So let Ecxmcm c Gro*tl Evanston 111 non. 1953
Bergson A Tl e S cture of So let B ages Cambr dge Massachusetts 1944
646 READINGS IN ENGLISH ON RUSSIAN HISTORY
Bicnstock, G., Schwartz, S. ML, and Yugov, A. Management in Russian Industry and
Agriculture. Ithaca, New York, 1944.
Campbell, R. Soviet Economic Power: Its Organization, Growth and Challenge.
Boston, 1960.
Dallii), D. J., and Nicolaevsky, B. I. Forced Labor in Soviet Russia. New Haven,
Connecticut, 1947.
Deulscher, I. Soviet Trade Unions. London, 1950.
Do Witt, N. Education and Professional Employment in the USSR. Washington, D.C.,
1961.
Dobb, M. Soviet Economic Development Since the 1917 Revolution. London, 1948.
Erlich, A. The Soviet Industrialization Debate, 1924-28. Cambridge, Massachusetts,
I960.
Gregory, P. R., and Stuart, R. C. Soviet Economic Structure and Performance. New
York, 1974.
Grossman, G. "The Solidary Society: A Philosophical Issue in Communist Economic
Reforms," Essays in Socialism and Planning in Honor of Carl Londoner.
(Ed. G. Grossman), Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1970.
Grossman, G. “The Economy at Middle Age,” Problems of Communism (March-
April 1976).
Grossman, G. (Ed.) Money and Plan: Financial Aspects of East European Economic
Reforms. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968.
Holzman, F. Soviet Taxation. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1955.
Holzman, F. (Ed.) Readings on the Soviet Economy. Chicago, 1962.
Jasny, N. The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR. Stanford, 1949.
Jasny, N. Soviet Economy during the Plan Era. Stanford, 1951.
Jasny, N. Soviet Industrialization, 1928-1952. Chicago, 1961,
Laird, R. D. (Ed.) Soviet Agricultural and Peasant Affairs. Lawrence, Kansas, 1963.
Lewin, M. Russian Peasants and Soviet Power: A Study of Collectivization. Trans-
lated by Irene Nove. Evanston, Illinois, 1968.
Lewin, M. "Soviet Policies of Agricultural Procurements before the War," Essays in
Honor of E. H. Carr. (Eds. Ch. Abramsky, B. J. Williams), Hamden, 1974.
Nove, A. An Economic History of the USSR. London, 1969.
Pryde, P. R. Conservation in the Soviet Union. Cambridge, England, 1972.
Quigley, J. The Soviet Foreign Trade Monopoly: Institutions and Laws. Columbus,
Ohio, 1974.
Schwartz, H. Russia's Soviet Economy. Second edition. New York, 1954.
Schwartz, H. The Soviet Economy since Stalin. Philadelphia, 1965.
Schwarz, S. Labor in the Soviet Union. New York, 1952.
E. Foreign Affairs
Adams, A. E. Readings in Soviet Foreign Policy : Theory and Practice. Boston (Heath
Series), 1961.
Barghoorn, F. C. The Soviet Cultural Offensive: The Role of Cultural Diplomacy in
Soviet Foreign Policy. Princeton, 1960.
Barghoorn, F. C. Soviet Foreign Propaganda. Princeton, 1964.
Beloff, M. The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1929-1941. 2 vols. New York, 1947-
49.
Beloff, M. Soviet Foreign Policy in the Far East, 1944-1951. London, 1953.
Bishop, D. G. (Ed.) Soviet Foreign Relations: Documents and Readings. Syracuse,
1952.
Borkenau, F. World Communism: A History of the Communist International. New
York, 1939.
Brandt, C. Stalin’s Failure in China, 1924-1927. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1958.
READINGS
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647
BrtttinsW 2. K The Sonet Bloc Unity and Conflict Cambridge Massachusetts
I960, revised 1967
Carell P Scorched Earth The Rumen-German Hot W 3-1944 Translated by
E Osers Boston 1970
Carr E H The Soviet Impact on the Western World London 19i6
ClUeU D T Communism and the Spanish Chi! War Berkeley 1955
Chew A. F The White Death The Eptc «/ the Soviet. Finnish Winter War East
Lansing Michigan 1971
Dallm A. German Rule In Russia 194 1-194 S A Study of Occuwit on Polton New
York 1957
Dallin A The Soilel Union at the United A'ar/ont New lork 1962
Dallin D J tower Ruula and the Far East New Haven 1948
Dallin D J Sot to Russia s Foreign Policy 1939 1942 (Translation) New Haven
1942
Degras J The Communist International 1919-1943 New York 1956
Degras, J Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy 7917-194/ 3 vols New York 1951-
1953
Degras J (Ed ) Calender oj Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy 1917-3941 Lon
don 1948
Eudm X and Fisher H H So let Russia and tie tV«r 1920-1927 Stanford 1957
Eudui X and North R. C (Eds.) toviw Russ a and t> e Last 1920-1927 Stanford
1957
Farnsworth B William C Bullitt and the Soviet Union Bloom ngton Indiana 1967
Fischer L. The Soviets in World A flairs 1917-1929 Pnnceton 1951
Fischer R StaKn and German Communism Cambridge Massachusetts 1948
Floyd D Mao against hhrushcl e\ A Short I fist ore of the Stno-Sov let Conflict New
York, 1963
Freedman R 0 Soviet Policy Toward tie Mid fie East Sirce 1970 New York 1975
OarthoU R L. Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age New y or) 1962
Griffith W E Communism in Europe Continuity Clongf and tl t SlnoJovlet Ofs
pule Cambridge Massachusetts 1966
Gruber H International Communism In tl e Era of Unlit A Documentary II story
Greenwich Connecticut 1967
Harvey, D L and Ciccontti L. C USSovle' Cooperation in Space IV ash ogten
D C., 1974
Jamgoich Nish Jr Soviet East European Dialogic International Relations of a New
Type Stanford 1968
Kapur, H tower Russia and Asia 19/7-1927 A Study ol Soviet Policy towards
Turkey Iran and Afghanistan Lordon 1966 New York 1967
Kcnnan G F Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin Boston 1961
kennan G F Soviet Foreign Policy I9I7-194J Princeton 1960
Laqueur W Z. The Soviet Union and the Middle East New York 19*9
Lasetson M M (Ed ) The Development of Soviet Fore gn Polcy In Europe 19 IT-
1942 A Selection of Documents Internal anal Conciliation No 386 (Janu
ary 1943)
Leach B A. German Strategy Against Russia 1939-1941 Oxford 1973
Mackintosh J Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Pol cy New York 1962.
Maisky 1 Memoirs of a Soviet Ambassador The War 1939-1943 New York, 1968
Moore H L . Soviet Far Eastern Policy 1933-1945 Princeton 194$
Mostly P E. The kremlin and ttorld Pol ms New y ork 1961
Mostly P E Russia after Stalin New York, 1955
Mostly, P E. (Ed 1 The Soviet Union 1922-1962 A foreign Affairs Reader New
York and London, 1963
648 READINGS IN ENGLISH ON RUSSIAN HISTORY
North, R. C. Moscow and Chinese Communists. Second edition, Stanford, 1962.
Overstreet, G. D., and WindmiUef, M. Communism in India. Second edition, Bom-
bay, 1960.
Pcthybridge, R. (Ed.) The Development oj the Communist Bloc. Boston, 1965,
Ro'i, Y. From Encroachment to Involvement: A Documentary Study of Soviet Policy
in the Middle East, 1945—1973. New York, Toronto, and Jerusalem, 1974.
Rubinstein, A. Z. (Ed.) The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union. New York, I960.
Rubinstein, A. Z. (Ed.) Soviet and Chinese Influence in the Third World. New York,
1975.
Seaton, A. The Battle for Moscow, 1941-1942. New York, 1971.
Seaton, A. The Russo-German War, 1941-45. New York, 1971.
Seton-Watson, H. The East European Revolution. Third edition, New York, 1956,
Selon-Watson, H. From Lenin to Khrushchev: The History of World Communism.
New York, 1951.
Shotwcli, J. T., and Laserson, M. M. Poland and Russia, 1919-1945. New York, 1945.
Sbnlman, Marshall D. Beyond the Cold War. New Haven, Connecticut, 1966.
Shulman, Marshall D. Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised. Cambridge, Massachusetts,
1963.
Sontag, R. J., and Beddie, J. S. (Ed.) Nad-Soviet Relations, 1939-194 It Documents
from the Archives of the German Foreign Office. Washington, D.C., 1948.
Swearingen, A. R.> and Langer, P. Red Flag in Japan. Cambridge, Massachusetts,
1952.
Taracuzio, T. A. War and Peace in Soviet Diplomacy. Cambridge, Massachusetts,
1940.
The Impact of the Russian Revolution, 1917-1967: The Influence of Bolshevism on
the World Outside Russia. London, 1967.
Uiam, A, B. Expansion and Coexistence: A History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-
1967. New York, 1968.
Uiam, A. B. Titoism and the Cominform. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1952.
Uiiman, R. H. Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-21. Vol. I: Intervention and the War.
Princeton, 1971. Vol. II: Britain and the Russian Civil War, November
1918-February 1920. Princeton, 1968. Vol. Ill: Anglo-Soviet Accord.
Princeton, 1973.
Villmow, J. R. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Englewood Cliffs. New Jersey,
1965,
Warth, R. Soviet Russia in World Politics. New York, 1963.
Weinberg, G. Germany and the Soviet Union, 1939-1941. Leiden, 1954.
Zinner, Paul E. Communist Strategy and Tactics in Czechoslovakia, 1918-1948. New
York, 1963,
F. Nationalities
Armstrong, J. A. Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939-1945. New York, 1955.
Browne, M. (Ed.) Ferment in the Ukraine: Documents by V. Chornovii, I. Kandyba,
L, Lukyanenko, V. Moroz and Others. New York, 1971.
Carve, Sir Oiaf. Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism. London,
1967.
Conquest, R. The Nation Killers: The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities. London,
1970.
Dmytryshyn, B. Moscow and the Ukraine, 1918-1952: A Study of Russian Bolshevik
Nationality Policy. New York, 1956.
Dunn, S. P. Cultural Processes in the Baltic Area under Soviet Rule. Berkeley, 1967.
Fedyshyn, O. S. Germany’s Drive to the East and the Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-
1918, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1971.
Goldhagen, E. (Ed.) Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union. New York, 1967.
READ1NC3S IN ENGLISH ON RUSSIAN HISTORY £49
Hovanxusian R G The Republ c of Armenia Vol 1 The Tint Year 1919-1919
Berkeley, 1971
Israel G The Jews in Russia Translaud from the Trench by S L CberaoS New
York 1975
Katz. Z. Rogers R and Hamed F (Eds.) Handbook of Major Soviet Satlonaftiles
New York and London 1975
Kirchner W The Rise of the Baltic Question Westport Connect at. 1970
Kohn H Nationalism in the Soviet Union (Translated from German) Sew York
1933
Kofcrz, W Russia and Her Colonies New York 19*3
Kotasky I Education In the So tet Uhra ne Toronto 1968
Kolasky J Tno Years in So\ let Ukra nt A Ccnaii uns Perioral Account of Russian
Oppression end the Growing Opposition Toronto 1970
Lubachko I S Belorussia under So » ft Rule 19)7 1957 Lexington Kentucky 1972
Nove, Alec and Newth J A The So ut M JMr East London 1967
Peters V Nestor Makhno The Life oj an Anarchist w nn peg 1970
Schwarz, S The Jews in the Souet Un on Svra use New \ o k 195 1
von Rauch G The Baltic States The lea s of Independence hstona Latvia Lithe
anta 1917-1940 Translated by Gerald Orn Berkeley end los Angeles
J974
C Ret yon Education and Culture
Bereday G and Pennar 1 (Eds) The Polucs cl So iet EJucaton Sew York I960
Brown E J The Proletarian Episode In So v cl Literal ire I9 J 9 1932 New York
1953
Brown E J Run on Literature since tie Re olu on New York, 1963
Churchward L G The Soviet Intel! gentslo An Et ay on the Socal Structure and
Roles of Soilet Intellectuals during the 1960's London and Boston, 1973
Curtiss J S The Russian Church and the So let State 19)7 1950 Boston 1951
Dunlop J B Haugh R., and Klunoff A (Eds ) Aleksandr Sotzher tyn Critical
Essays and Documentary Materials Belmont Massachusetts 1973
Ehienburg I Memo! is 1921-MI Translated bv T Sbebun ns New York 1963
Entcen G M The Soviet Scl otar Bureaucrat M N Petrov sh, end the Society of
Marxist Histor arts Urmersty Park Pennsjlvana, ard London 1978
Evtushenko F„ A Precocious Autobiography New York 1963
Fletcher W C A Study tn Sun hot Tie CUrch in Russia MI-1943 New York
1965
Hayward M and Fletcher IV C. (Eds ) Rehg on and the So let Stale A D lemma
of Power New York Washington London 1969
Jacoby S Insule Soi ret Scl ools New York 1974
Johnson F A Irushchev and the Arts The Pollies of So\ et Culture 1962-1964
Cambridge Massachusetts 1965
Keep 1 (Ed ) Contemporary History In tl e So et M trot New Yo k 1964
Lucky, G Literary Tollies in the Soviet Uira nr 1917-1934 New York 1955
McLean H and Vickery W N The 1 ear of Protest 1956 An Anthology of Soviet
Literary Materials New York 1961
Medvedev Zh A. The Rise and Fall of T D Lxsenlo Translated by I M Lerner
New York 1969 _ . ,., r
Mihailov M Moscow Summer Translated from Serbo-Croatian New York, Ho>
Sakharov A D Progress Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom Translated and In
troduction by H Salisbury New York 1968
Simon G Church Stale and Oppos lion in tie USSR Translated bv K Matett
Berkeley 1974
Slomm M Soviet Russian Literature H rttees and Problems New York, 1954
GENERAL WORKS IN RUSSIAN HISTORY
Solzhenitsyn, A, Ik Cater BW, Translated by R, Frank. New York, 15®,
Solzhenitsyn, A, Ik First Circle. Translated by M. Guyton, London, 1568.
Solzhenitsyn, ilk Gulag Mipelago. 3 vols, Vols, I and E translated by T, Whit.
ney; Vol IE translated by H, Melts, New York, 1574-1978.
Stroyen, W, Comitmisl taw m I the taint Orlhok Ckmli, 1M1-M Wash-
ington, D.C, 1567.
Strive, G. Russia UMm wider Uni a ai Jislin, 19IJ-W. Norman, Okla-
Strive, N, Ckristias in Cmimpcmj tow. Translated from French by L. Shep-
pard and A. Manson. New York, 1967.
Swayze, H. Political Control of Limture in the USSR, M-B59. Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 1561
Timasheff, N. Religion in Soviet Russia. New York, 1342,
Vucinith, A, S, Ik Soviet Mem) of Sciences, Stanford, 1356,
INDEX
Abiza Alexander 392
Aberdeen Cart of, 336
Abo (Tut ku) Treaty ol 252 university
■n 350
Abraham of Smolensk Saint, 12$
Absolutism see Autocracy Centratica
non
Academy of Arts Imperial 298 367
445
Academy of Science* Imperial 237
287 298
Academy of Sciences of the USSR-
287 direction of Soviet scholarship
382
“Acmeists 444
Adashev Alexis. 145 149
Admiralty 367
Admnonle threatened bv Sviatoslav
33 Treaty of 330-1
Adriatic Sea reached bv Mongols 71
Achrentlul Count Alois von and
Ruchlau agreement 417
Aesop 355
Afghanistan conflict with Great Brit
am. 399 settlement, 416-7 Soviet
relations with 512 566 trade with
42J
Agapios Saint, 86
Age of Reason 230 236 285 293
319 and ideologies, 360ff see also
Enlightenment, the
Agrarian panics and Communists, 335
Apiculture a Kievan Russia 45-8
in appanage Russia 114 in Mas
tOMte Russia 183-4 io lBih cen
tmy, 277-8 1800-1861 341-3 and
peasant communes. 373-4 m post
reform period 430-4 Soviet policy
SOI, in postwar period 531 w
post-Stalin period J47 9 550-1 and
private plots, 548-9, 373 and Mara
ul Ideology, 595, see also Collec
tivjzation Peasantry Serfdom
AgrogoroJo 531 573
Ahmad Khan campaigns against Mo*
cow (1451, 14 Si, 1461) 101 cam
psign against Moscow [1480), 106
Aiguo Treaty of 390
Aix la-ChapdJe, conference at 315
Akhmatova Anna. 445 474 584
AksaLo' Constantine '(>2-3 quoted 43
AkvAov Ivan 3fes 375
Akxikov Seise 359 ramify Chronicle
349
Mans 14
Masks 291 308 sold to U S 389
Albania Communist regime in 534
defiance of Soviet Un-on J63 564
Aleksandrov (town) t'0
Alelv-ev General Mi hael 4)8 440
Alesha Popoi ich 56
Mevisio 128 9
Alexander 1 Emperor ZU 231 273
27 J 347 and srchiiceiure 297 per
«onality 30(3- 2 reign of 300-22.
fust jvnod of reform (1801-5)
302-4 second period of reform
(1807-12 ) 30*4 in 1812 310-3
and foreign policy 1181 2—25 ► 313
8 and su centos 321 and estab
lishmen of universities, 549-40 and
Kanmtin 353-4
Alexander II Emperor and Crimean
3\ar 339 reign ol 368-90- re
forms 569 78 380- and emancips
ben 371-4 reseller 379-80 rep-
putehemtrxl wi.h public 384 foreign
poltc) 384 90 awassiration. 3S4
Alexander III Emperor reign cf 391-
6 support for Cnurch school 437
Alexander of Italic r.bctj [Prm e of
Bulgina) J09
Alexander Nevskii Prince of Nos go-
rod Grand Pnn-c Saint. 92 110
121 126 defeat of Swedes 80 reign
of 79 St) submission to Mongols
*0-8!
Alexander of Tver Grand Pnn« 98
Alexandra Cmprc'S personality nnl
role 396 421 4<J tilled 482
Alexandria Patriarch of 198 9
Alexis Metropolitan, 5aiot 99 112
121
Aleva or Aleksei Tifhaishti (Quietest
Onel Tsar 184 , 188 198 203 207,
213 233 reign of 177-82 interest
in West 177 currency reform ITS
t/foiAwvrcf 1649 178-179
651
652
Alexis, Tsarevich (son of Peter the
Great), 238-9, 243
Alexis, Grand Duke (son of Nicholas
II), 421, 456, 482
Algirdas, see Olgerd
Alipii, Saint, 39
“All power to the Soviets,” 458
All-Russian Congress of Soviets: First,
456; Second. 476; Fifth, 487; re-
placed, 507; see also Supreme Soviet
All-Russian Director, 480
All-Russian Period, 213
Alliance of Three Emperors, 398-9
Allied Control Council in Germany,
536-7
Allies: in First World War. 420; and
Soviet bid for peace, 477; interven-
tion in Russia, 479, 483; difficulties
and policies. 486: reparations de-
manded for, 511; in Second World
War, 522fl
Alliluyeva, Svetlana Iosifovna (daugh-
ter of Stalin); on Stalin. 494
Alphabet, see GJagolithic, Cyrillic
AUranstadt, Treaty of, 222-3
Alvensleben, Count Constantine, 385
AnjaJrik, Andrew, 556
Amastris, attacked by Rus, 26
Ambartsumian, Victor, 583
Ambrosius, 132
American Relief Administration, 489
Amur river, 432; basin, 194
Anarchism, 365-6, 448
Anatolia, 333
Andrew, or Andre!, Bogoliubski?
(Prince of Rostov and Suzdal), 40
Andrew, Grand Prince (son of Alex-
ander Nevskii), 92
Andrew, Saint, the apostle, legend of
converting Russia, 107, 125
Andropov. lurii, Vladimirovich, 545
AntJrusovo, Treaty of, 181
Anglo-Russian Entente, 416
Angola, 561
Anhalt-Zerbst, principality of, 248, 254
Anna (Pavlovna), Grand Duchess, 311
Anna Leopoldovna (Regent), 245
Anne (sister of Byzantine Emperor
Basil II and wife of St. Vladimir), 34
Anne (daughter of Peter I) : appointed
to Supreme Secret Council, 243;
mother of Peter III, 247
Anne, Empress, 246; regent, 243; at-
tempt to limit iter power, 2 44; reign
of, 244—5; establishes a cadet school,
249; and serfdom, 250
Annensky, Innokentii, 444
Antes, 19; TUlcrs. 20; products, 46
Anthony. Saint, 53
Anthony Ulric (Duke of Brunswick-
INDEX
Bevern-Luneburg, husband of Anna
Leopoldovna), 245
Antichrist, Peter the Great as, 239; Na-
poleon as, 310
Anti-Comintern Pact, 515
Anti-Communist bloc, 533
“Anti-Party group,” 543, 560
Anti-Semitism: in Imperial Russia, 394-
5; in Soviet Russia, 577
Antioch, Patriarch of, 198
Appanage Russia, 63-139, 213; coloni-
zation during, 93; institutions, 92-3,
115-19; termination of, at eml of
Basil Ill’s reign. 103; economy, 114-
19; society, 117-18; culture, 120-31;
boyars in, 153-4
Appanages, 92-3; in Muscovite Russia,
111
Appeasement, policy of. 515
Apraksin, Admiral Theodore, 219
“April Theses," 458, 468
Arabs, 16, 75; on Rus, 26
Arakcheev, General Alexis, 318-19
Archangel, or Archangelsk (port), 218;
English port of entry during Ivan
IV s reign, 148; trade center and
route, 169, 277, 281; English re-
stricted to, 207; anti-Soviet center jo,
482. 483; convoys to, 520
Archangel (province), 344
Architecture: in Kievan Russia, 58-9;
in appanage Russia, 126-9; in Mus-
covite Russia, 203-4; in 18th century,
297-8; Soviet, 586; see also Arts
Ardnkhan, 387, 487-8
Argun river, boundary with China, 194
Armenia: conquered by Mongols, 69;
partly ceded to Russia. 330; and
Soviet niie, 485
Armenian Church, discrimination
against. 394, 397
Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, 507
Armstrong, John A„ on Communist
party in Ukraine, 506
Army: reforms of Ivan IV, 146-7; re-
forms of Peter I. 221, 228-9; condi-
tions during World War I, 438, 454-
5. 457, 458 (connected with Revolu-
tion); conditions, end of 1917, 477
Army, Red: in Civil War, 479ff; in
Soviet-Polish War. 484; and national
independence movements, 485; sup-
pression of Kronstadt Rebellion. 488;
and industrialization, 503; and
purges, 504; occupation of Eastern
Poland, 517; in Second World War,
518-26 passim, 593, and scorched-
earth policy, 528; and spread of
Communism, 535; withdrawal from
Poland, 560; suppression of rebellion
INDEX
In Ucnjsiy, 560 intervention. In
Czechoslovakia 563 invasion of Ar
ghanistan 566 and the * new class "
S74
Arsetui (metropolitan of Rostov) 258
Ariel Vi
Arts in Kievan Russia 58-9 »n appa
cage Russia 126-31 in Muscovite
Russia 203-6 in 18th century 297-
% in 1800-1861, 367, m 1861-
1917 4J6 445-7 Soviet 586-7 see
clso Architecture Iconography Mu
sic Theater in Russia
Asia Refer 1 a interest in 226 export
Sion in 388-90 and Soviet policy
557-8 561 562-3 SEATO 559
are also lit Jn id ml countries
Assembly of 1471 (forerunner of *em
skiesobory) 189
Astrakhan khanate of 147 159 192
absorbed by Russia 71 147 formed
(1466) 1Q2 attacked by Crimean
Tartan 151
Astrakhan (town) unrest in J6J 175f
178 223 2J9 trading center 282
Atlantal. Charter 523
Atlantic Defense Pact signed 536
Atomic bomb dropped on Japan 522-3
Atomic v. capons control o( 551 561
566
Attfla the Hun 16
Attlee Clement wartime diplomacy
523
Aucrstadt battle of 308
Aupistus (Roman emperor) legend
that Muscovite rulers descend from
124-5
Augustus II (King of Poland and Elec
tor of Saxony) and Great Northern
War 221 -3 posv»<
Augustus 111 (King of Poland) 252
Austerl tz, battle of 307
Australia in SEATO 559
Austria (and AusirU Hungary) rela
tions with Russia the Crest "^Orth
ern War, 226 Alexis escapes to 238
from Teirr 1 10 Catherine II 251-2
passim Catherine H 264-72 pa*
jim Paul t 274-S in 1801-12 307
in 1812 310-11 pastim in 1812-25
313-17 passim in 1825-56 330-35
parirni Crimean 11 ar 336-9 passim
in 1856-81 379 380 384-8 passim
in 1881-1904 398-401 passim m
1905-14 416-18 passim the 1917
Revolutions, 458 Soviet Russia. 512,
559
Autocracy, 219 l43f 193 develop-
ment in Moscow comparison to
Lithuania 138f Ivan IV 153f after
653
Tun^ cd Troubles 173, and the
boyar dumj 3 73/ JSR Veters yk*
of and his reforms 2l0f 232—4 244
attempt to 1 mil and gentry support
for 244 bdJ Catherine Jl and
Alexander I 303 and “Offcial Na
taonaUty* 324, 372 in views o!
Sluopbiies 363 and Ocmber Mani
fecro 407-8 and Fuodimrnti) Laws,
408 9 recfllja Ausocrlt Central m
don
“Autocnt " u<e of title 107, 141 J45
lute r d uned nfier 1905 401
Avars 16
Avvakum archpriest 198 quoted 196
h s au ob ogj-jphy 20’
Axis power* jn S-cond World War
S20iT
A»r(T Cvrio 414
Arerbujjn 4ia
Arctl aiuiman Soviet Sotulisi Republic
507
\rov ifurtresi and ar-a) captured by
coxsactJ 175 and Peter l 2l9 221
224 252 and Catherine U 265
Bibar I Mongul emperor 1 108
Bier Academician Kiri E*Mt sen 353
Bigdjd Cal ptuic of 41
Bagration Prince Peter JH 112
Baku 425 49)
Bakun n Muhael 364 365-6 381
383 and populism 382
Balakirev Miln. 446
Balallavs battle of 338
Balkan BuJears see Biibjvx
Balkans 203 and rtlipon in Puss a
55 58 200 aid Russian foreign
policy 265 310 330 1 333 -4 336-
40 ptssm 385 387 398 399 416
417-18 3i7 Balkan Wars 417-18.
see uhofepara e PaU<m cnutlir <»
Balmont Consiantinc 444
Balti- (area amt r°tts) 84 220 307
420 trade through 61 26 f dash
ruth Sweden over 221 225-6 230
irot Russian policy 177
Baltic Oerman* 277
Baltic republics and German invasion
525 and Nk\ D 532
BJsic Slavs 80
Baltis-Whiie Sea canal JO 3
Bartuts 589
B-irclay de Tolly Prince Michael 311
Bariatinsky Prince Alexander 389
Bar mi (Architect), 204
Baroque style «1 Muscovy 294
Bar}/ dura (rwiff) 118 iSj 277,
282, 342
654
INDEX
Bashkir republic, 48S
Bashkirs, rebellion among (1705-11),
223, 239
Basil (archbishop of Novgorod), 94
Basil I of Moscow, Grand Prince:
reign of, 101; wars against Lithuania,
JO!
Basil II of Moscow, Grand Prince (the
Blind), 106, 111; reign of, 102-3
Basil III, Grand Prince, 66, 103, 125f,
132, 201; reign of, 103, 108f
Basil II (Byzantine emperor), 34
Basil of Kostroma, Grand Prince, 92
Basil the Squint-eyed, 102
“Basmachi,” 485
Basmanov, Theodore, 162, 16 4
Batlle of. Britain, and Hiller's decision
in the East, 517
"Battle Organization," 406, 413
Batu, Khan, 72; invades and conquers
Russia, 70, retrenches, 71
Batum, 387, 483
Baumgartcn, Nicholas p. S. von, on
matrimonial alliances of Kiev, 38
Bayer, Gottlieb S., on origins of
Kievan Russia, 23
Baykov, Alexander, on industrializa-
tion, 497
Bazarov, hero of Fathers and Sons
(Turgenev), 448; and concept of
nihilism, 441
Bazhenov, Basil (architect), 298
Beccarin, Crimes and Punishment,
258-9
Bekovich-Chcrkasskii, Prince Alexan-
der, 226
Belgium, 331, 419; in NATO, 536
Belgrade: Treaty of, 252; Red Army
in, 522
Beliaev, Pavel, 582n
Belingshausen, Thaddcus, 353
Belinsky, Vissarion, 354, 364-5 passim,
381, 448; on Gogol, 359; on Dos-
toevsky, 441
Beloff, Max, on Soviet foreign policy,
510
Beloozero (or Byeloozero), 24
Belorussians, see White Russians
Belsky family, 144
Bely, Andrei (Boris Bugaev), 444,
584
BenckendorfT, Count Alexander, 326
Bend, President Eduard, 535
Benois, Alexander, 440, 444; Petrouch-
ka, 446
Berdiaev, Nicholas: and Vekhi, 451; on
Marxism-Leninism, 470
Bereday, George Z. F., comparison of
education in U-S.S.R. and U.S.A.,
579-80
Berezina river, 312
Bergson, Abram: on five-year plans,
501; on agricultural goals adopted
by Twenty-second Party Congress,
549
Beria, Lavrentii (head of N.K.V.D.),
505,533
Bering, Vitus (explorer), 239
Bering Strait, 194
Berlin, Isaiah, on attraction of com-
munism, 472
Berlin: held by Russian army, 252;
1833 meeting and Convention of,
334; Congress of, 387; financial
market, 400; captured by Red Army,
521f; question of, 523, 558; and Cold
War, 537; East, riots in, 55S
Bcrlin-Baghdad railroad, 418
Bertinian Annals, 25
Bespopovtsy (priestlcss), religious dis-
senters, 399
Bessarabia: accepts Lithuanian suzer-
ainty, 135, 529; Russian advance
into, 265; ceded to Russia (1812),
308; part ceded to Turkey, 339;
southern areas ceded to Russia, 387;
ceded to Rumania, 487; ceded to
Soviet Russia, formed into Molda-
vian S.S.R., 517
“Bestuzhev courses,” 438£
Bestuzhev-Riumin, Constantine, 438
Bcstuzhcv-Riumin, Count Alexis, 247;
and Russian foreign policy, 251-3
Bctsky, Ivan, 289
Bible Society, 319
Bichurin, Father Iakinf, 353
Biren (or Biron), Ernst-Johann, 242,
245
Birger (Swedish commander of the
Battle of Neva), 80
Bironovshchina, 245
Bismarck, Prince Otto von: and Rus-
sian foreign policy, 385-90 passim,
399; and Berlin Congress, 387-8
Bjorko, Treaty of, 416
Black, C. E., quoted on Soviet relations
with the West, 527
“Black Hundreds,” 408, 450
‘‘Black Partition’ 1 or “Total Land Parti-
tion,” 384
Black Sea: controlled by Turkey, 115,
219; fleet in, 252, 266, and Russian
penetration, 265-7, 277, 308; ports
and trade, 281, 337, 345; and the
Crimean War, 337-9; neutralization
of, 339; provinces, use of free labor
in agriculture, 342; provisions of the
Treaty of Paris abrogated, 385-6; in
World War 1, 420; see also Straits
Blackstone, Sir William, effect on re-
forms of Catherine II, 262
Blitzkrieg, 518ff
656
INDEX
Buturlin, Basil (boyar), emissary to
Perciaslav rada, 180
By liny, 203; Kievan cycle, 56; Nov-
gorcdian cycle, 86
Byzantine Church, in Russia before the
conversion, 3*1; jurisdiction m Rus-
sia, 38, 54; Russian administrative
break with (1443), 103, 121
Byzantium, influence on Muscovite
State, 75; cultural influence, 34f, 53-
60 passim, 1.03; marriage of Sophia
Paleologuc, 107; icons, 204-5
Cadets, see Constitutional Democratic
party
Calendar; Julian, 221; Gregorian, 478
California, Russians in, 309
Calvinism, comparison to Old Belief,
200
Campbell, Robert W., on Seven-Year
Plan, 546
Campuchea, 566
Canada, and NATO, 536
Canals: Volga-Neva, 237; Volga Don,
237, 531; Baltic-White Sea, 503;
built with forced labor, 503
Canton, rebellion smashed in, 512
Capitalism; and “possessionary" labor,
279; emergence, 405; and industriali-
zation, 424-7; in Marxism-Leninism,
468-9
"Capitalist” production, 342
Carelia, see Karelia
Carpalho-Ruthenian area, incorporated
into U.S.S.R., 534
Carr, Edward H.: on nationalization of
industry, 478-9; on Soviet history,
591
Casimir IV of Lithuania and Poland,
135. agreement with Tver. 105; al-
liance with Mongols, 106
Caspian Sea, Russian interests, 226, 330
Castlereagh, Viscount, at the Congress
of Vienna, 314, 317-18
Cathedrals, see Churches
Catherine 2, Empress (wife of Peter I),
238, 239; reign of, 243
Calherine II, the Great, 242, 251, 274,
276-7, 284, 303; coup, 248; reign of,
254-73; personality, 254-7; and the
Legislative Commission, 257-60; re-
forms of, Church, 257-8; gentry and
serfs, 261-3; administration, 263-4;
foreign affairs, 264-72; evaluation,
272-3; and Westernization, 285-6;
and education, 288-90; literary ac-
tivity of, 294; views on serfdom,
295; and architecture, 297-8; and
Russian theater, 298
Catherine (daughter of Tsar Ivan V),
243, 245
Catholic, see Roman Catholic
CattcII, David T., on Spanish Civil
War, 514-15
Caucasus: conquered by Mongols, 69;
expansion and pacification of 263’
308, 331, 387, 388-9, in writings of
Lermontov, 358; German offensive
toward, 521; autonomous republics
in, 532; people of, in U.S.S.R., 57G
Ceausescu, Nicholas, 563
Censorship, 326-7, 329, 392-3, 584-6
Census: in the reign of Peter I, 234-5;
of 1794-96, 263; of 1959, 528
Center faction (Communist party), and
Stalin, 490
“Centers for liquidating illiteracy,”
578
Central Asia, 486, 487; explorations,
226, 353; Russian trade with, 282,
345; Russian expansion in and con-
flict with Great Britain, 388-9; oppo-
sition to Soviet regime in, 485; and
virgin soil project, 594
Central Committee, see Communist
party
Central Powers, 420
Centralization: development of, 103—
8, 110-13, 119, 150-1; before Time
of Troubles, 158f; after Time of
Troubles, 173; connection to serf-
dom. 186; development in Muscovite
Russia, 187, 195; views of historians
on development of, 195; Petrine re-
forms, 23011; reforms of Catherine
II, 261-3; and social criticism, 293-
6; strengthened by reforms of Sper-
anslcy, 306-7; Nicholas’s system,
324-7; Alexander III, 391-8, 392f;
and ‘‘counterreforms,” 392-3; see
also Ideologies
Cbaadaev, Peter, 361, 367; Philosophi-
cal Letfcrs, 361: Apology o/ a Mad-
man, 361
Chagall, Marc, 437
Chaikovsky, Nicholas, 482
Chaliapin, Theodore, 446
Chamberlain, Neville, 515
Chamberlin, William H., quoted on
February Revolution, 453
"Chancellery language,” 202
Chancellor, Richard, 148
Chang-chun, 403
Charles J (King of England), 207
Charles II (King of England), 196,
207 .
Charles VI (Holy Roman Emperor),
gives protection to Alexis, 238
Charles XII (King of Sweden): and
Great Northern War, 221-6 passim;
route of invasion followed by Na-
poleon, 311
<558
Civil strife (Com/.)
sus Suzdal, 99f; in Golden Horde,
100; on death of Basil I, 102 {; Time
of Troubles, 1 57-74: o/ro Rebel-
lions; Revolution
Civil War. 479-80, 488; and Stalin,
493
Class privileges, and education, 351
Clement, Metropolitan, 54
Clergy; represented in zemskii sobor of
id! 3, 171, 189; representation in
Legislative Assembly, 259; in 18th
century, 283; and October Revolu-
tion, 571
Coexistence, in Soviet policy, 511, 557
passim, 594
Collective farms ( kolkhozes ): function,
497-9, 50l; during the Second World
War, 529; and post-war period, 531;
decrease in, 548; criticism by Khru-
shchev, 548-50, 572-3; in Eastern
Europe, 535
“Collective leadership," 540, 541-2,
545
Collective security, 513
Collectivization, 496-501; and foreign
policy, 496; effects of, 497-S00, 572;
m Eastern Europe, 535
Collegia, or colleges: replace prikazy,
23 1 ; replaced by ministries, 303-4
Cominform, see Communist Informa-
tion Bureau
Comintern, sec Communist Interna-
tional (Third)
"Commanding heights," 489
Commissariat of Foreign Affairs: and
purges, 504; and Communist Inter-
national, 510
Commission for the Establishment of
Popular Schools, 290
Committee of Ministers, 325
Committee of the Sixth of December,
325
Commune, see Peasantry
Communism, international: and purges,
504; and opportunities after Second
World War, 529; and downgrading
of Stalin, 539, 541-2; and Hungarian
rebellion, 560; and the Soviet inter-
vention in Czechoslovakia, 563; see
also Bolshevism; Ideologies; Lenin-
ism; Marxism; and individual coun-
Communist bloc, 533, 537, 594-5
Communist China, sec Chinese People’s
Republic
Communist empire, 594-5
Communist Information Bureau (Coia-
inform); established, 536; abolished,
559
Communist International (Third)
INDEX
(Comintern): and Soviet foreign pol-
icy, 510, 511; and Seventh Congress
and popular fronts, 514; disbanded.
536
Communist Parly of the Soviet Union,
465; role in government, 487-8; po-’
litical struggle after Lenin, 490K; and
Stalin’s activity, 493; and N.EP,
495; Great Purge, 503-6; and Sialin
system, 505(1; role of, under Const!-
tutran of 1936, 5G6f; controls over
Soviet society, 529, 555-6, 594-6;
ideological control, 568-9, 575-77,
581-9 passim; role composition, or-
ganization, 568-70; views on, 591-3;
dictatorship of, 595; Political Bureau
(Politburo or Politburcnu) , 487,
504, 505, 593 passim, and emphasis
on Great Russians, 577; and foreign
policy, 512(1; post-war period pol-
icies. 530, 532; merged inlo Pre-
sidium, 533; name Politburcnu re.
stored after Khrushchev's fall, 533,
544; and “socialist realism," 584; and
religion, 587-9; Central Committee,
487; and purges, 504; supports Khru-
shchev, 541-2; Congress: Second,
406, Eleventh, on N.E.P., 489-90,
Fifteenth, 491, Seventeenth, 505,
Eighteenth, 505, Twentieth, on Stalin,
494, 540-1, Twenty-first, on collec-
tive farms, 548, Twenty-second, on
Stalin, 494, on purges, 503, 540-1,
560, narty program, 542, 560, on
agricultural goals, 548-9, on educa-
tion, 579, Twenty-third, 544, 551,
Twenty-fourth, 544, Twenty-fifth,
544, 551, Twenty-sixth, 544; Pre-
sidium, 533, reduced after Stalin,
540, name changed back to Politbu-
rcau after Khrushchev's fall, 544
Comte, Auguste, positivism and com-
munism, 472
Concentration camps, see Forced labor
camps
Concert of Europe, 307; sec also Con-
gross System
Confederation of Bar, 268, 271
Confederation of Targowica, 270
Congo, 560
Congress of Berlin, 387-8, 398
Congress of Soviets: replaced by the
Supreme Soviet, 507; see also All-
Russian Congress of Soviets
Congress of Vienna, 314
Congress System, 315-17
Conquest, Robert, on the great purge,
504
Conscription, 228-9; universal military
service, 377-8
Counsel! if&at, 306
INDEX
Constantine (Nikolaevich), Grand
Duke and emancipaiion 372 and
mil lary reforms 378 resignation of
391-2
CooMaDime (Pavlovich) Grand Duke
grid the “Greek project." 266 and
Decembrist uprising. 321 325 ttt
Polish rebellion of 1831 332
Constantine VI Porphyrogemtus 26
and Olgn 31 on Russian commerce
43-7 passim
Constantine IX Monomakh legend of
b» regalia 107 124, Jff nlro “Hat
of Vemamakfc"
Constantine XI (Byzantine emperor)
107
Constantinople relations with Russ a
26 70-1 78 trade With 30 41 5
sacked by CruMders in 1204 4) fill
to Turks (1453) and efferJ of Rus
sia 103 and schism in Russia 198
200 passim and Russian foreign poi
icy 2ZI 26J 3[0 333 387 417
420 White Army evacuated to 483
see also Byzantium Straits
Constituent assembly demanded by
Tver gentry 379 by radicals 408
by Cadets 410 and Provisional Gov
eminent 4T7-8 460- J and Kron
stadi rebellion 488
Constituent Assembly election to
476-7 disbanded by Bolsheviks 47"
opposition to Soviet rule 48 1
Cwijwui/wuif Chatter of the Rtustan
Empire (Novosihsev) 306-7 318
Constitutional Democratic pmy
founded 405 406-7. ui First Duma
4J0 m Second Duma 411 jn Third
and Fourth Dumas, 412-11 in Pro-
vincial Government 455, 458 and
Kornilov, 459-60 suppressed 478
Constitutionalism and Anne 244 and
Speransky s proposal 304-7 and
Novosiltsev J06-7 and Decern
bnsts 320 nnd views of Slavophile*
on 363 and loins Melikov 384
and October Manifesto 407-8 and
Fundamental Laws 408-9 see also
Duma, Nicholas II Provisional Gov
eminent
Constituiions First Soviet 487 Stalin
1st ofl 936 506-8
Contemporary The 357, 44S
Continental blockade 310
Cooperative movement 432-3
"Cosmopolitanism ” 377
Cowacki US’ conquest of Siberia,
152-3 in Time of "Doubles, 162
166f against gentry legislation 170,
ttkhorts with Romanovs J7i 175-7
pairlfti relations with Russia 232
659
and Pugachev rebcJlon 260t and
Catherine 11 2£>3 rrpn-sr-ttcj n
Legixliuve Commission 2)9 typos i
non to Soviet rule 48&-2ff see a ho
Dnieper Don Kuban Orenburg
and (Jrai cossrtckj
Coi ncil of 4 ffurtJrcd Chrpirn stt
Church coum-il
Coun il of Mi lual Leorrv m \ssn
Unec (COMFCOK) *14
Council of NpSaMtf , n Nt-^armJ Sj
in Pskov 87
Council of Peoples Commisa’s
fanned 475 under Lo strut on cf
»*>36 507-S
"Couritrtrfeirms 3Q1 *a2-4
( ourlanJ Dncb) uf takrn by husiu
in Polish r?rtnors 270 tee aim
Fml'i cl Duke of CouJLrj
Ctocov inf 3)4 17,
Crimen lii mate of ! 14 fttworl-J by
Russn )l create * 430) 102
under Turkish suzc nv ('4751
102 rtlat otts with Moscow 106 7
U’« 151 ’ W 4 ’ll raided hv cos
siuks l"9 am) Calvin' 1 If 265 6
Crmean Tutnrs inilefcnd nee move
nertanmg 485 532
( iimne War -'ll J29 136-40 146-7
384 38 38f und need tot retorm
170 J19
Critical rejlism 4-ff
Critically thinking indiv Jjils"469
Cross Smiue! If tr « Ut cm of Pn
irw-y Oironi in quo <d 24 5
Crossmsn R H 5 The Gtd That
Failed cd 471
Crus vies irToence on trade 41
Cuba and Sox cl policy 561 594
tut Caesar 446
Cull ol personality JS9f
Cultural autonomy under Constitution
of 1936 *07 «ri, 1st Ol nlines 576-7
Cultural cxchanees," 4J7
Colton? of Km an RusvJ 5< 60 of
Novg, rod SS 7 of appanage Ri»
su I20-3 of \1issio\Uc Rlvj/ 8
WS-’O') ot Petr Ju nmej 251-8 of
I8lh century 285 99 of first half of
19th trntury 34S-67 1661-1917
435-52 Soviet 581-8
Cumins tee To ovtsy
Curzon Line 484 524
Cypnan 126
Cyprus (ishndl occeped by Great
Britain 3 88
Cyril and Methodius Saints apostles to
Ihc Slav* 55
Cyril of Turov Sunt. 57
Cyrillic alphabet, 55 reformed 237,
emphasized by the Soviet regmt*. ''7
660
:ndex
Czarloryski, Prince Adam, 303
Czech Legion, and Civil War, 480-2
passim
Czechoslovakia: Russian alliance with,
514; and Munich, 515-16; post-war,
534; Communist regime in, 535, 537;
Soviet intervention (assisted by East
Germany, Poland, Bulgaria and Hun-
gary) in 1968, 563; feelings toward
Soviet Union, 594-5
Dagestan, ceded to Russia, 308
Daladicr, Edouard, 515
Dallin, Alexander, on German conduct
in Second World War, 526
Dallin, David J., on forced-labor
camps, 503
Daniel (Prince of Volynia), 90
Daniel (Prince of Moscow), establishes
Moscow dynasty, 97
Daniel (metropolitan of Moscow), 124
Daniel, Julius, 555
Danilevsky, Nicholas, Russia and Eu-
rope, 450
Danton, Georgcs-Jncqucs, 592
Danube: control over mouth of, 330;
ceded to Turkey, 339
Danubian principalities (Moldavia and
Wallachia) : Napoleon objects to
Russian control of, 3 JO; autonomy
under Russian protectorate. 331; in-
tervention in 1848, 335; and Crimean
Wnr, 337-9
Danzig, 268-70, 513, 516
Dargomyzhsky, Alexander, 357, 367
Daruga, 71
Davlet-Geray, Khan (Crimean), 151
Decembrist Movement and Rebellion,
319-22, 324
Decembrists, 360, 366, 370, 382
“Deconcenlration” in economy, 546
De la Gardie, Magnus, 167
Delianov, Ivan, 392. 437
Demidov Law School, 350
"Democratic centralism,’’ 506
Denikin, General Anthony, 481-3 pas-
sim, 486-7
Denisov brothers, Andrew ami Simeon
(leaders of Old Believers), 199
Denmark: in the Great Northern War,
221, 225; allied with Russia against
Sweden, 272; and Soviet Russia, 512;
in NATO, 536
Depression of 1900, 426
Derzhavin, Gabriel, 292-3
Detente, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 558, 562
Deulino, truce of, 176
Deutschcr, Isaac, on Slalin, 493-4
Devier, sea Viere, Anthony de
DeWitt, Nicholas: on Soviet education,
580
Dezhnev, Semen, 197
Diaghilev, Serge, 444 s 446
Diakonov, Mikhail A.: on kholoov,
118; quote on zemskie sobory, 187-
on boyar duma, 188-9
“Dialectic” in Marxism, 466-7
Dictatorship of the proletariat: and
Lenin, 467-8; in land of peasants,
495; and Constitution of 1936, 506
Diderot, Denis, 264
Dionysus (abbot), 170
Dionysus (icon painter), 130
Directory of the Rada, 4B5
Disraeli, Benjamin, 387
Dissent, in the Soviet Union, 555-6,
597; see also Solzhenitsyn, Alexander
Dmitrii, Grand Prince (son of Alex-
ander Nevskii), 92
Dmitrii of Tver, Grand Prince, 97-8
Dmitrii (Prince of Suzdal), 99
Dmitrii Donskoi of Moscow, Grand
Prince (son of Ivan II), 99; defeats
Mongols, 71, 100; Smut, 100; reign
of, Ulf, 121; literature on, J26f
Dmitrii (first son of Ivan IV), 149
Dmitrii (Prince of Uglich), 155f, 160-
2, 164, 165-6; canonized, 164
Dmitrii, see False Dmitrii
Dmitrov (town), 104
Dneprodzerzhinsk, riot in, 556
Dnieper river, 28 ct passim, 109, 133,
179; canai to West Dvina, 344; sue
also Trade, routes
Dnieper (river) cossacks: and the War
of Liberation, 180; and policy of
Catherine II, 263; see also Cossacks
Dniester river, 267
Dobb, Maurice H., and forced-labor
camps, 503
Dobroliubov, Nicholas, 381, 449
Dobrudja, 387
Dobrynin Nikitych, 56
“Doctors’ plot,” 538
Dogger Bank, 403
Doktadchik, 83
Dolgorukaia, Princess, 244
Dolgoruky, Prince Ivan (favorite of
Peter II), 243
Dolgoruky, Prince Jacob, 219
Dolgorukys, 243-4
Domostroi (“house manager”), quoted,
202
Don river: trade route, 115; Volga-Don
canal, 531
Don (river) cossacks: seize fortress of
Azov (1637), 176; in rebellion of
Razin, 178; in rebellion of Bulavin,
223; controls over, tightened, 232;
in rebellion of Pugachev, 260f; au-
tonomy of, limited, 263; sent to in-
vade India, 275; opposition to Soviet
1 «DEX
66 1
rule 4£t » NmtvBJ of Sholokhov
m
Dorosfcenko Hetman Peter Jgj
Dorastolon jeeSilutna
Dorpat (or Ii»rev>, 148 222
Dorjwt tmisersityfn 350
Dostoevsky Fedor 440 443 nnJ the
"golden age ’ 34S, 360 436 sod
Peimhtvisy 366 and popufiyn 332
Poor Fnfi 441 flairs from the
House of (he Demi 441 Crime and
Punishment 441 The Idiot 441 T lie
Possessed 441 FAe flrorAem Kom
ma tcv 44 1 as conservative philo-
sopher 441-2 and Pan-Shvism 450
Dfevliane 30 33
Pristra see StiisUu
Dtiuhimn Nikolai M on peasant re-
forms of Alexander 1 304 on kisc
)e » » reforms, 328
DuWek Alexander <63
Pukfmbory persecution of 397
Dunn and proposals of Speransk>
305 cxmsuluuvc created 407 8
representative granted 407-9 and
liberalism 4J0 boyar 50f i:0 144
150 167 169 173 175 214 and
False Dinutii 164 development of
189 supports Naryshkins 214 and
Peter 1 21% 23U state r,rst, 409
10 Second 4jt Third 412 413
414 Fourth 412 and the war effort
420 and February Revolution 433-
5 457-8
Ponlop Douglas M quoted on kha
Kirs 16-17
puranty Walter quoted on five year
plans 492
Patch vrade and relations wnh W4-5
208 220 282 see also Netherlands
Clvrna Northern vnd jstry along 277
Dvma Western 268 linked by canal
to Dnieper 344
Dtoncrie $2
D*omilr Francis on the Byzantine
hentace of Russia 35
Dzerzhinsky Felix 478
Dzugashvili see Stalin
East Slavs, see Slavs East
Eastern Rumeiia 387, 399 see also
Bulgaria
Economic council* regional J46
Economy of Eastern Slavs 19 45-6
4$ of Kievan Russia 43-S of ap-
panage Russia 1 14-19 of Muscovite
Russia 184-8 ui Igth century 235-
7 *56-%2 m 341-5 at
1861-1917, 422-34 ens« m follow
ing War Cornmuoi'/n 4§s Soviet
Russian in 1920’s 494 and Coststi
Jiaion of 1936 508 danu« l0 in
Second World War <28
rccoBstrucfioit of 530 development
< t after Stalin 546-53 <90 rf^er*
m control of 346-7 see oh* Apt-
culture Five year p's-s Indusijialr
ration Industry NEP S^vcntwr
Plan War Communism
Eduction w Kwian Russ a fO map.
panage Pussiv jji , n Muscovite
Russia 206 7 under Peter 1 237-8
ft Hth centun 2*5-91 in JBOO-
1861 , 49-52 in 1 * 61-1317 415
435 R and faction after 1866 }S0
in Sonet flu‘»U <77 8J 59<
f fro minis hum 86
Egorov Bottv <8*
Egypt and the Greek Wjr ol lrdenee
den v c 33(1 lonlkt with Turkey
< 3 <3fi Suti Canal ens > (19'61
c 60 ihe Arab Israeli «v ol 1067
arid S ivict policy <61 st else I ra'l
IBP everts of M0-13 depi ted in
War at d f rare s'Ws’o.) 443
Fasten Mbm 5ft 1 2
Enenhosser D»i f ht D NATO com
wander 536 and the Geneva (on
tc fence <59
EiserMem Scree <87 Herat der he*
Ait 8 ft
Ekaterinburg mperial family killed in
>8:
Elba (Kind) M3
ribe riser *22, «9t
Flections in Soviet Ru« a und r first
Soviei constant on 487 o der Cor
dilution of 1936 506
Flecotal liw and tbe f rsi Duma -07
Electoral kav ol WOT 411-12 453-4
Elijah 6n nl -.6
FI labeth Lmpie < sdjugV-f of pect
II 242 l 2<Sf 26< teigtt ol 24b-
8 and serfJooi 2-*»-<0 pJtnm death
and ns effect on to*ei"0 policy 252
5 mJ Western izat on -8Jf
Elizabeth l tQu-ctt of £n eland) cot
tespondence v. h Ivan IV 2921
Emancipation of Labor Group *-06
rnvanctpM on o' «rft 369-74 com
pared to era an ipoubti of slaves dt
US and to Prussian reforms 573
criticism of *73-4 see also "Great
reforms" Peasantry Serfdom
“Emperor" W\c of Russusn rulers 22<
compared to "i<ar " 23®
Encyclopedists 2S9
Eneelt, Fnedrieh. 465-13 po«m*
595 - 1 , ,
England re 1 won* with Novgorod 8-,
relations with Muscovite Russia I4S
160 W4-S 207, pa Umcnfacy xtrug-
662
England: (Coni.)
gle compared to Russia’s, 191; rela-
tions with Imperial Russia, 220 pas-
sing: influence on reforms of Cath-
erine II, 258, 262; see also Great
Britain
Enisci river, 152
Enlightened despotism, 230, 272
Enlightenment, the, 294, 360; and Cath-
erine II, 258ff, 272; Russian, 286,
and education of Alexander I, 301,
302; and Decembrists, 320; see also
Age of Reason
Epiphanius the Wise, 126
Erfurt meeting (1808), 310
Erivan, ceded to Russia, 330
Erlich, Alexander, on collectivization,
496
Ermak, conquest of Siberia, 1 52-3
Esenin, Serge, 445, 584
Estates General, similarity to zemskle
sobory, 189, 191
Estonia. 80; in the Great Northern War,
222ff; acquired by Russia, 225; and
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 477; and
Judenich, 482, 487; and Soviet re-
gime, 484, 487; becomes indepen-
dent, 484; and Litvinov Protocol and
treaty of nonaggression, 514; and
mutual assistance pact, 517; incorpo-
ration into U.S.S.R., 517
Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, 532
Eurasian School, 9; on Mongol influ-
ence, 72f, 74-6
Europe, eastern: German expansion in,
516; Soviet control over, 532; 534-5;
collectivization and industrialization
in, 535; religious and communist ex-
pansion in, 535, 595; uprisings and
unrest, 555-6, 558-60, 563-6; see
also individual count; is.?
Evtushenko, Eugene, 597
Executive Committee of the All-Russian
Congress of Soviets, 456, 460, 487
Executive Committee of the “Will of
the People,” see “Will of the People"
Extraordinary Commission to Combat
Counterrevolution, Sabotage, and
Speculation, see Cheka
Ezhov, Nicholas, 504-5
Ezltovshchina. 504
Fainsod, Merle: quoted on Lenin and
the October Revolution, 453; on
purges, 504-5; on Smolensk party
archives, 506
False Dmitrii (I), 160-4
False Dmitrii (II), “The Felon of Tu-
sliino,” 166-70 passim
False Dmitrii (III), 170
False Peter, 165-6
INDEX
Family, attitude toward in Soviet Rus-
sia, 574-5
Famines: of 1601-3, 159, 160; of
1891-92, 405, 431, and collectivi-
zation, 497
Far East: expansion in, 388-90; con-
flict with Japan in 1904-5, 401-3;
and Civil War, 483; Soviet policy in’
515; War in, 522-3; see also individ-
ual countries
Fay, Sydney, on First World War, 416
February 19 (March 3), 1861, Mani-
festo of, 371; see also Emancipation
of serfs
February Revolution (March, 1917)
4S5ff
February speech, see Khrushchev or
Communist party of the Soviet Union
Federal Republic of Germany (West
Germany), 537, 559
Fedor, see Theodore
Fedotov, George P.: quoted on Kievan
culture, 52; on Hilarion, 57
“Felon of Tushino, The,” see False
Dmitrii (II)
Feoklistov, Konstantin, 582n
Ferdinand of Saxe-Cobnrg (Prince of
Bulgaria), 399
Fel-Shcnshin, Athanasius, 444
Feudalism in Russia, 41, 49; question
of, 115-17; compared to West, 116-
17; in Muscovite Russia, 184
Fieravanti, Aristotle, 128
Fiiofci, sec Philothcus
Finland, and Finnish territory, 225f,
252; grand duchy of, 308, and policy
of Russification, 397-8, 415; and
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 477-8; and
Soviet regime, 484; becomes indepen-
dent, 484, 487; treaty of nonaggres-
sion with Russia, 517; joins German
invasion, 517fl; surrender, 522; and
Karelo-Finnish S.S.R., 532; pence
treaty with Allies, 534; and Com-
munists, 534-5; Porkkala Base, 534,
559
Finland, Gulf of: Swedish territory on,
176; Russians firmly established at,
222, 225
FinlandStation (Pe trograd ) , 45 8
Fin nic-spea king tribes, in Great Russian
ethnic type, 94
Finns, 79
Fires of 1862, 379
First Academic Expedition, 297
First Turkish War (1768-74), 260, 264
First World War, 415-16, 419-2! pas-
sim, and Revolutions of 1917, 454-5,
458
Fischer, George: on zemstvo system,
376; on liberalism, 450
664
Gatchina, 275, 482
“Gathering of Russia," 66, 85, 104-6,
110-13 passim, 158
Gedymin, or Gediminas (Grand Prince
of Lithuania), 133-4
General disarmament, and Soviet pol-
icy, 61 4f
General Secretariat (Ukrainian), 484
Geneva, summit conference (1955),
559
Genghiz Khan, see Jenghiz Khan
Genoa, economic conference, 512
Genoese colonies, 115
Gentry, 195; and Ivan TV’s military
service regulations, 146; before Time
of Troubles, 158f; during Time of
Troubles, 365-74 passim; of Moscow,
173, 370-1; supports autocracy, 186;
strength of in zemskie sobory, 189;
supports Naryshkins, 214; compul-
sory state service instituted by Peter
I, 228, 235; seeks advantages and
supports Catherine II, 262; Polonized
iu Western provinces, 277. 333; sup-
orts autocratic powers of Anne,
44; compulsory state service abol-
ished by Peter III, 248; gains of, in
1725-62, 248-50; in Catherine IPs
Legislative Commission, 259; under
Catherine II, 261-3, 272; “Golden
Age of Gentry,” 261-63, 274, 283-4;
incorporation and Charter of No-
bility, 262; under Paul I, 274; and
agriculture, in 1800-1861. 341-2; de-
cline of, 346, 423-4; and economic
conditions before “Great reforms,"
369; and emancipation of serfs, 369,
370-4; aud zemstvo system. 375; of
Tver, 379; supports reaction, 393;
representation in dumas, 412; and
October Revolution, 477, 571; see
also Boyars; Nobility
Gentry Bank, established by Elizabeth,
249
Gentry culture, 286, 348-9
Geographic factors, influence on Rus-
sian history, 8-10
George, sec lurii
George, Saint, 46
Georgia: conquered by Mongols, 69;
requests Russian suzerainty, 155; an-
nexed to Russia, 308; and war with
Persia, 330; and Soviet regime, 484;
Menshevik republic in, 485
Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic and
Georgians, 507; uprising in 1956,
556; attitudes toward Soviet Union,
594
German Democratic Republic (East
Germany), 534, 537; uprisings, 556;
participates in Soviet invasion of
INDEX
Czechoslovakia, 563; feelings, toward
Soviet Union, 595
German Knights, 66, 79, 80-1, 132-5
passim, 148
“German party” in Russia, 245, 253
German states, 220, 233,251
Germanization, by Teutonic Knights, 80
Germans, 69; in Russia, 84, 244-6
247-8, 263, 525
Germany, relations with Russia; in
1825-56, 331; in 1856-81, 385; in
1881-1914, 398-401, 416-19 passtm;
First World War, 419-20; and Soviet
Russia, 477, 478, 480; Nazi Germany
and Soviet Russia, 496, 502, 509-18
passim; Second World War, 520-6
passim; in 1945-68, 524, 533, 537,
558f, 593-4; see also Federal Repub-
lic of Germany; German Demo-
cratic Republic; German states; Prus-
sia
Gershenkron, Alexander P.- on growth
of Russian economy, 424; on peasant
commune, 431; on economic devel-
opment, 434; on collectivization, 496
Gide, Andr6, on Soviet Russia, 591
Gicrck, Edward, 564-5
Giers, Nicholas, 399
Gilds, Emil, 587
Glagolithic alphabet, 55
Gleb and Boris, Saints, sons of St. Vla-
dimir, 37, 53
Glinka, Michael, 357, 367
Glinskaia. Helen (mother of Ivan IV),
143
Glinsky, Prince Michael, 143
Gncdich, Nicholas, 355
“Go to the people" (v narod) move-
ment, 382-3, 448; see also Populism
God That Failed, The, 471
Godunov, Boris, 155-6 passim, 164,
188-9; Tsar, reign of, 160-2
Godunova, Irene (wife of Tsar Theo-
dore I), 156
Godunovs, 163, 164, 166; see also
Theodore II
Gogol, Nicholas, 358-9; Dead Souls,
354, 359; Evenings on a Farm near
Dikanka, 358; Inspector General,
359. 367; A Nose, 359; Notes of a
Madman, 359; Taras Bulba, 358;
Selected Passages from Correspon-
dence with Friends, 359
Gold standard: established, 398; and
industrialization, 425
“Golden age” in literature, 348-67
passim .
Golden Horde, 71, 74-6, 9 If, 112; ,n
struggle between Moscow and Tver,
97-9; defeated at Vozha, 100, de-
feated at Kulikovo, 100; attacks on
666
INDEX
Guards, regiments of: ( Cont .)
HI, 248; mutiny in Scmenovskii regi-
ment, 316-17
Guberttiia, reforms of: under Peter I,
232; under Catherine H, 261-2
Gubnye officials, 192
Guchkov, Alexander, 415, 420; in Pro-
visional Government, 455, 458
Guerrier, Vladimir, 438
Guerrilla movements during Second
World War, in occupied countries,
525, 527
Gulistan, Treaty of, 308
Gumilev, Nicholas, 444-5
Gustavos II, or Gustavus Adolphus
(King of Sweden), 176
Hadrian, Patriarch, 216, 232
Hagiography, 126; in Muscovite Russia,
202
Hague Peace Conference, 400
Haimson, Leopold, on Russia, 1905-
1917, 453
Halccki, Oscar, quoted on Lithuania
and European history, 132
Hango, battle of, 225
Hanover, 225. 252
Hanseatic League, 84, 148; Russian
commercial treaty with, 160
Hapsburgs, 152; and Russian foreign
policy, 251; sec also Austria
Harbin, 401
Hardenberg, Prince Karl August von, at
the Congress of Vienna, 314 passim
Hardrada. Harold, 37
"Hat of Monomakh," legend of, 107,
124
Hegel; influence in Russia, 361, and
Marxism, 466
Hegelianism and Left Hegelianism, 365
Helen, Grand Duchess, favored emanci-
pation, 372
Heilie, Richard, on selfdom, 1 86
Helsinki, university in, 350; 1975 con-
ference, 562
Henry V1TI (King of England), 154
Henry of Valois, 152, 251
Herberstein, Sigismund von, 108
Hermanrie, 15
Hcrmogcn, Patriarch, 169-70, 198; sup-
ports candidacy of Michael, 171
Herodotus, 8, 13f, 19
Herzegovina: insurrection in, 386; oc-
cupied by Austria-Hungary, 388; an-
nexed by Austria-Hungary, 417
Herzen, Alexander, 360, 362, 364-7,
371, 381; quoted on Catherine U,
254; My Past and Thoughts, 365;
and populism, 382
Hilarion, Metropolitan, 38, 57
His Majesty’s Own Chancery: orga-
nized, 325; First Department, 325;
Second, 325; Third, 325, concern
over dangers of serfdom, 370;
Fourth, 325-6, and education for
girls, 351; Fifth, 326
Historians, Lithuanian, on Union of
Lublin, 137
Historians, Marxist and Soviet: on de-
cline of Kiev, 40-1; on Kievan agri-
culture, 45; on feudalism, 49, 115-
16; on rise of Moscow expansion,
110, 112-13, on Ivan IV, 154; on
Time of Troubles, 172-3; on agricul-
ture in Muscovite Russia, 184; on
support of gentry by autocracy, 186;
on zemskie sobory, 190; on develop-
ment of centralized state in Russia,
195; on Catherine II, 272-3; on
Western influence, 299-300; on peas-
ant reforms of Alexander I. 304; on
national resistance to Napoleon, 313;
on Nicholas I, 340; on definition of
workers, 343; on prereform Russia,
346; on peasant uprisings, 370; on
emancipation of serfs, 373; on con-
ditions of gentry after the reforms,
424; on wages of Russian workers
before First World War, 429; on role
of U.S.S.R. in defeat of Japan, 523
Historians, Polish; on Union of Lublin,
137; on Muscovite Russia, 197
Historians, Russian (pre-revolutionary;,
440; on rise and aggression of Mus-
covy, 112; on interdependence of
landlords and peasants, 186; on de-
velopment of centralized state in
Muscovy, 195; on Catherine II, 272;
or Western influence, 299
Historians, Soviet, see Historians, Marx-
ist and Soviet
Historians, Ukrainian: on the effects of
tlie Union of Lublin, 137, on cos-
sacks, 179; on War of Liberation and
union with Moscow. 179; on Russian
domination, 271
Historians, Western: on zemskie sobory,
190f; on economic development of
Russia, 434; see also individual his-
torians
Historico-Philological Institute of
Prince Bezborodko, 350
Historiography: pre-Tevolutionary, 439-
40; in Soviet Russia, 583
Hitler, Adolf, 513, 515ff. 518 el passim;
and industrialization, 496
Holy Alliance, 301, 307; formed, 314-
15
Holy Land, dispute in, 337
Holy Roman Emperor: offers crown to
Ivan III, 107-8; Russian relations
with, 108
index
“Holy Russia ** 1 9t
Holy Synod founded 232-3 248 259
Holy Trinity-St. Sergius Monastery tee
Monasteries
Homer Odyssey and Iliad translated
355
Hook Sydney cn Catherine E 272
Hoover Herbert, 499
Hrushevsky (Grushevsky) Mikhail S
on Cossack* 179
Hundred Days," 313-14
Hungarians, 69 f 90 intervention in
Galicia 90 feelings toward Soviet
Russia 555
Hungary xcbellon and Russian int-r
vention in 1848 335 peace treaty
tviih Allies 534 Communist regime
in 534-5 rebellion m 1956 54 1
556 $59 participates in Soviet njva
won t>( Czechoslovakia in $968 S63
see also Austria
Huns, 15
laWocttlav Paul 439
Jagurbinsky Paul 218 243
lankovichde Mixjcvo Theodore 290
larlyk 73
hropolk (Sviatoslavich) sympathetc
toward Christianity 34
laropolk Grand Prince Son of Viadi
mir Mottomalh 40
Droslav (brother of Alexander Nev
skh) 82
larosUv Osmomysl (Prince of Galicia)
89 Jl
farosUv of Tver Grand Pnttce 92
IhshUy the Wise Grand pnnee 23
50 78 rctgn of 37 9 see alto Rui
nan Justice
larosljvl patrimony purchased by Ivan
HI 104 center of fresco painting in
Muscovite Russia 205 trade center
281 seized by SR s (Savinkov) 481
latoslavna wife of Prince Igor 58
Jasak fur tax in Siberia 194
latviagy 34
lavorsky Metropolitan Stephen 232
Ibn Ktiurdsdhbih on Rut 26
Iceland m NATO 536
Iconography in Kievan Russia 59 in
appanage Russia 129-30 in Musco
site Russia 204-5 rcwval In silver
age," 447
Icons of Archangel Michael 130 oC
Christ the Ruler of the World, 205
“The Miracle of Our Lady" or “The
Battle between the Man of Suzdal
and the Novgorodians " 130 The
Praying Novgorodians. 130 of
Saints Boris arul Gleb 130
Idealism German philosophy and pol
667
3 52 md -falhers,* 381
ideotog es and thm ghi in Ri van Rus-
1 1 53-4 n Muscovite Ruvo jot 2
" 14th century 293 in 18004*61
306-6 m 1861-19)7 381 4 44? sj
Commun t 465-73 Marxist, 465 7
Lttwut 467 9 intolerance 469-“l
appeal Of 471 3 *o l iwJustr J a
Uon <99 and Sovi I foreim policy
5C9 12 in postwar penod, 523-3
583 and Soviet s«>-ty 5f,y_71
516-7 SSI ire oho CVwntlJHSl
pvty political «trucgles
Ifioaticv Count Nihitis 3*7
Igtui ut Parmrcli
Ignatovich fnno I on peasant upris-
ing 369 10
ieor Grand P ru e 27 reign cf 30-31
Igor of Novgorod seservk Frm e (Tie
Lo o‘ r) t Hon of ly r) 57
II i of Murom 56
Ilmen Lake 81
Impend Ace W
Imperial Lyic.im 350
Imperial Ross 3 established 225 cob
t! lions ;usl poor lo revo) i ons of
1917 453-4 end of 454 .re alto
ind/v (dual re flit
Imperialism in Mar* <m I cn m« n
468 9 Ruvslm and ^rv et 5 lit
Inccne per cap Ja me of 432
Indu tiDde with T6 582 pi in io n
vide under Paul 27) and Russian
erpimwn '99 and hhr nb Jitv i
J ob v 558
o-Ch na w ir in $56 <93
Indonesia 5T
lodattnal z*iioj> at tnd of 19th cen
tu»y 398 9 -05 454-8 4J0 4>t-4
454 and hbor 428 9 54' in Souet
Russia 535 546-7 in eastern Tti
i ope 535 and urtumzaUor 572 tee
also Five year pl4ns Industry Seven
Yrrr Plan
Industry in Kievan RussLt 43 m ap-
panage Russia, 115 m Muscovite
Russia 184-5 in teign of Peter I
236-7 m 1 9th century 2 T S 80 in
1800-1861 3<3 346 ttt 186J-I9I7
424-8 474 hi Sovei Russ a Was
Communism 478 9 N E P 4<9
first three five year plans 492 503
508 m 1945 53 5 JO 31 ib 1953
M 545-7 sec also Five vent pDw
InJusiiulmtion Seven Year plan
Incdheim 25
Ingermmland acquired by Russia 225
Innocent Jll pope 89
Innocent IV Pone 1*2
Instruct on to tie Leaflet \e Comm s
son (Noio*) of Catherine II 2*8 9
NDEX
“Intellectual emancipation," 360, 366
Intellectuals: most sympathize with
Whites, 480; Soviet, 569; and opposi-
tion to Soviet regime, 573; “new
class, 574, 580-81
“Intelligentsia"- word and concept, 382;
and Law of March 1762, 250
International Court of Justice, 400
Interregnum (3610-1613), see Time of
Troubles
Ionian islands, 265, 274
Iran: and Soviet foreign policy ( 1921—
43), 512-3; and Litvinov Protocol.
513; US. supplies through, 520; and
postwar period, 534; see also Persia
Irbit fair, 281
Irkutsk, trade center and fair, 28 1
“Iron curtain,” 535, 557
Isidore, Metropolitan, 103
Israel: Jewish immigration from the
Soviet Union, 556; and Suez Canal
invasion, 560; the Arab-Israeli wars
of 1967 and 1973 and Soviet policy,
561 ; see also Egypt
Italian architects in Moscow. 128 pas-
sim
Italian colonics on Black Sea, 115
Italy, 220; Russian armies in, 274-5;
unrest in 1830. 331; in First World
War, 420; intervention in Russia,
483; and Soviet foreign policy, 1921-
41, 51211 passim; and peace treaty
with Allies, 534; Communist party
in, 535; as NATO member, 536; and
Cominform, 536
Itcnberg, Boris Samuilovich: on popu-
lism, 383
Itil (capital of Khazars), 16: sacked
by Sviatoslav, 32
Tudenich, General Nicholas, 482, 487
furev, see Dorpat
lurii, Prince (brother of Basil I), 102
lurii, Prince of Dimitrov, 104
lurii (Danilovich), Grand Prince of
Moscow: first grand prince in Mos-
cow, 92; struggle with Tver, 97;
married sister of Mongol khan, 97;
murdered by Dmitri i of Tver, 98
lurii (Vsevolodovich), Grand Prince.
91
lurii Dolgorukii (George of the Long
Arm), Grand Prince, 91, 96
Ivan, Prince of Riazan, 104
Ivan I, Kalita (John of the Moneybag)
of Moscow, Grand Prince: reign and
policy of, 98f, 103; testament of. Its
Ivan II, the Mecfc, 99
Ivan III, the Great, 66, 81, 111, 123f,
154, 389, 201); reign of. 103-8; con-
quest of Novgorod, 85, 104-5; mar-
riage to Zoe Paleologue, 107; ended
Mongol yoke, 71, 112; invites for-
eigners, 12Rf, 208
Ivan IV, the Terrible, 66, 138, 158
184. 188, 189-90, 201-2, 217; relai
of, 143-70; first part, 143-8; second
part. 348-53; character, 145f, 15],
153, 155; explanations of his reign,'
153-5; his reforms, 146, 153-4, 192*
correspondence with Kurbsky and
Queen Elizabeth, 202f; comparison
to Peter, 230; and Stalin, 494
Ivan (son of Ivan IV), killed by his
father, 151
Ivan V, Co-Tsar (half-brother of Peter
I), 213-16. 230; and his daughters.
226. 239, 243; see also Anne; Cath-
erine
Ivan VI. Emperor (great-grandson of
Ivan V), 245; killed, 257
Ivanovo-Voznesensk, textile industry in,
279-80
Izborsk, 24
hgoi, 54
Iziaslav, Grand Prince, 39
Izmail, fortress, 266
Izvolsky, Alexander, and Bosnian crisis,
417
Jadwiga, Queen of Poland, 135
Jagiello, or Jognila, Grand Prince of
Lithuania, and King of Poland as
Wladyslaw II, 135; and alliance with
Mongols against Moscow, 100
Jakobson, Roman, on The Lay o/ the
Host of Igor, 57
Japan, relations with, 390; Russo-Japa-
nese War (1904-5), 401-3; inter-
vention in Russia, 481, 483. 488; as
threat to Soviet Russia, 496; and So-
viet foreign policy (1921-41). 512,
513, 514; conflict with, 515; nonng-
gression treaty with, 517; and Sec-
ond World War, 520; surrender, 523;
contacts with Soviet Far East, 596
Jaruzelski, Wojciech, 565
Jasny. Naum, on Soviet economic goals
under Seven-Year Plan, 546
Jassy, Treaty of, 267
Jefferson, Thomas, on Alexander I, 301
Jelavich, Charles, on Bulgarian unifica-
tion, 399
Jena, battle of, 308
Jenghiz Khan, 69-70 passim, 76; Code
of, 74 .
Jeremiah, Patriarch of Constantinople,
155
Jerusalem, Patriarch of, 199
Jesuits, 162
Jews, persecution and Russification of.
394—5 ; and pogroms, 397; on d Nazi
670
INDEX
Khrushchev, Nikita: (Coni.)
second Party Congress, 494, 541-2;
on purges, 505, 540-41; and agro-
goroda, 531, 573; rise of, 540-41;
fall of, 542-3; and Seven-Year Plan,
546-9; and agriculture, 547-8; and
“B. and K." diplomacy, 558; and for-
eign policy, 558-61; and Cuban mis-
sile crisis, 561; emphasis on peaceful
coexistence, 594; and education, 579;
and religion, 588
Khvorostinin, Prince Ivan (Andre-
evich), 208
Khvorostinin, Prince Ivan (Dmitrie-
vich), 165
Kiakhta, Treaty of, 227
Kiao-chow, 40!
Kierkegaard, Scsren, 442
Kiev, town of, 20; occupied by Oleg,
29; sacked by Andrew Bogoliubskii,
40; sacked by Mongols, 40, 70; and
southwest Russia, 88-94 passim; terri-
tory becomes part of Lithuanian
state, 134; taken over by Poland,
137; under Moscow, 181, 214; metro-
politanate of, joins Moscow, 198;
center of enlightenment in Muscovite
Russia, 206; University of, 352
Kievan Russia, 23-60; question of ori-
gin, 23-8, rise, 30-33, zenith, 34-8,
decline, 39-42, reasons for decline,
40-42, economics, society, institu-
tions, 43-51, religion and culture,
52-60; influence of, 65, 66, on Nov-
gorod, 86, 93-4, on Southwest and
Northeast, 88, 93-4; on Lithuanian
state, 134; and Mongol invasion, 70-
71
Kinburn, 265
Kirchner, Wallher, quoted on 18th-
century growth, 242
Kireevsky, Ivan, 362
Kireevsky, Peter, 362
Kirghiz Republic, 485; Kirghiz Soviet
Socialist Republic, 507
Kirilenko, Andrew, 545
Kirov, Serge, assassination of, 503
Kiselev, Count Paul, reforms of, 328
Kishinev pogrom, 397
Kizcvcttcr, Aleksandr A.: quoted on
post-Petrine Russia, 242; on Legisla-
tive Commission, 259
Kiel or srub, 126-7
Klin, town of, and oprichnina, 151
Kline, George L., on Soviet education,
580
Kliuchevsky, Vasilii O., 440; on Kievan
trade, 43-4; on Kievan learning, 60;
on the role of colonization in Rus-
sian history, 93; quoted on rise of
Moscow, 95; on methods of Musco-
vite expansion, 111; on Time of
Troubles, 172; on Alexis, 177; on
boyar duma, 189; on zemskie sobory,
190; quoted on Peter’s assistants, 218;
on Peter I, 227; on Law of 1762,
249-50; on Legislative Commission,
259; on education of Alexander I
301
Kochubey, Count Victor, 303, 325
Kokand, khanate of, 389; republic of
485
Kokovtsov, Count Vladimir, 415
Kolchak, Admiral Alexander, 481-2
Kolkhoz, see Collective farms
Kolomenskoe village, 204
Komarov, Vladimir, 582n
Komosomol, sec Union of Communist
Youth
Kondakov, Nikodim, A AO
Koncts (quarter) : in Novgorod, 82; in
Pskov, 87
Konev, Marshal Ivan, 522
Konigsberg district, incorporated into
the Soviet Union, 523
Konovalov, Sergei, on English-Musco-
vite relations, 207
Korea; conquered by Mongols, 69; and
Russo-Japanese War, 401-3 passim;
Allied occupation of, and War in,
537-8; under communist rule, 538,
594; armistice in, 558
Kornileniia, 192; ended, 232
Kornilov, General Lavr: and "Kornilov
affair," 459-60; and Civil War, 481
Kornilov, Admiral Vladimir, 338
Korolenko, Vladimir, 444
Korovin, Constantine, 447
Kosciuszlco, Thaddeus: uprising led by,
270; released by Paul 1, 273
Kostomarov, Nikolai I., on election of
Tsar Michael, 175
Kosygin, Alexis: and collective leader-
ship following fall of Khrushchev,
543, 545; and Eighth Five-Year Plan.
551
Kotoshikhin, Gregory, 208-9
Koussevitzky, Serge, 446
Kovalchenko, Ivan D-, on ninetcenih-
century economic crisis, 369
Kovalcvskaia, Sophia, 439
Kovalevsky, Alexander, 439
Kovalevsky, Maksim M., quoted, 391;
oa the period of reaction, 404
Kovalevsky, Vladimir, 439
Kozclsk, devastated by Mongols, 72
Kramskoy, Ivan, 445
Kremlin in Moscow, 128f, I70f, 204,
312; walls built, 99
Kremlin in Rostov, 204
INDEX
kre«o dynastic agreement of 135
Krivtebt 24
KrilaniJ George 208
Kronstadt fortress 222 sailors front
in October Revolution 461 rebell on
of sailors 488
Kropoffcm Prince Peter 448 descr bes
impact of Emancipation 368 Mem
on of a Revol ilionlst 448
Krodener Baroness Julie de 314
Krylov Ivan 355 359
Kuban river area Neolith c culture w
13 cossacks 263 oppos tlon to So
vkI rule 481 see also Cossacks
kubtal Khan 69 15
Kucherov Samuel on the legal reform
of 1864 377
Kuchuk Kamarji Treaty of 265 6
Kuchum (Khan of Siberia) 153
Kuibyshev (Samara) seat of So ei
government in Second World W dr
518
Kulaks in NEP 489 and collet tK
zation 497 suppress on of 502 57**
Kulikovo battle on the field of 71 n«
sign ficanee 71 101 112 and St
Sety,\u& 121-2 literature on 126
Kunersdorf battle of 252
Kuomintang, supported by Stal n 5 12
Kurbatov Alexis 319
Kurbsky Prince Andrew 147 and
boyar opposit on to Ivan JV 150*1
153 correspondence tv th Ivnn IV
201
Kurile islands 390 523
Kursk fair near 281
Kutahla Convention of 333
Kutrigurs 16-17
Kutuzov Prince Michael 266 m Kusto
Turkish War 30% commands Rus
san forces against Napoleon 311
Kuzin eh Theodore or Fedor 302
Kuznetsstroi in indusiriahzat on 496
Tabor professional and end of Ifiih
century 279-80 in industrialist on
and unrest, 406 428-30 and So
party 406 429 454 under Soviet
regime 573
Tabor legislation 395 429 457
Tabor un ons in Imperial Russ a 4^ 9
in Soviet Russia 502 and purees
504
Ladoga Lake 81
ta Fontaine Jcande 355
TaHarpe Fr&ttric-Cisar de 301
Laibach Conference 3 15
Land settlement under the Emancipa
non Edict 372-4 question in tfae
First Duma 410 gentry 423 p«is
67 J
ant 43{ February Revolu ton 457
Pat onalizatm of 479 poicv Of
Bolshev Is 571 2 see al jo Co fleet)
matron
Land and Freedom ” formed im «e
al to Popul on
Lanl Cojun or ze~i hi nahnlnk
)93^t auhoriyde reasei <15
LaCtliu Len 583
Landlord sec Gentry
Larirr E Ham on franco Rush an M
1 an c 400
Languosc stud es in Sov d V issu 583
l aru-tt George \ quut-d on Rus-
sia expans on 184 on Siberia 195
La-uiu Gal op itatus of women 576
Lasswetl Harold D on rratonM ap-
peal uf i ommumsm 472
l it mini J6
L tv 1 SO ”5 457 and Tre iv 0/
Brest L ovsk 477 imj Sov et reft "le
'«4 hec cs mdcjx:iideM 48., wd
L iv nos V oncol 513 art t eatv of
non gres on '14 a nQ mut al as. s
tare act 517 ncorjvriinf n
OSsk 5)7
l&v v Sovcr Socvslst Repu^vc 531
I avrov Peter and I en n v 'ws 469
Ard pup I sm tS 7 445> { tt ri al
Let e 449
Laws Mongol md I us an cempar
son 74 * i Irik P Hovian - 87
107 s dtnn k of 1497 1*7 19)
Lithuanaft St tutes of 1*2) and
1*66 138 5 eb of 550 14t
T9 Ul flu )en e s 1649 T8
186-91 posim 253 and efe cn
levclopment of erfdom 86-87 mi
sm comtntik al ode of t66" IS’
tp m genlurc grtf) , 3'> ra;al
27J 4 of succe« on Pete I 2)9
Paul 1 273-4 Lav f Mshh »
1'62 .-9 '0 I m mi code l 1734
2J0 L?* of 1797 2 ’h cod f a
l on under N cholis 1 <28 1 unda
menial 405 4J4 sec -I Cons IJ
I on Rcfrrmi Ru <i lu 1 ‘
Lay of fe Ho < of l gar The 57 6*
30 ) 7 6 292
[cacue cf Armed Neutral £V 244 2"i
l ta gut of Ns' nr' S«v <t * ***** e
nro *13 and Soviet fore rn pol v
514
Icbanon 566
Lebedev Alexander 439
Ltbe sra n and Soviet Russ a 51*
Ledmclt Waclaw rn Tl t Brin t
Horseman 357
Lefort Franc 1 238 and. Grand Em
basiv 2 7 0
672
INDEX
Left, the; and Gogol, 359; in First
Duma, 410; in Second Duma, 411;
in Third and Fourth Dumas, 412-13;
and Stolypin, 413-15; in First World
War, 421
Left Opposition (Communist party),
490f; assassination of Kirov, 503
LefL Socialist Revolutionaries: in Con-
stituent Assembly, 476; support Bol-
sheviks, and in Soviet government,
477; on peace with Germans, 477;
and abortive uprising, 480; and use
of terror, 480
Leftist views on Soviet developments,
592
Legal system, Soviet, 508; see also Judi-
ciary reforms of 1864
Legislative Commission (1767-68),
257-60
Leibnitz, advice concerning reforms in
Russia, 23 1
Leipzig, battle of, or “Battle of the Na-
tions,” 3 13
Lemberg, sec Lvov
Lemke, Mikhail K., on Nicholas I, 340
Lena gold field massacre, 429
Lend-Lease, 525
Lenin, or Ulianov, Vladimir llich (K.
Tulin, V. Ilin, N. Lenin, etc.), 452,
575, 577, 590, 593; arrival of, in
Russia, 458; “April Theses,” 458; “all
power to the Soviets,” 458; and “July
days,” 459; and October Revolution,
460-61; and Communist ideology,
imperialism, the Highest Stage of
Capitalism, 467— 70ff; and Constituent
Assembly, 477-8; and peace with
Germans, 477-8; attempt on life of,
481; doubts victory in Civil War,
485; role in Soviet government. 487;
on N.E.P., 488-9; death of, 490; on
Stalin, 493; and industrialization,
495; quoted, 590
Lenin Mausoleum, 540, 542
Leningrad, 503; defense of, 518: see
also Petrograd; St. Petersburg
Leo (Prince of Volynia), 90
Leonov, Aleksei, 582n
Leontiev, Constantine, 450
Leontovicb (Leontovitsch), Victor: on
the Law of 1762, 250; on Catherine
IT, 272
Lermontov, Michael, 355, 356, 509; A
Demon, 358; The Hero of Our Time,
358
Lesnaia, battle of, 223
Leszczynski, Stanislaw (King of Po-
land), 223, 252
Levitsky, Dmitrii, 298
Lewin. Moshe, on Soviet Peasantry,
550
Liaotung Peninsula, 401-3 passim
Liapunov brothers, Procopius and Zach-
ary, 165; Procopius leads first na-
tional army, 169, killed by cossacks
170
Liashchenko, Petr I.: quoted on Kievan
development, 43; quoted on agricul-
ture in Muscovy, 184; on labor force
in 18th century, 279; on emancipa-
tion land settlements, 373; on indus-
trial regions (classification), 425; on
peasant proprietors, 433
Liban, 281
Liberalism: and Catherine U, 250, 272-
3; and Decembrists, 320; and zem-
stvo system. 405, 450; and establish-
ment of parties, 405; and Provisional
Government, 456; and October Mani-
festo, 408; development of, in Russia,
450; and the Soviet system, 591, 593
Liberals: admired Peter I, 240; and
Law of 1762, 250; see also Liberal-
ism; Westernize rs
Liberation, The, 405
Liberman, Evsei, 552
Liberum veto, 267, 269
Lichud brothers, Ioannicius and Sofro-
nius, establish Academy, 207
Liegnitz, battle of, 71
Lilge, Frederic, on Soviet education,
580
Literature and language: in Kievan
Russia, 55-8; in appanage Russia,
125-6; in Muscovite Russia, 201-3;
in 18th century, 291-2; in 1800—
1861, 354-60; in 1861-1917, 44(W6;
in Soviet Russia, 584-6
Lithuania, state of, or Lithuanian-Rus-
sian state: involvement in Russia, 66,
81. 90, 101-6 passim, 161, 166; uni-
fication of tribes and evolution in,
132- 7; wars with, 108, 134-6, 148,
152; Orthodox Church in, 121; ex-
pansion into Russia, and its effect,
133- 5; and Union of Kxewo, 135;
Polonization of, 135-6; and Union
of Lublin, 136-8; end of indepen-
dence, 138; reasons for decline.
138-9; influence on Russian history,
138-9; in partitions of Poland, 268-
70; statutes of, replaced by Russian
law, 333; and emancipation of serfs,
371; and Polish rebellion of 1863,
380; and Treaty of Brest-Litovsk,
477; and Soviet regime, 484; be-
comes independent, 484; and Lit-
vinov Protocol, 513; mutual assis-
tance pact, 517; incorporation into
U.S.S.R., 517, sec also Poland
Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic,
532
674
Marshal of the Nobility, 262
Marshall Plan, 536
Martha, nun (mother of Prince Dmitrii
of Ugltch), 162, 164, 166
Marx, Karl, 465, 590, 593; Capital, 429
Marxism, 406, 449, 451, 465-73; and
an industrial proletariat in Russia,
428; and the five-year plans, 494; and
Russian peasantry, 571-2; and na-
tional minorities in Soviet Russia,
576-7; and Soviet sciences, 581-4;
and literature, 584-6; and religion in
Soviet Russia, 587-9; and Stalin, 491,
592; and foreign policy, 509; “Marx-
ism-Leninism, 4 67ff; see also Com-
munist party; Ideologies
Mary, Empress Dowager, 326
“Massacre on the ice" (battle of Neva),
80
Masudi, 20
Materialism, in Marxism, 465-7
Mathcwson, Rufus W., Jr., quoted, 435
Maximalists (faction of Socialist Revo-
lutionaries), 413-14
Maynard, Sir John H.. on Bolshevik
victory, 474
Mazepa, Hetman Ivan, 223, 232
Mazon, Andr6, on The Lay of the Host
of Igor, 57-58
Mnzovia, 270
Mcchnikov, Elijah, 439
Mediterranean Sea: Russian interests
in, 265; Russian influence in, 274;
Napoleon objects to Russian bases
in, 310
Medvedev, Sylvester, 207
Mendeleev, Dmitrii, 439
Mengli-Geray (Crimean khan), 106
Mensheviks: and split from Bolsheviks,
406, 449, 467f, 568; and labor move-
ment, 430; in All-Russian Soviet
(1917), 456; in Provisional Govern-
ment, 458; and Constituent Assem-
bly, 476; suppressed by Bolsheviks,
478; in Georgia, 483
Menshikov, Prince Alexander, and out-
break of Crimean War, 337
Menshikov, Prince Alexander: and
Peter I, 218-19, 223; and Catherine
T, 238; his fall from power, 243
Menshutkin, Boris N., on Lomonosov,
296-7
Mcrczhkovsfcy, Dmitrii S., on Gogol,
359
Merrick, Sir John, and negotiations for
Treaty of Stolbovo, 207
Mestnlchestvo, 149, 154; abolished by
Theodore in 1682, 182; in Muscovite
Russia, 187
Methodius and Cyril, Saints, apostles to
the Slavs, 55
INDEX
Metternicb, Prince KJemens von. 114
315,318
Mexico, 491, 512
Miakotin, Venedikt A., quoted on Rus-
sia at end of 12th century, 88
Michael, Grand Duke, abdication of
456
Michael (Aleksandrovich) of Tver
Prince, subdued by Dmitrii Donskoi!
100
Michael (Borisovich) of Tver, Prince,
defeated by Ivan III, flees to Lithu-
ania, 105
Michael (Vsevolodovich) of Chernigov,
Prince, Saint, 126
Michael (laToslavich) of Tver, Grand
Prince, Saint, 92; and struggle with
Moscow. 97; executed by Mongols, 97
Michael of Vcreia, Prince, 104
Michael Romanov, Tsar, 157, 168, 172,
190, 198, 208; elected Tsar, 172;
reign of, 175-7
Middle classes (bourgeoisie): in Kievan
Russia, 48-9; in Novgorod, 84-5; in
appanage Russia, 117-18; in Musco-
vite Russia, 187; and Petrine re-
forms, 235; begin to emerge, 405;
support Whites, 487; and October
Revolution, 571
Middle East, trade with, 282
Miege, Guy de, 196
"Mighty Bunch" or "The Five," 446
Migrations: early, 11-20 passim; from
Kievan Russia, 65; legal, ceased, 159;
encouraged, 415; supported, 432
Mikhailov, Peter (pseudonym used by
Peter I), 219-20
Mikhailovsky, Nicholas: and populism,
382, 449; and Lenin’s views, 469
Mikoyan, Anastasius, 533
Military reform of 1874, 377-8
Military settlements, 318
Miliukov, Paul N.: quoted on 17th-
century Russia, 175; on financial
situation after 1613, 177; on schism,
201; on education in Muscovite Rus-
sia, 206; on Petrine economy, 227;
and Cadets, 405; and Progressive
Bloc, 420-1 ; as historian, 440, views
on election of Michael, 171; and lib-
eralism, 450; in Provisional Govern-
ment, 455, 458
Miliutin, Count Dmitrii, 391; and mili-
tary reforms, 377
Miliutin, Nicholas, 371, 377, 379
Miloslavskaia, Mary (first wife ox
Alexis), 213
Miloslavsky, Prince Elijah, 178
Miloslavskys, and their party, 213-14
Milosz, Czeslaw, on Communism, 471
Mindovg, or Mindaugas, 132
676
Mozhaisk, annexed to Moscow, 97
Mstislav (Prince of Galicia), 91
Mstislav the Brave of Tmuforokan, 37
Mstislav of Toropets. 79
Mstislav (Vladimirovich), Grand
Prince, 40, 78
Mstislavshy, Prince Theodore, 167
M.T.S., see Machine Tractor Stations
Mukden, battle of, 403
Miinchcngriitz, meeting at, 334
Munich agreement, 5IS
Municipal government: Petrine, 231;
reform of 1870, 376; and “counter-
reforms," 394; see ako Local admin-
istration
Munnich, Count Burhhard C.. 218; in
reign of Empress Anne, 245; in wars
with Turkey, 252
Muratov, Pavel P., on influence of St.
Sergius on iconography, 130
Muraviev, Nikita, 320
Muraviev-Amursky, Count Nicholas,
390
Murmansk: and Civil War, 483; con-
voys to, 520
Muscovite, or Naryshkin, baroque, 204
Muscovite Russia, 63, 81, 95-209 pas-
sim; autocracy and Mongol legacy,
74-5; and Mongols, 74-5, 102-107;
111-12; and Novgorod, 85, 104-5;
rise of principality, 95-113: struggle
with Tver. 97-105 passim; reaction to
centralization, 102; legends of prince-
ly descent from Roman emperors and
regalia of Constantine Monomakh,
107, 124-25; struggle with Lithuania,
108, 134, 152; reasons for success,
109-13, 138-9, geographic location.
109-10. economic factors, 110, poli-
cies, 111-12, role of Church, 112,
role of rulers, 110; institutions and
society, 144-5, 175-7. 188-92; union
with the Ukraine. 180; economy,
185-8; expansion, eastward, 193-5;
views on, 112-13; culture, 196-209;
and schism, 198-201; and Petrine
Russia, 232-3; see also Appanage
Russia and individual niters
Muscovite Russians, see Great Russians
Music: in Imperial Russia, 357, 367,
436, 445-6; in Soviet Russia, 581,
586-7
Musorgsky, Modest, 357; Boris Godu-
nov, 156, 446
Mussolini, Benito, and Munich, 515
Mutual Defense Assistance Program
(U.S.), 536
Muzhi (Kievan Upper classes), 49
Mysticism, absence in Kievan Russia,
53
INDEX
Nabokov, Vladimir V., on Gogol, 359
Nagy, Imre, 560
Nakaz, see Instruction to the Legislative
Commission
Nakhimov, Admiral Paul, 338
Namestmk, 392
Naples, 274
Napoleon L Emperor, 271, 275. 306;
on Alexander I, 301: and Russian
foreign policy (1801-32), 307-8; in
1812, 310-34; and Russian foreign
policy, 3 13-14 er passim
Napoleon III, Emperor: and Crimean
War, 337; and sympathy with Poles,
379, 385; Russian relations with,
after Crimean War, 385
Narodntchestvo, see Populism
Narva, fortress captured by Russians,
222; battle of, 222. 224, 229
Naryshkin. Leo (boyar), 216
Naryshkin baroque, or Muscovite ba-
roque, 204
Naryshkina. Nathalie (second wife of
Tsar Alexis and mother of Peter the
Great), 213-16, 238
Naryshkins and their party, 213-14
“National" communism, and Yugosla-
via, 536, 594
National independence movements, 479,
484-5; see also Minorities and indi-
vidual countries
Nationalism: in Soviet foreign policy,
510; and Second World War, 525-6.
593
Nationalities: Stalin as expert on, 493;
and Constitution of 1936, 507; poli-
cies toward, 576-8; see also Minori-
ties; Russification
Naval Academy, established, 287
Navarino, battle of, 330
Near East: conflict with Napoleon over
policies in. 310; in foreign policy of
Nicholas I, 333-8 passim; see niso
Balkans; Turkey, ere.
Nechaev, Serge (“Jacobin”), 383
Nekrasov, Nicholas, 365, 422. 440,
444
Nelidov, Alexander, 417
Nemelskaia Sloboda or German Sub-
urb, established, 208; see also Mos-
Neolithic culture, in southern Russia,
12-13
N.E.P., see New Economic Policy
Nepmen, 489
Nerchinsk, settlement of, 194
Neronov, Ivan, 198
Nesselrode, Count Karl, 330, 336
Nestor (chronicler), 57
Netherlands: recognizes Russia as an
678
Obolensky, Dimitrii: on the Byzantine
heritage of Russia, 36
Obrak (quitrent), 118, 185, 277, 282,
342, 371
Obshchina or mir, see Peasant com-
mune
Ochakov, fortress, ceded to Russia, 267
Ochrid, archbishopric of, 38
October general strike ( 1905), 407
October Manifesto, 407-8
October Revolution (November 1917),
460-61, 474, 475, and social changes,
567-8
Octobrist party, 410; in First Duma,
410; in Third and Fourth Dumas,
412-13; and Provisional Govern-
ment, 456
Odcr-Neisse line, 270
Odessa, 281, 345, 483; university in,
438
Odoevsky, Prince Vladimir, 361
"Official Nationality,” 324, 329, 354;
influence on higher education, 350;
and ideologies, 362; and serfdom,
370; as government policy, 391; ob-
solete, 449
Oganovsky, Nikolai P.: on population,
423; on peasant holdings, 433
Ogarev, Nicholas, 366
O.G.P.U. (United State Political Ad-
ministration), 503; see also Political
police
Oistrakh, David, 587
Oka river, 108, 109
Okun, Semen B., on peasant uprisings,
370
Olaf of Norway, King, Saint, 37
Olbia, 12, 14
Old Beifef (Oid Believers or Old Ritual-
ists), 182, 205, 214; and schism,
197-201; and Bulavin rebellion, 223;
and Petrine reforms, 233, 240; perse-
cutions of, 245, 394
Old Sarai, capital of the Golden Horde,
71
Old Society, destruction after the Octo-
ber Revolution, 571
Oldenburg, duchy and Duke of, and
Napoleon, 330
Oleg, Grand Prince, 29; occupies Kiev,
27; reign of, 30
Oleg (Sviatoslavich), 33
Olesha, Iurii, 585
Ofgn, Saint (wife of Grand Prince
Igor), 34, 53, reign of, converted to
Christianity, visit to Constantinople,
31
Olgerd, or Algirdas (Grand Prince of
Lithuania), 99; reign of, 134-5
Olmutz, Punctuation of, 335
Olonets. 279
INDEX
Omsk, Directory in, 481
Onegin, Eugene (hero of poem), 356,
358; see also Pushkin
Oprichnina and oprichniki, 150-5! pas-
sim, 159
Order No, 1, 456
Ordyn-Nashchokin, Athanasius, 181
Orenburg cossacks, opposition to Soviet
rule, 481
Organization Bureau (Orgburcau) of
the Communist Party, sec Communist
party
Orlov, Count Alexis (Grigorcvich)
(brother of Gregory), 248, 257; de-
feats Turkish fleet at Chesme, 265
Oriov, Prince Alexis (Fedorovich),
head of the Third Department of His
Majesty’s Own Chancery, 326; and
Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, 333
Orlov, Count Gregory, 257
Orthodox Christians; Russia as protec-
tor of, 265-7, 336-9; in Partitions of
Poland, 267, 271; under Turkish
rule, sympathy with, 330
Orthodox Church; in Lithuanian slate,
85, 121, 132-7, 139; in Ukraine, 179
Orthodoxy, and Slavophiles, 362-3; see
also Byzantine Church; Religion;
Russian Orthodox Church
Oriizheinaia Pnlata, 205
Ossetians (present-day descendants of
Alans), 14
Ostermatm, Andrew, 218, 245, 251
Ostrogoths, 15
Oslromirovo Gospel, 86
Ostrovsky, Alexander, 443
Otrepiev, Gregory, 161f
Ottoman Empire, sec Turkey
Outer Mongolia, Soviet control in, 512
Oxford Slavonic Papers, 207
Pacific Ocean; coast reached, 194; ex-
plorations in, 353; Soviet Russia and
the war in, 523
“Pacification” (post-1905 policy), 413-
14
Paganism, in Russia, S2-3
Paiilcn, Count Peter, 275
Painting, see Arts
Pakistan, in SEATO, 559
Paiaea, 57
Paleologuc, Zoe or Sophia, marriage to
Ivan IB, 107
Pallas, Peier-Simon, 297
Pan-Germanism, and World War I, 416
Pan-Slav Congress in Prague, 365
Pan-Slavjsm, 450; support for Balkan
insurrection against Turkey, 386-7;
popularity before World War I, 416
Panin, Count Nikita (Ivanovich), and
Russian foreign policy, 264
680
:ndbx
Peter I, the Great ( Corn .)
parison to Ivan IV, 230; and heirs of,
238-9, 243; evaluations, 239-41; and
Westernization, 286; and education,
287; and explorations, 297; and ar-
chitecture, 297-8; and theater, 298;
and views of Westemtzers, 364; see
also Reforms, Petrine
Peter II, Emperor (son of Alexis,
grandson of Peter I), 238; reign of,
243-4
Peter 111, Emperor (Duke of Holstein-
Gottorp), 242, 254, 257, 260; reign
of, 247-8; admiration for Frederick
11,252
Petrashevsky, see Butashcvich-Petra-
shevsky
Pctrashcvlsy, 326, 362, 366, 370, 441
Petrograd: revolutions in February,
455; "July days,” 459; October Rev-
olution, 460-61; threatened by Iude-
nleh, 482; controlled by Reds in
Civil War, 48 6; party organization in,
and Zinoviev, 491; see also Lenin-
grad; St. Petersburg
Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Sol-
diers’ Deputies (19171, 456, 460
Petrov, Professor Basil, 353
Phanagoria, 14
Philaret, Metropolitan and Patriarch
(Theodore Romanov, father of Tsar
Michael), 163, 171, 181, 198; influ-
ence of, 176; given title of Great
Sovereign, 176
Philip, Metropolitan, 151
Philip (Prince of Sweden), candidate
for Russian throne, 169, 175
Philippines, in SEATO, 559
Philoppopolis, captured by Sviatoslav,
33
Philosophcs, 256, 263, 270, 272, 294
Philotheus, or Filofei, 125
Pbotius, Patriarch, on 860 attack, 25
Piast (Polish ruling family), 135
Pialina, 82
Pilscn (or Plzen), unrest in, 558
Pimen, latest Patriarch, 588
l'imen, Metropolitan, account of his
journey, 126
Pioneers, 568
Pipes, Richard: on military settlements,
319; on national movements, 484
Pirogov, Nicholas, 439
Pisarev, Dmitrii, 381; quoted, 435; as
spokesman of nihilism, 447
Plano Carpini, Archbishop (papal leg-
ate), quoted, 72
Platonov, Sergei F„ 440; on Mongols,
67; on Lithuanian state and Olgerd,
135; on Ivan IV, 165, 153-5 passim;
on Dmitrii, 156f; on Time of Trou-
bles, 157, 160, 171-2; on False
Dmitrii, 163; on election of Tsar
Michael, 172; on zemskii sobor of
1613, 175; on comparison of Musco-
vite and Petrine Russia, 234
Plehve, Viacheslav, 396-7, 414; assas-
sinated, 406
Plekhanov, George, 406; and Lenin,
476
Plevna, defense of, 387
Pliny the Elder, 19
Pobedonostsev, Constantine, 392, 396;
supports Church schools, 437; as ide-
ologist of the Right, 449
Podcsta, similar position of prince of
Novgorod, 79
Podgomy, Nicholas: and collective
leadership following fall of Khru-
shchev, 545
Podolia, western, ceded to Austria in
First Partition of Poland, 268
Podseka, 48
Pogodin, Mikhail P.: quoted, 3; on
civil strife after Iaroslav the Wise,
42: quoted on Peter 1, 240-41; and
"Official Nationality,” 324, 329, 362;
at Moscow University, 354
Pogroms, against Jews, 395
Pokrovsky, Mikhail N., 583; quoted,
143; on Ivan IV, 154; on emancipa-
tion of serfs, 373
Poland ami Poles, 66, 69, 85, 191, and
influence in Southwest, 89-90; and
Lithuanian state, 135-7; relations
with Russia, 152, 180-81 ct passim;
in Time of Troubles, 157, 162-72
passim ; Truce of Deulino, 176; Peace
Treaty of 1634, 176; and Ukraine,
179-81; and treaty of "eternal
peace,” 214; and Great Northern
War, 221-6 passim; and Russian for-
eign policy', 1725-62, 250-53 passim;
Partitions and Catherine II, 251, 257,
264, 267-72, 277; rebellion of 1830,
271, 331-3; rebellion of 1863, 271,
378-80; Kingdom of Poland formed,
314; Constitution of 1815, 318, sus-
pended, 332; swears allegiance to
Nicholas I, 321; “Organic Statute of
1832,” 33Z; and foreign relations,
385; policy during First World War,
420; industry of region, 425; declared
independent by Provisional Govern-
ment, 456-7; Soviet-Poiish War,
483-4 passim; and Treaty of Brest-
Litovsk, 477; and Soviet regime,
484; and Litvinov Protocol, 513; and
Soviet foreign policy, 1 921^41. 514-
16 pass im; and Nazi-Soviet agree-
ment, 516-17; eastern Poland joined
to Soviet Union, 517, 529; and war-
682
Prussia, and relations with Russia:
( Cont .)
311; in 1812-25, 313-17 passim; in
1825-56, 330-35 passim; Crimean
War, 336-39 passim; 1856-81, 385-
89 passim; see also Germany
Prussia, East: campaign in, 419; pene-
trated by Red Army, 522
Prussia, Polish, and First Partition of
Poland, 268
Pruth river, campaign and Treaty, 224
Pskov, 85, 106, 152, 158f, 170; Sudeb-
nik, 74, 87, 1078; captured by Teu-
tonic Knights, 80; development of,
87f; “Little brother," 87; annexed by
Moscow, 108; heresy suppressed, 122;
rebellion in, 178
Pugachev, Emelian, and rebellion he
led, 256, 260-61, 282, 327
Pulkovo: observatory, 351, 352; in
Civil War, 482
Purges: great purge (1930’s), 503-8;
and Khrushchev’s speech, 505, 540-
41; postwar, 536; possibility of an-
other, 538; effect on the Party, 568
Puryear, Vernon I., on Crimean War,
336
Pushkin, Alexander. 75, 291, 326, 356-
9 passim, 585; Boris Godunov, 156,
356-7; on Peter the Great, 213
(quotation), 219, 357; on Pugachev,
260; A Captain's Daughter, 260, 356;
on Lomonosov, 296; Eugene Onegin,
354, 556; Ruslan and Liudmila, 356;
The Fountain of Bakhchisarai, 356;
The Prisoner of Caucasus, 356; Pol-
tava, 357; The Bronze Horseman.
357; in the Soviet Union, 592
Pushkino, see Tsarskoc Sclo
Putialin, Count Admiral Evfimii, 379,380
PutivI, 58
Quadruple Alliance, 316, 317
Quintuple Alliance, 316, 317
Rachmaninov, Serge, 357, 446
Rada (Pereiasiav), 180
Rada (Ukrainian, after 1917), 484-5
Radicalism and radicals, 364-6; disap-
pointment in emancipation, 374; new
radicalism after "great reforms,”
380-84; and emergence of political
parties, 406; and demand for a con-
stituent assembly, 407; Westernizers,
448
Radishchcv, Alexander, 295, 360
Radkey, Oliver H,, on agrarian policies
and peasantry, 572
Radomyslsky, see Zinoviev
Raeff, Marc, on Speransky, 305
Rapailo, Treaty of, 512
INDEX
R.A.P.P., see Russian Association of
Proletarian Writers
Raskol, see Old Belief; Russian Ortho-
dox Church; Schism
Rasputin, Gregory, 396, 421, 455
Rastrelli, Count Bartolomeo, 298
Razin, Stepan or Stenka: rebellion of
178, 260; in literature, 203
Raznochintsy, 382
Razumovsky, Count Alexis (favorite of
Empress Elizabeth), 246-7
Razumovsky, Field Marshal Count
Cyril, Hetman of Ukraine, 246
Realism, 381; in literature, 354-60;
“critical,” 381, 448
Red Guards, and October Revolution,
461
Red Russia, or Chervonnaia Rus, 268
Redemption payments, and emancipa-
tion, 372-4; cancelled, 432
Reformation, 73, 200, 207; compared
to Russian schism, 200
Reforms: of Ivan IV, 146, 154, 192,
Petrine, 216-17, economic, 227,
234-7, Western influence on, 228
passim, 233-4, military, 228-30, ad-
ministrative, 230-32, central govern-
ment, 230-31, local government,
231-2, Church, 232-3, effect on so-
ciety, 233-4, educational and cul-
tural, 237-8, opposition within his
family to, 238, evaluation, 239-41;
of Catherine II, 261-4, Church, 258,
263, gentry and serfs, 261-4, admin-
istrative, 261-4; in Alexander I’s
reign, first period, 303-5, second pe-
riod, 304-6, issue of, in reign of
Nicholas I, 327-8, 346-7, and edu-
cation, 350; of Stolypin, 414-416,
434; see also “Counterreforms";
“Great reforms"
Reinsurance Treaty, 3 99
Religion: in Kievan Russia, 34-6, 52-
4, 57-60; in appanage Russia, 120-
25; in Muscovite Russia, 196-201; in
18th century, 286; during reign of
Alexander I, 319; in 1800-1861, 319,
362-3, in 1861-1917, 394, 397, 407;
in Soviet Russia, 529, 577, 587-9;
see also Minorities; Paganism; Ro-
man Catholic Church; Russian Or-
thodox Church; Uniat e Church
Rcmizov, Alexis, 586
Renaissance, 73, 207
Repin, Elijah (painter), 445
Rerum moscovicarum cotnmentam
(Sigismund von Herberstein), 108
Res gestae saxonicae, 27
Reval, 225 . „ .
Revolution, prospect in Soviet Russia,
259
684
Rumiantsev, Count Peter, 253, 26*1
Rimich, Dmitrii, 319
Rus, question of origin, 23-8
Russell, Bertrand, quoted on planned
societies, 465
Russian geographic description of, 3-
10; Kievan, 23-60; appanage, 63-
139; Muscovite, 143-209; Imperial,
213-455; Soviet, 465-98; see also
Provisional Government; Ukraine
Russian Association of Proletarian
Writers (R.A.P.P.), 584
Russian Justice ( Russkaia Pravda): of
Iaroslav the Wise, 38, 45, 49, 50, 78,
107; of Pestcl, 320
"Russian land," concept of, 63
Russian language, emphasized in Soviet
schools, 577; see also Literature and
language
Russian Liberation Army. 526
Russian Orthodox Church, role and or-
ganization of, 54f, 121; patronized by
Mongols, 74; center in Moscow, 98f;
Council of Florence, 103, 121; union
with Rome declined, 107; role in
rise of Moscow, 112; in appanage
Russia, 118-25; metropolitan in Lith-
uania, 138; patriarchate established,
155, 198; role in Tune of Troubles,
168; lends national rally, 169; gained
authority in Time of Troubles, 173;
and Union of Brest, 179f; ecclesiasti-
cal reforms of Nikon and schism.
18 If, 198-201; in Siberia, archbish-
opric established in 1621, 194; expan-
sion in. Ukraine, 198, 200; Councils
(1547, 1549, 1551, 1554, 1654, 1656,
1666. 1667), 197-8; and Peter I,
219, 230, 233-4; mission in Peking,
227, 353; and Catherine II, 258, 263;
and decline of clergy, 283; and cul-
tural life in 18th century, 286, 288;
Uniate Church joins, 332; Uniatcs
forcibly reconverted, 380; Pobedon-
ostsev’s conception of, 392; and pol-
icy of Russification, 394; and Funda-
mental Laws, 408; support for
Church schools, 437; and the Bol-
shevik regime, 478; and Whites, 587;
and Soviet regime, 587-8; see also
Byzantine Church; Ideologies and
Thought; Orthodoxy; Religion
Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Re-
public (R.S.F.S.R.), 532; created,
487; organization, 487; and Constitu-
tion of 1936, 507
Russian Theater •, The (periodical), 298
Russification, policy of, 380, 391, 394,
397, 415; in Poland, 332; in western
Russian areas, 333; in Ukraine, 333;
INDEX
in Finland, 397; under Soviet reeimr
576-7, 594 6 ’
Russo-Chincsc Bank, 425
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-S, 401-3
Russo-Persian Bank, 425
Rybakov, Boris A., on Kievan life, 48
Rykov, Alexis, commissar of interior
475; trial of, 503
Ryleev, Conrad, 322
Ryndziunsky, Pavel G., on nineteenth-
century economic crisis, 369
Sadko, 86
Sagaidachny, or Sabaidachny, Hetman
Peter, 180
St. George’s day, 118, 186
St. Petersburg: built, 222; secured, 225;
symbol of new age, 239; schools, 249,
287-8, 290; threatened by Swedes,
272; Masonic lodges in, 294; archi-
tecture in, 297-8, 367; and Decem-
brists, 320-21; linked by canals to
Volga, 344; University of, 349-50;
and ‘‘Bestuzhev courses," 438; fires
in 1862, 379; and Jewish quota, 395;
and Revolution of 1905, 407-8; So-
viet (1905), 408, 429, 456; strikes in
1878-79, 429-30; conservatory estab-
lished. 446; and Stalin's revolutionary
activity, 493; sec also Leningrad;
Pctrogiad
St. Petersburg area, industry in, 279,
281-2, 425
St. Petersburg Era, 213
St. Petersburg-Baltic region, industry
in, 343
St. Sophia (area in Novgorod), 81
St. Vladimir, sec Vladimir, Grand
Prince
Saints; in Kievan period, 53-4; in ap-
panage period, 121-2, 126, in Mus-
covite Russia, 197
Sakhalin Island : southern half, Russian,
390, ceded to Japan in 1905, 403,
occupied by Japanese, 483; northern
half, evacuated by Japanese, 488,
512, occupied by Red Army, 523
Sakharov, Andrew. 556
Salnilsa, battle of, 40
S.A.I..T. talks, 562, 566
Saltykov, Michael (N. Shchedrin), 443
Saltykov family, influence with Tsar
Michael. 175
Samandar, 16; seized by Sviatoslav, 32
Samara (present-day Kuibyshev), cen-
ter of opposition to Soviet role, 481;
government of, organized, 482; see
also Kuibyshev
Samarin, George, 362, 379, 381; and
emancipation of serfs, 371-2
INDEX
685
Satriztliii 556 597
Sin Stefano Treaty of, 387
Sim. 107
Saratov, trade center 281 university in
43 $
Sard nia and the Crimean War 337-9
Sarlil 16 sacled by Sviatoslav 32
SarmatUns 14-15 17
Savelev (Saveliev) Pavel S, on trade
of East Slavs 4S
Savin, Sih 205
Savmkov Boris 480
Saxony tn the Great Northern War
221-5 patsm and Russian forcicn
policy 252 and the Congress of
Sazonov, Serge 417
Schaptro Leonard B on role of Com
mumst party 571
Schell ng influence in Russia 361
Schiemann Theodor quoted 323 on
Nicholas I 340
Schlder (Shildcr) Nikolai K on Nich
olasl 340
Schiller Russian translator of 355
influence on ideology 360fT
Schism (rnrkol) 197-201 see also Old
Belief Russian Orthodox Church
Schlozer August Ludwig son 297 on
the oricins of Kievan Russia 23-5
Schlusselburg fortress 257
Schonbrutin Treaty of 310
School of Mathematical and Nsvigu
tional Sciences 237 287
School of the tsar s icon painters 205
Schunun. Frederick L on Second
World War losses 528 on Soviet
Russia 591
Science and scholarship in 18th cen
tury 296-7 in 1800-1861 352-4
in 1861-1917 438-40 in Soviet Rus
sia 581-4
■Scissors crisis," 495
Scriabin Alexander 446
"Scythian ploughmen " 19 45
Scythians 13-14 15 17
Stch or Sich 179 abolished by Cath
enne 11 263 see also Dnieper cos
sacks
Scchenov Ivan 439
Second Coalition 274
“Second front <22 523
Second Turkish War (1787-92) 265 7
pass m 284
Second World War 516-23 et passim
diplomacy dunne <23-4 evaluation,
525 6 effect of 527-8 effect on
population. 571-2 and Soviet so-
ciety 593 594
Semenov Gregory and Cm! W ar 481
Semenov Nicholas, Sftj
Sem-novsku Regiment of the Guards
see Guards
Semenovskoe (village) 217
Seme vs U Vasihi I on peasant Lpru
inn, 369
Senate 225 228 established 23 1 loses
power 245 restoied to forner power
246 restored by Alcxard r 1 <(J3
and proposals of Spermskv 305 and
Nicholas I 125 becomes ‘supreme
Court 377
Sep irutivm aft t Rrvolitions of 1917
484-7 durme Second World War
594 see also Minorities
Serbs wnr *ith Turkey 186-8 pas
t m Russian volunteers in 386 ard
Russian f< reign policy ftbQC t4>
416-20 pass m and Wold War I
419 jrf ah’ 'i ucr*s!avu
Serbian settlements in Russn 2(3
Serfdom *< 116 fuff) established in
Rim i 1 59 174 Lnrrst io Time of
Tnublvs 165 and l to I eme of
1649 178 IR5 8 pvx n, develop-
ment in Mi scovits Russia !8< 7
Sbcna escapes serfdom 195 aboli
ton favored by Golitsyn 214 effect
of head (ax on 213 growth of
172<-62 249 <0 and Legislative
Csmmssion 2<9 ard Pugachev rc
be Hi on 260 61 und'f C-iiberm* II
2t 2 3 2 2 up ler Pc'es 267 condi
tors at end of fSth century 274
278 50 household serfs 282 372
ml soerd criticism 295 views of
Alexander 1 103 31R emancipatur
in Baltic provinces 11? m met of
Nicholis 1 327 ■» and serial lure
1800-1861 342 315 346 emaneipa
nor favored by Slavophils 361
cmxncipition (t$6f 1 i* (l 7 J
Serge Grand Duke assassinated 406
Serpu Patnar h 588
Serrus of Radonezh Sairt. 1(2 12)
126 J ciples of 119 122 nfluenc
on i on pamters 130
Seton Watson Much N quoted on pre
dr am'nt ol gre-sevola'vwarv Pu ms
422
Sevastopol or Sebastopol 266 defend
Of 338-9
Seven Year Plan 5»6-7
Seven 3 ears W ar 248 252—3
Sevmour Sir Hamilton converse! ons
with NiahoHs 1 33''
Shafirot Peicr 219
Shu-hmatov A’eVsei A on dismon
among Slavs, IS ca "Norman the
ory ” 27
686
INDEX
Shakhovskoy, Prince Gregory, 165
Shaklovity, Theodore, 215-16
Shamil, 389
Shanghai, massacre of Communists in,
512
Shcbapov, Afanasii P., on schism, 200
Shchedrin, N., sec Saltykov, Michael
Shcherbatov, Prince Michael, 297
Shelon river, battle on, 104
Shemakha area, ceded to Russia, 308
Shcmiaka, Dmitrii (nephew of Basil
II), his claim to seniority, 102
Shepilov, Dmitrii, 54i, 560
Sheremetev, Field Marshal Count Boris,
219, 222-3
Shestov, Leo (Leo Schwartzmimn), 451
Shevchenko, Taras, 333
Shevyrev, Stephen, 324, 354, 362
Shimonoseki, Treaty of, 401
Sbipka Pass, 387
Shishkov, Admiral Alexander, 354, 362
Sholokhov, Michael: on cossacks, 232,
The Quiet Don, 585; Virgin Soil Up-
tttrned, 585
Shostakovich, Dmitrii, 587
Shubin, Fedot, 298
Shuisky, Andrew, 145
Shuisky, Prince Basil, 189; on death of
Prince Dmitrii of Uglich. 156, 162-
3, 172f; as tsar, 164-7; deposed,
167
Shuisky, Prince Dmitrii (brother of
Basil), 166, 167; and his wife, 167
Shuisky family, 145
Shuvalov, Alexander, 247
Shuvalov, Ivan (favorite of Empress
Elizabeth), 247, 288
Shuvalov, Count Peter, 247
Siberia: conquest by Erma k, 152-3; ex-
peditions into and explorations, 194—
5, 203, 297, 353; trade centers in,
281; increase in population of, 389;
Trans-Siberian railroad built, 398,
401; migrations encouraged to, 415,
432; and Civil War, 481-3 passim;
and industrialization, 496-7; current
scientific and technological expansion,
552
Sibir, or Siberia, khanate of, Russian
suzerainty established, 152; see also
Siberia
Sigismund II, or Sigismund Augustus
(King of Poland), 137
Sigismund III (King of Poland), 167,
171; declares war against Russia,
167; candidacy for Russian throne,
168-9
Signposts, or Vekhi, 451
Silesia, 71, 252
Silistria, 33
“Silver age" in literature, 435-52 pas-
sim, 450-51; and Soviet literature,
584, and arts, 586
Simbirsk, 475; and Razin rebellion,
178; seized by Left SR’s, 481, 482;
see also Ulianovsk
Simeon, Tarlar prince, 150, 155
Simeon of Polotsk, 182, 203, 206
Simeon the Proud of Moscow, Grand
Prince, uses term “of all Russia,” 98
Simmons, Ernest I., quoted on Russian
literature, 435
Simonov, Constantine: Days anti
Nights, 585; The Russian Question,
585
Sineus (brother of Riurik), 24
Siniavsky, Andrei, 555
Sino-Sovict agreement of 1950, 537
Sinope, naval battle of, 337
Sipiagin, Dmitrii, 398; assassinated, 406
Skharia, see Zechariah
Skobecv, Frol, 203
Skobelev, General Michael, 389
Skomorokhi, 59, 203
Skopin-Shuisky, Prince Michael (neph-
ew of Basil Shuisky), 165-7, 169
passim
Skorina, Francis, scholar from Polotsk,
139
Skoropadsky, Paul, 485
Skriabin, Viacheslav, see Molotov
Skunitov, Maliuta, 151
Slaves: unrest and rebellion in Time of
Troubles, 165, effect of poll tax on,
235
Slavonic-Greek-Latin Academy, found-
ed, 206-7
Slavophiles and Slavophilism, 362-3,
365-6 passim, 381, 441; on Time of
Troubles, 172; view of Muscovite
Russia, 197; on Peter I, 240; and
emancipation of serfs, 370; on com-
mune, 374; Neo-Slavophilism, 556
Slavs, 17-20; question of homeland, 18;
and commune, 363
Slavs, East: people of Kievan Russia,
17-20; unified by Sviatoslav, 32; and
trade, 45; agriculture among, 45-6,
47-8; religion of, 52
Slavs, South, influence on appanage
literature, 126
Slepov, Lazar A„ quoted on collective
leadership, 539
Slitte, 148
Sloveni, 24
Smenovekhovtsy, 592
Smerdy, 49
Smolensk (town and principality), 20,
39, 65, 94, 277 et passim; and Mos-
cow, 106, 108, 181; and Lithuanian
INDEX
687
state 13* and Poland 167-70 pas
Sim 175-6 industry In 277, and
Napoleon 3 11
Smolny Institute established 290 boilt
298
Smufnoe irrm a see Time of Troubles
Sobornost 363
Social Democratic party < U SD ) 4Q6
split 406 449 467 8 m Duma 410
411 and labor movement 429-50
and The Spark 475 see also Bohh*
viks Mensheviks
Social Democrats Western views on
Lenin 469
“Social engineering" 573-4 584 591-
Soc al sciences and Soviet Marxism
581-2 583
Social sm app-ars in Russia 365 6 de
velopment of 448 9 and peasant
commune 448-9 and dependence on
world revolution 490 and social sm
in one country 490
"Socialist realism ” 445 581ff in 1 tera
tore 584-6 marts 586-7
Socialist revolution Russ a not pte
pared for 456 Lenin s views on
468-9 Trotsky s views on 592
Socialist Revolutionary partv ( SR )
406 448 449 m Dumas 410 412
and Stolypns pol cies 413 m the
Executive Committee or the Ml
Russian Soviet, 456 m Const tuert
Assembly 476-7 outlawed 478 op
pos t on to Soviet rule 480 **82 see
also “Battle Organization Left So
calm Revolutionaries Maximalists
Populism
Socalist stage and Constitution o f
1936 506
Socialists in Provij onal Government
456 438 9
Society in Kievan Russia 49 in Nov
gorod 81-7 in appanace Russ 2
117-19 us Muscovite Russia 158 9
185 8 in Time of Troubles 172-4
m Petrine Russia 234-6 in 18th
century 282-4 m 1800-1861 345
7 m 1861-1917 422-4 423-34 m
Soviet Russia 555-7 578 594-5 tee
also Boyars Gentry Middle classes
Peasantry Serfdom
Society 0 } the United Slavs 320
Solano P etro 128
Sol damy m Poland, 565
Soloveytchik (Soloveichik), George M
de oa Potemkin 266
Solov ev ISolovev), Sergei M 354
440 451 on role of geographic fac
tors m history 8 on colomzat on
93 on location of Mo* aw 109 on
Time of Troubles, 172 on peter I
240
Soloviev Vlad m r 4<&_<l A Juitrco
t on of the Good 4Sl
Solincbecodsk 204
Solzfi nrsvn Alexander 503 386 59"
Cuag 55 o
Soph a (Uegrr » t_ r of pet r th
Grc-t) 2te 221
Sophie rtu^ste F eaerika (Prirwss of
Anhalt Zi-rtst) tee Od^er re IT the
Great
Sorokin P t r m A. on the ere re-
l at ‘92
Soil a 82
South Puss n ' kr^in an region <ja
dustra 416
Scuih Mj n s in S h
So he st \ a Treaty Orea-jat n
SEAT 1) S'v
'•0 ic S-v. e > D cembr 1) $20
SouJvw v Russ a 6S — 9 J kie an b»ri
tape 0 (m Csl 11 Volyn a
Sose e n o f \ P ssa <G uticr
W« i‘sam d fcv 1 an HI \Q5 see
uh Get *ov reign
io et or o 1 1 if loy -07 ard
labs r note <29 30
Sj iCz h Al! c* conclude 4 514
Sos e Fre h At ancc oreludeJ 14
*15'
Sovet Gerr-an reenent 939t 416
Sovie co emv" or c t-ed 4" < frvt
rron-h* 4 6-^ et pu sin
Sov et ir I e tual*. 569 49
So t Navy 552 *M
Ss-s et Pol sh War 5 p s n
aovi t Ru su 4f 1 S^g e tabl shed **6t
er pass m an <va uit on 52*-6 and
c cclud r '''' rkv *90 6
Sovr t systen cspvns n sal the Wes.
533ff confused wih il motraEc so-
c lam 591 perspecti cs S9’’-S
Sos \ local fom-J 456 act s ty op-
posed to kem I v 4J9 All K ss an
Lwiptww F « 460 X a J, 4"6
Tifth 487 Suptene Soviet eswb-
1 sh-d *07 3?e also Su^tcmc c ovi
Sovkhoz sc State {tstas
Spam recop ,ion of Russ a as en en
p re 2’6 and pol cy of Caifcerire II
264 end Ruvsun foreign r 01 T
1801 12 30 a"d the Confess
System 315 17 Civil W'r la and
Soviet Rus a 5 1—— 25
Spark The ilskrc) 475
Spcransky Count M * , aeL 304 306
*3 IS and the Codifies i on of La«*
328 and Karamzin 354
688
index
“Spirit of Geneva,” (summit conference
in 1955), 559
Spiritual Reglament, 232
Sputnik J, 547
Srub, see klct
Stakhanov, Alexis, and “Stakhanovite”
movement, 502
Stalin (Dzhugashvili), Joseph, 470,
475; and five-year plans, 474, 491,
era of, 492-538; and party struggle,
490ff; background, 492-4; views on,
493-4; and the Twentieth and Twen-
ty-<second Party Congresses, 494,
540-42, 559; denunciation of. 494,
540-42, and its effects, 559; “Dizzy
with Success” speech, 498; and in-
dustrialization, 500-3; great purge,
503-5; his system, 505ff; Constitu-
tion of 1936, 506-7; quoted, 509;
foreign policy of, 509-18; support
for Kuomintang, 512; and Second
World War, 518-26; last decade of,
527-38; and Zhdanov. 533; death of,
538, 555, 593; buried in Lenin
Mausoleum, 540; and possibility of
another purge, 540, 595; problem of
succession, 540ff; removed from
Lenin Mausoleum, 542; and army,
575, and Great Russian nationalism,
577; and Marr theory, 584; and lit-
erature. 584-5; and death of Gorky,
585; and religion, 587-8
Stalingrad, 493; renamed Volgograd,
493; battle of, 521; in writings of
Simonov, 585; sec also Tsaritsyn
Stalinist Constitution, see Constitution
of 1936
Stanislavsky, Constantine, 447
Stankevicb, Nicholas, 364
Starodub (principality), joins Moscow,
108
Starovery, or staraobriadtsy, 199-201;
see also Old Belief: Russian Ortho-
dox Church
State Bank, established, 378
State Conference in Moscow (1917),
459
State Council, 306, 371, 409; made into
upper chamber. 409; during First
World War, 421
State farms (sovkhozes), 498; increase
of, 501, 548, 553, 572-3
State Gentry Land Bank, 393, 423
State Lending Bank, 283
State Planning Commission (Gosplan),
495
Steinberg, Isaac N., quoted, 404
Stcnder-Petersen, Adolph, on origin of
Rus, 25
Stenka Razin, see Razin
Stephen, from Novgorod, 126
Stephen of Perm, Saint, 122, 126
Steppun, Fedor A., on Slavophiles, 363
Stokes, Anthony D., on seat of religion
in Kie va a R u ssia, 3 8 '
Stolbovo pence treaty, 176
Stoletov, Alexander, 439
Stolypin, Peter, 411; his policy, 413-
15; “pacification” and reform, 4 IS-
IS; assassinated, 415; effect of land
reform of, 433, 454
Strabo, 14
Straits, the (Dardanelles and Bospo-
rus), 265, 274; Russian conflict of
interest with France over, 310; pas-
sage of Russian ships guaranteed
(1829), 331; troops land at Bospo-
rus, 333; Straits Convention (1841),
336, importance of, 337; and Izvol-
sky, 417; and First World War, 420;
sec also Crimean War
Stravinsky, Igor, 357; The Firebird,
446; Petrouchku, 446; Le Sacre du
prlntempts, 446
Streltsy, 147, 239; in struggle between
Sophia and Peter, 214-16; sup-
pressed by Peter, 220; rebellion in
Astrakhan (1705), 223; expanded
then disbanded by Peter 1, 228
Strigobiiki, 122
Stroganov, Count Paul, 303
Stroganov school of icon painting, 205
Strogonovs, 152, 177, 185, 204
Strumilin, Stanislav, 550
Struve, Frederick W. J., 352
Struve, Gleb, on Soviet and dmigrd lit-
erature, 586
Struve, Peter, 405, 451; quoted on feu-
dal izntion in Russia, 114
Subudey (Mongol general), 70
Succession; arrangement of laroslav the
Wise, 39, 43-2; in Moscow, 110; ia
Muscovite Russia, 189-90; problem
of, after Peter I, 238-9; Law of
Peter I, 239; Law of Paul. 273; after
Alexander I, and the Decembrist re-
volt, 321; in Soviet Russia, after
Lenin, 490-91, after Stalin, 540-41
Sudebnik, Pskovian, see Pskov, Sntlcb-
nik
Sudebnik of 1550, 146
Sudetenlnnd, and Munich, 515
Suez Canal invasion, 560
Sukhoralinov, General Vladimir, 420,
454
Suleiman I, the Magnificent, 108, 251
Sumarokov, Alexander, 292
Sumner, Benedict H., : on Peter I,
237, quoted on serfdom, 276
Sun Ya(-sen, JI2
Supreme Secret Council, 243-S
Supreme Soviet: organization under
INDEX
Constitution of 1936 307, role un
der Stalin 532
Sunkov Basil 445
Surozh attacked by Rus 26
Suslos Michael 545
Suvorov Generalissimo Prince Alexan
der 253 264 266 crushed Polish
uprising 270 Italian campaign 275
Suzdal (town and principality! n 9
9 1—4 passim 109 pagan revival in
37 devastated by Mongols 70 con
Irol over Volga trade route 79
S\i3topolk (liiaslavich) Grand Pnnce
39
Svratopolk (Vladimiriovich) ihe
Damned 3 £-7
Sviatoslav (larosiavwh) ol Chernigov
39
Sviatoslav (tporevich) Grand Prince
27-9 passim reign of 31-3
Sviatoslav (Olgovich) of Novgorod
Sevtrsk Prince 95
Sviatoslav (Vladimirovich! 37
Svimhvk fortress (near Kazan) 146
Sweden and Swedes 66 defeated bv
Alexander Nevskii 79 80 wars with
Russia 152 15' 181 involvement
in Tune ol Troubles 157 167 170
175 6 and Peier I 220 225 6 m
fluence on Petrine reforms 230-31
233 and Russian foreign policy
(1725 62) 251-3 passim and
Catherine It 264-6 pawns 271-2
passim and Russian foreign polcv
(1801-12) 307-8 war with Rusmi
1808-9 308 against Napoleon 311
and Russian foreign policy (18t2
25) 313-17 passim and Soviet fp'
eign policy 512
Switzerland Russian armies tn 275
Sylvester (chronicler) 57
Silvester (priest adviser to Ivjn IV)
145 149-50 presumed author of
Domojfro; 202
Syria 69 333
SJarb/ii 136
Tabic of Ranks 235 241
Tacitus, 19
Taganrog 221 345
Taiwan see Formosa
Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic 507
Tale about i}, e Capture of F$ko\ 126
Talleyrand 314
Tambov trade center 281
Tamtrhne 75 101 110
Tanats fortress of H
Tannenberg battle of (1914) 419
Tannenberg, or Grunwatd battle of
(1410) 135
Tanf! of 1724 236
6S9
T*nfls protective o' 1782 and 17?3
Tarle E> geiul V on natloait tests
tance to Napoleon 313
Tirht* 67 147 see ah Cr me 4
kliaralc of Kaz_n ttutuit rf
Mongols
T tun no v Valery 378
Titi hchev J) r) 197
T.xev in Kiev 4<j un'tr Mel- -oh
"3 “the fifth moi ey a-J ih-
money 177 on ct It v a ed 'end r
pla ed bv he id t < 23 « be’J or
poll tax insitued bv Pet* I 235
gentry ctenrr from “>*2 h*ij txx
rt ol <heJ lnn*TitanL.C t-*\ mtui* C"d
19 s ir direct and 1 5t jfiSitton
425 432 01 aetSWI* 4>l 2 ji
S,V'tRl' 49J
Tt It 1 1 r T II s ait ,p„ ,r b r ‘«(j
Tc-ai <1 wv P ter 357 4 f S xt
3 i»iflo»7 *-.t t m laAe 4*1
The %tei fti” L -1. 4-6
Tebcr n C«Ter**n « x2a
Telcpioi ffrot- 1 Pnr-e 1 3
lul Tulljuk SSR) urrs we
n SSt>
Tempct e\ Hu d on Cr mean Mar,
3u<
Pc nporarv Regutul -n '’92, t46
ext*nd»J 1 1 r r onl 19t
Temuv.hi'i tec S nr* 1 kl an
Tenmwn Allrtu en irnm w ar
W
Te t*. area spf< iter 10 R ls*ns Ts
481
1cre*bkox 1 V len ir 58' t
Terror «n revolution ry -05 413
4i< 454 if ibe bun 4I)X 41 s
*54 3 - inst Bpl be 1
FeWn * kn ft c C Or 8) 't
nl<o Cm - nkmilvi
r»ad nt a J Sl_/* 1O i"
Oaw Hie StS-6
Ttit' n Rusv 292 a 29R 35«-
,V U, 443 4- ' S37 emit lb'
at rCstafc st't ilfi7 *0 ti.n 3
Chekhov Co»n! Gnrky G \*d
Mov.ow u TV ter 0**«w3*\
PmhVi a n iroVu
lheod t' ftedor' 1 T«r Ivon Iver
IV t retcni* 15 8 16"'
P'et 'ore tFiu r) It Tt-r («n of
Berts Cjodunovv 16* 164
T-eodorc (ledor) Ilf T nr <«a*t of
A lex* ) reign 0' l&J. I*'* 2M5 213
Tltedouus ^nn S3
Th-ocno'f kfefrojx-'jUrt sc led in
Mo cow 98
Thnl Department see His Maiestys
Own Cb m« ry
690
IDEX
“Third element" of the zemstva, 405
“Third Rome," doctrine of, 107, 125
Thirty Years’ War, 221, 226
Thomsen, Vilhelm L. P., on origin of
Rus, 25
Thor, 24
Thom, 268-70
Three Emperors’ League, 386, 398
Tibet, 417
Tifiis, see Tbilisi
Tikhomirov, Mikhail N.: on towns, 19;
on zemskie sobory, 190
Tikhon, Patriarch, 588
Tikhonov, Nicholas, 545
Tilsit, Treaty of, 308, 310
Timasheff, Nikolai S., on the “great re-
treat,” 592
Time of Troubles, 156, 157-74, 177,
181, 185, 190; dynastic phase, 160-
64; social phase, 164-7; national
phase, 168-72; nature and results,
172-4; in contemporary literature,
201; reduced number of foreigners
in Russia, 208
Tito, Marshal (Joseph Broz), 522, and
Cominfortn, 536; relations after Stal-
in’s death, 563; see also Yugoslavia
Tiumen, built, 153
Tiutchev, Theodore, 354-5, 360, 36J,
444; quoted, 3; on Pushkin's death,
357; on Hapsburgs, 385
Tkachev, Peter, 383; and Lenin’s views,
469
Tobolsk: built, 153, trade center, 279
Todtleben, Colonel Count Edward, 338
Togliatti, Palmiro, quoted on “cult of
personality," 539
Tokhtamysh, Khan, 101
Tolstoy, Alexis N., 585
Tolstoy, Count Dmitni, 380, 392, 437
Tolstoy, Count Leo, 360, 397, 436, 440;
on Napoleon's invasion of Russia,
312; on Crimean War, 338; Sevasto-
pol Tales, 338; War and Peace, 349,
443; and Populism, 382; Childhood,
Boyhood and Youth, 442; Anna
Karenina, 443; A Confession, 443;
and anarchism, 448; and socialist
realism, 585
Tomsk: trade center, 281; university in,
438
Torgau, 522
Torzhok, 72, 151
"Total Land Partition,” see “Black Par-
Towns: in ancient Russia, 20; role in
decline of Kiev, 41; in southern Rus-
sia against Basil Shuisky, 165; north-
eastern, in liberation movement, 170
Townspeople: represented in zemskii
sobor, 171, 176, 189; in Muscovite
Russia, 187; represented in Legisla-
tive Commission, 259; at end of 18th
century, 283; fee also Middle classes
Trade: in Kievan Russia, 43-8; and
foreign policy in Kievan Russia, 45;
in appanage Russia, 115, 118; in
Muscovite Russia, 184-5; foreign,
under Peter, 237; at end of 18th
century, 281; in 1800-1861, 335-7;
in 1861-1917, 425-6, 427, 432; cen-
ters, 281-2, in Kievan Russia, 46-7,
Novgorod, 84, Lvov, 90, Galicia and
Moscow, 115; routes, 29, 41, 43-6
77. 81, 84, 90, 115, 281-2, “From
the Varangians to the Greeks," 29,
41, 44, 77, 81, Archangel to central
Russia, 154; Volga to Caspian Sea,
32; foreign, in Soviet Russia, 530-31
Transcaspian region, annexed, 389
Transcaucasia, 326, 342; industrial re-
gion in, 425; in Treaty of Brcst-
Litovsk, 477; Transcaucasian Feder-
ation, 485f; Transcaucasian Repub-
lic, 487-8
Trans-Siberian railroad: built, 398; and
conflict with Japan, 40], 402-3; and
Civil War, 482
Travendal, Treaty of, 221
Trcadgold, Donald, on Stolypin, 434
Treaty of 1686 (with Poland), 181, 214
Trediakovsky, Basil, 292
Trepov, General Theodore, 383
Triple Alliance, 400, 417
Triple Entente, 417
Tristan and Isolde, 203
Troppau, conference and Protocol of,
315
Trotsky (Bronslein), Leon, 493, 505,
511; on Nicholas IF, 396; and Octo-
ber Revolution, 461; in Soviet gpv-
ernment, 475; and "No war, no
peace!" 477; in Civil War, 482; and
Left Opposition, 490; exile and mur-
der, 491; and the great trials, 504;
quoted on nature of Soviet Union,
567, and “betrayal of the revolu-
tion," 592
Trubetskoy, Prince Dmitrii, 169
Truman, President Harry S.: and war-
time diplomacy, 523; and Soviet ex-
pansion, 535
Truman Doctrine, 536
Truvor (brother of Riurik), 24
“Tsar”: use of title, 107; Ivan IV
crowned “tsar,” 145; compared to
title “emperor," 230
Tsaritsyn (formerly Siab'ngrad, now
Volgograd), defense of, 493
"Tsar-Liberator,” see Alexander II, 369
Tsarskoe Selo (now Pusbkino), 298,
344, 350
JNOE3C
601
Tstolkovsky Const a Mine 582
Tucker Robert C on Stalin 494
TugorKhan or Toga on 56
Tukhachevslcy Martha! Michael 484
504
Tula gentry army of 165, metal m
diKtrv m 183 279
Tnlchin 320
TuremeY Ivan 3J6 360 370 381
436 447 Gentry A«r $49 440
556 Sports/nan r Stitches 370 440
"ftthcr and ‘'sons 381 447 his
views 44 1 Bwmqv aod ntwUyn
44i 448 Kudin 440 fathers and
Sons 440 On the E\e 440 insole
44 0 t irgm Soil 440
T'itltV.Mi hy KVWtjoU Cl
Turley 1 07 163 179 181 suzerainty
over Crimea 102 seized Const mti
nopfe 103 control of R|i«.k Sea
IV5 teUtiorw •with VtijSMi vinAti
Sophia 214 under Peter I 219 21
224 226 from Peter 1 tt> CatKno
II 251-5 pa Him under Catherine
31 264-7 2$S-?3 under Paul \
274 jo 1836 81 383 9 pawn, , n
1881-1917 417-18 passm Ru«un
wars with in 1806-12 307 m IMS
330 Crime sn War 336-') m IR?7
78 186-8 conflict with Egypt and
Treaty of Unkivr Skelessi 333-1
336 Russian trade with }45 421
ftud national independence loose
tnem 483 receives Kars Ardikhjn
area 487-8 and Soviet Ruivia 512
513
TUtkmanchai Treaty Of 331
Turkmen Soviet Socialist RepuH c S07
Tushino 166f see also False Dmitru
(It)
Tver (town and principality) 92-3
1D9 112 struggle with Moscow gl
97f 102 absorbed bv Mo«c i1u ' lot
!®5 gentry renounces pmdettv 379
JystQtsht or ehlhanh 82 abolished m
Novgorod 105 last one in Moscow
112
II 2 plane incident 360
UJel (appanage), 63
Ufd) and reforms of Peter 1 232
and reforms ot Catherine )1 261
Ufa seized by Samara government 482
Ug«dey, Great Khan 70
Ughi* 104 155
Ugra river battle of 106
Upturns. 15
Ukraine 203 206 271 277 372 union
with Moscow 180 divided between
Moscow and Poland 181 under
Russian Orthodox Church (1654)
*98 clergy of rote In vAvix IT
*-«*£> nx fltssa'v te tiwirt revival
203 m Great Northern 33 *c 222 4
tith k n ng «,f Mntro'i over 232 seif
darn ertrtdrd irto 2.t>$ wevtev
rp’ted bv Rus a tro labor sere 1
m *’(> u rul the Trcirt of Brest
Iitovsl 477 and Sorct rej m»
4S4 7 pasut 1 UV.iiw.vsr. SravAt t w
cultst Repcb’ic 48? xo7 tvn nc m
49“ and communal a*r culture 4 D
Ccmmuni t pa tv in $1)6 in Seccnd
World ^ V X Ml $21 $2* *<•! CC>\
Ic-ljvuaUon 3’2 anJ “•'ourre^fs
rut on.d M* 577 sc alti Appar)
aye t us u Di leper v oss ekJ Kie
sera Vi v*. * V iiS -.r, ra «»ve p-
Luhuvn an Ri jii state
UVnm an' 6'f 1*9| «,hn typ* 94
viul l Cuanian »tvi (19 \\ar of
V-ib onion \%t) awl <*.b m 2fth
ar I p n t on of Poland 268-71
nd nationalism 394 *84-‘ in
U ' S F '>6 fed n ft toward Soviet
Un si '94
lAraitu c* N on Korr R>\ alia “
4x9
Adsr
1 Siat rt 44- on
Mini m uvd Itvia ityilir 1 w
on pinillrl I tween eornmOr s’! end
libtf ism $93
LI 10 v Alexander execution of effect
ovlmr 469
Ulwnov VI 1 lim r ««•«• Lemn
Ulianovsk tfotmerli 5 mbtr'M 4 7 '
Ulann P chard H on Allied wer
'•eow>H -t'.&
VIoJ rme see L aws
Ulnki Cl ooora <Juccn of Sweden
225
UmaV. Ctow.lv 169 «stvblwhcJ b\
Union of Brest 179 and Inlfwfi.il
Ruvs n pot sy t32 3 ?SC aid 5cv
Mitpo'iCV Vs' u.< Mi'Oti tes
V ritsn ot ConvnurivV \ o th < Komso-
mol) 556 568 andpu Ed 5B4
Lmwn of the Godless 583
tjr ot\ of V, bcr_ era. foiwiied 4Q5
Umoh ot UiiHm \36f
tin on of Peremlavl 180-SI
Union cf Salvat on. 3Jt3
Union o* Soviet SoeiaU'A Uepuel'W
(USSR) established 4ft? «m
position 507
Union of Soviet V. rirers, 3?i
Union of Towns 410
Union ot VJnKras 4(5?
Union of '3 elf ire 320
(iniltd front" LMi« to Cht»5 512
United Ml oos '27 524 536 U.5SR
m 536 558 and V-us 537-8
692
United States of America, 317, 501;
comparison of Soviet and U.S. econ-
omies, 546-7; comparison of Soviet
and U.S. education, 579-80; com-
parison of scientific achievement,
583; relations with Russia, before
J 92 1 , 389, 456, 483, in 1921-41,
512, 513, in Second World War,
520ff, 523-4; in 1945-53, 533-8; in
1953-68, 557-62; in 1968-83, 561-
2, 566 passim; sec also North Amer-
ica; North American colonies
Universal military service, 377-8; see
also Conscription
University education: in 18th century,
288-9; in 1800-1861, 304, 349-52;
in 1861-1917, 435, 437-8; in Soviet
Russia, 579-80
University Statute: of 1835, 351; of
1863, 380, 392, 436; of 1884, 392-3
Unkiar Skelessi, Treaty of, 333, 336
Unkovsky, Alexis, 379
Unofficial Committee, 303, 304, 360
Upper classes, support Whites, 487; see
also Boyars; Gentry; Muzhi; New
upper class; Nobility
Ural cossacks, and Pugachev rebellion,
260; autonomy limited, 263; opposi-
tion to Soviet rule. 481
Ural mountains and area, 70, 152; in-
dustry in. 185. 237, 343; and indus-
trialization, 496
Ushakov, Simon (icon painter). 205
Ushakov, Admiral Theodore, 274
Uspensky, Gleb, 443; on Dostoevsky,
442
Ussuri region, ceded to Russia, 390
Ustinov, Dmitrii, 545
Ustrialov, Nikolai V., on evolution of
Soviet Russia, 592
Utigurs, 16
Uvarov, Count Serge, 340, and doc-
trine of ‘‘Official Nationality," 324;
and higher education, 349-52; and
Oriental studies, 353
Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, 507
Varangian Rus, 24
Varangians, 23-28ff
Vasiifev, Aleksandr A., on attacks of
Rus on Surozh and Amastris, 26
Vasilsursk, fair in, 108
Vavifov, Nicholas, 581
Veche, 50, 87, 93f; Kievan. 50-51;
Novgprodian, 79, 82, 83, 105: Psko-
vian, 87; in Galicia and Volynia, 91;
disappears from Russian politics, 119
Vedomosti, began publication, 287
Vedrosha river, battle of, 106
Veklti, or Signposts, 451
INDEX
Veliaminov, Basil (last Moscow tvsiat-
skii), 111
Velikie Luki, 152
Venedi (designation of Slavs), 19
Venetian colonies, 115
Venevitinov, Dmrtrii, 361
Venturi. Franco, on populism, 383
Vcreia (principality), 104
Vereshchagin, Basil, 445
Vernadsky, George: on origins of Rus-
sia, 9, 27; on Kievan matrimonial
alliances, 38; on Kievan population,
48; on Mongols, 67, 72-6 passim; on
Kasimov, 102-3; on Dmitrii of Ug-
lich, 156; quoted on Treaty of Brest-
Litovsk, 477-8
Vernadsky, Vladimir, 583
Verona conference, 315
Viacheslav (son of Iaroslav the Wise),
39
Viatichi, 32
Viatka, 85; annexed to Moscow, 104
Viborg, or Viipuri, seized by Peter 1,
225
Viborg Manifesto, 410-11
Vienna, 521; Congress of, 314, 317;
Treaty of, 331; meeting (1961), 560
Vienna Note, 337
Vicre, Anthony de, 218
Vielminb, 558
Vietnam and Vietnam war, 558; effect
on U.S.-Soviet relations, 561; effect
on Sino-Soviet relations, 562-3
Vilna, or Vilnius, 1 34, 135, 311, 522;
university in, 350, 352
Vinius, Andrew, 208
Vinogradov, Ivan, 583
Vinogradov, Paul, 440
Vipper, see Wipper
“Virgin lands" project, 594
Visigoths, 15
Vistula river, 223, 524
Vitebsk, 311
Viten or Vytenis (Grand Prince of
Lithuania), 133
Vitichev, 43
Vitovt (Grand Prince of Lithuania),
101, 135
Vladimir, Grand Prince, Saint, 29, 53,
56, 78, 125; reign of, 33-6; con-
verted to Christianity, 34; revival of
paganism, 34; marriage to Anne,
sister of Byzantine emperor, 34; can-
onized, 36
Vladimir, Prince of Galicia, 89£
Vladimir (lurcvich). Prince of Mos-
cow, 97 .
Vladimir (Vsevolodovich), Prince ot
Moscow, 97
Vladimir, Prince of Staiitsa, 149, 151
Vladimir Monomakh, Grand Prmcc:
INDEX
693
his Testament 40 54 57 60 reign
of 39-41 campaigns of 40 desceR
danfs rule in Northeast 78 91 92
legend of regalia, 107 124
Vladumr (town and principality), 93,
1090 town built 40 gamed in im
pOrtance 65 attacked by Mongols
70, seat of grand prince, 91 an
nexed to Muscovy 109
Vladumr m Volynia 99 given to Igor
son of Jaroslav 39
Vladimir-Suzdal 91-4 spin into five
principalities, 93 see also Rostov
Suzdal Vladimir
Vladimirsky Budanov Mikhail F on
Galician boyars 90-91 quoted on
service people "114 on Ulo heme
of 1649 186 on Muscovite edu a
tton 206
Vladislav (boyar) occupes princely
seat in Galicia 90
Vladivostok founded 390 and Civil
War 482 passim 1974 meeting of
Brezhnev and Ford 562
Vlasicv Athanasius 163
Vlasov General Andrew J26
Voeioda 193 232
Volga area disorders in 165 rebellion
of Stenka Razin 178 rebellion of
Bashkirs 223 fresco painting in 205
industrial region of 277 use of free
labor in 342
Volga Bulears see Bulgars
Volga river 109 115 379 trade routes
of 77 81 115 canals 237 344
531 navigation on, 344 and Second
World War 521
Volga-Caspun Sea trade route con
trolled by Russians 35
Volga-German Autonomous Republic
abolished 532
Volgograd (formerly Tsantsyn and
Stalingrad! renamed 493
Volkhov riser 81
Volkov Theodore 298
Volast and proposal of Speransky 305
Volostel 192
Voltaire 255 264 272 quoted 254
Voltairianism Russian, 294
Volynia 65 88-91 devastated by
Mongols 71, 90 united with Gali-
cia 89 decline 90 becomes part of
Lithuanian state 90 134 taken over
by Poland 137
Von Laue, Theodore on economic de
velopment of Russia trader the old
regime 434
Vomfatiev, Stephen. 198
V orkuta forced labor camp uprising
556
Voronezh 219 520
Voronikhin. Andrew 367
Vorontsov Michael 247
Voroshilov Mar hxl Clement 533 54s
Vorotynsky Ponce Michael 147
Vorsin n\ er b title i_f n» sitmifican *
135
Vostokov Alexander 354
Vatchtna 116 UR in Lithuanian
sta.e 138
Vojce Arthur quoted on Russian art
205
Vozha nver battle of 100
Voznesensky Andrew 597
Vs-vo , od,Grard Prm e 39
V ►volod HI of the Lnrgc Ned Grind
Prince 92 f
\ vshnegradsky lsan *95
Vytenii V f »cn
Wale a Lech 565
W 1 Inch a 224 265 subjugated by
Mun r oU 7 1 under L ihu mans, 13*
and Peter 1 224 reiurred to Turkey
26* rights in granted to Russia
308 see also O nubian pnn ip’litw*,
Wiil-h Warren R on eonpos t on of
First D ma 409 10
War tommumsn 47S 88 1 ms, 4$R
similarity to First Fi\e bear Plan
497 3nd peasantry 571 2
War lndustn Comm ttee und wa ef
ton <20
War of 1812 rre 1812 exensol
War of the Aus nan Succession 2*2
War of the Pci sh Succc s or 252
\\ ir of the Spanish Sutce sion 226
War of the Third Coal lion *07
Warsaw Grand Du hy of created,
311) aboli bed *14 city of and
resolution of 18*0 3 2 an ittiKs
trial cemer 425 nnd Sos ct Pclish
\Vi> 483— 1 in rtbcll on against
Germ ins, S24
Warsaw Treats (or Wi-j.iv. Pact)
559 563 564
Waterloo Kittle of 113
Weakest link 0 eory 469
Webb Sidney ard Beatnc- asnl Sonet
Russi3 391
Meid!/' Wbdim r on undeveloped
Goth >. style m Russia 128 q oed
on Russian culture 285
Wcnien tattle of 152
Werab Treaty of 272
V\e«t the travels in of Peter I 217
220 Peter I tries to form coal tion
against Turks 220 Slavopl De views
on 363f rapprochement with Russia
collapse*, 513 nnJ Munich crisis
51S susp ctous of Soviets 516 atu
tudes during Second 55orld War.
694
INDEX
West, the: (Coni.)
523-4; Russian co-operation with,
524; and postwar Soviet Russia, 533-
8 passim; niter death of Stalin. 557-
62
Western influence in Russia; in time of
Boris Godunov, 160; under Alexis,
177; on iconography, 205; “self-
criticism” in Muscovite Russia, 208-
9; on reforms of Peter I, 228, 233-4;
in 18th century, 348-9; on literature,
357-8, 440-41; on ideologies, 360-
66; on arts, 367, 446-7; on judicial
reforms, 377; on Russian radicals,
381-2; and industrialization, 424-6,
502 et passim; on culture before
1917, 447; on communist ideology,
466ff
Western provinces, 277; serfs in, 328;
emancipation in, 374
Westernization, 242, 258, 278-9, 283-
99 passim; in reign of Peter I, 233-5,
237-8, 240-41; in reign of Catherine
If, 273ff; sco also Western influence
Westernizcrs, 362, 364-6 passim
Whistler, George, 344
White Russia, or Belorussia: and Mus-
covite Church reforms, 200, and
Partitions of Poland. 267-70 passim;
Polish rebellion of 1863 spreads to,
379; and Soviet-Polish War, 484; de-
clares independence, 484; western,
ceded to Poland, 487; and German
invaders, 525
White Russians. 65. 94, 200: ethnic
type associated with Lithnanian-Rus-
sian state, 139
White Volunteer Army, 481ff
Whites: and the Civil War, 479-87
passim, 493; peasant attitudes and,
572; and the Church, 587
Widukind (author of Res gestae sax-
onicae ), 27
Wiclopolski, Marquis Alexander, 379
“Will of the People,” 392, 448; formed,
384; assassinates Alexander IT, 384;
tradition of, resumed by SR’s, 406;
and Lenin’s views, 469
William TI (Emperor of Germany),
416-18
“Window into Europe,” 226, 277
Winter Palace, 384, 407; built, 247,
298; stormed in 1917, 461
Wipper (Vipper), Robert I-, on Ivan
IV, 154
Witte, Count Serge, 395, 427, and in-
dustrialization, 398, 424-5; and Far
Eastern policy, 401-2, 403; and Oc-
tober Manifesto, 407-8; and French
loans, 408; and elections to First
Duma, 409; and trade, 425; and
taxes, 432; and education, 437
Wladyslaw (Prince of Pofand), 173;
invitation to become Russian tsar,'
167, 174; candidacy rejected by
Sigismand III, 168; candidacy with-
drawn, 176
Wladyslaw II of Poland, see Jagiello
Wojtyla, Kard, 565
Workers, see Labor
World of Art, The (periodical), 444
Wrangel, General Baron Peter, 483,
488
Yagoda, 504
Yalta Conference, 523, 524
Yalu river, 401
Yenikale, 265
Yenisei, sec Enisci river
Yezhov. see Ezhov
Yezhovshchina, see Ezhovshchina
Yuan dynasty (China), 69
Yugoslavia: German invasion of, 517;
and Cominform, 536; Khrushchev’s
relations with, 559; independence of
Soviet Union, 563, 564; potentialities
of independent communism, 594, see
also Balkans; Serbia; Tito
Zadonshchina, 126
Zaionchkovsky, Petr A., quoted on abo-
lition of serfdom, and capitalism,
368
Zakharov, Hadrian. 367
Zamiatnin, Dmitrii, 377
Zarudny, Serge, 377
Zarutsky, Ivan (cossack leader), 169,
171, 175
Zasulich, Vera, 383
Zcchariah, or Skharia, the Judaizer, 123
Zeinshchina, 150
Zemskii nachatnik, see Land captain
Zemskii sober, 17], 188-191; first full
(1549), 145-6; of 1566, 154; in
reign of Ivan IV, 145-6, 154, 189-
90; of 1598, election of Boris Godu-
nov as Tsar, 160, 190; of 1613, com-
position, and election of Romanov
dynasty to throne, 171-2; in leign of
Michael, 190-91; in Alexis's reign,
of 1642, 176, of 1648, 178, of 1653.
180, others, 190-91; development in
Muscovite Russia, 188-91; parallels
in West, 189, 191; not used by Peter
L 230; and Slavophiles, 363
Zemstvo, 192, 305-6; reform of 1864,
374-5; system, 374, 393; school for
radicalism and liberalism, 376; polit-
ical significance, 377; restriction af-
INDEX
6SS
Sdfrizditi 556, 597
San Stefano, Treaty of, 387
Sam, 107
Saratov, trade center, 281, university tn
438
Sardinia and the Crimean VVar, 337-9
Sartit, 16, sacked by Sratoslav, 32
Samatiuns 34-15, 17
Saielev (Saveliev), Pavel S, on trade
of East Slavs, 45
Savin, Sih 205
Savinkov, Bom 480
Saxony m the Great Northern War
221-5 pa trim and Russian foreign
policy, 252, and the Congress of
Vienna, 314
Sazonov, Serge 417
Scfcjptro Leonard S , on role of Com
JMU»*I party 571
Schdling influence in Russia 361
Schtemann Theodor quoted 323 on
Nicholas 1 340
Schilder (Shildcr) Nikolai K on Nich
olasl 340
Schilicr Russian translations of 355
influence on ideology 360ff
Schism (raskoi) 197-201 see also Old
Belief Russian Orthodox Church
Schlozer August Ludwig von 297 on
the origins of Kievan Russia 23-5
Schlusselburg fortress 257
Schonbrunn Treaty of 310
School of Mathematical ami Nxviga
tional Sciences, 237, 287
School of the tsar s icon painters 205
Schumun, Frederick L on Second
World War losses 528 on Soviet
Russia 591
Science and scholarship in IStb cefi
tury, 296-7, In 1800-1861. 352-4,
tn 1861-1917 438-10, in Soviet Rus
sia, 581-4
‘■Scissors crisis," 495
Scriabin, Alexander. 446
"Scythian ploughmen," 19, 45
Scythian* 13-14, 15, 17
Stch or Sick 179, abolished by CaJh
enne JJ, 263, ire oho Dnieper cos
sacks
Scchcnov, Ivan 439
Second Coalition 274
“Second from," 522, 523
Second Turkish War (1787-92), 265-7
passim 284
Second World War, 516-23 et passrm
diplomacy during, 523-4. evaluation
525-6 effect of 527-8 effect on
population, 571-2, and Soviet so.
ciety 593, 594
Semenov, Gregory, and Civil War, 48l
Semenov, Nicholas. 58}
Semcnovsku Regiment of the Guard?
see Guards
Scmenovskoe (village). 217
Semcvsky Vcsilii I , on peasant Letts
togs, 369
Senate 22S 228 established 231, lose*
power 243 restored to fomcr power
246 restored by Alcxend-r I. 303,
and proposals of Speramkv 305, and
Nicholas I, 325, becomes Supreme
Court 377
Sep iratism aftet Revolilions of 1917,
484-7 during Second World War,
594 str also Minorities
Serbia war *ith Turkey 186-8 pas
sim Russian volunteers tn 386 *rd
Russian foreign policy (1905-14)
416-20 passim and World War )
419 ut als i Yucoslav ta
Serbun settlements m Ruvsn 263
Serfdom '' 116 fully established m
Russn 159 174 unrest io Time of
Troubles 165 and ( to' feme of
1649 178 185-8 pxjtmi develop-
men! in Muscovite Russia 185 7
Sbcria escapes serfdom 195 a boh
non favored by Golds* n 214 effest
of head (ax on 21 J growth of
1725-62 249 80 ami Legislative
Commission 259 ard Pugachev re
hellion 260 61 und't Cathcnn* If
2(2-3 272 under Pc'es 267 condi
tiers at erd of f8th century 274
278-80 household serfs 232 372
■md social criticism 295 views of
Alexander J 7D3 318 emanciptior
in Baltic provinces 31? m men of
Nu-holts 1 327-8 nnd agriculture
1800-1861 342 3 39 346 emanetpa
tior favored by Slavophiles 363
cmxncipilion (186f I 3*0 74
Serge Grand Duke assassinated J06
Serpu- Patnar h J8S
Scrcnis of Radonezh SairL 112, 121
126 disciples of 119 122 influence
im i.en painters 130
Scion Watson Hugh N quoted on pre
dicam'Dt of pre-revoluuonarv Russia
422
Sevastopol or Sebastopol 266 defend
Of 338-9
Seven War Plan, 5-6-7
Seven years War 24? 252—3
Seymour Sir Hamilton conversations
with Nicholas I. 337
Shafirov Peter 219
Sh.Vbmatov Aleksei A on rfmoon
nmone, Slavs, IS, cn "Norman the-
ory "27
686
INDEX
Shakhovskoy, Prince Gregory, 165
Shaklovity, Theodore, 215-16
Shamil, 389
Shanghai, massacre of Communists in,
512
Shchapov, Afanasii P., on schism, 200
Shchedrin, N., see Saltykov, Michael
Shcherbatov, Prince Michael, 297
Shelon river, battle on, 104
Shemakha area, ceded to Russia, 308
Shemiaka, Dmitrii (nephew of Basil
II), his claim to seniority, 102
Shepilov, Dmitrii, 541, 560
Sheremetev, Field Marshal Count Boris,
219, 222-3
Shestov, Leo (Leo Schwartzmann), 451
Shevchenko, Taras, 333
Shevyrev, Stephen, 324, 354, 362
Shimonoseki, Treaty of, 401
Shipka Pass, 387
Shishkov, Admiral Alexander, 354, 362
Sholokhov, Michael: on cossacks, 232,
The Quiet Don, 585; Virgin Soil Up-
turned, 585
Shostakovich, Dmitrii, 587
Shubin, Fedot, 298
Shuisky, Andrew, 145
Shuisky, Prince Basil, 189; on death of
Prince Dmitrii of Uglich, 156, 162-
3, 172f; as tsar, 164-7; deposed,
167
Shuisky, Prince Dmitrii (brother of
Basil), 166, 167; and his wife, 167
Shuisky family, 145
Shuvalov, Alexander, 247
Shuvalov, Ivan (favorite of Empress
Elizabeth), 247, 288
Shuvalov, Count Peter, 247
Siberia: conquest by Ermak, 152-3; ex-
peditions into and explorations, 194-
5, 203, 297, 353; trade centers in,
281; increase in population of, 389;
Trans-Siberian railroad built, 398,
401; migrations encouraged to, 415,
432; and Civil War, 481-3 passim;
and industrialization, 496-7; current
scientific and technological expansion,
552
Sibir, or Siberia, khanate of, Russian
suzerainty established, 152; see also
Siberia
Sigismund II, or Sigismund Augustus
(King of Poland), 137
Sigismund III (King of Poland), 167,
171; declares war against Russia,
167; candidacy for Russian throne,
168-9
Signposts, or Vckhi, 451
Silesia, 71, 252
Silistria, 33
“Silver age” in literature, 435-52 pas-
sim, 450-51; and Soviet literature,
584, and arts, 586
Simbirsk, 475; and Razin rebellion,
178; seized by Left SR’s, 481, 482;
see also Ulianovsk
Simeon, Tartar prince, 150, 155
Simeon of Polotsk, 182, 203, 206
Simeon the Proud of Moscow, Grand
Prince, uses term “of all Russia,” 98
Simmons, Ernest J., quoted on Russian
literature, 435
Simonov, Constantine: Days and
Nights, 585; The Russian Question,
585
Sineus (brother of Riurik), 24
Siniavsky, Andrei, 555
Sino-Soviet agreement of 1950, 537
Sinope, naval battle of, 337
Sipiagin, Dmitrii, 398; assassinated, 406
Skharia, see Zechariah
Skobeev, Frol, 203
Skobelev, General Michael, 389
Skomorokhi, 59, 203
Skopin-Shuisky, Prince Michael (neph-
ew of Basil Shuisky), 165-7, 169
passim
Skorina, Francis, scholar from Polotsk,
139
Skoropadsky, Paul, 485
Skriabin, Viacheslav, see Molotov
Skuratov, Maliuta, 151
Slaves: unrest and rebellion in Time of
Troubles, 165, effect of poll tax on,
235
Slavonic-Greek-Latin Academy, found-
ed, 206-7
Slavophiles and Slavophilism, 362-3,
365-6 passim, 381, 441; on Time of
Troubles, 172; view of Muscovite
Russia, 197; on Peter I, 240; and
emancipation of serfs, 370; on com-
mune, 374; Neo-Slavophilism, 556
Slavs, 17-20; question of homeland, 18;
and commune, 363
Slavs, East: people of Kievan Russia,
17-20; unified by Sviatoslav, 32; and
trade, 45; agriculture among, 45-6,
47-8; religion of, 52
Slavs, South, influence on appanage
literature, 126
Slepov, Lazar A., quoted on collective
leadership, 539
Slitte, 148
Sloveni, 24
Smenovekhovtsy, 592
Smerdy, 49
Smolensk (town and principality), 20,
39, 65, 94, 277 et passim; and Mos-
cow, 106, 108, 181; and Lithuanian
INDEX
stale, 134, and Poland, 167-70 pas-
sim, 175-6, industry in, 277, and
Napoleon, 311
Smolny Institute established 290, built,
298
Smutnoe vremia, see Time of Troubles
Sobornost, 363
Social Democratic party ("SD ), 406
tpht, 406, 449, 467-8, in Duma 4J0
411; and labor movement, 429-30,
and The Spark, 475, see also Bolshe
viU, Mensheviks
Social Democrats, Western, views on
Lenin 469
'Social engineering," 573-4, 564, 591-
S 0 C 13 I sciences and Soviet Marxism,
581-2 583
Socialism appears in Russia 363-6 de
velopmem of, 448-9 and peasant
commune, 448-9, and dependence on
world revolution, 490 and ' socialism
in one country,’ 490
"Socialist realism," 445, S811T in liters
ture, J84-6 in arts 586-7
Socialist revolution Russia not pre
pared for 456, Lenin's views cm
468-9, Trotsky s views on, 592
Socialist Revolutionary paw ( SR’)
406. 448 449 m Dumas 410 412.
and Stolypins policies, 413 m the
Executive Committee of the Ail
Russian Soviet, 456 jn Constituent
Assembly, 476-7, outlawed, 478, op
position to Soviet rule, 480, 482, set
oho “Battle Organization , Left So
cialist Revolutionaries Maximalists
Populism
‘Socialist stage,’ and Constitution o'
1936, 506
Socialists, in Provisional Government
456, 458-9
Society, in Kievan Russia, 49, in Nov
gorod, 81-7, in appanage Russia
117-19, in Muscovite Russia, 15S-S
185-8 in Time of Troubles 172-4
in Petrine Russia, 234-6 in 18tb
century, 282-4 in 1800-1861, 345-
7. in 1861-1917, 422-4 428-34 in
Soviet Russia, 555-7, 578, 594-5 see
also Boyars Gentry; Middle classes,
Peasantry Serfdom
Society of the United Sims, 320
Solano. Pietro, 128
"Solidarity," in Poland, 565
Soloveytcbik (Solaveichik), George M
de, on Potemkin 266
Soloviev (Solavev), Sergei M , 354,
440, 431; on role of geographic fac
tors in history, 8, on colonization.
687
93, on location of Moscow 109, on
Time of Troubles, 172 on Peter I,
240
Solovies, Vladimir, t <0-51, A Juu'fca
{ton of the Good tSl
Solvjcbccodsk 204
Solzhsnrsvn Alexander, 503 386, 597,
Gu'ag 55 o
Sophn (Regent, <r t.- r c f p e ( ;r th-
GreaO 214 221
Sophie Au juste F-edcrlks (Prirwti of
Anhalt Zertst) ire Ctt^erre If, the
Great
Sorokin Pitirim A. on the ere’ 1 re-
t -at ‘92
Soto a 82
South Russun ' krainm region (in
dustria \ 42 S
Sccth SIj'« see S’au S-'- h
So> the st \iia Treaty Orea-^aton
<SEATOj jsv
«ol as. 1 S\ie> (D ctnbrin) 320
SouJiw-u Russia 68-9 1 kievan b*rt
tape « *e o’se Cxlicm Voly-na
Sose eiyt of \ , P usia" (t? uJari
me 2 ssum-d by J an HI 105 see
uht Great ^ov- reign"
So et or *0 kJ cf 19)* 407 and
labor units _ <29 30
Sj -tCz-vh Alhsrc* concluded 514
Sonet Fre- h A1 lance .orcludeJ ‘14
US'
So/etGerrsin vreenent ‘ 93 1 *) 516
Some cevenm-m organized 4"‘ frst
months 4 6- T etpj'ihn
Sov enrt* 1'e-iual*. 569 *9“
Soviet Navy, 552 561
Soviet Polish War <H2-5 p--J n
oovi-t Russia Jfj-jfg eviabhshed 461
ei passim anevamton 52 ‘-6 and
c.ccludin^ remarks *90-5
So net system npansicn aoJ the Wes.,
533ff confused wih d-mocruLc so-
ci lism 591 perspectives, SS’-S
Sovi-s local fcm-J 4 56 aettut) op-
posed to kt-n l?v 459 Ml R vsiio
Congresses First 460 Xcond, 476
nfth 487 Supteme Sonet estab-
lish'd *07, see alto Su^irme Sovi*’
Sovkhoz re- Slate farms
Spam recognition of Russia as *« cn
pire 226 and p<?> ey of Cathenre 11
264 nnd Ruvsun foreign rohey
1801-12 30", s-d the Cong-ess
System 315-17. Civil War in and
Soviet Russia 514-15
Spark The (hire), 475
Speransk) Count Michael 304 305,
*3)8, and the Oxidation of Laws
328 and Karamzin, 3 54
688
“Spirit of Geneva,” (summit conference
in 1955), 559
Spiritual Reglament, 232
Sputnik I, 547
Srttb, see klet
Stakhanov, Alexis, and “Stakhanovite”
movement, 502
Stalin (Dzhugashvili), Joseph, 470,
475; and five-year plans, 474, 491,
era of, 492-538; and party struggle,
490ff; background, 492-4; views on,
493-4; and the Twentieth and Twen-
ty-second Party Congresses, 494,
540-42, 559; denunciation of, 494,
540-42, and its effects, 559; “Dizzy
with Success” speech, 498; and in-
dustrialization, 500-3; great purge,
503-5; his system, 505ff; Constitu-
tion of 1936, 506-7; quoted, 509;
foreign policy of, 509-18; support
for Kuomintang, 512; and Second
World War, 518-26; last decade of,
527-38; and Zhdanov, 533; death of,
538, 555, 593; buried in Lenin
Mausoleum, 540; and possibility of
another purge, 540, 595; problem of
succession, 540ff; removed from
Lenin Mausoleum, 542; and army,
575, and Great Russian nationalism,
577; and Marr theory, 584; and lit-
erature. 584-5; and death of Gorky,
585; and religion, 587-8
Stalingrad, 493; renamed Volgograd,
493; battle of, 521; in writings of
Simonov, 585; see also Tsaritsyn
Stalinist Constitution, see Constitution
of 1936
Stanislavsky, Constantine, 447
Stankevich, Nicholas, 364
Starodub (principality), joins Moscow,
108
Starovery, or staroobriadtsy, 199-201;
see also Old Belief; Russian Ortho-
dox Church
State Bank, established, 378
State Conference in Moscow (1917),
459
State Council, 306, 371, 409; made into
upper chamber. 409; during First
World War, 421
State farms ( sovkhozes ), 498; increase
of, 501, 548, 553, 572-3
State Gentry Land Bank, 393, 423
State Lending Bank, 283
State Planning Commission (Gosplan),
495
Steinberg, Isaac N., quoted, 404
Stender-Petersen, Adolph, on origin of
Rus, 25
Stenka Razin, see Razin
Stephen, from Novgorod, 126
INDEX
Stephen of Perm, Saint, 122, 126
Steppun, Fedor A., on Slavophiles, 363
Stokes, Anthony D., on seat of religion
in Rievan Russia, 38
Stolbovo peace treaty, 176
Stoletov, Alexander, 439
Stolypin, Peter, 411; his policy, 413-
15; “pacification” and reform, 413-
15; assassinated, 415; effect of land
reform of, 433, 454
Strabo, 14
Straits, the (Dardanelles and Bospo-
rus), 265, 274; Russian conflict of
interest with France over, 310; pas-
sage of Russian ships guaranteed
(1829), 331; troops land at Bospo-
rus, 333; Straits Convention (1841),
336, importance of, 337; and Izvol-
sky, 417; and First World War, 420;
see also Crimean War
Stravinsky, Igor, 357; The Firebird,
446; Pctroitchka, 446; Le Sacre du
printempts, 446
Streltsy, 147, 239; in struggle between
Sophia and Peter, 214-16; sup-
pressed by Peter, 220; rebellion in
Astrakhan (1705), 223; expanded
then disbanded by Peter I, 228
Strigolniki, 122
Stroganov, Count Paul, 303
Stroganov school of icon painting, 205
Stroganovs, 152, 177, 185, 204
Strumilin, Stanislav, 550
Struve, Frederick W. J., 352
Struve, Gleb, on Soviet and emigre lit-
erature, 586
Struve, Peter, 405, 451; quoted on feu-
dalization in Russia, 114
Subudey (Mongol general), 70
Succession: arrangement of Iaroslav the
Wise, 39, 41-2; in Moscow, 110; in
Muscovite Russia, 189-90; problem
of, after Peter I, 238-9; Law of
Peter I, 239; Law of Paul. 273; after
Alexander I, and the Decembrist re-
volt, 321; in Soviet Russia, after
Lenin, 490-91, after Stalin, 540-41
Sudebnik, Pskovian, see Pskov, Sudcb-
nik
Sudebnik of 1550, 146
Sudetenland, and Munich, 515
Suez Canal invasion, 560
Sukhomlinov, General Vladimir, 420,
454
Suleiman I, the Magnificent, 108, 251
Sumarokov, Alexander, 292
Sumner, Benedict H., : on Peter I,
237, quoted on serfdom, 276
Sun Yat-sen, 512
Supreme Secret Council, 243-5
Supreme Soviet: organization under
INDEX
Constitution of 1936 507, role tin
dtr Sialm 532
Sunkov Basil 445
Surozh attacked by Rus 26
Suslov Michael 545
Suvorov Generalissimo Prince Alexan
der 253 264 266 crushed Polish
uprising 270 Italian camps ten 275
Suzdal (town and pnncipaluy) n 9
91-4 passim 109 pagan revival in
37 devastated by Mongol* 70 con
Irol over Volga trade route 79
Swstopolk (Iziashvich) Grand Prince
39
Smtopolk (Vladiminovtch) the
Damned 36-7
Sviatoslav (farosiavich) of Chernigov
39
Swatoslai (Igorevich) Grand Prince
27-9 passim reign of 31-3
Sviatoslav (Olgovich) of Novgorod
Seversk Prince 95
Sviatoslav (Vladimirovich 1 37
Sttiazhsk fortress (near Kazan) 146
Sweden and Swedes 66 defeated bv
Alexander Nevskii 79 80 wars with
Russia 152 155 181 involvement
in Time of Troubles 157 167 170
175 6 and Peter 1 220 225 6 in
fluence on Petrine reforms 230-31
233 and Russian foreign policy
(1725 62) 251-3 passim and
Catherine II 264-6 passim 271-2
passim and Russian foreign policy
<1801-12) 307-8 war with Russu
18C8-9 30S against Napoleon 311
and Russian foreign policy (1812
25) 313-17 passim and Soviet for
cign policy 512
Switzerland Russian armies in 275
Sylvester (chronicler) S7
Silvester (priest adviser to Ivan IV)
145 149-50 presumed auihor of
Domosrroi 202
Syria 69 333
SJachta 136
Table of Ranks 235 241
Tndlus, 19
Taganrog 221 345
Taiwan see Formosa
Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic 507
Tale abcu/r (he Capture of Pskov 126
Talleyrand 314
Tambov trade center 281
Tamerhne 75 101 110
Tanais fortress of 14
Tannenberg battle of (1914) 419
Tannenberg. or Grunwald battle of
(1410) 1?5
Tanil of 1724 236
Tariffs proteeme o' 1762 and 1793
231
Tarle Evgend V on national resis
tance to Napoleon 313
Tirht* 67 147 see o r » Cr me 4
kharate of khjtw t cf
Mongols
T tarirov VaJrn 378
Txti hchev B r\ "’97
T*.xes in Kiev 49 nn'er Mor-olx
"J "the fifth nor ey a-J th- t-ntb
money 177 on a tc v» ed 'end r
pto cd by heid ux 2}e ' Ye'J of
poll tax m-.ttt.led by Pet* I 235
gentry cxemn- frem ‘‘‘I li*iJ m
r\ ol shed tnh*ntan k e t-\ istnf c*d
194 irdireut and it ius-'niii t n
424 412 on t Tci sorts 4jt 2 n
S, vj*l Ri 1 495
Tt lit 1 r r 11 y uii ,p„ , rt p
Tc v ais«vsev P ter 357 4 ( S s(
5 mpfory -<« 5 m fs.le 4*(
Th* Steeping 4-6
Tebcr n Confer t 421
Teicpncv Oho!* j Pru—e: 1 3
Txrl Tutljuk SSR) tyrs *[!
n 556
Temper ex H u id on Cr mean V> ar,
3><
Te nporarx Reguljl -os '’92, '*6
ext*ndrj tv T r -n 1 397
Temuxhin sec I nr‘ 1 K1 an
Tennxwn Altrtu xn Crncn " ar
338
Te area cppcttior to b Ishe Ti
48 J
Tcre*hkox 1 V len ir 4«' t
Terrors'! revolution r> -05 413
4|< 454 if the Run 40* 41<
-54 a» mxt Bp! he s !
rein in c Kn g«v c C Cv ? ) *r
also C*r " n howl is
Pia.1 nl 1 JSLctO i"
(haw Die 4S5-6
Th n e' n Rus' 731 \ 29R 356
,J( «-i 443 4 ,' 417 COU1 I s '
at restab s>-UI67
Chekhov Co*M Corky G hoed
Moscow a The ter t>-«wso.
PushVi a n iroku
1 hex’d r* (1 edor' f Tsar (x-i c’ ,\sr
(V) reign 1 ' 15 6 i 6^
fher 'ore tFcu r) H Ti’r («n o[
Boris Godunov 1 162 164
Theodore thedor) 111 Tv (‘on of
Alexis) revn o' 182. 189 206 213
Tuodcwus *ntn S3
Th*ocn«t Metropchtan sc leu In
Mo cow 98
Hird Department see rus MaiestyS
Own Cbjncery
690
INDEX
“Third element” of the zemstva, 405
“Third Rome,” doctrine of, 107, 125
Thirty Years’ War, 221, 226
Thomsen, Vilhelm L. P., on origin of
Rus, 25
Thor, 24
Thorn, 268-70
Three Emperors’ League, 386, 398
Tibet, 417
Tiflis, see Tbilisi
Tikhomirov, Mikhail N.: on towns, 19;
on zemskie sobory, 190
Tikhon, Patriarch, 588
Tikhonov, Nicholas, 545
Tilsit, Treaty of, 308, 310
Timasheff, Nikolai S., on the “great re-
treat ” 592
Time of Troubles, 156, 157-74, 177,
181, 185, 190; dynastic phase, 1 60—
64; social phase, 164-7; national
phase, 168-72; nature and results,
172-4; in contemporary literature,
201; reduced number of foreigners
in Russia, 208
Tito, Marshal (Joseph Broz), 522, and
Cominform, 536; relations after Stal-
in’s death, 563; see also Yugoslavia
Tiumen, built, 153
Tiutchev, Theodore, 354-5, 360, 361,
444; quoted, 3; on Pushkin’s death,
357; on Hapsburgs, 385
Tkachev, Peter, 383; and Lenin’s views,
469
Tobolsk: built, 153, trade center, 279
Todtleben, Colonel Count Edward, 338
Togliatti, Palmiro, quoted on "cult of
personality,” 539
Tokhtamysh, Khan, 101
Tolstoy, Alexis N., 585
Tolstoy, Count Dmitrii, 380, 392, 437
Tolstoy, Count Leo, 360, 397, 436, 440;
on Napoleon’s invasion of Russia,
312; on Crimean War, 338; Sevasto-
pol Tales, 338; War and Peace, 349,
443; and Populism, 382; Childhood,
Boyhood and Youth, 44 2; Anna
Karenina, 443; A Confession, 443;
and anarchism, 448; and socialist
realism, 585
Tomsk: trade center, 281; university in,
438
Torgau, 522
Torzhok, 72, 151
“Total Land Partition,” see “Black Par-
tition”
Towns: in ancient Russia, 20; role in
decline of Kiev, 41; in southern Rus-
sia against Basil Shuisky, 165; north-
, eastern, in liberation movement, 170
Townspeople: represented in zemskii
sotor, 171, 176, 189; in Muscovite
Russia, 187; represented in Legisla-
tive Commission, 259; at end of 18th
century, 283; see also Middle classes
Trade: in Kievan Russia, 43-8; and
foreign policy in Kievan Russia, 45;
in appanage Russia, 115, 118; in
Muscovite Russia, 184-5; foreign,
under Peter, 237; at end of 18th
century, 281; in 1800-1861, 335-7;
in 1861-1917, 425-6, 427, 432; cen-
ters, 281-2, in Kievan Russia, 46-7,
Novgorod, 84, Lvov, 90, Galicia and
Moscow, 115; routes, 29, 41, 43-6,
77, 81, 84, 90, 115, 281-2, “From
the Varangians to the Greeks,” 29,
41, 44, 77, 81, Archangel to central
Russia, 154; Volga to Caspian Sea,
32; foreign, in Soviet Russia, 530-31
Transcaspian region, annexed, 389
Transcaucasia, 326, 342; industrial re-
gion in, 425; in Treaty of Brest-
Litovsk, 477; Transcaucasian Feder-
ation, 485f; Transcaucasian Repub-
lic, 487-8
Trans-Siberian railroad: built, 398; and
conflict with Japan, 401, 402-3; and
Civil War, 482
Travendal, Treaty of, 221
Treadgold, Donald, on Stolypin, 434
Treaty of 1686 (with Poland), 181, 214
Trediakovsky, Basil, 292
Trepov, General Theodore, 383
Triple Alliance, 400, 417
Triple Entente, 417
Tristan and Isolde, 203
Troppau, conference and Protocol of,
315
Trotsky (Bronstein), Leon, 493, 505,
511; on Nicholas II, 396; and Octo-
ber Revolution, 461; in Soviet gov-
ernment, 475; and “No war, no
peace!” 477; in Civil War, 482; and
Left Opposition, 490; exile and mur-
der, 491; and the great trials, 504;
quoted on nature of Soviet Union,
567, and “betrayal of the revolu-
tion,” 592
Trubetskoy, Prince Dmitrii, 169
Truman, President Harry S.: and war-
time diplomacy, 523; and Soviet ex-
pansion, 535
Truman Doctrine, 536
Truvor (brother of Riurik), 24
“Tsar”: use of title, 107; Ivan IV
crowned “tsar,” 145; compared to
title “emperor,” 230
Tsaritsyn (formerly Stalingrad, now
Volgograd), defense of, 493
“Tsar-Liberator,” see Alexander II, 369
Tsarskoe Selo (now Pushkino), 298,
344, 350
INDEX
691
Tsiolkowky Ccnsianiine 582
Tucker Robert C on Stalin 494
Tap>r Khan orTugann 56
Tukhachcvsky Marshal Michael 484
5W
Tula gentry army of 165, metal m
tlustty in 185 279
Tulcbm 320
Turgenev Ivan 356 360 370 381
436 443 Gentry best 349 440
556 Sportsman s Sketches 370 440
“father and 'sons’* 381 447 his
news 441 Bazaroi and nihilism
441 448 Rudin 440 Fathers and
Sons 440 On the Esc 440 Smoke
440 I irgin Soil 440
Turkestan conquered by Mongols 69
Turkey 107 163 179 ( 81 suzerainty
over Crimea 102 seized Constwti
noplc 103 control of Bhek Sea
1 15 relations with Russia under
Sophia 214 under Pcier I 219 21
224 226 from Peter 1 to Cathcrm
I! 251-3 passim under Catherine
If 264-7 268-71 under Paul (
274 in 1856-81 385 9 paxum m
1881-1917 417-18 pass in Russian
wars wuh in 1806-12 307 in »t>28
330 Crimean War 336-9 in 1877
7 8 386-8 conflict with Egypt and
Treaty of UnVnr Slelessi 333— i
336 Russian trade with 345 425
and national independence move
tnenl 485 receives Kars Ardakhan
area 487-8 and Soviel Russia 512
513
Turkmanchai Treaty of 331
Turkmen Soviet Socialist RcpuM c 507
Tushwo I66f see also False Dmilrii
(H)
Tver (town and principality) 92-3
109 112 struggle with Moscow 81
97f 102 absorbed bv Moscow 107
105 gentry renounces privileges 379
Tystatskn or chlltarch 82 abolished in
Novgorod 105 last one in Moscow
112
U 2 nlanc incident 560
Udtl (appanage), 65
Ue’dy and reforms of Peter I 232
and reforms of Catherine II 261
Ufa seized by Samara government 4S2
Ugedey, Great Khan 70
Ughch 104 155
Ugra river battle of 106
U grans, J5
Ukraine 203 206 271 277 372 union
with Moscow 180 divided between
Moscow and Poland 181 under
Russian Orthodox Church <1654)
»98 cl-rg/ of role Ja schism j'O
Uergv in Muwv ie lusnr res ml
203 in Great Northern 3\ar 223 4
tich in ng of centre's oser 232 serf
dom extended imo 26J scs^ir b^
«j tired bv Rus ra 2"0 labor t are t
in -*29 arsil [be TrtiT of Rrest
Litovsk 477 ami Sov et rej me
4S4 7 pawn Ukrainian Soviet So-
cialist Repub’ic 487 307 fim tie in,
49? and communal a gr culture 4*7
Communist ns t\ in 506 In Se-ond
World 33 ar 318 521 525 cal
Icvlivuation 5"*2 and “t-ourneuis
nat onal s|< 577 se all's Appan
nge T ussm Di leper vOswrks Kie
van R is, j Fit? in sn state <i-
Lilhuin jr> Ri jn state
Ukrur ans fitf |*4| ethti type <J4
md l t‘ uanian stit 139 War of
Lib ration 150 and sch m 200
or I P rj i on of Poland 268-71
nd nationalism 394 ■.84-* in
U*SR '76 fed rc toward Soviet
tnen '94
Ukraintsev N on Kerr )os alia *
4'9
l am Adam 11 on Sial n 49-, on
Man ism md (ml a trnJiz t an 495
on piratic] I tween comm nr n and
liberal sm 593
LI itws Alexander execution of effect
on fen r 469
Ul/anos VI r hm r see Lenin
Uhai ovsk tformerlv 5 mbir'k) 4 1 '
L liman R chard H on Allied mcr
ventton -•'16
VloJtente see 1 a« i
Ulnka El onora Queen of Sweden
225
Unwlt Cbun.li 169 csl Wished b)
Union of Brest 179 and Imp-ra 1
Rn»r n pol sy 332 3 3SC and So-
viet policv 588 see alto Mi'Ort les
l rion of Comiuptu Yo th (Komso-
mol) 556 568 undpu ecf 504
Union of thr Godless. 5gg
Ur on of L ber- on, founded JOS
Union of Lublin 136f
Un on of Perenslavl liO-81
Union of Salvation. 320
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR) established 487 com
position 507
Union of ‘Soviet V- ritcrs. 5?-*
Union of Towns 420
Union of Unions 407
Union of Welfare 320
United front" lactic* in China 512
United Nat om 527 524 534 U55R.
in 536 558 and Korea 537-8
692
United States of America, 317, 501;
comparison of Soviet and U,S. econ-
omies, 546-7; comparison of Soviet
and U.S. education, 579-80; com-
parison of scientific achievement,
583; relations with Russia, before
1921, 389, 456, 483, in 1921-41,
512, 513, in Second World War,
520ff, 523-4; in 1945-53, 533-8; in
1953-68, 557-62: in 1968-83, 561-
2, 566 passim; see also North Amer-
ica; North American colonies
Universal military service, 377-8; see
also Conscription
University education: in 18th century,
288-9; in 1800-1861, 304, 349-52;
in 1861-1917, 435, 437-8; in Soviet
Russia, 579-80
University Statute: of 1835, 351; of
1863, 380, 392, 436; of 1884, 392-3
Unkiar Skelessi, Treaty of, 333, 336
Unkovsky, Alexis, 379
Unofficial Committee. 303, 304, 360
Upper classes, support Whites, 487; see
also Boyars; Gentry; Muzhi; New
upper class; Nobility
Ural cossacks, and Pugachev rebellion,
260; autonomy limited, 263; opposi-
tion to Soviet rule, 481
Ural mountains and area, 70, 152; in-
dustry in, 185. 237, 343; and indus-
trialization, 496
Ushakov, Simon (icon painter), 205
Ushakov, Admiral Theodore, 274
Uspensky, Gleb, 443; on Dostoevsky,
442
Ussuri region, ceded to Russia, 390
Ustinov, Dmitrii, 545
Ustrialov, Nikolai V., on evolution of
Soviet Russia, 592
Utigurs, 16
Uvarov, Count Serge, 340, and doc-
trine of “Official Nationality,” 324;
and higher education, 349-52; and
Oriental studies, 353
Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, 507
Varangian Rus, 24
Varangians, 23-28ff
Vasiliev, Aleksandr A., on attacks of
Rus on Surozh and Amastris, 26
Vasilsursk, fair in, 108
Vavilov, Nicholas, 581
Veche, 50, 87, 93f; Kievan. 50-51;
Novgorodian, 79. 82, 83, 105; Psko-
vian, 87; in Galicia and Volynia, 91;
disappears from Russian politics, 1 19
Vedomosti, began publication, 287
Vedrosha river, battle of, 106
Vckhi, or Sigiiposts, 451
INDEX
Veliaminov, Basil (last Moscow tysiat-
skii), 111
Velikie Luki, 152
Venedi (designation of Slavs), 19
Venetian colonies, 115
Venevitinov, Dmitrii, 361
Venturi, Franco, on populism, 383
Vereia (principality), 104
Vereshchagin, Basil, 445
Vernadsky, George: on origins of Rus-
sia, 9, 27; on Kievan matrimonial
alliances, 38; on Kievan population,
48; on Mongols, 67, 72-6 passim; on
Kasimov, 102-3; on Dmitrii of Ug-
lich, 156; quoted on Treaty of Brest-
Litovsk, 477-8
Vernadsky, Vladimir, 583
Verona conference, 315
Viacheslav (son of Iaroslav the Wise),
39
Viatichi, 32
Viatka, 85; annexed to Moscow, 104
Viborg, or Viipuri, seized by Peter I,
225
Viborg Manifesto, 410-11
Vienna, 52T, Congress of, 314, 317;
Treaty of, 331; meeting (1961), 560
Vienna Note, 337
Viere, Anthony de, 218
Vietminh, 558
Vietnam and Vietnam war, 558; effect
on U.S.-Soviet relations, 561; effect
on Sino-Soviet relations, 562-3
Vilna, or Vilnius, 134, 135, 311, 522;
university in, 350, 352
Vinius, Andrew, 208
Vinogradov, Ivan, 583
Vinogradov, Paul, 440
Vipper, see Wipper
“Virgin lands” project, 594
Visigoths, 15
Vistula river, 223, 524
Vitebsk, 311
Viten or Vytenis (Grand Prince of
Lithuania), 133
Vitichev, 43
Vitovt (Grand Prince of Lithuania),
101, 135
Vladimir, Grand Prince, Saint, 29, 53,
56, 78, 125; reign of, 33-6; con-
verted to Christianity, 34; revival of
paganism, 34; marriage to Anne,
sister of Byzantine emperor, 34; can-
onized, 36
Vladimir, Prince of Galicia,’ 89f
Vladimir (Iurevich), Prince of Mos-
cow, 97
Vladimir (Vsevolodovich), Prince ot
Moscow, 97
Vladimir, Prince of Staritsa, 149, 151
Vladimir Monomakh, Grand Prince:
693
his Testament 40 54 57 60 re! S n
of 39-41 campaigns of 40 descen
lirulcn No^caM 78 91 93
legend of regale 107 124
Vladimir (town and principality), 93,
109 ff lown built 40 gamed in im
portance 65 attacked by Mongols
70, seat of grand prince, 91 an
nexed to Muscovy 109
Vladumr m Volynia 99 given to Igor
son of larostav 39
VUdtmir-Suzdsl 91-1 *1" »“
mKOTltw*. » *" Ro '” V
Suidai Vladimir
Vladimirsky Budanov Mikhail F o
cXian boyars 90-91 quoted on
service people" 114 on Ulo Iteme
of 1649 186 on Muscovite edu a
Vladislav (boyar) occupes princely
seat in Galicia 90 .
Vladivostok founded 390 and Civil
War 482 passim 1974 meeting of
Brezhnev and Tord 562
Vlasiev Athanasius 163
Vlasov General Andrew 526
VofnTareti 5 disorders in l6! ^' ll0 " f
ol Stenka Rarin 171 rebellion of
Bashkir. 12! fresco [.aiming in 205
industrial region of 277 use of free
labor in 342
Volga Bulears see Bulgars
Volga river 109 115 379 trade routes
of 77 81 115 canals 237 344
531 navigation on, 344 and Second
World War 521
Volga-Caspian Sea trade route con
trolled by Russians 35
Volga-German Autonomous Republic
abolished 532 .
Volgograd (formerly Tsaritsyn and
Stalingrad) renamed 493
Volkhov riser 81
Volkov Theodore 298
Volos, and proposal of Speransky 305
Volostel 192 , ,,,
Voltaire 25! 2« 272 quoted 251
Voltairianism Russian, 294
Volynia 65 8S-91
Mongols 71, 90 umttd nidi Gali-
na 89 decline, 90 becomes part o'
Lithuanian slate 90 124 mi™
by Poland 137 .
Von Laue, Theodore on economic de
velopment of Russia under the old
regime 434
Vontfatiev, Stephen. 198
\ orkuta forced labor camp uprisings
556
Voronezh 219 520
Voronikhin. Andrew 367
Vorontsov Michael 247
Voroshilov Marshal Clement 533 542
Vorotynsky Prince Michael 147
Vorslla riser butlccf its sigmfican e
135
Vostokov Alexander 354
Vatchma 116 MB In Lithuanian
sta.e 138
Voy ce Artht-r quoted on Russian an
205
Vozha nver battle of 100
Voznesensky Andrew 597
Vs-so’od, Grand Prm e 39
V -voted HI of the Large Not Grind
Prince 92 f
V vshnegradsky Ivan ->95
Vytenis JccVi’en
Walesa Lech 565 u v
\\ 1 hch a 224 265 subjugated by
Mon oh 7 1 under L thu nuns, 13*
and Peter 1 224 rciurred to Turkey
■>6* ri"bts m granted lo Russia
308 see else, Danubian prm i|«litrts
Walsh Warren R on compos t on of
First D ma 409 10
War tommumsn 478 88 J *
similarity to First riseVear Plan
J97 and peasantry 57 1 -
War Industry Commtiee und e
fort t20 .
War of 1812 me 1812 evens of
War of the Avs nan Succession ; *2
War of the Pol *h Succc s or *5-
W ir of the Spanish Succession 226
War of the Thtfd Coal ton >07
* 5 T . £& %' »!
mafSRt C, 4« W «nd’wmFel»l.
wT. 481-4 in retell nn 4H™' 1
W S3TS5J foe «•» ••=<.)
559 563 564
Waterloo battle of 313
«*” w'edim. -
Golhc style n R®»* 4
on Russian culture 285
Wenien battle of 152
WeraU Treaty of -7- , 2I7
tV%I rS P rochement »«h R««“
on 3631 rapp yefumch crisis
694
INDEX
West, the: ( Cont .)
523-4; Russian co-operation with,
524; and postwar Soviet Russia, 533-
8 passim; after death of Stalin. 557-
62
Western influence in Russia: in time of
Boris Godunov, 160; under Alexis,
177; on iconography, 205; “self-
criticism” in Muscovite Russia, 208-
9; on reforms of Peter I, 228, 233-4;
in 18th century. 348-9; on literature,
357-8, 440—41; on ideologies, 360-
66; on arts, 367, 446-7; on judicial
reforms, 377; on Russian radicals,
381-2; and industrialization, 424-6,
502 et passim; on culture before
1917, 447; on communist ideology,
466ff
Western provinces, 277; serfs in, 328;
emancipation in, 374
Westernization, 242, 258, 278-9, 283-
99 passim ; in reign of Peter I, 233-5,
237-8, 240-41; in reign of Catherine
II, 273ff; see also Western influence
Westernizers, 362, 364-6 passim
Whistler, George, 344
White Russia, or Belorussia: and Mus-
covite Church reforms, 200, and
Partitions of Poland, 267-70 passim;
Polish rebellion of 1863 spreads to,
379; and Soviet-Polish War, 484; de-
clares independence, 484; western,
ceded to Poland, 487; and German
invaders, 525
White Russians. 65, 94, 200; ethnic
type associated with Lithuanian-Rus-
sian state, 139
White Volunteer Army, 48 Iff
Whites: and the Civil War, 479-87
passim, 493; peasant attitudes and,
572; and the Church, 587
Widukind (author of Res gestae sax-
onicae), 27
Wielopolski, Marquis Alexander, 379
“Will of the People,” 392, 448; formed,
384; assassinates Alexander II, 384;
tradition of, resumed by SR’s, 406;
and Lenin’s views, 469
William II (Emperor of Germany),
416-18
“Window into Europe,” 226, 277
Winter Palace, 384, 407; built, 247,
298; stormed in 1917, 461
Wipper (Vipper), Robert I., on Ivan
IV, 154
Witte, Count Serge, 395, 427, and in-
dustrialization, 398, 424-5; and Ear
Eastern policy, 401—2, 403; and Oc-
tober Manifesto, 407—8; and French
loans, 408; and elections to First
Duma, 409; and trade, 425; and
taxes, 432; and education, 437
Wladyslaw (Prince of Poland), 173 ;
invitation to become Russian tsar)
167, 174; candidacy rejected by
Sigismund III, 168; candidacy with-
drawn, 176
Wladyslaw II of Poland, sec Jagiello
Wojtyla, Kard, 565
Workers, see Labor
World of Art, The (periodical), 444
Wrangel, General Baron Peter, 483
488
Yagoda, 504
Yalta Conference, 523, 524
Yalu river, 401
Yenikale, 265
Yenisei, see Enisei river
Yezhov, see Ezhov
Yezhovshchina, see Ezhovshchina
Yuan dynasty (China), 69
Yugoslavia: German invasion of, 517;
and Cominform, 536; Khrushchev’s
relations with, 559; independence of
Soviet Union, 563, 564; potentialities
of independent communism, 594, see
also Balkans; Serbia; Tito
Zadonshchina, 126
Zaionchkovsky, Petr A., quoted on abo-
lition of serfdom, and capitalism,
368
Zakharov, Hadrian, 367
Zamiatnin, Dmitrii, 377
Zarudny, Serge, 377
Zarutsky, Ivan (cossack leader), 169,
171, 175
Zasulich, Vera, 383
Zechariah, or Skharia, the ludaizer, 123
Zemshchina, 150
Zemskii nachalnik, see Land captain
Zemskii sobor, 171, 188-191; first full
(1549), 145-6; of 1566, 154; in
reign of Ivan IV, 145-6, 154, 189-
90;" of 1598, election of Boris Godu-
nov as Tsar, 160, 190; of 1613, com-
position, and election of Romanov
dynasty to throne, 171-2; in reign of
Michael, 190-91; in Alexis’s reign,
of 1642, 176, of 1648, 178, of 1653.
180, others, 190-91; development in
Muscovite Russia, 188-91; parallels
in West, 189, 191; not used by Peter
I, 230; and Slavophiles, 363
Zemstvo, 192, 305-6; reform of 1864,
374-5; system, 374, 393; school for
radicalism and liberalism, 37 6; polit-
ical significance, 377; restriction af-
695
i8Rfi 380 393 397 423 Zent
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Zorndorf battle of 252
Zosma(monc) travels 126
Zubatov Serge 407
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