Advanced search Subscribe to our newsletter and you'll continuously be informed about our new books, series and journals. You can customize this e-mail newsletter to your particular needs and interests. Newsletters include special discount codes. To subscribe or change existing preferences press the subscribe button	Pragmatism. An Annotated Bibliography 1898-1940. SHOOK, John R. Amsterdam/Atlanta, GA, 1998, XXX, 617 pp. With contributions by E. Paul Colella, Lesley Friedman, Frank X. Ryan and Ignas K. Skrupskelis. Hb: 978-90-420-0269-2 / 90-420-0269-7 € 177 / US$ 257 Series: Value Inquiry Book Series 66 Studies in Pragmatism and Values "This comprehensive bibliography should fill a very real need." CHOICE, September 1998, Vol. 36, No. 1 " [a] valuable volume..." Peirce Project Newsletter, Volume 3, No. 1, Winter 1999 Designed to fill a large gap in American philosophy scholarship, this bibliography covers the first four decades of the pragmatic movement. It references most of the philosophical works by the twelve major figures of pragmatism: Charles S. Peirce, William James, John Dewey, George H. Mead, F.C.S. Schiller, Giovanni Papini, Giovanni Vailati, Guiseppe Prezzolini, Mario Calderoni, A.W. Moore, John E. Boodin, and C.I. Lewis. It also includes writings of dozens of minor pragmatic writers, along with those by commentators and critics of pragmatism. It encompasses literature not only concerning pragmatism as an alliance of philosophical theories of meaning, inquiry, belief, knowledge, logic, truth, ontology, value, and morality, but also as an intellectual and cultural force impacting art, literature, education, the social and natural sciences, religion, and politics. This bibliography contains 2,794 main entries and more than 2,000 additional references, organized by year of publication. 2,101 of the references include annotation. Its international scope is focused on writings in English, French, German, and Italian, though many other languages are also represented. Peter H. Hare contributed the Guest Preface. The introduction contains an historical orientation to pragmatism and guides to recent studies of pragmatic figures. This work is extensively cross-referenced, and it has exhaustive and lengthy author and subject indexes. Contents: Foreword by Peter H. Hare. Acknowledgments. Introduction. Research Methods. Abbreviations. Bibliography. Author Index. Subject Index. About the Author and Contributors. About the Author and Contributors John R. Shook is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Corning Community College in Corning, New York. His published articles discuss Dewey in relation to Wilhelm Wundt, Neo-Hegelianism, and American Realism, and he is preparing a book on the emergence of John Dewey's instrumentalist pragmatism. E. Paul Collela is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the University Scholars Program at Xavier University in Cincinnati, Ohio. He has published in the areas of social and political thought, and the Italian Pragmatists. He is currently at work on several projects involving Italian pragmatism, Italian Futurism, and Giambattista Vico. Lesley Friedman is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Lynchburg College in Virginia. She has published articles on Berkeley, Hume, and Peirce, and is an executive board member of the Charles S. Peirce Society. Frank X. Ryan is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Kent State University in Ohio. He has published essays on Dewey's theory of self, of experience, and on Dewey's collaboration with Arthur Bentley. He is presently working on a book on Dewey's philosophy of transaction. Ignas K. Skrupskelis is Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of South Carolina. In recent years he has served as Visiting Professor of Philosophy at Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania. He was the associate editor of the Works of William James, and he is currently the editor of the Correspondence of William James. SAMPLE (text only, note that the lay out of the book is not reproduced) 1905 214 Anon. What They Think of Our Dewey. School Journal 71 (30 Sept 1905): 322. This article consists of quotations from two foreign articles, each lauding Dewey's educational methods. JRS 215 Bakewell, Charles M. The Issue Between Idealism and Immediate Empiricism. J Phil 2.25 (7 Dec 1905): 687-691. Bakewell replies to Dewey's "Immediate Empiricism" {233}. Dewey confusingly equates an object conceived in all of its relations with an object immediate experienced. Such an object is perfectly compatible with idealism. JRS Notes See Dewey's reply, "The Knowledge Experience Again" {234}. See also Schiller's comments on this exchange, "Thought and Immediacy" {374}. 216 Bakewell, Charles M. An Open Letter to Professor Dewey Concerning Immediate Experience. J Phil 2.19 (14 Sept 1905): 520-522. Reprinted in MW 3: 390-392. An immediate experience cannot refer beyond itself, so how can one "correct" another? JRS Notes See Dewey's reply, "Immediate Empiricism" {233}. 217 Bellonci, Goffredo. Le Pragmatisme et la morale. In Congrès International de Philosophie, IIme Session, Rapports et Comptes Rendus (Geneva: Kundig, 1905. Rpt., Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1968), pp. 670-673. A series of conclusions given in six paragraphs. They claim that (1) living signifies acting in diverse ways, and that from the point of view of knowledge no theory expresses anything, and hence there are neither true nor false theories, (2) there is frequently a confusion between the cause of a thing and the condition of a thing, (3) logic has no necessity, but rather is, like law, an intermediate between two liberties, (4) morality...is nothing other than the condition which permits that passage of cause to effect, of ideality to fact, (5) the moral man is not living: one must continuously create new "idéalitiés," and (6) life and art force us, at every moment, to be something and someone, under pain of not being anything at all. LF Notes Subsequent discussion by Prosper Meyer de Stadelhofen, Allesandro Levi, and Odoardo Campa is reported on pp. 673-674. 218 Bergson, Henri. Lettre au Directeur de la Revue Philosophique sur sa relation à James Ward et à William James. Rev Phil 60.8 (Aug 1905): 229-230. Reprinted in Ecrits et paroles (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959), vol. 2, pp. 239-240. Mélanges, ed. André Robinet (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972), pp. 656-658. In his report, "Le Congrès international de psychologie," Rev Phil 60.7 (July 1905): 67-87, Gaston Rageot remarked that (1) it was a result of the influence of James Ward and William James that Bergson developed his doctrine of real duration (what Rageot calls his "écoulement intérieur,") and (2) "it is impossible to see anything other than the Bergsonian doctrine of the primacy of action in...James." (p. 229) In this letter, Bergson takes exception to both these claims. LF Rageot is mistaken in attributing similarities between James and Bergson to accidental influences. They are due to general and profound causes. James's "stream of thought" and Bergson's "durée réelle" have different meanings. IKS Notes See Rageot's reply, Rev Phil 60.8 (Aug 1905): 230-231. 219 Bode, Boyd H. Cognitive Experience and Its Object. J Phil 2.24 (23 Nov 1905): 658-663. Reprinted in MW 3: 398-404. James's radical empiricism is but one mode, a functional role for feelings of relation, of the common appeal to experience made by all philosophies. This mode is individualistic, and James's resulting logic, epistemology, and metaphysics are consequently confused with psychology. JRS Notes See Dewey's response, "The Knowledge Experience Again" {234}. 220 Bode, Boyd H. The Concept of Pure Experience. Phil Rev 14.6 (Nov 1905): 684-695. How can Dewey's functionalism explain the difference between ideas and perceptions, and the inability of some people to call up images? This theory supposes both that distinct sensations arise from conflict in experience, and that conflict can only originate in the experience of discriminated sensations. James's account of attention similarly suffers. The admitted continuity in experience from silence to thunder cannot be functionally explained. It must be instead attributed to basic relations in consciousness, which refutes "pure experience." JRS 221 Bode, Boyd H. 'Pure Experience' and the External World. J Phil 2.5 (2 March 1905): 128-133. Reprinted in Pure Experience, pp. 55-60. "Thoroughgoing" empiricists find unacceptable the theory that thought refers to a reality beyond itself. James's is the latest attempt to do away with "objective reference" and to reduce everything to pure experience. Such efforts are futile since they lead to solipsism. IKS Notes See James's response, "Is Radical Empiricism Solipsistic?" {247}. 222 Bush, Wendell T. An Empirical Definition of Consciousness. J Phil 2.21 (12 Oct 1905): 561-568. Reprinted in Pure Experience, pp. 98-106. James's functional concept of consciousness is the first step towards dissolving any credibility to idealism. JRS 223 Brunschvicg, Léon. L'Idéalisme contemporain. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1905. Of interest is Brunschvicg's remarks about Le Roy, whose position the former takes to be a kind of pragmatism. In developing his own view the author opposes his spiritualism to the "new philosophy" of Le Roy et al., arguing that although science has its origin in the demands of practice, it develops by discarding these origins and turning toward the unity and continuity of reason. (p. 131) See especially "La Philosophie nouvelle et l'intellectualisme," pp. 98ff. LF Reviews Adam Leroy Jones, Phil Rev 15.4 (July 1906): 426-430. 224 Calderoni, Mario. De l'utilité "marginale" dans les questions éthiques. In Congrès International de Philosophie, IIme Session, Rapports et Comptes Rendus (Geneva: Kundig, 1905. Rpt., Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1968), pp. 619-620. Reprinted in Scritti di Mario Calderoni {1749}, vol. 2, pp. 207-208. Notes Subsequent discussion by Goffredo Bellonci is reported on pp. 620. 225 Calderoni, Mario. Du role de l'evidence en morale. In Congrès International de Philosophie, IIme Session, Rapports et Comptes Rendus (Geneva: Kundig, 1905. Rpt., Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1968), pp. 616-617. Reprinted in Scritti di Mario Calderoni {1749}, vol. 2, pp. 205-206. Notes Subsequent discussion by Pétavel-Oliff, D. Metzger, Prosper Meyer de Stadelhofen, and E. Peillaube is reported on pp. 617-618. See also E. Peillaube, "Le VE congrès international de psychologie" Rev de Phil 6.6 (1 June 1905): 698-704. 226 Calderoni, Mario. Il senso dei non sensi. Leonardo 3.3 (June-Aug 1905): 102-104. Calderoni provides a detailed discussion of what he believes is the essential core of pragmatism, Peirce's pragmatic maxim, in reaction against Prezzolini's negligent interpretation. Calderoni builds the continuum between the experience of the scientist and the experiences of ordinary human beings, thereby establishing the relevance of Peirce's maxim to all facets of human experience. He also offers some discussion of the peril into which philosophy must fall by ignoring precision of conceptual meaning. EPC 227 Calderoni, Mario. Intorno alla distinzione fra atti volontari ed involuntari. Leonardo 3.3 (June-Aug 1905): 125-127. Reprinted in Scritti di Mario Calderoni {1749}, vol. 1, pp. 267-274. This article seems to have been written in response to the militantly voluntaristic pragmatism of Giuseppe Prezzolini and Giovanni Papini. Having just concluded a skirmish with Prezzolini over the essence of pragmatism in the pages of Leonardo (see his "La varietà del pragmatismo" {161}), Calderoni steps back to examine the general problem of the relationship between will and action. Prezzolini endows the human being with virtually infinite power of action stemming from an omnipotent will. Calderoni once again employs the pragmatic method in his more Peircean understanding of it to attempt definitive solution to the problem. Philosophers fall into the trap of taking the will as a given and then proceeding to define other more complex states. Calderoni maintains that this is not a legitimate approach. The meaning of will needs to be clarified with some greater care. Calderoni concludes, quite pragmatically, that the belief that an act is voluntary or involuntary will manifest itself in different practical consequences. In addition, Calderoni severs Prezzolini's Will-to-Believe pragmatism from the Peircean variety entirely, maintaining that the tradition of James and Schiller is distinct from that of Peirce! The latter is seen to be articulating a kind of positivism, in that they both root out useless and futile questions. EPC 228 Calderoni, Mario. Variazioni sul pragmatismo. Leonardo 3.1 (Feb 1905): 15-21. Reprinted in Scritti di Mario Calderoni {1749}, vol. 1, pp. 239-258. Calderoni expands his polemic with Prezzolini in this essay, describing the relative positions of C. S. Peirce and William James. The most telling lines are reserved for the closing paragraphs, where Calderoni maintains that Peircean pragmatism based on the pragmatic maxim, and the Will to Believe variety which had been argued by Prezzolini, are "truly opposites and antagonists" to each other. EPC Notes For an interesting overview of the two camps, with a decided preference towards the "Peirceans," see Giovanni Gullace, "The Pragmatist Movement in Italy," Journal of the History of Ideas 23.1 (Jan-March 1962): 91-106. 229 Calò, Giovanni. Intorno al progresso odierno del prammatismo e ad una nuova forma di esso. Riv Filo 8.2 (March-April 1905): 182-209. Reviews Wendell T. Bush, J Phil 2.19 (14 Sept 1905): 528-530. 230 Chadwick, Cabell Wright. The Theology of James. Dissertation, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1905. 231 Christie, R. Humanism as a Religion. Contemporary Review 88.5 (Nov 1905): 683-702. 232 Dessoulavy, C. Le Pragmatisme. Rev de Phil 7.1 (1 July 1905): 89-94. A brief but dense sketch of pragmatism: "a vigorous system destined for a more than just a momentary existence." (p. 89) The dispute between its defenders-including part of the English religious community-and its critics still continues. "Pragmatism should be envisaged as the culminating point of modern philosophy and the different tendencies that were made manifest during the nineteenth century: Kantianism, Evolutionism, [and] Utilitarian philosophy." (p. 90) "In agreement with the Kantian, the pragmatist strongly (re)doubts pure metaphysics; with the evolutionist, he admits the provisional...character of our faculties of knowledge, and in agreement with the English moralists, he distinguishes two kinds of goods, but he further identifies them with the true." This discussion is followed by several examples of pragmatism and pragmatic truth, and the suggestion the pragmatism is just Leibnizism in disguise. There is a discussion of the categorical imperative, and of the difference between pragmatism and empiricism. Dessoulavy concludes that the advantages of the pragmatic system are numerous, and that notes that the Scholastic assumption that the good is the useful is the very affirmation in which pragmatism consists. LF 233 Dewey, John. Immediate Empiricism. J Phil 2.22 (26 Oct 1905): 597-599. Reprinted in MW 3: 168-170. A reply to Charles Bakewell's "An Open Letter to Professor Dewey Concerning Immediate Empiricism" {216}. Bakewell takes immediate experience to be unchanging and unrelated to other experiences. We must be able to directly experience something as mediating between other experiences. Transcendentalism fails to account for the experience of reality's continuity and growth. JRS 234 Dewey, John. The Knowledge Experience Again. J Phil 2.26 (21 Dec 1905): 707-711. Reprinted in Dewey and His Critics, pp. 183-187. MW 3: 178-183. A reply to Bakewell's "The Issue Between Idealism and Immediate Empiricism" {215} and Bode's "Cognitive Experience and Its Object" {219}. The recognition of the full meaning of an experience cannot itself be beyond experience; it is another type of experience intermediating towards a "new aesthetic-moral attitude." Knowledge does involve mediation, but when Bakewell mistakenly assumes that all experience must be knowing experience, he wrongly concludes that no experience can be immediate. JRS 235 Dewey, John. The Knowledge Experience and Its Relationships. J Phil 2.24 (23 Nov 1905): 652-657. Reprinted in Dewey and His Critics, pp. 177-182. MW 3: 171-177. Dewey responds to F. J. E. Woodbridge's "Of What Sort Is Cognitive Experience?" {297}. Knowledge is not needed to experience the various qualities of things, but begins as things are experienced as able to influence other things, and ends in an experience of an object's "knowness" when it resolves a doubtful situation into a "stable, dependable state of affairs." In this sense, a knowledge experience transcends the doubtful experience. JRS 236 Dewey, John. Philosophy and American National Life. In Centennial Anniversary of the Graduation of the First Class, July Third to Seventh, 1904 (Burlington, Vermont: University of Vermont, 1905), pp. 106-113. Reprinted in MW 3: 73-78. Philosophy serves the democratic concern with working solutions for citizens. JRS 237 Dewey, John. The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism. J Phil 2.15 (20 July 1905): 393-399. Reprinted with a concluding note answering critics, in The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy {793}, pp. 226-241. Dewey and His Critics, pp. 167-173. Pure Experience, pp. 107-114. MW 3: 158-167. Things are what they are experienced as. Since knowing is not the only way of experiencing, then there is nothing subjective or unreal about experienced unknown things. Known things are not "more" real, but instead more valuable. The "cognitive" encompasses the experiences involved the process of inquiry, culminating in a known object. Illusions can be detected only if they are as real as their causes. JRS Summaries Mattie Alexander Martin, Phil Rev 15.3 (May 1906): 350. Notes See Woodbridge's response, "Of What Sort Is Cognitive Experience?" {297}. 238 Dewey, John. The Realism of Pragmatism. J Phil 2.12 (8 June 1905): 324-327. Reprinted in MW 3: 153-157. Dewey responds to Stephen S. Colvin's remark that pragmatism results from a solipsistic psychology in "Is Subjective Idealism a Necessary Point of View for Psychology?" J Phil 2.9 (27 April 1905): 225-231 [MW 3: 382-389]. Dewey states that pragmatism is doubly realistic: experience is "naïvely realistic" when thought is not needed, and ideas are "realistically conceived" in physiological terms. Empiricism eliminates the threat of metaphysical dualism. JRS 239 Dickenson, G. Lowes. The Newest Philosophy. Independent Review (Aug 1905). 240 Herrick, C. Judson. A Functional View of Nature As Seen by a Biologist. J Phil 2.16 (3 Aug 1905): 428-438. An activity process, a "total situation," can be objectively viewed either temporally (functionally) or spatially (structurally). One type of process, the organism, is the "sum total of the reaction of protoplasm and environment," and its experience ought to be studied in the same objective modes like any other process. It is easy to fall into the fallacy of deriving structure from function, or vice-versa, arriving at idealism or materialism. JRS 241 Hoernlé, R. F. Alfred. Pragmatism V. Absolutism. Mind n.s. 14.3 (July 1905): 297-334; 14.4 (Oct 1905): 441-478. This conflict is the Anglo-American phase of the wider post-Hegelian debate between voluntarism and intellectualism. Pragmatism differs from its German metaphysical or ethical counterparts (Schopenhauer, Sigwart) by focusing on epistemology: its doctrine is that consciousness is purposive, and the intellect serves wider natural demands for ethical, religious, and aesthetic harmony. Hoernlé pursues several major criticisms of Bradley; on the nature of error, he praises pragmatism's concern with our ability to detect error, and faults Bradley's Absolute for making all human pursuits pointless and impossible. When pragmatism's critic declares that a theory's success is due to its truth, and not the reverse, pragmatism must respond by raising this dilemma: is the acceptance of a theory as "true" independent of reasons for its acceptance, or not? The first horn portrays the label "truth" as a purely "formal endorsement," and permits one to declare a theory true without any supporting reasons or any recognition of its truth. The better alternative is the second horn: to reject "crude realism" and see that "when we discover the answer to a problem, the solution and the acceptance of the solution are for us one and the same," and that the intellectual process which culminates in such acceptance cannot be artificially isolated and cast off as incidental: "to make the working of a theory responsible for its truth, or the truth for the working, is to deal in tautologies." (p. 449n) We can only claim that someone else's judgment is false, and distinguish "the truth" from their reasons, when we believe that we have better reasons to judge differently. Experience has objective and subjective aspects, relative to our ability to control them. The realist forgets that interaction is reciprocal, and that just as we must change to gain knowledge, reality must change to become known. All "laws of thought" are limited to some definite range of experience, and susceptible to revision. James's doctrines of "will to believe" and "indeterminism" illustrate how faith is practically justified through successful living. Pragmatism cannot arbitrate among various successful theories spawned by conflicting values, yet envisions an ultimate objective harmony. Psychology will no longer assist the pragmatist, since it treats only subjective facts of psychical existence, facts irrelevant to the search for validity. Our common interests, made possible by our sharing in a wider, objective experience (absolute idealism), allow the search for universal truths. JRS Summaries Grace Bruce, Psych Bull 3.4 (15 April 1906): 135-138; F. D. Mitchell, Phil Rev 15.4 (July 1906): 450-453. Notes Schiller praises this essay as "the best general account of the Pragmatic movement which is extant" in "The Relations of Logic and Psychology," Studies in Humanism {490}, p. 71n. 242 James, William. The Essence of Humanism. J Phil 2.5 (2 March 1905): 113-118. Reprinted in The Meaning of Truth {672}, pp. 121-135. Essays in Radical Empiricism {1078}, pp. 190-205. Works MT, pp. 70-77. Works ERE, pp. 97-104. Humanism is neither a hypothesis nor based on discovery of new facts, but is rather a change in perspective, leading to change in the sizes and values of things. Its formulations are provisional as yet and its definitions are incomplete. Its leading advocates, F. C. S. Schiller and John Dewey, have only published fragmentary programs. Its central assertion is that experience is self-contained and depends upon nothing. The formula can be read atheistically but his own reading is theistic, with God being an experience of "widest actual conscious span." Humanism eliminates the typical monistic problems of evil and freedom, and the sterile absolute of idealism. It analyzes knowledge as a relation between portions of experience, agreeing with common sense as to the identity of knower and known in perception, and in case of representative knowledge, asserting an experienceable "leading" from knower to known. For common sense, the perceptions in which chains of leadings terminate are the real objects. Philosophers view these perceptions as not quite reaching reality. For humanism, the reality beyond, whether conceived as viscera and cells, or atoms, or mind-stuff, is just further possible experience. Since the subject of truth is discussed elsewhere, here it is enough to emphasize that truth lies wholly within experience and is always a matter of apperception: if new experiences are too incongruous with old experiences they are always treated as false. IKS Reviews Giovanni Vailati, Leonardo 3.2 (April 1905): 73 [Scritti {1018}, p. 596]. Summaries George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 14.3 (May 1905): 383. 243 James, William. The Experience of Activity. Psych Rev 12.1 (19 Jan 1905): 1-7. Reprinted in Essays in Radical Empiricism {1078}, pp. 155-189. McDermott, pp. 277-291. Works ERE, pp. 79-95. The problem of activity involves a psychological question, whether we perceive activity, and a metaphysical question, whether there is activity. For radical empiricism, either the word "activity" has no meaning, or it must be possible to point out concrete experiences which serve as "type and model" of its meaning. In the case of activity, we find experiences which contain desire, goal, and resistance, but many writers have insisted that behind phenomenal activity there must be real agents. Three kinds of theories have been proposed concerning such agents and they have to be examined in terms of the pragmatic method. If one holds real agents to be consciousnesses of wider span than ours, their purposes become ours. If they are understood in religious terms, they do not "de-realize" activity but corroborate it. The real agents are by others thought of as of lesser span, either as "ideas" or nerve-cells. In both cases, the real agents would have to be thought of as indifferent to the larger outcome. Thus, pragmatically, our interest is in outcomes. The metaphysical question centers around causality, for real activities are those which create things which otherwise would not be. Causality must be accepted as an ultimate category and what we feel it to be. IKS Reviews Giovanni Vailati, Rivista di Psicologia Applicata 1.2 (March-April 1905): 111-113 Summaries George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 14.3 (May 1905): 381-382. Notes An abstract is in Psych Bull 2.2 (15 Feb 1905): 39-40 [Works ERE, pp. 257-258].	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