You will find here some information about me and my work.

I am Professor of Philosophy at the University of Miami, an extremely congenial place to do philosophy. I am also Chair of the Philosophy Department.

Most of my work focuses on philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of logic. I have been trying to develop an empiricist view about science that is compatible with a nominalist view about mathematics and logic. Not an easy task, but one that has led me to explore also a number of fascinating and interrelated issues in metaphysics, epistemology and logic.

I also have been examining the role of images (in particular microscopic images) in scientific reasoning, visual evidence in science, and the form of information it provides. This led me to engage with a number of issues in the philosophy of art (such as theories of representation and depiction). More generally, I have examined issues related to narrative in film, film evaluation, and others topics in the philosophy of film.

In addition, I defend a form of logical pluralism that emphasizes the role played by a primitive modal notion, and thus ties logical pluralism to modalism. I defend a corresponding modal epistemology for this approach that meshes with an empiricist view of science while acknowledging the role of skepticism about a number of philosophical modal claims (involving possible worlds, essences, categories etc.).

I have also been working on the notion of style of scientific reasoning, its use in understanding and evaluating scientific practice, and its connections with the notion of evidence. In particular, this provides a framework to make sense of continuity in the sciences despite substantial changes.

I have been examining the connections between identity and quantification, and how these notions are related to fundamentality, in particular in the context of the foundations of quantum mechanics. I offer an empiricist, metaphysically deflationary account.

Finally, I have engaged with skepticism (in particular, Pyrrhonism), which I take to be intimately connected with empiricism, and suggested steps toward a more positive form of Pyrrhonism, which is also a more attractive, non-dogmatic form of empiricism.