Cross-Cultural Research http://ccr.sagepub.com Unilineal Descent Organization and Deep Christianization: A Cross-Cultural Comparison Andrey V. Korotayev Cross-Cultural Research 2003; 37; 133 DOI: 10.1177/1069397102238925 The online version of this article can be found at: http://ccr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/37/1/133 Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com On behalf of: Society for Cross-Cultural Research Additional services and information for Cross-Cultural Research can be found at: Email Alerts: http://ccr.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Subscriptions: http://ccr.sagepub.com/subscriptions Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Downloaded from http://ccr.sagepub.com at EMORY UNIV on January 6, 2008 © 2003 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. 10.1177/1069397102238925 Cross-Cultural Korotayev / DESCENT Research ORGANIZATION, / February 2003 CHRISTIANIZATION ARTICLE Unilineal Descent Organization and Deep Christianization: A Cross-Cultural Comparison Andrey V. Korotayev Russian State University for the Humanities The author studies variables that are usually regarded as the main causes of the decline of unilineal descent organization (statehood, class stratification and commercialization), along with a variable that has never been regarded as such a cause—deep Christianization. He finds that the traditionally accepted causes of the decline of unilineal descent organization are less significant ( = –.26 for the statehood; = –.18 for class stratification, and = –.23 for commercialization) than deep Christianization ( = = –.7). He also shows that the presence of unilineal descent groups correlates negatively with communal democracy and is especially strong for complex traditional societies ( = –.49; = –.84). Because the communal democracy correlates positively with the supracommunal one, the Christianization of Europe might have contributed to the development of modern democracy by helping to destroy unilineal descent organization in this region. Keywords: Christianity; social evolution; unilineal descent; political evolution; state The development and decline of unilineal descent organization have been the subject of numerous studies (e.g., Aberle, 1961; Cross-Cultural Research, Vol. 37 No. 1, February 2003 133-157 DOI: 10.1177/1069397102238925 © 2003 Sage Publications 133 Downloaded from http://ccr.sagepub.com at EMORY UNIV on January 6, 2008 © 2003 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. 134 Cross-Cultural Research / February 2003 Bohannan, 1963; Cohen, 1969; Coult & Habenstein, 1965; Divale, 1974; Ember, Ember, & Pasternak, 1983; Ember & Levinson, 1991; Engels, 1884/1964; Fortes, 1953; Kirchhoff, 1955/1968; Korotayev & Obolonkov, 1989, 1990; Levinson & Malone, 1980; Lowie, 1920/ 1970; Morgan, 1877/1964; Murdock, 1949; Murdock & Provost, 1973; Murdock & Wilson, 1972; Pasternak, 1976; Pasternak, Ember, & Ember, 1997; Sahlins, 1972; Service, 1962). One predictor of unilineal descent organization is, of course, unilocal residence (Lowie, 1920/1970, pp. 157-162; Murdock, 1949, pp. 59-60, 184-259; Service, 1962, p. 122). Although, as Murdock (1949) noted, “Unilocal residence does not necessarily lead to unilinear descent” (p. 209), the absence of unilocal residence invariably results in the absence of unilineal descent. The loss of unilocal residence, then, is the main proximate cause of the loss of unilineal descent. But what is the ultimate cause? Ember et al. (1983) provided evidence that unilineal descent groups would occur in nonstate societies with warfare (see also Pasternak et al., 1997, p. 260). This suggests that the decline of warfare is an important ultimate cause of the decline of unilineal descent organization. However, these results do not apply to the main concern of this article—the causes of decline of unilineal descent organization in complex societies—because complex societies were excluded from the sample used by Ember et al. (1983, p. 395). In fact, many authors have noticed that unilineal descent groups are more commonly found in societies of midrange complexity. They occur less often in the most simple societies and tend to disappear in the most complex societies (Aberle, 1961; Coult & Habenstein, 1965; Ember & Levinson, 1991; Levinson & Malone, 1980; Murdock & Provost, 1973; Murdock & Wilson, 1972; Pasternak et al., 1997; Pasternak, 1976; Service, 1962). The most commonly suggested causes of the decline of unilineal descent organization in complex societies are commercialization, and, especially, class stratification and state formation (Bohannan, 1963, p. 136; Cohen, 1969; Ember et al., 1983, p. 395; Engels, 1884/ 1964; Fortes, 1953; Kirchhoff, 1955/1968; Morgan, 1877/1964; Pasternak et al., 1997, pp. 262-264; Sahlins, 1972, p. 225; Sanderson, 1988, p. 337; Scupin & DeCorse, 1998, p. 390).1 Author’s Note: This study was supported by grants from the Russian Foundation for the Humanities (RGNF no. 01-03-00332a) and from the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (RFBR/RFFI no. 01-06-80142). Downloaded from http://ccr.sagepub.com at EMORY UNIV on January 6, 2008 © 2003 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. Korotayev / DESCENT ORGANIZATION, CHRISTIANIZATION 135 However, I felt that these explanations were somehow insufficient. Our own previous cross-cultural research on unilineal descent groups in the complex cultures of Eurasia and North Africa (Korotayev & Obolonkov, 1989, 1990) revealed that the distribution of unilineal descent organization in the complex cultures of this megaregion has a peculiar shape. In the western part of this megaregion (the part that virtually coincides with the circumMediterranean region of Murdock), the border between the areas traditionally lacking unilineal descent organization and the areas having them ran almost precisely along the border between the Christian and non-Christian worlds.2 And this was not just in Europe. In the African Horn, for example, only 3 of almost 100 cultures lack unilineal descent groups. Two of them—the Amhara and the Tigrinya—are the only deeply christianized cultures in the area. The exception—the Falasha (professing Judaism)—only confirms the rule. All the Islamic and so-called pagan cultures of the area had unilineal descent groups. Could this be a coincidence? Probably not. Christian doctrine emphatically rejects unilineal descent group values.3 On the other hand, as Goody pointed out (1983, pp. 44-46), in the 4th century A.D., the Christian Church imposed regulations promoting the monogamous nuclear family (i.e., the regulations that prohibited close marriages, discouraged adoption, and condemned polygyny, divorce, and remarriage). Goody suggested that the Church was striving to obtain the property left by couples lacking legitimate male heirs. The result, however, was that the nuclear family became the main form of kinship organization, with almost no corporate suprafamily kinship entities.4 Other norms and practices of the Christian Church are consistent with this argument. Take, for example, the rule of celibacy for the clergy. In this respect, Christianity differs from the religion that in many other respects looks so similar to it—Islam, in which the marriage for rija:l al-di:n (“the men of religion”) is not just permitted but prescribed (as for all the other Muslims capable of marrying [e.g., Bogoljubov, 1991, p. 71]). Unlike the Islamic rija:l aldi:n, the Christian hierarch has no right to have legitimate descendants. Thus, he cannot be a competent member of a descent group, nor can he found his own descent group (with his name becoming the name of the lineage eponym ancestor). Given the immense influence the Christian hierarchy had on the traditional Christian states, one would expect that this factor must have contributed to the weakening of unilineal descent organization in Christian Downloaded from http://ccr.sagepub.com at EMORY UNIV on January 6, 2008 © 2003 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. 136 Cross-Cultural Research / February 2003 TABLE 1 Cross-Tabulation: Deep Christianization × Unilineal Descent Groups Unilineal Descent Groups Christianization 0 = Absent 1 = Present Total 0 = Absent 1 = Present n % n % N Total % 382 32 414 31.3 88.9 838 4 842 68.7 11.1 1,220 36 1,256 100 100 100 NOTE: p = .000000000002 (by Fisher’s exact test), φ = –.2, p < .00000000000000001, γ = –.89, p < .00000006. societies. Hence, I had reason to expect a strong significant negative correlation between “deep Christianization” and the presence of unilineal descent groups. Why did I choose to consider only “deep” Christianization? It took the Christian Church centuries to eradicate pre-Christian norms, values, and practices (e.g., Bessmertnyj, 1989; Herlihy, 1993). One would not expect a superfluous Christianization to produce any radical changes in kinship and marriage practices and norms. Thus, I coded the following cultures (christianized not less than 500 years prior to the ethnographic present) of the Ethnographic Atlas sample as 1 = Deep Christianization—present: Amhara, Armenians, French Basques, Boers, Brazilians, Bulgarians, Byelorussians, Cheremis, Czechs, Dutch, French Canadians, Georgians, Greeks, Haitians, Hungarians, Hutsul, Icelanders,5 Irish, Lapps, Lebanese,6 Lithuanians, Neapolitans, New England, Portuguese, Romanians, Russians, Serbs, Spaniards, Spanish Basques, Svan, Tigrinya, Tristan, Ukrainians, and Walloons. All other cultures were coded as 0 = Deep Christianization— absent. I started with a straightforward cross-tabulation of the presence of unilineal descent organization7 and deep Christianization.8 The results are shown in Table 1. The results of the statistical analysis looked rather promising. The correlation between Christianization and the presence of unilineal descent groups was in the predicted direction and significant beyond any doubt. It did not look strong with φ ≈ –.2; however, Downloaded from http://ccr.sagepub.com at EMORY UNIV on January 6, 2008 © 2003 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. Korotayev / DESCENT ORGANIZATION, CHRISTIANIZATION 137 TABLE 2 Cross-Tabulation: Deep Christianization × Unilineal Descent Groups (for the Cultures Relying > 85% on the Food Production [Agriculture and Animal Husbandry]16) Unilineal Descent Groups 0 = Absent 1 = Present Deep Christianization n % n % N Total % 0 = Absent 1 = Present Total 36 25 61 11.0 89.3 292 3 295 89.0 10.7 328 28 356 100 100 100 NOTE: p < .00000000000000001 (by Fisher’s exact test), φ = –.56, p < .00000000000000001, γ = – .97, p < .00000005. γ of ≈ –.9 appeared rather impressive. The interpretation of these figures in conjunction with the cross-tabulation does not present any problem: although the lack of unilineal descent groups is a rather poor predictor of Christianization, Christianization appears to be an extremely strong predictor of the absence of unilineal descent organization. It was also clear that even phi for this correlation could be raised to a much higher level. Indeed, the Christian factor is not relevant for most of the Ethnographic Atlas sample. In the ethnographic record, the majority of the societies lacking unilineal descent groups are bilaterally organized foragers, and Christianity certainly has nothing to do with this fact. Christianity appeared relatively late in human history and had its deepest impact on highly complex cultures. Thus, I realized that at a certain stage of my study, I would have to omit simple cultures from the sample. I started by including in the sample only societies relying more than 85% on the food production (agriculture and animal husbandry). The cross-tabulation of the presence of unilineal descent organization and Christianization for this subsample is shown in Table 2. As I expected, the correlation for this subsample remained in the predicted direction and became much stronger. However, at this point, one might doubt if Christianization can be treated as an independent factor. Within the subsample, precolonial deep Christianization appears to be significantly and positively correlated with political centralization, with the Downloaded from http://ccr.sagepub.com at EMORY UNIV on January 6, 2008 © 2003 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. 138 Cross-Cultural Research / February 2003 TABLE 3 Cross-Tabulation: Deep Christianization × Number of Supracommunal Levels (for Cultures With > One Level of Political Integration Above the Community) Deep Christianization Number of Supracommunal Levels 2 3 ≥4 Total 0 = Absent 1 = Present Total n % n % N % 156 64 22 242 96.9 75.3 81.5 5 21 5 31 3.1 24.7 18.5 161 85 27 273 100 100 100 100 NOTE: Spearman’s ρ = .29, p = .000001, γ = .66, p = .000007. statehood9 for the societies with medium or high cultural complexity (see Table 3). On the other hand, as I already mentioned, the statehood is considered one of the strongest negative correlates of unilineal descent organization. My test initially supported this theory. Unilineal descent organization is curvilinearly related to political centralization (as is observed with all the other main components of cultural complexity) (see Table 4). Spearman’s rho has a significant positive value for this table simply because of the heavily skewed distribution of the sample— the overwhelming majority of its cultures belong to the lower ranges of cultural complexity, where political centralization correlates positively with the presence of unilineal descent groups. However, for societies with higher levels of cultural complexity, we observe a significant negative correlation: the higher the political centralization, the less frequent the presence of unilineal descent groups becomes. The development of the state organization looks like a significant cause of the decline of unilineal descent organization (see Table 5). Hence, an alternative explanation for the negative correlation between deep Christianization and the presence of unilineal descent groups would suggest that the real cause of the decline of unilineal descent organization is the formation and development of the state. The negative correlation between deep Christianization and unilineal descent groups would be explained Downloaded from http://ccr.sagepub.com at EMORY UNIV on January 6, 2008 © 2003 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. Korotayev / DESCENT ORGANIZATION, CHRISTIANIZATION 139 TABLE 4 Cross-Tabulation: Number of Supracommunal Levels × Unilineal Descent Organization Unilineal Descent Groups Number of Supracommunal Levels 0 1 2 3 ≥4 Total 0 = Absent 1 = Present Total n % n % N % 248 65 25 28 13 379 48.7 19.1 15.7 32.9 50.0 261 275 134 57 13 740 51.3 80.9 84.3 67.1 50.0 509 340 159 85 26 1,119 100 100 100 100 100 100 NOTE: Spearman’s ρ = .24, p = .0000000000000001, γ = .39, p < .00000000000000001, Cramer’s V = .31, p < .00000000000000001. TABLE 5 Cross-Tabulation: Number of Supracommunal Levels × Unilineal Descent Organization (for Cultures With > One Level of Political Integration Above the Community) Unilineal Descent Groups Number of Supracommunal Levels 0 = Absent 1 = Present Total n % n % N % 2 3 ≥4 Total 25 28 13 66 15.7 32.9 50.0 134 57 13 204 84.3 67.1 50.0 159 85 26 270 100 100 100 100 NOTE: Spearman’s ρ = –.26, p = .00001, γ = –.49, p = .00005. by the fact that, in the precolonial era, Christianity was present mainly within states (there were almost no Christian bands or chiefdoms). This explanation seems convincing, but I have strong doubts about it. To start with, the negative correlation between Christianization and the presence of unilineal descent organization for the cultures with two to four supracommunal levels (φ = ρ = –.55; see Table 6) is much stronger than the correlation between unilineal descent organization and the statehood (ρ = –.26; see Downloaded from http://ccr.sagepub.com at EMORY UNIV on January 6, 2008 © 2003 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. 140 Cross-Cultural Research / February 2003 TABLE 6 Cross-Tabulation: Deep Christianization × Unilineal Descent Groups (for the Cultures With > One Level of Political Integration Above the Community) Unilineal Descent Groups 0 = Absent 1 = Present Total Deep Christianization n % n % N % 0 = Absent 1 = Present Total 38 28 66 15.9 90.3 201 3 204 84.1 9.7 239 31 270 100 100 100 NOTE: p = .0000000000000001 (by Fisher’s exact test), φ = –.55, p < .00000000000000001, γ = – .96, p < .00000000000000001. Table 5). It is also stronger than the positive correlation between the statehood and Christianization (ρ = .29; see Table 3). This evidence alone shows that the negative correlation between Christianization and the presence of unilineal descent groups is not a byproduct of the negative influence of the developing statehood on unilineal descent organization. However, there is additional evidence against the so-called alternative explanation. Let us control the influence of the political-centralization variable by taking a subsample with a similar number of levels of supracommunal political integration. I chose the subsample with three such levels (which would mostly correspond to medium-complex states) as this sample is of reasonable size and comprises a considerable number of Christian cultures. For this subsample, the negative correlation between Christianization and unilineal descent organization is unequivocally strong (> .7; see Table 7) and much higher than the correlation between unilineal descent organization and political centralization (its value is just –.26; see Table 5). The negative correlation between deep Christianization and unilineal descent organization is so much stronger than the one between the unilineal descent organization and political centralization that a question arises: Is the negative correlation between the traditional statehood and unilineal descent organization an illusion produced by the heavy presence of Christian cultures within any worldwide sample of traditional developed states (including Murdock’s sample)? If we remove from our sample of complex societies (the one used for Table 5, i.e., the societies with Downloaded from http://ccr.sagepub.com at EMORY UNIV on January 6, 2008 © 2003 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. Korotayev / DESCENT ORGANIZATION, CHRISTIANIZATION 141 TABLE 7 Cross-Tabulation: Deep Christianization × Unilineal Descent Groups (for Medium Complex States, Three Levels of Political Integration Above the Community) Unilineal Descent Groups Deep Christianization 0 = Absent 1 = Present n n % 0 = Absent 9 14.1 Burmese, Cambodians, Hadimu, Kanuri, Lozi, Macassare, Ngoni, Sinhalese, Turks 1 = Present 19 90.5 Amhara, Armenians, Basques, Bulgarians, Czechs, Dutch, French Canadians, Greeks, Haitians, Hungarians, Hutsul, Icelanders, Lithuanians, Neapolitans, New England, Portuguese, Romanians, Spaniards, Spanish Basques 28 Total % Total N 55 85.9 64 Afghans, Babylonians, Bagirmi, Bamum, Dagomba, Dagur, Delim, Edo, Egyptians, Esa, Fon, Fur, Ganda, Gibe, Giriama, Gujarati, Hamama, Hamyan, Ife, Igala, Janjero, Jimma, Kabyle, Kalmyk, Kashmiri, Kazak, Khalka, Luba, Magar, Merina, Mossi, Ndebele, Nyankole, Nyoro, Regeibat, Ruanda, Rundi, Sahel, Sakalava, Sanusi, Sindhi, Songhai, Sotho, Suku, Swazi, Tamil, Telugu, Toro, Trarza, Turkmens, Yemenis, Yoruba, Zazzagawa, Zinza, Zulu 2 9.5 21 Lebanese, Serbs 57 85 % 100 100 100 NOTE: p = .0000000003 (by Fisher’s exact test), φ = –.7, p < .0000000001, γ = –.97, p < .000000001. Downloaded from http://ccr.sagepub.com at EMORY UNIV on January 6, 2008 © 2003 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. 142 Cross-Cultural Research / February 2003 TABLE 8 Number of Supracommunal Levels × Unilineal Descent Groups Cross-Tabulation (for non-Christian Cultures With More Than One Level of Political Integration Above the Community) Unilineal Descent Groups Number of Supracommunal Levels 0 = Absent 1 = Present Total n % n % N % 2 3 ≥4 Total 21 9 8 38 13.6 14.1 38.1 133 55 13 201 86.4 85.9 61.9 154 64 21 239 100 100 100 100 NOTE: Spearman’s ρ = –.11, p = .08, γ = –.27, p = .12. more than one level of political integration above the community) all the deeply christianized cultures, the strength of the negative correlation between political centralization and unilineal descent organization drops to an insignificant level (see Table 8). Unsurprisingly, the same thing happens to the other components of cultural complexity proposed as causes of the decline of unilineal descent organization—class stratification and commercialization. Class stratification shows a curvilinear relationship with unilineal descent organization: societies lacking unilineal descent organization occur more frequently both among egalitarian societies and societies with complex class stratification (see Table 9). As an anonymous reviewer of the first draft of this article suggested, there is a problem with how the authors of the 1990 electronic version of the Ethnographic Atlas ranked the values of this variable. Indeed, it is difficult to accept the argument that “dual stratification”—defined by Murdock (1967) as “stratification into a hereditary aristocracy and a lower class of ordinary commoners or freeman, where traditional ascribed noble status is at least as decisive as control over scarce resources” (p. 166)—is a more developed form of class stratification (and, hence, should be ranked higher) than “elite stratification”—defined by Murdock (1967) as stratification “in which an elite class derives its superior status from, and perpetuates it through, control over scarce resources, particularly land, and is thereby differentiated from a propertyless proletariat or serf class” (p. 166). The reviewer thinks I should merge elite and dual stratification into a single category. Downloaded from http://ccr.sagepub.com at EMORY UNIV on January 6, 2008 © 2003 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. Korotayev / DESCENT ORGANIZATION, CHRISTIANIZATION 143 TABLE 9 Cross-Tabulation: Class Stratification17 × Unilineal Descent Organization Unilineal Descent Groups Class Stratification 0 = Absent 1 = Present n % n % N % 37.7 329 62.3 528 100 35.8 131 64.2 204 100 20.5 31 79.5 39 100 26.1 164 73.9 222 100 45.0 44 699 55.0 80 1,073 100 100 1 = Absence among freemen 199 2 = Wealth distinctions 73 3 = Elite (based on control of land or other resources) 8 4 = Dual (hereditary aristocracy) 58 5 = Complex (social classes) 36 Total 374 Total NOTE: Spearman’s ρ = .053, p = .084, γ = .089, p = .085, Cramer’s V = .124, p = .002. That the relation is insignificant according to the measures of significance associated with rho and gamma (which assume the linear relationship between the variables), but unequivocally significant according to the measure of significance associated with Cramer’s V (and finally, chi square, which is sensitive to any type of relationship) shows that we are dealing with a significant curvilinear relationship. I expressed similar concerns, and came to similar conclusions, in an earlier article (Korotayev, 1999). In that article, I argued that elite stratification is more developed than dual, and recoded the variable accordingly for some calculations. The reason I did not discuss this problem in the first version of my article was that my first series of statistical tests showed that, with respect to the questions I was studying, the cultures with dual and elite stratification did not display any significant differences. Because the tests using the Ethnographic Atlas rankings would not differ significantly from tests using better rankings, I decided to ignore the problem. However, as the editor has since asked me to take the anonymous reviewer’s suggestion into account, I have done so. To measure the degree of social stratification, I used three versions of ranking. Version 1 was suggested by the authors of the 1990 electronic edition of the Ethnographic Atlas: “1 = absence among freemen; 2 = wealth distinctions; 3 = elite (based on control Downloaded from http://ccr.sagepub.com at EMORY UNIV on January 6, 2008 © 2003 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. 144 Cross-Cultural Research / February 2003 TABLE 10 Class Stratification × Unilineal Descent Organization (Summary Table) Spearman’s Item p Version 1 Version 2 Version 3 .05 .06 .06 .08 .07 .07 p .09 .09 .09 .09 .08 .07 Cramer’s V .12 .12 .12 p .002 .001 .002 of land or other resources); 4 = dual (hereditary aristocracy); 5 = complex (social classes).” Version 2 was suggested by the anonymous reviewer and previously used in Korotayev (1999): “1 = absence among freemen; 2 = wealth distinctions; 3 = elite (based on control of land or other resources) or dual (hereditary aristocracy); 4 = complex (social classes).” Version 3 was suggested by Korotayev (1999): “1 = absence among freemen; 2 = wealth distinctions; 3 = dual (hereditary aristocracy); 4 = elite (based on control of land or other resources); 5 = complex (social classes).” As one might expect, after a careful study of Table 9, the results according to all three versions are quite similar. All suggest a significant curvilinear (but not linear) relationship. Once again, for complex societies (selected this time as societies with dual, elite, and complex class stratification, thus omitting more or less egalitarian cultures), class stratification shows a significant negative correlation with unilineal descent organization (version 1: ρ = –.18, p = .001, γ = –.35, p = .001; version 2: ρ = –.18, p = .001, γ = –.42, p = .002; version 3: ρ = –.14, p = .01, γ = –.28, p = .01) and a significant positive correlation with deep Christianization (version 1: ρ = .33, p = .0000000003, γ = .74, p = .00003; version 2: ρ = .42, p = .0000000000000001, γ = .91, p = .0000004; version 3: ρ = .41, p = .000000000000004, γ = .9, p = .00000003). However, these correlations are weaker than the negative correlation between deep Christianization and unilineal descent organization (p = .000000000001 [by Fisher’s exact test]; γ = –.93, p = .0000001). Similar to what we observed above with respect to political centralization, when the Christian factor is controlled for social stratification, it remains strong and significant (see Table 11). However, once again, the strength of the negative correlation between class stratification and unilineal descent organization Downloaded from http://ccr.sagepub.com at EMORY UNIV on January 6, 2008 © 2003 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. Korotayev / DESCENT ORGANIZATION, CHRISTIANIZATION 145 TABLE 11 Cross-Tabulation: Deep Christianization × Unilineal Descent Groups (for Societies With Complex Class Stratification Only) Unilineal Descent Groups 0 = Absent 1 = Present Deep Christianization n % n % 0 = Absent 1 = Present Total 14 22 36 25.0 91.7 42 2 44 75.0 8.3 Total N 56 24 80 % 100 100 100 NOTE: p = .00000002 (by Fisher’s exact test), γ = –.94, p = .0000000002, φ = ρ = –.61, p = .00000004. drops to an insignificant level as soon as the deeply Christianized cultures are removed from the sample (version 1: ρ = –.06, p = .33, γ = –.74, p = .3; version 2: ρ = –.007, p = .9, γ = –.02, p = .9; version 3: ρ = .43, p = .44, γ = .11, p = .44). As mentioned above, a similar thing happens with commercialization. As there are no data on degrees of commercialization in the Ethnographic Atlas, I had to use the variable on the use of money for the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample from Murdock and Provost (1973, 1985).10 Although for societies with two or more supracommunal levels, we do not observe a significant negative correlation between commercialization and unilineal descent groups, the correlation becomes marginally significant if the variable is dichotomized (0 = true money, absent vs. 1 = true money, present: p = .079 by Fisher’s exact test; ρ = –.23; γ = –.47). However, again, this correlation is much weaker than the negative correlation between deep Christianization and unilineal descent organization for the same sample (φ = ρ = –.4, p = .003, γ = –.88, p =.003). Similar to what we observed above with respect to political centralization and class stratification, when the Christian factor is controlled for commercialization, it remains strong and significant (for societies with > one supracommunal level and true money, p = .02 [by Fisher’s exact test], γ = –1.0, p = .01, φ = ρ = –.52, p = .01). And again, the strength of the negative correlation between commercialization and unilineal descent organization drops to an insignificant level as soon as the deeply Christianized cultures are omitted from the sample: p = .28 by Fisher’s exact test, φ = ρ = –.13 (for the dichotomized variable). Downloaded from http://ccr.sagepub.com at EMORY UNIV on January 6, 2008 © 2003 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. 146 Cross-Cultural Research / February 2003 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS Among the extra-kinship-and-marriage causes of the decline of unilineal descent organization considered in this article (the development of state organization, class stratification, commercialization, and deep Christianization), deep Christianization is the strongest and most significant.11 What is more, after being controlled for Christianization, all the other factors are insignificant, whereas when Christianization is controlled for the other factors, it retains its strength and significance. This suggests that the significant negative correlation between the three above-mentioned factors and unilineal descent organization might result from the presence of Christian cultures in all samples of complex societies. Hence, the development of the state, class stratification, and commercialization might not have an independent effect on the decline of unilineal descent organization. Incidentally, I do not insist that the results of my tests destroy the theory maintaining that the development of the state leads to the decline of unilineal descent organization. My previous qualitative research on this subject persuaded me to think that this theory cannot be entirely wrong (Korotayev, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1997, 1998; Korotayev & Obolonkov, 1989, 1990). The above research suggests that although average, non-Christian traditional states normally failed to destroy unilineal descent organization, the strongest, most complex traditional states often succeeded. Hence, to save the Statehood factor, we might contrast the most complex states (with four or more administrative levels above the community) to less complex polities (with two to three supracommunal levels). The results are shown in Table 12. The Statehood factor still seems to have an independent, weak, but significant effect on the decline of unilineal descent organization. The growth of the strength of states appears to be a significant cause of the decline of unilineal descent organization. However, it is a much weaker cause than deep Christianization. This conclusion may not seem convincing to many readers. Clearly, the development of the modern state, stratification, and commercialization has led to the decline of unilineal descent structures throughout the modern world, including some entirely unchristianized areas. By contrast, the decline of modern state structures revives and strengthens unilineal descent organization (as happened, for example, in southern Yemen in the 1990s).12 Downloaded from http://ccr.sagepub.com at EMORY UNIV on January 6, 2008 © 2003 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. Korotayev / DESCENT ORGANIZATION, CHRISTIANIZATION 147 TABLE 12 Cross-Tabulation: Supercomplex Versus Less Complex States × Unilineal Descent Groups (for non-Christian Cultures With More Than One Level of Political Integration Above the Community) Unilineal Descent Groups Number of Supracommunal Levels 0 = Absent 1 = Present Total n % n % N % Two to three ≥4 Total 30 8 38 13.8 38.1 188 13 201 86.2 61.9 218 21 239 100 100 100 NOTE: p = .008 (by Fisher’s exact test), γ = –.59, p = .04, φ = –.19, p = .004. Of course, it is difficult to argue with Pasternak et al.’s (1997) statement that Descent groups lose viability in complex state-organized, commercial-industrial [emphasis added] societies because non-kin agencies of the state assume many kin functions (e.g., defense, education, welfare, adjudication). In complex societies, it is individuals (not families or larger kin groups) who take advantage of economic or occupational opportunities; when someone moves to a new job, parents and siblings are not likely to go along (and cousins and aunts and uncles even less likely). (pp. 262-263) However, this statement applies to the industrial (and, hence, modern) statehood, stratification, and commercialization. I should stress that Murdock, in his Ethnographic Atlas (as well as the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample), aimed mainly at the collection of data on traditional cultures at the earliest possible date of their observation, and, hence, as little modernized as possible. Thus, the conclusions of this article only apply to traditional cultures.13 The effect of traditional statehood, social stratification, and commercialization appears to be radically different from the effect of modern state organization, stratification, and commercialization. The modern state organization, stratification, and commercialization do appear to destroy (more or less successfully) unilineal descent organization, whereas traditional class stratification and commercialization per se do not; the traditional statehood seems to be a significant but rather weak factor in this respect. Only the stron- Downloaded from http://ccr.sagepub.com at EMORY UNIV on January 6, 2008 © 2003 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. 148 Cross-Cultural Research / February 2003 gest traditional states frequently succeeded in destroying unilineal descent organization, but such states were not typical of the traditional world. The moderately strong traditional states were systematically successful in the destruction of unilineal descent organization only when the Statehood factor was coupled with the Christian factor. In the world of traditional complex cultures, the disappearance of unilineal descent organization occurred systematically only when both factors acted together—that is, when the Christian church was backed by the state.14 POST SCRIPTUM In our previous article (Korotayev & Bondarenko, 2000), we discovered a significant negative correlation between polygyny and democracy. We also showed that polygyny is more likely to be an independent variable. We argued that the absence of polygyny in the Christian part of the circum-Mediterranean region (but not in its Moslem part) could be explained by the strict prohibition of polygyny by the Christian Church. Of course, when in the 4th century A.D., the Christian Church imposed regulations promoting the monogamous nuclear family (i.e., the regulations that prohibited close marriages, discouraged adoption, condemned polygyny, divorce, and remarriage), it was not trying to contribute to the development of modern democracy. As Goody suggested (1983, p. 44-46), the Church may have been attempting to obtain property left by couples lacking legitimate male heirs. The unintended consequence of this attempt was the formation of a relatively homogeneous ethnographic macro-region consisting of nuclear monogamous families. Of course, the Greeks and Romans were monogamous prior to Christianization. However, the pre-Christian Germans, Celts, and Slavs were polygamous (Herlihy, 1993, p. 41). Hence, the formation of the zone of uninterrupted monogamy in Europe must be attributed to Christianization. It is probably not a coincidence that, a few centuries later, this region consisted predominantly of democratic communities (Udal’tsova, 1985-1987). Given the strong correlation between communal and supracommunal democracy (Korotayev & Bondarenko, 2000, Table 8), it is probably not a coincidence that modern supracommunal democracy originated in this very region. This point clarifies the causal direction of the link between communal and supracommunal democracy. In this respect, it is significant that the formation of Downloaded from http://ccr.sagepub.com at EMORY UNIV on January 6, 2008 © 2003 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. Korotayev / DESCENT ORGANIZATION, CHRISTIANIZATION 149 TABLE 13 Cross-Tabulation: Communal Democracy × Unilineal Descent Groups (for All World Cultures) Unilineal Descent Groups 0 = Absent Communal Democracy n 0 (Absent—hereditary leadership) 131 1 (Present—elected [formally or through consensus] leadership) 102 Total 233 1 = Present Total % n % N % 25.8 376 74.2 507 100 56.4 79 455 43.6 181 688 100 100 NOTE: p = .0000000000002 (by Fisher’s exact test), γ = –.58, p < .000000000000000001, φ = –.28, p < .000000000000000001. communal democracy in Europe preceded the development of democracy of supracommunal political structures. The Christianization of Europe appears to have unintentionally contributed to the formation of modern democracy. Did the Christianization of Europe contribute to the formation of modern democracy by destroying unilineal descent organization? There is reason to expect that unilineal descent organization will correlate negatively with communal democracy. The presence of unilineal descent groups would inhibit the development of communal democracy—indeed, their presence would favor hereditary communal leadership when the leadership position is transmitted within a certain descent group (normally the strongest one within the community and the one whose members would act as natural supporters of this leadership system). Thus, one would expect that the destruction of unilineal descent groups would contribute to the transition from the less democratic, hereditary, communal headmanship to the more democratic, elected headmanship (and the other way around). Hence, I had some grounds to expect that there would be a negative correlation between the presence of unilineal descent groups and communal democracy. To test this hypothesis, I used the Ethnographic Atlas database. The results are shown in Table 13. The correlation is in the predicted direction, significant beyond any doubt, but not particularly strong. However, here we are only interested in knowing if the absence of unilineal descent groups is Downloaded from http://ccr.sagepub.com at EMORY UNIV on January 6, 2008 © 2003 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. 150 Cross-Cultural Research / February 2003 TABLE 14 Cross-Tabulation: Communal Democracy × Unilineal Descent Groups (for Complex Class Societies) Unilineal Descent Groups 0 = Absent Communal Democracy n 0 (Absent—hereditary leadership) 2 1 (Present—elected [formally or through consensus] leadership) 17 Total 19 1 = Present Total % n % N % 14.3 12 85.7 14 100 65.4 9 21 34.6 26 40 100 100 NOTE: p = .002 (by Fisher’s exact test), γ = –.84, p < .0003, φ = –.49, p < .001. an important predictor of communal democracy in complex societies. In this part of the sample, the negative correlation between the presence of the unilineal descent groups and communal democracy is much stronger than in the sample as a whole (see Table 14). Thus, as we can see, in complex class societies, the absence of unilineal descent groups is a significant and strong predictor of communal democracy. This suggests that the Christianization of Europe contributed to the development of modern democracy not only by prohibiting polygyny (Korotayev & Bondarenko, 2000) and thus promoting the small nuclear family (Bondarenko & Korotayev, 2000) but also by helping to destroy unilineal descent organization. As a result, by the Middle Ages, Christian Europe was composed almost exclusively of democratic communities (e.g., Udal’tsova, 1985-1987)—a fact that facilitated the democratic transformation of supracommunal levels of political organization.15 Notes 1. First developed by Morgan (1877/1964), this idea was later endorsed by Engels (1884/1964). Thus, it is not surprising that it became dominant in Soviet anthropology, especially in the mid 1930s-1950s (e.g., Korotayev & Obolonkov, 1989, 1990). Downloaded from http://ccr.sagepub.com at EMORY UNIV on January 6, 2008 © 2003 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. Korotayev / DESCENT ORGANIZATION, CHRISTIANIZATION 151 2. In east Eurasia, the only complex culture area consistently lacking unilineal descent organization was the area of the Hinayana Buddhist states. This area will not be studied in this article, but I shall consider it in my next article. 3. For example (this text is from The Holy Bible, New International Version. Colorado Springs, CO: International Bible Society, 1984; I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Tamara Tsereteli for finding these quotations), Going on from there, he saw two other brothers, James son of Zebedee and his brother John. They were in a boat with their father Zebedee, preparing their nets. Jesus called them, and immediately they left the boat and their father and followed him. (Matthew 4:21-22) Another disciple said to him, “Lord, first let me go and bury my father.” But Jesus told him, “Follow me, and let the dead bury their own dead.” (Matthew 8:21-22) For I have come to turn a man against his father, a daughter against her mother, a daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law—man’s enemies will be the members of his own household. (Matthew 10:35-36) Someone told him, “Your mother and brothers are standing outside, wanting to speak to you.” He replied to him, “Who is my mother, and who are my brothers?” Pointing to his disciples, he said, “Here are my mother and my brothers. For whoever does the will of my Father in heaven is my brother and sister and mother.” (Matthew 12:47-50) But you are not to be called “Rabbi,” for you have only one Master and you are all brothers. And do not call anyone on earth “father,” for you have one Father, and he is in heaven. (Matthew 23:8-9) 4. Of course, this is not the only channel through which Christianization might have led to the destruction of unilineal descent organization (e.g., Stark, 1996). 5. The 19th to 20th centuries. 6. Maronites. 7. As the source of the data for this variable, I used the electronic version of the Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock, Textor, Barry, & White, 1990). I employed the variable no. 21 (Cognatic Kin Groups, which corresponds to Column 24 in the printed version of the Ethnographic Atlas [Murdock, 1967, p. 157]), where the value 9 (unilineal descent groups, which corresponds to value 0 [absence of cognatic kin groups] as inferred from the presence of unilineal descent) was recoded as 1 (unilineal descent groups, present). All the other values were recoded as 0 (unilineal descent groups, absent). I also checked variables nos. 17 and 18 (Largest Patrilineal Kin Group and Largest Patrilineal Exogamous Group, which correspond to Columns 20 and 21 [Patrilineal Kin Groups and Exogamy] in the printed version of the Ethnographic Atlas [Murdock, 1967, p. 157]), as well as nos. Downloaded from http://ccr.sagepub.com at EMORY UNIV on January 6, 2008 © 2003 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. 152 Cross-Cultural Research / February 2003 18 and 19 (Largest Matrilineal Kin Group and Largest Matrilineal Exogamous Group, which correspond to Columns 22 and 23 in the printed version of the Ethnographic Atlas [Murdock, 1967, p. 157]). When Atlas reported the presence of unilineal groups of any sort (even if the value of variable no. 21 was other than 9), the respective cases were recoded as 1 (unilineal descent groups, present). Thus, I have taken into consideration all the relevant data on unilineal descent groups contained in Atlas. 8. The coding for this variable was done by ourselves on the basis of Tishkov (1998). 9. To measure the variable political centralization/statehood, I used variable no. 33 (Jurisdictional Hierarchy Beyond Local Community) of the electronic version of the Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock et al., 1990), which corresponds to Column 33 of the printed version of the Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock, 1967, p. 160). In the electronic version, the variable is coded as follows: “0 = missing data; 1 = no levels (no political authority beyond community); 2 = one level (e.g., petty chiefdoms); 3 = two levels (e.g., larger chiefdoms); 4 = three levels (e.g., states); 5 = four levels (e.g., large states)” (Murdock et al., 1990, file ATL.COD). In the printed version, the coding is more logical, with 0 corresponding to no levels, 1 corresponding to one level, and so forth (Murdock, 1967, p. 160); so, I recoded this variable in my electronic version according to the printed version of the Ethnographic Atlas. To use this variable as a measure of political centralization, I accepted the assumption of both the authors of the Atlas electronic version (see above), and Murdock himself: “The second digit [corresponding to Column 33—A. K.] incidentally provides a measure of political complexity, ranging from 0 for stateless societies, through 1 or 2 for petty and larger paramount chiefdoms or their equivalent, to 3 for states or 4 for large states” (Murdock, 1967, p. 160). 10. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer of the first draft of this article for his or her suggestion to use this variable. 11. A problem that might be discussed at this point is the Galton problem. In some sense, all of the Christian cases discussed in this article come from the same source, and most of them are also neighboring societies. So does the Galton problem invalidate my findings? I do not think so. As far as I understand, the Galton problem arises when we observe a simultaneous diffusion of certain characteristics. Indeed, if Christianity had spread simultaneously with the diffusion of bilateral social organization, the causal link between Christianization and the destruction of unilineal descent organization would not be so clear. However, in many cases, Christianization preceeded the disappearance of unilineal descent groups by a few centuries (e.g., Krjukov, 1968, pp. 376-378, 1995; Lavrovskij, 1867, pp. 33-37, 46-50; Shkunaev, 1989, pp. 74-93, 107-114). 12. My personal observations based on my fieldwork in south Yemen in 1982 to 1983 and 1996. Downloaded from http://ccr.sagepub.com at EMORY UNIV on January 6, 2008 © 2003 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. Korotayev / DESCENT ORGANIZATION, CHRISTIANIZATION 153 13. One may argue, of course, that most European cultures of the 19th and 20th centuries (when they were observed by ethnographers whose data Murdock included in the Ethnographic Atlas) were already quite modernized. Yet it seems necessary to stress that Murdock tried to use the least modernized villages best preserving the traditional culture as focal communities for his database. On the other hand, the combination of characteristics attested by the Ethnographic Atlas for the European cultures (simultaneous occurrence of Christianity, statehood, and the absence of the unilineal descent groups) cannot be treated as a result of modernization. Christianization, state formation, and the disappearance of unilineal descent groups took place in the whole of Christian lowland Europe (including its eastern portion) long before the modernization. And already in the high Middle Ages, all the lowland Christian European cultures were states and lacked unilineal descent organization (e.g., Udal’tsova, 19851987). Of course, unilineal descent organization survived in some highland and peripheral areas of Europe until the 20th century (e.g., Kosven, 1963, pp. 103, 104, 108, 111, 171, 172, 175, 178), and it is difficult not to relate this fact to the weakness (or sometimes absence) of state structures in those areas. 14. However, a careful study of Table 7 suggests that in addition to Christianity, there seems to exist another religion that (in cooperation with the state) systematically destroyed the unilineal descent organization. This religion is Hinayana Buddhism. Christianity and the Buddhism, it should be noted, are both religions of nonviolence. Could this be a coincidence? I shall try to answer this question in my next article, “Unilineal Descent Organization, Religions of Non-Violence, and Socialization: A Cross-Cultural Comparison.” 15. Of course, I do not argue that the formation of democratic communal organization in Europe was the only (or even sufficient) cause of the transition to modern democracy in Europe. No doubt, it is possible to find many other factors and mechanisms of this process. For example, Collins (1999) presented evidence for diplomatic coalitions in balances of power as a source of collegially shared power structures, a mechanism (from outside in) that seems to be entirely independent from the one described above (from inside out). 16. As a source of our data, I used the electronic version of the Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock et al., 1990), variables nos. 4 and 5 (Animal Husbandry and Agriculture, which correspond to Columns 10 and 11 in the printed version of the Ethnographic Atlas [Murdock, 1967, pp. 154155]). In both versions, the variables are coded as follows: 0 = 0%-5% dependence; 1 = 6%-15%; 2 = 16%-25%; 3 = 26%-35%; 4 = 36%-45%; 5 = 46%-55%; 6 = 56%-65%; 7 = 66%-75%; 8 = 76%-85%; 9 = 86%-100%. I summed up both variables and thus obtained a food production index. I selected as relying more than 85% on food production those cultures that had values 9 and 10 of the food production index variable. Downloaded from http://ccr.sagepub.com at EMORY UNIV on January 6, 2008 © 2003 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. 154 Cross-Cultural Research / February 2003 17. To measure this I used variable no. 65 (Class Stratification) of the electronic version of the Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock et al., 1990), which corresponds to Column 67 of the printed version of the Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock, 1967, pp. 165-166). In the electronic version, the variable is coded as follows: “0 = missing data; 1 = absence among freemen; 2 = wealth distinctions; 3 = elite (based on control of land or other resources); 4 = dual (hereditary aristocracy); 5 = complex (social classes)” (Murdock et al., 1990, file ATL.COD). The same codings are retained in the 1999 electronic edition of the Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock et al., 1999, p. 113). References Aberle, D. F. (1961). Matrilineal descent in cross-cultural perspective. In D. M. Schneider & K. Gough (Eds.), Matrilineal kinship (pp. 655-727). Berkeley: University of California Press. Bessmertnyj, Ju. L. (1989). Kizucheniju matrimonial’nogo povedenija vo Frantsii XII-XIII vekov [On nuptial behavior in France, the 12th and 13th centuries]. Odissey, pp. 98-113. Bogoljubov, A. S. (1991). Zawa:j [Marriage]. In S. M. Prozorov (Ed.), Islam (pp. 71-72). Moscow, Russia: Nauka. Bohannan, P. (1963). Social anthropology. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Cohen, Ye. A. (1969). Ends and means in political control: State organization and the punishment of adultery, incest, and violation of celibacy. American Anthropologist, 71, 658-687. Collins, R. (1999). Macro-history: Essays in the sociology of the long run. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Coult, A. D., & Habenstein, R. W. (1965). Cross tabulations of Murdock’s world ethnographic sample. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. Divale, W. T. (1974). Migration, external warfare, and matrilocal residence. Behavior Science Research, 9, 75-133. Ember, C. R., Ember, M., & Pasternak, B. (1983). On the development of unilineal descent. In M. Ember & C. R. Ember (Eds.), Marriage, family, and kinship: Comparative studies of social organizations (pp. 359-397). New Haven, CT: HRAF. Ember, C. R., & Levinson, D. (1991). The substantive contributions of worldwide cross-cultural studies using secondary data. Behavior Science Research, 25, 79-140. Engels, F. (1964). The origin of the family, private property, and the state. New York: International Publishers. (Originally published in 1884) Fortes, M. (1953). The structure of unilineal descent groups. American Anthropologist, 55, 17-41. Goody, J. (1983). The development of the family and marriage in Europe. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Herlihy, D. (1993). Biologija i istorija: k postanovke problemy [Biology and history: An introduction]. Tsivilizatsii, 2, 34-44. Downloaded from http://ccr.sagepub.com at EMORY UNIV on January 6, 2008 © 2003 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. Korotayev / DESCENT ORGANIZATION, CHRISTIANIZATION 155 Kirchhoff, P. (1968). The principles of clanship in human society. In M. H. Fried (Ed.), Readings in anthropology (2nd ed., Vol. 2). New York: Crowell. (Originally published 1955) Korotayev, A. (1995a). Ancient Yemen. Some general trends of evolution of the Sabaic language and the Sabaean culture. New York: Oxford University Press. Korotayev, A. V. (1995b). Apologija trajbalizma. Plemja kak forma sotsial’no-politicheskoj organizatsii slozhnykh nepervobytnykh obshchestv [Apologia for tribalism. Tribe as a form of sociopolitical organization of complex non-primitive societies]. Sotsiologicheskij zhurnal, 4, 68-86. Korotayev, A. V. (1995c). Mountains and democracy: An introduction. In N. N. Kradin & V. A. Lynsha (Eds.), Alternative pathways to early statehood (pp. 77-93). Vladivostok, Russia: Dal’nauka. Korotayev, A. V. (1996a). Pre-Islamic Yemen. Sociopolitical organization of the Sabaean cultural area in the 2nd and 3rd centuries A.D. Wiesbaden, Germany: Horrosowitz Verlag. Korotayev, A. V. (1996b). Dva sotsioekologicheskikh krizisa i genezis plemennoj organizatsii v Severo-Vostochnom Jemene [Two socioecological crises and genesis of tribal organization on the northeast of Yemen]. Vostok/Oriens, 6, 18-28. Korotayev, A. V. (1996c). Ot vozhdestva k plemeni? Nekotorye tendentsii evoljutsii politicheskikh sistem Severo-Vostochnogo Jemena za poslednie dve tysjachi let [From chiefdom to tribe? Some trends of evolution of north-eastern Yemen political systems in the last two-thousand years]. Etnograficheskoe obozrenie, 2, 81-91. Korotayev, A. V. (1997). Sabejskie etjudy. Nekotorye obshchie tendentsii i faktory evoljutsii sabejskoj tsivilizatsii [Sabaean studies. Some general trends and factors of evolution of the Sabaean cultural-political area]. Moskva, Russia: Vostochnaja literatura. Korotayev, A. V. (1998). Vozhdestva i plemena strany Hashid i Bakil: Obshchie tendentsii i faktory evoljutsii sotsial’no-politicheskikh sistem Severo-Vostochnogo Jemena [Chiefdoms and tribes in the land of Hashid and Bakil: Some trends of the evolution of the political systems of the north-east Yemen in the last three millennia]. Moskva, Russia: Institut Vostokovedeniya RAN. Korotayev, A. V. (1999). O sootnoshenii sistem terminov rodstva i tipov sotsial’nyh sistem: opyt kolichestvennogo kross-kul’turnogo analiza [The correlation between the kinship terms and social system types: A quantitative cross-cultural comparison]. Algebra rodstva, 3, 117-147. Korotayev, A. V., & Bondarenko, D. M. (2000). Polygyny and democracy: A cross-cultural comparison. Cross-Cultural Research. The Journal of Comparative Social Science, 34, 190-208. Korotayev, A. V., & Obolonkov, A. A. (1989). Rodovaja organizatsija v sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoj strukture klassovyh obshchestv [Clan organization in socio-economic structure of complex societies]. Sovetskaja etnografija, 2, 35-45. Korotayev, A. V., & Obolonkov, A. A. (1990). Rod kak forma sotsial’noj organizatsii v rabotah dorevoljutsionnyh russkih i sovetskih issledovatelej [Clan as a form of social organization in the works of pre- Downloaded from http://ccr.sagepub.com at EMORY UNIV on January 6, 2008 © 2003 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. 156 Cross-Cultural Research / February 2003 revolution Russian and Soviet scholars]. In K. Z. Ashrafyan & G. F. Kim (Eds.), Uzlovye problemy istorii dokapitalisticheskih obshchestv Vostoka (pp. 3-52). Moskva, Russia: Nauka. Kosven, M. O. (1963). Semejnaja obshchina i patronimija [Family community and patronymy]. Moskva, Russia: Izdatel’stvo Akademii nauk SSSR. Krjukov, M. V. (1968). Tipy rodstva i ih istoricheskoe sootnoshenie [Kinship types and their historical interrelation]. In L. V. Danilova (Ed.), Problemy istorii dokapitalisticheskih obshchestv (pp. 352-383). Moskva, Russia: Nauka. Krjukov, M. V. (1995). Sinhronno-diahronnyj metod i kontseptsija transformatsionnoj mnogolinejnosti sistem rodstva. Algebra rodstva, 1, 111-137. Lavrovskij, P. A. (1867). Korennoe znachenie v nazvanijah rodstva u slavjan [Basic meanings of kinship terms among the Slavs]. Sankt Peterburg, Russia: Tipografija Akademii Nauk. Levinson, D., & Malone, M. (1980). Toward explaining human culture. New Haven, CT: HRAF. Lowie, R. (1970). Primitive society. New York: Liveright. (Originally published in 1920) Morgan, L. H. (1964). Ancient society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Original work published 1877). Murdock, G. P. (1949). Social structure. New York: Macmillan. Murdock, G. P. (1967). Ethnographic atlas: A summary. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Murdock, G. P., & Provost, C. (1973). Measurement of cultural complexity. Ethnology, 12, 379-392. Murdock, G. P., & Provost, C. (1985). Measurement of cultural complexity. World Cultures, 1/1, Files STDS06.COD, STDS06.DAT. Murdock, G. P., & Wilson, S. F. (1972). Settlement patterns and community organization: Cross-cultural codes 3. Ethnology, 11, 254-295. Murdock, G. P., Textor, R., Barry, H., III, & White, D. R. (1990). Ethnographic atlas (second computer version). World Cultures, 6(3). Murdock, G. P., Textor, R., Barry, H., III, & White, D. R., Gray, J. P., & Divale, W. (1999). Ethnographic atlas (third computer version). World Cultures, 10(1), 24-136, File EA01-09.SAV. Pasternak, B. (1976). Introduction to kinship and social organization. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Pasternak, B., Ember, M., & Ember, C. (1997). Sex, gender, and kinship: A cross-cultural perspective. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Sahlins, M. (1972). Stone age economics. Chicago: Aldine. Sanderson, S. K. (1988). Macrosociology: An introduction to human societies. New York: Harper & Row. Scupin, R., & DeCorse, C. R. (1998). Anthropology: A global perspective (3rd ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Service, E. R. (1962). Primitive social organization. New York: Random House. Shkunaev, S. V. (1989). Obshchina i obshchestvo drevnih kel’tov [Community and society among the ancient Celts]. Moskva, Russia: Nauka. Downloaded from http://ccr.sagepub.com at EMORY UNIV on January 6, 2008 © 2003 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. Korotayev / DESCENT ORGANIZATION, CHRISTIANIZATION 157 Stark, R. (1996). The rise of Christianity: A sociologist reconsiders history. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Tishkov, V. A. (Ed.). (1998). Narody i religii mira [Peoples and religions of the world]. Moscow, Russia: Bol’shaja rossijskaja entsiklopedija. Udal’tsova, Z. V. (Ed.). (1985-1987). Istorija krest’janstva v Evrope [The history of peasantry in Europe] (Vols. 1-3). Moskva, Russia: Nauka. Andrey V. Korotayev is a professor in and head of the program in Anthropology of the East at the School of History, Political Science and Law at the Russian State University for the Humanities, and in the sociology faculty at the State University Higher School of Economics in Moscow. He is a senior research fellow of the Oriental Institute and of the Center for Civilizational and Regional Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences. He received a Ph.D. from Manchester University and a doctor of science degree from the Oriental Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He has done field research in Yemen and Libya. He is the author of more than 130 publications, including four monographs (Ancient Yemen, 1995; Factors of Social Evolution, 1997; Sabaean Studies: Some General Trends and Factors of Evolution of the Sabaean Civilization, 1997; and Chiefdoms and Tribes of the Land of Hashid and Bakil, 1998). His research focuses on social evolution, cross-cultural research, and Arabian anthropology. Downloaded from http://ccr.sagepub.com at EMORY UNIV on January 6, 2008 © 2003 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution.