Wei-Jin Period Xuanxue “Neo-Daoism”: Re-Working the Relationship between Confucian and Daoist Themes Abstract In recent years philosophical ideas developed during the Wei-Jin period, broadly referred to as xuanxue (玄學) in Chinese and “Neo-Daoism” or “Dark Learning” in English, have been accorded increasing attention in academia. This article provides an introduction to some major thinkers of the Wei-Jin period, addressing both their original writings and recent scholarly interpretations. The article aims to demonstrate that many Wei-Jin period intellectuals formed their theories through reinterpreting the relationship between texts associated with Daoism and Confucianism. Thinkers of this period often attempted to show how these defining “schools” of pre-Qin Chinese thought did not propose theories that were fundamentally inconsistent, and that their ideas could be woven together as elements of a coherent view. This intellectual movement can thus be, and often has been, viewed as an attempt to integrate Daoism and Confucianism. However, a more nuanced reading demonstrates that these thinkers were reworking the relationship between what were seen as predominately Daoist or Confucian themes from their very foundation. Accordingly, the common description of Wei-Jin thinkers as “(Neo-)Daoist” is decidedly incongruous. 1. Introduction A unique and original group of Chinese thinkers arose following the fall of the Han (漢) dynasty in (220CE). Their thought has been referred to as xuanxue (玄學) in Chinese and “Neo-Daoism” or “Dark Learning” in English. The modern revival of scholarly interest in xuanxue philosophy is often attributed to the publication of Wei-Jin Xuanxue Lungao 魏晉玄學論稿 (Essays on Wei-Jin Period Xuanxue) by Tang Yongtong 湯用彤 (Tang 1957). According to Tang Yongtong’s influential analysis, Xuanxue thinkers all attempt to weigh in on three major concerns. Arguably the most widely encompassing concern is how to deal with the (at the time already) long standing Chinese philosophical discussion on the correspondence between names (名) and actualities (實) or forms (形), by negotiating the relationship between “teaching of names” (名教), traditionally identified with Confucianism, and what is more natural or “self-so” (自然), a concept emphasized in Daoism. The second major concern of Xuanxue thought involves the debate over how language relates to meaning (言意之辯). The third concern regards the relationship of being and nonbeing (有無), to which Wei-Jin thought introduced the “root and branches” (本末) model. In each of these areas xuanxue thinkers achieve major developments over previous pre-Qin and Han thought. This article addresses several basic issues that lay the groundwork for understanding Wei-Jin philosophy. The first section surveys the translation of—or decision to leave untranslated—the term xuanxue (玄學). The second section looks at hypocrisy as a problem late Han thinkers saw arising from the institutionalization of Confucian moral teachings, and which they worried could have serious social and political consequences. In the third section I will rehearse the established organization of these thinkers into three historical periods of development. This sets the stage for the following discussion of each major figure’s philosophy. 2. What is “Xuanxue”? The term xuanxue is commonly translated as “Neo-Daoism,” which follows Feng Youlan 馮友蘭(Feng 1948) or “Dark Learning,” which was proposed by Erik Zürcher (Zürcher 1959). While many scholars agree with these translations there are others, most notably Tang Yijie 湯一介, Alan Chan, Rudolf Wagner, and Richard John Lynn, who adamantly reject the use of either “Neo-Daoism” or “Dark Learning” and propose their own alternatives. Tang Yijie argues that “Mysterious Learning of Wei and Jin Dynesties” (sic) is the most fitting translation of xuanxue (Tang 2009: 41). Alan Chan rejects any translation, noting that to call xuanxue “Neo-Daoism” misleadingly reinforces suggestions that Wei-Jin thinkers were simply “reinterpreting Confucianism through the lens of Daoism” (Chan 2010: 5). Chan points out that since xuan (玄) The term xuan can also be a noun indicating “the dark”. Accordingly another translation of xuanxue could be, “Learning of the Dark.” Rudolf Wagner describes Xuanxue thinkers: “Their main discovery was the intrinsic ‘darkness’ of ‘that by which,’ suoyi, the ten thousand kinds of entities are, and their main contribution was to discover this darkness...as a constituent feature of the That-by-which itself” (Wagner 2003: 1). is already something “obscure” and “insubstantial” in Chinese, xuanxue can be left “untranslated, though not unexplained” (Chan 2010: 6). The term xuan itself can also be a noun indicating “the dark.” Accordingly Rudolf Wagner proffers “Scholarly Exploration of the Dark” to understand xuanxue (Wagner 2003: 2). Richard John Lynn believes “Arcane Learning” is clearly both compatible with the original Chinese meaning of xuanxue and makes sense in English (Lynn 2016). In this article I will not attempt to enter this debate, though by default I will be following Alan Chan. I will simply refer to xuanxue as “Xuanxue,” leaving it to the reader to decide which term is most suitable after having been presented with a brief introduction to some of the major thinkers and themes of Xuanxue. Despite these differences in translation most of the abovementioned scholars agree on two important characterizations. Firstly, they strongly reject the interpretation of Xuanxue as a type of escapism – though some of its thinkers may have tendencies that hint at it. Secondly, they see Xuanxue as reacting with suspicion to what they saw as the “empty norms, standards, and values” of their times (Li 2008: 201). For example, Tang Yongtong 湯用彤, Yu Dunkang 餘敦康, and Wang Deyou 王德有 all emphasize the role of social and moral hypocrisy, as the breakdown between corresponding names and actualities, to be the major motivating factor for Wei-Jin theories (Tang 1957, Yu 2004, Wang 2010). They use a common phrase in philosophy, “to have the name without having the actuality” (有其名而無其實), This saying is a modification on the Zhuangzi’s phrase, “Without having the [corresponding] actuality, how can the name be obtained?” (固有無其實而得其名者乎). to note how persons gain false reputations by appearing to be something they are not. Many scholars of Xuanxue note the concern for the mis-match between names and actualities as a major contributing factor in the general shift of philosophical attitudes that occurred between Han and Wei-Jin periods. For example, see Yang 2009, Yu 2004, Ziporyn 2003, Wang 2010, Tang 1957, Tang 2009, Shang 2013, Lu 2010, Li 2008. For example, the late-Han thinker Wang Fu 王符 (85-163CE) found widespread moral problems were the effect of names and actualities not being in correspondence with one another (cf. Makeham 1994). Similarly, Xu Gan 徐干 (170-217 CE) also identified hypocrisy in Han society as rooted in the abuse of names. He called for a return to Confucius’ teachings to solve the problems. In the Analects, Xu argued, Confucius already identified and attacked so-called “village worthies” (鄉愿) as hypocrites: Throwing virtuousness into confusion is what Zhongni [Confucius] hated. Today village worthies with false/hypocritical names [伪名] throw virtuosity into confusion. (Makeham 1994: 107-108, translation modified) Wei-Jin thinkers also saw their own society corrupt in these ways. As such, Xuanxue can be read as partly a reaction to moral hypocrisy resulting from the institutionalization and codification of Confucian teachings of names. The Daodejing and Zhuangzi then became particularly accommodating resources because their views on issues such as Dao, language, and morality were based on self-so, which made them more resistant to pretenders and hypocrites, who required codified names to fool others. Xuanxue thinkers thereby developed their theories by reinterpreting the relationship between Daoist and Confucian texts “from the ground up” through an appreciation of their common themes. 3. Three Phases of Wei-Jin Thought Tang Yongtong also suggested, as many others have, that Xuanxue thought can be loosely categorized into three phases. These phases have sometimes been described according to Hegelian dialectics (Yu 2004), as moving along with historical and political changes (Chan 2010), and as trends in interpreting the Zhuangzi 莊子 (Li 2008). Detailed explanation of how these phases relate to one another exceeds the scope of this article. However, I will organize my discussion in accordance with these categories, looking at the major figures of each of these three phases. The first phase of Wei-Jin philosophy begins with He Yan 何晏 (195-249) and Wang Bi 王弼 (246-249), who comprehensively reevaluated familiar pre-Qin notions such as non-presence (無), dao (道), language (言), emotions (情), and the sage (聖人). According to Tang they attempted to combine Confucian and Daoist themes by using Daoist arguments to explain Confucian morality. (Tang 1957: 164) Drawing heavily from the Yijing 易經 (Book of Changes), Lunyu 論語 (Analects), and Daodejing 道德經. Wang Bi, for instance, attempts to use the model of the unspeakable dao in the Daodejing to understand Confucian virtues as ineffable. The second phase is associated with the so-called “Seven Worthies of the Bamboo Grove” (竹林七賢), and is mainly represented by Ji Kang (or Xi Kang) 嵇康 (223-262) and Ruan Ji 阮籍 (210-263). These men were in some ways more unsettled by the corruption and hypocrisy they found in society than He Yan and Wang Bi, and turned to the notion of self-so (自然) as an ethical ideal that does not resonate with Confucian moral teachings. The last phase is exemplified in Guo Xiang’s 郭象 (252-312) philosophical system, which builds on the previous two groups and is motivated by, or perhaps partly plagiarized from, Xiang Xiu’s 向秀 (227-272) work. Like He Yan and Wang Bi, Guo Xiang also re-envisions the relationship between themes emphasized in Daoist and Confucian texts, ultimately arguing that self-so is a type of “settling” (安) in one’s place. Through an elaboration of concepts that have comparatively little significance in the Zhuangzi 莊子 (4th-3rd c BCE), including natural determinacies (性), allotment (分), lone-transformation (獨化), and traces (跡), Guo develops his ideas with conclusions that are closely in line with the Confucian tradition (cf. Tang 2009, Yang 2009, Ziporyn 2003, 2015). 3.1 Phase One: He Yan, Wang Bi and Pei Wei’s Reaction Xuanxue philosophy is often said to have started during the Zhengshi 正始 era, which refers to the first ten years (240-249) of Cao Fang’s 曹芳 reign as the third emperor of the Wei dynasty. It was during these years that He Yan, Wang Bi and other influential thinkers developed their theories, which would later be identified as the first stage of Xuanxue thought. This first phase is then often referred to as zhengshi xuanxue 正始玄學. As demonstrated by Wang Baoxuan 王葆玹, many of the issues laid out by Zhengshi era thinkers were directly related to social and political “Zhengshi reforms” (cf. Wang 1987). Xuanxue thus later became part of the official curriculum as one of the “four studies” 四學/四科, along with Confucianism, Literature, and History. (Wang 1987: 3) One of the major defining features of Zhengshi Xuanxue is the “Pure Conversation” (清談) gatherings that took place among political and intellectual elites. These sessions were transformed versions of the more politically charged “Pure Criticism” (清議) protests of the later Han, which were, in turn, continuations of political remonstration practices. In the context of “Pure Criticism,” “pure” (清) had two distinct but related connotations. Firstly, it refers to the selfless intentions of those who wanted to reform the government. Secondly, “pure” also refers to something transparent or penetrating (Wang 1987: 107-8). While “Pure Conversation” gatherings retained the word “pure,” their intentions were somewhat different. Instead of aiming their discussions at corrupt officials or practices, “Pure Conversation” participants often argued about loftier, or more “philosophical” issues such as the meaning of dao or the relationship between humane tendencies and emotions or talent. The focus on characterizing (and often eulogizing) the qualities of an individual, which led to charges that the qingtan participants were a mutual emulation society. In today’s vocabulary these topics might be deemed “metaphysical,” but Wei-Jin thinkers simply called them “pure.” Someone who performed well during a “Pure Conversation” assembly could gain a reputation that would help him gain political office, even though the gatherings were often thought of as generally disdainful of politics. Through his participation in “Pure Conversation” Wang Bi became known as a boy-genius. In fact, it was probably on these grounds that He Yan, who was holding political office and old enough to be Wang’s father, granted the teenager audience (Zhu and Shen 2011: 468). He Yan himself was a known scholar and is remembered for associating dao with wu (無), “non-presence,” or “non-specificity” and his suggestion that sages are free of emotions. Of He Yan’s presumably numerous writings most of what has survived is found in fragments of his “Discourse on Dao” (道論) and “Discourse on the Nameless” (無名論), although he was probably most famous for heading an editing committee for the collected Analects commentaries. He Yan In “Discourse on Dao” He Yan says that all things depend upon wu to come into existence and to become accomplished (成). It is difficult, He Yan continues, to speak about wu because it has no distinct form or properties and therefore no words can describe it. Naming (as is described in many pre-Qin texts, especially the Xunzi 荀子) only creates or speaks to distinctions (分). Dao is wu in that it is no-particular-thing. He Yan writes, “Dao is exactly that which does not have anything” (夫道者, 惟無所有者也) (He in Wu 2011: 28). In this way dao is full or complete (全), it is the condition for the possibility of all properties without being identifiable as any in particular. Therefore all things rely on dao to obtain their definite properties. If dao was to have any one characteristic, or be partial in any way, it could not be the root for all the various individual things. Dao is thereby full or complete because it embodies all particularity. Being without distinctions, dao is therefore unnamable. In the “Discourse on the Nameless” He Yan elaborates his argument about dao being unnamable through an analogy with yin (陰) and yang (陽). He notes that summer nights are yin when compared to the yang summer days they are submerged in. Similarly daytime is yang in the mist of yin winter. So in yang there is yin and in yin there is yang. Even though summer nights and winter days are quite far from one another, they are related, just as are summer days and winter dawns (He in Wu 2011: 27). He Yan believes that understanding this helps one realize the namelessness of Dao. Dao is also submerged within the realm of names, but that does not mean it can be named. It is categorically distinct from that which is rooted in it. He also uses Confucius’ description of the famous sage-ruler Yao 堯 in the Analects 8.19 to make his point. Like Dao, Yao was complete in his accomplishments. No personal name can describe Yao’s excellence because he embodies all the virtues that can be named. In the same way dao has all definite features, and so cannot be distinguished by names that point to a particular feature (He in Wu 2011: 30). San Guo Zhi (三國志), which is a historical text covering the Eastern Han Dynasty (25-220) and the Three Kingdoms Period (220-280), records that He Yan thinks sages are without happiness, anger, sadness or joy (何晏以為聖人無喜怒哀樂). (Chen 1982: 498) Unfortunately there is no further explanation, which means that this ascription is open to at least three types of interpretation. According to Yu Dunkang, He Yan envisions sages in the same way Han thinkers saw mystical or angelic (仙) beings, i.e. as god-like (神) non-humans able to unify with heavenly gods (天神) (Yu 2004: 78). Alan Chan agrees that the “exceptional sage nature [is] categorically distinct from the nature of common people” (Chan 2010: 38). However, Chan emphasizes Dao’s namelessness (due to its not admitting specificity) to argue that the “sage’s harmonious nature is necessarily “bland,” its being whole and complete does not admit of partiality in the form of differentiated affective-cognitive manifestations” (Chan 2010: 36). While both readings are well-grounded in He Yan’s own writings, I would like to offer a third alternative, one based on He Yan’s commentary to the Analects, where he speaks about emotions explicitly. Commenting on the Analects 6.3, where Confucius praises Yan Hui 顏回 as his only student to really love learning (好學), He Yan writes: Most people get carried away with (任) their emotions, their happiness and anger violate [natural/天] patterns (理). Yan Hui was all about (任) Dao, his anger/excitement (怒) did not exceed appropriate limitations (過分)....Anger/excitement has its own pattern; it should not be violated or overdone... (Jiang 2013: 599) Based on this explanation of Yan Hui’s appropriateness, He Yan’s sage could also be read as someone who did not emotionally violate natural patterns or rituals. Just as Confucius was able, at seventy, to completely follow his heart-mind (從心所欲), He Yan’s sage could be read as someone without inappropriate emotions (Analects 2.4). Read in this way He Yan’s argument explains how the ritually checked emotions of a Confucian and lack of desires and emotions mentioned in the Daodejing and Zhuangzi essentially refer to the same thing. Wang Bi Like He Yan, Wang Bi also explains dao as wu; however, Wang gives wu quite different connotations. He Yan conceives of dao as complete within the realm of being. Wang Bi, on the other hand, explains wu as a nothingness with ontological significance. In other words, it is non-being, but one that gives birth to the myriad of things. In his annotations on both the Yijing and the Daodejing, Wang Bi cites wu, or non-being, as the root of all being. His comment on chapter forty of the Daodejing makes the point clear: “All things under the heavens rely on being (有) to be alive. The origin of being takes non-being (無) as its root” (Lou 1999: 110). Non-being is not necessarily the beginning of being in a temporal sense, but rather logically speaking – or, to speak with Alan Chan, “a conceptually necessary basis of being” (Chan 2014). Tang Yongtong asserts that Wang Bi’s notion of non-being is an innovation in Chinese ontology. Truly, while certain suggestions of an ontological appreciation of dao already appear in the Daodejing and perhaps even the Analects, Wang Bi arguably represents the first occurrence in Chinese thought of elaborate ontological considerations. However, Rudolf Wagner, who is in general agreement with this suggestion, cautions that, although “ontology might be a good term to give a general idea to a reader reared in the Western philosophic idiom...Wang Bi’s agenda is quite different.” (Wagner 2003: 147) Wagner, like many others, finds Wang’s project to be mainly oriented towards political philosophy. One avenue for understanding the philosophical significance of Wang Bi’s dao is to grasp that his ontological reading of dao has strong moral connotations as well. In my own reading, Wang Bi’s dao represents a type of ontology that feeds directly into his political and moral projects. Thus the ontological interpretation of dao is aimed at achieving certain moral goals. In his introduction to the Daodejing, Wang Bi says that names indicate particular forms, but dao has no form. If dao was one particular form it could not give rise to the myriad things, including virtues. Wang Bi explains: Thus an image that takes an actual form is not the great image; a note that makes an actual sound is not the great note….and if one uses the great note, folkways and customs will undergo [moral] transformation….folkways and customs undergo [moral] transformation, but this transformation is impossible to analyze. Heaven may have produced the five things [metal, wood, water, fire, earth], but it is non-being that brings about their utility. The Sage [Confucius] may have promulgated the five teachings [i.e., concerning the five human relationships], but it is those who do not speak who bring about [moral] transformation. Therefore [the first chapter of the Daodejing reads:] “the dao that can be described in language is not the constant Dao; the name that can be given is not its constant name.”….Although the past and present differ and folkways and customs change with time, this [the dao] never changes. (Lynn 1999: 30-31, translation modified) Here we find a nuanced reworking of the relationship between the ineffable dao and Confucian morality. The dao of the Daodejing and Confucius’ moral teachings are, as explained by Wang Bi, referring to one and the same thing. The five teachings speak to basic human relationships, which are the foundation for understanding Confucian appropriateness or virtues. These teachings cannot describe or define how morality – as folkways and customs – undergoes transformation through time. In fact, what Confucius describes are only examples. The particular expressions of virtues can change, but the virtues themselves remain the same. Since there is nothing particular about the virtues they cannot be distinguished or named themselves, but rather only through their expressions in concrete folkways and customs. In his comment on the Analects 8.19, Confucius states that Yao was so awesome that no personal name could describe him, Wang Bi explains that Yao was simply following Dao: Sages model nature’s virtuosity. So we say Yao models it only when he completely follows the Dao of nature....Good and bad must have each other, they are co-generative and names differentiate shapes. If great love completely lacks selfishness how could a special designation for it exist? If the utmost good has no preference how could its name be generated? Therefore, [the sage] takes nature as a model and completes its transformations. Dao is self-so. (Lou 1999: 626) Here Wang Bi calls into question any attempt to name dao or moral virtues. Names can only point to specific features of virtuous action. The actions themselves are essentially self-so, and since dao is identical (同) to self-so, being moral can be understood as an expression of Dao. Thus moral virtues 1) cannot be equated with any of their particular expressions and are ineffable, and 2) are an expression of Dao. In this way Wang Bi presents a moral ontology that draws on his reading of Confucian and Daoist texts as not necessarily in conflict. Pei Wei’s Reaction Although Pei Wei (裴頠) was born after the two major representatives of “The Seven Worthies of the Bamboo Grove,” Ji Kan and Ruan Ji (who had already passed on), his philosophy is best understood as in direct contradiction to He Yan and Wang Bi’s, and represents a significant development in Chinese thought. It is, perhaps, “the first appearance in Chinese metaphysics of [the] conception of Being as an independent reality that must forever remain Being.” (Ziporyn 2003: 25) Whereas Wang Bi focused on non-being as the source and sustainer of all things, Pei found that things exist interdependently and rely exclusively on being. Pei Wei’s most famous essay is thus aptly titled “Revering Being” 崇有論. In order to make such strong claims about being Pei must depart from traditional Chinese interpretations of the interdependence between being and non-being. For thinkers like He Yan and Wang Bi, in the Laozi and Zhuangzi, being and non-being are seen as related. It is through their interaction that things are born and transformed. Pei Wei sees, for the first time in Chinese thought, being and non-being as “exclusionary opposites” (Chai 2010: 97). Pei counters traditional understandings of the relationship between being and non-being by arguing that non-being is an absolute nothing that cannot generate any thing or have any effectual function. Things are thereby self-generated and ultimately grounded in being alone. These points are more fully developed in Guo Xiang’s philosophy. 3.2 Phase Two: The Seven Worthies of the Bamboo Grove The next major phase of Xuanxue thought is associated with the so-called “Seven Worthies of the Bamboo Grove” (竹林七賢). They were a group of intellectuals who lived during the transition from the Wei to the Jin dynasty. Living through a bloody political takeover that led to the death of He Yan, these thinkers were somewhat more pessimistic about social problems. In fact, they have been classified as “nihilistic hermits” (Shang 2013). However, as Alan Chan points out, their supposed escapism has little to do with their ethical perspectives (Chan 2014). Similar to He Yan and Wang Bi, the Seven Worthies saw the Han institutionalization of Confucianism as having led to widespread political corruption and moral hypocrisy. Like Wang Bi, they also turned to notions of self-so to resolve these problems, but their idea of self-so stands in conflict with social and political life, which they saw as inhibiting natural self-so behavior. Their ideas were thus more negative in that they attempted to deconstruct moral associations and political institutions they found detrimental to natural human states. These seven include Ji Kang, Ruan Ji, Shan Tao 山濤 (205-283), Xiang Xiu 向秀 (227-272), Liu Ling 劉伶 (221-300), Wang Rong 王戎 (234-305), and Ruan Xian 阮咸 (dates unknown). While they were said to all have produced profound thought and led eccentric lives, little is known about the latter five. Here I will mainly discuss Ji Kang and Ruan Ji. Ji Kang emerged as arguably the most prominent of the Seven Worthies during his lifetime and retains that position in contemporary scholarship. His best-known essay is titled “Music is Without Sorrow or Joy” (聲無哀樂論). Here Ji Kang argues “that music [is] incapable of possessing human emotion,” thereby “releasing it from the chains of Confucian ritualism” (Chai 2009: 151). Classical Confucian music theory, as found, for example, in the Liji 禮記, holds that certain notes are in direct correspondence to specific emotions. Ji dismisses any claim that musical notes are somehow inherently connected to specific human emotions. In addition to criticizing the connection between emotions and music Ji Kang makes two other prominent attacks on Confucian beliefs. Firstly, in the essay “On Intelligence and Courage” (明膽論) Ji asserts that there is not necessarily a connection between intelligence and courage. Secondly, in “On Nourishing Life” (養生論) Ji tries to show that humans do not naturally love learning. In all of these essays his overarching goal is to dismantle Confucian assumptions about certain associations, which makes space for new understandings of self-cultivation and ethical action based heavily on the notion of a prereflective self-so response to the world as described in the Daodejing and Zhuangzi. Ruan Ji’s ideas also rely heavily on the notion of self-so as presented in the Daodejing and Zhuangzi. According to Ruan Ji self-so contains an inherent order that is superior to anything humans can construct. Human-made institutions set up artificial values that cause strife and struggle between individuals while simultaneously fostering greed and selfishness. The result is that many people become deceptive. Ruan’s recommendation to remain self-so by retaining what is natural seems mystical or escapist at times (cf. Chan 2014). Politically, this leads to a position close to anarchism. For example, Ruan Ji writes: Those who are bright do not overcome others with their intellect; those who are dull are not defeated because of foolishness. The weak do not respect/fear force; the strong are not exhausted through [using] their power. With no ruler all things find their [proper] place; without ministers all affairs are in proper order. Protect the body and cultivate natural tendencies/nature; do not go against one’s essentials. This alone is the way things need to be done if they are to persist for a long time. (Chen 1987: 170) Here Ruan is arguing for a type of natural self-so governing, which he thinks will leave the state in “proper order.” He is developing ideas from Chapter 25 of the Daodejing, which says that everything can find its own place (自定), and Chapter 57, where people are said to be able to correct themselves (自正) so long as the ruler practices non-action (無為). While the Confucian Analects and Mencius contain similar notions of non-action, Ruan reads the idea more literally, and attributes his understanding to themes in the Daodejing and Zhuangzi. 3.3 Phase Three: Guo Xiang Guo Xiang, in addition to being history’s most influential commentator to the Zhuangzi, is also the compiler and editor of the received Zhuangzi. While there is little doubt that Guo edited the text down to its present form, as early as the fifth century Guo has been accused of plagiarizing large parts of his interpretation from Xiang Xiu (cf. Zhu and Shen 2011: 473). We know about Guo Xiang’s complex philosophy almost exclusively through his commentary on the Zhuangzi. In many ways Guo builds on Wang Bi’s suggestion that names are inadequate descriptions of virtuousness, which is itself essentially self-so. But Guo also differs from Wang on several points. Most famously, the two differ in their respective emphases on being and non-being. While Wang tries to show the foundational importance of non-being for creation and change, Guo concentrates on being, asserting that all things change of themselves by “self-transformation” or “lone-transformation” (自化/獨化). Guo does, however, agree with Wang that defined virtues only give rise to the possibility of deception of duplicity. As discussed above, Wang gets over this problem by referring to self-so action, which aligns one with Dao, and rejecting definitions for particularizing morality. Guo goes a step further, building on Wang’s ideas through his development of the concept of “traces” or “footprints” discussed in the Zhuangzi. Traces or footprints are imprints leftover from some previous action. Venerated names and doctrines then only refer to past models left by action that was originally self-so, and thereby efficacious. By naming, defining, or modeling these traces one loses what was truly efficacious about them, that is, their being self-so. Moreover, following traces ignores the particularity of both the subjects that created them and environments in which they were made. Guo thereby proposes that people stop following names and doctrines: The concept of “Humanity” [仁] is the trace left behind by an instance of unbiased love. The concept of “Responsibility” [義] is the effect left behind by an instance of bringing something to completion. Love is not Humanity, but the trace of Humanity comes from love. Completing things is not Responsibility, but the effect of Responsibility emerges from the act of completing things. Maintaining Humanity and Responsibility is insufficient to bring about an understanding of real love and real benefit, which come from intentionalessness. Hence, they must be forgotten. (Ziporyn 2009: 204) Here Guo makes it clear that any definition, teaching, or model always misses the root of morality. The root of humaneness, for example, is the genuine feeling of love. When one tries to imitate or learn from love as defined by humaneness one only misses the moral basis of the virtue. One thus becomes self-so by not modeling others, no matter how praiseworthy their actions appear to be. By forgetting or simply not cognizing these traces people can act self-so, i.e., according to their natural determinacies (性) and allotments (分). This will, Guo suggests, spontaneously produce harmonious interactions and an orderly society. Guo, like Wang, reads Confucius as the highest sage. Like all Xuanxue thinkers Guo deals with the difference between the teaching of names and the natural or self-so. Bringing together the two, Guo attempts to suggest that Confucius’ teachings should not be read as literal examples of how one should act. The wide array of moral illustrations in the Analects shows, for Guo, that what is exemplary is never pre-determined through definitions or a matter of imitating models. Guo sees Confucius’ teachings as emphasizing the particularity of subjects and environments, proving that unique self-so actions are unreflective and completely spontaneous. Within this system there is no real distinction between the Analects or the Daodejing and Zhuangzi. These texts actually employ the same ideas, and only differ in the way they emphasize certain aspects of these shared ideas. 4. Conclusion In some ways the association of Xuanxue with Daoism through the label “Neo-Daoism” is understandable. The Wei-Jin period certainly saw a strong revival in study of the Daodejing and Zhuangzi. From He Yan and Wang Bi’s engagement with political and philosophical issues to the “Seven Worthies’” dissatisfied distancing from social realms and Guo Xiang’s complex philosophical system, Xuanxue thinkers are deeply rooted in the Daodejing and Zhuangzi. But these intellectuals were also heavily influenced by the Analects which they radically reread, contrary to the existing commentaries. However, they agreed, with some exceptions, that Confucius was the highest sage. So why isn’t Xuanxue called “Neo-Confucianism”? But aligning Xuanxue thinkers with either tradition is ultimately problematic. Wei-Jin period intellectuals saw the texts associated with Daoist and Confucian traditions as emphasizing different aspects of a shared concern. 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